A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID*

HANS MORGENTHAU
Universityof Chicago

Of the seeming and real innovations which United States has interestsabroad whichcan-
the modern age has introduced into the prac- not be secured by militarymeans and for the
tice of foreignpolicy, none has proven more support of which the traditional methods of
bafflingto both understandingand action than diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If
foreignaid. The very assumption that foreign foreignaid is not available they will not be
aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a supported at all.
subject of controversy.For, on the one hand, The question, what kind of policy of foreign
the opinion is widely held that foreignaid is aid we ought to have, can then not be evaded.
an end in itself,carryingits own justification, As it has developed in recent years, the kind
both transcending,and independentof, foreign we have is fundamentally weak. It has been
policy. In this view, foreignaid is the fulfill- conceived as a self-sufficient technical enter-
ment of an obligation of the few rich nations prise, covering a multitude of disparate objec-
toward the many poor ones. On the otherhand, tives and activities,respondinghaphazardly to
many see no justificationfora policy of foreign all sorts of demands, sound and unsound, un-
aid at all. They look at it as a gigantic boon- related or only by accident related to the
doggle, a wasteful and indefensibleoperation political purposes of our foreign policy. The
whichserves neitherthe interestsof the United United States, in short, has been in the busi-
States nor those of the recipient nations. ness of foreignaid for more than two decades,
The public debate on foreignaid has con- but it has yet to develop an intelligibletheory
tributed little to understanding.In the spring of foreignaid that could provide standards of
of every year the nation engages in such a judgment for both the supporters and oppo-
debate, carried on almost exclusively in terms nents of a particular measure.
of the amount of money to be spent for pur-
I. SIX TYPES OF FOREIGN AID
poses of foreignaid rather than of the sub-
stantive purposes which a policy of foreignaid The firstprerequisiteforthe development of
is supposed to serve. The Administrationtries, a viable foreignaid policy is the recognitionof
as it were, to sell a certain amount of foreign the diversityof policies that go by that name.
aid to Congress, and Congress refuses to buy Six such can be distinguishedwhich have only
that amount. Congress generally appropriates one thing in common: the transferof money,
about ten per cent less than what the Admin- goods and services fromone nation to another.
istration has requested, and the Administra- They are humanitarianforeignaid, subsistence
tion spends what is appropriated as it sees fit foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery,
withinthe general categories authorized. Only prestige foreignaid, and foreignaid for eco-
when glaring abuses and inefficienciesare un- nomic development.
covered, as for instance in our foreignaid to Of these distinct types, only humanitarian
Laos, is the question of the substance of our foreignaid is per se nonpolitical. The aid which
foreignaid policy raised in public, and even governments have traditionally extended to
then it is put in the negative termsof remedy- nations which are victims of natural disasters,
ing the abuses and inefficiencies rather than in such as floods, famines and epidemics falls in
the positive terms of the purposes our foreign that category. So do the services, especially in
aid policy may be supposed to advance and the the fields of medicine and agriculture, which
kinds of measures best calculated to serve private organizations, such as churches and
these aims. foundations, have traditionally provided in
It is in fact pointless even to raise the ques- Asia, Africa,and Latin America.
tion whetherthe United States ought to have While humanitarianaid is per se nonpolitical,
a policy of foreignaid-as much so as to ask it can indeed performa political functionwhen
whether the United States ought to have a it operates within a political context. The
foreign political or military policy. For the foreignaid that private organizations provide
will be attributed for better or worse to their
* This paper was prepared for the Public Af- respective governmentsinsofar as humanitar-
fairs Conference Center, University of Chicago, ian aid emanating from a foreign country is
and will appear in a volume of essays on foreign recognized by the recipient country or its in-
aid to be published by Rand McNally and Co. in habitants to performa political function.Thus
1962. the agricultural aid which the Rockefeller
301

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302 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Foundation has provided for many years to ment to another performshere the functionof
certain Latin American countries is likely to a price paid for political services rendered or
take on under contemporary conditions a to be rendered. These bribes differfrom the
political function which it did not perform traditional ones exemplifiedabove in two re-
previously. The same has from the beginning spects: they are justifiedprimarilyin terms of
been true of the workthe Ford Foundation has foreign aid for economic development, and
been doing in India. By the same token, money and services are transferredthrough
humanitarian aid extended by a government elaborate machineryfashionedforgenuine eco-
may have political effects. nomic aid. In consequence, these bribes are a
Subsistenceforeignaid is extended to govern- less effectivemeans forthe purpose of purchas-
ments, such as those of Jordan and Niger, ing political favors than were the traditional
which do not command the resources to main- ones.
tain minimalpublic services. The givingnation The compulsion of substituting for the
makes up the deficit in the budget of the traditional businesslike transmissionof bribes
recipientnation. Subsistence foreignaid is akin the pretense and elaborate machinery of
to the humanitarian type in that it seeks to foreignaid for economic development results
prevent the breakdown of order and the dis- froma climate of opinion which accepts as uni-
integration of organized society. But it also versally valid the proposition that the highly
performsthe political functionof maintaining developed industrial nations have an obliga-
the status quo, without, however, as a rule, tion to transfermoney and services to under-
increasingits viability. Where a political alter- developed nations for the purpose of economic
native to a nonviable regime may exist, sub- development. Thus, aside from humanitarian
sistenceforeignaid diminishesthe chances ofits and militaryforeignaid, the only kind of trans-
materializing. fer of money and services which seems to be
Bribes profferedby one governmentto an- legitimate is one ostensibly made for the pur-
other for political advantage were until the pose of economic development. Economic de-
beginningof the nineteenthcenturyan integral velopment has become an ideology by which
part of the armoryof diplomacy. No statesman the transferof money and services from one
hesitated to acknowledge the general practice governmentto another in peace time is ration-
ofgivingand accepting bribes,howeveranxious alized and justified.
he might be to hide a particular transaction. The present climate of opinion embraces
Thus it was proper and common fora govern- another assumption as universally valid: that
mentto pay the foreignministeror ambassador economic development can actually be pro-
of another countrya pension, that is, a bribe. moted through such transfersof money and
Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister of Elizabeth, services. Thus economic development as an
received one from Spain. Sir Henry Wotton, ideology requires machinerythat makes plaus-
British Ambassador to Venice in the seven- ible the postulated efficacyof the transferfor
teenth century, accepted one from Savoy the stated purpose of economic development.
while applying for one fromSpain. The docu- In contrast to most political ideologies, which
ments which the French revolutionarygovern- operate only on the verbal level and whose
ment published in 1793 show that France sub- effectsremain within the realm of ideas, this
sidized Austrian statesmen between 1757 and political ideology, in order to be plausible, re-
1769 to the tune of 82,652,479 livres, the quires an elaborate administrative apparatus
Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz receiving100,000. serving as an instrumentfora policy of make-
The Prussian Ambassador in Paris summed believe. The government of nation A, trying
up well the main rule of this game when he to buy political advantage from the govern-
reported to his governmentin 1802: "Experi- ment of nation B for, say, the price of 20
ence has taught everybody who is here on million dollars, must not only pretend, but
diplomatic business that one ought never to also act out in elaborate fashion the pretense,
give anything before the deal is definitely that what it is actually doing is giving aid for
closed, but it has only proved that the allure- economic development to the government of
ment of gain will often work wonders." It is nation B.
worthyof note that the firstappropriation act This practice of giving bribes as though they
adopted by the first Congress of the United were contributions to economic development
States in 1789 included a modest contingent inevitably creates, in the giver and the recip-
fundforsuch purposes. ient, expectations which are bound to be dis-
Much of what goes by the name of foreign appointed. Old-fashioned bribery was a rela-
aid today is in the nature of bribes. The trans- tively straightforward transaction; services
fer of money and services from one govern- were to be rendered at a price, and both sides

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 A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID 303

knew what to expect. Bribery disguised as put in jeopardy the continuation of military
foreignaid foreconomic developmentmakes of aid. Militaryaid is here reallyin the nature of a
giver and recipient actors in a play which in bribe.
the end they may no longer be able to dis- What appears as military aid may also be
tinguish from reality. In consequence, both actually in the nature of prestige aid, to be
may come to expect results in terms of eco- discussed below. The provision of jet fighters
nomic development which in the nature of and other modern weapons for certain under-
thingsmay not be forthcoming.Thus both are developed nations can obviously performno
likelyto be disappointed,the giverblaming the genuine military function. It increases the
recipient for his inefficiencyand the recipient prestige of the recipient nation both at home
accusing the giver of stinginessand asking for and abroad. Being in the possession of some of
more. The i(leology, if taken for reality, gets the more spectacular instruments of modern
in the way of the original purpose of the trans- warfare,a nation can at least enjoy the illusion
action, and neither side believes that it has of having become a modern militarypower.
received what it is entitledto. As briberyappears today in the guise of aid
For the past decade, military aid took the foreconomic development,so does aid foreco-
lion's share of the foreignaid programsof the nomic development appear in the guise of mili-
United States. A shiftin favor of nonmilitary tary assistance. In the session of 1961, for in-
aid occurred during the 1961 session when stance, Congress appropriated 425 million
Congress appropriated somewhat over 2 bil- dollars foreconomic aid to strategicareas, and
lion dollars for military aid, while the total it is likely that in the total appropriations of
voted for all the other foreignaid programs over 2 billion dollars for military aid other
ran in excess of 3 billion dollars. To the latter items of economic aid are hidden. This mode of
amount must be added the equivalent of ap- operation results from the reluctance of Con-
proximately 1 billion dollars in foreign cur- gress to vote large amounts foreconomic aid in
rencies,the proceeds of the sale of agricultural contrast to its readiness to vote virtually any
commodities abroad, to be used for economic amount requested for military purposes. Yet
grants and loans to purchasing governments. the purposes of aid for economic development
Foreign aid for militarypurposes is a tradi- are likely to sufferwhen they are disguised as
tional way by which nations buttress their militaryassistance, as we saw the purposes of
alliances. Rome used to receive tributefromits bribery sufferwhen disguised as aid for eco-
allies for the military protectionsit provided. nomic development. The militarycontextwith-
The seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies are in which such aid is bound to operate, even
the classic period of military subsidies, by though its direct administration be in the
which nations, and especially Great Britain, hands of the civilian authorities, is likely to
endeavored to increase the military strength deflect such aid from its genuine purposes.
of their allies. Glancing through the treaties More particularly, it strengthens the ever-
of alliance of that period, one is struck by the present tendency to subordinate the require-
meticulous precision with which obligations ments of aid for economic development to
to furnishtroops, equipment, logistic support, military considerations.
food, money, and the like were defined. The Prestige aid has in common with modern
loans which France extended to Russia after bribes the fact that its true purpose, too, is
the conclusion of the alliance between the two concealed by the ostensible purpose of eco-
nations in 1894 fall in the same category. This nomic development or military aid. The un-
traditionalmilitaryaid can be understood as a profitableor idle steel mill, the highway with-
division of labor between two allies who pool out trafficand leading nowhere, the airline
theirresources,one supplying money,materiel, operating with foreignpersonnel and at a loss
and training, the other providing primarily but under the flag of the recipient country-
manpower. all ostensibly serve the purposes of economic
In contrast to traditional practice, military developmentand under different circumstances
aid today is extendednot only to allies but also might do so. Actually, however, they perform
to certain uncommittednations. The military no positive economic function.They owe their
aid the United States has been giving to existence to the penchant, prevalent in many
Yugoslavia is a case in point. The purpose is underdeveloped nations, for what might be
here not so much militaryas political. It seeks called "conspicuous industrialization," spec-
political advantage in exchange for military tacular symbols of, and monumentsto, indus-
aid. It obligates by implication, the recipient trial advancement rather than investments
toward the giver. The latter expects the former satisfyingany objective economic needs of the
to abstain froma political course which might country.

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304 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

This tendency sheds an illuminating light prestige aid because he cannot justify it in
upon the nature of what is generallyreferredto terms of economic development, and may
as the "revolution of risingexpectations." We thereby forgo available political advantages.
are inclinedto assume that the urgentdesire to The classic example of this erroris the Ameri-
improve one's lot by means of modern tech- can rejection of the Afghan request for the
nology and industry is a well-nigh universal paving of the streetsof Kabul as economically
trend in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. unsound. The Soviet Union, pursuing a politi-
Actually, however,this trend is universal only cally orientedpolicy of foreignaid, did pave the
in the sense that virtually all underdeveloped streets of Kabul.
nations want to appear as having achieved in-
II. FOREIGN AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
dustrialization, while only a fraction of the
MENT IN PARTICULAR
population, and frequently only small elite
groups withinit, seek the social and economic None of the types of foreignaid discussed
benefitsof industrializationand are willing to thus far poses theoretical questions of great
take the measures necessary to achieve them. magnitude; rathertheyraise issues forpractical
For many of the underdeveloped nations the manipulation which can be successfullymet by
steel mill, the highway,the airline,the modern common sense tested by experience. Foreign
weapons, performa function that is not pri- aid for economic development has been the
marilyeconomic or military,but psychological primary area for theoretical analysis and
and political. They are sought as the outward speculation, and these have been primarilyof
show of modernityand power. They performa an economic nature. Economic thought, true
function similar to that which the cathedral to its prevailing academic tradition, tends to
performedforthe medieval city and the feudal look at foreignaid as though it were a self-
castle or the monarch's palace forthe absolute sufficienttechnical enterprise to be achieved
state. Nehru is reportedto have said, when he withthe instruments,and judged by the stand-
showed Chou-En-Lai a new dam: "It is in these ards, of pure economics. And since Western
temples that I worship." And the more under- economic development,fromthe firstindustrial
developed and less viable a nation is, the revolutiononwards,has been due to the forma-
greateris likely to be its urge to prove to itself tion of capital and the accumulation of tech-
and to the worldthroughthe resultsof prestige nical knowledge, we have tended to assume
aid that it, too, has arrived in the mid-twen- that these two factors would by themselves
tiethcentury. provide the impetus forthe economic develop-
The advantage forthe giverof prestigeaid is ment of the underdeveloped nations of Asia,
threefold.He mayT receive a specific political Africa,and Latin America. This tendency has
advantage in returnforthe aid, very much like been powerfullysupported by the spectacular
the advantage received for a bribe. Also, the success of the Marshall Plan, the political
spectacular character of prestige aid estab- origins and motivations of which were easily
lishes a patent relationship between the forgottenin its justificationas a strictlyeco-
generosity of the giver and the increased nomic measure forthe provisionof capital and
prestigeof the recipient.The giver's prestigeis technological know-how. Yet it is not always
enhanced, as it were, by the increase of the recognized that this success was made possible
recipient'sprestige.Finally, prestigeaid comes only by the fact that, in contrastto the under-
relativelycheap. A limited commitmentof re- developed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin
sources in the form of a spectacular but eco- America, the recipients of Marshall aid were
nomically useless symbol of modernity may among the leading industrial nations of the
bringdisproportionatepolitical dividends. world, whose economic systems were but
The giver of foreignaid is thereforewell ad- temporarilyin disarray.
vised to distinguishbetween prestige aid and The popular mind, on the other hand, and,
aid foreconomic development,though both are throughit, much of the practice of foreignaid
justifiedby the prospective recipient in terms have proceeded from certain unexamined as-
of genuine economic development. The pros- sumptions, no less doubtful for being deeply
pective giver, if unaware of the distinction,is embedded in the American folkloreof politics.
likely to fall into one of two errors. By mis- Thus the popular mind has established correla-
taking prestige aid for aid for economic de- tions between the infusion of capital and
velopment,he may waste human and material technology into a primitive society and its
resources in support of the latter when the economic development, between economic
purpose of prestige aid could have been development and social stability, between
achieved much more simply and cheaply. Or social stability and democratic institutions,
else he may reject out of hand a request for between democraticinstitutionsand a peaceful

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 A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID 305

foreignpolicy. However attractive and reas- puts a culturalobstacle in the path ofindustrial
suringthese correlationsmay sound to Ameri- development,whichforeignaid by itselfcannot
can ears, they are borne out neitherby the ex- overcome. Saving, that is, the preservation of
periences we have had with our policies of capital or goods for investment or futureuse,
foreignaid nor by general historic experience. has become so integral a part of our economic
The firstof these assumptions implies that thought and action that it is hard for us to
underdevelopment is at least primarily the realize that there are hundreds of millions of
result of lack of capital and technological people in the underdevelopedareas ofthe world
know-how.Underdevelopmentis regarded as a who are oblivious of this mode of operation,in-
kind of accident or at worst as a kind of de- dispensable to economic development. We have
ficiencydisease, which can be taken care of come to considerthe productiveenterpriseas a
throughsubcutaneous injections of the missing continuum in the bettermentof which the in-
ingredients.Yet a nation may sufferfromde- dividual owner or manager has a personal
ficiencies,some natural and insuperable,others stake. Yet in many underdeveloped areas the
social and remediable, which no amount of productive enterpriseis regarded primarilyas
capital and technological know-how supplied an object for financial exploitation, to be dis-
from the outside can cure. The poverty of carded when it has performedits function of
natural resourcesmay be such as to make eco- bringingthe temporaryownerthe largest finan-
nomic development impossible. Nations such cial returnin the shortestpossible time. Foreign
as Jordan and Somalia are in all likelihood aid poured into such a precapitalisticand even
permanently incapable of economic develop- prerationalmould is less likelyto transformthe
ment for that reason. Many of the nations mould than to be forcedby it, in ways hardly
whichare the perennialrecipientsofsubsistence predictable in advance, into channels serving
aid are likelyto fall in the same category. the interestsof a precapitalistic or prerational
A nation may also sufferfrom human de- society.
ficiencies which preclude economic develop- The economic interests which tend to pre-
ment. As there are individuals whose qualities vent foreignaid frombeing used foreconomic
of character and level of intelligence make it development are typically identifiedwith the
impossible for them to take advantage of ruling groups in underdeveloped societies,
economic opportunities, so are there nations whichderive theirpolitical power in good meas-
similarly handicapped. To put it bluntly: as ure fromthe economic status quo. The owner-
there are bums and beggars, so are there bum ship and controlof arable land, in particular,is
and beggar nations. They may be the recipients in many of the underdeveloped societies the
of charity,but short of a miraculous transfor- foundationof political power. Land reformand
mation of their collective intelligence and industrializationare in consequence an attack
character,what theyreceive fromthe outside is upon the political status quo. In the measure
not likelyto be used foreconomic development. that they succeed, they are bound to affect
Other nations are presentlydeficientin the drastically the distribution of economic and
specific qualities of character and intelligence political power alike. Yet the beneficiariesof
that go into the making of a moderneconomic both the economic and political status quo are
system,even though their general or inherent the typical recipients of foreignaid given for
capabilities qualify them potentially for the the purpose of changing the status quo. To ask
necessary transformationsometime in the fu- them to use foreignaid for this purpose is to
ture. They are, to use a rough analogy, in a require a readiness forself-sacrificeand a sense
medieval stage of cultural development, still of social responsibilitywhich few rulinggroups
awaiting the equivalent of the moral and in- have shown throughout history. Foreign aid
tellectual revolutions which in the sixteenth profferedunder such circumstancesis likely to
and seventeenthcenturiescreated the cultural fail in its ostensible purpose and, performing
preconditionsforthe economic development of the functionof a bribe to the ruling group, to
the West. Yet we tend to take the existence of strengthen the economic and political status
these preconditionsforgranted,forgettingthat quo. It is more likely to accentuate unsolved
without the secularization and rationalization social and political problems than to bring
of Westernthoughtand society the industriali- them closer to solution. A team of efficiency
experts and public accountants might well
zation of the West would not have been pos-
have improvedthe operations of the Al Capone
sible. gang; yet by doing so, it would have aggravated
A civilization, such as the Burmese, which the social and political evils which the opera-
deprecates success in this world because it tions of that gang broughtforth.
stands in the way of success in the other world, Given this likely resistance of the ruling

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306 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

group to economic development, foreign aid By creating an urban industrial proletariat,it

requires drastic political change as a necessary loosens and destroysthe social nexus of family,
condition for its success. Foreign aid must go village and tribe, in which the individual had
hand in hand with political change, either foundhimselfsecure. And it will not be able, at
voluntarily induced from within or brought least not soon, to provide a substitute forthis
about through pressure from without. The lost social world. The vacuum so created will be
latter alternativefaces the givingnation with a filled by social unrest and political agitation.
dilemma. On the one hand, to give foreignaid Furthermore,it is not the downtroddenpeoples
for economic development without stipulating livingin a static worldof unrelievedmiserywho
conditions that maximize the chances for suc- are the likely protagonists of revolution, but
cess will surely maximize the chances for rather those groups that have begun to rise in
failure. On the other hand, to give aid "with the social and economic scale have not enough
strings" arouses xenophobic suspicions and na- to satisfy their aroused expectations. Thus,
tionalisticresentments,to be exploited both by economic development is bound to disturb not
the defendersof the statusquo and the promo- only the economic status quo but, through it,
tersof Communistrevolution. the political statusquo as well. If the change is
Furthermore,once one has decided to bring drastic enough, the social and political effects
about political change in opposition to the of economic development may well bring
ruling group, one must identifysome alterna- about a prerevolutionary or revolutionary
tive groupas the instrumentof political change. situation. And while the United States may
Sometimes, the only choice is among alterna- have started the revolutionaryprocess, it will
tive groups which are equally unattractive. again be uncertain under whose auspices it
Sometimes, and not infrequently,the absence will be ended.
of any available alternative group leaves only The United States faces a number of formid-
the choice between creatingone or doing noth- able handicaps in tryingto control social and
ing. political change in the underdeveloped nations
Finally, the promotion of drastic social either as a prerequisite for, or a result of,
change on the part of the giving nation may foreignaid foreconomic development. First of
create the indispensable conditionforeconomic all, as a Westerncapitalistic nation, the United
development,but it also conjures up the spec- States is a conservative power both domesti-
tre of uncontrollable revolution. In many of cally and internationally, and must appear
the underdeveloped nations peace and order particularlyso to the underdeveloped nations.
are maintained only throughthe ruthlessuse of Both in its civilization and its social and eco-
the monopolyof forceby the rulinggroup. De- nomic structure,it belongs to that complex of
terminedand skillfulforeigninterventionmay nations which until recentlywere able to hold
find little difficultyin weakening or even re- Africa, Latin America, and the outlying areas
moving altogether the power of the ruling of Asia in a conditionof colonial or semicolonial
group. It is not so easy to finish what has dependency.It has militaryalliances withthese
therebybeen started. While the interventionist nations,and whileit has generallyshunned and
nation may be able to controlevents up to the even opposed outrightcolonial policies, it has
point of instigatingdrastic reformand revolu- actively and successfully participated in the
tion, it may well prove unable to control the semicolonial exploitation of backward nations.
course of the revolution itself. More particu- Thus the resentment against the former
larly, a democratic nation, such as the United colonial powers attaches also, to it and its
States, is greatly handicapped in competing policies of foreignaid are frequentlysuspect, as
with Communists in the control of a revolu- serving in disguise the traditional ends of
tion. The revolution may start, as it did in colonialism.
Cuba, under the democratic auspices of un- Furthermore,the United States, by dint of
organized masses dedicated to social reform its pluralistic political philosophy and social
and supported by the United States, and may system, cannot bring to the backward nations
in the course of its development be taken over of the worlda simple message of salvation, sup-
by the highly organized and disciplined Com- portedfirstby dedicated and disciplinedrevolu-
munist minority,the only organized and dis- tionary minorities and then by totalitarian
ciplined revolutionarygroup on the scene. control.In the nature of things,the advantage
Successful foreignaid foreconomic develop- lies here withthe Communistpowers.They are,
ment may have similarly unsettling political as it were, specialists in exploiting a revolu-
results. Economic development, especially by tionary situation, which is bound to cause us
way of industrialization,is bound to disrupt embarrassment.For while the Communistsare
the social fabricof the underdeveloped nation. able to direct a revolution into the desired

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 A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID 307

channels through their use of a disciplined causal relationship exists between the two.
minority,we, even if we are convinced that The most impressive example is the Soviet
revolution is inevitable and thereforedo not Union. Its rapid economic development has
oppose it, tend to look on it with misgivings gone hand in hand with totalitarian govern-
since we cannot control the direction it will ment, and a case could well be made for the
take. proposition that the formerwould have been
The Communist powers have still another impossible without the latter. It is more likely
advantage over the United States in that, at than not that where the intellectual and moral
least on the surface, their problems and preconditions for economic development are
achievements are more meaningful to the lacking in the population at large and are
underdeveloped nations than ours. The Soviet presentonly in a small elite, as is true in many
Union has achieved, and Communist China of the underdeveloped nations, the imposition
attemptsto achieve, what the moreenlightened of the will of that small minorityupon the ma-
underdevelopednations seek: a drastic increase jority of the population is a prerequisite not
in national output throughrapid industrializa- only forthe start of economic developmentbut
tion. The Communist powers use totalitarian also forsustained economic growth.
control as their instrument and Communist As concerns the promotion of a peaceful
doctrine as rationalization. Seeking the same foreignpolicy, economic development is likely
results, the underdeveloped nations cannot to be counterproductiveif a political incentive
help being attracted by the methods which for a belligerentforeignpolicy is present. The
broughtabout these results elsewhere. In con- contrary conclusion derives fromthe popular,
trast, the slow process, stretching over cen- yet totally unfoundedassumption that "poor"
turies, through which the nations of the West nations make war on "rich" nations for eco-
achieved a high standard of living throughin- nomic advantage and that "rich" nations are
dustrializationmust appeal much less to them. by definitionpeaceful because they have what
That appeal is furtherlessened by the economic they want. In truth,of course, most wars have
processes of the free market and the political been fought not for economic but political
processes of liberal democracy through which advantage, and, particularly under modern
in large measure Westernindustrializationwas technologicalconditions,only economicallyad-
achieved. For these processes require a degree vanced nations are capable of waging modern
of moral restraintand economic and political war. We did not consider the Soviet Union a
sophistication which are largely absent in the militarythreat as long as it was economically
underdeveloped nations. The simple and crude underdeveloped; it became one when its eco-
methods of totalitarianism must appear to nomic development had transformedit into a
them much more congenial. modern industrial power. Similarly, Commun-
Thus we arrive at the disconcertingconclu- ist China today, except to its immediate neigh-
sion that successful foreign aid for economic bors, is only a potential militarythreat by vir-
development can be counterproductiveif the ture of its economic potential, both likely to
social and political goal of the giving nation is be activated by economic development.
the recipient's social and political stability. In Foreign aid foreconomic development,then,
some cases at least, the failureof American aid has a very much smaller range of potentially
for economic development may have been a successfuloperation than is generallybelieved.
blessing in disguise in that it did not disturb a Its success depends in good measure not so
stable statusquo whose continuance was in our much upon its soundness in strictlyeconomic
interest. Such aid, intended for economic de- termsas upon intellectual,moral, and political
velopment, actually performs the function preconditions, which are not susceptible to
eitherof a bribe or of prestigeaid. Here again, economic manipulation,if they are susceptible
however, these functionsare likely to be im- to manipulation from the outside at all. Fur-
paired by disappointed expectations of eco- thermore, the political results of successful
nomic development on the part of the giving foreignaid for economic development may be
and the recipientnation. either unpredictable or counterproductivein
It is equally a moot question whether suc- termsof the political goals of the givingnation.
cessfulforeignaid foreconomic developmentis In any event, they are in large measure uncon-
conducive to the development of democratic trollable. Foreign aid profferedand accepted
institutions and practices. Without stopping for purposes of economic development may
here to examine the complexities of the rela- turn out to be something differentfrom what
tionship between democracy and economic it was intended to be, unless it is oriented
development,it is enough to observe, as recent toward the political conditions withinwhich it
history has made clear, that no necessary must operate. Most likely,it will turnout to be

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8308 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

a bribe or prestigeaid, or else a total waste. To other. Bribes given to the ruling group, for
do too much may here be as great a risk as to instance, are bound to strengthenthe political
do too little, and "masterly inactivity" may and economic statusquo. Military aid is bound
sometimesbe the better part of wisdom. to have an impact upon the distribution of
political power within the receiving country;
it can also have a deleteriouseffectupon the
III. CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY
economic system, for instance, by increasing
The major conclusionsforpolicy to be drawn inflationarypressures. Similarly, the effectof
fromthis analysis are three; the requirementof subsistence foreignaid is bound to be the sup-
identifyingeach concretesituation in the light port of the statusquo in all its aspects. Insofar
of the six differenttypes of foreignaid and of as the giving nation desires these effectsor can
choosing the quantity and quality of foreign affordto be indifferent to them they obviously
aid appropriate to the situation; the require- do not matterin termsof its over-allobjectives.
ment of attuning, within the same concrete But insofaras the giving nation has embarked
situation, differenttypes of foreignaid to each upon a policy of foreignaid for economic de-
other in view of the over-all goals of foreign velopment which requires charges in the
policy; and the requirement of dealing with political and economic status quo, the other
foreign aid as an integral part of political types of foreignaid policies are counterproduc-
policy. tive in terms of economic development; for
The task of identifyingconcrete situations theystrengthenthe very factorswhichstand in
withthe type of foreignaid appropriateto them its way.
is a task for countryand area experts to per- This problem is particularlyacute in the re-
form. Can country A not survive without lations between prestige aid and aid for
foreign aid? Is its government likely to ex- economic development. The giving nation may
change political advantages for economic seek quick political resultsand use prestigeaid
favors? Would our militaryinterestsbe served for that purpose; yet it may also have an in-
by the strengtheningof this nation's military terest in the economic development of the
forces? Does this country provide the non- recipient country, the benefits of which are
economic preconditionsfor economic develop- likely to appear only in the moredistantfuture.
ment to be supported by foreignaid? Are our Prestige aid is at best only by accident favor-
political interestslikely to be served by giving able to economic development; it may be ir-
this nation foreignaid forpurposes of prestige? relevant to it, or it may actually impede it.
Can a case be made forforeignaid in order to What kind of foreignaid is the giving country
alleviate human suffering?What kind and to choose? If it chooses a combinationof both it
quantity of foreignaid is necessary and suffi- should take care to choose an innocuous kind
cient to achieve the desired result? of prestige aid and to promote economic de-
To answer these questions correctlydemands velopment the benefits of which are not too
firstof all a thoroughand intimateknowledge long in coming. Afghanistanis the classic ex-
and understandingof the total situation in a ample of this dilemma. The Soviet Union, bv
particularcountry.But it also requirespolitical paving the streets of Kabul, chose a kind of
and economic judgment of a very high order, prestige aid that is irrelevantto economic de-
applied to two distinct issues. It is necessary velopment. The United States, by building a
to anticipate the receptivity of the country hydroelectric dam in a remote part of the
to different kinds of foreignaid and theireffects country,chose economic development,the very
upon it. When this analysis has been made, it is existenceof whichis unknownto most Afghans
then necessaryto select froma great numberof and the benefitsof which will not appear for
possible measures of foreignaid those which years to come.
are most appropriateto the situation and hence It follows,then, from the very political or-
most likelyto succeed. ientation of foreignaid that its effectupon the
In most cases, however,the task is not that prestige of the giving nation must always be
simple. Typically, an underdeveloped country in the minds of the formulatorsand executors
will present a number of situations indicating of foreignaid policies. Foreign aid foreconomic
the need for differenttypes of foreign aid development, in particular, which benefitsthe
simultaneously.One type given withoutregard recipientcountryimmediately and patently is
forits potential effectsupon another type risks a more potent political weapon than aid
gettingin the way of the latter. One of the most promisingbenefitsthat are obscure and lie far
conspicuous weaknesses of our past foreignaid in the future.Furthermore,the political effects
policies has been the disregard of the effect of foreignaid are lost ifits foreignsource is not
differenttypes of foreignaid have upon each obvious to the recipients. For it is not aid as

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 A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID 309

such or its beneficialresults that creates politi- ganda. They are all weapons in the political
cal loyalties on the part of the recipient,but armory of the nation.
the positive relationship that the mind of the As militarypolicy is too importanta matter
recipient establishes between the aid and its to be left ultimately to the generals, so is
beneficial results, on the one hand, and the foreignaid too importanta matterto be leftin
political philosophy, the political system, and the end to the economists. The expertiseof the
the political objectives of the giver, on the economist must analyze certain facts, devise
other. That is to say, if the recipientcontinues certain means, and performcertainfunctionsof
to disapprove of the political philosophy,sys- manipulation forforeignaid. Yet the formula-
tem,and objectives of the giver,despite the aid tion and over-all execution of foreignaid policy
he has received, the political effectsof the aid is a political function.It is the province of the
are lost. The same is true if he remains un- political expert.
convincedthat the aid receivedis but a natural, It followsfromthe political nature of foreign
if not inevitable, manifestationof the political aid that it is not a science but an art. That art
philosophy, system, and objectives of the requires by way of mental predisposition a
giver. Foreign aid remains politically in- political sensitivity to the interrelationship
effectual-at least for the short term-as long among the facts, present and future,and ends
as the recipientsays either: "Aid is good, but and means. The requirementsby way of mental
the politics of the giver are bad"; or "Aid is activity are two-fold.The firstis a discrimina-
good, but the politics of the giver-good, bad, ting judgment of facts, ends and means and
or indifferent-have nothing to do with it." their effects upon each other. However, an
In order to be able to establish psychological analysis of the situation in the recipientcoun-
relationship between giver and recipient, the try and, more particularly,its projection into
procedures through which aid is given, and the futureand the conclusions fromthe analy-
the subject matter to which it is applied, must sis in termsof policy can only in part be arrived
lend themselvesto the creation of a connection at through rational deduction fromascertain-
between the aid and the politics of the giver able facts. When all the available facts have
which reflectscredit upon the latter. been ascertained, duly analyzed, and conclu-
The problemof foreignaid is insoluble if it is sions drawn from them, the final judgments
considered as a self-sufficient technical enter- and decisions can be derived only fromsubtle
prise of a primarily economic nature. It is and sophisticated hunches. The best the
soluble only if it is considered an integral part formulatorand executor of a policy of foreign
of the political policies of the giving country- aid can do is to maximize the chances that his
which must be devised in view of the political hunches turnout to be right.Here as elsewhere
conditions,and forits effectsupon the political in the formulation and conduct of foreign
situation, in the receiving country. In this policy, the intuition of the statesman, more
respect, a policy of foreignaid is no different than the knowledgeof the expert,will carrythe
from diplomatic or military policy or propa- day.

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