Naval Doctrine Publication 2

Naval Intelligence
 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000
AND
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-0001

FOREWORD
As in the past, naval intelligence is on watch today, supporting
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces deployed around the world. Naval
intelligence provides vital threat information on the location, dispo-
sition, capabilities, and intentions of our adversaries—actual and po-
tential. It supports directly the naval commander’s requirements for
planning and executing combat operations. When applied effectively,
naval intelligence focuses the commander’s effort for decisive action
against the enemy. It reduces risk to friendly forces and supports all
levels of naval, joint or multinational operations, in peace and war.

Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Naval Intelligence, is

the second in a series of six capstone documents that articulate naval
doctrine and provide the foundation for the development of tactics,
techniques and procedures. NDP 2 outlines broad guidance for Navy
and Marine Corps intelligence. All who serve in—or are served by—
naval intelligence must understand its contents.

C. E. MUNDY, JR. J. M. BOORDA

General, U. S. Marine Corps Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant of the Marine Corps Chief of Naval Operations
 INTRODUCTION

Our nation faces an array of geopolitical, social, and techno-

logical changes that are fundamentally altering the course of world
events. In response to these challenges, we have articulated a new
naval strategy that changes the way U.S. naval forces operate. The
focus of naval warfighting has shifted to operations in littoral re-
gions of the world, where outcomes can be controlled or influenced
from the sea. This new focus makes the nature of potential threats
more difficult to predict. Because of this increased uncertainty, the
need for naval intelligence has never been greater.

Naval intelligence provides insights into this uncertain

world, both in peace and in war. Properly employed, intelligence
can give us an accurate estimate of the situation, forecast likely
adversary courses of action, and allow us to apply selective but de-
cisive combat power throughout the battlespace. The fog of war
precludes us from having a complete picture of the battlespace, but
naval intelligence can lessen the unknowns and reduce risk for
friendly forces.

More than any other service, naval forces deploy forward

in harm’s way. Around the world, naval forces promote regional
stability and stand ready to respond to crisis. Every day we train
and operate within range of potential adversaries whose military
capabilities pose an immediate threat. These circumstances create
a unique operational environment for naval intelligence. Embed-
ded in units, staffs, theater and national agencies, it provides
around-the-clock support to widely dispersed forces. Its hallmark
is tailored, fused, all-source intelligence, provided directly to sup-
ported operating forces.

NDP 2 ii
 Naval intelligence provides indications and warning, cuing
for surveillance efforts, and discrimination between friendly, neu-
tral, and potentially hostile forces. It gives the commander, his staff,
and subordinate commands the information they need to plan and
execute combat action, and to evaluate the results. A commander,
for his part, must understand fully the capabilities and limitations
of the overall process to employ intelligence resources effectively
throughout his battlespace.

Naval operations demand both general military and naval-

specific intelligence, provided by Navy and Marine Corps intelli-
gence professionals, and specialized technical expertise provided by
a cadre of career cryptologists.

This publication defines naval intelligence and outlines its

enduring principles. It describes the ways naval intelligence sup-
ports military planning for routine peacetime operations, opera-
tions other than war, and combat. Finally, it identifies specific
challenges for naval intelligence in the future.

iii NDP 2
NDP 2 iv
 Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE
The Nature of Naval Intelligence ................................................. 3
Definition ....................................................................................................... 4
Scope ............................................................................................................... 6
Purposes .......................................................................................................... 7
Support to Operating Forces ....................................................................... 10

CHAPTER TWO
Fundamentals of Naval Intelligence ........................................... 13
Principles ....................................................................................................... 14
Key Attributes ............................................................................................... 18
Sources ........................................................................................................... 22
The Intelligence Cycle ................................................................................... 24

CHAPTER THREE
Naval Intelligence Operations .................................................... 29
Functions ...................................................................................................... 30
Structure ........................................................................................................ 38
Support to Planning ..................................................................................... 39
Support to Operations ................................................................................. 43

CHAPTER FOUR
New Direction - Future Challenges ............................................ 47
Support for Expeditionary Forces ............................................................... 48
Training and Readiness ................................................................................. 50
Coordination and Cooperation ................................................................... 51
Intelligence and the Information Revolution ............................................... 53
Support to Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare ............ 54
Intelligence Emphasis .................................................................................... 56

CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 58

APPENDIX A .............................................................................. 59

GLOSSARY ................................................................................. 62

1 NDP 2
NDP 2 2
 CHAPTER ONE

The Nature of Naval

Intelligence

“Nimitz’s concept of intelligence was dynamic: Facts were high grade

ore to be sifted carefully, the pure metal of knowledge extracted and
forged into a weapon to defeat the enemy.”
— Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway

T
he United States is a maritime nation that relies on
naval forces to support its national interests. The readi-
ness, mobility, and forward deployments of these forces
make the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps ideally suited to serve as
primary instruments of national resolve during peace, crisis, and war.
Depending on the mission, naval forces can form the nucleus of a
Joint Task Force, operate as an enabling force for joint operations
afloat and ashore, or act independently. To perform such operations
successfully, naval intelligence is required. It provides a fused, all-
source picture of the battlespace to support operations at sea, from
the sea, and ashore.

The focus on operations in littoral regions has created new

and dynamic challenges for naval intelligence. Despite a reduced
threat of global confrontation, political instability persists around the
world, creating increasingly complex and unpredictable regional threats
to national interests. Meanwhile, rapid advances in technology have
changed the nature of modern warfare and increased the demands on
intelligence. In response, the Navy and Marine Corps employ a highly

3 NDP 2
capable organization of intelligence and cryptologic personnel—afloat
and ashore—closely linked to and integrated with other service, joint
and national intelligence operations.1

Definitions

“By ‘intelligence’ we mean every sort of information about the enemy

and his country— the basis, in short, of our plans and operations.”
— Karl von Clausewitz: On War, 1832

At the outset, it is important to understand the distinction

between information and intelligence. Information is an assimilation
of data that has been gathered, but not fully correlated, analyzed, or
interpreted. While not fully analyzed or correlated, information still
has significant value to the tactical commander and plays a key role
in threat warning and target acquisition. For example,combat infor-
mation is “unevaluated data, gathered by or provided to the tactical
commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the critical-
ity of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in
time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements” (Joint
Publication 1-02). Organic, theater and national level cryptologic
sensors provide a significant portion of combat information.

Intelligence, on the other hand, is “the product resulting from

the collection, exploitation, processing, integration, analysis, evalua-
tion, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign
countries or areas.” Integration and analysis, combined with a thor-
ough understanding of mission requirements, convertinformation
into usable intelligence. Thus, intelligence is the product we derive
from analyzing all available and relevant information.

1
The Navy and Marine Corps have different intelligence and cryptologic career paths.
Regardless of the service distinctions, both disciplines are essential to successful intelli-
gence support.

NDP 2 4
 To the commander, intelligence is an essential element in
planning and executing both combat and non-combat operations. It
provides an assessment of an adversary’s capabilities, vulnerabilities,
and intentions, enabling the commander to employ combat power
more effectively in attaining specific military objectives. Intelligence
helps a commander identify an adversary’scenters of gravity and criti-
cal vulnerabilities, so he can bring maximum force to bear on key
adversary weaknesses.2 It also helps the commander assess the effects
of military operations. Intelligence strives to reduce the uncertainty
facing the commander, thus reducing risk to friendly forces. The
commander’s information requirements always must be theprincipal
driver of the intelligence effort. By clearly articulating his intent, the
commander sets the tone for successful integration of intelligence
within the command.

Naval intelligence is a system of personnel, procedures, equip-

ment, and facilities, both afloat and ashore. It supports both naval and
joint operations. It is embedded in all major echelons of command and
is deployed continuously with naval forces. It encompasses not only
dedicated intelligence elements such as a Marine Radio Battalion, but
those having other primary functions as well, an example being a
destroyer at sea sending a surface contact report. In fact, naval forces
are unique in that intelligence collection capabilities are resident in
many of our weapons platforms; at the tactical and operational levels
of warfare, intelligence collection is just one more capability of ships,
submarines and aircraft. Naval intelligence includes centers ashore for
maritime, scientific and technical intelligence, training, administration
of intelligence programs, and systems acquisition. Naval intelligence is
a part of the joint intelligence architecture in current theaters of opera-
tions, connecting naval forces to theater joint intelligence centers, na-
tional intelligence agencies, service intelligence centers, and cooperative
foreign governments.

2
Centers of gravity are “those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military
force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight (Joint Pub 1-02).”
Critical vulnerabilities are those elements of a military force that are vulnerable to attack and
whose degradation or destruction will lead to defeating the centers of gravity and, ultimately,
his ability to resist. (See NDP 1, Naval Warfare, for further discussion of critical vulnerabili-
ties.)

5 NDP 2
Scope

Naval forces are prepared to operate at the strategic, opera-

tional, and tactical levels of warfare. Naval intelligence provides
evaluated intelligence on an adversary’s capabilities and intentions
to support planning and operations at all levels of warfare.

— Strategic Intelligence is required for the formation

of policy and military plans at national and international levels. At the
strategic level, intelligence is oriented toward national objectives and
supports the formulation of policies and determination of priorities.
Strategic intelligence focuses first on discerning the capabilities and in-
tentions of potential adversaries as well as considering the strategic
intentions of allies and other potential multinational partners. Strategic
intelligence plays a central role in identifying an adversary’s centers
of gravity.

— Operational Intelligence is required for planning

operations within regional theaters or areas of operations. It concen-
trates on intelligence collection, identification, location, and analysis to
support the operational level of warfare, which includes identifying an
adversary’s operational critical vulnerabilities. Further, it assists the
commander in deciding how best to employ forces while minimizing risk.

— Tactical Intelligence is required for planning and

conducting tactical operations at the component or unit level. It focuses
on a potential adversary’s capabilities, his immediate intentions, and the
environment. It is oriented more toward combat than long-range plan-
ning. Far more than at any other level, tactical intelligence support is the
primary focus of naval intelligence.3

The three levels of intelligence were evident during Opera-

tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Strategic intelligence led to the
identification of Iraq as a potential enemy—with its leadership and
command and control as centers of gravity; operational intelligence

3
"OPINTEL” is the term previously used in the Navy to refer to tailored, all-source intelli-
gence provided directly to naval operating forces. “OPINTEL” equates to tactical intelli-
gence; it should not be confused with intelligence support at the operational level of warfare.

NDP 2 6
identified the Iraqi air defense system as a critical vulnerability that,
if destroyed, would neutralize the Iraqi military’s capability to counter
coalition air power; tactical intelligence supported plans for destroying
or neutralizing critical command and control vulnerabilities, such as
the Iraqi radar sites destroyed with high-speed anti-radiation missiles
by Navy tactical aircraft at the outset of the air war.

Purposes

“You are supposed to tell us what the Japanese are going to do, and
I will then decide whether it is good or bad and act accordingly.”
— Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy
CinCPacFlt, 1942

Naval intelligence, which supports all aspects of naval opera-

tions, has the following primary purposes:

— Supporting the Commander. Commanders require

intelligence as a tool to evaluate the feasibility of, or determine risk
factors associated with, objectives, plan and direct operations, and
evaluate the effects of their actions. As the commander’s primary
advisor for intelligence matters, the intelligence officer must support
the commander, his staff, and lateral and subordinate commands—
not only with tailored intelligence, but by accurately conveying the
capabilities and limitations of the intelligence system as well. The
commander and his forces must have a clear understanding of what
intelligence can and cannot provide, and how it will support the
operation.

To be effective, intelligence support must have credibility

which is attained by gaining the trust of the commander. This trust
is usually gained over time, after a track record of accurate intelligence
assessments has been established. Intelligence allows the commander
to fight smarter by supporting his selection of the best courses of
action. This includes advising the commander when an objective or
planned course of action is probably not obtainable, even if this advice
goes against the conventional wisdom. Each intelligence estimate should

7 NDP 2
reflect clear analysis and sound judgment. The ultimate goal is to provide
the commander and his forces the intelligence support needed to prevail in
combat.

— Identifying Centers of Gravity and Critical Vul-

nerabilities. Naval intelligence strives to provide an accurate picture
of the battlespace from which we can identify clear and attainable
objectives. For instance, at the operational level, the force commander
may decide that to accomplish his objective, a particular target set—
such as enemy command and control facilities—must be destroyed. At
the tactical level, intelligence support is needed to plan an effective
strike against a specific element of that target set, such as a radio-relay
site. This tactical intelligence may consist of detailed, analyzed target
photographs from tactical reconnaissance or national collection sys-
tems, pinpointing essential aim points for the strike leader.

— Supporting Planning and Execution of Opera-

tions. Naval intelligence provides staff support in both deliberate and
crisis action planning.4 During planning, collection resources are
identified and tasked to meet intelligence requirements in support of
the operation. Gaining knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities and
intentions may alter operational plans significantly. Similarly, chang-
ing operational tasking may in turn modify intelligence requirements.
A close partnership between the intelligence and operations officers will keep
operations efforts focused on the mission and ensure that intelligence require-
ments are met. Throughout all phases of planning and execution,
intelligence and operations are critically interdependent.

— Protecting the Force. Naval intelligence provides

early warning of impending hostile action and reduces risk by detect-
ing adversary actions that have an impact on friendly planning as-
sumptions. Effective force protection enables us to limit the adverse
effects of deception and surprise. Force protection efforts, supported
by vigorous counterintelligence operations, can limit or distort the

4
Deliberate planning is conducted primarily in peacetime to develop operations plans for
contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Crisis action planning is
the process of formulating and implementing plans and orders in response to time-
sensitive crises. (Adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1)

NDP 2 8
 NAVAL INTELLIGENCE IN DESERT STORM
In response to Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.S. forces,
under General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central
Command, began deployment to the Gulf. The Office of Naval Intelligence’s
StrikeProjectionEvaluationandAnti-AirWarfareResearch(SPEAR)groupwas
tasked to provide critical node analysis to support combat preparations.

After a thorough review, SPEAR concluded that Saddam Hussein,

awareofthecoalition’svastlysuperiorairforces,wouldlikelynotsendhisentire
950-plane armada against the attackers. Rather, he would use them sparingly,
relying on hit-and-run tactics, and dispersal to hardened shelters around the
country,toenhancetheirsurvival.

SPEARassessedtheprimarythreatstocoalitionaircrafttobenumerous
anti-airartilleryweapons,man-portableairdefensemissiles,andradar-guided
surface-to-air missiles, supported by a formidable air defense command and
controlnetwork. KnowledgeofIraq’slethallow-to-mediumaltitudethreatresulted
incoalitionaircrewsmodifyingtheirtacticsinordertooperateathigheraltitudes.
Iraq’srelianceonitsairdefensenetworkmadethesystemacriticalvulnerability.
Therefore,neutralizingthisenemycapabilitybecameanobjectiveofthealliedair
operation.

Armedwiththisvitalintelligence,thecommander,hisairstaff,andthe
operatingforceswereabletoplanandconductoperationsthatnotonlyhelped
toprotecttheforcebetter,butreorientedittowardmorepunishingstrikemissions
as well. A post-war study commissioned by the U.S. Air Force concluded that
SPEAR’s analysis was “perhaps the best assessment of the Iraqi air force and
air defense system” in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

9 NDP 2
adversary’s assessment of friendly capabilities and intentions. Fur-
ther, naval intelligence provides the information needed to conduct
successful deception measures against the adversary. These measures
require detailed knowledge of the adversary’s perceptions, vulner-
abilities, intelligence-gathering capabilities and limitations, tactics,
techniques and procedures, and the physical characteristics of the
battlespace. Moreover, intelligence can reduce the likelihood of
fratricide by helping to clear the fog of war.

— Supporting Combat Assessment. Naval intelli-

gence is essential in developing combat assessments that can help
the commander decide whether to redirect friendly forces or end
operations. Combat assessment is the procedure by which the com-
mander weighs the effectiveness of military operations by consider-
ing battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, and reattack
recommendations. Analysis of the enemy’s reaction to friendly
operations gives us insights into his morale, materiel status, and
ability to continue hostilities.

Support to Operating Forces

Support to operating forces is the cornerstone of naval intel-

ligence. Because of their mobility and forward deployment, as well as
the unique nature of surface, subsurface, air, special and landing force
operations, naval forces have special requirements for tailored intel-
ligence on potential threats in both the maritime and littoral envi-
ronments. Naval intelligence is designed to support operations at sea,
from the sea, and ashore—through an organization closely linked
with joint and national intelligence centers.

Naval forces engaged in operations are supported by theater

Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). The theater JIC serves as a focal
point to ensure that operating forces receive intelligence support from
national and service intelligence centers such as DIA, CIA, NSA and
the National Maritime Intelligence Center. Naval forces also main-
tain such organic intelligence capabilities as photographic interpreta-

NDP 2 10
tion, communications intelligence analysis, and finished intelligence
production, which support not only the commander and embarked
forces, but theater and national decisionmakers as well.

Communications are key to ensuring that intelligence is avail-

able to the commander and his forces at every level throughout the
battlespace. Relevant intelligence must be pushed to the commander
on the basis of preplanned essential elements of information; simi-
larly, because naval forces must be able to respond quickly to any
crisis, the commander must be able to pull timely and relevant intel-
ligence at any time, from any location as well. Rapid, concurrent
dissemination of intelligence ensures that an accurate, complete, and
common picture of the battlespace is available to all tactical users.
The commander can improve the effectiveness of his forces by exer-
cising his intelligence and cryptologic capabilities realistically, and by
ensuring that reliable communications deliver the product to the
user.

Naval intelligence personnel and systems are co-located with

decisionmakers at nearly every echelon of command. Similarly,
cryptologic personnel and systems are woven into the fabric of oper-
ating forces—from specially configured surface ships, submarines, and
naval aircraft to Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). Embed-
ding intelligence and cryptologic personnel, equipment, and commu-
nications at the unit, afloat staff, theater and national levels contrib-
utes to effective intelligence support under virtually all circumstances.
That said, effective intelligence support can be assured only when the
commander and the members of his intelligence organization have
a clear understanding of the fundamentals of intelligence.

—§—§—§—

11 NDP 2
NDP 2 12
 CHAPTER TWO

Fundamentals of Naval
Intelligence

“To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded.”

— General David M. Shoup, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1960

T
he fundamentals of naval intelligence, distilled from
years of operational experience, guide both the com-
mander and the intelligence officer. The commander
who understands these fundamentals can employ intelligence to his
best advantage; the intelligence officer who understands these fun-
damentals can support the commander’s requirements better. The
fundamentals of naval intelligence include principles, key attributes,
intelligence sources and the process of the intelligence cycle. They
apply across the spectrum of military operations—from peacetime,
to operations other than war, to combat.

13 NDP 2
Principles

The principles of naval intelligence provide enduring guidelines

for effective intelligence operations. Understanding and applying these
principles will give decisive advantages to naval commanders.
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the
result of a hundred battles. When you are ignorant of the enemy, but
know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If
ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every
battle to be in peril.”
— Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 B.C.

— Know the Adversary. Since the time of Sun Tzu,

knowing the adversary has been the paramount principle. Identifying
the adversary is the first step in gaining this knowledge. Knowing how
the adversary thinks (especially how the adversary perceives success
and failure) is essential in forecasting his likely courses of action. We
know our adversary better by understanding his goals, objectives,
strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabili-
ties, and values. We gain this understanding by studying his charac-
ter, culture, social mores, customs and traditions, language, and his-
tory. Only then will the intelligence officer be able to provide the
commander a full assessment.

Because naval forces often will be first on the scene in a crisis,

naval intelligence must identify potential adversaries in peacetime and
prepare intelligence for anticipated crises. We will not always have the
luxury of planning against a single adversary. Naval forces may be
called into action in a variety of contingencies—against a conven-
tional armed force, a terrorist group, or in response to civil or natural
disasters. Under these conditions, we must seek to know all potential
adversaries, while focusing our intelligence efforts against the most
likely one.

NDP 2 14
 “The commander must appreciate and shoulder his intelligence re-
sponsibilities or fail in the discharge of his operational functions.”
— BGEN James M. Masters, U.S. Marine Corps
A C/S-Intelligence, HQMC, 1958

— The Commander’s Needs are Paramount. No

commanding officer approaches port without knowing the tides
and shoals that may endanger ship and crew. Similarly, no fleet,
battle group or MAGTF commander approaches combat without
first understanding the opponent. Intelligence, the heart of our
combat decisionmaking, enables us to fight smarter by reducing our
uncertainty about the adversary. Armed with this knowledge, the
commander can then determine his best courses of action and ar-
ticulate his continuing intelligence needs. Thus, intelligence directly
influences operations, from the earliest phases of planning through
execution.

The commander involves his intelligence staff early in the

planning phase to ensure that intelligence will support his effort. In
turn, the intelligence staff must keep the commander advised of any
changes in adversary activity and any gaps in knowledge that may
develop.

— Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort. In any theater

of operations, unity of effort ensures that intelligence supports the
commander’s objectives. Clearly stating and prioritizing informa-
tion requirements are important steps in ensuring unity of effort.
This becomes a particular challenge in multinational operations,
where naval forces may encounter major differences in language and
culture, limitations imposed by bilateral agreements, and differing
strategic objectives. In building unity, we should recognize national
differences, promote complementary intelligence operations and—
most importantly—enable the exchange of intelligence. We can achieve
all of this through the coordinated efforts of a joint or multinational
intelligence center and the exchange of intelligence liaison personnel
and systems.

15 NDP 2
 — Plan for Combat. Forward deployed naval forces
can be thrust into combat with little warning; thus, naval intelligence
resources must be able to function continuously in diverse opera-
tional environments. Realistic and continuous intelligence planning
and training must support the full range of naval operations. Naval
and national intelligence systems must be reliable and give command-
ers timely access to the intelligence they need. At the same time, the
commander must understand the essential nature of this support and
prioritize resources to satisfy his needs. For example, automated data
processing interoperability should be a key goal, so that own-service
systems can talk to other-service, other-theater or national systems via
common protocols and formats. Intelligence personnel must ensure
that all databases and communications are in place (or readily surged)
to support combat operations, afloat and ashore.

— Use an All-Source Approach. Developing an intel-

ligence assessment is comparable to completing a jigsaw puzzle with-
out all the pieces. To develop the full picture, the intelligence analyst
should seek as many pieces as possible. This is known as the principle
of “all-source” analysis.

Rarely will a single source or sensor provide the entire picture

of the battlespace. Historical examples exist in which a single source
provided the key intelligence, such as the communications intercept
that led to the shootdown of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s
aircraft during World War II. However, even that key intercept was
fused with other known data—location of enemy airfields, likely course
and speed of the aircraft, and other current intelligence—to plan the
shootdown. The most useful and complete intelligence assessments
usually emerge after a fusion of data from multiple sources. To
preclude being deceived by our own analytical errors or by adversary
deception, we use an all-source technique that permits the develop-
ment of corroborating data. Further, all-source analysis can disclose
conflicting data, which demand additional analysis to discern a more
accurate picture. Most often, however, the all-source approach devel-
ops complementary data, where information from one source con-
firms information provided by another.

NDP 2 16
 ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND THE NAVAL
EMBARGO OF IRAQ

The operations of the maritime interception force during Desert

Shield and Desert Storm clearly demonstrate the importance of all-source
intelligence analysis. The embargo of Iraq’s overseas trade, mandated by a
U.N. resolution, directly involved the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard and
eleven other coalition navies. Coalition naval forces patrolled the Arabian
Gulf, northern Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea in search of merchantmen
carrying munitions, petroleum, and other contraband. Thousands of suspect
ships were located, intercepted, and inspected. This complex task required
timely and accurate intelligence on the nationalities and characteristics of
the merchant vessels, the origins and destinations of their cargoes, and the
orders under which their masters operated.

U.S. maritime intelligence activities provided a wealth of

intelligence derived from international shipping registers, vessel
sightings, electronic intelligence, cryptologic reporting, open sources,
satellite imagery, human intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance
photographs. This information was collated, analyzed, and fused into
intelligence products that were provided to naval operating forces.
Complementing this intelligence with information from organic radar,
cryptologic sensors, and other surveillance assets, the maritime
interdiction patrol force intercepted more than 10,000 ships by the spring
of 1991. This enabled the Gulf War coalition to maintain, in the words of
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, a “steel wall around the waters leading
to Iraq” that helped hasten the defeat of the Iraqis on the battlefield.

17 NDP 2
Key Attributes

Effective intelligence has several mutually supportive attributes

or qualities. In certain cases these qualities can appear as competing
goals. For example, although both thoroughness and timeliness are
attributes of any intelligence product, a goal of thoroughness for any
one product could actually hinder timeliness. To be effective, naval
intelligence must strike a proper balance among the following—some-
times conflicting—attributes:

— Timeliness. Intelligence should be timely enough

to support policymaking or decisionmaking, to enhance the prospect
of mission accomplishment. Timeliness is most essential during the
formulation of the commander’s estimate and when handling highly
perishable data normally called Indications and Warning intelligence.
To ensure that timeliness requirements are met, the commander must
prioritize his information needs.

— Objectivity. From the facts on hand, the intelli-

gence analyst must be free to assess and report the situation without
the influence of bias, distortion, or political constraint. Intelligence
analysts should be meticulous in their efforts to discount precon-
ceived notions and not allow these to influence, much less drive, the
intelligence effort.
“Tell me what you know. . .tell me what you don’t know. . .tell me
what you think. . .always distinguish which is which.”
— General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990

— Usability. A commander needs intelligence that is

easy to understand and apply to operational decisions. Usability
demands timeliness, relevance, and proper format or form. The speed
and complexity both of modern threats and our own telecommuni-
cations systems place a premium on rapid intelligence dissemination.
Commanders need this intelligence in time to react to threats and
make better decisions.

NDP 2 18
 — Availability. To support the commander’s planning
and operations, intelligence should be available when and where needed.
Availability requires foresight, an ability to predict, a clear understanding
of objectives, and thorough intelligence training. In order to respond to
rapidly emerging intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer should
anticipate, collect, evaluate, produce, and store information. In naval
operations, we depend on reliable, interoperable, up-to-date, on-line
intelligence databases. We must be able to receive current, meaningful,
appropriately classified intelligence to support changing operational re-
quirements rapidly. Recognizing the need to protect sensitive intel-
ligence sources and methods, we must guard against excessively
restrictive classification of intelligence, which would deny it to the
commander or operator who truly needs it. Many intelligence items
can be “sanitized” by removing references to the highly-classified source
of the data, and released at a lower classification.

— Thoroughness. Thorough intelligence contributes

directly to successful combat planning and execution. Proper identi-
fication and prioritization of the commander’s essential elements of
information help to clarify the scope and detail of the intelligence re-

19 NDP 2
quired.5 The intelligence effort should give us the information we need—
nothing more, nothing less. Since the intelligence picture never will be
complete, the commander should be aware of gaps in available informa-
tion. By recognizing both the known and the unknown, a commander
can apply appropriate judgment to reduce risk.

— Accuracy. Intelligence should be factually correct

and convey sound estimates of the adversary’s intentions and capabili-
ties. Accurate intelligence reduces uncertainty, thus increasing the
commander’s confidence in his understanding of the battlespace. Com-
parison of information received from multiple sources improves the abil-
ity to verify information and reduces susceptibility to deception. The
dissemination process must not reduce accuracy.

— Relevance. Intelligence should pertain directly to

the operations at hand and to the level of command for which it is
intended. For example, the commanding officer of a destroyer conduct-
ing maritime interdiction operations would find it important to learn that
a merchant ship with a history of arms smuggling is entering his area of
responsibility. The National Command Authorities might find the same
intelligence somewhat less relevant. If intelligence does not support the
needs of the intended user, it has little value.

5
Essential elements of information (EEI) are the critical items of information regarding
the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate
with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical
decision (Joint Pub 1-02).

NDP 2 20
 BATTLE OF MIDWAY - THE ATTRIBUTES OF NAVAL
INTELLIGENCE

BeforetheBattleofMidway,AdmiralChesterNimitzaskedhisintelligence
officer, Commander Edwin Layton, to forecast as closely as possible the time and
method of the anticipated Japanese attack on Midway. With the objective thus
defined, Layton set to work. A decoded message from the Japanese aircraft carrier
commandcontainedthephrase,“weplantomakeattacksfromageneralnorthwest
direction,” but did not specify the target. Layton thus assumed that the Japanese
force would approach Midway from the northwest on an approximate bearing of
315 degrees. He estimated that they would approach under cover of darkness, just
as they had at Pearl Harbor six months earlier, and launch their bombers at first
light. Heknew,too,thattheU.S.forcesonMidwaywouldlaunchtheirsearchplanes
at first light.

Usingavailableintelligence, Layton’s analysts discerned that the attack

would occur on June 4th. Knowing the time of sunrise on June 4th and the
approximate course and speed of the American search planes, Layton was able to
forecast with accuracy andtimeliness when and where they would detect the
Japanesecarriers. LaytonprovidedAdmiralNimitzusableintelligencebyestimating
that the Japanese would approach Midway on bearing 315 degrees and that they
would be sighted 175 miles from Midway at about 0600. Nimitz was reportedly
surprised by thethoroughnessof Layton’s forecast, but immediately grasped the
relevance of the estimate. He ordered his staff to plan a course of action that would
take this intelligence into account.

Shortly after 0600 on 4 June 1942, Admiral Nimitz received an

urgent message from Midway, “Plane reports two carriers and main body
ships bearing 320, course 135, speed 25, distance 180.” The battle that
followed broke the Japanese initiative in the Pacific and changed the course
of the war. As Admiral Nimitz later remarked to Layton, “Well, you were
only five miles, five degrees, and five minutes off.”

21 NDP 2
Sources of Intelligence

Intelligence sources vary greatly in capability, method, sophisti-

cation, and utility, ranging from a local informant to a billion-dollar recon-
naissance satellite system. All sensors possess capabilities that make
them unique. All have limitations as well. For instance, reconnaissance
satellites may provide broad area coverage not available from any other
sensor, yet collection over the desired area may be affected by adverse
weather or orbital geometry. As a rule, however, the utility of the source
is not a function of its sophistication; the best intelligence often can come
through the simplest collection means. To be effective, intelligence must
use all available sources; it cannot simply concentrate on the most famil-
iar. Further, naval intelligence must be ready to function in an environ-
ment where some sensor data may be missing.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Counterintelligence CI
Imagery Intelligence IMINT
Photographic Intelligence PHOTINT
Human Intelligence HUMINT
Measurement and Signature Intelligence MASINT
Acoustic Intelligence ACINT
Electro-optical Intelligence ELECTRO-OPTINT
Infrared Intelligence IRINT
Laser Intelligence LASINT
Nuclear Intelligence NUCINT
Unintentional Radiation Intelligence RINT
Open Source Intelligence OSINT
Radar Intelligence RADINT
Signals Intelligence SIGINT
Communications Intelligence COMINT
Electronic Intelligence ELINT
Foreign Instrumentation
Signals Intelligence FISINT
Scientific and Technical Intelligence S&TI
Medical Intelligence MEDINT

NDP 2 22
 Intelligence collection is naturally constrained by resource allo-
cation, the nature of the threat, technology, and the environment. Col-
lection resources are normally managed so that they remain focused on
areas perceived as enduring threats. Refocusing the intelligence system
on emerging threats may take time. Intelligence assets are necessarily
finite and competition for them can be extremely keen, thus, they should
be managed carefully.

Sensor selection and employment, processing, and timeliness

depend on the nature and characteristics of the target. For example,
electronic intelligence (ELINT) may provide us little information when
directed against an adversary with unsophisticated weapons; on the
other hand, human intelligence (HUMINT) might bring some results in
the same case. A proper mix of sensors and sources is the key. Another
important factor is the rapid processing of sensor data. The intelligence
effort must have enough trained personnel to interpret data within the
context of ongoing operations. Finally, we must carefully and continually
assess the timeliness of sensor data.

Sensor data can be corrupted and erroneous; therefore, we

should not be mesmerized by a display of data on a screen. Such data
requires careful analysis and ambiguity must be resolved. Some sen-
sors produce data enabling weapons or tactics to be employed di-
rectly, such as ELINT data used to guide an anti-surface missile at-
tacking an enemy ship. In such cases procedures should be in place
to disseminate data immediately and ensure that forces acting upon that
information will understand what it is, how it will arrive, and what it will
look like. Other intelligence sources, however, often produce informa-
tion that requires careful consideration and analysis before forces can
be committed on the strength of it.

23 NDP 2
The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence products result from a series of interrelated activities

termed the intelligence cycle. Figure 1 illustrates the process through
which the commander levies intelligence requirements, information is
collected and converted into intelligence, and intelligence is disseminated
to users. This cycle normally consists of five steps: planning and direct-
ing, collection, processing, production and dissemination. This cycle
greatly simplifies a dynamic and complex process, but it is useful to
illustrate how the intelligence process works. Naturally, intelligence
efforts do not always flow sequentially through the cycle. For example,
a request for imagery generates planning and direction, but may not
involve new collection if the request can be satisfied from archival imag-
ery.

Figure 1

— Planning and Direction. During this phase of the

cycle, the commander must identify and prioritize his information re-
quirements. This phase is instrumental to the cycle’s success. Because
a great number of intelligence requirements may have to be satisfied,
planning and directing determines the effort required to meet our needs.
After the commander identifies his requirements, the intelligence officer
formulates a collection plan, taking into account the collection assets

NDP 2 24
available and the commander’s essential elements of information. One
of the key elements in the planning phase is assessing current intelligence
to ensure that it meets our requirements. Early discovery of any require-
ments that cannot be satisfied through organic, theater or national intel-
ligence collection resources will highlight potential intelligence gaps. Plan-
ning further includes the identification of personnel, transportation and
communications requirements.

— Collection. Collection involves tasking organic,

attached, and supporting collection resources to gather information.6
The collection process determines what will be—and what will not
be—available to support decisionmaking. Since few collection require-
ments can be met fully by organic assets alone, collection resources
available at the theater and national level will normally be tasked as well.
To do this effectively, the intelligence staff must know the capabilitiesand
limitations of available collection resources, must understand the require-
ments validation process to obtain desired collection approval, and must
identify the collection resources that can contribute to fulfilling mission
requirements.

— Processing. Processing is the conversion of collected

information into a form suitable for producing usable intelligence, such as
translating foreign languages, developing film from tactical reconnaissance
aircraft, generating hard- or soft-copy images provided by electro-optical
or infrared sensors, and converting raw electronic intelligence data into a
standard message format suitable for automated handling. Timeliness and
accuracy are especially relevant during processing.

6
Organic intelligence resources are intelligence assets or capabilities permanently assigned
to a particular command. Attached resources are separate assets attached to the joint force
to support a particular operation or phase of the operation. Supporting intelligence re-
sources are those from another AOR, theater, combatant command, or national organi-
zation providing support to the commander from outside his AOR (Joint Pub 2-0).

25 NDP 2
 — Production. Intelligence production is the integration,
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of information from all available
sources into tailored, usable intelligence. A key principle in production is
the fusion of information from various sources to form a complete and
accurate product. Fusion is essential for an effective intelligence produc-
tion process that accurately reflects and supports the commander’s priori-
tized essential elements of information (EEI). Because of the uncertain
nature of combat, the commander, operations officer and intelligence of-
ficer should review EEIs periodically to ensure that intelligence assets are
supporting mission needs.

— Dissemination. The goal of the dissemination process

is to provide the right amount of appropriately classified intelligence when,
where, and how it is needed. Getting the product to the user is the last step
in the intelligence cycle; but, because the cycle is dynamic, the process does
not end with dissemination. First, intelligence personnel must ensure that
the product is actually used. This is a particular obligation of intelligence
personnel who are members of operational staffs. They are in the best
position to demonstrate the value of intelligence products to commanders
and other staff members. Second, intelligence personnel must see to it
that dissemination is refined by gathering feedback from the com-
mander or other users to ensure that intelligence requirements have
been satisfied and the finished intelligence products are usable. If not,
the intelligence staff must take corrective measures to meet the needs of the
commander. The dissemination process should not overwhelm the tactical
user with massive amounts of data. Instead, intelligence dissemination
should follow established procedures designed to push time-sensitive, threat-
warning data to the commander, while allowing him to pull less time-sensitive
intelligence required for his mission.

An accurate display of intelligence data is essential to achieving

effective employment of intelligence products. Increasingly, tactical com-
manders prefer to view crucial data in the context of the larger scenario in
progress. Effective display of intelligence information is essential in order
to translate usable products into modern command and control, and
weapons targeting systems. This process should include, as necessary,
sanitization of classified data and reformatting into specific compatible data
fields.

NDP 2 26
 Intelligence lays the groundwork for naval operations in peace
and war. By understanding the fundamentals of naval intelligence, the
commander is best able to ensure that intelligence is fully integrated into
operations. This integration enables intelligence to support both planning
and execution effectively.

—§—§—§—

27 NDP 2
NDP 2 28
 CHAPTER THREE

Naval Intelligence Operations

“The great military victory we achieved in Desert Storm and the mini-
mal losses sustained by U.S. and Coalition forces can be directly
attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis.”
— General H. Norman Schwarzkopf III, U.S. Army
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, 1991

A
s an integral part of naval forces, naval intelligence
resources are forward deployed around the world.
Because of this forward deployment, naval intelligence
must always be at a high state of readiness, with unparalleled situational
awareness of the operating theater. To maintain that awareness, naval
intelligence operations in peacetime closely parallel those in war and in
operations other than war. More than any other service, naval intelli-
gence supports peacetime operational decisionmaking on a daily basis.

29 NDP 2
 Since its formal establishment in 1882, the Office of Naval In-
telligence has been a major player in many successful operations that
have meant the difference between ultimate victory and defeat. During
World War II, an intensive cryptanalytic effort by the Navy’s Commu-
nications Security Group—forerunner of today’s Naval Security
Group—led to the breaking of the Japanese Navy’s code and played a
pivotal role in attaining final victory in the Pacific. The naval cryptanalytic
efforts of World War II foreshadow similar cryptologic tasks that will be
required for operations against future adversaries including signals search
methodology, language skills, and signal access.

In the Cold War era, the Navy established the Ocean Surveil-
lance Information System (OSIS). OSIS focused naval intelligence
efforts on the Soviet Navy threat and provided intelligence support to
fleet and headquarters units. OSIS was a synergistic blend of intelli-
gence and cryptologic personnel that provided tailored, fused, all-
source intelligence to operating units. More recently, the naval intel-
ligence system has served as a model for the establishment of Joint
Intelligence Centers (JICs). These joint organizations matured during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and today help meet the
intelligence requirements of naval commanders in multiple theaters and
in multiple roles. Regardless of the theater or mission, however, certain
basic functions of naval intelligence remain constant.

Functions of Naval Intelligence

Naval intelligence reduces risk by identifying adversary capabili-

ties, vulnerabilities, and intentions. It attempts to impart thorough knowl-
edge of the situation through the application of certain basic intelligence
functions. These intelligence functions form the foundation of required
analytical support to the commander. Mission, threat, time, and re-
sources available will determine the priority and level of effort applied to
specific intelligence functions in any given situation. The effective incor-
poration of the following functions into the intelligence process will pro-
duce the highest quality support throughout planning and execution.

— Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. In-

telligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is the systematic and

NDP 2 30
continuous analysis of the adversary, terrain, and weather in the assigned
or potential battlespace. It is a significant element in the Commander’s
Preparation of the Battlespace and a key part of our decisionmaking
process.7 Its goals include understanding the adversary’s forces, doc-
trine, tactics, and probable courses of action, together with the physical
and environmental characteristics of the target area. IPB identifies gaps
in knowledge that require intelligence collection efforts. It consists of
five elements:

l Define the Battlespace Environment: Defines the area of

operations and focuses intelligence assets on the battlespace.
l Describe the Battlespace’s Effects: Evaluates physical char-
acteristics of the battlespace and their effects on friendly and
adversary capabilities to maneuver, attack, employ sensors,
andcommunicate.
l Evaluate the threat: Encompasses a detailed study of the
threat, identifying adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities.
l Determine Threat Courses of Action: Ties the previous
steps together providing a predictive analysis of probable
adersary courses of action - and friendly force survivability in
each case.
IPB is of great importance to all aspects of combat planning. It
is not limited to supporting planning, but is a long-term, continuous effort
directed against potential adversaries as well. We use IPB to plan action
and manage the risk to friendly forces. Risk will always be inherent in
military operations, but IPB seeks to reduce that risk. We assess risk
by weighing adversary capabilities and intentions against friendly forces
and assigned missions. This risk is then analyzed to determine whether
additional information or intelligence could alleviate it. Our management
of risk thus depends on a clear understanding of both whatis known and
what is not known.

7
Commander’s Preparation of the Battlespace is used to mean analysis of the physical
characteristics of an area and its affects on our ability to establish superiority in every
dimension of the battlespace, as well as a detailed study of adversary capabilities, vulner-
abilities, and probable courses of action.

31 NDP 2
 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLESPACE
Desert Shield/Desert Storm

During Operation Desert Shield and throughout air

operations of Desert Storm, U.S. Navy and Army special operations
personnel and force reconnaissance Marines established a series of
observation sites along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border. Tasked to
conduct surveillance of the border and intelligence collection in
support of follow-on operations, these sites were manned by Navy
SEALs, Army Special Forces and Marine Corps force reconnaissance
teams, augmented with Marine Corps and Army SIGINT personnel.
Through nightly patrols and continuous visual and electromagnetic
monitoring of Iraqi forces, the surveillance teams were able to conduct
all-source collection of Iraqi army activity across the border. Their
efforts laid the groundwork for a thorough IPB that was instrumental
in planning for the forthcoming ground offensive to liberate Kuwait.

— Indications and Warning. The goal of Indications

and Warning (I&W) is to provide early warning of potential hostile
action. To accomplish this goal, intelligence must convey understanding
of the adversary. This understanding is gained through Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace and allows us to interpret indications, thus
allowing adequate warning. I&W prevents surprise and reduces risk by
detecting adversary actions that may threaten friendly forces. It can
support strategic, operational, or tactical levels of warfare. Strategic
I&W is concerned primarily with detecting a potential adversary’s
preparations for war, policy shifts, advances in military capability, or
acquisition of new technology. By focusing on reduction of surprise and
threat avoidance, I&W supports operational and tactical commanders.

I&W is essential for naval forces because of their forward pres-

ence in areas of potential crisis. Threat response times are greatly
decreased in the littoral regions, making I&W crucial for avoiding or
countering threats. Early investment in collection, regional threat analy-
sis, target databases, and training help build a coherent picture of the
adversary’s capabilities and intentions. The commander’s requirements
must be anticipated and understood in order to identify potential organic

NDP 2 32
collection deficiencies and to focus theater or national intelligence assets
on potential adversaries far enough in advance.

— Situation Development. Analysts use situation

development to build on the IPB process. Situation development helps
us assess and predict an adversary’s actions. For example, current
intelligence may reveal that an adversary is removing coastal defense
missiles from storage. Intelligence must evaluate intentions: Is the ac-
tivity merely proficiency training—or is there hostile intent? If it is train-
ing, are there opportunities to collect intelligence? If hostile intent is
assessed, are any friendly forces at risk?

Predicting an adversary’s future actions is difficult. We may lack

complete information because of gaps in our collection ability, or due to
adversary concealment efforts. Nevertheless, situation development can
reduce risks by assessing capabilities and likely courses of action. In the
example of coastal missiles, intelligence can give an accurate picture of
the threat by calculating where the missiles might go, how quickly the
adversary can fire them, and which of our naval forces are in the threat

33 NDP 2
envelope. The intelligence analysts use IPB as background; they then
place the threat in context by assessing location, current operating pat-
terns, training cycle status, and geopolitical situation. Situation develop-
ment is especially critical in high-tempo operations when time is short
and the cost of miscalculation is high. Although they are unable to
foresee the future, intelligence personnel can make judgments that help
the commander make better decisions.
“The credit must be given to Nimitz. Not only did he accept the
intelligence picture, but he acted upon it at once.”
— Admiral Raymond Spruance, U.S. Navy (Ret), 1982

— Targeting. Targeting is a function of intelligence and

operations, by which an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities are identified
for possible attack or disruption. The primary goal of targeting is to
enable us to use resources effectively in defeating the adversary. Target-
ing is more than a function of planning the physical destruction of enemy
facilities. Targeting is an analysis process in which the components of a
target, or target system—and their vulnerabilities and relative impor-
tance—are assessed to determine what effect their loss or impairment
would have on the adversary. Intelligence can indicate where selective
employment of force can have a major effect on the adversary.

During the targeting process, we first develop and then select

targets in accordance with the commander’s guidance, objectives and
the results of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. Targets
may be either physical targets, such as bridges and command centers,
or functional targets, such as enemy command and control capability.
Operations personnel then match the targeting information to the appro-
priate instruments of force in a process commonly termed
weaponeering. Continuous involvement of intelligence personnel in
targeting deliberations may identify gaps in available data that a weapon
requires for proper operation. Early identification of such shortfalls can
activate intelligence collection to fill the gaps. Timely feedback from
battle damage assessment is crucial to targeting because it allows us to

NDP 2 34
 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING -
OPERATION DENY FLIGHT

Beginning in April 1993, the Navy has flown many F-14 Tactical
Aerial Reconnaissance Pod (TARPS) sorties over Bosnia-Hercegovina as part
of Operation Deny Flight. Operating from aircraft carriers stationed in
the Adriatic Sea, the TARPS aircraft photographed hundreds of square
miles of disputed territory, using thousands of feet of film. After the
aircraft recovered aboard the carrier, Intelligence Specialists quickly and
accurately provided the commander and other senior decisionmakers the
location and types of belligerent arms, equipment, and forces. The
Intelligence Specialists also produced annotated TARPS photos for carrier
and shore-based strike team leaders to assist in planning potential
contingency operations.

assess mission effectiveness and permits us to husband resources and

eliminate needless risk.

— Battle Damage Assessment. Battle damage as-

sessment (BDA) is an element of Combat Assessment.8 BDA evaluates
the effectiveness of friendly force operations by exploiting and analyzing
intelligence on enemy forces, facilities and functions. BDA includes not

8
Combat Assessment (CA) is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force
employment during military operations. CA is composed of three major components, (a)
battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommen-
dations. The objective of CA is to identify recommendations for the course of military
operations. (Joint Pub 1-02).

35 NDP 2
only physical damage assessments, but functional damage assessments
as well. Physical damage assessments quantify the extent of damage to
a material target, such as imagery indicating the center span of a targeted
bridge has been destroyed, thus severing an enemy resupply line. Func-
tional damage assessments determine the disruption to operational tar-
gets, for example, determining the effectiveness of electronic jamming on
enemy command and control capabilities. BDA helps determine the
impact of friendly operations on enemy combat effectiveness.

Verification of combat effectiveness is essential, especially for

subsequent planning and reporting purposes. BDA may require analyz-
ing large amounts of data, with limited or imprecise information available
to fully evaluate results. Therefore, all-source intelligence is essential to
the BDA function. The commander must consider BDA throughout all
phases of mission planning and execution, for all levels of warfare. At
the tactical level, BDA supports reattack decisions; at the operational
level, BDA determines the extent of achievement of operations and
campaign objectives; at the strategic level, BDA provides key informa-
tion for senior decisionmakers with regard to campaign progress—and
attainment of national security objectives.

—Intelligence Information Management. Intelli-

gence must be delivered to the user on time and in a usable format.
By providing a push-pull information capability to the commander,
intelligence information management seeks to ensure timeliness, avail-
ability, and usability of intelligence. Intelligence information manage-
ment monitors the flow of intelligence from collector to customer, iden-
tifying chokepoints and single points of failure across all intelligence
cycle activities.

Effective dissemination of intelligence requires knowledge of

communications systems architecture and equipment. As a management
tool, intelligence information management facilitates the dissemination of
intelligence to support operations as the battlespace expands. It helps
the intelligence officer understand and articulate intelligence dissemina-

NDP 2 36
tion requirements to the communications and operations officers. Such
interaction ensures that the intelligence dissemination needs are met.

— Force Protection. Force protection is both offen-

sive and defensive. It is supported by all intelligence functions, but is
executed primarily through counterintelligence operations and force se-
curity measures. To neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of hostile
intelligence collection activities, counterintelligence and security are es-
sential. These protect information against espionage, personnel against
subversion and terrorism, and installations and material against sabotage.
Adversary forces can be expected to use every available means to
thwart or otherwise impede the operations of our naval forces. Coun-
terintelligence and security measures aid in identifying our own vulner-
abilities and reducing risks, and are essential in achieving surprise during
military operations.

Naval intelligence identifies adversary intelligence collection

capabilities, assesses friendly vulnerabilities, identifies risk, and enables
the commander to plan for operational security, deception and surprise.
Force protection encompasses the measures taken by the commander
to protect his forces, posture and information, and to deny such protec-
tion to his adversary. The commander must consider force protection in
every aspect of planning and tailor it to the intended operations and the
adversary’s capabilities.

Security addresses both the protection of information and its

dissemination. Sensitive intelligence requires protection, but command-
ers should be denied neither the intelligence they require to fight effec-
tively nor intelligence that might keep friendly forces from being placed
at risk. Decisions regarding releasability of intelligence must be made
early—balancing operational requirements with the need to protect sen-
sitive sensors or sources. Sanitization may be a viable option which
would make the information available while still protecting the source or
sensor.

37 NDP 2
Structure of Naval Intelligence

Naval intelligence forces have been designed as an integrated

system of personnel, procedures, facilities and equipment structured to
support naval, joint and multinational operations. To be effective, naval
intelligence must be structured to ensure both top-down and bottom-up
intelligence support. Top-down intelligence support leverages national
or theater intelligence resources to support the tactical commander;
bottom-up support ensures that organic intelligence supports operations
while contributing to the larger intelligence effort.

To support naval forces engaged in littoral operations, the pri-

mary work of naval intelligence is conducted at the tactical level in
dedicated intelligence centers afloat, such as a Carrier Intelligence Cen-
ter, or deployed ashore with the MAGTF command element. These
forward deployed intelligence centers are staffed by personnel from
embarked flag staffs, ships’ company, carrier air wings and MAGTF
intelligence organizations. Personnel assigned produce not only current
intelligence, but other finished intelligence products that support a variety
of contingency operations. Intelligence centers provide assessments of
the adversary’s capabilities and build and maintain threat intelligence files
and databases. Depending on mission requirements, these centers may
be augmented with liaison personnel from other services or national
intelligence agencies.

Naval intelligence centers serve as fusion centers where informa-

tion from various sources (cryptologic sensors, tactical airborne recon-
naissance, units in contact with the enemy, etc.) is validated, correlated,
analyzed, and disseminated to support operations. These centers also
use links to theater and component sensors and to the joint intelligence
centers, to complement organic capabilities and to facilitate national,
theater, and tactical intelligence support to a wide range of operations.
A fundamental operating principle of the intelligence center is that all-
source intelligence must be integrated with operations and contribute to
our common tactical picture. These operations are facilitated by reliance
on a wide variety of automated data processing systems.

NDP 2 38
 Because naval forces will normally operate as a component of
joint forces, both afloat and ashore intelligence centers are integral parts
of an intelligence architecture that connects the commander to joint and
service intelligence centers, national intelligence agencies, and the intel-
ligence centers of other nations.9 Interoperability, cooperation in re-
source management, and intelligence sharing throughout this architecture
is essential to support the commander’s decisionmaking.

Support to Planning

Intelligence is the cornerstone of planning. During all phases of

planning, intelligence on capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of
potential adversaries is essential. Intelligence reduces the unknowns that
planners must face and forms the basis for both deliberate and crisis
action planning. Early involvement of the intelligence staff in planning
(including exercise planning) is essential to ensure that intelligence con-
tinuously supports the entire operation.

9
For a description of some of the joint and naval intelligence organizations that support
naval operations, see Appendix A.

39 NDP 2
 In deliberate planning, the commander’s emphasis is on devel-
oping a carefully crafted plan for military operations. As shown in Figure
2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is the predominant
intelligence function during development of the commander’s estimate and
concept of operations. IPB identifies information requirements and short-
falls and permits refocusing collection and production resources to accom-
plish the plan. Planning must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate and
respond to new information as it becomes available.

FIGURE 2

Targeting is an essential task in developing an operational plan.

Throughout plan development, targeting materials are built and main-
tained as appropriate. During the entire deliberate planning cycle, intel-
ligence information management (to include communications and dis-
semination architectures) and force protection (to include information
security) are essential to ensure that the intelligence portion of the plan
is executable. Indications and Warning generally do not support delib-
erate planning.

NDP 2 40
 In crisis action planning, the commander’s emphasis is on
developing a course of action to respond to an emergent crisis. As
depicted in Figure 3, intelligence is especially vital in crisis action planning
since the crisis itself often grows and evolves while planning is underway.
Indications and Warning play a key role in detecting events that generate
crisis action planning. Situational development guides the modification
of plans—both as the crisis unfolds and subsequent to selection of the
preferred course of action. Because planning timelines are greatly re-
duced during crisis action planning, intelligence preparation of the

battlespace and targeting become the key tasks in support of the com-
mander. Battle damage assessment is especially important during the
execution planning and execution phases, but must be considered
throughout all phases. As with deliberate planning, intelligence informa-
tion management and force protection are ongoing concerns. Continu-
ous involvement of intelligence, from planning to mission completion,
guarantees the full integration of intelligence with operations in support
of the commander’s effort.

41 NDP 2
 SUPPORT TO PLANNING - THE INCHON LANDING

In July 1950, only a few weeks after North Korean forces stormed
across the 38th parallel and pushed South Korean and U.S. forces into the
southeast corner of the Korean peninsula, the supreme allied commander
in Korea considered a major counterstroke. After a prototypical Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace, General Douglas MacArthur decided that
naval forces could dramatically alter the course of the war by seizing Inchon,
a major port on Korea’s Yellow Sea coast. Possession of Inchon would
enable the allies to recapture a key air base, and mount a major ground
offensive on Seoul which would cut off North Korean forces in the south.

The North Koreans recognized the potential harm a landing at

Inchon could do, but they believed the area was entirely unsuitable for a
major amphibious operation. Tides rose and fell an average of 32 feet daily;
the current ran swiftly in the narrow, winding waterways; and the approaches
to the harbor were easy to mine, lined by defensible islands, and marked
by extensive mud flats, high seawalls, and dominating hills. Moreover,
harbor facilities were rudimentary, with little room in the roadstead to
deploy logistic shipping.

In planning for the amphibious operation, the allies capitalized on

high quality intelligence to overcome these disadvantages and take the
enemy by surprise. Aerial photographs, the testimony of former
inhabitants, and first-hand reports of naval special warfare teams that went
ashore to conduct reconnaissance of the Inchon area shaped the operational
planning of the amphibious task force commander, Rear Admiral James
Doyle, and his staff. Naval intelligence helped Admiral Doyle select the best
water approach, set the time for the amphibious assaults, and identify the
North Korean Army line of communication as a critical vulnerability.

This comprehensive planning bore fruit on 15 September, when

the allied amphibious task force launched its initial assault from the sea. By
the 19th, the 1st Marine Division seized the air base at Kimpo and began
the assault on Seoul. U.S. Army troops pushed out from the Inchon
beachhead and on the 27th linked up with their comrades advancing north
from the Pusan perimeter. Two days later, the Marines captured Seoul.
Thus, by skillfully incorporating intelligence into operational planning, in
a little more than two weeks, allied forces were able to oust the invaders
from the Republic of Korea.

NDP 2 42
Support to Operations

Naval forces have unique, multidimensional intelligence require-

ments. Countering threats to air, surface, subsurface, and landing forces
requires in-depth knowledge of the threat, weather, hydrography, terrain,
ports, and airfields. The sophisticated nature of the threat in naval warfare
causes naval forces to demand detailed technical intelligence on an
adversary’s weapon systems. The intelligence picture is formed from all
sources in the battlespace, including dedicated force intelligence collection
resources, national and theater assets, liaison officers, and units in contact
with the enemy. Naval forces also have unique intelligence collection
capabilities, especially in their ability to collect intelligence covertly. Such
collection can take place at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels.

During peacetime, naval intelligence plays an important role by

supporting day-to-day decisionmaking for forward deployed naval
forces. It also supports policy formulation and decisionmaking on force
structure, systems acquisition, and doctrine and tactics development.
Intelligence resources monitor foreign nations and regions to detect and
characterize threats to U.S. national interests. Further, peacetime intel-
ligence enhances naval training and exercises by providing realistic threat
scenarios to train against.

43 NDP 2
 Military operations other than war take place in a world populated
by a growing number of impoverished and unstable nation-states seeking
wealth, power, or security. Operations other than war can include combat
or non-combat actions in the following areas: arms control, combating
terrorism, nation assistance, non-combatant evacuation operations, other
civil support operations such as disaster relief or humanitarian assistance,
sanctions enforcement, international peace operations, support to insur-
gency and counterinsurgency, and counterdrug operations. In addition, a
deteriorating situation may demand that naval forces quickly make the
transition from such operations to sustained combat operations. Great
demands can be placed on the intelligence system during operations other
than war; these might include requirements for such nontraditional intelli-
gence as determining the projected level of flood water or the local infant
mortality rate. To build a picture of the adversary, we must have a broad
understanding of the theater of operations and the underlying reasons for
conflict. To gain this understanding, naval intelligence personnel must seek
nontraditional sources of information with unique access, such as open
sources, academia, emigres, and civilian area experts. Reliance on organic
intelligence collection assets will increase and may require early deploy-
ment of such collection resources as tactical counterintelligence, HUMINT,
and cryptologic teams. Littoral operations also may increase requirements
for rapidly identifying and deploying specialized linguists and area experts.

Cryptologic operations play a key role in supporting naval expe-

ditionary operations. Naval cryptologic personnel, afloat and ashore,
employ tactical sensor systems that provide the commander time-sensitive
combat information on an adversary’s composition, disposition, location
and intent. This information can be disseminated as electronic warfare
support data directly to the tactical decisionmaker or processed into
SIGINT by afloat or ashore analysis cells. Cryptologic operations can
provide unique situational awareness by giving the commander insight into
an adversary’s decisionmaking cycle. For this reason, cryptology plays an
important role in Command and Control Warfare. Cryptologic efforts rely
increasingly on a complementary mix of tactical, theater, and national as-
sets.

Combat operations place unique demands on naval intelligence

personnel for innovation, initiative, and intensity of effort. Employing the

NDP 2 44
 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR

- Since the standup of Joint Task Force Four in 1989,

naval cryptologic operations have played a major role in the
detection and monitoring of illicit drug trafficking in the
Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean.

- During Operation Restore Hope in 1993, Marine Corps

tactical HUMINT operations proved to be indispensable. By
“taking the pulse” of the local populace, HUMINT personnel were
able to determine which indigenous forces were friendly, neutral or
potentially hostile, where weapons caches were located and where
threat situations might develop. Additionally, they provided the
Joint Task Force Commander an appreciation of Somali perception
of, and reaction to, United Nations’ support and relief operations.

- During the Mississippi River flooding in the summer

of 1993, naval tactical aircraft flew photographic reconnaissance
missions over the Mississippi River Valley, mapping the extent of
flood damage and providing that information to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and other civil authorities charged
with flood relief efforts.

same tools and structures used during peacetime and operations other
than war, the intelligence staff carries out the primary intelligence func-
tions to support ongoing combat operations. Intelligence during combat
must identify enemy capabilities, intentions, and critical vulnerabilities in
a timely and accurate manner, providing the commander maximum lever-
age in applying combat power against the enemy. During combat, the
timeliness, tactical relevance, and accuracy of intelligence are especially
vital.

—§—§—§—

45 NDP 2
NDP 2 46
 CHAPTER FOUR

New Direction - Future

Challenges

“Our world without the Cold War confrontation is a safer world, but
it is no Garden of Eden. . . Intelligence remains our basic national
instrument for anticipating danger: military, political, and economic.”
— President George Bush, 1991

U
.S. national security planning focuses on the uncer-
tain environment of regional conflict. Many factors
promote regional instability: the breakup of multiethnic
nations, state-sponsored terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation of ad-
vanced weapons technology (including weapons of mass destruction),
and militant religious fundamentalism. U.S. military strategy necessarily
emphasizes operations in littoral regions of the world to support national
and international security interests.

47 NDP 2
 We face a world characterized by political disorder and con-
frontation, intense economic competition among nations, and a growing
technological threat. Potential adversaries now can buy sophisticated
surveillance, communications, and weapon systems on the world market
at affordable prices. New centers of power and influence are emerging,
sometimes threatening U.S. interests. Naval intelligence professionals
must anticipate and understand these changes. Multiple threats world-
wide present other new challenges, and naval intelligence must employ
new methods and procedures so that naval forces can meet them.

At present, naval intelligence organizations are reorienting their

efforts to meet future needs. These include facing significant challenges
with respect to supporting expeditionary forces, keeping training and
readiness at a high level, coordinating and cooperating with other ser-
vices and nations, exploiting the opportunities of the information revolu-
tion, and preparing for future operations. These challenges are interre-
lated and require skilled, mission-oriented intelligence professionals who
can manage multiple intelligence disciplines to provide the commander a
tailored, all-source assessment of the battlespace.

Support for Expeditionary Forces

Forward deployed naval forces will continue to be the National

Command Authorities’ force of choice to remain engaged overseas.
Unrestricted by host nation access, naval forces continue to provide a
strong and flexible overseas presence to deter potential aggression or
respond to crises. Naval forces may be called upon for forcible entry into
areas defended by integrated air, sea, and ground weapon systems. Some
defenses will consist of forces in fixed positions; others will include mobile
combined-arms units backed by naval forces and aircraft. A future adver-
sary may employ the newest missiles, mines, and military technology against
our aircraft, ships, submarines, and landing forces. The proliferation of
these modern weapons and the spread of emerging technologies have
made these threats more lethal, placing U.S. and multinational forces at
greater risk. As the lessons of military history show, we cannot afford to
discount the Third World threat.

NDP 2 48
 Intelligence requirements in littoral regions are significantly dif-
ferent from those of open-ocean operations. Our proximity to littoral
threats will mean less warning and reaction time for friendly forces. Any
potential adversary’s acquisition of advanced technology is a significant
concern as well. Consequently, naval intelligence must maintain detailed
databases on potential threats and develop methods to exploit each
adversary’s weaknesses.

Identifying those areas where military operations may be con-

ducted is vital. Detailed information on the environment and local
infrastructure (bathymetry, weather, topography, ports, air facilities,
etc.) will be required to support the full range of expeditionary opera-
tions. Nontraditional intelligence sources, collection means, and dis-
semination methods must be explored and employed. Open-source
intelligence may be especially important. In addition, forces deploying
to areas known for infectious diseases must have advance information
about local medical conditions. Forward deployed expeditionary
forces must incorporate medical intelligence as a force protection
measure.

The naval command and control architecture must ensure con-

nectivity between naval forces afloat and ashore (including theater and
national support agencies)—and must be useable by the warfighter.
Intelligence databases and communications must be interoperable with
other services, non-DOD government agencies, and joint intelligence
centers to ensure the uninterrupted flow of intelligence to the com-
mander. Naval intelligence must be prepared to support amphibious
operations during sustained operations ashore, while simultaneously
supporting requirements of the ships, submarines, and aircraft that
maintain battlespace dominance in the littoral area of operations. To
be most effective in expeditionary operations, naval intelligence per-
sonnel should be integrated into national, theater, and service intelli-
gence organizations to articulate naval capabilities and operational
philosophies, influence decisions, and optimize intelligence support to
naval forces. This support requires extensively trained naval intelli-
gence professionals.

49 NDP 2
Training and Readiness

To remain ahead of the challenges associated with geopolitical

upheavals, socioeconomic crises, and rapid technological innovation,
naval intelligence personnel must receive comprehensive and specialized
training. Intelligence training should be updated continuously, reflecting
tomorrow’s challenges. Basic, intermediate, and advanced training, both
ashore and afloat, should include non-institutional methods—such as on-
the-job training—and should develop well-rounded, career-oriented
professionals who will have credibility within the intelligence and
cryptologic communities, the naval Service, and external agencies and
organizations.

Training underpins broad professional experience. Personnel ro-

tation policies and deployment cycles must enable intelligence personnel to
maintain career paths that provide them experience in naval, joint, and
multinational operations. Of particular concern is adequate foreign-area
and language expertise. Operations in littoral regions of the world create
unprecedented specialized language requirements, thus adequate language
training should be made available. Foreign language proficiency, especially
in languages not commonly studied, must be emphasized continually in
training programs.

As naval professionals, we must train the way we fight. To be

effective during real-world operations, naval intelligence must be inte-
grated into all aspects of operational training. Such training increases
exposure to operations and provides the intelligence professional a
deeper understanding of capabilities and limitations—essential in ad-
vising the commander on ways to counter adversary capabilities.

Another cost-effective way to train is to capitalize on modeling

and simulation to test concepts, doctrine, and connectivity—without
having to deploy actual forces. Intelligence must be used in exercises
and simulations—especially free-play sessions—to maintain the skills
necessary to support all forms of naval, joint, and multinational opera-
tions. Intelligence training is the prerequisite for real-time intelligence
support to operations.

NDP 2 50
 Other intelligence assets that enhance training and readiness are
reserve intelligence and cryptologic personnel. These personnel are
trained and readily available, and can be integrated quickly into the
active component. They include academics, business executives, and
country-area experts whose civilian jobs may place them in close con-
tact with influential foreign leaders or littoral regions of particular interest.
Identifying and establishing databases of unique reserve skills and exper-
tise will enhance intelligence support to naval expeditionary operations.
In concert with these actions, the active component should ensure that
unique reserve skills and expertise, able to support combat operations
and contingencies, are identified early in the planning process. The
reserves represent a large pool of talent that can significantly augment the
commander’s intelligence effort.

Coordination and Cooperation

In the future, closer coordination and cooperation with other

services and other nations will assume even great importance than they
have today. Future joint and multinational operations will require com-
patible intelligence systems that complement those employed by other
services, multinational forces, and national agencies, including non-DOD
government agencies.

51 NDP 2
 Experience in operational theaters around the world demon-
strates that early planning for intelligence sharing improves intelligence
support and shortens delays in dissemination. Simple procedures
should exist—and be exercised often—to handle sharing of classified
material. Sometimes multinational partners may have more current
data or better access to specific information about an adversary or the
environment than our own forces. Exchanging personnel and systems
can improve the flow of information, minimize misunderstandings, and
improve the efficacy of operations as well as aid in area stability.
Liaison officers act as bridges between cultures, languages, doctrines
and methodologies. Coordination and cooperation among intelligence
personnel facilitate planning and execution. Naval intelligence person-
nel should strive to provide intelligence support under simulated war-
time or crisis conditions to ensure they can do so under the strain and
confusion of combat.

Intelligence and the Information Revolution

Naval commanders today must orchestrate combined arms

operations across the dimensions of air, land, surface, subsurface, space,
and time. To fight and win in this multidimensional battlespace, the naval
commander must harness sophisticated information technology.

NDP 2 52
 Emerging communications, computer and reconnaissance tech-
nology is revolutionizing the commander’s ability to maintain situational
awareness and control his forces effectively. Since naval forces are
forward deployed, the naval intelligence system should be flexible and
responsive to the commander’s needs. The communications architec-
ture for intelligence dissemination must provide the naval commander a
global, instantaneous, secure, and survivable capability that includes:

l Responsive surveillance of selected geographic areas

l Real-time information transfer to commanders at
various echelons
l Responsive, secure communications between
decisionmakers and operational commanders
l Intelligence push/pull with automatic over-the-air
database update for forward deployed forces

Driven by technological advances, naval expeditionary forces

are now part of an electronic web that ties sensors, decisionmakers and
operating forces together in an integrated, global network. To provide
the commander timely and accurate information to operate amid the
chaos of battle, management and tailoring of information will be crucial
to success in future conflicts.

The commander relies on electronic information and communi-

cation systems to gain situational awareness, select a course of action,
and direct military operations. Naval intelligence systems must provide
continuous, comprehensive support to the commander. Potential adver-
saries possess or seek similar decisionmaking capabilities that can pro-
vide them combat advantage over their adversary. Establishing com-
mand and control dominance will give the commander a complete and
transparent view of the battlespace, while the adversary still struggles to
peer through an opaque lens.

53 NDP 2
 Naval intelligence must seize the opportunities offered by the
technological revolution. Because of the vast amount of sensor data
available today and the high speed at which it is processed and dis-
played, superior intelligence analysis, fusion and dissemination capa-
bilities are needed to gain best leverage from the information advan-
tage. Quality of intelligence always must take precedence over quan-
tity. To be effective, intelligence must be processed and presented as
an integral part of the commander’s tactical picture. Only through
accurate depiction will the commander’s needs be satisfied. Accord-
ingly, data displays must be revised and updated continually to ensure
the information remains accurate.

Support to Information Warfare/Command and

Control Warfare

Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare (IW/

C2W) offers the commander an additional means to engage adversarial
forces. IW/C2W seeks to deceive, disrupt or destroy the adversary’s
information infrastructure and command and control process to subdue
the opposition rapidly. At the same time, IW/C2W seeks to protect our
information infrastructure and command and control process from at-
tack.

To be successful, IW/C2W must be based on sound intelligence.

Current and precise knowledge of the adversary’s information and com-
mand and control systems—especially their critical and vulnerable nodes—
is paramount in IW/C2W planning and execution.10 Intelligence plays a vital
role by identifying essential and vulnerable adversary nodes, as well as by
recommending those nodes that we shouldnot degrade or destroy because
of the intelligence gained through their exploitation. Naval intelligence gives
the commander the ability to strike an adversary at precise times and places—
to blind, cripple, deceive, or destroy him.
10
In this context, nodes are points within the command and control system where person-
nel, equipment and procedures converge to perform command and control functions.
Nodes can include command centers, radar and surveillance sites, intelligence facilities,
communications stations, as well as the supporting infrastructure. Nodes are linked
together by communications or data networks. Critical nodes are the essential elements of
a command and control system whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the
ability of a force to command, control or effectively conduct combat operations.

NDP 2 54
 IW/C2W relies on fused, all-source intelligence to plan and
execute operations. It requires complete all-source databases, sound
analysis, and rapid and reliable communications. Further, without accu-
rate knowledge of the adversary’s weaknesses, strengths, disposition,
and intentions, the commander may find that his efforts are ineffective.
Standard intelligence functions must be applied innovatively and meticu-
lously to support all aspects of IW/C2W: deception, operations secu-
rity, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and destruction.

Naval cryptology, in particular, is essential in IW/C2W efforts to

disrupt the adversary’s decisionmaking process and sever the links be-
tween the adversary commander and his forces. Dominance of the
electromagnetic battlespace lies at the heart of IW/C2W. Cryptologic
operations characterize and map this battlespace. By detecting, locat-
ing, exploiting, and attacking threat emitters, cryptology supports imme-
diate decisionmaking for employment of electronic attack, threat warn-
ing and avoidance, and targeting.

55 NDP 2
Intelligence Emphasis

“It is my desire to conserve, to the maximum practible extent, the DNI

[Director of Naval Intelligence] organization and strength and if pos-
sible to get them more help. The greater the contractions of the
Navy— the more important our DNI and Communications Intelligence
become.”
— Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations, 1947

The unpredictable nature of future threats demands that naval

intelligence invest wisely in areas that will enhance the capabilities of
naval expeditionary warfare. An area that continues to show promise is
an active and dedicated involvement in the use of national sensors for
operational and tactical intelligence support. We must ensure that sen-
sors and collection methods, afloat and ashore fusion centers, and dis-
semination systems are highly capable and responsive to support opera-
tions. These capabilities are required to provide the commander and his
forces the broad area coverage they need, along with timely Indications
and Warning.

Since naval expeditionary forces must be fully integrated with

national and theater collection platforms, a dedicated effort should be
made to provide timely, accurate, and complete sensor-to-shooter con-
nectivity. To complement these capabilities, naval forces require an
organic collection and intelligence-processing capability to locate high-
value targets and gaps in adversary defenses quickly and accurately,
through an integrated network of organic reconnaissance systems.
Competition for national sensors, orbital limitations, or other factors may
sometimes preclude adequate support to operating forces; therefore, the
commander must have alternate capabilities. This need is particularly
compelling when projecting power ashore in littoral regions where ad-
equate charts and maps are lacking.

The spread of highly sophisticated telecommunications systems

in littoral regions today presents a major challenge to naval cryptology.
Rapidly evolving technology and equipment will increase the complexity

NDP 2 56
of this threat and its supporting infrastructure. Naval cryptologic systems
must be able to exploit the target threat, maintain a high state of readi-
ness, be as survivable and mobile as the forces they support, and have
the flexibility to allow tailoring of cryptologic direct support units for
specific mission requirements.

Although we live in an age of instantaneous communications,

technical collection is not the only way to gather intelligence about an
adversary. For instance, counterintelligence operations can neutralize
and degrade an adversary’s intelligence effort while HUMINT opera-
tions can provide unique intelligence, normally not accessible by other
means, about adversary activity—to include rare insight into his inten-
tions. Recent operations demonstrate that naval expeditionary forces
need to have a strong tactical HUMINT capability.

The HUMINT capability must be expanded to meet the opera-

tional requirements of the future without decreasing the counterintelli-
gence force protection role—collection, investigations, operations,
multidiscipline analysis, and support to operations security and counter-
reconnaissance. Employed as part of an all-source intelligence effort,
HUMINT and counterintelligence operations provide the commander
unique information.

—§—§—§—

57 NDP 2
 CONCLUSION
In an increasingly multi-polar world, naval intelligence profes-
sionals face many new and profound challenges. Mission success de-
pends on dedicated personnel with intellectual curiosity, initiative, integ-
rity and a detailed understanding of operations. Closely aligned to the
need for dedicated personnel is the need for unsurpassed intelligence
capabilities that are relevant and operationally responsive.

The strength and lasting character of naval intelligence lie in its

integration with naval operating forces. This union will enable the com-
mander to achieve decisive combat results. In order to accomplish this,
naval intelligence must be able to survey the battlespace and anticipate the
commander’s requirements by understanding an adversary’s capabilities,
assessing his intentions, and identifying his centers of gravity and critical
vulnerabilities.

NDP-2, Naval Intelligence, articulates those time-honored and

battle-tested principles which have been derived from more than a cen-
tury of experience. Naval commanders must consider intelligence as an
integral part of their combat power—and the potential difference be-
tween victory and defeat.

NDP 2 58
 APPENDIX A: JOINT AND NAVAL
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
THAT SUPPORT NAVAL OPERATIONS

1. The joint intelligence architecture normally exists at four levels:

National. The National Military Joint Intelligence Center

(NMJIC) is the central body for management of national intelligence
operations. Closely tied to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the
NMJIC supports the intelligence needs of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the needs of the unified commanders. The NMJIC
focuses mainly on global Indications and Warning, operational intelli-
gence, national targeting support, production and database manage-
ment. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/
CSS) also provides signals intelligence, combat information and infor-
mation security devices and assistance in its role as a Combat Support
Agency.

Unified Command. The theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)

supports the Unified Commander, service components and subordinate
Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Its functions are similar to those of the
NMJIC, although limited to the Unified Commander’s geographic or
functional area of responsibility. The theater JIC is the primary source
for target area intelligence assessments and databases.

Joint Task Force. At the JTF level, the JIC supports the intel-
ligence needs of the JTF commander and subordinate warfighting com-

59 NDP 2
ponent commands. The JTF JIC is normally established to support and
focus on a specific military operation and is typically collocated with the
JTF commander and staff. It may be afloat or ashore and is usually
composed of intelligence personnel from the JTF staff augmented by
personnel from the theater JIC, component services, and national agen-
cies.

Service Component. At the component level, service intelli-

gence centers, such as an amphibious flagship’s JIC, support the intel-
ligence needs of the component commander and subordinate units.
Although closely linked to the larger joint intelligence architecture, naval
intelligence centers, afloat or deployed ashore as part of a MAGTF,
focus their efforts on executing naval operations. During joint operations
in littoral regions, when a naval commander is commander of the JTF,
naval intelligence centers may function as both the service component
intelligence center and a JTF JIC simultaneously.

2. The Department of the Navy has established intelligence organiza-

tions that provide unique and continuous intelligence support to naval
maritime and expeditionary operations.

National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) - The National

Maritime Intelligence Center incorporates the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, and the Coast Guard
Intelligence Coordination Center, and is the national resource for all
maritime and expeditionary intelligence-related issues.

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) - The Office of Naval

Intelligence organizes and trains intelligence personnel, provides highly
specialized, maritime-related intelligence analysis, and administers intel-
ligence oversight, security, and intelligence manpower issues. Its day-to-
day operations include liaison with both DOD and non-DOD agencies,
long-term analysis of foreign military and naval forces and operations,
foreign liaison support, scientific and technical analysis, strategic trade
analysis, and intelligence systems acquisition.

NDP 2 60
 Commander, Naval Security Group (COMNAVSECGRU) -
The Commander, Naval Security Group Command is the Navy’s execu-
tive agent for cryptology and information warfare/command and control
warfare. COMNAVSECGRU is responsible for cryptologic planning
and programming, systems acquisition, training, and administration of the
naval cryptologic field activities around the world. Marine Corps par-
ticipation within the Naval Security Group is provided by the Marine
Support Battalion that collocates companies at selected naval cryptologic
field activities. Marine Support Battalion also provides support to naval
expeditionary operations through augmentation of Fleet Marine Force
Radio Battalions.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) - The Marine Corps

Intelligence Activity focuses on crises and predeployment support to
expeditionary warfare. It complements and coordinates the efforts of
theater, other service, and national intelligence organizations providing
unique threat, technical, and terrain-analysis products that are tailored to
Marine Corps tactical units preparing to deploy to a theater of opera-
tions. The activity functions as the service collection and production
manager, and as the primary coordination link with ONI for expedition-
ary intelligence analysis and production. Additionally, MCIA provides
threat and technical intelligence assessments supporting the Concept
Based Requirements System in areas of service-unique doctrinal devel-
opment, force structure, force modernization, training and education,
and acquisition.

Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) - The In-

telligence Coordination Center, a Coast Guard tenant command at the
NMIC, provides strategic intelligence support to Coast Guard law en-
forcement, military readiness, port security, marine safety, and environ-
mental protection missions. The ICC serves as the Coast Guard’s 24-
hour I&W watch, maintaining a current picture of all maritime threats. It
serves as the Coast Guard’s primary interface with the collection, pro-
duction, and dissemination elements of the national intelligence and law
enforcement communities.

61 NDP 2
 GLOSSARY
Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT): Intelligence derived from the
collection and processing of acoustic phenomena. (Joint Pub l-02)

All-source Intelligence: Intelligence products and/or organi-

zations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, includ-
ing, most frequently, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, and open
source data, in the production of finished intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Battlespace: All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land,

space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of
influence and area of interest. (NWP 1-02)

Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. A logical process

of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances
affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of
action to be taken to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Communications Intelligence (COMINT): Technical and

intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other
than the intended recipients. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Counterintelligence (CI): Information gathered and activities

conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign govern-
ments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NDP 2 62
 Critical Vulnerability: That element of a military force that is
vulnerable to attack and whose degradation or destruction will lead to
defeating the enemy’s center of gravity and, ultimately, his ability to resist.
(NWP 1-02)

Deception: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by

manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to
react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Electronics Intelligence (ELINT): Technical and geolocation

intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic
radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive
sources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Electro-optical Intelligence (ELECTRO-OPTINT): Intelli-

gence other than signals intelligence derived from the optical monitoring
of the electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet (O.O1 micrometers)
through far infrared (l,OOO micrometers). (Joint Pub 1-02)

Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT):

Technical information and intelligence information derived from the inter-
cept of foreign instrumentation signals by other than the intended recipi-
ents. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Fusion: In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources

of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activ-
ity. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Fusion Center: In intelligence usage, a physical location to ac-

complish fusion. It normally has sufficient intelligence automated data
processing capability to assist in the process. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Human Intelligence (HUMINT): A category of intelligence

derived from information collected and provided by human sources.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): Intelligence derived from the

exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers,

63 NDP 2
electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein
images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film,
electronic display devices, or other media. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Indications and Warning (I&W): Those intelligence activities

intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on
foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or
allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad.
It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of
hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United states,
its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States
reconnaissance activities; terrorists’ attack; and other similar events.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

Infrared Intelligence (IRINT): Intelligence derived from in-

formation collected by infrared sensors. (NWP 1-02)

Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, process-

ing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available infor-
mation concerning foreign countries or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Intelligence Estimate: The appraisal, expressed in writing or

orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition
with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or
potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint Pub
1-02)

Intelligence Requirement: Any subject, general or specific,

upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the
production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Intelligence Center (JIC): The intelligence center of the

joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for
providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint
force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and
the national intelligence community. (Joint Pub 1-02).

NDP 2 64
 Laser Intelligence (LASINT): Technical and geolocation in-
telligence derived from laser systems; a subcategory of electro-optical
intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Littoral: 1. Seaward: Area from the shore to open ocean that

must be controlled to support operations;
2. Landward: Area inland from shore that can be
supported and defended directly from the sea. (NWP 1-02)

Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT): Sci-

entific and technical intelligence obtained-by quantitative and qualitative
analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence,
modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical
sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated
with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identifi-
cation and/or measurement of the same. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Medical Intelligence (MEDINT): That category of intelli-

gence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of
foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information which is of
interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and opera-
tions for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and
the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both mili-
tary and civilian sectors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST): A nationally

sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts
from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. (Joint
Pub 1-02)

Naval Cryptology: Action taken to exploit and attack foreign

communications and other electromagnetic signals, while protecting our
own, for the purposes of command and control warfare, electronic
warfare, signals intelligence, and signals security. (NWP 1-02)

65 NDP 2
 Nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT): Intelligence derived from
the collection and analysis of radiation and other effects resulting from
radioactive sources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Information of potential

intelligence value that is available to the general public. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Operational Intelligence: Intelligence that is required for plan-

ning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish
strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. (Joint Pub l-
02)

Photographic Intelligence (PHOTINT): The collected prod-

ucts of photographic interpretation, classified and evaluated for intelli-
gence use. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Radar Intelligence (RADINT): Intelligence derived from data

collected by radar. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual

observation or other detection methods, information about the activities
and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data con-
cerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics
of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI): The product

resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of
foreign scientific and technical information which covers: a. foreign de-
velopments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering
techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities,
and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems,
and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the
production methods employed for their manufacture. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NDP 2 66
 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): A category of intelligence
comprising either individually or in combination all communications intel-
ligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intel-
ligence, however transmitted. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Strategic Intelligence: Intelligence that is required for the for-

mulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national
and theater levels. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Surveillance: The systematic observation of aerospace, surface

or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, elec-
tronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Tactical Intelligence: Intelligence that is required for planning

and conducting tactical operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Targeting: 1. The process of selecting targets and matching the

appropriate response to them taking account of operational require-
ments and capabilities. 2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the
commander’s mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander’s
disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited,
will accomplish the commander’s purpose through delaying, disrupting,
disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

Target Materials: Graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, or

other presentations of target intelligence, primarily designed to support
operations against designated targets by one or more weapons system(s).
Target materials are suitable for training, planning, executing, and evalu-
ating military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT): Intelligence derived from

exploitation of foreign material, produced for strategic, operational, and
tactical level commanders. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT): Technical intelligence de-

rived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.
Telemetry intelligence is a category of foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

67 NDP 2
 Unintentional Radiation Intelligence (RINT): Intelligence
derived from the collection and analysis of non-information-bearing el-
ements extracted from the electromagnetic energy unintentionally ema-
nated by foreign devices, equipment, and systems, excluding those gen-
erated by the detonation of nuclear weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Validation: A process normally associated with the collection of

intelligence that provides official status to an identified requirement and
confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given collector and has
not been previously satisfied. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Weaponeering: The process of determining the quantity of a

specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific
level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapon
effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill,
and weapon reliability. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NDP 2 68
 SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON
READINGS

Joint Publication 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support

to Operations” (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993).

Naval Doctrine Publication 1, “Naval Warfare” (Washington,

D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1994).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-20, “Commander’s Guide to

Intelligence” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1991).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-21, “MAGTF Intelligence Opera-

tions” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1991).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-25, “Counterintelligence”

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1991).

Field Manual 34-1, “Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Op-

erations” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993).

Field Manual 34-130, “Intelligence Preparation of the Battle-

field” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994).
 Handel, Michael I., ed. Intelligence and Military Operations.
(London, England, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1990).

Handel, Michael I., ed. Leaders and Intelligence. (London,

England, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1989).

Handel, Michael I., ed. War, Strategy and Intelligence. (Lon-

don, England, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1989).

Holmes, W. J. Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence

Operations in the Pacific during World War II. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1979).

Layton, Edwin T., et al. And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and
Midway-Breaking the Secrets. (New York, NY: William Morrow and
Co., 1985).

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
 Naval Doctrine Command was established by the Department of
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and integrated naval doctrine; provide a coordinated Navy-Marine
Corps voice in joint and multinational doctrine development; and
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remains relevant we encourage your feedback on this publication and
other doctrinal issues. Address your comments to:
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