Corruption and Human Security Prepare Fo

22 ANTI-CORRUPTION FOR HUMAN SECURITY
Corruption and Human Security: Prepare for

the Rainy Day or be Prepared to Drain the
Swamp
Charles E. Tucker, Jr.
Abstract: The paper makes three central arguments: First, sudden influxes of official development aid
into countries with unprepared governance institutions hinder their long-term economic and structural
development. I analogize to the "resource curse" of countries rich in natural sources that cannot
effectively absorb newly realized resource rents stemming therefrom, highlighting recent international
experience in this regard; Second, "raining" significant development aid on an economy before helping it
develop basic capacity (i.e., competence) to govern is not only counter-productive, but is corrupting. In
such cases, the aid is, in effect, a supply-side appeal to (and institutionalization of) monopolistic rent-
taking tendencies. Thus, the aid does long-term damage to the country by perverting its governance
system and converting localized petty corruption into institutionalized grand corruption – corruption that
is difficult (or impossible) to reverse through traditional anti-corruption campaigns. Third, in situations
where official development aid has induced the institutionalization of grand corruption, traditional
cleanup efforts – focused on ex ante public awareness, anti-corruption committees, and punitive
sanctions – have proven to be virtually worthless. Therefore, in cases of grand corruption
institutionalism, rather than focus on ineffective punitive sanctions, I propose ex ante anti-corruption
cleanup efforts concentrate on regularizing the rent taker’s future behavior. Such inducements to
regularization could include amnesty programs designed to bring the underground economy into the
open.
Keywords: development assistance; aid; natural resources; human rights; international law
Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! rage! blow!

You cataracts and hurricanoes, spout
Till you have drench'd our steeples, drown'd the cocks!
You sulphurous and thought-executing fires,
Vaunt-couriers to oak-cleaving thunderbolts,
Singe my white head!
And thou, all-shaking thunder,
Smite flat the thick rotundity o' the world!
Crack nature's moulds, all germens spill at once,
That make ingrateful man!1
“When you’re up to your (neck) in alligators, it’s hard to remember your mission was to drain the
swamp.”2
IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE HUMAN SECURITY 23
Introduction
In 2011 non-military foreign aid from official sources (i.e., Official Development Assistance, or
“ODA”)3 to developing countries amounted to $133.5 billion, up from $128.7 billion in 2010.4
And – for the period of 1995 to 2009 – it exceeded $1.6.5 trillion (measured in 2009 dollars).5
Supporters of this type of aid have argued that it has been critical for worldwide economic
development, poverty alleviation, and health improvement.6 Similarly, in the context of debating
the proposed nature of the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), they have
argued that this aid should be increased.7 However, whether it has generally promoted
economic development and welfare, or enhanced human security, has been the matter of much
academic8 – and political9 – debate. While this paper does not directly engage this debate, it does
suggest that the way in which official development assistance has routinely been administered
has had a corrupting influence on the societies in which it has been administered and, when left
uncorrected, has inevitably led to grand corruption. In short, this paper argues that raining
significant amounts of financial aid on the ill-prepared ground of ineffective local governance
institutions inevitably leads to damaging floods for which only the most organized – and corrupt
– are prepared to benefit. The greater the rain, the greater the flood, the greater the damage.
And, once irreparably damaged, options for mitigating the damaging effects are few; so few that
only the corrupt may be in any real position to mop up the mess.
Official Development Assistance (“ODA”)
Throughout the Cold War, western-funded bi-lateral non-military foreign aid was primarily
linked to security-driven geo-political calculations, vice ideologically based social and economic
development strategies.10 However, since the early 1990s, security-driven systemic foreign aid
goals have gradually begun giving way to more ideologically focused state-centered models of
development.11 These state-centric development initiatives substantially increased following the
unsuccessful structural adjustment programs initiated in developing countries by international
financial institutions during the 1980s;12 as well as in response to the adoption of the 2002
United Nations (UN) Millennium Declaration and its operationalizing Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs),13 designed to attain certain development and poverty eradication benchmarks by
2015.14 It is in the context of this shift in emphasis to development, as well as in response to
the substantial increase in the amount of post-Cold War ODA being administered,15 that a
virtual cottage industry arose evaluating the putative (in)effectiveness of international aid
practices.16
One result of these myriad studies – and the international conversations they have provoked –
has been an incremental shifting of aid administration ideology, leading to an increasing
consensus that “good governance”17 is fundamental to the successful allocation of development
aid.18 As a result, model foreign development aid policies have recently begun undergoing
reconsideration and revision,19 as evidenced by the wide endorsement of international standards
of practice, such as found in: the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002);20 the
Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003);21 the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005);22 the
Accra Agenda for Action (2008);23 and the Busan Partnership Statement (2011).24 Taken together,
adoption of these standards will ultimately require fundamental shifts in the way donors manage
aid; particularly with regard to conceptualizing local governance capacity development.25
WEINSTITUTE.ORG/IJSHS
Given this recent attention to good governance, we are currently seeing early indications that
some states and global institutions are beginning to be more selective in their aid allocations;26
with a gradual shift27 toward requiring some level of good governance within developing
countries as a perquisite for receiving development aid.28 This said, geo-strategic security and
commercial motives continue to matter for many donors.29 In fact, recent studies indicate that
large bi-lateral aid disbursements continue to be determined – at least partly – by the
commercial and political self-interests of individual donor countries. One recent study, for
example, found that the United States, France, Japan, and certain other major donors, were
continuing to make their aid allocations based primarily on their own trade-related interests,
vice demonstrated determinations of basic recipient governance capacity. The report classified
these countries as “egoistic donors.”30 Another study found that, “the direction of foreign aid
(has been) dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs
and policy performance of the recipients.”31 And yet another noted, “(i)t is widely agreed in the
aid allocation literature that donors are not purely altruistic but also pursue self-interests by
using aid as a means to promote exports and gain political support from recipient countries.”32
Given these circumstances – and notwithstanding repeated calls from within the “international
aid community”33 for increased aid selectivity and/or conditionality34 – it is apparent that with
current geo-politics being what they are,35 and with large-scale aid donors being who they are,36
countries exhibiting poor governance and weak institutions37 will continue to receive significant
ODA.38 In fact, as was highlighted in one recent study, it seems the world’s most corrupt
countries may well continue receiving the highest amounts of foreign aid.39 Therefore – unless
donor aid administration policies, procedures and processes toward these countries improve40
– if the current governance-blind ODA trend continues, it will come as no surprise if and/or
when the results of these future development programs prove less than optimal. Instead, just
the opposite will be true: as current economic studies of politically-motivated ODA-funded
programs uniformly demonstrate, these types of programs will continue to cause reductions in
growth in recipient countries and – in any case – will be universally “less effective than average”
aid programing.”41 Furthermore, unless aid practices change, the “tsunamis of cash”42 these
programs will rain on unprepared economies and will continue to fuel rampant corruption43
within recipient countries.44 As such, while there is always hope that such future programing
might do well – without change this hope is simply aspirational.45
A. Inconclusive Economic Benefits of ODA on Intended

Beneficiaries: In fifty years of administering ODA, virtually no disaggregated macro-
economic data has ever been made available regarding the actual impact of the aid on
intended beneficiaries.46 As a result, available studies do not empirically prove that any
particular aid quality or aid practice is directly related to macro-economic effectiveness
(i.e., growth).47 Instead, studies examining the indirect relationship between foreign aid
and growth – utilizing econometric analysis of cross-country (i.e., macro) data – are
increasingly demonstrating that over the last half-century, development aid has either
been economically ineffective,48 or proof of its putative effectiveness has been
“inconclusive or contradictory.”49 In the meantime, while the findings of these macro-
economic studies have proved to be (in the words of at least one commentator) “sad,”
there has been a growing body of research demonstrating that – on a micro level – some
individual project activities have often been effective in achieving their outcomes.
Regarding this “micro-macro paradox,” one observer has noted:

(This) paradox reflects the fact that the vast majority of micro-level
studies (i.e. those focused on individual projects or programs) find aid to
be effective, while a wide variety of macro-level analysis (i.e. econometric
analysis of cross-national data sets) report aid to have negligible, no
observable or negative impact. In other words, “many aid-funded projects
report positive micro-level economic returns (and yet are) somehow
undetectable at the macro-level” . . . There are two important
conclusions to be drawn from . . . micro-level studies . . . The first is that
aid certainly can and does work. The second is that these studies do not
attempt to answer the general question “is aid effective?” Rather, they
assume that sometimes it is and sometimes it is not, and try to identify
the conditions and policies which lead to more and less effective results.50
Thus, given the vagaries inherent in trying to answer the question of whether aid is
effective, it may be more useful to ask three different questions: What are the main
deterrents to aid effectiveness? Does ineffective preparation to overcome these
deterrents create long-lasting harm? And, if so, how should the international community
help local governments mitigate the damaging effects?51
B. Conclusive Negative Impact Of ODA on Economic Growth and

Local Governance Development:
a. The Natural Resource Curse: Theoretically, countries with abundant

natural resources should have greater opportunities for economic growth than
their resource-constrained counterparts.52 However, for at least two decades,
economists have routinely empirically demonstrated that the presence of abundant
natural resources generally produces negative economic growth,53 lower incomes,54
and weaker political institutions,55 as compared to economies without similar
resources.56 Furthermore, the rent seeking behavior produced by these resources
often degrade local governance capacity, 57 as well as help create more authoritarian
political regimes,58 institutionalize corruption59 and – in some cases – lead to
physical conflict60 and civil war.61 The connection between these negative
consequences and natural resource abundance has been labeled the “resource
curse.”62
b. The “Unnatural Resource Curse” - ODA: As with natural resources,

empirical studies examining the macro-economic benefits of official development
aid on intended beneficiaries have also been “discouraging.”63 One reason for this is
that large influxes of development aid have routinely been shown to “fuel”
corruption.64 This, of course, has implications for the donor community, particularly
with regard to its willingness to make future contributions in a resource-
constrained economy. Meanwhile, there is increasing evidence that the
administration of aid has been detrimental to the social and economic development of
the countries in which it has been administered. In short, recent studies
demonstrate that, “(f)oreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient
countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the
‘curse of natural resources’ literature. Therefore, there may be also the ‘curse of
unnatural resources.’”65 One may reasonably conclude, therefore, the greater the
aid, the greater the curse.66
In their seminal study, “The Curse of Aid,” economists Simeon Djankov, Jose Garcia-
Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, examined data from 108 recipient countries
receiving ODA during the period of 1960 to 1999. They found that natural
resources and foreign aid shared a common characteristic: they could be
appropriated by corrupt politicians without having to resort to unpopular, and
normally less profitable, measures like taxation. 67 As a consequence, not only did
foreign aid reduce growth and increase rent-seeking corruption, but it also had a
net negative impact on democracy. In fact, they concluded that foreign aid was “a
bigger curse than oil.” 68 In explanation, the authors theorized that high levels of aid
made it more difficult to solve the “collective action problems” inherent in reform
efforts, and created “moral hazards” for both recipients and donors by perpetuating
“soft budget constraints” and a “tragedy of the commons” problem with regard to
future budgeting, thereby weakening the development of local pressures for
accountability and reform’.69 In extreme cases, the extent of large-scale aid-inducing
rent seeking activity could lead to civil conflict.70 Thus, they concluded: “This is not
to say that promoting democracy should be the objective of foreign aid. However .
. . at a minimum donors and international agencies should abide by the Hippocratic oath:
do no harm.”71
Notwithstanding cautionary admonitions about “doing no harm,” it appears the

international aid community – particularly its major donors – are not generally
improving their foreign aid administration practices.72 In fact, if anything, current
studies report a declining trend regarding the on-going effectiveness of aid
development programs vis-à-vis recipients’ growth and democracy.73 For example, a
2012 economic impact study examined the effectiveness of foreign aid in improving
governmental institutions in 52 African countries. The study’s findings suggested
that – for the period between 1996 and 2010 – development assistance generally
continued to have a deteriorating impact on recipient government quality, dynamics
of corruption-control, political-stability, rule of law, regulation quality, voice, and
accountability and government effectiveness.74
While these findings should give the international aid community cause for
reflection, all may not bleak; a number of other studies have shown that while general
economic development aid has demonstrated little or no positive effect on
democratic consolidation, targeted democracy and governance aid has consistently shown
itself to produce a positive effect on democratic consolidation and corruption abatement.75
In short, recent studies demonstrate that strong governance institutions can and do
make a significant difference regarding the effectiveness of aid; they can and do make
a difference regarding corruption mitigation and abatement; they can and do make a
difference regarding democracy development. Furthermore, where such institutions
are lacking technical assistance to improve them can and does work, so long as local
governance institutions are systematically and carefully strengthened before
significant ODA pre-maturely flows in76 and permanently degrades them.77

Regarding Corruption
A. Definitions of Corruption: When examining corruption in the context of

development aid administration, one significant difficulty quickly arising is that
corruption’s definition within the economic, political science, and legal literature varies
widely, a fact certainly explaining the varying “modeling and measuring” criteria utilized
in the findings resulting from academic studies.78
a. General Definition: Professor Arvind Jain has written extensively on the

subject of corruption and commented that, “almost everyone who writes about it
first tries to define it.” He found these various definitions conflicting, but nonetheless
concluded there was at least some consensus among scholars and practitioners that
corruption generally referred to acts in which the power of public office was used for
personal gain in a manner that “contravened the rules of the game.”79 Thus, focusing
on public officials, he described corruption as involving the use of powers delegated
to them by the public to, “further their own economic interests at the expense of
the common good.” “If discovered,” he said, “these activities would, at worst, be
considered illegal and, at best, entail strong public disapproval.”80
b. Petty and Grand Corruption: Working within this general definition, Jain
and others have emphasized that at least two sub-categories of corruption can be
identified: 81 “bureaucratic (or petty) corruption,” involving corrupt acts of
appointed bureaucrats when dealing with their superiors (i.e., political elites) and/or
the public; and “grand corruption,” involving acts of political elites through which
they exploit their power to make economic policies.82 Petty corruption usually
involves bureaucrats taking bribes from the public as a quid pro quo for providing
bureaucratic services to which the public is already entitled - or taking bribes to
perform services for which the public is otherwise not entitled. In the case of grand
corruption, however, political elites in positions to change national policies to serve
their own economic and/or political interests use this power to make resource
allocations that serve their personal interests. In such circumstances, public spending
is often diverted to those sectors where gains from the corruption will be greatest
and little attention is paid to the needs of the collectivity. This type of corruption is
difficult to identify and measure, but undoubtedly creates the most serious negative
consequences for a society, particularly in extreme situations where political leaders
make little distinction between their own wealth and that of the state.83
While petty corruption often occurs during routine business activities or ordinary
life,84 and while societies do pay a price for this type of “grabbing” activity,85 grand
corruption – involving, as it does, political leaders and their close associates in
positions where they are able to award major contracts, concessions, and the
privatization of state enterprises – impose larger costs on ordinary people by
diverting funds to top political leaders in exchange for sweetheart deals with big
foreign and domestic businesses.86 “Consider the officials’ decision calculus,”
observes corruption expert Susan Rose-Ackerman, “(c)orrupt rulers favor capital
intensive public projects over other types of public expenditures and will favor
public investment over private investment. They will frequently support ‘white
elephant’ projects with little value in promoting economic development.”87
One outcome of this rentier modus operandi is that it creates perverse incentives for
public officials working throughout their governments’ various bureaucracies to
become corrupt. Simply put, corruption is “contagious.”88 Thus, given what they see
happening above them, and knowing that the rule of law is non-operative in their
jurisdictions, public employees may be tempted to either abscond with monies
under their own control, or stand by and watch as funds are either stolen by others
or wasted on virtually worthless public works projects.89 The choice for many is
simple: take the money. However, once this type of contagion catches on, it has a
cascading effect on others, societal grand corruption ensues, and the corruption
problem becomes socially “sticky;” meaning it may never go away.90
The situation in Afghanistan reflects but one implication of this type of “stickiness.”
As highlighted in a April 2013 report issued by the U.S. Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 91 after more than a decade of receiving billions
of dollars92 of (admittedly ill-planned,93 ill-managed,94 and uncoordinated95) official
development assistance from the international aid community, the Afghan
government still lacks the institutional capacity to effectively manage the money
pledged to it by the international community. This is particularly troubling given that
most of these “direct assistance funds” will undoubtedly be subjected to less
oversight than funds provided through projects directly implemented by U.S. and
other donor government agencies. As a result, considering what SIGAR referred to
as, “the pervasiveness of corruption in Afghanistan,” not only has much of the
international aid community’s past funding been squandered, but in all likelihood its
future funding will similarly not achieve its intended purpose – to help the people of
Afghanistan.96
The bottom line is that “raining” millions – or billions – of development aid dollars on
economies before even beginning to help them develop the basic institutional
capacities to effectively and legitimately absorb the money inevitably leads to grand
corruption; and grand corruption, which inevitably endangers human security and
development.97 This is, perhaps, something worth keeping in mind as we consider
the future of development assistance.
B. Notional Worldwide Scope of Corruption: In order to discuss the

scope of the corruption problem, one should have at least some approximation of the
size or scope of the worldwide “corruption industry.”98 However, given the hidden
nature of corruption in general, and grand corruption in particular,99 official estimates
are virtually impossible to obtain and unofficial estimates are inherently unreliable. 100
This said, various semi-authoritative indirect measurements of corruption-related
phenomena do exist, giving some insight into the scope of the overall problem:101
a. With regard to petty corruption, aggregated enterprise and household surveys

seeking quantitative estimates of petty bribery have recently allowed economists to
make reasonably accurate worldwide extrapolations of the phenomena. The findings

of these calculations are staggering: the annual value of worldwide transactions

tainted by petty corruption – i.e., situations not involving budgetary leakages or asset
thefts from within the public sector – is estimated to range between $600 billion and
$1.5 trillion;102
b. Public officials receiving such bribes and/or siphoning-off state/development aid

assets seldom pay tax on these “earnings.” Therefore, recent tax evasion studies
provide insight into the prevalence of corruption in developing countries. One
report, issued by the Tax Justice Network (TJN), found that as of 2011,
approximately $21-32 trillion had accumulated in untaxed offshore wealth; of this
amount, approximately 25-30% (i.e., $5.3–9.6 trillion) was thought to be from
developing countries. The TJN concluded that each year developing countries
probably lost more in interest on this missing tax capital than they lost to new capital
flight;103
c. With regard to money laundering, NGO studies examining illicit capital outflows
from the developing world have also provided at least some insight into the
corruption industry. For example, a December 2012 study, conducted by Global
Financial Integrity (GFI), analyzed illicit financial flows from developing countries
between the years 2000 and 2010. Utilizing a World Bank Residual model, it
concluded illicit financial flows cost developing countries approximately $5.86 trillion
during the decade, and for the year 2010 GFI estimated illicit flows ranged between
$783 billion to $1,138 billion, up significantly from 2009. The report opined,
“(w)hatever strengthened financial regulations may be in place or may be
contemplated cannot yet be seen to have an effect on the continued passage of funds
out of poorer countries, through the global shadow financial system, and ultimately
into richer western economies”;104
d. In addition to the lost opportunity costs incurred through this type of capital
flight, there may be other pernicious consequences, such as debt. As noted by the
European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD), in a report it issued in
2013, “(i)llicit outflows are a major explanation for developing country debt.”
EURODAD cited a 2011 study that found, subsequent to 1970, sub-Saharan Africa
had lost approximately $700 billion to illicit capital flight, dwarfing its outstanding debt
of $175 billion. The authors noted, “(f)or every dollar of foreign borrowing, on
average more than 50 cents (left) the borrower country in the same year. This tight
relationship suggests that Africa’s public external debts and private external assets are
connected by a financial revolving door.”105
Under the totality of the circumstances, public sector grand corruption may well be
the greatest obstacle to development a fragile country faces. The cost is not simply
the loss of funds, but a “profound demoralization of society at large.”106 Public sector
corruption directly affects economic growth by negatively shifting the allocation of
public funds and indirectly affects growth by changing incentives, prices and
opportunities that entrepreneurs face. It dramatically and negatively affects
investment levels,107 income distribution, and state efficiency.108 And it perverts the
design and implementation of rules regulating access to in-country assets. In short,
how well the government spends its resources – including its ODA funding - is
significantly more important than how much or on what it spends its money.109
C. Corruption as a Human Rights Issue: Corruption denies people a better

quality of life, taking away vital food, medicine, education and support. Moreover, it
always hits the poor the hardest.110 A 2009 International Council on Human Rights
Policy (ICHRP) paper – jointly issued by Transparency International – made the case
that in addition to being an economic and/or criminal law matter, corruption should also
be addressed as a human rights issue.111 In support of this contention, the ICHRP
reminded readers that the term “corruption” derived from the Latin word corruptio,
meaning, “moral decay, wicked behavior, putridity or rottenness.” Thus, the ICHRP
argued that the legal and/or technical definitions of corruption needed to include the
concept of, “(p)erversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by
bribery or favour.” Further, the ICHPR emphasized that numerous studies had
demonstrated perversions of public integrity disproportionately affected the vulnerable
and marginalised – women, children, and minority groups – who often suffered
corruption’s harshest consequences. Likewise, in dealings with police, judges, hospitals,
schools, and other basic public services, poor citizens tended to suffer more violations
than the rich and see a larger share of their resources “eaten away.”112 In short, the
ICHPR concluded that where grand corruption prevailed, notwithstanding any other legal
amelioration mechanisms that might be brought to bear, it needed to be addressed as a
violation of International Human Rights Law.113
D. Corruption as a Human Security Issue: Meanwhile, there has also been

increasing international recognition of the interdependent and mutually reinforcing
relationships between the universal principles underlying the impetus to nurture human
development, enhance the rule of law, promote democracy, respect for human rights,
and the need to ensure peace and human security.114 Therefore, the on-going
negotiations over the nature of the post-2015 Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
framework provide an opportunity for the international aid community to develop
targets that will reflect a more nuanced understanding of the challenges inherent in
fostering human development, particularly with regard to the critical role peace and
security play in that endeavor.115 Moreover, within the context of the post-2015
development goals debate, there is also the opportunity to consider the extent to which
the concept of security may extend beyond laconic references to armed violence. In
short, we in the development community have the opportunity to consider the inherent
connection between human development and human security, as well as to
comprehensively debate and define what we mean by those terms. In doing so,
however, we should be mindful of the mutual obligations “the united nations” have
under customary international law to advance the tenets of “the United Nations’”
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, particularly with regard to ensuring freedom
from fear and want.116
Admittedly, human security – vice national security – is an evolving concept, but one
that fundamentally seeks to place the individual, as opposed to the state, as the referent
of the security. It does so against a background of evolving transnational norms relating
to security and governance, as well as the development of scientific understanding that

challenges orthodox conceptions of security.117 Its objective is to safeguard the “vital

core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term
human fulfillment.”118 In short, as noted in the 1994 UNDP Human Development
Report:
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as
security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national
interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear
holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people . . .
who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolizes
protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social
conflict, political repression and environmental hazards (emphasis added).119
In keeping with the tenor of the UNDP Human Development Report, Shahrbanou
Tadjbakhsh, Director of the Programme for Peace and Human Security at CERI, has
written eloquently on the subject of human security and made a compelling case for
taking a broad view of the concept’s definitional sub-components. He notes, in
particular, that human security as a concept represents a redefinition of traditional
understandings of security and development.
It entails:
§ The recognition of new threats to security beyond those that are military,
including factors such as underdevelopment and human rights violations;
§ The recognition that efforts to provide security have to go beyond dealing with
state governments to deal directly with the people concerned;
§ The recognition that intervention can have positive effects, but that it van also
have negative effects if not properly conceived and carried out.
Human security requires:
§ The recognition of the interconnections between development, security and

human rights;
§ The adoption of multi-dimensional solutions based on an inter-disciplinary

approach;
§ Making use of academic research in the framing of policy proposals.
In short, human security provides a framework that, “puts individuals at the center of
both analysis and action” and serves as a means to, “evaluate threats, foresee crises,
analyze the cause of discord and propose solutions entailing a redistribution of
responsibilities.” Thus, human security is not only an analytic concept, but it signifies
shared political and moral values.120
With regard to inclusion of anti-corruption within the definitional context of the

development, human rights, and human security agenda, former UN Secretary Kofi
Annan has given voice to the international community’s increasing recognition that
corruption causes enormous harm to people and respects no borders. He has
categorically stated that corruption impoverishes national economies, threatens
democratic institutions, undermines the rule of law, and facilitates other threats to
human security, including organized crime and terrorism.121 It is, in fact, under the very
backdrop of such international recognition of the interdependent connections between
human rights, corruption, human development, and human security that the UNCAC
arose as an instrument emanating from the recognition that corruption is a problem of
transnational human security significance.122
While recognizing that some might object to including human security as a specific post-
2015 development goal,123 it is, nonetheless, the position of this author to forcefully
advocate for its inclusion in the post-2015 framework. Further, while some
commentators might argue against including an amorphous concept such as anti-
corruption within the definitional parameters of a specific human security-related
development goal (perhaps arguing that its parameters would be too difficult to pin
down), this author would simply note that regional security organizations and individual
nation states – supported by academic studies124 – have already begun defining and
measuring corruption within a security context.125 In so doing, they have already
determined that corruption within “fragile states”126 is a matter of grave international
security concern, as well as a matter of national security significance for many individual
countries. Likewise, individual countries, including, but not limited to, the United States,
have reached this same conclusion, finding – through harsh experience – that corruption
not only impairs the physical security and well-being of countless citizens, but
substantially increases the probability that fragile states will degenerate into failed states
– with all that implies in our inter-connected world.127 Consider, for a moment, these
recent regional security assessments:
§ In the face of ethnic divisions, boundary disputes, politicised armed forces and
deeply institutionalised corruption, most of the countries of Southeast Asia face
serious problems in establishing stronger states, even though they are not now
suffering from the intense competing foreign interventions of the Cold War;128
§ Africa’s irregular threat dynamics sustain black markets directly linked to state
corruption, divert attention from democratization efforts, generate or fuel civil
wars, drive state collapse, and create safe havens that allow terrorists and more
criminals to operate. Combined with the inability or unwillingness of African
governments to provide for public security, the result of these threats has been
labeled a “retreat from the state” by large segments of African societies;129
§ Conflicts in the (Latin American) region today are related to the stability of
democratic regimes, which may be threatened by weak political institutions and
the ability of non-state players to threaten governments, and in the level of
corruption in the civil service;130 and

§ Central Asian countries suffer from limited or poor accountability in public

decision-making and policy, pervasive corruption, smuggling, and drug trade, all of
which serve the interests of the governing elites and undermine their willingness
and ability to control security forces and border control agents effectively.
Accordingly, governments find it difficult to implement their stated intentions to
pursue the goals of improved border management, control of drug trafficking, and
reduced behind-the-border harassment of private business and investors.131
The bottom line is that the current international security environment has prompted
state and regional security officials to rethink their assumptions about corruption. And
they have largely come to the conclusion that corruption is not a second-tier
amorphous problem; it is a specifically definable (and treatable) problem of global
strategic proportions.132 That said, the international security community has also
(perhaps belatedly) come to realize that militarizing the problem is not the solution. 133
Simply put, the myriad complex issues surrounding human security – including
corruption – require different modes of redress than those traditionally used in national
security or international security frameworks. And the time to carefully consider the
ramifications of this reality is now. 134
Under these circumstances, if the international security community can find ways to
define attainable anti-corruption goals in an international security context, we in the
international aid community should be able to the same in a human security and human
development context. Failing to do so during the on-going post-2015 development goals
debate would be the squandering of an historic opportunity to help develop less kinetic,
more nuanced, more sustainable, and more development-oriented approaches to
sustainable human welfare.135
Regarding Current Anti-Corruption Efforts:
A. Background: Ex Post Anti-Corruption Efforts Vice Ex Ante

Prevention: Efforts to combat corruption are about as old as corruption itself.136
Yet, at present, we still do not have solid disaggregated macro-level data regarding the
relative effectiveness of most current corruption reform programs.137 Instead, what we
have are mostly anecdotal case studies describing ex post anti-corruption programing,
most of which evidence “disturbing” results.138 Simply put, the record (such as it is)
indicates that ex post facto, anti-corruption efforts seldom work.139 One reason for this
is that – rhetoric aside – sustained international aid community commitment to address
the matter has been “rather dubious;”140 with anti-corruption efforts often being
designed more with an eye toward placating donors than actually stemming systemic
abuse.141 However, this lack of success may also be partly attributable to ignorance,142
owing to an underlying lack of knowledge regarding the actual causes, effects, and cures
of corruption.143 Alternatively, given the typically short-term duration of many donor-
funded development and/or anti-corruption projects, it may simply be a lack of patience,
for while successful democracy development aid may reduce corruption in the long-run,
it usually has little impact in the short-run.144
B. Anti-Corruption Campaigns: Most traditional ex post anti-corruption

campaigns are of the “one-size-fits-all,”145 “rules-based” (vice principles-based and/or
capacity-based),146 “top-down” variety.147 Thus, the approaches utilized typically
emphasize (at least theoretically) law enforcement and regulation, with two underlying
dimensions: repression, and limits on administrative discretion.148 Repression has
normally been conceptualized as being backed by severe legal penalties and increased
probabilities of malfeasance detection. This type of approach is based on the theory
that, “a fully rational, risk-neutral actor opts for criminal behavior if the expected benefit
exceeds the sanction multiplied by the probability of being convicted;” thus emphasizing
a “sober balancing of pros and cons.”149 The second dimension of typical rules-based
anti-corruption approaches – i.e., imposed limits on discretion – is usually based on the
assumption that governmental corruption is enabled by public office holders exercising
excessive leeway in carrying out their tasks and basing their decisions on monetary
inducements rather than civic duty. Approaches for limiting such discretion often entail
staff rotations, separation of functions, standardization of rules/procedures,
internal/external audits, and etc.150 As noted, these approaches seldom work.151 The
reason typically given for such failures being a lack of “political will.”152
C. Proposed Pro Ante Institution Building:
a. Political Will: As noted, most economic and political science research focuses
on incentives, information, and enforcement as being the determinants or limitations
motivating or deterring the corrupt practices that influence efficiency in resource
allocation and welfare.153 Key to this literature is the assumption that individuals face
a choice between two different action modalities: production or rent-seeking.154
Thus, the literature pre-supposes that if individuals have the will to act in non-
corrupt ways – induced through adequate incentives or disincentives – they will, in fact,
act non-corruptly. 155 However, while willingness may be a necessary predicate for
relatively efficient, non-wasteful, and non-corrupt governmental administration, it is
insufficient to predict such outcomes.156 Instead, to achieve these outcomes, public
officials must be both willing and able to perform.157 As Derick Brinkerhoff, a
Distinguished Fellow at the Anti-Corruption Centre, put it:
As the familiar phrase, “willing and able,” conveys, will and capacity are
closely connected . . . (Scholars) note that country decision-makers’
assessments of their capacity to implement reforms influence their
willingness to make upfront commitments. Thus, what may look to
outsiders like a lack of political will can be linked instead to insufficient
capacity. The political calculus is, “best not to try if we aren’t sure we have
the means to make progress”. The simple fact is that pro-development
aid and policy improvements require cap(able) institutional frameworks
in order to be effective. Good economic policies, standing alone, are
insufficient for productive development or corruption prevention. Thus,
institutional reform is a fundamental precondition for effective corruption
prevention and/or abatement.158

b. Pro Ante Anti-Corruption Programing: The World Bank confirms that

an effective anti-corruption strategy requires – as a pre-condition – the development
of basic governance capacity mechanisms through multi-pronged and phased
interventions tailored “to the specific patterns of behavior and experience
encountered in the setting towards which the interventions are being targeted.”159
Co-authors Mirjana Stanković and Robert Sundberg have expanded on this theme
and argued that any effective multi-pronged approach must recognize that, “corrupt
systems need to be ‘healed’ via mainly technical interventions aimed at corruption’s
root causes through an economics-based approach that incorporates ethics strategies
as one part of a more holistic intervention.”160 Therefore, they recommend moving
away from “legislated ethics”161 anti-corruption approaches and toward anti-
corruption activities that do not primarily rely on the “conscience of individuals.”162
In reaching this conclusion, they admitted that compared with most standard anti-
corruption strategies “currently in vogue,” increasing the capacity, stature, and
professionalism of government institutions, “which coexist or contain ‘corruption
focal points,’ may not seem to be a dynamic or attractive course of action.”163
However, they argued that “when institutions are built up in terms of training,
normalized staff positions with adequate compensation, formal legal standing vis-à-vis
other institutions and political leadership, and are given the legal and regulatory tools
with which to effectively carry out their clearly defined responsibilities, such
institutions may become effective mechanisms upon which other reform strategies
may be based and which effectively tie together the entire, multi-pronged strategy.164
Admittedly, one recognizes that in the real world donor-applied pressure to

immediately reduce levels of local corruption may leave little choice but to
implement traditional rules-based anti-corruption mechanisms. 165 And, in some
cases, these programs may have some marginal functionality.166 But the ultimate ends
to these means cannot and will not be justified unless culturally sensitive,167
functionally sustainable,168 ex ante, attention is also given to developing other
institutional governance capacities that will serve to support the formal anti-
corruption mechanisms, and do so by establishing the necessary preconditions for
accelerating and sustaining growth. In short, while ex post curative measures might
be expected to be a component of almost any externally-funded anti-corruption
strategy,169 excessive focus on ex post facto legal and institutional enforcement
perspectives – at the expense of ex ante “whole of functional government”
institutional development preventive approaches – will simply not work.170
c. Pro Ante Governance Capacity Development – The Rest Of The

Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Approach: Studies overwhelmingly
demonstrate that in a development aid environment, capable institutions are
necessary to support growth and stem corruption. But what institutions? As a 2008
study succinctly framed the issue, “whilst there are a multitude of studies showing
the value of good governance, research remains to be done on what good
governance really entails, what specific institutional forms that can follow from the
above mentioned basic norm, and how change from low to high QoG (i.e., “quality
of government”) can be obtained . . . Thus, although research points to the value of
achieving QoG, a “one size fits all” approach is likely not the way forward.171 So, the
answer to the question, “what institutions?,” is: it will depend on the circumstances
found at the intervention location.
Clearly, one must prioritize, but any effective anti-corruption approach will take
more than simply setting up stand-alone anti-corruption agencies, training criminal
law judges with formulistic rules-based criminal law materials, lecturing public
employees about ethics, and/or providing awareness training to civil society
organizations – all with a primary emphasis on punishment. It will take a prioritized,
phased, effective, sustainable and holistic governance capacity development plan of
action. And it will also take pragmatically-focused discourse – in concert with local
partners – on the meaning and implementation of both top-down and bottom-up172
capacity-building approaches.
In short, as this author has previously noted, experience has shown that stand-alone
sector-specific trainings (e.g. trainings of judges) are insufficient to create “rule of
law societies.” In fact, when poorly timed, poorly coordinated, poorly conducted,
and/or inadequately reinforced, they may actually be counter-productive. Instead,
capacity building needs to be context-specific and more facilitative rather than
interventionist. And yet, millions of dollars and years of effort continue to be
expended on such means and mechanisms as military/contractor-driven anti-
corruption and rule of law trainings of judicial and other law enforcement personnel.
This must change.173
Before initiating any plan of action, thoughtful assessment of local culture, capacities,
needs, and resources must be undertaken – and done in conjunction with local
partners. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough
explanation of how such assessments should be conducted, suffice to say, there are
any number of assessment templates that may be useful starting points.174 However,
caution is urged when relying on such pre-packaged tools. One reason for this has
been highlighted by a number of capacity-development experts, including Harvard
Professor Dani Rodrick, whose own studies have found that the international aid
community’s predilection for trying to build local institutions based on putative
international "best-practices" has been ineffective for at least two reasons: first, it
has inevitably led to non-culturally specific, one-size-fits-all, approaches that have
seldom gained local commitment and, therefore, have seldom worked; second,
international best-practice mechanisms are often unsuitable and/or unsustainable in
local contexts. Therefore, Roderick, et al., have argued that the most appropriate
institutions for developing countries are "second-best institutions,” those that take
context-specific markets and government capacities into account. These institutions
will often diverge greatly from theoretical best practices.175
While “one-size-fits-all” approaches are to be avoided, experience has shown that

with regard to the types of capacities and capabilities that should be considered and
evaluated before initiating development and anti-corruption programs, one should
start with the commonly found “structural drivers of corruption” that often operate
in developing countries. These drivers of corruption include:

§ Deleterious property rights protection mechanisms;176
§ Inept regulatory schemes;177
§ Anemic managerial,178 human resource management, 179 and operational

planning practices; 180
§ Ineffectual public administrative capabilities;181
§ Inefficient and/or non-transparent procurement,182 contracting,183 and

logistical support systems;184
§ Arcane fiscal budgeting,185 accounting, and audit capacities;186
§ Antiquated educational pedagogies, 187 including but not limited to law school
teaching methodologies;188 and
§ Dickensesque court systems.189
Infestation with even a few of these institutional structural weaknesses portend that
aggregate corruption will likely remain in the developing country. But the “raining” –
or even worse – the “storming” of development aid onto such countries will simply
swamp their nascent governance systems, inevitably exacerbating and structurally
institutionalizing any indigenous corruption;190 that is, unless prioritized, targeted,
phased, bottom-up/top-down and jointly planned/jointly executed, predicate institutional
development strategies are thoughtfully developed and executed.191 It is only through
such collaborative processes that developing countries will be able to navigate
around the structural drivers of corruption, fraud, waste, and abuse, and to do so in
ways that will enable sustained economic development and create the necessary
conditions for sustained improvement in good governance, public welfare and human
security.192
Until that happens, the current governance and anti-corruption agendas, supported
by international agencies, will not achieve these results precisely because they do
not identify the structural drivers of corruption or create feasible responses that are
likely to improve development prospects in particular countries. More worryingly,
by setting broad anti-corruption and good governance goals they may be doing
actual damage by setting unachievable targets for developing countries and diverting
attention from critical governance reforms.193
In light of this situation, rather than repeating the admonition, first do no harm, one
would be better served to recommend: physician, heal thyself.
Draining the Swamp: Amnesty in Return for Investment:
A. Asset Recovery Mechanisms – International Mutual Assistance:

Because local ex ante anti-corruption efforts seldom work in developing countries,194
many in the international community maintain that “international mutual assistance”
mechanisms, utilizing international-law-based civil asset recovery powers, in conjunction
with the compulsion powers of criminal law enforcement agencies, can step in to help
dam the tide of grand corruption.195 This contention is ill-founded for at least three
reasons: first, the current international legal regimen – lacking as it is in substantive
enforcement capabilities – is structurally inadequate to meet the complex challenges
faced by local nations and the international community in combating grand corruption;
second, there is little evidence that the international community has the political will to
systematically employ the even half-hearted international mutual assistance anti-corruption
mechanisms currently available; and third, even if international mutual-assistance
mechanisms were successful in (routinely) returning recovered assets to their intended
beneficiaries, there is simply no reason to believe that any such assets – returned to
same ill-prepared, ill-governed, economies from whence they were first rained (and
appropriated) – would be any better utilized the second time around. Therefore, unless
comprehensive remedial governance capacity-developments were undertaken before the
recovered assets were returned to the intended beneficiary countries, the returned
assets would again serve as “a supply-side appeal to (and institutionalization of)
monopolistic rent-taking tendencies” still in place. Thus, alternative approaches to
corruption abatement and asset recovery must be considered.
a. International Law: The case for the systematic application of international

mutual assistance and international law to combat corruption is much in vogue.
Admittedly, as a number of commentators have rightfully pointed-out, “great steps”
have been taken over the last decade to establish an international legal regimen to
combat bribery and corruption. These commentators routinely cite as examples
thereof: the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which came
into effect on December 14, 2005; the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, 1977; and the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative,
launched jointly by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World
Bank in 2007.196 However, while internally comprehensive, given current political and
economic realities, systematic application of these laws is often unrealistic;
consequently, they are simply incapable of stemming and/or ameliorating grand
corruption.
The assumption underlying reliance on these legal mechanisms as a buttress against

grand corruption appears to reside in logic similar to that espoused by Nicolò
Machiavelli, who once observed, “(a)nyone who would order the laws of a republic
must assume that all men are wicked . . . laws make them good.”197 But Machiavelli
198
was wrong. First, as an instrument of coercion, law alone is insufficient to “make
people good;” law requires enforcement and enforcement requires political will. In short,
“force and enforcement are part of the very essence of legality.”199 Or, as Abraham
Lincoln once observed, “law without enforcement is only good advice.” However, as
it currently stands in the arena of anti-corruption, the invocation of criminal liability –
normally a matter within the jurisdiction of national law – is subject to the same

practical imitations as found in other state-based anti-corruption measures; to wit:

the necessity of securing local political will.200 As we have seen, though, local political
will to prosecute grand corruption is routinely lacking. Therefore, enforcement
normally “boils down” to asset recovery, and asset recovery requires international
mutual assistance. Unfortunately, the political will of the international community to
provide this assistance is also all too often lacking. 201
Dr. Liliya Gelemerova, an asset recovery and money laundering expert, has observed
that “bad money” often goes to “good countries,” much of it leaving developing
countries and transiting through complex money laundering mechanisms on the way
to the US, UK and elsewhere in the West.202 Gelemerova noted that regardless of
the complex mechanisms used to transit the money, once it found its way to the
West, it seldom returned “home.” Instead stripped governmental and international
development aid assets routinely remain in Western developed economies, and not
the developing countries where the assets belonged.203 Because of this reality, Gelemerova
concluded that the international asset recovery regimens had simply come “to little
avail.”204
Others would concur. In fact, according to recent studies, the situation may be
getting worse, for notwithstanding supposedly robust national and international asset
recovery and anti-money-laundering legal regimens currently in place – including
those found within the UNCAC – law enforcement agencies are reporting ever
increasing volumes of illicit money being laundered.205 As a result, the fight against
corruption in developing countries remains seriously hindered and there is “a wide
gap between governments’ anti-corruption rhetoric and the impunity enjoyed by
public officials.”206
One potential response to this situation would be to fortify international asset

recovery and anti-money-laundering legal regimens. However, there are at least two
seemingly insurmountable obstacles in doing so: first, given the history of its
ratification, the international will to alter the current UNCAC framework appears
tepid, at best;207 and second, as the current international legal regimen was never
conceptualized to deal with grand corruption, it is ill-suited to the task.208 Instead, the
current anti-money laundering and asset recovery systems were conceptualized to
stem illicit narcotics activity, human trafficking and terrorism. They were simply not
designed to impede financial crimes such as large-scale rent looting by political elites
from developing countries, many of whom first gained access to the funds in question
because of their geo-political importance to major international aid donors.209 Under
the circumstances, the likelihood of the current international legal regimen being
significantly altered so as to stand as a bulwark against grand corruption appears
bleak,210 an opinion echoed in a report issued by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource
Centre:
Our political economy analysis of UNCAC indicates that the

Convention, with its preventive and criminal provisions, provides a basis
on which some elements of grand corruption could be addressed.
UNCAC in fact provides a quite comprehensive view of areas that might
be involved in grand corruption schemes: notably, it addresses public

officials (including high-level bureaucrats and politicians), the private
sector, and the international cooperation necessary to recover assets
and fugitives. However, important provisions on criminal offences, asset
recovery, and political corruption are arguably not strong enough nor
clearly defined. Thus, our preliminary conclusion is that UNCAC has just
enough breadth, depth, and leverage to make corrupt elites uneasy, but
perhaps little more than this, as the Convention leaves considerable scope
for undermining effective enforcement at the country level. With a
strong focus on technical anti-corruption measures but significant
weaknesses in providing for the more structural and potentially
constitutional checks and balances of a national integrity system—most
notably, independence of the judiciary and legislature—UNCAC has
important limitations (emphasis added).211
As is the case with many national anti-corruption legal regimens, international

political will to utilize asset recovery programs and asset repatriation is significantly
lacking. Consider, for a moment, the 2009 findings of a study undertaken by the Basel
Institute of Governance into international cooperation vis-à-vis asset recovery:212
There is a large gap between the rhetorical commitment of many

governments towards international cooperation in asset recovery
matters and their actual willingness to make it happen. It has been
argued that this discrepancy reflects unfavorable constellations of
political and economic interests in both requesting and requested
countries. The focus on commitment problems has revealed a central
dilemma that must be overcome if the asset recovery agenda is to
ultimately succeed. In the absence of mechanisms that signal sustained
credible commitment, international agreements, such as the UNCAC, will not
be trusted and therefore remain ineffective . . . In the absence of bilateral
agreements, requests for legal cooperation will mainly depend on the
goodwill of the authorities in requested countries, or the ability of
governments in requesting countries to come up with mutually
beneficial deals. Consequently, the outcome of ARPs become less
predictable because they depend on the specific context rather than on
internationally agreed legal rules and standards (emphasis added).213
Given these findings, it is not surprising that the Basel Institute concluded that, “the
major successful asset recovery cases . . . are behind us. For almost a
decade now, few new cases have been brought to light.” 214 The bottom line
is that difficulties lie not in the complexities of the law, but rather in the rent-seeking
behaviors and calculations of prominent officials, all highly sensitive areas of concern
where the prosperity of countries, sovereignty issues and national interests are at
stake.215 Bearing that in mind, national/international judicial authorities and
international development actors should attempt forge new alliances to overcome the
hidden obstacles to asset recovery.216

b. Institutional Incentives: In addition to mischaracterizing law for coercion,

Machiavelli may have also missed a point or two regarding incentives and institutions.
At their base, legal rules and regulations are rationalized by appeal to the incentives
they create.217 However, legal incentives often crowd out natural motivations of
citizens to “engage in socially valued behavior as a sense of civic duty, a commitment
to personal growth and charity towards others.”218 In short, the punitive sanctions
created by national and international anti-corruption legal regimens offer no ex post
facto incentives for corrupt wrongdoers to “come clean” and/or “go legit.” In fact,
just the opposite.
Illegality associated with corruption usually necessitates the perpetrator undertaking

additional efforts to avoid detection and punishment, thereby leading to further
corruption by such means as pay-offs, hush-money, threats, violence, and etc. Given
these consequences, empirical studies routinely demonstrate that current punitive
anti-corruption policies often cause “corruption to be more distortionary than
taxes.219 Notwithstanding these findings, Machiavellian punitivists advocating for the
current international anti-corruption regimen continue to assume that a one-size-fits-
all coercive legal environment remains the best way to combat corruption. Their faith
in coercion is misguided; one reason being that while the existence of wide-spread
corruption always reduces growth, such negative effects exhibit nonlinearities, as they
are more pronounced in less developed economies. As a result, the effectiveness of
coercive anti-corruption policies depends on the state of development of the
particular economy in question, with institution building tending to be a far more
effective approach to corruption abatement in less developed countries, and stricter
enforcement (i.e., stricter penalties) tending to be more effective in more developed
countries.220
c. Personal Incentives: Professor Petrus Van Duyne has written extensively

about underground economies, money laundering, and international anti-money-
laundering legal regimens. 221 Significantly, for the purposes of this paper, he has
observed that an asset-appropriator’s underlying purpose (i.e., incentive) in engaging in
“money laundering is to try to attain the misleading appearance of “cleanness or
legitimacy” for illegally acquired assets;222 that is, to “turn black money white” so that it
may be moved to the above-ground economy and used openly by the appropriator. 223
The anti-money-laundering (AML) legal regimen, in contrast, is devised to thwart this
design, with the underlying international policy impetus being: “‘Ill gotten goods (should)
never thrive.” Van Duyne has opined, however, that “(a)s with many proverbs, this is
pious wishful thinking of the ‘righteous’. . . history invariably proves them wrong.” 224
Van Duyne’s point is that the proceeds of “loot and plunder” (and many other forms
of illegal enrichment) have, in the past, and often still do, prosper; citing as examples
“American robber barons” and their “modern Russian counterparts.” His most salient
point, however, is that when platitudes have been set aside - and when given the chance
- many “robber barons” have used their ill gotten funds to establish charitable
foundations, legitimate industries and other socially acceptable institutions, including
universities. As a consequence, once these funds became “gentrified,” misdeeds were
“forgiven.” 225 However, today, the “‘Ill gotten goods (will) never thrive” canard has
morphed into international policy, culminating in the enactment of ineffectual anti-
money laundering regimens,226 the unintended effect being that “ill gotten gains” from
grand corruption are seldom recovered, put to effective use and/or otherwise
gentrified.227
John McDowell and Gary Novis, policy advisors with the US State Department, have
also written about un-surfaced, non-gentrified, non-integrated, black money, and noted
that from an economic standpoint, “corruption money” is seldom put to efficient use.
That is, because of risks associated with the international anti-money laundering
regime, asset appropriators are not interested in profit generation and/or efficient
investments, but rather in protecting their proceeds. 228 Thus they seldom invest their
funds in activities that are economically beneficial – even to the countries where the
funds are located.229 Instead, to the extent they invest at all, they often do so in “low-
quality” ventures that simply hide their proceeds; usually to the detriment of local
growth. In fact, in some countries, entire industries, such as construction and hotels,
have been financed not because of actual demand, but because of the short-term
interests of money launderers. When these industries no longer suit the money
launderers, they abandon them, causing a collapse of these sectors and immense
damage to economies that could ill afford these losses. 230
There are, of course, a number of implications to this state of affairs; one being that
the amount of black money being kept in the underground economy appears to be
sufficient to help prop-up or derail some governments. In fact, “(e)stimations of the
level of money laundering reach up to 2 to 5% of world GDP, raising the question
where all this money goes.”231 Where indeed? Why has this money not been “surfaced”
and “integrated” into the above-ground economy? After all, as Van Duyne’s observed,
trying to make illicit black-money white should be the main concern of “crime-
entrepreneurs” and law enforcement officials alike.
The answer, of course, resides in the fact that the largely dysfunctional international
asset recovery regimen has not demonstrated the concerted will to routinely make
corruption-related black money white, nor has it demonstrated the will to routinely
return appropriated assets to their originally intended economies – fragile states.
Instead, the international asset recovery legal regimen demonstrates just enough
enforcement capacity to intimidate corrupt asset appropriators, but not enough
capacity to force the divestiture of these ill-gotten assets. As a result, the perverse
impact of the current international anti-money laundering legal regimen is that it
induces corrupt capital appropriators to keep their assets hidden, where its is poorly
utilized, rather than surfaced into the “legitimate economy” where it could integrated,
gentrified and effectively put to work.232 In short, the money is in purgatory.
Meanwhile, while laundered money typically does little good where it is hidden, at
least it is (usually) safe. Thus, at some point, it could theoretically be used for what it
was initially intended – fragile state economic development. This said, as a matter of
economic reality, it is hard to rationally argue that the money should immediately be
returned to the fragile states for which it was initially intended if no effective institutional
capacity reforms have been internalized. Whether ironic or not, all money – including
crime money – eschews instability, mal-governance and institutional corruption.

Therefore, without an intention to change, there is no rational reason why purloined

money should be shifted to these inherently economically unstable jurisdictions.233
Regardless, as the situation now stands, even assuming, arguendo, local governments do
demonstrate the will to effectuate institutional change, and assuming they could
effectively put the purloined money to good use, the international anti-money-
laundering regimen is impeding billions of dollars from doing what it was intended to
do – enhance stability, develop fragile economies and ensure human security.
Development was the money’s original mission, but this mission cannot be
accomplished because the money is mired in a purgatorial legal “swamp,” with all the
“alligators” circling.234 It is time to drain this swamp.
B. An Alternative To Mutual Support - Self-Help:
a. The Color of Money: Grand corruption is a social, not individualistic,

problem. Its roots are grounded in a country’s social and cultural history, political
and economic development, bureaucratic traditions and policies. It is a symptom of
“deep institutional weaknesses.”235 Or, as Roman David has described it, grand
corruption is a part of a “cultural ethos,” where various environmental factors
incentivize individual actors to act in a corrupt way. 236 Thus, attitudes and decisions
regarding corruption are “largely derived from shared social perceptions,” as well as
“people’s beliefs about corruption and the emotions attached to those beliefs, which
have been reflected in the term ‘folklore of corruption.’”237
Laws, though, are typically designed to deal with individuals – not cultures. Therefore,
to the extent laws are intended to be normative, they pre-suppose a culture of basic
compliance, not widespread impunity. Thus, one major difficulty with prevailing anti-
corruption legal paradigms is that they do not appropriately address the root causes
of the problem; culture. Even more significantly, because they are “on the books”
but unenforced, and because they are often imposed from outside, they add to a
culture of cynicism, a culture that begins to view law as hubris. In short, unenforced
and unenforceable anti-corruption laws substantially degrade the rule of law.238 It is in
this context that we must reconsider the “color” of corruption money, as well as
the methods to recapture it by fragile economies.
In a 2012 study commissioned by the World Bank, University of London Economists

Stephanie Blankenburg and Mustaq Khan examined the impact illicit capital flows had
on developing countries. While recognizing that flows could, in fact, do real harm to
fragile states, Blankenburg and Khan nonetheless found that outflows were often
indicative of “deeper structural problems of political governance” within those
countries and needed to be evaluated in a context-specific manner. Thus, even
though the flows could be considered “illicit” under international legal paradigms, or
illegal under national frameworks, from a development economics impact standpoint
(i.e., harm analysis), Blankenburg and Khan would only label these out flows as
“illicit” if “all direct and indirect effects in the context of the specific political economy of
the society (were) taken into account.239 The authors stressed that indirect effects
depended on the interplay between the economic and political structures of the
country; they also varied widely across contexts:
What constitutes damage in the sense of a negative developmental

impact depends on how we define development. When illicit capital
flows are equated with illegal outflows . . . the implicit suggestion is
that adherence to prevailing legal rules is sufficient for promoting the
social good . . . Yet, the use of the notion of illicitness also suggests
that damaging developmental outcomes may not always correspond
to violations of the law and that, therefore, social, economic, and
political damage needs to be more precisely defined. Moreover, if we
are not to suffer the criticism of paternalism, our criteria have to be
widely accepted as legitimate in that society. In practice, it is difficult
to establish the criteria that measure development and therefore can
be used to identify damage in any society, but particularly in
developing ones. A social consensus may not exist if there are deep
divisions about social goals (emphasis added). 240
In further examining the reasons for capital flight, Blankenburg and Khan evaluated
the flows stemming from a variety of contextual standpoints, including criminality,
economic self-interest, and lack of confidence in governance structures. They also
evaluated the efficacy of efforts to block outflows through such mechanisms as
criminal punishment and asset recovery.241 Their findings led them to advocate for
alternative frameworks to deal with flows driven by political and economic actors,
contending that an obvious reason why political actors in developing countries
engaged in capital flight was over concerns that their political opponents would
expropriate their assets if they came to power. Blankenburg and Khan argued that
the realpolitik nature of political settlements in many developing countries meant
that blocking financial outflows would probably not lead to “liberal rule of law”
because any new ruling coalitions would probably require off-budget resources to
maintain political stability and will keep resources available for elections and for
their own accumulation. In short, “(e)xpropriating the financial resources of former
politicians may therefore have the paradoxical effect of increasing instability . . . we should
not consider all capital outflows by political actors to be illicit in these contexts. 242
Given their findings, Blankenburg and Khan argued that international efforts should
be expended into trying to block capital flight. Rather, international policy focus should
be on helping design local policies to address low productivity and absorb new
technologies, as well as to align regulations across similarly situated developing countries.
Blocking financial outflows without addressing these matters, they noted, will not
improve social outcomes as “(t)he problem is not the capital flight, but the growth-
reducing arrangements that induce it.”243
In conclusion, Blankenburg and Khan argued that from an economic standpoint,

expropriation of government assets could well serve a social interest in that it
could lower the “cost of politics” and/or preserve assets that would otherwise be
lost permanently to governmental waste and mismanagement. In this context,

societies may not be hurt by capital flight as the monies were simply diverted to
safer, more efficient, economies. And, by this logic, the economic challenge for
developing economies with expropriated asset outflows is to rationally align their
policies – and their institutions – so as to re-attract the expropriated capital.
b. Correlation and Cause – They Are Not The Same: Political Scientist
Roman David has observed that the factors keeping a “democracy stable may not
be the same as those that brought it into existence; thus, explanations of
democracy must distinguish between function and genesis.”244 David attributed his
reasoning to Dankwark Rustow’s influential work, “Transitions to Democracy:
Toward a Dynamic Model.”245 In it, Rustow examined the assumptions underlying
functional studies of democracy and proposed a, “dynamic theory of democracy”
that distinguished between “correlate” and “cause.”246 In expounding on this concept,
David noted, “the association between these measures and clean government has
led many to believe that anticorruption measures are causes, not correlates, of
clean government, albeit that they represent function rather than genesis.” David
opined, however, that claiming the establishment of anti-corruption mechanisms –
in themselves – generated shifts to clean government was similar to claiming that,
“holding free elections ensured a clear passage to democracy.” “Scholars of
democratization,” David observed, “would probably disagree with that.”247
Drawing on his democratisation research, David concluded that the factors that
keep government clean are necessary, but not sufficient, for transformation
towards clean government.248 Thus, while anti-corruption law enforcement
mechanisms might be able to keep a clean society clean, they were typically
incapable of “cleaning” a society with an ingrained culture of corruption. In such
cases, only positive incentive mechanisms, such as amnesty, have the capacity to play
a crucial role in establishing clean government by transforming the political culture in
particular society. As Roman observed, “clean and corrupt governments are
qualitatively different situations that require different methods of dealing with
corruption.”249
David argued that anti-corruption mechanisms operating within cultures harboring

a “folklore of corruption” – i.e., cultures of grand corruption – need to be structured
entirely differently from those operating in predominately clean environments; in
societies with cultures of corruption, “the potential that sanctions have to facilitate
a value-normative shift towards clean government is limited.” Instead, “in the short
term, the absence of sanctions and penalties can act as a greater catalyst to
transformation than their immediate imposition.” Thus, he concluded, amnesties
could serve as “transformative measures,” encouraging “the transformation of
political culture during the process of democratisation” and also be “useful in the
process of changing the culture of corruption.”250
c. An Immodest Proposal – Amnesty: Assuming an economically rational

economy, one of the most pernicious impacts corruption has on a developing
country is that it results in a loss of resources available for investment or, as
economists might say, “capital accumulation is depressed.” Thus, the costs of
corruption are significant, especially since it would take only minor changes in
growth rates of developing countries to produce substantial cumulative gains in
output and welfare.251 In a perfect world, the answer to this problem would be
asset recovery and repatriation; assuming, of course, the economy in question was
finally institutionally capable of absorbing the repatriated cash. However, the world
is not perfect and international mutual assistance has not (yet) proven itself to be
an effective instrument to systematically make significant repatriation a reality.
Meanwhile, corrupt appropriators of developing county assets appear to be holding

hundreds of millions (if not billions) of dollars in disposable assets. And though they
may be prepared to keep their ill-gotten gains hidden – or prepared to invest two
illegitimately earned black dollars in a speculative money-laundering scheme in
return for the hope of receiving one semi-legitimate white dollar – does not mean
they are disinterested in receiving the highest returns possible.252 Just the opposite is
probably true. It would seem, therefore, that synergies of interest may well exist
between developing countries and their corrupt (former) leaders; synergies that
could be played out in the context of amnesty programs.253 In order for these
synergies to constructively pan out, however, the economies in question would not
only have to offer amnesty, but they would undoubtedly have to institutionally
restructure themselves in a way that would make them a conducive place for
(re)investment and growth.
It is for another time to expound in-depth on the exact nature corruption amnesty
programs could or should take. But, at least preliminarily, one could envision the
broad parameters of such potential programing entailing the following:
§ First, as “all politics is local,”254 in order to be politically palatable, any amnesty

program would undoubtedly require a national consensus that corruption had
previously been so systemic, culturally ingrained and widespread that criminal
prosecutions under local national law of all/most expropriators would be
unrealistic. This would require a significant public outreach component;255
§ Second, somewhat akin to an “exhaustion of remedies” theory, any effective

amnesty program would probably need to be preceded with a consensus
within the government and political elites that international asset recovery
mechanisms had proven to be too cumbersome, ineffective or expensive for
practical use by the nation. This would probably best be demonstrated
through actual past attempts to engage these mechanisms;256
§ Third, to be most effective, amnesties should be accompanied by some sort of

lustration mechanism not dissimilar to that used by prosecutors/courts in
jurisdictions that allow plea bargaining. Such a system could require
expropriators to provided information about their crimes and/or accomplices,
thereby providing an additional incentive for others to come forward;257 and
§ Fourth, in order to achieve the development goals originally intended for the
money in question, expropriators would probably need to be required to

repatriate the assets to the country to which they were intended, and be
integrated (i.e., invested) into socially beneficial growth-enhancing endeavors.
In this event, a taxation system could appropriately tax the repatriated assets,
as well as the future profits from the endeavors. Further, in order to prevent
volatility, one would presume that some sort mandatory investment period
would need to be structured. 258
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated three central propositions.
First, that sudden influxes of official development aid into countries with unprepared
governance institutions hinder their long-term economic and structural development. I
analogized to the resource curse of countries rich in natural sources that cannot effectively
absorb newly realized resource rents stemming from those resources. I highlighted recent
international experience in this regard and showed that the primary impediment to effective
growth was a lack of governance capacity.
Second, I demonstrated that raining significant official development aid on an economy before
helping it develop basic capacity (i.e., competence) to govern was not only counter-productive,
but was corrupting. In such cases, the aid becomes, in effect, a supply-side appeal to (and
institutionalization of) monopolistic rent-taking tendencies. Thus, the aid does long-term
damage to the country by perverting its governance system and converting localized petty
corruption into institutionalized grand corruption; corruption that is virtually impossible to
reverse through traditional anti-corruption campaigns.
Third, I demonstrated that in situations where official development aid had induced the
institutionalization of grand corruption, traditional cleanup efforts – focused as they are on ex
ante public awareness, anti-corruption committees and punitive sanctions – have proven to be
virtually worthless. Therefore, in cases of grand corruption institutionalism, rather than focus
on ineffective punitive sanctions and mutual assistance asset recovery mechanisms, I proposed
undertaking ex ante anti-corruption cleanup efforts, revolving around comprehensive amnesty
programs, in order to spur growth and investment, as well as regularize the rent taker’s future
behavior.
About the author

Major General (USAF, Ret.) Charles Tucker, serves as Executive Director of two
International Non-Governmental Organizations: the Sustainable Capacity International Institute,
Arezzo, Italy; and the World Engagement Institute, Chicago, IL, USA. In these capacities, he
designs and manages institutional capacity building programs throughout the world. He likewise
promotes the economic and legal development of people through education, research,
documentation, and advocacy. In addition, Gen. Tucker serves as a Senior Fellow of the Center
for the Study of the Middle East (CSME), School of Global & International Studies, Indiana
University, Bloomington, as well as the International Projects Director for the National Strategy
Forum, a non-partisan training institute and think-tank located in Chicago. He also he serves as
a Member of the Board of Directors of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA), Geneva, Switzerland, where, as the United States
Government representative on the 12-member Board, he is charged with promoting, governing
and overseeing the implementation of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers to promote the responsible provision of private security services and respect
for human rights and national and international law by exercising independent governance and
oversight of the ICoC. Professor Tucker has been an educator, international legal expert, and
institutional capacity development practitioner for more than thirty years. Throughout his
career, he has routinely served with the US State Department, United Nations and various
International Organizations in numerous countries. His academic career has included teaching
positions in International Law for the University of Colorado (1999-2002) and DePaul
University (2008-2011). He attained the rank of Assistant Professor of Law at the US Air Force
Academy and served as Course Director of the Academy’s Comparative International Law
Program (1999-2002). He was the founding Co-Editor of the USAFA Journal of Legal Studies
and the DePaul University Rule of Law Journal. Prof. Tucker has also served as Adjunct
Professor of Business and Labor Management for Bradley University (2002-2008), as Adjunct
Professor of Political Science for the University of Maryland (1984-1989), and as Adjunct
Professor of Government for Wayland University (1982-1984). Prof. Tucker currently serves as
the Co-Course Director of the United Nations’ Annual International Humanitarian Law
Symposium. He has lectured as a Visiting Professor at the Vietnam National University (Đại học
Quốc gia Hà Nội); the Universität Heidelberg (Germany; the University of Zagreb (Sveučilištu u
Zagrebu, Croatia); the University of Sarajevo (Univerziteta u Sarajevu, Bosnia and Herzegovina);
Ankara Üniversitesi (Turkey); the University of Sulaimani (‫ﺍاﻝلﺱسﻝلﻱيﻡمﺍاﻥنﻱيﺓة ﺝجﺍاﻡمﻉعﺓة‬, Sulaymaniyah, Iraq);
and Duhok University (‫ ﺩدﻩهﻭوﻙك ﺝجﺍاﻡمﻉعﺓة‬, Duhok, Iraq). Prior to retiring from his active duty and
reserve military career, Gen. Tucker served as the National Guard’s Director of Joint Doctrine,
Training and Force Development. He was responsible for overseeing the National Guard’s
various Joint Education and Training Centers, as well as its entire Joint Professional Education
Program and curricula development efforts. Since his military retirement, he has assisted the
Vietnamese, Kenyan and Somali governments with their constitutional and legal development
and has published widely on these subjects. He is a 1979 graduate of the University of Notre
Dame (B.A., Government) and a 1982 graduate of the DePaul University College of Law (Juris
Doctor).
Notes
1
William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 3, Scene 2.
2
Quote attributable to Charles E. Tucker, Sr. (1933-1993), as recalled – and modified – by author. The adage may
not have originated with the speaker. See: Popik, Barry. “Origin and history of ‘drain the swamp’ (Mother Jones,
Reagan, Rumsfeld, Pelosi).” Red State Member Diary Online. (July 29, 2010), at:
http://www.redstate.com/barrypopik/2010/07/29/origin-and-history-of-drain-the-swamp-mother-jones-reagan-
rumsfeld-pelosi/ (accessed 26 March 2013).
3
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) defines ODA as:
. . . flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral
institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or
by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main

objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 %

(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 %).
See, OECD website, “Official development assistance – definition and coverage,” available at
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (accessed 11 March 2013).
4
In 2011, DAC members provided $133.5 billion in ODA, representing 0.315 % of their combined gross national
income (GNI). See, OECD aid statistics and databases: “All about numbers - who spends what, where?” at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/50060310.pdf (accessed 11 March 2013).
5
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). “Towards human resilience: Sustaining MDG progress in an age of
economic uncertainty. Ch. 5, Official Development Assistance.” (2011): 146. And see: Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 2012. Books Express Pub. 2011: Table 1297. U.S. Government Foreign Grants and Credits by
Type and Country: 2000 to 2010.
6
Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Penguin Press, 2005.
7
See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, "From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals," The Lancet
379, no. 9832 (2012): 2206-2211 (proposing organisation of the post-2015 MGD goals into the broad categories of
economic development, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion, as well as “good governance at all levels,
local, national, regional, and global.” Id. at 2208).
8
See, Evelyn Wamboye and Abel Adekola, "Foreign Aid, Legal Origin, Economic Growth and Africa’s Least
Developed Countries," (2013): 19 (“issue of foreign aid effectiveness in developing countries has continued to
puzzle many policy makers and donors alike”); and Susan Harkness, “Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-
being,” UNU-WIDER No. 2004/33, Research Paper, United Nations University (UNU), 2004 (describing problems
inherent in devising unambiguous, uncontroversial, measurements of political and civil rights. Id. at 16).
9
Eric Werker, “The Political Economy of Bilateral Foreign Aid,” Harvard Business School BGIE Unit Working Paper
13-026 (2012).
10
Steven Radelet, "A Primer on Foreign Aid," Center for Global Development Working Paper 92 (2006).
11
James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe, "Testing Models of US Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During
and after the Cold War," The Journal of Politics 60, no. 01 (1998): 63-85.
12
Pierre Landell-Mills, Ramgopal Agarwala, Stanley Please, and Banque Mondiale, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth: A Long-term Perspective Study, World Bank, 1989.
13
David Booth, "Aid Effectiveness: Bringing Country Ownership (and Politics) Back In." Conflict, Security &
Development 12, no. 5 (2012): 537-558.
14
The attacks of 11 September 2001 played a part in alerting the West to costs of failed states and the need for
development assistance. On 14 March 2002, President Bush announced a 50% increase in US ODA. See, William
Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so much Ill and so little Good.
Penguin (2006): 47. And see, Robert K. Fleck and Christopher Kilby, “Changing Aid Regimes? US Foreign Aid from
the Cold War to the War on Terror,” Journal of Development Economics 91, no. 2 (2010): 185-197 (U.S. aid flows to
developing countries increased during “War on Terror,” but emphasis placed on need steadily fell).
15
ODA volumes in the mid‐ and late‐nineties were, in real terms, at the same level as during the mid‐eighties. In or
around 2000, they began to increase and by 2006 ODA was 60% above 1999 levels. See, Stephen Howes, "An
Overview of Aid Effectiveness, Determinants and Strategies." (2011): 1.
16
For example, see:
§ James Putzel, Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 2010 (by promoting institutional arrangements that are ideologically congenial to the
donors’ citizens, but ill-adapted to the specific donee context, ODA can fuel conflict and human
insecurity);
§ Simplice Anutechia Asongu, Reversed Economics and Inhumanity of Development Assistance in Africa,
University Library of Munich, Germany, 2012 (development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth,
GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development);
§ Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas van de Walle, “A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State
Building in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Aid-Institutions Paradox,” Washington DC, 2006 (large and sustained
volumes of aid can have negative impacts on development of good public institutions); and
§ Bräutigam, Deborah,, and Stephen Knack. “Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan
Africa,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, (2004), 52, 2: 255-285 (aid creates long-term client-
state dependencies).
17
The term “governance” was introduced in the literature via a 1989 World Bank publication. See, World Bank.
“Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development,” Washington, DC, 1989. Another early paper using
the term defined it as, “the use of political authority and exercise of control over a society and the management of
its resources for development.” See, Pierre Landell-Mills,, and Ismail Serageldin, "Governance and the External
Factor," In Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, pp. 303-20, 1991. Currently,
the World Bank equates “good governance” with “sound development management.” Governance areas evaluated
by the Bank include: public sector management; accountability; legal framework for development; and information
and transparency. See, World Bank. Governance and development. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992: 1-4. But see:
Heather Marquette, "Corruption, Democracy and the World Bank," Crime, Law and Social Change 36, no. 4 (2001)
(governments may be honest but inefficient and narrow elites may capture the state and exert excess influence on
policy. Id. at 396).
18
Gil S. Epstein and Ira N. Gang, "Good Governance and Good Aid Allocation," Journal of Development Economics
89, no. 1 (2009): 12-18.
19
Seiki Tanaka and Masanori Yoshikawa, “Establishing Good Governance in Fragile States Through Reconstruction
Projects—Lessons from Iraq,” Brookings Working paper 56 (2013).
20
Monterrey Consensus Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development Monterrey,
Mexico, 18-22 March 2002, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf (accessed
10 May 2013)(role of development aid in range of domestic and external resource flows needed to achieve the
MDGs).
21
OECD (2003) Rome declaration on harmonization. In High-Level Forum I on aid effectiveness, 24–25 February
2003. OECD, Rome. http://www.who.int/hdp/publications/1b_rome_declaration.pdf (accessed 10 May 2013)(DAC
donors’ agreement to better harmonize aid interventions).
22
OECD (2005) Paris declaration on aid effectiveness. In High Level Forum II on aid effectiveness, 28 February–2
March 2005. OECD, Paris, available at: http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?doc_id=2148 (accessed 10 May
2013)(outlining the “rules of the game” for delivering aid).
23
OECD (2008) Accra agenda for action. In High Level Forum III on aid effectiveness, 2–4 September 2008.
OECD, Accra, Ghana. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-
4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf (accessed 10 May 2013 (mid-point evaluation of Paris Declaration; reflected input
from more than 3000 Civil Society Organizations: and set accelerated agenda toward improving quality and
effectiveness of ODA).
24
OECD (2011) Busan partnership for effective development cooperation. In Fourth High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness, Busan, South Korea, 29 November–1 December 2011. OECD, Busan, South Korea, available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf (recognized importance of country ownership, donor
alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability, with a significant focus on transparency
and the use of country systems).
25
But note, Gerry Mackie, "Effective Rule of Law Requires Construction of A Social Norm of Legal Obedience."
(2012) (international institutions seldom undertake the harmonization of moral-social-legal engagements carefully
designed to respect autonomy and to minimize harm. Id. at 12).
26
William Easterly and Claudia R. Williamson, "Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency
Practices," World Development 39, no. 11 (2011) (authors identified “five best practice dimensions,” for aid
disbursement: agency transparency; minimal overhead costs; fragmentation of aid; delivery to more effective
channels: and allocation to less corrupt, more democratically free, poor countries. Id. at 1930 1931).
27
OECD-DAC, “Managing Aid: Practices of DAC Member Countries,” Better Aid Series, 2009. (The pace and depth
of aid reform are not yet consistent across donor programmes. Id. at 76-77.)
28
Id., Tanaka and Yoshikawa, supra, note 19, at 2.
29
Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Maya Schmaljohann, The Allocation of German aid: Self-interest and
Government Ideology, No. 1817, Kiel Working Paper, 2013 (geo-strategic and commercial motives matter for the
allocation of German aid.)
30
Jean‐Claude Berthélemy, "Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do
all Donors Behave the Same?" Review of Development Economics 10, no. 2 (2006): 179-194. Aid agencies that
received the worst overall scores included the US and Greece.
31
Alberto Alesina and David Dollar. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of Economic Growth 5,
no. 1 (2000): 33-63. (“Inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically
friendly to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a
superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony.”) Accord, Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, “How Much Is a
Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy

114, no. 5 (2006) (U.S. aid increased by 59% when country held a temporary seat on the UNSC; its UN aid
increased by 8%).
32
Andreas Fuchs, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Hannes Öhler, Why Donors of Foreign Aid do not Coordinate: The Role of
Competition for Export Markets and Political Support, No. 1825. Kiel Working Paper, 2013: 22-23. And see: Axel
Dreher, Stephan Klasen, James Raymond, and Eric Werker, "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-driven Aid Less
Effective?" (2010).
33
The term, “international aid community,” appears throughout the development aid literature. At least one
prominent economist uses the term interchangeably with the terms “international aid bureaucracy,” “international
aid agencies,” and “cartel.” See, William Easterly, "The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in
Foreign Aid," The Journal of Policy Reform 5, no. 4 (2002): 223-250. (“The members of this cartel are the world’s
leading foreign aid organizations, which constitute a near-monopoly relative to the powerless global poor.”) In
further describing this “community” the author opined:
A group of well-meaning national and international bureaucracies dispensed foreign aid under
conditions in which bureaucracy does not work well. The hostile environment under which such
aid agencies functioned induced them to organize a cartel that increased inefficiency and reduced
effective supply of development services, frustrating the good intentions and dedication of
development professionals. The cartel of good intentions allows rich country politicians to feel
that they are doing all in their power to help the world’s poor, supports rich nations’ foreign
policy goals, preserves a panoply of large national and international institutions, and provides
resources to poor country politicians with which to buy political support. In short, foreign aid
works for everyone except for those whom it was intended to help. Id. at 224 – 225.
34
The issue of “conditionality” is controversial in that it implies a connection between “acceptance” of the
conditions and “ownership” of the programing involved. Ownership is not the same as commitment, and studies
verify conditionality has not been an effective instrument to, “get governments to do something they do not want
to do.” See, Morrissey, Oliver, and Arjan Verschoor. "What does ownership mean in practice?" The IMF, World
Bank and Policy Reform (2006): 276.
35
For an insightful discussion of the linkages between U.S. foreign aid allocations and U.S. geo-political foreign
policy goals, see: Te-Yu Wang, “U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues,” International
Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 199-210. (The U.S. successfully utilized foreign aid programs to induce foreign
policy compliance in UN on issues vital to its national interest.)
36
In 2012, the world’s largest ODA donors, by volume, were the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
France and Japan. See list of ODA donors, by gross funding allocations, at OECD website:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm
37
Economists Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson have defined “good institutions” as,
“corresponding to a social organization which ensures that a broad cross-section of the society have effective
property rights.” See, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, An African Success Story: Botswana,
No. 3219, CEPR Discussion Papers, 2002: 1.
38
Id., Easterly and Williamson, 2011, supra, note 26, at 1945.
39
David de la Croix and Clara Delavallade, "Why Corrupt Governments may Receive more Foreign Aid," Oxford
Economic Papers, 2013.
40
Development aid is different from other forms of non-tax revenue because aid comes with a “donor attached.”
Bermeo, Sarah. "The Curse of Aid? Re-Examining the Impact of Aid on Regime Change." In Re-Examining the
Impact of Aid on Regime Change (September 14, 2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. 2009: 19 (study found
donor intent and not an unintended curse associated with increased financial flows, influenced the relationship
between foreign aid and local political elites). Accord, Tanaka and Yoshikawa, supra, note 19, at 20 (quality of donor
intervention found to lead to more positive results than the quantity of intervention).
41
Id., Axel Dreher, Vera Eichenauer, and Kai Gehring, 2013. Accord, Matteo Bobba and Andrew Powell, Aid
Effectiveness: Politics Matters, No. 601, Working paper/Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department,
2007 (aid allocated to political allies ineffective for growth: aid extended to countries that are non-allies was highly
effective. Id. at 24).
42
“Throwing money at the problem exacerbates the problem,” says Andrew Wilder, an expert at Tufts University
who has studied the effect of aid in southern Afghanistan. “A tsunami of cash fuels corruption, delegitimizes the
government and creates an environment where we're picking winners and losers.” See, Michael Hastings, “The
Runaway General,” Rolling Stone 1108, no. 1109 (2010): 8-22. As Professor Wilder explained in an earlier piece for
Foreign Policy Magazine:
The most destabilizing aspect of aid, however, is its role in fueling corruption. And here,
Western donor governments have been slow to acknowledge their contribution to this problem.
Our research suggests that the failure to win Afghan hearts and minds is not because too little
money has been spent. In fact, money has been part of the problem. Spending too much too
quickly with too little oversight in insecure environments is a recipe for fueling corruption,
delegitimizing the Afghan government, and undermining the credibility of international actors. But
policymakers also ignore the most obvious, effective, and quickest way to reduce corruption:
reduce funding, especially in the most insecure areas, to levels more in line with what Afghanistan
can absorb. Future benchmarks for success, as well as incentive structures for both military and
civilian institutions, should be changed from the number of projects implemented and amounts of
money spent to ensuring accountability and the quality and impact of programs. Id.
See, Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon, "Money Can’t Buy America Love," Foreign Policy, Washington DC 1
(2009): 11.
43
In post-conflict countries, the presence of international peacekeepers and aid providers may contribute to
corruption rather than prevent it, owing to the large volumes of cash that follow them into war-ravaged
economies. See, Alix Boucher, William Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry. "Mapping and
Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States." (2010): 23.
44
See, for example:
§ Arjan De Haan and Ward Warmerdam, “The Politics of Aid Revisited: A Review of Evidence on State
Capacity and Elite Commitment,” Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper 7
(2012). (“Aid frees central government resources for spending on current consumption, which in turn
fuels corruption”);
§ D. Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, London: Penguin
Books, 2009. (Citing a World Bank study finding nearly 85% of aid money was either diverted or
channeled for “unproductive” or “grotesque” ventures);
§ Margaret Kelly Wilkie, “The Effects of Foreign Aid on Perceptions of Political Corruption in Sub-Saharan
Africa,” PhD diss., University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida, 2008. (ODA given to corrupt
governments “only fuels corruption”); and
§ Michal Chervin and Sweder Van Wijnbergen, “Economic Growth and the Volatility of Foreign Aid.”
(2010). (Aid volatility “fuels corruption”).
45
David H. Bearce and Daniel C. Tirone, “Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor
Governments,” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 3 (2010): 837-851. (When the strategic benefits are large for donors,
foreign aid becomes ineffective because Western governments cannot credibly enforce their conditions for
economic reform. Id. at 837).
46
Id., Easterly and Williamson, 2011, supra, note 26 (current studies leave out any direct measurement of the
impact of aid dollars on the intended beneficiaries and, therefore, “there are simply no reliable impact measures
available across agencies.” Id. at 1930-1932).
47
Id. at 1930-1949. Easterly also notes that aid beneficiaries have few means to provide feedback or influence the
behavior of the international aid bureaucracy, and aid agencies are “typically not transparent” about their operating
costs and/or how they spend the aid money.
48
Hristos Doucouliagos and Martin Paldam, “The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results of 40 years of
Research,” Journal of Economic Surveys 23, no. 3 (2009): 433-461. (The aid effectiveness literature has not managed
to show there is a significantly positive effect of aid. Id. at 461.) And see, Hristos Doucouliagos and Martin Paldam,
“The Ineffectiveness of Development Aid on Growth: An Update,” European Journal of Political Economy 27, no. 2
(2011): 399-404 (“analysis of the results of decades of research suggests that, on average, aggregate development
aid flows are ineffective in generating growth.” Id. at 401).
49
See, e.g., William Easterly and Tobias Pfutze. “Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign
Aid,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 2 (2008). (“It is a sad reflection on the aid establishment that knowing
where the money goes is still so difficult and that the picture available from partial knowledge remains so
disturbing.” Id. at 23).
50
Daniel Miller, “Sachs, Easterly and the Banality of the Aid Effectiveness Debate: Time to Move On,” Mapping
Politics 3 (2012): 78, citing: Paul Mosley, Overseas Aid: Its Defence and Reform, Wheatsheaf Books, 1987; and Michael
Clemens, Steven Radelet, and Rikhil Bhavnani, “Counting Chickens when they Hatch: The Short Term Effect of Aid
on Growth.” Center for Global Development working paper 44 (2004).

51
For a useful discussion of the generalized determinants of aid effectiveness and strategies for making aid more
useful, see Howes, supra, note 15, at 8.
52
Richard M. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, Psychology Press, 1993.
53
See, e.g., Xavier Sala-i-Martín and Arvind Subramanian. Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from
Nigeria. No. 9804. International Monetary Fund, 2003 (natural resources exert a negative and nonlinear impact on
growth via their deleterious impact on institutional quality).
54
Thorvaldur Gylfason, “Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development,” European economic review
45, no. 4 (2001): 847-859.
55
Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-361; and Jeffrey D. Sachs
and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic Review 45, no. 4 (2001): 827-838.
But see, Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse,” The Economic
Journal 116, no. 508 (2006): 1-20 (quality of institutions determines whether countries avoid the resource curse. Id.
at 16).
56
Id., Sachs and Warner, 2001, supra, note 55, at 827-838.
57
Arye L. Hillman, “Rent Seeking,” The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, 2nd Edition, Cheltenham UK: Edward
Elgar, 2011, citing: Gordon Tullock, “Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,” J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ.
16 (1986): 459; and Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society,” The American Economic
Review 64, no. 3 (1974): 291-303.
58
Michael L. Ross, “The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth can Make You Poor,” Natural Resources and Violent
Conflict: Options and Actions (2003): 17-42. (Since mid-1990s there has been growing research on the causes of civil
wars. One of the most surprising and important findings: “natural resources play a key role in triggering,
prolonging, and financing these conflicts.”)
59
Nazgul Eralieva and Jie Qin, “An Examination of the Natural Resource Curse after the 1990s,” 立命館経済学
61, no. 3 (2012): 405-423. And see, Margareta Sollenberg, “A Scramble for Rents: Foreign Aid and Armed Conflict,”
PhD diss., Uppsala University, 2012 (“this dissertation is the first to stress the potential of aid to produce incentive
structures for elite rent-seeking scrambles and to specify conditions under which such incentives may translate into
increasingly competitive rent-seeking raising the probability of conflict.” Id. at 32.)
60
Roland Hodler, “The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries,” European Economic Review 50, no.
6 (2006): 1367-1386.
61
Simeon Djankov, Jose Garcia-Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, “Does Foreign Aid Help?” Available at SSRN
896550 (2006): 7. See also, Michael Ross, “Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview with some Policy
Options.” In a draft report prepared for The Governance of Natural Resources Revenues Conference, sponsored
by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement, Paris, pp. 9-10. 2002. (Resource dependence
promotes civil war in four ways: by harming a country’s economic performance; by making its government weaker,
more corrupt, and less accountable; by giving people who live in resource-rich regions an incentive to form an
independent state; and by helping finance rebel movements.) And see, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and
Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-595. (Authors tested “greed theory,”
focusing on the ability to finance rebellion, against a “grievance theory,” focusing on ethnic and religious divisions,
political repression and inequality. Found: greed considerably outperformed grievance.)
62
Id., Auty, supra, note 52. But see: Christa N. Brunnschweiler, and Erwin H. Bulte, “The Resource Curse Revisited
and Revised: A Rale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55, no. 3
(2008): 248-264. (“we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions and institutions determine resource
dependence.” Id. at 23.) But note: The resource curse is confirmed many economists emphasizing the fact that
natural resources do not, by themselves, harm growth; they only become a problem in the absence of good
institutions (referred to as “institutional appropriability”). See: Anne Boschini, Jan Pettersson, and Jesper Roine,
“The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal,” World Development (2012); and Anne D. Boschini, Jan Pettersson,
and Jesper Roine, “Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
109, no. 3 (2007): 593-617. And see, Robert T. Deacon and Ashwin Rode, “Rent Seeking and the Resource Curse,”
2012 (empirical studies indicate that rent-seeking can be constrained by effective governance institutions and that a
resource curse only applies to societies with poor governance institutions. Id. at 25).
63
Id., Djankov, et al., 2006, supra, note 61 (“the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of foreign aid is
discouraging.” Id. at 1). And see: Simplice A. Asongu, The Political Economy of Development Assistance: Peril to
Government Quality Dynamics in Africa, University Library of Munich, Germany, 2012 (development assistance
deteriorates government quality dynamics of corruption-control, political-stability, rule of law, regulation quality,
voice and accountability and government effectiveness. Id. at 24-25).
64
Simplice A. Asongu, “On the Effect of Foreign Aid on Corruption,” Economics Bulletin 32, no. 3 (2012): 2174-
2180. (“Development aid fuels corruption in Africa,” refuting findings of Keisuke Okada and Sovannroeun Samreth,
“The Effect of Foreign Aid on Corruption: A Quantile Regression Approach,” Economics Letters 115, no. 2 (2012):
240-243.)
65
Id., Djankov, et al., 2006, supra, note 61, at 1.
66
Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, “The Curse of Aid,” Journal of Economic Growth 13,
no. 3 (2008): 169-194.
67
Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol found if the foreign aid a country received over a period of five years
reached the 75th percentile of its GDP, then a 10-point index of democracy was reduced between 0.6 and one
point. As a comparison, they measured the effect of oil rents on political institution and found the fall in democracy
when oil revenues reached the 75th percentile was smaller. Id. at 172.
68
Id. at 172.
69
Id. at 173, citing Bräutigam and Knack (2004), supra, note 16, at 255-285 (statistically significant, negative
relationship between aid intensity and quality of governance). Accord, Deborah Bräutigam, Aid Dependence and
Governance, Vol. 1. Expert Group on Development Issues, 2000.
70
Id., citing Michael Maren, “The Road to Hell: How International Charity & Food Aid Damage the Third World,”
1997 (Somalia's civil war caused by the desire of factions to control food aid). And see, Djankov, et al. (2006), supra,
note 61 (foreign aid “windfalls” can lead to increased corruption, rent-seeking activities and civil war).
71
Id. at 174, citing Paul Collier and David Dollar, “Development Effectiveness: What Have We Learnt?” Economic
Journal 114, no. 496 (2004)(emphasis added). And see, Franklin D. Kramer and Melanne Civic. “Strategic Realities in
Irregular Conflict. Ch. 3,” 2013 (NGOs that rush to establish humanitarian and development programs without
assessing local conflict dynamics inadvertently do harm as humanitarian resources transferred into a local context
fuel conflict between groups and can be hijacked by local armed groups to buy more weapons. Id. at 30).
72
See, e.g., Jessica Martini, Roch Mongo, Hyppolite Kalambay, Anne Fromont, Nathalie Ribesse, and Bruno
Dujardin, “Aid Effectiveness from Rome to Busan: Some Progress but Lacking Bottom‐up Approaches or
Behaviour Changes,” Tropical Medicine & International Health 17, no. 7 (2012): 931-933 (Decision-making should be
based on bottom-up approaches, such as country-led mechanisms of planning, implementation and evaluation,
taking stock of and scaling up local experiences. Id. at 932.)
73
Id., Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2011, supra, note 48. (Authors confirmed a “striking pattern”: as the number of
estimates has increased, the partial correlation of aid and growth keeps declining. Authors’ meta-analysis had
detected this declining aid effectiveness. Id. at 402.)
74
Id., Asongu, 2012, supra, note 63.
75
Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright, Foreign Aid and Democratic Development in Africa, UNU-WIDER Research
Paper WP2012/20, 2012 (democracy and governance aid, focused on capacity building, have a consistently positive
effect on democratic consolidation; economic aid has no effect on democratic consolidation). Id., at 28 – 29.
76
“Strong commitments of aid should follow, not lead, the indicators of effort being made to achieve better
macroeconomic stability, and better governance.” Deborah Bräutigam, Aid Dependence and Governance, Vol. 1,
Expert Group on Development Issues, 2000: 55.
77
Oxford Economics Professor Paul Collier evaluated the state of development in 58 countries; mostly in Africa.
He argued for continued financial development assistance, taking a middle position between Jeffrey Sachs (calling
for a “big bang” to double official development assistance and end poverty) and William Easterly (who has been
deeply skeptical of the aid business). Collier contended aid could work under limited circumstances. He cited, as
an example, aid applied to reinforce institutional development already underway, such as the US’s Millennium
Challenge Account that has provided countries with incentives to reform policies. However, he warned that
providing large amounts of development aid to new leaders – or to those economies at the very beginnings of a
reform process – often created disincentives to complete reforms. Collier recommended a “go slow” approach.
See, Paul Collier, Bottom Billion, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007.
78
Arvind K. Jain, “Models of Corruption,” Economics of Corruption 65 (1998): 13.
79
There are, of course, dissenters from the consensus; chiefly citing to cultural and economic differences. See, e.g.,
Kalin Ivanov, “The Limits of a Global Campaign against Corruption,” Corruption and Development: The Anti-corruption
Campaigns (2007): 28-45 (author raised “doubts about the feasibility of a global fight against corruption, divorced
from the local context,” because the “global agenda’s technocratic approach” failed to understand that local views
of corruption “may reflect alternative normative frameworks such as familial duties, ethnic or religious loyalties,
fidelity to friends, or norms of reciprocity.” Id. at 35).

80
Arvind K. Jain, “Corruption: A Review,” Journal of Economic Surveys 15, no. 1 (2001): 71-121; 71-72. But see, Jens
Chr. Andvig, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Inge Amundsen, Tone Sissener, and Tina Søreide, “Corruption. A Review of
Contemporary Research.” Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2001: 5-49. Andvig argues that the legal public definition of
corruption is problematic because it assumes laws prohibit corrupt behavior, legal frameworks are neutral and
non-political, all corrupt behavior is covered by laws, and there was a non-varying correspondence between
legality and morality. Andvig concludes that the legality of various practices varies across jurisdictions as corruption
is a “social act;” it “is now a legal one, now illegal, depending upon the social context” (emphasis added). Id. at 49.
81
Professor Petrus Van Duyne has identified nine sub-divisions of corruption, assuming there to be a,
differentiation between corrupter and corruptee; between the person who induces or initiates the corrupt
exchange and the person who accepts it. However, Van Duyne concedes, “(i)n general it is difficult to make such a
differentiation.” See, Petrus C. Van Duyne, “Will Caligula Go Transparent?” United Nations Centre for International
Crime Prevention 1, no. 2 (2001): 73, 77.
82
Prior to 1990, countries now identified as “corrupt” were simply referred to as “authoritarian” or “totalitarian.”
Sarah Bracking, Political Development and Corruption: Why “Right Here, Right Now!” Corruption and Development. The
Anti-Corruption Campaigns. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan (2007): 3-27, at 9.
83
Id., Jain, 2001, supra, note 80, at 71 - 72. Others sometimes refer to this form of corruption as, “state capture.”
See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, Susan. The challenge of poor governance and corruption. Copenhagen Consensus, 2004
(“state capture” implies that the state itself can be characterized as largely serving the interests of a narrow group
of business people and politicians, sometimes with criminal elements mixed in. Id. at 12). See also, Joel Hellman,
Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann. “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in
Transition,” 2000: 35.
84
One study found only 16 cents of every aid dollar directed to Ugandan primary school education reached its
intended target. U. Myint, “Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures,” Asia Pacific Development Journal 7, no. 2
(2000): 33-58. And see, Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government
Transfer Program in Uganda,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 2 (2004): 679-705: 679 (data revealed
during 1991-1995, Ugandan schools, on average, received only 13% of international grant funding. Most schools
received nothing. The bulk of the funding was captured by local officials and politicians). See, also, Benjamin A.
Olken, “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” No. w14123.
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008 (finding 24-28% of Indonesian community-development
infrastructure project had been lost to corruption).
85
See, Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. “Cursed by Resources or Institutions?” The World Economy
29, no. 8 (2006): 1117-1131. (Rent-seeking outside the productive economy pays off when institutions are bad, “or
grabber friendly.” Id. at 123 – 124).
86
Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State,” Yale LJ Online 2010 (2010): 125-140
(corruption at the top of the state hierarchy typically imposes large costs on ordinary people by diverting funds to
top political leaders. Id. at132).
87
Id., Rose-Ackerman, 2004, supra, note 83, at 27 (citations omitted).
88
Olivier Cadot, “Corruption as a Gamble,” Journal of Public Economics 33, no. 2 (1987): 223-244 (corruption is a
“highly contagious phenomenon” Id. at 239).
89
Regarding waste, see, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Rory Truex, “Corruption and Policy Reform,” 2012, SSRN
2007152 (endemic corruption creates incentives for officials to create unneeded projects to hide monopoly gains;
in such cases the loss to society is not just the bribes paid; it is the total of wasted resources spent on the project.
Id. at 25).
90
Bo Rothstein, “Anti-Corruption–A Big Bang Theory,” QoG Working Paper Series, no. 3 (2007): 3. (Problem with
corruption is that is a phenomenon that seems to be very “sticky.” Most empirical research shows that “once the
system gets there, it stays there.”) Accord, Eric M. Uslaner, “The Bulging Pocket and the Rule of Law: Corruption,
Inequality, and Trust,” in Conference on The Quality of Government: What It Is, How to Get It, Why It Matters,
2005, pp. 17-19 (“Corruption is remarkably sticky over time”); And see, Myint, supra, note 84 (when systemic
corruption takes hold of a country, the institutions, rules and peoples’ behaviour and attitudes become adapted to
the corrupt way of doing things and corruption becomes a way of life. Id. at 41).
91
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April
2013.
92
Since 2002, Congress has provided nearly $93 billion to rebuild Afghanistan, making it the most costly effort to
reconstruct a single country in US. This number does not yet include all Afghanistan reconstruction funding for
Fiscal Year 2013 because final appropriation amounts have not been determined for many accounts, including State
and USAID accounts. Id. at 3 – 4.
93
The April 2013 SIGAR report commented extensively on ineffective development aid programing, noting that in
the 21 audit reports, it had highlighted numerous instances of inadequate planning, poor quality assurance, lack of
Afghan capacity, and questionable sustainability. Id. at 8.
94
For example, SIGAR emphasized that Afghan government institutions, particularly those involved in
infrastructure projects, lacked technical and managerial capacity to monitor projects, resulting in deficient work. Id.
at 19.
95
Statistics reveal that at least 80% of international aid has been spent by donor agencies and their implementing
partners with little consultation with the Afghan government. As a result, the Afghan government, “has little
incentive to sustain these donor-funded projects.” Id. at 13.
96
Id. at 20.
97
Selçuk Akçay, "Corruption and Human Development,” Cato J. 26 (2006) (statistically significant negative
relationship between corruption indexes and human development; more corrupt countries tend to have lower
levels of human development. Id. at 29).
98
See, Olatunde Julius Otusanya, "The Role of Multinational Companies in Corrupt Practices: The Case of Nigeria,”
International Journal of Critical Accounting 3, no. 2 (2011): 171-203.
99
See, e.g., Global Witness, “Grave Secrecy: How a Dead Man Can Own a UK Company and other Hair-raising
Stories about Hidden Company Ownership from Kyrgyzstan and Beyond,” (2012) ($64 million in Kyrgyz funds
funneled out of country with assistance of Western banks. Id. at 5).
100
There is on-going debate about the accuracy of corruption and money laundering statistics. See, e.g., Petrus C.
Van Duyne, “Organised Crime, Laundering and the Congregation of the Gullible,” 2011; Petrus C. Van Duyne and
Georgios A. Antonopoulos, Cross-border Crime Inroads on Integrity in Europe, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010:
Introduction; and Petrus C. Van Duyne, “Criminal finances and state of the art. Case for concern?” Crime Business
and Crime Money in Europe, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal, 2007: 69-95. Accord, Antoinette Verhage, “The Holy Grail of
Money Laundering Statistics: Input and Outcome of the Belgian AML System,” (2010): 143-168 (it is surprising that
after almost two decades, no valid data are available and no one knows the magnitude of the crime. Id. at 150).
101
As the accuracy of corruption and money laundering statistics is open to question, the figures noted herein are
considered notional and cited for discussion purposes only.
102
Daniel Kaufmann, “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption,” 2005, SSRN 829244.
103
James S. Henry, “The Price of Offshore Revisited,” Tax Justice Network. & Christian Aid (2008) Death and taxes:
the true toll of tax dodging. Christian Aid (2012).
104
Dev Kar and Sarah Freitas, “Illicit Financial Flows From Developing Countries: 2001-2010,” (2012): i, 27.
105
Alex Marriage, "Secret Structures, Hidden Crimes: Urgent Steps to Address Hidden Ownership, Money
Laundering and Tax Evasion from Developing Countries,” (2013): 6.
106
Id., Landell-Mills, et al., supra, note 12.
107
Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 3 (1995): 681-712.
108
Pranab Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature 35, no. 3
(1997): 1320-1346.
109
Arvind K. Jain, “Corruption: A Review,” Journal of Economic Surveys 15, no. 1 (2001): 71-121, at pp. 71-72; citing:
Lant Pritchett and Daniel Kaufmann, “Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects,”
Finance and Development 35 (1998): 26-29; and Aymo Brunetti, Gregory Kisunko, and Beatrice Weder. “Credibility
of Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector,” The World Bank
Economic Review 12, no. 3 (1998): 353-384.
110
Robin Hodess, J. Banfield, and T. Wolfe, “Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2003,” Berlin,
Germany: Transparency International (2003). Accord, Arvind K. Jain, “Corruption: Theory, Evidence and Policy,” CESifo
DICE Report 9, no. 2 (2005): 3-9 (corruption introduces costs and benefits that create a bias against the poor. Id. at
6-7).
111
International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), and Sweden, "Corruption and Human Rights: Making
the Connection,” ISBN 2-940259-85-2 (2009): 115; citing the Oxford English Dictionary, 1978, at 1024-1025.
112
Id. at v. The ICHPR estimated that in Mexico approximately 25% of income earned by poor households was lost
to petty corruption. It estimated in Bangladesh that 33% of girls trying to enroll in a government stipend scheme
for extremely poor students had to pay bribes, while half had to make a payment before collecting their awarded
scholarship. And, in Madagascar, 25% of all households were forced to cover school enrollment fees although all
primary education was free.

113
Id., at 115. Accord, Shrivastava Ashish and Dixit Kusum, "Corruption is Dangerous for Human Rights: A Study,”
2013, noting:
An analysis of corruption that draws on human rights will emphasize the harm to individuals that corruption
causes. From this perspective, it is often taken for granted that corruption “violates” human rights. When people
make this claim, they have a range of issues in mind. They mean that, when corruption is widespread, people do
not have access to justice, are not secure and cannot protect their livelihoods. Court officials and the police pay
more heed to bribes than to law. Hospitals do not heal people because the medical staff give better treatment to
patients who pay backhanders or because clinics lack supplies due to corrupt public contracting procedures. Poor
families cannot feed themselves because social security programmes are corrupt or distorted to support a
patronage network. Schools cannot offer their students a sound education because the education budget has been
looted and as a result teachers cannot be paid and books cannot be purchased. Farmers and market sellers cannot
earn a living because police take a cut of their produce and sales. In numerous ways like these, corruption
encourages discrimination, deprives vulnerable people of income, and prevents people from fulfilling their political,
civil, social, cultural and economic rights. Id. at 2.
114
Katja Samuel, Nigel D. White, and Ana Maria Salinas de Frias, “World Justice Project Counter-Terrorism Expert
Network: Report of Key Findings and Recommendations on the Rule of Law and Counter-Terrorism.” (2012): 8,
citing: the Report of the Secretary-General, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All,” (2005) UN Doc A/59/2005 (In Larger Freedom Report), paras 127-8; and World Summit Outcome,
UNGA Res 60/1 (16 September 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para. 119; UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc
S/RES/1674, para. 2. For a discussion of emerging challenges for development in security-constrained
environments, see, Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel, and Nigel White, eds. Counter-Terrorism: International
Law and Practice, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012.
115
Lisa Denney, “Security: The Missing Bottom of the Millennium Development Goals?” (2012): 2 (advocating for
inclusion of security in the post 2015 MDGs, but with a narrow focus on armed violence. Id. at 7).
116
See, UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 16 May 2013]: preamble.
117
Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies Perspectives 2, no. 3 (2001): 239-
251.
118
Sabina Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security,” (2003).
119
Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie, “Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and Transition,”
United States Agency for International Development/Complex Emergency Response and Transition Initiative, Washington,
2000.
120
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “Human Security: Concepts and Implications,” Les Etudes du CERI - n° 117-118 (2005):
53. Accord, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and Implications, Vol. 51,
Routledge, 2007.
121
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, “Message to the Third Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding
Integrity,” delivered by Dileep Nair (Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services), 29–31 May 2003.
122
Philippa Webb, “The United Nations Convention against Corruption Global Achievement or Missed
Opportunity?” Journal of International Economic Law 8, no. 1 (2005): 191-229.
123
See, e.g., David Chandler, “Human Security: The Dog that Didn’t Bark.” Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (2008): 427-
438.
124
See, Simplice A. Asongu and Kodila-Tedika Oasis. Fighting African Conflicts and Crimes: Which Governance Tools
Matter? No. 44044, University Library of Munich, Germany, 2013. Asongu and Kodila-Tedikam evaluated 38
African countries, utilizing a data sample of African Development Indicators (ADI) from the World Bank (WB) and
the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). Their findings confirmed a direct connection between pervasive
corruption and conflict, noting that corruption-control efforts would, “go a long way” not only to improving the
quality of life and wellbeing of citizens, but also by creating “ideal conditions” for sustainable economic growth. The
authors concluded that, “(u)ltimately, the measure will prevent organized criminal groups from corrupting,
colluding with and/or penetrating state structures.” Id. at 6, 13, 14.
125
See, e.g., Mohd Masoom Stanekzai and Masaki Kudo, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” Toward Bringing
Stability in Afghanistan: A Review of the Peacebuilding Strategy, 2008 (important that SSR in post-conflict countries be
approached from a human-security perspective. Id. at 39).
126
“State fragility” may be characterized as, “weak governments, insufficient security and legal frameworks,
ineffective administration, poor public services, high rates of conflicts and civil wars, growing extreme poverty. See,
Oasis Kodila-Tedika and Simplice A. Asongu, “State Fragility, Rent Seeking and Lobbying: Evidence from African
Data,” (2013): 1, 3. (“Rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the
effectiveness of governance capacity.” Id. at 15.)
127
See, e.g., White House. National Security Strategy, 2010: 47, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 16 May 2013),
and Kaufmann, Daniel. "Corruption, governance and security: challenges for the rich countries and the world."
Available at SSRN 605801 (2004): 95.
128
Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” Survival 36, no. 2 (1994): 3-21.
129
Andre Le Sage, “Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for US Engagement.” Institute for National Strategic
Studies (2010).
130
Diamint, Rut. "Security Challenges in Latin America." “Bulletin of Latin American Research,” 23, no. 1. (2004): 43-
62, at 59 (emphasis added).
131
Johannes Linn, “Reality or Mirage?” ББК 65.9 Е 91 (2012): 96 (emphasis added).
132
Kimberley Thachuk, “Corruption and International Security.” SAIS Review 25, no. 1 (2005): 143-152.
133
Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and
Security in Afghanistan.” Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA (2012) (most destabilizing aspect
for post-war-aid economies is large development spending that fuels massive corruption and delegitimizes
government. Id. at 2-3).
134
T. S. Allen, “Addressing an Ignored Imperative: Rural Corruption in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal On-Line |
February 17 (2013): 2:30am, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/addressing-an-ignored-imperative-
rural-corruption-in-afghanistan (accessed 12 May 2013) (“Now is . . . an appropriate time to consider the
ramifications of military-led efforts to fight corruption.” Id.). Allen’s article assumes the existence of “out-of-
uniform” organizations capable of solving such political problems; he may presume too much. See: Robert
Hoekstra and Charles E. Tucker, Jr., “Adjusting to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” Prism 1, no. 2.
(2010); and Robert Hoekstra and Charles E. Tucker Jr., “Adjusting to Stabilization and Reconstruction
Operations,” JCOA Mission Statement: 23, 37.
135
Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001): 87-102; and
Selçuk Akçay, “Corruption and Human Development,” Cato J. 26 (2006): 29).
136
These efforts have sparked an “anti-corruption industry.” See, Steven Sampson, “The Anti-corruption Industry:
from Movement to Institution.” Global Crime 11, no. 2. (2010): 261-278; and Stephen P. Riley, “The Political
Economy of Anti‐corruption Strategies in Africa.” The European Journal of Development Research 10, no. 1 (1998):
129-159, 132. Some question whether this industry is biased toward perpetuating itself, despite poor outcomes.
See, e.g., Sarah Bracking (ed.), Corruption and Development, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007: 236 – 257; and Bracking
(2007), supra, note 82, at 3-27.
137
See, Tine Søreide, “Democracy's Shortcomings in Anti-corruption.” CMI Working Paper (2012): 1, and Rose-
Ackerman and Truex (2012), supra, note 89, at 14).
138
A sampling of studies finding “disturbing” trends in corruption and anti-corruption campaigns:
§ Yuliya Zabyelina and Jana Arsovska. “Rediscovering Corruption’s Other Side: Bribing for Peace in Post-
conflict Kosovo and Chechnya.” Crime, Law and Social Change (2013): 1-24. (Conventional anti-corruption
approaches can impede successful war to peace transitions);
§ Aili Mari Tripp, Donor Assistance and Political Reform in Tanzania, United Nations University, World
Institute for Development Economics Research, 2012. (“Disturbing consequences” of donor supported
aid and anti-corruption practices in Tanzania”)
§ Olugbenga Olagunju, “Corruption Control in Nigeria: Holistic Approach.” Advances in Arts, Social Sciences
and Education Research 2, no. 1 (2012): 1.
§ Byaruhanga Julius, “Improving Service Delivery in Developing Countries; Approaches, Challenges and
Methodologies Case Studies from Uganda,” (2011). (Corruption has into a global vice of disturbing
proportions.);
§ Martin Tisne and Daniel Smilov, “From the Ground Up. Assessing the Record of Anti-corruption
Assistance in Southeastern Europe," (2004): 51. (“It is a disturbing trend that national anti-corruption
strategies should be applied from country to country with little regard as to whether the solution matches
the problem . . . so little has been achieved.”);
§ Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from
Latin America,” World Development 34, no. 2 (2006): 381-404 (results for Ecuador “very disturbing”); and

§ Barbara George and Kathleen Lacey, “A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations,
Multilateral Development Banks and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to
Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives,” Cornell International Law Journal 33, no. 3 (2000): 547.
139
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (2006): 86-99 (In
recent years, anticorruption has become “a major industry, with global expenditures growing to an estimated one
hundred million dollars per year. “(T)here is little evidence that all this activity is accomplishing much.” Id. at 86).
Accord:
§ Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell, “The failure of Anti-Corruption Policies A Theoretical
Mischaracterization of the Problem,” QoG Working Paper Series 19 (2010)(some corruption became more
entrenched in response to efforts to curb it. Id. at 19);
§ Anwar Shah, “Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance,” World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 3824 (2006)(many anti-corruption programs are simply “folk-remedies or “one size fits all”
approaches that offer little chance of success. Id. at 4); and
§ James Gathii, “Corruption and Donor Reforms: Expanding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of
Law as an Anti-corruption Strategy in Kenya,” Connecticut Journal of International Law 14, no. 2.
(1999)(dealing with corruption simply as a matter of procedural fairness is insufficient).
140
Id., Andvig, et al., supra, note 80.
141
Ed Brown, Jonathan Cloke, and José Luis Rocha, “Governance, Neoliberalism and Corruption in Nicaragua,”
Corruption and Development. The Anti-corruption Campaigns (2007): 182-202 (anti-corruption campaign in Nicaragua
was weakly pursued for geopolitical reasons and donor inconsistency “was breathtaking.” Id. at intro).
142
Id., Rose-Ackerman and Rory Truex, 2012, supra, note 89, at 4.
143
Id., De Haan and Warmerdam, supra, note 44, at 23, concluding, “a better understanding of aid dynamics is
necessary.”
144
Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-national Study,” Journal of Public Economics 76, no. 3
(2000): 399-457; and Martin Paldam, “The Cross-country Pattern of Corruption: Economics, Culture and the
Seesaw Dynamics,” European Journal of Political Economy 18, no. 2 (2002): 215-240.
145
Richard Manning, “Working Paper No. 2012/24, WP/024. Aid as a Second-Best Solution: Seven Problems of
Effectiveness and How to Tackle Them,” United Nations University-Wider, 2013, available at ISBN 978-92-9230-
487-4.
146
Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Organization of Anti-corruption: Getting Incentives Right! Vol. 57, no. 08, Passauer
Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, 2008.
147
Id., Asongu, 2012, supra, note 63, at 12 (attempts by Western aid agencies to introduce top-down formal
institutions “had not fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements”).
148
Id., Bardhan, supra, note 108, at 1333-1336; Rose-Ackerman and Rory Truex, 2012, supra, note 89, at 23; and
Cadot, supra, note 88, at 223-244.
149
Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “Behavioral and Experimental Economics as a Guidance to Anticorruption,” (2012):
279-300. And note, the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) takes a rules-based/repression-based
approach, particularly with regard to its proviso that signatory countries implement national criminal codes for
countering corruption. See: UNODC website, at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html?ref=menuside (accessed on 13 May 2013).
150
Id., Lambsdorff, 2012, supra, note 149.
151
Id., Lambsdorff, 2008, supra, note 146, at 3. For a discussion of such failures in Afghanistan, see: United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends,” (2012): 3-29;
and Civil-Military Fusion Centre. “Corruption & Anti-corruption Issues in Afghanistan,” (2012): 6 ($30 to $60
billion of US funding was “wasted due to fraud, corruption, weak reporting and accountability mechanisms in Iraq
and Afghanistan.” Id. at 23-25).
152
See, e.g., Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Unpacking the Concept of Political Will to Confront Corruption,” U4 Brief
2010, no. 1 (2010). Accord: Patrick Meagher, “Anti‐corruption Agencies: Rhetoric Versus Reality,” The Journal of
Policy Reform 8, no. 1 (2005): 69-103; and John Mukum Mbaku, “Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of
Cleanups,” Cato J. 16 (1996): 99-118 (traditional anti-corruption campaigns, focusing on societal, legal, market, and
political strategies ineffective; to understand why people engage in corruption need to examine the rules that
regulate the socio-political behavior of individuals; at 114.).
153
Keith Blackburn, Niloy Bose, and M. Emranul Haque, “Endogenous Corruption in Economic Development,”
Journal of Economic Studies 37, no. 1 (2010): 4-25.
154
David de la Croix and Clara Delavallade, “Democracy, Rule of law, Corruption Incentives, and Growth,” Journal
of Public Economic Theory 13, no. 2 (2011): 155-187.
155
Id., Boucher, et al., supra, note 43, at 47, noting a “comprehensive anti-corruption strategy . . . ends up looking
like a comprehensive peace-building or state-building strategy.”
156
Id., Morrissey and Verschoor (2006), supra, note 34 (preferences and capacity give rise to local commitment to
reform, but the ability to implement successfully will depend on administrative capability and institutional
structures. Id. at 280-282).
157
One might presume that being “willing but unable” is a probable prescription for systems failure; being “unwilling
and unable” is an undoubted prescription for disaster. Id., Brinkerhoff, 2010, supra, note 152, at 1.
158
Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Unpacking the Concept of Political Will to Confront Corruption,” U4 Brief 2010, no. 1
(2010), at 1 (emphasis added).
159
World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition - A Contribution to the Policy Debate, Washington, DC, 2007.
160
Mirjana Stanković and Robert Sundberg, “A Crime of Calculation–Addressing the Economic Bases of
Corruption in Serbia,” in 16th NISPACEE Conference in Bratislava, Slovakia, 2008: 1 (emphasis added). And see, Robert
E. Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean Abaroa, and H. Lindsey Parris, Corrupt Cities: Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention,
World Bank, 2000; and Kari K. Heggstad and Mona Frøystad, “The Basics of Integrity in Procurement,” U4 Issue
2011, no. 10 (2011): 16 (the challenge is not the creation of written codes of conduct, but putting the guidelines
into practice).
161
Robert Sundberg and Mirjana Stanković, “Anticorruption Mechanisms in Serbian Local Government: Institutions
which both Oppose and Are Resistant to Corruption,” in 15 NISPACEE Conference in Kyev. 2007: 1-4, 2. (“Too
often, anticorruption programs overlook the fact that ethics and legal systems alone are not sufficient to effectively
address corruption. Rather, it is properly established institutions that prove to be powerful anticorruption
mechanisms.” Id. at 1.)
162
Id., Sundberg and Stanković, 2008, supra, note 160 at 3 (emphasis added). Authors noted that mere provision of
legislation, ethical guidelines, training and institutional frameworks are insufficient; public officials cannot turn these
into practice unless given appropriate process-oriented tools to distinguish among parts of the process and guide
them to the desired outcomes. Id. at 12-13.
163
Id., Sundberg and Stanković, 2007, supra, note 161.
164
Ibid. at 3.
165
Traditional anti-corruption programs typically include judiciary, prosecutorial and/or anti-corruption
commission development, as well as public oversight programs designed to spur successful utilization of these
mechanisms. See, Id., Dreher, et al., supra, note 29; and Petter Langseth, Rick Stapenhurst, and Jeremy Pope, “The
Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption,” Commonwealth Law Bulletin 23, no. 1-2 (1997): 499-528.
166
Id., Rose-Ackerman and Rory Truex (2012), supra, note 89, citing Francesca Recanatini, "Anti-corruption
Authorities–An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption?” in International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Vol. 2,
edited by Rose-Ackerman & Søreide (Edward Edgar Publishing, 2011).
167
Cultural contexts, as well as specific forms and determinants of corruption, will vary from country to country.
Thus, before embarking on massive development aid programing, aid agencies must gain an understanding of the
country-specific circumstances. To be effective, this will require close consultation with local actors (top-down and
bottom-up) to help develop a concise set of feasible – and sustainable – institutional development priorities. Among the
key variables that should be analyzed include: potential Rule of Law development, specifically including non-criminal
law matters (3 protection of property rights); appropriateness of local regulations, regulatory discretion and
bureaucratic red tape; economic policies; political variables (e.g., fracture politics, length of leader in power,
democracy); Civil Liberties (and ability of civil society to play a role); professionalism and incentives of civil service;
education and literacy; natural resources management; ethno-linguistic fragmentation; income distribution; and
financial and accounting systems. See, Daniel Kaufmann, “Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt Towards
Incentive-Driven Approaches?” Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries. UNDP,
1998: 79.
168
Id., Manning, supra, note 145, at 15, noting, “donors need to take a clear-headed approach to the competence of
local delivery systems, where decisions need to be taken on what it is reasonable for the state to attempt to
deliver and what is best delivered through other channels (and in both cases what safeguards are essential to limit
risks of misappropriation).”
169
One is mindful that even if these programs are tactically successful, they are usually strategically problematical.
See, Joseph Hanlon, "Do Donors Promote Corruption?: The Case of Mozambique,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 4
(2004): 747-763, at 757-758. And see, Barbara Jones, “UK gives £19million aid to South Africa - its president spends

£17.5million on his palace,” Daily Mail Online (23:50 GMT, 24 November 2012, Updated, 23:50 GMT, 24 November
2012), at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2238017/UK-gives-19million-aid-South-Africa--president-spends-
17-5million-palace.html#ixzz2TsWU4Atm (accessed on 15 May 2013)(predatory elites became highly skilled at
ensuring that management of donor money was transparent and clear, but then stole from banks, skimmed public
works contracts, demanded shares in investments, smuggled drugs and other goods and ensured the justice system
did not work).
170
Id., Kaufmann (1998), supra, note 167, at 63.
171
Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, and Naghmeh Nasiritousi, “Quality of Government: What you Het,” Annual
Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 135-161.
172
See, Marcel Fafchamps, Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence, Vol. 3. MIT Press, 2004. And
see, William Easterly, “Institutions: Top down or bottom up?” The American Economic Review 98, no. 2 (2008): 95-
99, 96; citing Avinash Dixit, “Lawlessness and Economics. Alternative Modes of Governance. Economics With and
Without the Law,” edited by A. Dixit, The Gorman Lectures, ТЕОРИЯ И ИСТОРИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВА И ПРАВА 1, no.
2 (2012): 358 (an agenda of gradual reform that recognizes the constraints of bottom up evolution will lead to
more hopeful results than a delusory top down attempt to leap to institutional perfection. Id. at 96).
173
See, Charles E. Tucker Jr., “Cabbages and Kings: Bridging the Gap for More Effective Capacity-Building,”
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 32 (2010).
174
To name but two:
For a comprehensive approach to multi-pronged capacity development, see: Kanni Wignaraja, “Capacity
Development: A UNDP Primer,” New York: United Nations Development Programme (2009), describing at length a
multi-pronged, multi-layered approach to institutional capacity assessment;
The joint UN DPKO/OHCHR United Nations Rule of Law Indicators provide a detailed assessment guide for
evaluating police, courts and prisons in fragile states. See, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights,
Department of Peacekeeping, The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide and Project Tools, UN
Sales No. E.11.I.13 (2011), at
http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2011/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf.
175
See, Dani Rodrik, “Second-best institutions,” No. w14050, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. Accord:
Id., Manning, supra, note 145; Merilee S. Grindle, “Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in
Developing Countries,” Governance 17, no. 4 (2004): 525-548 (reform is a “process,” thus calling for assessments of
“foundations of existing capacity,” and targeted incrementalism in institutional development); and Malebogo
Bakwena, “Is it True that Good Institutions Alleviate the Resource Curse? A Re-assessment of Existing OLS Cross-
country Evidence,” Botswana Journal of Economics 10, no. 14 (2013): 2-26 (countries with even just “average”
institutions resist the resource curse).
176
Dani Rodrik, “Institutions for High-quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them,” Studies in
Comparative International Development (SCID) 35, no. 3 (2000): 3-31. Referencing post-Soviet privatization, Rodrick
observed that establishing property rights protections is rarely a matter of simply passing laws, as legislation in
itself will neither be necessary nor sufficient for the provision of secure control rights. He argues, in practice,
control rights must be upheld by a combination of legislation, private enforcement, custom and tradition. For
legislation to be effective, there must also be acceptable restrictions on acquiring property rights. This implies the
need for an effective regulatory scheme. Rodrik emphasizes five types of market-supporting institutions: property
rights; regulatory institutions; institutions for macroeconomic stabilization; institutions for social insurance; and
institutions of conflict management. Id. at 26-27. And see, Acemoglu, et al., supra, note 37 (Botswana's good
economic policies, and therefore, its economic success, reflected its “institutions of private property” that protected
property rights of actual and potential investors, provided political stability and ensured that the political elites
were constrained.)
177
Christian Daude and Ernesto Stein, “The Quality of Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment,” Economics &
Politics 19, no. 3 (2007): 317-344 (unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive regulatory burden,
government instability and lack of commitment play a major role in deterring foreign direct investment); Uslaner,
supra, note 90, at 17-19. 2005 (regulatory policy has a powerful effect on corruption and on the level of risk that
determine how much money countries can borrow); Daniel, Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi,
“Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008,” World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 4978, 2009 (regulatory quality is defined as the “ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”); and Rodrik,
supra, note 176, at 14-15 (cautioning that regulatory institutions need to be developed locally, relying on hands-on
experience, local knowledge, and experimentation).
178
One reason for poor management is poor talent; and poor institutions attract poor talent. See, Timur Natkhov
and Leonid Polishchuk, “Institutions and the Allocation of Talent,” Higher School of Economics Research Paper No.
WP BRP 15 (2012) (“public policies and reforms that repair faulty institutions direct talent towards socially
productive activities and thereby reduce the gap between private incentives and social needs in human capital
accumulation.” Id. at 32).
179
Id., OECD-DAC (2009), supra, note at 27. According to the OECD, “(t)here are three institutional challenges to
implementing the aid effectiveness agenda: a) decentralising to the country level; b) adjusting human resources
management . . . and c) adapting procedures.” Moreover: “(h)uman resources management often needs to be
revamped to motivate staff to implement the aid effectiveness agenda, to develop appropriate training and to
recruit more local staff. Id. at 76.
180
Evans Osabuohien, Uchenna R. Efobi, and Adeleke Salami, “Planning to Fail Or Failing to Plan: Institutional
Response to Nigeria's Development Question,” African Development Bank, 2012. (Effective policies are products
of effective planning. Planning requires trained institutional structures to achieve macroeconomic objectives, which
include: rapid economic growth and development; price stability; maintaining favorable external balances; and
reducing unemployment. Institutional checks are fundamental to guiding plan implementers and guard against
abuses.)
181
Administrative capacity explains much of the variance in developing countries’ growth. See, L. G. Reynolds,
Economic Growth in the Third World, 1850–1980, Yale University Press, 1985; and S. Knack and P. Keefer,
“Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,”
Economics and Politics 7, no. 3. (1995): 207–227. (Econometric research suggests that the influence of high quality
public institutions may exceed the impact of good economic policies in explaining development performance.) And
see, Alan Doig and Stephen Riley, “Corruption and Anti-corruption Strategies: Issues and Case Studies from
Developing Countries,” Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries 45 (1998). (“Lawyers,
accountants and investigative journalists all need help. Enhanced professional skills, as well as political and
managerial will to control corruption, are more likely to be seen in democratic societies where the pressures of
political competition often force politicians to act. Democratisation is thus a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the reduction of corruption.” Id. at 60.)
182
Tina Søreide, Corruption in Public Procurement. Causes, Consequences and Cures, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002
(technical expertise among the public officials concentrates the competition to price offers and a more efficient
result may prevail, thus supporting the recommendation to establish small, independent, procurement units with
professional officials. Id. at 22-30). See also: Søreide, 2012, supra, note 137 (procurement reform, alone, insufficient;
need strengthened anti-trust/competition authorities). And see, Rose-Ackerman and Rory Truex, 2012, supra, note
89 (procurement officials who lack capacity to appropriately estimate costs, technical difficulties and actual benefits
of project, open the door to corrupt operatives who exploit this unreliability enrich themselves and to further the
interest of their firms. Id. at 25-26).
183
Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the Law,” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 48, no. 3 (2002): 221-241. And see: Søreide, 2012, supra, note 137 (cost-efficient results
sought by International Competitive Bidding will be dependent on institutional qualities held by the state
administration; when countries lack effective economic and human resources capacities, alternative procurement
methods should be considered. Id. at 21).
184
Howoilca Boost, “Curse or Cure? How Oil can Boost or Break Liberia’s Post-war Recovery,” Global Witness,
2011. Boost investigated corrupt practices of the National Oil Company of Liberia. One the key finding was that
neither the various ministries of the Liberian government nor the oil company had the basic managerial and
logistical capacity to oversee the oil and gas industry. Id. at 38 – 56. Accord, Anthony H. Miller, “Providing Aid to
Fragile or Failed States: A Short Argument for Moderation,” Pepperdine Policy Review 5, no. 1 (2012) (because they
lack structured central governments with logistical capacity, aid to fragile or failed states should be restricted to in-
kind aid and technical assistance. Id. at 4).
185
Id., Rose-Ackerman and Rory Truex, 2012, supra, note 89, at 6-7; citing Shawn Cole and Anh Tran, “Evidence
from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding Corruption,” International Handbook on the Economics of
Corruption 2 (2011) (corruption dampens development is by inflating the budgetary costs of public goods and
services because these costs incorporate kickbacks. Unless the procurement process is very competitive, this
means individual projects and procurement contracts are excessively expensive and unproductive. Id. at 6-7).
186
Benjamin A. Olken, Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia, No. w11753. National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2005 (formal and grassroots auditing capabilities reduced road construction
corruption-based financial losses between 24-28%, even when these capabilities only increased the chances that a

project would actually be audited. Id. at 23). And see, Deborah Bräutigam, Aid Dependence and Governance, Vol. 1,
Expert Group on Development Issues, 2000 (donors often substitute their own accountants and reporting for
those of local government auditors, as if an enclave of accountability can be created that can then somehow grow
beyond its borders. In aid dependent countries, this has rarely been the case. Id. at 42).
187
See:
§ Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, “Policy Reform and Aid Effectiveness in Africa,” (2009) (in countries with weak
social cohesion, aid donors must target education and health projects to reduce negative effects of ethnic
fractionalization and social fragmentation. Id. at 9);
§ David Elliot Bloom, David Canning, and Kevin Chan, Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa,
No. 102, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006, 19 (positive and statistically significant correlation between
higher education enrollment rates and governance indicators, including absence of corruption, rule of law,
absence of ethnic tensions, bureaucratic quality, low risk of repudiation of contracts by governments, and
low risk of appropriation);
§ Arvind K. Jain, “Corruption: Theory, Evidence and Policy,” CESifo DICE Report 9, no. 2 (2005): 6-7
(government expenditures on education are negatively and significantly related to corruption);
§ Abdiweli M. Ali and Hodan Said Isse, “Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-country
Comparison,” Cato J. 22 (2002) (corruption is negatively and significantly correlated with the level of
education, judicial efficiency, and economic freedom. Id. at 461);
§ Id., Gylfason (2001), supra, note 54 at 847-859 (education is good for growth); and
§ Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-national Study,” Journal of Public Economics 76, no. 3
(2000): 399-457 (education, makes abuses harder to conceal).
188
Oduwole, Oluwakemi Titilayo. "Institutional Assessment as an Agent of Reform: An Analysis of Nigerian Legal
Education." PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2012.
189
See, Tucker, 2010, supra, note 173 (rule of law development requires going beyond traditional top-down
approaches and focus on business law, family law, property law, legal education, creating for-profit and pro bono
community-based/university-based law clinics, and linking formal legal institutions (including universities) with
traditional civil society organizations and practices. Id. at 1351-1353.)
190
Id., Ali and Isse, supra, note 187. (“The interaction term between foreign aid and government expenditure
shows that the marginal effect of government expenditure on corruption increases with the level of foreign aid.” Id.
at 460.)
191
The contemporary orientation to nation-building should be re-evaluated in favor of a more grass-roots,
sociologically driven and institutionally based approach; the little things that guide and regulate human conduct in
private or public sectors are just as consequential as the big ones. See, N. Kalu, “Institution-building, not Nation-
building: A Structural-functional Model,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 77, no. 1 (2011): 119-137, at
119-120.
192
Mushtaq H. Khan, “Governance and Anti-corruption Reforms in Developing Countries: Policies, Evidence and
Ways Forward,” (2009): vii, 14 - 21.
193
Id. at vii (emphasis added).
194
Id., Doig and Riley, supra, note 181, at 60. And see, Agnes Batory, “Why do Anti‐corruption Laws Fail in Central
Eastern Europe? A Target Compliance Perspective,” Regulation & Governance 6, no. 1 (2012): 66-82 (widespread
failures of policy compliance signal there is something wrong with the policy, rather than something is wrong with
the targets who are being uncooperative by failing to comply with it. Id. at 78-80).
195
James Maton and Tim Daniel, “The Kleptocrat’s Portfolio Decisions,” Draining Development? Controlling Flows of
Illicit Funds from Developing Countries (2012): 415.
196
Accord, Bracking, 2007, supra, note 82, at 3-27.
197
Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, Kessinger Publishing, 2004.
198
Samuel Bowles, “Machiavelli’s Mistake: Why Good Laws Are No Substitute for Good Citizens,” (2011).
199
Costas Douzinas, “Violence, Justice, Deconstruction,” German LJ 6 (2005): 171.
200
Id., Maton and Daniel, supra, note 195, at 415. (“(A)fter initial enthusiasm for a recovery exercise within a state,
political reality intervenes, interest wanes, people disperse, and instructions are increasingly difficult to obtain.” Id.
at conclusion, 446-448.)
201
Ibid. at 415 (“international conventions recognize the need for concerted action, but, ultimately, the leaders in
individual states have to summon the political will to tackle those who have gone before them and resist the
temptation of simply following them, or nothing will ever change for the disadvantaged of this world.” Id.)
202
Liliya Gelemerova, The Anti-money Laundering System in the Context of Globalisation: A Panopticon Built on Quicksand?
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011: 226. Gelemerova cited, for example, one report indicating that approximately 90% of
Nigerian state governors owned property in the UK; payment for which had presumably come from Nigerian
government assets stripped by the appropriators and trafficked (i.e., laundered) through the international business
and banking systems. Id., citing: Michael Peel, Nigeria-related Financial Crime and its Links with Britain, London:
Chatham House, 2006: 19; and N. Alabi, “West Africa,” in Global Corruption Report 2003, edited by R. Hoddes, T.
Inowlocki and T. Wolfe (London: Transparency International (Berlin) and Profile Books Ltd, 2003).
203
Ibid. at 253.
204
Ibid. at 4.
205
Ibid. at 253.
206
Id., Alabi, supra, note 202, at 215.
207
Hannes Hechler, Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, Lucy Koechlin, and Dominic Morris, “Can UNCAC Address
Grand Corruption?” U4 Report 2011, no. 2 (2011). (“With UNCAC already in place . . . the remedy lies not in
trying to improve the text of the Convention but in finding creative ways to apply it as written.) As noted by the
authors:
. . . the Convention has a critical weakness in that it does not sufficiently address the nexus between
power relations and corruption clearly, such as by addressing political and electoral corruption in
a more detailed way and by making more provisions mandatory. The provisions for review
mechanisms suffer from the same weakness, not taking into account the political and socio-
economic dynamics surrounding anti-corruption reform, through mechanisms such as multi-
stakeholder consultations. The Convention challenges the vested interests of dominant coalitions
by criminalising the corrupt activities that sustain their systems. But a major problem remains, in
that it is precisely those dominant elites who are largely in charge of ensuring implementation. The fact
that UNCAC is a government-driven and government-owned convention, which also implicates
politicians and public officials at all levels, poses difficult barriers to genuine implementation and
bottom-up reform. The solution must involve other domestic accountability actors in a holistic reform
approach, with attention to the weaknesses or biases of these actors as well as those of
government officials (emphasis added). Id. at vii – viii.
208
Patrícia Galvão Ferreira, “Breaking the Weak Governance Curse: Global Regulation and Governance Reform in
Resource-rich Developing Countries,” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2012: 174; citing, W. Kenneth and Duncan
Snidal, “Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption,” The Journal of Legal Studies
31, no. S1 (2002): S141-S177 (the conceptual underpinnings of the current system, including the UNCAC, were
not predicated on the types of “grand corruption” outlined in the instant article. Id. at 174–175).
209
Id., Gelemerova, supra, note 202, at 155, et seq.. And see, Søreide, 2012, supra, note 137 (empirical assessment of
the UN anti-corruption convention finds its impact is too dependent on political considerations. Id. at 3).
210
Recent press reports indicate that “bags of money” have been delivered to President Hamid Karzai by the US.
This money has been characterized as “foreign aid,” not corrupt bribe money. See, Sean Carberry, “Secret Cash to
Afghan Leader: Corruption or Just Foreign Aid?” (1 May 2013, 3:01 PM). National Public Radio Online (accessed 19
May 2013) at: http://www.npr.org/2013/05/01/180313502/secret-cash-to-afghan-leader-corruption-or-just-foreign-
aid. In the meantime, press reports indicate, “(m)ore than £2bn of cash has been openly flown out of Kabul airport
since 2007, raising fears huge sums of British and American aid are being creamed off by corrupt officials.” See, e.g.,
Ben Farmer, “Aid cash feared lost as £2bn is flown out of Afghanistan,” The London Telegraph Online (28 Jun 2010,
5:27PM BST) (accessed 19 May 2013) at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7859275/Aid-cash-feared-lost-as-2bn-is-flown-out-of-
Afghanistan.html. One need not be unreasonably cynical as to speculate that current and (undoubtedly) future
international money laundering and asset recovery legal mechanisms will be insufficient to address this situation.
211
Id., Hechler, et al., supra, note 207, at vi (limitations of UNCAC should not be taken as grounds for rejecting it
as it can serve as a useful tool for societal stakeholders and external donors engaged in dialogue with governments.
Id. at viii).
212
Ivan Pavletic, “The Political Economy of Asset Recovery Processes,” International Centre for Asset Recovery (2009):
5570284-1257172052492.
213
Ibid. at 20. ARPs are Asset Recovery Processes.
214
Ibid. at Preface.
215
Ibid. at Preface.
216
Ibid. at Preface.

217
Incentives will not work, or will generate perverse results, in the absence of adequate institutions. See, Dani
Rodrik, “Institutions for High-quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them,” Studies in Comparative
International Development (SCID) 35, no. 3 (2000): 3-31.
218
Emad Atiq, “Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of Legal Incentives,” (2013).
219
Detection-avoiding strategies may also fuel corruption by inducing some public officials to encourage the
financing of projects for which the collection of bribes is easier. See, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny,
“Corruption,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 3. (1993): 599-617.
220
Carlos Da Cunha and Jens Weidmann, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and
Economic Growth,” Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth (June 1999). IMF Working Paper 99/85
(2001).
221
Prof. Van Duyne believes the term, “money laundering,” lacks empirical specificity. Therefore, he prefers the
term, “criminal financial management.” See, Petrus C. Van Duyne, Marc S. Groenhuijsen, and A. A. P. Schudelaro,
“Balancing Financial Threats and Legal Interests in Money-laundering Policy,” Crime, Law and Social Change 43, no. 2-
3 (2005): 117-147, fn. 29 (“the essence of laundering still is making a ‘black’, illegal possession ‘white.’” Id. at 135.
222
Petrus C. Van Duyne and Hervy de Miranda, “The Emperor's Cloths of Disclosure: Hot Money and Suspect
Disclosures,” Crime, Law and Social Change 31, no. 3 (1999): 245-271, 262.
223
Id., Van Duyne, et al., 2005, supra, note 221, at 117-147.
224
Petrus C. Van Duyne, “Money Laundering Policy: Fears and Facts,” Criminal Finance and Organizing Crime in
Europe, 2003.
225
Ibid.
226
Ibid.
227
As Prof. Van Duyne commented, “An abundance of crime-money need not be without effects . . . As a matter
of fact, the financial system may even benefit from the surfacing and integration of crime-money.” Id. at 124, citing:
R. Thomas Naylor, “Drug Money, Hot Money, and Debt,” European Journal of International Affairs 2, no. 3 (1989):
52-60; and Francisco E. Thoumi (ed.), Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Vol. 2, United Nations University
Press, 1995. According to Van Duyne, one example of beneficial use of ill gotten gains is that the 1980s debt crisis
in Latin America “was softened” by the return of narco-dollars. Van Duyne opined, “(i)t was a touchy subject, but
none of the European creditor banks ever felt its integrity affected.” Id.
228
John McDowell and Gary Novis, “The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime,” Economic
Perspectives 6, no. 2 (2001): 6-10.
229
Ibid.
230
Ibid.
231
Joras Ferwerda, “The Multidisciplinary Economics of Money Laundering,” Tjalling C. Koopmans Dissertation Series,
2012. Accord, John Walker, “How Big Is Global Money Laundering?” Journal of Money Laundering Control 3, no. 1
(1999): 25-3; and Brigitte Unger and Elena Madalina Busuioc, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2007.
232
Id., Van Duyne, 2003, supra, note 224; Petrus C. Van Duyne, “Crime-entrepreneurs and Financial Management,”
Upperworld and Underworld in Cross-Border Crime, 2002; Van Duyne, 2007, supra, note 100 at 69-95; and
Gelemerova, supra, note 204.
233
Id., Gelemerova, supra, note 202, at 120. Van Duyne concedes that under the current construct, the money will
eventually surface, but probably in the west and not in the economy that required it in the first place. See, Van
Duyne, 2003, supra, note 224.
234
What one author refers to as, a veritable, “swamp full of dollars.” See, Usman A. Tar, “A Swamp Full of Dollars:
Pipelines and Paramilitaries in Nigeria's Oil Frontier,” Review of African Political Economy 39, no. 131 (2012): 195-197.
235
Selçuk Akçay, “Corruption and Human Development,” Cato J. 26 (2006): 29.
236
Roman David, “Transitions to Clean Government: Amnesty as an Anticorruption Measure,” Australian Journal of
Political Science 45, no. 3 (2010): 391-406, at 394.
237
Ibid.
238
Ibid.
239
Ibid. at 25.
240
Ibid. at 24.
241
Ibid. at 37.
242
Ibid. at 45-46.
243
Ibid. at 48 (Blocking financial outflows could, in extreme cases, lead to the consumption of capital by some
investors. The appropriate response is to remove some of the underlying restrictions on investment).
244
Id., Roman, supra, note 236, at 391.
245
Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3
(1970): 337-363.
246
Ibid. at 340, 346.
247
Id., Roman, supra, note 236, at 391.
248
Ibid. at 392-393.
249
Ibid. at 392-393. Functional measures maintain a state of affairs, whereas transformative measures transform
from one state of affairs to another. If the dualism between transformative and functional measures applies to
anticorruption measures, then widespread corruption and clean government have to reflect two distinct states of
affairs.
250
Ibid. at 395. David further noted:
. . . the major rationale for amnesties is to bring about rapid change to a qualitatively different situation. Amnesties
may be applied under circumstances in which law enforcement agencies are unable to function effectively due to
widespread delinquency among citizens. Amnesties are exceptional measures often adopted in critical situations
when the state apparatus is unable to perform the functions of the day. They aspire to transforming an
unsatisfactory situation into a state of affairs in which functional measures are adequate for keeping the situation
under control. Id. at 396.
251
Id., Blackburn, et al., supra, note 153, at 23.
252
Id., Gelemerova, supra, note 202.
253
See, generally, Petrus C. van Duyne and Stefano Donati, “In Search of Crime-money Management in Serbia,”
European Crime-markets at Cross-roads. Extended and Extending Criminal Europe, 2008.
254
A phrase attributable to former U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Tip O’Neill.
255
The concept proposed is not dissimilar to recommendations that formal Anti-Corruption Agencies engage in
public outreach. See, e.g., Recanatini, supra, note 166.
256
It is axiomatic that administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort is had to the courts. See, e.g.,
Raoul Berger, “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies,” The Yale Law Journal 48, no. 6 (1939): 981-1006. Here the
concept is that in order to proceed with amnesty, the local government has reasonably pursed its rights under the
UNCAC.
257
Amnesty conditional on the exchange of information, similar to the South African amnesty process or the Polish
lustration system may create uncertainty among the corrupt. It effectively breaks the relationships of trust within
the members of a criminal network.
258
Id., Van Duyne, et al., 2005, supra, note 221 (in 2004, the Belgian government announced a moderate tax
amnesty together with more effective controls due to improved exchange of information with foreign banks in
Europe; led to a massive repatriation of money and a huge spending on consumer articles and house improvement.
Id. at endnote 14); and Sam Ashman, Ben Fine, and Susan Newman, “Amnesty International? The Nature, Scale and
Impact of Capital Flight from South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 37, no. 01 (2011): 7-25. (In 2010,
South African Reserve Bank introduced amnesty for illegal capital flight; for a flat rate fee of 10% of the value of the
assets, corporations and individuals disclosing their prior illegal expatriation of capital received no further penalties
and were allowed to keep their assets offshore under the Voluntary Disclosure Programme. This was “a first step
towards the complete liberalisation of outflows” to ameliorate post-apartheid capital flight. Id. at abstract.)
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22 ANTI-CORRUPTION FOR HUMAN SECURITY

Corruption and Human Security: Prepare for

Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! rage! blow!

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

Official Development Assistance (“ODA”)

A. Inconclusive Economic Benefits of ODA on Intended

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

B. Conclusive Negative Impact Of ODA on Economic Growth and

a. The Natural Resource Curse: Theoretically, countries with abundant

b. The “Unnatural Resource Curse” - ODA: As with natural resources,

Notwithstanding cautionary admonitions about “doing no harm,” it appears the

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

A. Definitions of Corruption: When examining corruption in the context of

a. General Definition: Professor Arvind Jain has written extensively on the

B. Notional Worldwide Scope of Corruption: In order to discuss the

a. With regard to petty corruption, aggregated enterprise and household surveys

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

of these calculations are staggering: the annual value of worldwide transactions

b. Public officials receiving such bribes and/or siphoning-off state/development aid

C. Corruption as a Human Rights Issue: Corruption denies people a better

D. Corruption as a Human Security Issue: Meanwhile, there has also been

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

challenges orthodox conceptions of security.117 Its objective is to safeguard the “vital

Human security requires:

§ The recognition of the interconnections between development, security and

§ The adoption of multi-dimensional solutions based on an inter-disciplinary

§ Making use of academic research in the framing of policy proposals.

With regard to inclusion of anti-corruption within the definitional context of the

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

§ Central Asian countries suffer from limited or poor accountability in public

Regarding Current Anti-Corruption Efforts:

A. Background: Ex Post Anti-Corruption Efforts Vice Ex Ante

B. Anti-Corruption Campaigns: Most traditional ex post anti-corruption

C. Proposed Pro Ante Institution Building:

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

b. Pro Ante Anti-Corruption Programing: The World Bank confirms that

Admittedly, one recognizes that in the real world donor-applied pressure to

c. Pro Ante Governance Capacity Development – The Rest Of The

While “one-size-fits-all” approaches are to be avoided, experience has shown that

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

§ Deleterious property rights protection mechanisms;176

§ Inept regulatory schemes;177

§ Anemic managerial,178 human resource management, 179 and operational

§ Ineffectual public administrative capabilities;181

§ Inefficient and/or non-transparent procurement,182 contracting,183 and

§ Arcane fiscal budgeting,185 accounting, and audit capacities;186

§ Dickensesque court systems.189

Draining the Swamp: Amnesty in Return for Investment:

A. Asset Recovery Mechanisms – International Mutual Assistance:

a. International Law: The case for the systematic application of international

The assumption underlying reliance on these legal mechanisms as a buttress against

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

practical imitations as found in other state-based anti-corruption measures; to wit:

One potential response to this situation would be to fortify international asset

Our political economy analysis of UNCAC indicates that the

be involved in grand corruption schemes: notably, it addresses public

As is the case with many national anti-corruption legal regimens, international

There is a large gap between the rhetorical commitment of many

IJSHS, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (DECEMBER) 2013

b. Institutional Incentives: In addition to mischaracterizing law for coercion,