Sue Thompson

ARTICLES
The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Sue Thompson

Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for
Regional Initiatives, 1947-77
Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Inter- M. Faishal Aminuddin,

governmental Relations in Southeast Asia Joko Purnomo
The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda Leni Winarni
Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Teuku Rezasyah,

Network Case Neneng Konety,
Affabile Rifawan,
Wahyu Wardhana
Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Agus Suman,

Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian,
Indonesia Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih
RESEARCH NOTE
Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A South- Moch Faisal Karim
east Asian Perspective
JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES (JAS)
Editor in Chief Tirta N. Mursitama
Managing Editors
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Tangguh Chairil
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Paramitaningrum
Layout Editors Theodora

Vivi Juliani
Associate Editors
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Donatus K. Marut
University of Indonesia, Indonesia Kiki Verico
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Lili Yulyadi
Brawijaya University, Indonesia M. Faishal Aminuddin
University of Warwick, United Kingdom Moch Faisal Karim
University at Albany, SUNY, United States Mutti Anggita
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands Pamungkas A. Dewanto
National Planning Agency, Republic of Indonesia Sumedi A. Mulyo
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Wendy A. Prajuli
Advisory International Editorial Board

BINUS Business School, Indonesia Ahmad Syamil
Swinburne University of Technology, Australia Alfons Palangkaraya
University of Indonesia, Indonesia Andi Widjajanto
Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia Andrik Purwasito
Jana Wyżykowskiego University, Poland Arkadiusz Kotlinski
Airlangga University, Indonesia Baiq L. S. Wardhani
University of Le Havre, France Darwis Khudori
Paramadina University, Indonesia Dinna Wisnu
Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia, Indonesia Dino P. Djalal
University of Hawai’i at Manoa, United States Ehito Kimura
Jawaharal Nehru University, India Gautam K. Jha
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Harjanto Prabowo
Ritsumeikan University, Japan Jun Honna
University of Indonesia, Indonesia Juwono Sudarsono
Dr. GR Damodaran College of Science, India K. K. Ramachandran
Australian National University, Australia Lorraine Elliott
Yunnan University, China Lu Guangsheng
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore Malcolm Cook
National University of Singapore, Singapore Marleen Dieleman
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia Marty Natalegawa
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Malaysia Nanthakumar Loganathan
Australian National University, Australia Pierre van der Eng
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia Rizal Sukma
Kaohsiung SEAS, Taiwan Samuel C. Y. Ku
Budapest Business School, Hungary Tamas Novak
Cheng Shiu University, Taiwan Wan-Ping Tai
Padjadjaran Univeristy, Indonesia Yanyan M. Yani
JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES
Volume 5 Number 1 2017
Contents
EDITORIAL
Tirta N. Mursitama
ARTICLES
The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Economic Development, 1-22
and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77
Sue Thompson
Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in 23-36

Southeast Asia
M. Faishal Aminuddin
Joko Purnomo
The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda 37-50

Leni Winarni
Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Network Case 51-59

Teuku Rezasyah
Neneng Konety
Affabile Rifawan
Wahyu Wardhana
Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN 60-67

Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia
Agus Suman
Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian
Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih
RESEARCH NOTE
Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A Southeast Asian 68-74
Perspective
Moch Faisal Karim
journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas
Aim and Scope
The Journal of ASEAN Studies (JAS) is an International peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the
past, current, and future issues relevant to ASEAN and its circle of issues. The article shall address any research on
theoretical and empirical questions about ASEAN. The Topics addressed within the journal include: diplomacy, political
economy, trade, national development, security, geopolitics, social change, transnational movement, environment, law,
business and industry, and other various related sub-fields.
Journal of ASEAN Studies expects the articles encourage debate, controversy, new understanding, solid theory, and reflection
on ASEAN. The articles sent should have a sharp analysis and rigorous methodologies quantitative or qualitative as well
as written in an engaging and analytical style. The JAS does publish original research, reviewing research, book review,
opinion pieces of current affairs. However JAS does not publish journalistic or investigative style of article. The JAS would
not be responsible for any implied or written statements of articles published. Each author would be responsible for their
own writing.
Journal of ASEAN Studies is an international multidisciplinary journal, covering various fields of research on ASEAN either
as community, organization, process, and web of cooperation.
Journal of ASEAN Studies publishes the following types of manuscripts:
• Scholarly articles: The manuscripts should be approximately 5,000-8,000 words. The manuscripts must contain a
review of the current state of knowledge on the research question(s) of interest, then share new information or new
ideas that will impact the state of theory and/or practice in area of ASEAN Studies.

• Review Article: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-3,500. The manuscripts must contain the current state
of understanding on a particular topic about ASEAN by analysing and discussing research previously published by
others

• Practice notes: These are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that are of specific interest to
practitioners. These manuscripts must present new development for the ASEAN.

• Research notes: Similar to practice notes, these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that have
specific implications for ASEAN. The manuscripts should employ rigorous methodology either qualitative or
quantitative.

• Book Review: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-4,000. The manuscripts must contain a critical
evaluation of book by making argument and commentary on the particular book discussed.
Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies

Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) is established as part of the International Relations Department, Bina
Nusantara (BINUS) University. Our aims are to undertake and promote research and deliberation on diplomacy, business,
international relations and developmental issues particularly in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific.
We also commit to build, connect and share research and others kinds of knowledge generating activities for the betterment
of life of the people and earth. Our immediate constituency is International Relations Department, BINUS University and
the larger constituency is the broader academic community of the BINUS University and other universities and institutions
both national and international as well as policy community.
CBDS publishes scholarly journal, working papers, commentaries and provides training and consultancies services in the
areas of diplomatic training, negotiations, commercial diplomacy, conflict resolutions for business, business and
government relations, promoting competitive local government in attracting foreign investment, and understanding impact
of regional economic integration on development specifically toward ASEAN Community 2015.
CBDS Secretariat
Kijang Campus,
Binus University
Jl. Kemanggisan Ilir III No. 45, Kemanggisan / Palmerah Jakarta Barat
11480 +62.21 534 5830 ext. 2453
+62.21 534 0244
http://ir.binus.ac.id/cbds
Editorial
Greetings from the Journal of ASEAN Studies. We are very grateful to reach the fifth year of
contributing to the Southeast Asian studies, both Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) as institution and also individual country in the region. With the publication of
this Volume 5 Issue 1, 2017, we are pleased to stay on track in providing an academic venue
for scholars, practitioners, diplomats, businessmen, and larger stakeholders of ASEAN to
contribute to the development of knowledge and debates pertaining to the Southeast Asian
political, social, economic, and security issues.
In this issue, there are six interesting manuscripts that consist of five articles and one
research note. The first article is entitled, “The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism:
Security, Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77”
written by Sue Thompson from Australian National University, Australia. Thompson
discusses Southeast Asian regionalism by focusing on the aspect of economic development
and security. She argues that the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism was a combined
effort of foreign power support for Asian initiatives throughout the economic development
with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the region from the
post-war period into the early years of ASEAN and the aftermath of the war in Vietnam.
The second article is entitled, “Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental
Relations in Southeast Asia” written by M. Faishal Aminuddin and Joko Purnomo, both from
University of Brawijaya, Indonesia. Aminuddin and Purnomo review inter-state relations in
Southeast Asia countries and find that regional cooperation in the region has achieved
limited political development. They provide an alternative type of political diplomacy by
combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy
actions done by non-government actors.
The third article is entitled, “The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda” written by Leni
Winarni from Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia. Winarni examines why the Buddhist
Community in Myanmar turns into religious violence against Rohingya people in the State
of Rakhine. She uses historical perspective to analyze the ethnic-religion violence and finds
that the conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity.
The fourth article is entitled, “Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University
Network Case” written by Teuku Rezasyah, Neneng Konety, Affabile Rifawan, and Wahyu
Wardhana from Padjadjaran University, Indonesia. Rezasyah et al. discuss the role of
ASEAN University Network (AUN) in enhancing regional integration in the higher
education sector in ASEAN. Lastly, the fifth article is entitled, “Sub-National Government and
the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia” written
by Agus Suman, Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian, and Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih. They
elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development gap due to regional
integration by using Indonesia as a case study.
This issue ends with a research note entitled, “Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive
Politics: A Southeast Asian Perspective” written by Moch Faisal Karim from University of
Warwick, United Kingdom. Karim explores the notion of disruptive politics and the
challenge it poses to the liberal world order.
Finally, the editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for the authors who
have submitted their manuscripts as response from our invitation and call for papers, as
well as who have participated in the International Conference on Business, International
Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD) at Bina Nusantara University whose papers are
published in this issue. We also would like to thank the Indonesian Association for
International Relations (AIHII) for continuing support of this joint publication with the
Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) of the Department of International
Relations of Bina Nusantara University.
Jakarta, 31 July 2017
Prof. Dr. Tirta N. Mursitama, Ph.D.

Editor-in-chief
The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism:
Security, Economic Development, and Foreign Power
Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-771
Sue Thompson Australian National University, Australia
Abstract
Policy objectives for Southeast Asian regionalism had been evolving since the
end of the Second World War. Economic development viewed as essential for
establishing peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the links between
development and security were evident in the elaboration of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Also evident was the second-line
support provided by external powers. While ASEAN was a regional
initiative that came out of the Bangkok talks to end Confrontation, Western
governments had been formulating regional cooperation policies in Southeast
Asia decades prior. Economic development viewed as essential for containing
communist influence and preventing internal insurgencies in the region.
Growth and prosperity would come through regional development programs
with external support. This would then expand to some form of collective
security led by the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Regionalism viewed
as one way of providing economic assistance to newly independent nations
without the appearance of foreign interference in regional affairs. Therefore,
the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign
power support for Asian initiatives throughout the economic development
with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the
region from the post-war period into the early years of ASEAN and the
aftermath of the war in Vietnam.
Key words: regionalism, Southeast Asia, economic development, security
 1
* Thisarticle was originally presented in The Fifth International Conference on Business, International
Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD 2016) at Bina Nusantara University.
Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 1-22

DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.4160
©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations
ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic
2 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism
regional cooperation. Australia and New

Introduction Zealand too saw the benefit of such an
arrangement, taking the initiative to seek
At the end of the Second World War,
consultation with the U.S. on the future of
early efforts towards Southeast Asian
the Pacific region at the end of the war.
regionalism emerged from Southeast Asian
Britain was also supportive of the idea of
nations seeking to achieve peace and
regional cooperation and looked at
stability, economic development and
developing a policy for its colonial areas.
policies of self-reliance. Western
Both the British and the Australians believed
governments too were pursuing their
that some form of regional cooperation was
policies on regional cooperation for similar
much preferable to a post-war mandate
outcomes. For the United States (U.S.)
system (Letter, Evatt to Johnson, 1944).
especially, such agreement would provide
Securing support from the region was crucial
stability for a grouping of non-communist
for officials who were keen to avoid direct
nations without the appearance of Western
interference in the affairs of governing
support, as well as a multilateral umbrella
bodies, and within Asia, some states also
under which bilateral relationships between
backed the idea of closer cooperation,
the West and Southeast Asian countries
especially those that supported
would thrive and prosper. These policies
decolonization, but not pro-communist
have often overlooked when tracing the
independence movements.
post-war evolution of Southeast Asian
regionalism as the focus of this topic has However, regional cooperation could
tended only to highlight the role played by only succeed if Southeast Asian nations
the regional nations themselves. Indeed, themselves agreed that there was a need for
officials such as Abu Bakar Lubis, the private closer relations and would work together.
secretary to Indonesian Foreign Affairs This need did come from the common fear of
Minister Adam Malik, have promoted this China’s domination in the region and
perception, denying that formal regional concern for economic development,
cooperation was the result of an American especially once Western interests reduced.
idea or action (Anwar, 1994, pp. 49-57). The creation of formal regional cooperation
Additionally, perceptions of the role of came with the establishment of the
regional cooperation have highlighted Association of Southeast Asian Nations
economic and social issues, rather than any (ASEAN), a move that was only possible
security benefits, missing the importance of through regional initiatives from the
regionalism as a vehicle for promoting both founding member states. Indeed, the
economic development and safety policies of creation of ASEAN attributed to efforts from
regional and external powers. the countries in the region, especially
ASEAN’s conception was a direct result of
Western governments initially
the Malaysian-Indonesian talks that ended
sought to secure regional peace and
Confrontation, the conflict between these
cooperation through the United Nations
two nations. However, Western policies did
(UN). Washington was interested in
contribute to the evolution of regional
collaboration among groups in the UN
cooperation in Southeast Asia, reflecting the
where there was mutual interest, such as
Journal of ASEAN Studies 3
combined efforts of foreign power support countries and non-regional members such as
for Asian initiatives. France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union,
Britain, and the U.S. As the Cold War
Early Initiatives intensified, the Australian Government
particularly, promoted the commission as a
On 4 July 1949, Philippine President
forum for non-communist governments and
Quirino made a speech outlining the need
capitalist development (Mitcham, 2012, p.
for a ‘Pacific Union, a real union of peoples
191 & 1930).
around the Pacific on the basis for common
counsel and assistance.’ Quirino then sent a However, Washington and several
letter of instructions to General Romulo, other countries were cautious about
Philippine Diplomat and President of the Philippine overtures towards the
UN General Assembly at the time, outlining development of a Pacific Union. When
his plans for such an organization. Romulo General Romulo tried to undertake
responded and proposed that Korea, the preliminary discussions on the idea with
Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, various diplomatic representations at the
Australia, India, Burma, Ceylon and UN, several nations indicated that American
Indonesia organize a political and economic policy would largely influence their position.
union aimed at containing ‘Russo-Chinese’ Following this, Romulo attempted to secure
Communism, while also denouncing a commitment from Washington to support
European imperialism. Britain, France, the the participation in a Southeast Asian
Netherlands and the U.S. would at first meeting. The response from the State
excluded from such an organization. After Department was that while the U.S. would
some form of grouping emerged, an offer of be sympathetic to the principle of a
economic cooperation with the U.S. would Southeast Asian association, the success of
pursue. Then, if Communism could contain, any such group would have to be generated
a joint appeal for American military aid spontaneously within the area (Memo,
could be considered (Memo, for Butterworth Secretary of State and Butterworth, 1950).
and Fisher, 1949).
Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to
The links between economic promote the idea of Asian regionalism to
development and security had been evident counter anti-Western forces. This idea
from the beginning of the UN and had reflected in support for the development of
resulted in the establishment of some the Mekong River Basin. Post-war interest in
agencies such as the Economic and Social developing the area came out of French-Thai
Council (ECOSOC) and the International negotiations to settle a territorial dispute. In
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1950, former Office of Strategic Service
(IBRD), amongst others. In early 1947, Director William Donovan recommended
ECOSOC created regional commissions to that the administration support the
encourage development, and one of these development of the Mekong Basin as a long-
bodies was the UN Economic Commission range project to secure cooperation between
for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
was established on 19 March 1947. The Vietnam. This concept presented to ECAFE,
membership of ECAFE included both Asian and in 1957, the Committee for the
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower supporting two main goals in Southeast Asia
Mekong Basin established. In 1958, as interdependent: security and social and
Washington provided US$2 million to help economic development (Administrative
finance the collection of primary data in the History of the Department of State, 1963-
area. The State Department viewed the 1969). In early 1965, State Department
Mekong Committee as having enormous advisers suggested to Under-Secretary of
potential for the political and economic State George Ball, that some Asian
future of the region, ‘in determining whether development defense agency, or
Southeast Asia remains free or comes under organization, might be initiated to replace
the control of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’ (Memo, existing groups. Ball agreed to consider such
Landon to Rostow, 1961). an approach (Conversation between Ball and
Talbot, 1965). However, many in
By the early 1960s, there were some Washington were wary that this policy
regional organizations in existence, but only would portray as American interference. In
a few with solely Asian membership. The April 1965, Chester L. Cooper, a staff
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) - an member of the National Security Council
economic and cultural organization that (NSC), suggested that Washington should
included Malaya, the Philippines, and present to UN Secretary General, U Thant,
Thailand - was one such organization. It the idea of forming a new regional
founded in 1961, yet its functions limited, institution called, The Southeast Asia
especially when the Philippines refused to Development Association. It would be a
recognize the newly created Federation of coordinating and consultative organization
Malaysia, because of a Philippine claim to with permanent staff and an executive agent
the British Borneo territory of Sabah. for the management of multi-national capital
Another organization was Maphilindo, for projects, and the concept must appear to be
Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Its an Asian initiative and be Asian (Talking
purpose was to unite the Malay world, and Points for Bundy from Cooper).
arose out of the Manila Agreement, a report
by the Foreign Ministers of those countries, Many officials felt that regional
accepted and augmented by the three heads cooperation was to be an Asian idea,
of government in meetings in Manila in July privately Washington attributed main part
and August 1963. They agreed that foreign of its implementation to American money.
bases should not undermine their Johnson’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk,
independence, although Maphilindo came to claimed that one important step towards
nothing because of the outbreak of regional cooperation was the provision of
Confrontation, and Manila’s claim to Sabah US$1 billion for economic development in
(Minute, Mare to Mr. Samuel, 23 January Asia, as outlined in a speech delivered by
1967). President Johnson at Johns Hopkins
University. Another important step was
American Initiatives directing this US$1 billion towards the
establishment of the Asia Development Bank
Under President Johnson, the
(ADB) and other regional programs (Rusk to
Department of State continued to pursue
Rev. Dusen, 1965).
regional cooperation as a policy objective,
Until Confrontation ended, regional depending on Indonesia’s participation.

security cooperation was unfeasible. Consideration would then have to be taken
However, economic development could be a as to the form and substance of such a group,
means to end that dispute, and improve what its relationship would be with other
relations between Indonesia and other regional organizations and in what direction
Southeast Asian countries, especially would American diplomatic initiatives
Malaysia and Singapore. When Washington follow in furthering the idea (Memo from
commented favorably on Maphilindo as an Ropa to Rostow, 1966).
organization that might provide the means
of promoting regional cooperation and of Continuing American interest in
finding a solution to Confrontation, Asian economic development and regional
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, security cooperation continued as Johnson
expressed his concern that the U.S. was made a trip to the region in October-
supporting the resurrection of Maphilindo. November 1966. There he met with the
Department of State officials told Lee that heads of six nations – Australia, New
Maphilindo was an Asian and not an Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of
American initiative and that the State Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand – in
Department did not want any plans for trade Manila on October 24-25. This meeting
and security cooperation perceived as closed with a declaration of Peace and
American interference (Washington to Progress in Asia and the Pacific and all seven
Singapore, 1965). heads of government declared strong
support for the principle of regional
By mid-1966, some regional and sub- cooperation (Administrative History of the
regional cooperative initiative had evolved Department of State, 1963-1969).
such as the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) –
an economic and cultural alliance made up British Support and the End of
of non-communist countries within the Confrontation
region, the ADB and the ASA. State
London also supported regional
Department officials believed these bodies
cooperation for Southeast Asia, especially
were promising for future progress in
considering Britain’s military commitments
regional and sub-regional cooperation that
to the region. In early 1964, the British
would, in turn, led to collective efforts at
Embassy in Washington delivered an Aide
solving economic, social and security
Memoire to the White House posting that
problems in Asia (Memo for Rostow from
Western withdrawal from Vietnam or
Jorden, 1966). Donald D. Ropa of the NSC
Malaysia was inevitable and if there was any
Staff stressed to National Security Adviser,
chance of stabilizing an independent
Walt Rostow in April 1966 that American
Southeast Asia without the presence of
security interests in the Pacific basin would
Western forces, regional cooperation was an
be dependent on more regional cooperation
undeniable attraction. This withdrawal was
for economic development and political
an ideal situation in the long-term, but it was
cooperation for mutual security concerns.
not possible in the short-term, especially due
The ASA or Maphilindo might be able to
to the leftist chaos of Indonesia (British
evolve as a wider cooperative group,
Embassy in Washington Aide Memoire,
1964). However, the British did not present form of regional cooperation in Southeast
any ideas on how to progress this issue. In Asia that would be worked out by the
May 1965, Rusk suggested to his British participating countries (London to certain
counterpart, Michael Stewart, that missions, 1966). Then London could plan for
Washington and London should do more to the withdrawal of its forces from Singapore.
encourage Southeast Asian countries to While Washington wanted the British
cooperate. With the aim of reducing British military bases to stay for at least the
or American military involvement in the immediate future, the hope of some U.S.
region, suggesting the establishment of an officials was that out of the regional
organization around Malaysia, the initiatives implemented in the early 1960s.
Philippines, and Thailand (Record of The initiatives would uniquely be Asian
discussion, Rusk, and Stewart, 1965). mutual security arrangements, buttressed by
American power presence, which will
Some Southeast Asian states compensate for ultimate British withdrawal
supported the departure of Western military (Ropa to Rostow, 1966).
bases from the region, but not all.
Indonesian leader, General Suharto Formal Initiatives and the Creation of
reportedly said in February 1966 that the ASEAN
defense of Southeast Asia was a matter for
the countries in the area and that the British It informally agreed at the Bangkok
military base in Singapore was a target for talks that Indonesia should join an ASA-type
China’s expansionism. The Malaysian and body that would give a new name (Kuala
Singapore governments, on the other hand, Lumpur to London, 1966). Indonesia was
wanted the base to stay (Kuala Lumpur to keen to see that foreign forces withdraw
Ottawa, 1966). Nevertheless, cooperation from the region and new Indonesian
between the Southeast Asian nations was President Suharto wanted closer ties with his
required. London was quite keen on the neighbors to help stem the spread of China’s
establishment of an organization like the influence in the area (Jakarta to Washington,
defunct Maphilindo, with the addition of 1966). He told two British Members of
Singapore. However, the Malaysians were Parliament that an Asian community should
less sure of resurrecting this organization. be responsible for the security of Southeast
Kuala Lumpur’s preference was for the ASA, Asia (Meeting, Jackson MP, Dalyell MP, and
which would include Thailand. Regardless General Suharto, 1966). Thai Prime Minister
of the form such an association would take, Thanom Kittikachorn and Malaysian Prime
London’s position was to support any new Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said that
organization that might emerge from the they were pleased that countries in the
Bangkok talks between Malaysia and region were increasingly aware of the need
Indonesia on ending Confrontation (Memo, for regional cooperation, and stressed their
Pritchard to Lord Beswick, 1966). Britain determination to make a Southeast Asian
was uncertain whether a regional association work (Kuala Lumpur to
organization would discuss at these Washington, 1966). Malaya had been the
meetings; however, it instructed its missions initiator of ASA and was a participant of
in the region to stress its approval for some Maphilindo, and was now, like Malaysia,
willing to join a regional organization that
would include members of Singapore. The support to be too obvious, Thanat replied
Australian High Commission in Kuala that he was sure Washington would be able
Lumpur saw the possibility that a new local to determine where and when it could
organization would make Malaysia less provide useful assistance (Record of
dependent on its non-Asian allies (Kuala conversation between Rusk and Khoman,
Lumpur to Canberra, 1966). Malaysian 1966).
Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin explained to
U.S. officials that the American nuclear However, problems arose over
umbrella and a Southeast Asian regional whether the organization would involve
organization were the only two alternatives itself in regional defense. Malik stressed to
to avoid the spread of communist influence the American Ambassador in Jakarta in early
(Kuala Lumpur to Washington, 1966). 1967 that the new regional group would only
be an economic, cultural and technical
The Malaysian Government association and that defense matters would
specifically, agreed with continued Western not consider; although in time ASEAN
support in Southeast Asia. During a meeting would take on a more political role (Jakarta
between Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister to Canberra, 1967). However, one defense
Tun Abdul Razak and U.S. Defense Secretary matter that was discusses was the presence
Robert McNamara in Washington, Razak of foreign military bases in the region.
said that from Malaysia’s perspective, it was Indonesia was opposed to such bases and
important to have Laos, Burma, Cambodia, wanted this reflected in the new
and Thailand coordinating policy to keep organization’s declaration. This opposition
any pressure from China away from had been an aim of the previous regime in
Malaysia’s borders. McNamara then Jakarta and had been part of Sukarno’s anti-
emphasized the importance that the U.S. imperialist rhetoric during Confrontation.
attached to the creation of some form of For the apparent pro-Western Suharto
regional grouping so that American forces government, the motivations for opposing
could eventually withdraw from the Asian foreign bases seemed less clear. However, in
mainland (Washington to Kuala Lumpur, early 1967, officials told Australian and
1966). In Thailand, Thai Foreign Minister British representatives that the Indonesian
Thanat Khoman had told Humphrey, he military stood to gain significantly if
wanted to gather representatives from non- countries in the region opted out of defense
communist Asian countries to promote arrangements with non-regional powers and
increased regional cooperation. The instead organized their defense plans with
Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, and the participation of Indonesia (NIC 303(74),
the South Korean President, Park Chung- First Draft, 1974). Although, the Acting
hee, backed this sentiment (Letter, Vice- Director of Asian Regional Affairs at the
president to Johnson, 1966). However, State Department, Philip Manhard, also told
Thanat did not want overt American the Australians that it was difficult to
support. He told Rusk that he hoped determine how far Malik was interested in
regional development could have America’s ASEAN taking on a security role and
discreet blessing. When the Secretary of whether the Indonesian Army was pushing
State asked if Bangkok did not want U.S. for this position. Manhard pointed out that
in a recent speech, Malik had denied that the Jakarta insisted on a statement reflecting the
new regional grouping would have a temporary nature of Western bases in the
security role, but had then made region. For Indonesia, the declaration must
contradictory statements, commenting that refer to the foreign bases, and stipulate that
regional security had discussed amongst the the region was responsible for its defense.
five nations (Washington to Canberra, 1967). However, the other four nations also did not
Back in May 1967, Malik asked whether emphasize ASEAN as a security
proposals for the new regional organization organization (Canberra to all posts, 1967).
would include a joint military security plan Indeed, days later, when the Soviet
against communist infiltration, he replied Ambassador to Thailand asked Thanat about
that regional cooperation along the lines of the issue of bases, he responded that the
economic, cultural and technical military bases stationed in Thailand was
partnerships could interpret as a form of Thai and not American and that the U.S. was
defense (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1967). only needed to use these bases in the face of
North Vietnamese aggression (Washington
When ASEAN was inaugurated on 8 to Canberra, 1967).
August 1967, the State Department regarded
the formation of ASEAN as a positive move, The Australian Government, on the
despite the indication that member nations other hand, seemed to view the organization
would not welcome any form of outside as a forum to promote security in the region.
interference, and not just from China. A day after ASEAN’s inauguration,
Washington was not overly concerned about Australia’s Minister for External Affairs,
the paragraph relating to foreign bases, Paul Hasluck, praised the new association
believing the negotiations had largely and its aims at increasing cooperation
avoided contentious political issues amongst the member states. He added that
(Washington to Canberra, 1967). The Soviets ASEAN not only had committed to support
denounced ASEAN, labelling it a new economic growth, social progress and
military group and China completely cultural development in the region but to
ignored the new organization. ASEAN’s also ‘promote regional peace and stability’ –
declaration stated that the countries in objectives that had the full support of
Southeast Asia would cooperate on Canberra (Canberra to certain posts, 1967).
economic, social and cultural development. Years later, in his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew
The founding countries also declared their wrote that the unspoken objective of ASEAN
commitment to stabilizing and securing the was to build strength through regional
region from external interference (Gill, 1997, solidarity before a power vacuum was
pp. 30-33). The declaration added that all created because of the British military
foreign bases were temporary and that the withdrawal from Southeast Asia and a
countries in the region shared the main possible American one later (Yew, 2000,
responsibility for defending Southeast Asia, p.369).
although ASEAN was not directly concerned
with defense. Of the five founding members, The Early Years of ASEAN
Indonesia was the only country that did not
However, in the early years of
have Western forces inside its territory, and
ASEAN, the organization was loosely
structured, and Singapore was the only cooperation, or try to forge ahead into the
member state that gained any great financial security arena. Singaporean Foreign
benefit. The Singaporeans pushed for issues Minister, S. Rajaratnam, stated that his
such as tourism, shipping, fishing and intra- government believed ASEAN should stay
regional trade to be considered by the first solely focused on economic cooperation in
meeting of the ASEAN standing committee, Southeast Asia. Whereas Malik referred to
hoping that these economic projects would Britain’s military withdrawal and a
lead to closer involvement in regional prospective American disengagement as
planning. However, four of the five cause for the member states to ‘induce us to
founding members – Thailand, Malaysia, jointly consider policies in our effort to cope
Indonesia, Philippines – had similar and with the new emerging situation.’ Thanat
competed for agricultural economies and Khoman also mentioned security concerns,
economic nationalism was expected to be a which was reiterated by the Malaysians,
major hurdle for the new organization. stating that there was scope to work out
Singapore was the country best suited some form of security arrangements and that
economically to a regional arrangement. As member countries should take responsibility
a result, the Australian Government’s for their region following any power
assessment of the benefit of ASEAN was that vacuum left by departing Western forces
it would carry more significance in the (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1969).
political rather than the economic sphere
(Canberra to all posts, 1967). Indeed, this Fueling these security concerns was
view was reflected in the outcome to internal the announcement in January 1968 of
tension within the organization through Britain’s intention to withdraw all its
Manila’s ongoing claim to Sabah that caused military forces from Southeast Asia by 1971
the breakdown of Philippine-Malaysian and U.S. President Nixon’s statement on the
diplomatic relations in 1968. ASEAN island of Guam in July 1969 that the U.S.
encouraged a resolution of the crisis and expected Asian nations to assume more
Indonesia was given credit for acting as an responsibility for their defense. America
effective mediator (Talking points for would keep all existing treaty commitments,
meeting with Malik, by Kissinger, 24 but would not enter any new ones, unless
September 1974). However, the approach they were vital to the interests of the U.S. In
was essentially one of non-interference in the case of internal subversion in Asia,
member disputes, reflecting the way ASEAN assistance from Washington would not be in
tackled both external and internal pressures the form of troops, but development aid,
through a philosophy of non-interference military equipment, and training (Record of
and consensus (Tarling, 2006, p. 210). meeting between Wilson and Nixon, 1969).
Debate on the future role of ASEAN Later in the Philippines, Nixon

emerged at a meeting of foreign ministers in nevertheless continued to stress the
December 1969. The opening statements importance of economic development as a
from some ministers revealed emerging vehicle for increased stability in Asia. In a
issues on whether the organization would statement, the American President reiterated
deal solely with economic and cultural U.S. was backing for the ADB saying that he
had asked Congress to appropriate US$20
million for the ordinary capital of the ADB to Indonesia, Kissinger told Agnew that he
and US$25 million to its special fund for the should stress that Jakarta’s pursuit of
following fiscal year. He also stressed that regional economic policies and multilateral
the Bank was an Asian institution with its economic aid approaches justified America’s
headquarters in Asia and with a requirement aid program to Indonesia (Memo, Kissinger
that 60 per cent of its capital must come from to Agnew, 1969). Indeed, by the end of 1969,
Asia. While the U.S. and other non-Asian the administration in Washington had
countries could play a role, the leadership of noticed that Asian nations were starting to
the Bank must always come from Asia rely less on individual outside aid donors.
(Nixon Statement, 1969). Then, a few weeks The Asian begin to rely more on multilateral
later, Secretary of State William Rogers aid organizations such as the ADB and the
supported Nixon’s position in a speech to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and that
media in Canberra. He stressed that the Americans welcomed the creation of
American policy in Asia would be to other Asian organizations based on Asian
encourage Asian leaders to meet their own initiatives. Therefore, while the U.S. did not
internal security needs with material want to interfere, it would be willing to assist
assistance from the U.S. and to encourage multilateral and regional organizations
‘rapid economic development of the area where possible (Memo, East Asia and the
with emphasis on increasing regional Pacific, 1969).
cooperation’ (Rogers speech, 1969). Nixon
publicly announced in January 1970 his The Changing Regional Scene
proposal to ask Congress to authorize a
Overall, the response of Southeast
contribution of US$100 million to the ADB’s
Asian leaders to Nixon’s comments was that
Special Funds over a three-year period –
they viewed the so-called Nixon Doctrine as
US$25 million in the first fiscal year, and then
a warning signal that the U.S. would
US$35 million and US$40 million in the
eventually disengage from the Asian
following two fiscal years. He stressed that
mainland and regional allies must assume
since the ADB’s establishment, the bank had
greater responsibility for their security. For
made a major contribution to Asian
some regional nations, the American policy
economic development and that it provided
announcement was in step with current
a ‘unique capability for acting as a catalyst
aspirations, such as Bangkok’s efforts to
for regional cooperation’ (White House Press
move towards a more independent foreign
Statement, 1970).
policy path and Manila’s wish to move
However, officials American beyond the traditional image as an American
Embassy in Singapore warned Washington strategic client (Acharya, 2012, p. 140). The
that if Southeast Asian regionalism were to Australian Embassy in Manila reported that
be successful, nations there must be sure that the Philippines appeared to be in favor of
the U.S. would not abandon them (Singapore Southeast Asian nations becoming more self-
to Washington, 1969). Kissinger too stressed reliant. Philippine President Marcos’s
this position to the American Vice-President proposal for an Asian forum to ‘solve Asian
in December 1969, before Spiro Agnew’s problems’ and his foreign secretary’s
proposed to visit the region. During the visit references to Asian security arrangements
indicated that Manila acknowledged the
changing role of future American facing any possible contingencies (Memo

involvement in Southeast Asia and admitted 126, 1971).
that the Philippines would become more
involved regionally (Manila to Canberra, Malaysia’s reaction to Nixon’s
1970). declaration was to support bilateral
relationships between countries of the region
Thanat Khoman told the Australians but without treaty ties or another
that he believed China would become a more institutionalization. This policy stemmed
serious problem after the end of the war in from the announcement of not just the Nixon
Vietnam and that countries in the region had Doctrine, but also the British intention to
only two alternatives: either submit to China withdraw militarily. Kuala Lumpur’s doubts
or unify and develop a front, which the about the utility of the newly formed Five-
Chinese would have to accept. A pact was Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
not necessary for this purpose, instead of between Britain, Australia, New Zealand,
regional cooperation based on mutual Singapore, and Malaysia, as well as limited
understanding and self-interest was all that expectations of Australian and New Zealand
was needed (Bangkok to Canberra, 1969). assistance (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra,
However, a year later, the Thai Government 1970).
seemed to recognize that regional
cooperation alone would not provide in the Singapore’s response to the changed
immediate future any prospect of an strategic environment was to build its
alternative security backing. This defense forces, but these efforts were not a
recognition was because of the disparity of direct reaction to the so-called doctrine,
power between countries in the region, the although Singapore’s efforts for closer
internal instability in most Asian nations and cooperation in defense matters with
Bangkok’s reluctance to accept the risks that Malaysia could have been encouraged by it.
would be involved in any new mutual However, since the British announcement,
security arrangement. Nevertheless, Singapore had been building its military due
regional cooperation potentially provided an to its geographical proximity to Malaysia
opportunity for Thailand to supplement its and Indonesia (Singapore to Canberra, 1970).
security alliance with the U.S. by The Indonesians seemed to accept
underpinning political and economic ties much of what was outlined by Washington
with its neighbors (NIC Note 4/70, 1970). and emphasized the need for extensive
This assessment was made a few months foreign aid to counter the military weakness
after Thailand secured additional financial of the countries in the region. In fact, the
assistance from Washington. In August concept of increased economic development
1971, Nixon directed that a US$45 million to replace a foreign military presence suited
special assistance packaged negotiated with the government in Jakarta that was quick to
Bangkok to strengthen the Thai economy point out that Indonesia lacked the capacity
and defense capabilities. The Americans to contribute to the joint defense and military
hoped this would accelerate the security. Rather its priority was economic
improvement of Thai armed forces development (Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur,
capabilities so that they might be capable of Singapore to Canberra, 1970). Nevertheless,
Indonesia became the beneficiary of an arms was out of regional altruism, Jakarta
expanded U.S. military aid program when was extremely keen to secure funds for six C-
Washington approved in March 1970 130 planes, and an M-16 rifle factory and
contributions of approximately $15 million American officials noted that they might
U.S. dollars per year – an increase of $10 have used their support for and participation
million from the original budget (Kissinger in regional cooperation as part of their bid.
memo for Secretary of State and Secretary of NSC staff member, John H. Holdridge raised
Defense, 1970). Jakarta was hoping for yet that possibility with Henry Kissinger, before
more and that the Americans would not adding that while there was still no
depart any earlier than 1973 and would leave movement towards a regional security
no security vacuum. Suharto sent General arrangement in Southeast Asia, ‘the
Sumitro to Washington in July 1970 to ask for Indonesians might just be able to get things
more military aid, and during discussions going’ (Memorandum, John H. Holdridge to
with Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Kissinger, 1970). Nixon authorized an
Henry Kissinger, he stressed that Indonesia increase in military aid to Indonesia to $18
was not yet a ‘real power’ and was still million for the 1971 fiscal year
unable to take over the responsibility of (Memorandum, Holdridge and Kennedy to
security in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the Kissinger, 1970).
Indonesian Government had not intended to
expand its armed forces before 1973, instead The Australian Government was also
deciding to concentrate on economic hopeful that Jakarta would pursue a greater
development and ‘sacrifice’ security for the interest in a collective security for Southeast
sake of national reconstruction. Jakarta was Asia, despite Suharto’s preoccupation with
worried that its neighbors – Thailand, the economy and internal disputes along
Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia – with the continuation of the Indonesian
lacked the military power to withstand position of non-alignment. Malik’s efforts to
potential internal instability, or stand up to arrange an international conference in
intensive Soviet diplomacy. Besides, these Jakarta in 1970 on how to bring peace to
Asian nations might turn to the Soviet side to Cambodia was the cause of these high hopes
counter Chinese infiltration. Therefore, in Canberra. The officials believed that the
Indonesia now had to develop strong armed Jakarta Conference on Cambodia revealed
forces and hoped to acquire military the Indonesian Government’s willingness to
supplies from Western Europe and the U.S. take a leading role in regional security (NIC
(Memo of Conversation between Sumitro 1(70), 1970).
and Kissinger, 1970). Kissinger responded Britain as well recognized the
very positively to Sumitro, stating that, ‘we importance of Indonesia as an emerging
recognized the Indonesian role, precisely leader in Southeast Asia. In 1971, the British
what the Nixon Doctrine required Ambassador in Jakarta urged the British
(Memorandum of Conversation between Government to acknowledge the growing
Sumitro and Kissinger, 1970). importance of Indonesia to regional stability.
Although the Americans did not He wrote to the Foreign Office that the long-
presume that Indonesia’s request for more term security of British investments in
Malaysia and Singapore depended on the
fortunes of Indonesia and hoped that concept, while the Indonesians, Thai,
London would steadily increase its aid Filipinos, and Singaporeans showed their
program there. Ambassador Combs felt that preference for a zone of peace, freedom and
the Indonesians viewed their position in neutrality (NIC 124(72), 1972).
Southeast Asia, as resident guarantors of
stability in the region, were keen supporters These proposals first discussed at a
of ASEAN and were increasingly likely to meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in
take the lead on regional policies (Combs, to Kuala Lumpur in November 1971. At this
Foreign Office, 1971). In early 1969, London venue, the Malaysians sought an agreement
was providing £200 million a year on aid and that all foreign powers should be excluded
technical assistance to the Far East. While from Southeast Asia, that the region should
this support was mostly bilateral, the British not use as a theatre for international power
placed a lot of emphasis on multilateral aid struggles, and that the great powers – the
to Southeast Asia and the opportunities it U.S., Soviet Union, and China – would
presented for regional cooperation. In doing guarantee this. This proposal was
so had played a role in many regional bodies unacceptable to the four other
such as the Colombo Plan, the ADB, the representatives at the meeting. They did not
Mekong Committee, and the specialized want to see a certain reference to
institutions of the UN (Speech, Maclehosesp, ‘neutralization’ or great power guarantees.
1969). The meeting’s declaration reflected this. In
the end, the meeting stated that the ASEAN
The Zone of Peace, Freedom and nations would make all necessary efforts to
Neutrality enable Southeast Asia to be recognized as a
zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality that
As the level of American and British was free from any form of interference by
military involvement in Southeast Asia outside powers. The regional nations would
declined, the five ASEAN countries started also make every effort to increase
to pay closer attention to political and cooperation amongst themselves (Canberra
security issues. However, each of these to Australian posts, 1972).
nations had different security arrangements.
Thailand and the Philippines were members However, each member state had
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization different aspirations regarding security in
(SEATO), and the Philippines had a security Southeast Asia and their existing bilateral
treaty with the U.S., Malaysia, and Singapore relationships. For the Malaysians, ZOPFN
were members of the FPDA. Indonesia had was a means to achieve domestic security
no security deals but shared joint-military without cooperative arrangements with non-
arrangements with Malaysia. Nevertheless, regional or regional states (NIC 303(74),
there was a new attitude towards a 1974). For the other four ASEAN nations,
reassessment of past policies and practices in external security guarantees still viewed as
an aim to seek more regional independence. necessary. Thailand and the Philippines
As a result, ideas of some neutral area continued to place importance on the U.S. as
presented as a solution to the changed their main protecting power. Singapore,
security environment in Southeast Asia. The with an economy oriented to manufacturing
Malaysians proposed a neutralization and exporting, on the other, hand believed
its interests were best served by an open- Despite the signings of ZOPFAN,
door policy for all the great powers, and not and an agreement in 1973 to establish a
only one powerful ally. Indonesia saw itself Permanent ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta,
as playing an independent role in the region, Washington felt pressure from within
which involved encouraging its neighbors to Southeast Asia. Notably, Thailand and the
strengthen their security systems as well as Philippines, retain SEATO as a symbol of
practice closer regional cooperation. At the American presence in the region during its
same time, Jakarta also placed a lot of transitional period of disengagement
reliance on its relationship with the U.S. for (Buszynsky, 1981, pp. 287-296). However,
both economic assistance and a guarantee of Bangkok and Manila did agree to abandon
regional security (NIC 124(72), First Draft, the military component of SEATO in
1972). response to Australian and New Zealand
pressure on Washington to downgrade the
By 1973, ZOPFAN continued to exist alliance as a price of their continued
as a mere statement of intent rather than any membership.
concrete framework. Indonesia, especially,
was in no hurry to see the implementation of The issue of a changing role for
the neutralization proposal because of its SEATO raised during a meeting with Nixon
wish for a continued U.S. military presence and the SEATO General Secretary, General
(Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 1975). Singapore Sunthorn, just days before the September
also supported American military presence 1973 SEATO Council meeting. During the
in the region and during a visit to the U.S. in former, when Sunthorn suggested that
March 1973, Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the SEATO could play a future role in
benefits to achieving the long-term objective supplementing bilateral aid programs in
of a quadripartite balance between U.S., Asia, Nixon replied, ‘that can give meaning
Soviet Union, Japan and Western naval to the organization. The military is very
forces. In turn, the neutralization concept important, but this is also helpful’ (Memo of
did not appear to be a factor severely conversation, President Nixon and General
affected by the U.S. military planning in the Sunthorn, 1973). At the 18th SEATO Council
region, nor did it halt the flow of American meeting of 28 September 1973, all delegates
economic and military assistance (NIC agreed to abolish the military structure of
57(73), 1973). Indeed, ZOPFAN reflected the SEATO, except military exercises.
changes taking place in Southeast Asia that
the ASEAN nations were unable to Canberra’s pressure to downgrade
influence, as they were unable to agree on SEATO reflected the regional policy aims of
what would be the future role of the external the Australian Prime Minister, Gough
powers (Narine, 1998, pp. 198-201). Towards Whitlam. When he first came to office in
the end of the decade, the Malaysians had 1972, Whitlam endorsed proposals for
lost interest in the concept, as had the other neutralization of the Indian Ocean and
ASEAN member states (Response to Southeast Asia, sought to withdraw
Proposed Parliamentary Question, 1977). Australian forces from Vietnam, praised the
Guam Doctrine and Nixon’s moves towards
Diversification détente with China and the Soviet Union,
and showed little support for the FPDA or
SEATO. For Whitlam, supporting regional Southeast Asian nations. During the 1975
cooperation would be one of the main Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the discussion
elements of Australia’s foreign policy for the was dominated by the implication of the
1970s with less emphasis on military pacts political changes in Indochina. Ministers
(Briefing Paper, 1974). This increased expressed optimism and caution and
emphasis on regionalism and cooperation concluded that the war’s end provided hope
between the superpowers led to calls from for securing peace, progress, and stability in
Whitlam to propose an Asian and Pacific Southeast Asia and decided to initiate
organization that would eventually include friendly relations with the Indochina nations
China’s membership. The idea would be to (Draft Paper, 1975).
bring the Asia-Pacific nations closer without
the interference of the major powers (The At the first meeting of Heads of
Hobart Mercury, 1973). Such an ASEAN governments in Bali in February
organization was not supposed to replace 1976, members reiterated the commitment to
SEATO, ASPAC or ASEAN, nor was it to the organization and at a subsequent
transform these organizations. Rather, meeting of economic ministers; the
Whitlam attempted to propose new ideas agreement reached on the establishment of
about regional cooperation (Letter, Paris to an industry in each member country where
Canberra, 1973). there would be joint equity participation that
would be developed to benefit the region.
The Singaporeans also had visions of The Philippines then suggested the
other regional groupings. Rajaratnam told establishment of an ASEAN common
his Australian counterpart during a meeting market; however, this proposal was only
in Canberra in November 1973 that while a supported by Singapore. Instead,
long-term objective for his government was discussions commenced on whether to set
a larger regional group, this would come up a system of preferential tariffs. By the
about with the assistance of the formation of mid-1970s, ASEAN members had also
some smaller sub-regional groupings. started cooperating closely in international
Suggestions for these sub-groups were the bodies, coordinating votes at the UN and
possibility of a smaller organization made of representations to the European Economic
up of Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Community (EEC) on economic matters
Papua New Guinea, and creating a group for (Response to Proposed Parliamentary
the four Commonwealth countries in the Question, 1977). Significantly, member
region. These groups would run alongside states obtained from the EEC recognition of
ASEAN and the FPDA, strengthening ASEAN as one region and preferential access
Southeast Asian unity (Record of to certain commodities into EEC markets,
Conversation, Rajaratnam and Willesee, strengthening relations between the two
1973). regional blocs (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974).
ASEAN also pursued external economic
The End of the War in Vietnam support from wider regional states, security
some joint economic cooperation projects
The end of the war in Vietnam and
with Australia, and seeking similar
the withdrawal of American forces paved
cooperation with New Zealand and Canada.
the way to closer cooperation between some
Japan also started expressing a willingness to After the second summit meeting of
undertake joint economic ventures with the ASEAN heads of Government in Kuala
regional group, despite earlier refusals to do Lumpur on 1977, ASEAN leaders
so (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974). maintained the level of cooperation in
economic areas and took steps to increase
Despite closer cooperation cooperation in cultural and social fields. One
economically and diplomatically, ASEAN of the most substantial areas of progress was
member states continued, ten years after the in ASEAN’s external relations through
association’s inauguration, to differ as for discussions with the Prime Ministers of
whether ASEAN should pursue security Australia, Japan and New Zealand on
objectives. Indonesia was one of the stronger common foreign policy and especially
supporters of security cooperation amongst foreign economic policy. As Lee Kuan Yew
members, but even Jakarta was concerned pointed out in his closing statement at the
about the organization presenting an image meeting, ‘it is psychologically easier to deal
of a defensive alliance. Thus, most military with ASEAN’s external partners than to sort
cooperation in the region remained bilateral out intra-regional arrangements between the
and at the 1976 ASEAN summit in Bali, partners themselves.’ These arrangements
leaders agreed to continue to cooperate on are an indication that ASEAN nations would
security matters, on a non-ASEAN basis continue to value both cooperation within
(Memo, U.S. Interests, and Objectives in the the Association while maintaining their
Asia-Pacific Region, 1976). external relationships (ASEAN Information
Independence and non-alignment Paper, 1977).
were a major goal for ASEAN members
Conclusion
regarding security cooperation; however,
relations with Vietnam also shaped defense Policy objectives from inside the
issues, as there was a consensus among the countries and outside of Southeast Asia
member’s states not to confirm Vietnamese towards regional cooperation and security
suspicions that ASEAN would become the had been developing since the end of the
next SEATO. Hanoi’s position was that Second World War. Economic development
while it was prepared to develop bilateral viewed as essential for containing
relations with ASEAN member states, it was communist influence and preventing
not willing to deal with ASEAN as an internal insurgencies in the region. Regional
Association. In turn, the Southeast Asian cooperation was one way of providing
member nations in ASEAN, despite financial assistance to newly independent
increased cooperation within the nations without the appearance of foreign
organization as well as continued interference in regional affairs. The aim for
aspirations for independence and non- many of the countries involved in Southeast
alignment, sought continuing American Asian regionalism was that growth and
involvement in their region as a deterrent to prosperity would come through regional
the Soviet Union and Chinese strategic development programs with external
ambitions as well as Japanese economic support. This program would then expand
domination (FCO paper, 1977). to some form of collective security led by the
Southeast Asian nations themselves. This
policy started to gather pace during the security relations continued to be supported
1950s and 1960s. By the late 1950s, the U.S. by foreign powers.
administration was strongly promoting the
UN Economic Commission for Asia and the About Author
Far East as one of the most important
Dr. Sue Thompson is a Senior
multilateral groupings in promoting
Lecturer at the National Security College in
regional economic and social cooperation
the Crawford School of Public Policy at the
and development. In 1950, the U.S.
Australian National University. Her focus of
supported the development of the Mekong
research examines the history of regional
Basin as a long-range project to secure
cooperation in Southeast Asia during the
regional cooperation between Burma,
Cold War with a focus on foreign power
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. In
influences in the post-war evolution of
the early 1960s, the U.S. tried to promote
Southeast Asian regionalism. Dr. Thompson
regional cooperation in Asia by urging closer
has conducted extensive fieldwork in North
Japanese relations with other countries in the
America, Europe, and Southeast Asia and is
region, initially through the Association of
currently working on her second sole-
Southeast Asia. Key to this plan was the role
authored book on this topic. Dr Thompson
that the regional nations would play
completed her Ph.D. from the School of
themselves. For Western countries, regional
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the
cooperation not only potentially provided a
University of London in the United
vehicle for containing communism in Asia,
Kingdom. She holds a Master’s degree from
but the policy presented an alternative
the London School of Economics and a
security system in replace of Western
Bachelor degree with honours from the
military bases. Southeast Asian nations
Australian National University.
themselves supported closer regional
integration as a means of containing Chinese References
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1 Redefining ASEAN Way
Redefining ASEAN Way:

Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in
Southeast Asia1
M. Faishal Aminuddin University of Brawijaya, Indonesia

Joko Purnomo University of Brawijaya, Indonesia
Abstract
This paper reviews inter-state relations in Southeast Asia countries.

Regionalism in Southeast Asia has been criticized on its limited achievement
in political development, Political development in this region focuses more
on nation’s interests than regional interests. Added to this, there is a lack of
political channel outside formal government relations hinders political
connectivity among Southeast Asian people.
The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, to analyze the pattern of political
development in Southeast Asian region. Secondly, to assess the implication
of using non-interference principle for maintaining political relations in
Southeast Asian region and its contribution to the lack of political awareness
regionally. Thirdly, to propose new political diplomacy concerned with
promoting political awareness regionally.
This paper ends by providing an alternative type of political diplomacy by

combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal
diplomacy actions done by non-government actors. We point out an
alternative strategy to promote political awareness in Southeast Asian
community in the future. First, open policy to connecting the diplomatic
based community. Second, optimize the regional cooperation with more
concern with democracy and human rights issue. Third, building and
institutionalizing political awareness through people participation.
Key words: regional cooperation, non-interference principal, political

awareness, communitarian
1
This article was originally presented in The Third International Conference on Southeast Asia
(ICONSEA 2009) at the University of Malaya by M. Faishal Aminuddin in the form of a paper entitled,
“Political Awareness: Building Inter-government Relation in Southeast Asia Countries.”

DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.962
taking place in Asia. First, political processes

Introduction fail to build democracy as in South Korea
and Taiwan and enforces consolidated
Regionalism in Southeast Asia is
autocracies in China, Laos, Singapore, and
dominantly related to ASEAN. Since it was
Vietnam. Second, there is unstable
established over 50 years ago, it appears that
autocracies occurred in Afghanistan,
strategical position of ASEAN has not been
Cambodia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
able to bring the significant form of mutual
Thailand. Added to this, civil society
understanding among the members. The
organizations get significant pressure from
positive achievement in terms of economic
autocratic power and only a few among
development within this region contributes
those organizations who have political
a minor progress in narrowing inequalities
representation. BTI (2016) also found that
between countries. Previously, economic
countries with high economic growth, such
growth within this region was followed by
as Singapore and Vietnam showed that
certain reduction of inequalities between
political stability, strong government
countries. There was also some progress in
institutions, and tight administration control
term of poverty alleviation. After the 1990s,
are factors contribute to economic
however, economic growth only facilitates
transformation. Hence, there is a little
the increase in inequalities between
progress in flourishing democratization at
Southeast Asia countries. Interestingly,
the regional level.
inequality within country shows different
pattern. Inequality trends have diverged, The studies noted that the concept of
with inequality rising in Indonesia and ASEAN way is a passive response and it
falling in Thailand, Malaysia, and the tends to hinder the progress of
Philippines; in part due to policy Efforts democratization. The ASEAN way is going
(Jain-Chandra et al., 2016). In terms of into the debate and still unclear, hence, it
internal mobility within this region, there is needs to get a more extensive explanation
an intriguing interaction between people in (Haacke, 1999; Acharya, 2001). Other study
Southeast Asia countries. A study shows that cited that the ASEAN way may represent the
97 per cent of the 6.5 million internal collective identity of ASEAN crystallized in
migration in 2013 only circulates in three the principle of non-intervention or silent
countries: Thailand, Malaysia, and diplomacy (Rüland, 2000; Nischalke, 2000).
Singapore. In a more specific scale, of a total In some cases, however, the ASEAN way is
of 88 per cent of internal migration, more than just the principle of non-
connecting eight corridors (ILO & ADB, intervention. Some evidence depicts the
2014). success in the intervention of domestic
conflicts such as in Cambodia (Goh, 2003).
In the context of social and political
Unfortunately, weak political intervention to
matters, however, connectivity among
foster democratization in this region only
Southeast Asian people is very limited. This
facilitates a hijack of the ASEAN Way led by
circumstance exists because there is a lack of
autocratic power. These are caused by the
political channel caused by straight
inclination of the state sovereignty and
government policy. In the study of BTI
(2016), there are two processes that are
policy priorities in maintaining domestic 2) explanation on the extension of the

stability (Katsumata, 2003). boundaries of regionalism towards
democratization pressure to create open
Moreover, the achievement of regionalism; 3) designing the model of
economic growth is not always followed by political awareness as an active concept of
an increase in regional exchange to share non-intervention.
democratic values. Studies on
democratization showed findings varied. In Scoping Government Interaction
Malaysia and Singapore, democracy runs
within the strong-state authority, where the The intergovernmental relationship
stability of the regime occurs due to its in Southeast Asian region comes into
strong control over political activities (Slater, dynamics situation. It attracts scholars to
2012). On the other side, democratization in contribute to the theoretical discussion on
Indonesia successfully reduces state regionalism perspective. Generally,
authority but it also facilitates the rise of regionalism is interpreted as a policy and a
oligarch (Hadiz & Richard Robinson, 2013). tremendous project where some actors from
In general, there is no single factor that state or non-state engage in cooperative and
causes stagnant democratization in this coordinate their common good for the
region. Specific explanation of the region. Krasner (1983), stated that some
difficulties of democracy establishment aspects have necessarily to be identified
relies on the tradition of the political elites related to some norms, rules, and procedures
who have a concern to dominate the political which may be met to the expectation of some
system. Thus, democracy merely produces different actors. We argue that regionalism
"elected autocrat" (Kurlantzick, 2012). in ASEAN is viewed as an interplay between
political development, pseudo-nationalism,
This paper will answer the question and closed regionalism.
of: to what the extent the redefinition of
ASEAN way should able to solve regional The important variable needs to be
politics problem? We offer normative explored in the discussion of regionalism is
assessment based on the cultural approach political development. Even though there
to undertaking the ideal type of inter- are variations of political development
governmental relationships in this region. within this region, but there is a tendency for
We use the interpretive analysis on the centralizing political power as a model of
concepts of forming the ASEAN cooperation political development. It can be seen in
and undertake the theoretical review to Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore. The
explain the compatibility of democracy in government authority had dominant control
this region. in public life even though citizen is still given
political space if not considered as national
This paper consists of three stability threat. We argue that centralistic
discussions, namely: 1) restrictive government-style with significant political
conceptions on intergovernmental relations power is intended to create political
analysis to obtain the possibility or subsistence aimed to ensure the stability of
probability for interconnectivity amongst the domestic economy. Hence, political
governments in politically sensitive issues; development in this region only focused
merely on country’s interests rather than Democratization, however, may contribute

regional interests. to the structural political change in each
country. Moreover, it also gives adequate
This pattern of political development influenced pressure for the pattern of
continued until the early of the 1990s. regional relationship, especially inter-
Afterward, regionalism became a well- political agencies. Democratization provides
known issue which discussed since the a great opportunity for replacing state-centric
shifting of worldwide power constellation. model that puts the state as a center for all
ASEAN regionalism was reconstructed to the interaction. Ideally, democratization
become tether of expectation for within regionalism becomes a part of the
strengthening government control capacity. political commitment to fight against
The expansion form of ASEAN consultation authoritarian style in domestic politics
with other state or regional cooperation whether by self-modality based on domestic
counterpart had significance only to capacity and capability or by using stronger
improve regional economic development. By power from the outside.
the expansion of Japan and China, it had a
possibility to transform larger regional State-centric model came from the
economic agenda, namely Asian economic definition extended by Weberian that gave
agenda. This kind of action, however, is larger space for the optimization of state
inadequate for developing the democratic authority. General view concerning the role
pattern in Southeast Asian region. Two of the state puts the government as the
explanations on this matter. Firstly, superior political agency. To control
Southeast Asian economic actors do not have extensively, the authority requires the
any specific interest to ensure the existence of internal loyalty and external
establishment of democracy because they are acknowledgment. Hence, the state should
more interested to expand their business not only act for their interest but should also
outside Southeast Asian region due to its represent the interest of others outside the
economic advantages. Secondly, China and government. It can be stated that decision
Japan also have limited attention on the making process within the state is an arena
political matter during its economic of many interests and the results represent
expansion in Southeast Asian region. China the dynamic interaction amongst them
has strong desire to become the center of (Moravcsik, 1999).
regional corporation in Asia (Wunderlich,
2008). The tendency to secure its energy From this perspective, the model of
security and market expansion, however, state authority influences the behavior of its
makes China does not put significant governmental regime. Governmental
attention to political development in Asia. behavior has its scope and can be divided
into bilateral and multilateral. A bilateral
Southeast Asian region has an relationship is developed both with
opportunity to increase political countries within region and countries
development rapidly. It can be ignored that outside regions. While a multilateral
there are difficulties to maintain its political relationship is developed both with regional
development related to the problem of countries and different regional countries.
establishing democratization. Both of those stages become natural fence
which indicates that the government has highly obvious that the type of regional
limited scope for territory and sovereignty. integration only concerns with institutional
policy and behavior, but it has less connected
Another variable which needs to be with people’s interests, namely
observed is the “network establishment” in democratization with specific values
the regional cooperation. Domestic regime embedded within ASEAN society.
commonly brings function as motivator or
catalyst for strengthening relationship The concept of regionalism in Asia
within the jurisdictional region. The pattern needs to be viewed as a representation of
of organized network provides sufficient ASEAN value, namely communitarian.
stability which indicates non-hierarchical Moreover, democratization is considered as
and interdependent attitude. Moreover, it is specific value embedded in ASEAN society.
also connecting various actors who share Domestic politics that becomes a threat to the
high mutual interest and trust as a sign of institutionalization of democracy is
togetherness. This kind of cooperation with important to get an attention. Undoubtedly,
collective purpose achievement considered there are some countries who had an
as an ideal type of regionalism (Börzel, 1997). unsteady political situation. The process of
Hence, regionalism should be viewed as a democratization faces significant challenges
complex and multi-facet process involving as it can be seen in Kampuchea, Laos, and
both formal and informal integration Vietnam. On these countries, build the
supported by networks from government commitment for integrating democracy with
and society. domestic politics is not an easy task to be
done. We argue that the participation of
Democratization and Regionalism: A ASEAN in the process of democratization in
Crossing Boundaries their members will give significant
contribution to the deepening democratic
Regionalism has limited attention to
spirit in that countries. Moreover, it can
integrating the regional interest with the
reduce the participation of external actors
promotion of democracy. Regional
such the United States or European countries
integration tends to consider more on
to involve in domestic politics within
economic, social and cultural aspects and has
ASEAN countries.
a limited action to bring the spirit of
democracy when dealing with domestic We need to consider that there is no
politics. It is very important to change the homogeneous political culture in the region.
essence of regionalism where economic As it can be seen from the polarization of
interests are superior than commitment on state political institution that is divided in
democratization. Added to this, ASEAN the form of absolute monarch, constitutional
gives limited interest to strengthen the inter- monarch, republic, socialist and junta
citizen relationship to spread democratic military. Meanwhile, governmental
values. Consequently, ASEAN has lost its structure is also varied, namely: presidential,
opportunity to create reciprocal dialogue to parliamentary, Leninist, and military
broader political issues. It is not surprise that dictator. Clark Neher and Ross Marlay
ASEAN is viewed as an elite integration (1995) classify this region into four categories
rather than people integration. Hence, it is in term of democratic scales: semi-
democracy, semi-authoritarian, structure and kinship containing a set of

authoritarian based on citizen participation, mutual share principle and doing something
electoral competition and civil freedom. for a community (Inoguchi, 1998). Political
Democratic implementation which has culture in the Southeast Asia is closely
electoral competition and civil freedom is related to kinship system that influences the
relatively well known in Indonesia, shape of interaction or inter-institutional
Philippines, and Thailand. relationship. Personal figure is very
important for the whole process for taking
Even though some countries show decision. Fukuyama (1995) described an
positive performance to accept the example like in China which strictly
democracy, it does not mean that there are develops the greatness of family.
limited political obstacles in those countries.
Attempts of the military coup, political Specifically, in the Southeast Asia, it
competition among elites, local resistances seems that the personal trust exceeds social
and separatism are among potential trust. It needs a new formulation where the
problems faced by countries such as combination between colleague trust and
Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand. In other formal regulation of political institution is
words, serious political problems still exist, established. Regional integration needs to
even though democracy is also flourishing. take into accounts the urgency of using the
With this circumstance, it gives relevance for basic value of society when establishing
ASEAN to strengthen its contributions to regional policy and behavior. Marsh (ed.
democracy with the spirit of ASEAN: 2006) mentioned that Malaya cultural
communitarianism. background is less influence compared to
China cultural background to governmental
Expanding spectrum of behavior. On the contrary, other aspects such
democratization will bring a better as ideology, whether it is liberal democracy
consequence for the intergovernmental or authoritarian, influences more (Blondel,
process of negotiation. Democratization Sinnott, & Svensson, 1998). Hence,
model is not homogenous. It needs to establishing connectivity by strengthening
represent and accommodate political colleague trust as a manifestation of cultural
tradition. Hence, it allows variety of values as an important aspect of developing
domestic political management in each regional policy and behavior is very
country. One good example is what important action to be done.
happened in Myanmar. The crisis was
handled by two things: regional cooperation The design of communitarian
through ASEAN participation and public democracy that is accommodating local
awareness regarding humanitarian issues. values is essential for ASEAN.
The act of regional institution combined with Communitarian democracy differs with
people awareness and participation are western liberal democracy in terms of
potentially reducing the crisis. providing space for local wisdom-cultural
values, instead of abandoning these values.
Democratization with Asian values It is expected that by using local wisdom-
may be used as a moral reference that is cultural values that embrace the sense of
formed by the characteristic of social communitarian, democratization in region
and promoting regional-based conflict issues occurred in one country becomes very
resolution for any political dispute within minimum, even though the political issues
ASEAN are truly established. The sense of may affect other countries or regional
communitarian among people will develop stability. This kind of diplomacy leads to
substantially if connectivity does exist. To be political ignorance between ASEAN
on that stage, we need to consider, what we members and it reduces mutual
call, “political awareness”. ASEAN understanding between countries. We
community needs to consider opening more cannot ignore that non-interference principal
extensive opportunity for instituting is chosen by considering sociocultural
political instruments, where the regional aspects embedded in Southeast Asian
political institutions may be used for society. The implementation of this
supporting the design of political awareness. principal, however, should also consider the
Civilian also has a good experience to importance of responsiveness among others
manage a better integration, not only in the about the political problems that can
economic field but also in sociopolitical significantly influence regional politics.
policy and regional security (Bersick &
Pasch, 2007). Second, the regional intercommunity
relationship has already been formed but
Designing Political Awareness limited action has been done to foster this
society relationship to strengthen regional
We view the concept of political connectivity among ASEAN people.
awareness as an awareness of citizens to Domestically, network of non-government
accept a concept of political action and the organization (NGOs) is flourishing.
results of the political process. Political Regionally, the connectivity between NGOs
awareness has a direct impact on certain tends to focus on specific issues related to the
aspects such as the political action of citizens concern of NGOs but it gives less attention to
and their political behavior which is strengthen political awareness and political
dependent on the intake and supply of dialogues. In other words, a potential asset
political information (Zaller, 1990). that already exists between civil society to
create connectivity among civil society is
Political awareness is an urgent
ignored.
agenda needed to be strengthened in
ASEAN. There are reasons for it. First, each Third, the regional corporation that
government tends to strengthen regional strongly relies on non-interference principal
diplomacy by not having interfered with provides complexity when defining which
domestic problems faced by other ASEAN problems needed to tackle domestically and
members as an act of implementing the which problems that needs regional
principle of non-interference. Human rights attention and actions. This complexity gives
violation in Papua, Rohingya persecution in dis-incentive for ASEAN to maintain
Myanmar, and the arrest of pro-democracy regional interest and become important
activists in Malaysia, as examples, did not actors within regions. As a result, ASEAN
bring significant political attention does not use the opportunity to foster inter-
regionally. Consequently, attention between country relationship by using its unique
ASEAN members toward some political
cultural and traditional ASEAN values to On the other side, no country has the
tackle domestic problems. courage to bring domestic political issues to
become regional political issues. The
Political issues slant Southeast Asian problem is that this situation is worsened by
countries can compare into two scales. It the increase in political cooperation between
particularly appears during the last second ASEAN state members and external actors
decade, facilitated by the increase of such as developed country and other
worldwide political escalation and the multilateral cooperation beyond the regional
spread of these issues through transnational boundary. Thus, regional politics in this
channels. The first scale is regional issue, region is picturized by political ignorance
which emerges as the effect of global and political dependence into external actor
interaction. After the 9/11, this region takes a outside the region such as China, USA, and
significant attention to war against terrorism Russia. This article tries to bring the attention
programs sponsored by the USA under of the limited political awareness among
President George W. Bush. This agenda ASEAN member. Moreover, this article also
results to the domino effect toward the reviews the recent political value of this
existence of transcultural communities region that too much rely on non-interfere
within this region due to the idea of principal. Specific attention is given to the
polarization and stigmatization between issue of political awareness between
radical and non-radical community or countries which is politically abandoned.
terrorist and non-terrorist organization.
There is an urgent need to emphasize
The second scale is domestic political awareness in the way ASEAN
government issue contributing to the members construct their diplomacy. It is an
regional stability. There is a fluctuation urgent action to put political awareness as a
relationship among countries in Southeast spirit of cultural and political diplomacy.
Asian region, especially when it comes to the The concept of political awareness refers to
bilateral relationship. Pursuing its national the establishment of space for mutual
interests rather than promoting mutual understanding among countries which are
understanding among ASEAN member is not only concentrated on domestic issues but
becoming the picture of the bilateral also extend to some issues across the country
relationship. Moreover, there is a tendency in logical reason and boundary. Political
of conducting political ignorance when it awareness insists to each country for having
comes to the political issues of one country. an equal responsibility in a mutual
Separatist issue occurred in Pattani, understanding frame, concerning with the
Southern Thailand; Papua, Indonesia; and need of promoting and protecting regional
Moro, Philippines is only viewed as internal democratization. Thus, a mutual controlling
matters and does not bring more attention to dynamic for each country may have
build regional collaborative act to solve the maximum power to put the position of each
problems. ASEAN is seen to do anything but country as balancing force against political
ignorance. It can be stated that ASEAN unstableness.
provides limited incentives for bringing
truly intergovernmental interaction in the Using a case of Spratley Archipelago,
political matter. a territorial dispute between some ASEAN
countries and China, we can see that the actors from outside region. Eliminating
maintenance of political stability in this external pressure and infiltration will be
region is ignoring the importance of seeking additional benefits from this action.
a solution by maximizing the role of ASEAN
to involve actively in regional politics. In the Second, facilitate the connectivity
positive side, the involvement of external between economic actors, especially to
actor outside ASEAN gives contribution for maximize regional market. Regional market
problem resolution by forming partner for within ASEAN country provides benefits
dialogue. While from the negative side, the mainly for big corporations especially when
external environment affects cohesion of each economic actor only focuses in their
ASEAN policy itself (Yoshimatsu, 2006). own domestic market. ASEAN corporations
More importantly, the role of ASEAN is tend to choose international market than
dominated by the active role of external develop market within ASEAN territory due
actors. Hence, political stability in this region to economic advantage’s consideration. A
at some degree has significant dependency new type of regional economic connectivity,
on external actors rather than internal actors. especially done by small and medium
Important assessment regarding this issue enterprises could bring positive progress not
came from Emmers (2003), he evaluated that only in terms of economic benefits but also
ASEAN had its own way in resolving its social benefits. Connectivity between
different problems in every case and for each economic actors will develop a better
member. There is no legal mechanism which understanding of others led to the
allow to approach each problem by using collaborative work for maximizing regional
dialogue effort for achieving collective market for ASEAN’s economic actors.
consensus. The main frame for this Third, build a stronger altruism spirit.
consensus is national sovereignty and non- We cannot ignore that each country has
inference politics in the domestic matter. domestic problems that potentially becomes
Consequently, the desire to maintain their regional problems. Abu Sayyaf group in
domestic interests rather than regional Philippine, as an example, tends to be
interests is obvious. With this situation, each viewed as the domestic problem in
country does not want to be politically tied, Philippine rather than an embryo for
thus, they become an unpredictable agent. regional problems faced by all ASEAN
We are emphasizing alternative member. Being selfish and ignore each other
pathways to strengthen the work of ASEAN. - as the best action of the ASEAN way-,
First, develop the network among non-state however, is only postpone the development
actors. Civil societies in Southeast Asian of problems. It needs urgent attitude change
region need to strengthen its communication among countries to put concern for the other
and collaboration regionally. Cultural interests.
bonding as an Asian people can be used to Fourth, reduce the dependency to
strengthen solidarity and trust among Asian external actors outside ASEAN to solving
people. This network can be expected to local or regional problems. There is a
perform the significant collaborative action tendency where involving external actors,
to solve regional problems instead of invite mainly powerful countries, is the first
reaction among ASEAN countries rather less significant role. A new form of approach
than relying on inviting ASEAN to solve needs to be offered. ASEAN members need
domestic problems. Terrorism, illegal to be pushed to create a closer cooperation
migration, drug trafficking problems, and and formulate policy collectively. As
territory dispute as it is shown at South happened in Kampuchea in the 1980s or
China Sea are some examples of that ASEAN reconciliation mission in East Timor,
tendency. Strengthen trust and commitment both change political mindset, particularly in
among ASEAN countries and between the concept of autonomy and self-
ASEAN countries with other counterparts to government (Vatikiotis, 2006).
settle problems using peaceful and durable
solution as it already undertakes when The regional issue needs to be
announcing the Declaration on The Conduct resolved by considering the expectation of
of Parties in The South China Sea (DOC) be the people in this region. Cooperation and
implemented seriously. consultation which bring mutual benefit
among the countries involved in the issues
Neighboring Partnership may influence the type of solution. Cultural
similarity in ASEAN community is
Has government realized what they commonly considered have a significant
should do in neighboring life? This simple power in searching for the solution. One
question has a significant implication for the example for this is in the effective conflict
improvement of regional cooperation, resolution based on cooperative principle. It
whether it is represented by ASEAN as might be traced from what was stated by the
regional cooperation institution or another Indonesian ex-minister of foreign affairs in
initiative in the relationship of 1979 concerning with communicatively
intergovernmental. Focused on ASEAN, the conflict resolution (Anwar, 1994). The same
issue of well-neighboring concept is still thing may be known from Ghazali Shafi’e
problematic. Pursuing their internal benefits who commented in Malaysia that collective
when conducting diplomatic matters rather cultural inheritance was spirit of
than regional benefits is one explanation for togetherness in a big kampong
this situation. Moreover, ASEAN country (village/country) of Southeast Asia. Estrella
tends to choose bilateral relationship to gain Solidum from the Philippines underlined
expected benefits due to its less complexity ASEAN way is consistent with the cultural
than regional relationship. Bilateral elements that every member of ASEAN has.
relationship that always emphasizes more ASEAN way is viewed as process of taking
on internal benefits among two countries policy based on consultation and consensus,
conducted relationship is an advantage informally, non-confrontation and collective
behind that choice. benefit (Acharya, 2001).
One of the basic things strictly Indeed, the establishment of
observed is that conflict resolution model in supranational organization in Southeast
ASEAN is less powerful. The cause relates to Asia has limited prospect or better future.
the very strong nationalist politics in each There are three main reasons for that. First,
country. Hence, the intergovernmental historically, there is no political authority
organization such regional organization play that dominantly governs to this region. The
second is ideological reason, where on reducing in consensus’s effectiveness.

nationalism becomes the main trigger to the Without that, well-established cooperation
emergence of resistance against colonialism. and the optimization of the result of
Hence, nationalism exceeds regionalism. cooperation among ASEAN members will be
Lastly, until now there is no country who far away to be reached.
wants to play powerfully as regional leaders.
ASEAN form which is static and with no A legal and formal cooperative
political integrated orientation should be framework is extremely needed.
tested for the next further period. Political International law should also need to
dynamics of intercountry relationship in this become compulsory. Consensual and
region is extremely influenced by external political approaches in regional relationship
pressure. On the other side, the within ASEAN, however, must be
accumulation of domestic issues in this strengthened to maintain positive
region until now does not come up with an achievement. It is functioned for covering
effective resolution, yet. the impasse of formal diplomatic line or
limited negotiation toward some exertions
A space for discussing various kind or services that are involving the interest of
of governmental interest, not only in the case country beyond the region.
of giving protection for the citizen but also
for national interest, maybe accommodated Collectivity and caring one with
in special diplomatic action which is another should not be considered as part of
considering another country as part of one’s aggressiveness toward each other.
strategic partnership cooperation. Strategic With this new understanding, involving in
partnership cooperation is needed to be one country’s matter should not be viewed
strengthened to gain better understanding as an act of interfering with the domestic
and perception among countries. issue of one country. On the other side,
proactive offer should also be provided in
Another framework which has better the incidental cases that need urgent
opportunity in the context of regional responses.
cooperation is a neighboring partnership.
Philosophical background of this framework Conclusion
comes from some positive elements in closer
ASEAN is unique regional
social life. Neighbor is a part of someone
cooperation. There is some achievement in
closer life. In Southeast Asian society
economic development in this region,
tradition, collectivity becomes a foundation
however, regional integration provides little
of interfamily interaction, however, it has
benefits in terms of political development.
not hit the boundary of privacy for each
The principle of non-interference as a code of
territory.
conduct for maintaining regional diplomacy
Implementation of neighborhood reduces significantly a political awareness to
partnership needs a precondition that the political matters. Therefore, political
should be fulfilled by each country. Low connectivity among Southeast Asian
trust among countries within ASEAN is countries is limited.
needed to be minimalized due to its impacts
This paper has opened a space for research focuses on globalization and
further discussion as an attempt to design international development. Currently, he
both formal and informal field for conducts research related to border affairs
intercountry regional relationship. A within Southeast Asia region.
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Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal
The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda
Leni Winarni Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia
Abstract
Regarding Southeast Asia as a multi-ethnic region, this paper attempts to examine

about why Buddhist Community turns into religious violence against Rohingya
people in the State of Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan). Through understanding
the triggers of conflicts, this paper applies historical perspective to analyze why
ethnic-religious conflict occur nowadays between Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim in
Myanmar. This paper also discusses how history has influenced the construction of
the government’s policy under a military regime to exclude Rohingya. However, the
ethno-religious conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in
managing diversity.
Key words: ethnic-religion violence, Muslim Rohingya, Buddhist Rakhine, state’s

role
Introduction Throughout history, the conflict

between Rohingya Muslim in the north
The challenges that newly and Rakhine Buddhist in the South of
independent state faces in the post-colonial Rakhine state are much influenced by their
period are not only on how to manage relationship in the past. Although it is
diversity but also how to maintain the classic, the history has created a pattern of
stability of a nation-state based on a conflict which is accumulated in the
nationalism. Southeast Asia is the society and has constructed their
portrayal of the “melting pot” with its perspectives about the others. Moreover,
mixed ethnic identity and religious this can also be used to analyze why the
diversity among them. It is the place where government leads the primordialist issue
most of its unification is an agreement as a reason to maintain stability within the
resulting after the colonial states left at the state. Thus, history is one main factor to
end of World War II. Meanwhile, the construct the ethnic-religious conflict in
mixed community has also caused another Myanmar today. Even though, Aung San
problem, which revolves around minority Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy
and majority. Rather than examining the (NLD) won the elections in 2015 and her
problem of diversity, this paper will focus victory is a way to democracy, but in the
on explaining why the Rohingya Muslim case of the Rohingya, the task will not be
and Rakhine Buddhist often involve in easy.
these conflicts compared to other ethnic
groups in Myanmar throughout its
historical perspective.

DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.1812
38 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda
Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Rohingya has Muslims- Sunni. In his book,
Pagodas Minahan also stated that according to
Bamar Historian “…the term ‘Rohingya’ did
Many centuries ago, Hinduism is not appear until the 1950s when it was coined
the most dominant religion in the Rakhine by Bengali Muslim migrants who had settled in
Kingdom and Buddhism took its place in the Rakhine region during the colonial
the 500 BCE. After around 710 CE, Islam period…” (Minahan, 2012). On the contrary,
reached the state (Saw, 2011; Sakinada, another literature claims that the Rohingya
2005). According to Minahan (2012) in the community has settled in that region for a
book entitled Ethnic Groups of South Asia long period before it was under the British
and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia, Islam’s colonial rule.
arrival has embraced many of the former
Buddhist, Hindu, and animist population. The historical background of
When Bengal was under Muslim rule in Arakan seems close to the conflict. In 1785,
1213, Muslim’s influence was greatly Burman soldiers have attacked Arakan
developed in Arakan (Minahan, 2012) one brutally resulting to the destruction of
the other hand, Bamars or Burmans mosques, libraries, and cultural
disposed the king of Arakan in 1404. institutions (Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998).
During the same period, Buddhism The Burman monarchy attempts to clean
became the most influential and up those who were considered as “the
ascertained religion which can be seen in other” or has non-Burmese origins. In the
the later period of Rakhine kings who were efforts to appall the memories of Burmese
all Buddhists (Gibson, James, & Falvey, brutality, the Rohingya community
2016). Another fact of Rakhine State is that welcomed the British in Arakan and it was
for many centuries there has been relations during the colonial rule that they received
made between the Muslims in Bengal and political rights and economic autonomy. In
the Kingdom of Arakan. When Arakan was 1937, the British separated Arakan from the
independent in the 15th and 16th century, Indian empire which causes the Rohingya
this region was ruled by both Buddhists community’s regress into its previous
and Muslims (Ursula, 2014). situation; living in fear and insecurity.
According to Minahan (2012), In 1942, the Japanese forces have

Rohingya was also known as Ruainggas, reached Rakhine and made that area as a
that is part of Indo-Aryan ethnic group. He front line until the end of the Second World
stated that there are other Rohingya War. During 1942-43, both Muslims and
communities spreading out in Saudi Rakhines were attacking each other mostly
Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, due to their different alliances; most
Europe, North America, United Arab Muslim communities were pro-British, and
Emirates, Australia, and New Zealand. Rakhines were supporting the Japanese.
That is approximately 3.5 million of With shellacking from both parties,
Rohingya people and about 800,000 has Muslim communities fled to the north
lived in the Rakhine State (Minahan, 2012). where they were a majority, and Rakhine
He also explained that Rohingya speaks an moved to the south (Yegar, 1972, in Asia
Indo-Aryan language which refers to Report No. 26, International Crisis Group
Bengali or known as Chittagonian (ICG), 2014). This is reasonable in seeing
language that Southeastern Bangladesh why the largest Muslim groups were
uses and in the religion aspect, most of settled in the Rakhine State. In 1945, British
awarded the Rohingya community a Arakan since 1823 (Bayefsky, 2005). The
civilian administration in Arakan because Rohingya community was not only
of their loyalty. Two years later in 1948, stateless but also endures military
Arakan State was integrated into Burma pressure; including highly restrictive
according to the 1948 treaty and Burma policies. This situation is compounded by
granted its independence from Britain the fact that the military regime is the one
(Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998). to facilitate the movement against
Rohingya (Dittmer, 2010). The goal of that
Although many evidences and movement is to reduce Rohingya’s
historical reports prove that the Rohingya population, hence, there is no accurate
community is a native in that region, but documentation estimating the number of
Burma (now Myanmar) as well as the Muslim population in the Rakhine State.
Burmese Kingdom still perceived them as Meanwhile in 1982, there was about 56 per
foreigners or newcomers. Therefore, for cent of the total population inhabitant in
the Muslims living as a minority in the the district (Yegar, 2002). It is possible that
Buddhists’ land is difficult for Rohingya. the Rohingya community has the highest
The poor relationship between Muslims population at that time. A decade later in
and Buddhists did not only happens today, 1994, Burmese Muslim was estimated to be
but it has a heavy historical relation that 3 per cent out of the total population of 45
result to the Burmese’s reluctance to co- million, but Muslim claimed that their
exist with the Rohingya Muslims since number of population is around 7 million
centuries ago. or 13 per cent out of the total population
Today the Rakhine State, like other (Veen, 2005). According to the data, the
states of Myanmar, is a diverse region. The Muslim population shows a small number
Rakhine Buddhist is the largest group in Myanmar, but the data of ICG in 2014 or
amongst the total population which is other sources stated that Rohingya
approximately 60 per cent of the 3.2 Muslims were the second largest group in
million. The Muslim communities, the State of Rakhine; even though the
including Rohingya, are at least 30 per cent number was under 50 per cent of the
while the rest population is Chin (who are population. However, this imbalance
Buddhist, Christian or Animist), and other number of population causes insecurity
small minorities including the Kaman (also and fear to emerge.
Muslim), Mro, Khami, Dainet and
Violence Against Rohingya: Problem
Maramagyi who have reached 10 per cent
with Ethnicity or Religiosity?
(International Crisis Group (ICG), 2014). In
fact, the data of Rohingya population could The violence against minority
not be accurately mentioned; it is because refers to “uncertainty” (Appadurai, 2006).
there are discrepancies of numbers from The problem “came out” when they are
different sources. among us and the boundaries are unclear
between “them” and “us.” Likewise, the
Moreover, there are communities
minority group who has identified
unregistered as citizens because they are
themselves as different, the majority needs
unrecognized by the regime under the 1982
them to determine what they call as “we.”
Citizenship Law. The military regime
According to Appadurai (2006), the
rejects Arakan Muslims (Rohingya) from
majority needs the “other” to define their
their recognition as citizens, even though
own identity. He also argues that the
they have been settling in the land of
majority recognizes the minority group as of abuse. While, the data has also shown
an “impure” element in the national body. that in 1994, at least 110,000 Karen and
Meaning, they destroy an opportunity for Mon people (some of Myanmar’s
self-definition in “understanding their ethnicities) as other minority groups in
own identity” (Sen, 2010). Myanmar fled to Thailand during the
intense offensive act by the military of
In fact, the concept of “we” as the Rakhine (Burma Project, n.d.). Muslim
majority’s argument poses as a difficult Rohingya might not be the only minority
boundary to accept the “others.” In the case group that is targeted in the violence.
of Rohingya, the Burma Kingdom for However, compared to the other groups,
many centuries ago and Myanmar state the issue of Rohingya Muslims is more
today have continuously oppressed them complicated.
because they are different. They are
regarded as not a part of Myanmar Meanwhile, according to the 2009
nationality. Rohingya is perceived as Human Right Watch Report, in 1995, the
different because they were pro-British in Bangladesh government has forced most of
the Second World War and they have a Rohingya Muslims to go back to the border
different religious identity with the with the UN supporting this repatriation
majorities of Myanmar. Rohingya was process. Then, the government granted
closely associated with Bengali, but on them a Temporary Registration Card
contrary, they are clearly different from (TRC), which gave them the limited
Bengali; physically and politically. freedom of movement and employment in
the western part of Arakan.
When it is believed in 1990 that in
accordance with the ending of Cold War, The violence for anti-Muslim also
the world would return to a new hope of occurred in 1996 in Shan state and Yangon.
peacefulness and a more democratic world In 1997, SLORC initiated an anti-Muslim
order, but the fact is showing the riot in Mandalay as well as other cities and
pathologies in the nationhood purification. the government is reported to be involved
Myanmar, since their political isolationism in the riot (Veen, 2005). The issue of anti-
under the military’s rule in 1962, is closed Muslim violence has since been happening
from outside world. There is not much in 2001 as well as in Sitwe which results to
information acknowledged by the many Muslims and Buddhists killed and
international community regarding injured. Since that time, the Government
Myanmar’s situation. There is no clear and decided for travel restriction on Muslims in
obvious information on how Rohingya the conflict area, particularly those who do
people becomes the object of perpetrator travel between Sitwe and other towns. In
and the subject to brutal violence from the these cases, there were no information on
majorities. For example, in 1991-2, the whether Muslim-Rohingya has been
army has arranged about 250,000 Rohingya involved in the conflict or not. However,
communities to flee to Bangladesh, and the issue of anti-Muslim (non-Rohingya)
they were repatriated without “given has also spreads out to the other Muslim
citizenship” by the state (Dittmer, 2010). communities. The data from Amnesty
International reported that Karen Muslim
In addition, the data reported by community has also been victimized. A
Rianne ten Veen and the Islamic Human refugee from Muslim Karen Woman from
Rights Commission states that in 1991, Hpa’an Township Kayen State, said that
Rohingya Muslims were targeted as object
her village was destroyed by the soldiers in Rakhine Buddhists. Besides being Muslim,
April 2004 - including their mosque. the physical appearance of Rohingya is
very distinct from the descendant of
Until in 2012, the conflict occurred Mongoloid. It seems to simplify the reason,
between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya “they are not like us; we cannot accept
Muslims in Rakhine finally spreads out in them” (Hurd, 2015).
international media, harvesting mass
attention from the world. The trigger of The communal violence between
this conflict is the rape and murder of a Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine
Buddhist woman by Rohingya Muslims was not only an issue in the Islamic world,
which leads into violence and riot in the but also in international level. It leads into
same year. The data report shows that strong international critic over military
dozens of people were killed, a hundred government of Myanmar neglecting the
houses burned, and 75,000 people, mostly conflict in Rakhine state. However, the
Rohingya, displaced (Caballero-Anthony, violence against Rohingya Muslim by the
2016). state is showing how state has significant
rule in perceiving Rohingya as “the other.”
The conflict between Muslim Thus, the discrimination was not only in,
Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine also law, economic, or education, but also
spreads out of the Rakhine state. In March political and humanity right.
2013, violence occurred in Meiktila,
Mandalay region and 43 people were killed When Buddhists Turn to Violence
in this accidence. While in May 2013, a
boarding school and a mosque were set on The historical explanation
fire in Lashio, Shan State (Fuller, 2013). describes that Arakan State, for centuries,
According to the data, extremist Buddhist has been an area for territory struggle and
groups known as 969 were suspected to symbol of power, respectively amongst
initiate the anti-Muslim violence. This Portugal, Britain and Japanese. The
report is also written by Caballero (2016), Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim, including
but according to her, 40 people were killed Rohingya are claiming each other that
because of these riots. She explained that a Arakan is their own land, whether that is
commotion in a gold shop in Meiktila, “the land of Muslims” or “the land of
Central Myanmar has lead the violence Buddhists.” In terms of political
between Buddhist and Muslims. phenomenon, there are two major factors
in ethno-religious conflicts which are
She also explicated that based on ethnicity and territory (Harris, 2009).
the UN claim and a BBC News report, in
January 2014, more than 40 Rohingya men, In her book, Erika Harris (2009)
women, and children were killed in explained that homeland is a crucial place
Rakhine State after an issue that a for the people:
Rohingya Muslim killed a Rakhine police.
“In the case of homeland, the appeal is
Seeing these cases, we can see how
that, in the first place, it belongs to
violence can be easily followed by another
people whose name it carries; what
violence; even the reason behind the
happens to others who may not have
incident was unclear. The boundaries of
another homeland or who even think of
conflict become unclear then, whether it is
it as their own is as secondary
communal conflict between Rohingya and
consideration, if a consideration of
Rakhine or Rohingya Muslims and
ethno-national movements at all… nomenclature of Rakhine was designed for

there is no potential for conflict Rakhine people or known as “the Buddhist
anywhere without disputed territory, land.”
as there is no peace without territorial
settlements. Homelands are spaces There are three core points
where national narratives are made, to contesting in this conflict; ethnicity,
which past struggles and dreams of the territory, and identity, which are all related
future belong. All homeland are “lands to the historical background. These points
of hope and glory” but also, space of the are the main elements of why conflict
nightmare of ethnic violence take happens in the world, particularly in
place….” Rakhine. According to Jack Snyder (2000),
there are two kinds of nationalities in the
Nevertheless, the conflict in world: ethnic nationalism and civic
Rakhine state is not only about the clash of nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is based on
two ethnicities, but also identity, which the primordial sentiments such as
Harris did not include it as an element of ethnicity, culture, or religion. While, civic
analysis. The identity could not be nationalism is based on national
separated from homeland nor ethnicity. It sentiments that overcome the distinction of
can be seen from the Palestine conflict ethnicity, religion, race, and social class
between Palestinian and Israeli who fights within the society. Today, in the
and claims that Palestine is their homeland. globalization era, the ethnic nationalism,
For Rohingya people or the Rakhine which based on primordialism sentiment is
Buddhist, Rakhine state is the place where being abandoned gradually, especially in
their ancestor lived in and they are the West. In contrary, the countries that
emotionally engaged with. Arakan is the faced diversity problems like Myanmar,
place where they find the memories of their the common structure of a conflict is
identity. Although the oppressed constructed by the dominant power to
government compels them to leave the marginalize the minorities with great
land, they are returning with the oppression.
consequence of being stateless. It is
because they have no other place nor The question then is why the
choice for both to stay and survive. Buddhist community turns to violent
measures against Rohingya Muslims.
Historical homeland conflict also Firstly, it should be noted that religious
has its root when U Nu regime fulfilled violence can occur in all religions
their promise to give autonomy in Arakan (Hansclever & Rittberger, 2000; Seul, 1999;
and Mon in 1962. However, the Mujahidin Bartels, n.d.). Jeffrey Seul in his journal
in that time continue demanding its legal argued that the escalation of intergroup or
separation from Burma (Azizah in Yusuf, inter-ethnicity conflict cannot be solely
2013). In the same year also, Burmese seen as identity competition, even
Army did coup d’état against U Nu regime, economic and politics factors also play
and Burma was under military junta. In important roles in the conflict (Seul, 1999).
1989, the government changed the name of By adopting Connor’s idea about
Arakan to Rakhine. Thus, when someone nationalism which refers to “us-them”
mentions “Arakanese Muslims,” it refers to (Seul, 1999), Seul explains that Connor’s
Muslim minorities that has already argument was based on a single cultural
disappeared. It seems that the marker, including religion which can be
the root or reference for national identity and nations (Hasenclever & Rittberger,
construction. This argument could be 2000). Otherwise, in the constructivist
examined in the context of Myanmar in perspective, religion is an intervening
which Buddhism was constructed as their variable.
national identity. In the other hand,
Rohingya community is not reflected as a Marco Ventura (2014) mentions
part of the Mongolian nation. Thus, there about the constructivist approach in his
must be a logical argument to explain how book in the following term:
intergroup conflicts in Rakhine occur. “…ethnic identity is as fluid,
Seul as well as Samuel Huntington changeable, and often actively
are using the primordialist perspective. contested. From such perspective, most
Huntington believes that the next pattern of the emphasis of the analysis is on the
of conflict after the Cold War pattern was strategic aim of collectivity framing
not only dominated by ideological or ethnic membership and boundaries in a
economical aspects, but it will involve given manner than on individual
religion-fed cultural “fault lines” (Ventura, motives to endorse a given ethnic
2014). The following statement is affiliation. Consequently, elite and
Huntington’s most cited passage in The mass interests are not assumed to
Clash of Civilization: converge, nor are the interests of
different ethnic group assumed to be
“It is my hypothesis that the intrinsically divergent: ethnic conflict
fundamental source of conflict in this and violence can serve elite interests
new world will not be primarily beyond ethnic boundaries and can
ideological or primarily economic. The contradict the interests of the masses
great divisions among humankind and on all sides.”
the dominating source of conflict will
be culture” (Huntington, 1993). This approach also described about
how the elite plays a significant role in
According to the primordialists intergroup conflicts. Related to the
(Samuel Huntington, Gilles Kepel, Jeffrey Rohingya case, the elite Army plays a role
Seul, and Bassam Tibi), they argue that the to mobilize the violence through
most important factor in the twenty-first recognizing that Rohingya people are the
century conflicts is the nations in “impure” community in the state. Here,
civilization (Hasenclever & Rittberger, the regime saw the issue of impurity as an
2000). In their book, Hasenclever and opportunity to reduce population. Indeed,
Rittberger are also attempting to outline Buddhist-Muslim violence is nothing new
the three approaches to analyze the impact in Myanmar, especially in Rakhine
of faith and politics, before it can be used to (Kingsbury, 2015). It can be seen from the
measure the conflict. government statement when other entities
ask of the solution for refugee camps or
In the instrumentalist perspective, deportation. President Thein Sein
socio-economic are the basic of conflict and emphasizes that Rohingya people were
religion is only a spurious correlation in unacceptable in Myanmar. His comments
terms of intergroup conflict. The in Radio Free Asia (2013), states that they
Instrumentalists believe that most of take responsibility for their own ethnics
religious conflicts start from unequal and because Rohingya were not
growth between economic, social, political authentically their ethnic, it was
impossible to endure them legally Bengali. When Arakan was Bengal’s

(Caballero-Anthony, 2015). feudatory in the 15th century, Rohingya
converted to Islam and developed their
There are two approaches to own distinct culture and art (Jonassohn &
understand the Buddhist in how they are Björnson, 1998). The Rohingya community
involved in the violence; that are has the skills needed to develop their own
primordialists and constructivist economic ability or thorough education
perspective. But this hypothesis has also but because they are “stateless,” they do
been influenced from the history of not have the opportunity and are
relationships between Buddhist and powerless. On the other hand, the Rakhine
Rohingya just as how Burmese-Buddha Buddhist already has an opportunity to
has ruled for centuries imposing the restore their socio-economic because they
Rohingya. Aside from the historical have obtained official citizenship.
background, cultural reasons also play an However, when Rakhine Buddhists opted
important role. If cultural reasons cause the violence, it seems that they are defending
construction of “us and them,” which is their nationalism, but unfortunately
very clear to differentiate Rohingya Rohingya could not do the same way,
Muslim and Rakhine Buddhist, then it is because they have either no state or
indeed an important factor that depicts and “nationalism.”
influences the course of history for
Rohingya people in Myanmar An Overview: Islam in Myanmar
continuously.
Muslim in Myanmar was not
The Buddhist practices its religion dominated by the ethnic of Rohingya, there
as a Burmese religion for centuries so that some ethnics involved as well. However,
it has a strong influence in the Burmese the antagonistic relationship between
culture. Although the government Rohingya Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine
changed the name of Burma into has never been in peace. Serial conflicts
Myanmar, the identity was already record that ethnical conflict between
embraced by the whole nation. Since there Burmese with Buddhists as a majority and
is an imbalance between majority and other immigrant, such as Indians, does
minority, the Buddhist culture becomes a happen. Sub-ethnics such as Mon and
reflection of their basic culture. They feel Karen, as mentioned previously, have also
insecure and fearful that the minority will become victims in the Burmese conflict,
change the Buddhist culture. and many among of them are Muslims.
On the other hand, according to the It is significant since Buddhists in

historical background in during the British Myanmar has not been in the conflict with
colonial, Rohingya Muslims owns legal other Muslim community with Chinese
administration since they were loyal to the descendant –Chinese Muslim that comes
British colony. They have an opportunity from Yunan, a border area between China
in economic, social status, and education. and Myanmar in the west. Most of them
They have a position in the government come to Burma as traders, breeders and
and this continues in the U Nu regime until refugees in the post-Panthay revolution
coup d’état by the junta military in 1962. (1856-1873). Under the Manchu
Historically, they came to Arakan as government in Myanmar, this Chinese
traders and soldiers, most are notably from Muslims then are well-known as Panthay
Arab, Mongol, Turkish, Portuguese, and
or Hui in the Chinese language. According happened due to fear over wide
to Naw Lily Kadoe in her writing entitled distribution of Muslim power and the
Ulama, State, and Politics in Myanmar, as possibility of a scrapped Buddhist
cited in Yegar (1972), this tribe easily position, which still needs to be proved.
assimilates with the local community and Third is that conflict over Buddhist
is be able to keep their identity as Muslims. Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is
considered completely as an ethnical
On the other hand, the arrival of conflict, but it has much to do with a
Indians under the British government had religion. For the example, their rejection
caused an increasing number of Muslim over Rohingya without mentioning Islam
population in Myanmar. Previously, the as the religious attribute. Fourth is the
Muslim population in this state is small, limited information of conflict regarding
passive and loyal to the king of Burma. the relationship between Buddhist
Yet, the coming of Indian immigrants have Burmese and ethnic Hui (Panthay) as
doubled the population and with the minority. Meaning the closeness between
increasing number of mosque and school Rakhine and Hui could be viewed as
based on Islamic education constructions ethnical intimacy, both of which came from
(Yegar, 1972). The scale of ethnical conflict Mongoloid race. Yet, it could be also
between Indian Muslims and Burmese interpreted that the ethnic of Hui could
Buddhists increases in the post-World War adopt the local culture better compared
I, that is in the 1930 and 1938 which with Bengali Muslim (Rohingya) and
happens due to the fight for jobs in Indians.
Rangoon (Yangon) (Kadou, 2015).
Path for Harmony
Analyzing conflict in Myanmar is
not an easy task, but serial historical factors Although it is not easy and there is
with violence over Muslim Rohingya is still no win-win solution acquired between
showing that ethical conflict is not new, it Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya,
was rooted on their historical relationship. many efforts had already been shown to
Through short explanation, we can analyze reconcile the parties. Indeed, this issue had
what Buddhists’ relationship with the grabbed international attention, either
Muslim minority in Myanmar looks like. from the Muslim countries or non-Muslim
However, it cannot be generally concluded countries. International respond over the
that the Buddhist-Muslim relationship in conflicts in Myanmar, especially in the
Myanmar is worse because, in several northern Rakhine State is a movement for
cases, anti-Muslim sentiment happens in global humanitarian crisis.
Rakhine due the ethnicity of Rohingya, and
the conflict has also happened outside Since the crisis happened in the
Rakhine. 2012, 57 counties affiliated in the
Organization of Islam Cooperation (OIC)
There are some hypotheses that condemned genocide over Rohingya
can be drawn by looking at this problem; Muslim in Myanmar, as what happened in
first is that conflicts happening between the summit meeting in Mecca, Augusts
Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is 2012 (Kadoe, 2015). In the other side,
motivated through economic-politic and Myanmar government invited the state
social variables. Second, is that the conflict representatives and UN to see the actual
between the two had created bigger reality that is happening in the Rakhine
religious conflicts crossing ethnicity. It had
State. Indeed, this decision also emerges a emergency support for Rohingya Muslim
serial of protests especially from Buddhists refugees in February 2017. It is recorded
in several areas of conflicts, such as that since the humanitarian crisis
Yanggon, Meiktila, Lashio in the northern happened in 2012, many Rohingya
Shan State. refugees have been escaping to Southern
Malaysia.
A couple years before in 2011, Adli
Abdullah, the leader of the International Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia
Concern Group on Rohingya (ICGR) in as the largest Muslim populations in Asia
Malaysia, hoped that the Rohingya issue have also been supporting the refugees in
could be discussed in the ASEAN Summit the same way. Recently, refugees of
while several parliaments from Southeast Rohingya community receives
Asian countries still intensively conducted accommodation and hospitality in Aceh
the dialogue to solve the issue of Rohingya. before they depart to Australia to gain
They urge ASEAN to include this issue as asylum. Indonesia is also the only state
the main agenda of the ASEAN summit in allowed by the Myanmar government to
Malaysia on 26-27 April 2015. However, enter the Rakhine region to provide
this effort still has an obstacle, because humanitarian assistance to Rohingya
Myanmar considers the issue of Rohingya refugees when the crisis still occurred. The
as a domestic matter and ASEAN has no Indonesian government through the
right to interfere this issue. Even if there are Ministry for External Affairs has been
many Rohingya refugees residing in doing diplomacy in resolving conflict as
ASEAN countries, particularly in well as giving humanitarian aids for
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Rohingya Muslims. Thus, international
demand for harmony cannot be well-
Later, on 20th of May 2015, the achieved without internal effort from
Foreign Ministers of three ASEAN Myanmar government per se.
countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand conducts a meeting in Kuala The wining of National League for
Lumpur to discuss joint solutions and the Democracy (NLD), pioneered by Aung San
resolving of regional issues (Indonesian Suu Kyi in the general election 2015 had
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). This previously seen as bringing a hope for
Meeting also aims to find a comprehensive religious freedom and sectarian conflict. In
solution involving the country of origin, contrary, wining does not give a significant
transit, and goals through the principle of contribution to religion harmony. Indeed,
burden sharing and shared responsibility. Aung San Suu Kyi intents to limit
This is necessary to prevent the issue of international intervene for resolving the
irregular migrants for it not to evolve into problem of Rohingya Muslim and
a humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia. Buddhist Rakhine. Furthermore, the
appointment of Htin Kyaw in the
Furthermore, in the meeting with parliament (2016) gives no significant
the Ministry of External Affair of ASEAN changes due to his loyalty towards Aung
in Yangon December 2016, the Minister San Suu Kyi. Thus, the harmony is located
from Malaysia, Anifah Aman, demands for on the government’s ability in handling
full humanitarian access in the conflict militaristic regime. At least, the president
area. It made Malaysia as the ASEAN from civil society could be a new hope for
country that initiates involvement into the
issue. Indeed, Malaysia also reports to give
Myanmar after many years of militaristic 2016). Otherwise, according to historian

controlling regime. and it is mostly believed by Rohingya
people, they argued that their ancestors
While, international sympathy over were not only coming from East Bengal,
this case is still going on. In the prior but also from different Muslim countries.
December 2016, there are fourteen They were not coming to Rakhine State
countries, among them are Austria, during the British colonial period but over
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, hundred years earlier before. Rohingya
France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, people has heavily rooted in Rakhine, the
Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the definition of Rohingya people identity
United States. These countries imposed seems difficult to be explained. Hence, the
Myanmar government in allowing them to Rohingya people itself as an ethnic identity
give aids for Rohingya Muslims (The New is still debatable.
York Times, 2016). It is related to the UN
report portraying the increasing number of The conflict in Rakhine based on
humanitarian crisis in that area. However, the primordialists and constructivist
the amount of aid especially in food is still perspectives also could be explained based
limited. There are 20,000 people from on historical context which states that for
150,000 refugees who got food. This centuries the Burma Kingdom did invade
tragedy was reported by Pierre Péron, a Rohingya to get Arakan. After Arakan was
spokesperson of UN for Coordination of a part of Burma Kingdom, this land since
Humanitarian Affairs. then belongs to them. In the 17th century,
when Arakan was under the British rule,
Basically, the problem of Rohingya Rohingya was protected until the Britain
Muslim is not an easy task to be solved, it colony left the country in 1948. Post-British
is due to historical complexity that has rule, the Muslims’ peacefulness in Arakan
been happening for a long while. In other changes into conflict with the Buddhists.
words, a conflict between Rohingya Indeed, since 1962, the junta military has
Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine is not oppressed Rohingya Muslims and played
merely a temporary response; it is rooted a significant role in the movement to expel
happened many years, across generation Rohingya from the Myanmar state. The
and remaining into the present. case of Rohingya currently has found a
new stage and it is a concerned as an issue
Conclusion
related to humanitarian disaster in
It is believed that Rohingya is a Southeast Asia. This issue becomes more
legacy from British colonial policies that complex because the conflict involves not
are trapped in a misfortunate situation. only ethnic-religious, but also economic,
Historically, Rohingya were leaving their social and political aspects. However, the
ancestors to migrate into Rakhine State conflict between the Buddhist and
during the British colonial period and was Rohingya community is very complicated
called by most non-Rohingya people as and its resolution is not easy. The
Bengali Muslim. The official view of the international communities are continuing
Myanmar Government is that all Rohingya their efforts to negotiate with junta military
people are illegal immigrants from Bengal to give more accesses to Rohingya and to
(present day Bangladesh) and the know about what happened in Rakhine as
government does not address Muslim a part of humanitarian activities.
migration under British rule (Gibson,
About the Author 29, 2017, from BBC:

http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/du
Leni Winarni is a lecturer in nia/2015/04/150422_rohingya_asea
International Relations and researcher in n_parlemen.
Center of ASEAN Studies, Sebelas Maret
University, Surakarta. Currently, she is a Caballero-Anthony, M. (Ed.). (2016). An
Ph.D. candidate of Inter-Religious Studies introduction to non-traditional
(IRS) in Gadjah Mada University. Her key security studies: A transnational
interests are politics and religion, Islamic approach. Sage Publication Ltd.
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1 Higher Education Integration in ASEAN
Higher Education Integration in ASEAN:

ASEAN University Network Case1
Teuku Rezasyah Padjadjaran University, Indonesia

Neneng Konety Padjadjaran University, Indonesia
Affabile Rifawan Padjadjaran University, Indonesia
Wahyu Wardhana Padjadjaran University, Indonesia
Abstract
Higher education has an important role in the region’s economic growth, with
talents and ideas developing in the process. ASEAN University Network (AUN)
is the institution that facilitates cooperation among ASEAN universities and
beyond. This research attempts to describe the role of AUN in enhancing regional
integration in the higher education sector in ASEAN. This research uses qualitative
method to get depth information and the bigger picture in the governance of AUN’s
role and mechanism in regional integration of higher education system. The results
of this research showed that AUN helped enhancing regional cooperation.
Key words: AUN, regional integration, higher education, Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN).
1
This article was originally presented in The Fifth International Conference on Business,
International Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD 2016) at Bina Nusantara University.

DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.962
Introduction competitiveness and capability of human

resources.
Education is one of the sectors that
have a crucial role in regional integration. The cooperation in the education
It is a backbone for development and sector in Southeast Asian level particularly
regional integration, as it has been proved, higher education has been established
in Western Africa, which helped to further since 1956. Mustajarvi and Bouchon (2014)
regional integration (Guannu, 2010). This explained it narratively with the first
research argued that such experience is establishment of the Association of
also relevant in ASEAN. Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher
Learning (ASAIHL) in 1956, followed with
ASEAN integration process has the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education
shown its greater importance following the Organization (SEAMEO) in 1965
establishment of ASEAN Economic (Mustajarvi & Bouchon, 2014). Thirty years
Community (AEC) in late December 2015. later, the ASEAN University Network
The integration process consists four (AUN) was established in 1995. Mustajarvi
pillars of economic integration; single and Bouchon also described the
market and production base, competitive comparison later compared the higher
economic region, equitable economic education integration in Europe and
development, and integration of the global ASEAN. The pattern of higher education
economy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). This integration in ASEAN more likely suitable
integration has proceeded with a new with neo-functionalist approach and
phase after ASEAN Charter in 2008. With accompanied with legal formal and
the new phase of integration in the political initiatives.
economic sector, hopefully, it will begin to
advance in integration and boost Research Question and Methodology
development in a region.
The fact is ASEAN has not yet
In ASEAN today, only eight fulfilled the complete integration among
occupations received mutual recognition stakeholders of higher education.
agreements among ASEAN countries Although the stakeholders such as policy
(Fukunaga, 2015). Therefore, there is a makers and institutions have established
demand to produce more capable skilled the regional organization, in the process,
labor to increase or maintain its education has not involved all universities in
sector quality and contribute to regional ASEAN, or at least the state universities.
integration with an equal and fair
standard. The purpose of this research is to
highlight the regional integration of
The regional integration process in ASEAN in higher education sector. It uses
EU countries could be a set of an example the theory of regional interdependence for
of regional integration in the education regional integration. This theory is
sector for ASEAN. In Europe, the Bologna originated from interdependence theory
Process helped to support the which developed as a critique of realist
modernization of education and training theory in the 1970s and emphasized non-
and helped to better integrate the countries state actor in international relations
inside EU (Papatsiba, 2006). It shapes (Wilkinson, 2010). The term of regional
European values and knowledge that form interdependence is more familiar with
European identity also increase economic development in a region. The

DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.4155
non-state actor has bigger role in regional higher education governance in

integration and economic prosperity. Philippines has put the main policy maker
in one institution that is the Commission
The questions that arise in this on Higher Education (CHED) which was
article are: established in 1994. It is an autonomous
1. How is the quality of the higher institution that has authority on higher
education sector in ASEAN education policy in Philippines. The
countries? unique thing about the higher education
system in the Philippines is that the quality
2. How can AUN contribute in assurance or accreditation based on an
regional integration in the higher internal request and then to be accredited
education sector? by the external auditor and the higher
education institution pays the accredited
The method of this research uses agents. The regional cooperation of the
descriptive analytical method, and get data higher education institution in Philippines
incorporate primary data coming from is very extensive but mostly only located in
ASEAN Secretariat, and secondary sources five best universities in Philippines.
coming from academic journals dealing
with the development of AUN. Indonesia
This research is divided into two Indonesia has 3,000s higher

parts. The first part is to describe the education institution until 2013, and the
overview of higher education in ASEAN majority is college type campus
countries. Each of ASEAN countries will be (Moeliodihardjo, 2014). Recently, in 2014,
described in this part. The second part is to the new administration has established a
discuss regional integration process of new ministry dealing only with research
higher education sector in ASEAN and advance education, with its own
particularly AUN and analyze how AUN budget. Before that, the higher education
contribute for regional integration of the was put merely under the directorate
higher education sector. general level, under the Ministry of
Education and Culture. Today, the higher
The Overview Condition of Higher education in Indonesia has begun to show
Education in ASEAN Countries greater trends to conduct extensive
Nowadays, with the introduction international networks. In terms of
of AEC in 2015, ASEAN tried strongly to regional cooperation, every university has
narrow the gap among ASEAN countries, its own policy with so many association
proved with the growth of the higher and organization but in this part, only
education system in ASEAN. Here is the AUN that been described.
brief overview of higher education in
Malaysia
ASEAN Countries.
With 600 higher education
Philippines institutions in 2011, Malaysia has proved
There are 2,060 higher education itself to become an advanced institution of
institutions until 2008 in Philippines higher education sector in Southeast Asia
(ICHEFAP, 2011). Most of them are (Arokiasamy, 2011). Public institutions in
satellite campus. The political structure of this country received massive support
from the government, and later developed
themselves to becoming international of Thailand higher education system and

reputed universities. Earlier on, Malaysia paid attention to the use of English as the
operated a system called National Higher medium of communication.
Education Strategic Plan (NHESP). In 2014,
NHESP was in phase 2, with the merging Brunei Darussalam
of two ministries, focusing on
Brunei currently has 18 higher
internationalization, to become a hub for
learning institutions (Ministry of
international higher education. The
Education of Brunei Darussalam, 2015).
existing activities in internationalization
The public institutions are predominantly
among others are international mobility
in Brunei and administered by the Ministry
program, international service learning,
of education of Brunei, aiming to educate
and international cooperation in education
its citizens. Most of Brunei citizen are
and training, and boosting and trust to
studying in tertiary education abroad and
Malaysia partners (Knight, 2013).
prefer to choose advance education in
Singapore advance APEC. In internationalizing its
higher learning institutions, Brunei
With only six universities, provided scholarships for foreigner to
Singapore has the best higher education study in Brunei’s universities.
institution in ASEAN (Ministry of
Education of Singapore, 2015). Two of Vietnam
them are Nanyang Technological
Vietnam is developing countries
University and National University of
with rapid growth in the economy and
Singapore is the major reputed global
needs progressive advancement in the
university and even the best in Asia. The
higher education sector to support its
Ministry of Education is the major policy
economic growth. There are 498
maker of higher education institution in
institutions of higher education in Vietnam
Singapore. The country has successfully
(Nguyễn & Vũ, 2015). The main
utilized its long national stability and
administrator of higher education sector in
economic growth, and successfully
Vietnam is the department of higher
integrated and centralized all areas of
education under the authority of Ministry
education. The universities in Singapore
of education and training. Vietnam is
have also maintained enormous
improving and restructuring its internal
cooperation with world class universities
quality.
such as Harvard, Cambridge, and made
themselves the global hub of education in Laos
Southeast Asia.
Laos began its commitment to
Thailand developing its higher education in the
early 1990s (Ogawa, 2008). Previously, the
Thailand had 645 higher education
government focused on improving the
institutions in 2000 (Kirtikara, 2001). The
primary education sector. Until 1995, the
Ministry of Education holds the authority
country had only 10 public higher
in running the education system.
education institutions. Today, it has grown
Following the Second 15-year Long Range
to 91, including the rapid number of
Plan on Higher Education and the 11th
private institutions (Lie, Kaur, & Sirat,
Higher Education Development Plan, the
2014). The rapid development of private
country conducted an internationalization
institution was driven by decree of Education holds main authority in ruling

government that allows private the higher education, focusing on the
institutions to be established. The Ministry improvement and enhancement of its
of Education holds the power to govern internal quality. Specific attention had
higher education sector in Laos. The focus been given to, in reaching young
of Laos is the internal quality improvement generation to participate in tertiary
within the late development of higher education. Like Laos and Myanmar,
education sector. Considering the need to Cambodia also preferred to attract foreign
support international student mobility, the sources to develop its higher education
Ministry of Education continued to send system.
the local students overseas to study,
aiming to come back to the country to The Role of AUN in Integration of
improve the quality of education in Laos. Higher Education in ASEAN
However, Laos also accepted international
In November 1995, AUN was
student from abroad.
established. Following the development in
Myanmar 1997 to 1999, the membership of AUN was
expanded in line with the increasing
The transition from the military member of ASEAN. Today, AUN
regime to a more democratic regime in incorporates 30 universities (AUN
2011 helped to reform the higher education Secretariat, 2016) (Table 1).
system in Myanmar, with government
launched a comprehensive review of the AUN establishment was based on
education system in 2014 (Win, 2015). That the ambitions of the leaders of ASEAN and
review aimed as a foundation for the the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Education
betterment of higher education sector in (ASCOE) in establishing ASEAN
Myanmar. Nationally, there are 164 of universities. But the idea failed due to
higher education institution in Myanmar, constraints of cost, location, and
with 96 institutions located in Mandalay leadership. Therefore, in 1994 ASEAN
and Yangon (McCord, Simon, & Weil, initiated began initiated ideas leading to
2013). The main authority in ruling higher the establishment of networks between
education sector is the ministry of universities in ASEAN so that cooperation
education, visioning international in the field of education can be improved.
cooperation for Myanmar higher In 2000, the AUN Secretariat set up in
education system mainly focusing on aid Bangkok, Thailand (Beerkens, 2004). While
preferably coming from overseas to most of AUN member are public
improve the local education quality. At the universities, only two universities are
same time, Myanmar also sends the local private, namely De La Salle University and
student abroad to transfer the knowledge Ateneo de Manila University.
and practice in Myanmar’s education.
Cambodia
Soon after the end of the Khmer

regime in 2009, the new government in
Cambodia began to improve the qualities
of the local 134 educational institutions
(Kitamura et al., 2016). The Ministry of
Table 1. AUN Members in ASEAN
Mandalay University of Brunei Ateneo de Manila Royal University of De La Salle

University Darussalam University Phnom Penh University
Royal University University of the Airlangga Nanyang Gadjah Mada

of Law and Philippines University Technological University
Economics University
National University of Singapore Bandung Institute Burapha University

University of Indonesia Management of Technology
Singapore University
National Chiang Mai National University Chulalongkorn University of

University of University of Malaysia University Malaya
Laos
Mahidol Universiti Putra Prince of Songkla University of Vietnam National

University Malaysia University Science, Malaysia University, Hanoi
Universiti Utara Vietnam National Yangon Institute of Can Tho University University of
Malaysia University, Ho Chi Economics Yangon
Minh City
The objective of AUN is the wish schemes initiated through South East Asia
for the establishment and strengthening Engineering Education Development
solidarity networks between universities Network (SEED-Net) helped to strengthen
in ASEAN. So far, the cooperation the Japan-ASEAN Summit in 1997 and the
involved the exchange of staffs and ASEAN+3 Summit (Watanabe et al, 2006).
students respectively to increase the skills, This brings considerable benefits in
knowledge, and ability of Human utilizing geological potential in Southeast
Resources (HR) at each university (AUN Asia, as well as exchange of students and
Secretariat, 2016). AUN also managed to staff. Another example in social sciences
establish cooperation with universities issues, AUN has the positive impact on its
outside ASEAN such as EU, Japan, South member by the enhancement of the
Korea and China and invited them as an Southeast Asian Human Rights Studies
observer in meetings of the AUN. Network (SEAHRN). It involves other
universities which are not AUN member.
For example, in the fields of
geology, AUN and cooperation between Learning from the ideas of Thomas
universities in Japan conducted research Friedman which highlighted the greater
on the potential development of geology in importance of globalization following the
the area. Research and development of year 2000, it can be asserted that the
products successfully developed in this increasing development of AUN, run in
collaboration. Based on research tandem with the ASEAN’s path by
conducted by Koichiro Watanabe et al, establishing the what so called the ASEAN
shows the AUN and Japanese cooperation Community in 2015 (Friedman, 2005).
In fact, AUN continued to highlight scheme. In the membership issue, it is not

the importance of human resources, easy to integrate quickly in adding the new
manifested in the completion and member. Such difficulties can be overcome
innovation. In the process, universities if every member of AUN play a role in
inside ASEAN had begun to better interact, practicing AUN mechanisms, and share
with experts and academics working their expertise to their fellow partners at
together to improve the education qualities the national level. AUN enhancement in
in various countries inside ASEAN at the SEAHRN could be the good model for
same time (Ratanukul, 2009). collaboration beyond AUN member in
ASEAN. In the same way, AUN can share
At the level of regional cooperation its best practices in supporting the local
and the establishment of AUN is also governments inside ASEAN’s provinces to
attractive because it can improve the better deal with globalization issues, such
relationship between ASEAN countries. as finding the best ways to achieve all
Education has been utilized as a tool of targets stipulated in the Sustainable
foreign policy, with member benefitting Development Goals (SDGs). By doing this,
from permitting their universities to better AUN’s role will further strengthens
interact with their partners inside ASEAN. ASEAN’s path towards achieving all goals
In addition, education is a part of people to stipulated in the ASEAN Community 2015
people diplomacy by doing international and raise the reputation of its members at
mobility student. Nowadays, there are 12 the global level.
programs of scholarship that available for
AUN member and will increase along with Conclusion
the capacity enhancement of AUN member
(AUN Secretariat, 2016). AUN has a network which runs in
line with the ideas of ASEAN Community.
In line with the findings of Josef T. In addition, AUN has a capacity to
Yap, universities inside ASEAN had improve the quality of education and
benefitted from the exchange of people, universities in ASEAN, especially
transnational education, information changing the mind of universities which
exchange, regulatory reform, and are outside the top 400 universities in the
development cooperation. In this research, world.
Yap mentions that the AUN and ASEAN
Quality Assurance Network had played an Acknowledging there is a big gap
important role in furthering the on one hand between universities in
importance of ASEAN (Yap, 2012). Even Singapore and Malaysia, and universities
though the ideas of quality of assurance in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. On the
and accreditation is yet to come, but other hand, it is advisable that AUN to
integration processes inside ASEAN tend better focusing on strengthening the
to work along this direction. internal cooperation using all frameworks
inside ASEAN. There is a lot of potential of
Even though, AUN alone currently AUN to contribute in the regional
covers only 30 universities from thousands interdependence of ASEAN. By doing this,
of universities in Southeast Asia. There are AUN will help to narrow the current gap
still a lot of universities inside ASEAN that already exist, which will in the long run
have the potential, to take advantage of this help to increase the sense of belonging and
sense of identity as an internal part of http://www.aunsec.org/scholarships.p

ASEAN. hp.
About the Authors AUN Secretariat. AUN member universities.

Retrieved from
Teuku Rezasyah is a lecturer at http://www.aunsec.org/aunmemberun
Department of International Relations, iversities.php.
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
Padjadjaran University. He can be AUN Secretariat. AUN’s history and
contacted by e-mail background. Retrieved from
reyzasyach@yahoo.com. http://www.aunsec.org/ourhistory.ph
p.
Neneng Konety is a lecturer at
Department of International Relations, Beerkens, H.J.J.G. (2004). Global
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, opportunities and institutional
Padjadjaran University. She can be embeddedness; higher education consortia
contacted by e-mail konetyas@yahoo.com. in europe and southeast asia (PhD
Dissertation). Enschede: Cheps/UT
Affabile Rifawan is a lecturer at
Department of International Relations, Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat: A
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, brief history of the twenty-first century.
Padjadjaran University. He can be New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
contacted by e-mail
Fukunaga, Y. (2015). Assessing the
a.rifawan@unpad.ac.id.
progress of ASEAN MRAS on
Wahyu Wardhana is a non- professional services. ERIA Discussion
permanent lecturer and researcher at Paper, No.21, pp. 1-43.
Department of International Relations,
Guannu, J. (Ed.). (2010). Nation-states and
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
the challenge of regional integration in
Padjadjaran University. He can be
West Africa: The case of Liberia (Vol.13).
contacted by e-mail
Paris: Karthala Editions.
wahyu_w016@yahoo.com.
Kirtikara, K. (2001). Higher education in
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Sub-National Government and the Problem of

Unequal Development in ASEAN Economic
Integration: Case of Indonesia1
Agus Suman University of Brawijaya, Indonesia

Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian University of Brawijaya, Indonesia
Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih University of Brawijaya, Indonesia
Abstract
Economic integration, as a prevalent phenomenon in contemporary international relations,

brings with it several problems including in the practice of development. Krapohl & Fink
(2013) argue that regional integration can follow three different developmental paths which
are intra-regional interdependence, extra-regional dependence and intra-regional
asymmetries and hence regional integration can in fact reinforce current situations rather
than changing it. With regards to this, ASEAN is following the second path, creating a
reliance on external actors and thus requiring member states to be highly competitive in the
global level. However, this strategy ignores an important element, the intra-national
development gap, since ASEAN is mostly focused in overcoming the intra-regional gap.
This paper therefore seeks to elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development
gap due to regional integration by using Indonesia as a case study. The findings show that
regional integration in Indonesia can in fact widen the national development gap due to
three main reasons. First, ASEAN integration is highly top-down in nature, thus limiting
the role of Indonesia’s sub-national governments (SNGs) and private actors in the process;
second, differing capacity of Indonesia’s sub-national governments to engage in IR provides
higher opportunities for some while creating hindrances for others and lastly, the high
transactional cost of intra-national economic activities in Indonesia causes the benefits of
economic integration to be highly concentrated in one area. Therefore, there needs to be a
larger role for SNGs in regional integration particularly in the most underprivileged area
of Indonesia.
Key words: ASEAN, Indonesia, development gap, sub-national government
1
This article was originally presented in The Fourth International Conference on Business,
International Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD 2015) at Bina Nusantara University.

DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.2060
Introduction development gap among member

countries, ASEAN is also facing
For most countries, regional development gap within their own
integration is no longer a choice but a countries, such as the case of Indonesia.
necessity. The need to be included in the
global economy and obtain the benefits of Indonesia is an archipelagic
a freer market have forced countries to country with a relatively modest
engage in multiple trade arrangements. infrastructure quality and a high level of
As of April 2015, a total of 612 regional inequality. Indonesia has one of the fastest
trade agreements have been reported to growing inequality rate (Gini index) in
World Trade Organization, with 406 East and Southeast Asia, rising from 0.32
agreements being in force (WTO, 2015). Of in 1999 to 0.41 in 2012 (World Bank, 2014a).
these 406 agreements, there are at least 13 Indonesia’s inequality is not only evident
arrangements which are formed based on in the fact that Indonesia’s richest
regional integration or regionalism. By far, population has enjoyed a 20 per cent
European Union (EU) is the most higher growth in their income and
advanced regional integration while consumption since 2003, but also a
Association of Southeast Asian Nations disparity in regional development
(ASEAN) is the most successful and long- progress where eastern Indonesia lags in
enduring regional integration outside of other areas (World Bank, 2014). According
the western world (Beeson, 2013). to the head of Indonesia’s Autonomy
Watch or KPPOD, Sofjan Wanandi, only
ASEAN member countries 10 per cent of Indonesian cities
themselves are highly diverse in terms of experienced an improvement in their
economic growth and political conditions. economic performance ever since
Its member countries include wealthy Indonesia’s implementation of a
states such as Singapore and democratic decentralization policy in 2001 (Antique,
countries like Indonesia, but also 2009).
incorporate poor countries such as
Cambodia and authoritarian states like Based on this background, this
Myanmar. In terms of economic growth, paper seeks to explain ASEAN regional
intra-ASEAN trade has a moderate integration and its effect on development,
growth, with an average growth of 7.62 particularly on intra-national inequality,
per cent from 2007 up to 2013 (ASEAN by using Indonesia as the case study. This
Statistical Yearbook, 2014). This number is paper argues that when regional
relatively low compared to other areas integration is implemented in a country
such as Europe and Southern America. At with high level of economic inequalities,
the end of 2015, ASEAN will enter a its benefits will be diminished since
higher level of economic integration regionalism will in fact widen the
which includes free flow of labor, development gap, as in the case of
investment and capital, commonly known Indonesia. Furthermore, the nature of the
as ASEAN Economic Community. Under integration, whether it is a top-down or
this scheme, one of the main goal or pillar bottom-up integration, also determines
is to achieve an ‘equitable economic the effect of regionalism on development,
development’ which focuses on since it can lead to a concentration of
minimizing development gap between power and rulemaking capacity at the
member countries. However, aside from central government. This paper will be
62 Sub-National Government and the Problem of …
divided into three parts where part one range from 1960s to 1980s focus mostly on
will review existing studies of regionalism the debate between the intergovernmental
and sub-national government while part and supranational approach, which
two and three will discuss regional highlights the difference between
integration in Indonesia and highlight the regionalism as an inter-state project and
role of sub-national government in this regionalism as a project to create
process. institutions above the state
(supranational). Theories under this
Theorizing Economic Integration and heading include classic theories of
Regionalism functionalism, neofunctionalism,
Economic integration is the federalism, confederalism and liberal
removal of barriers to trade, payment and intergovernmentalism. Newer theories of
mobility from the factors of production, or regionalism emerge in the late 1980s and
in other words, is an effort to unite the early 1990s following the shift and
economies of two or more countries inclusion of non-material or ideational
through a series of joint policies factors in the analysis. One important
(Carbaugh, 2010). Basically, the idea of theory under the New Regionalism
economic integration dates back to liberal Approach is Multilevel Governance (MLG)
economists such as Adam Smith and in which the article uses as its basis.
David Ricardo who believe that non- Marks (1996) defines MLG as a
restricted economic activities will give the policy-making or decision-making process
most efficient outcome for all countries. which involves not only the state as the
Economic integration will create static exclusive actor but also other actors at
efficiency gains and dynamic efficiency various levels, namely at the
gains (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Static supranational, national and sub-national
efficiency gains occur because economic levels. Under MLG, each level should
integration will lead to specialization have the authority to create and
among member countries and market implement policies and in several cases, to
expansion, resulting in the economies of even refuse in implementing decisions
scale (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Aside that higher levels of authority impose.
from static efficiency gains, economic Multilevel governance was originally
integration will also bring dynamic developed in the European Union where
efficiency gains because in the long run, the tendency to result in overlapping
economic integration will stimulate governance among multiple levels of
innovation and make industries much government is high since many countries
more efficient and competitive (Balaam & uses a decentralized system of
Dillman, 2011). Although, economic gain government. MLG tries to avoid this
was often considered the primary motive problem by offering an alternative form of
for regional integration, newer theories of power sharing between multiple levels of
regionalism focus less on highlighting governance and reduces the chances of
only the economic gains. overlapping. Multilevel governance sees
In general, theories of regionalism regionalism as a process of governance
can be classified into 2 eras or waves of and policy making that involve multiple
theorizing, the classical theories and the actors at multiple levels (supranational,
new waves or New Regionalism national and sub-national), employing
Approach (NRA). Classical theories which both vertical and horizontal relationship
(Gavin, 2005). Horizontal relationship regionalism as one of their development

means that the process involves multiple strategies since it is viewed as a
actors at the same level while vertical collaborative effort that countries do to
relationship involves different levels of engage in development. However,
governance (Gibson, 2011). In this sense, countries are also in a dilemma on
MLG expands the classic definition of choosing to fully integrate themselves to
rulemaking (in terms of regional the global economy or still trying to retain
integration) by government to include their economic sovereignty. Hence,
various actors at multiple levels. countries are struggling to balance their
domestic interests, regional agreements
Regionalism and Development in and international demands through
ASEAN Countries multilateral cooperation (Abugattas, 2004).
In their 2007 Report, United With regards to ASEAN, relatively low
Nations Conference on Trade and socio-economic conditions by member
Development (UNCTAD) stated that countries has caused development to be
developing countries have started to use one of the priority issues in ASEAN.
Table 1. Human Development Index (HDI) of ASEAN Member Countries
(1985-2013)
Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2014)
In average, there has been an PDR is around 0.4 which shows quite a
increase in the human development high level of human development
condition of ASEAN member countries inequality. In addition to that, the
from the year of 1985 up to 2013, with Lao domestic inequality also shows a similar
PDR obtaining the lowest HDI (0.569) and picture.
Singapore has the highest (0.901). The
difference between Singapore and Lao
On average, from 1990-2013 almost a large problem in Southeast Asia. In

all ASEAN countries have the experience terms of intra-ASEAN trade itself, ASEAN
of an increase in their Gini coefficient, still trade largely with external countries
with Indonesia showing the steadiest (non-ASEAN states) with a ratio of
upward trend. This shows that despite the around 1:3, in both exports and imports
implementation of ASEAN Free Trade (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2014).
Area in 1994, domestic inequality remains
Table 2. Gini Coefficient of ASEAN Member Countries (1990-2013)
Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2014)
Regionalism and Sub-National result of complex interactions between

Government: Case of Indonesia different actors at various political levels.
Supranational institutions can also be a
In terms of the formation of medium for society to advance their own
regionalism, ASEAN is considered as interests with less government
highly state-centric in nature. ASEAN involvement. A study by Guido &
Secretariat (ASEC) only acts as the Kamarulnizam (2011) shows that although
facilitator for member states’ activities. Indonesian public generally supports the
ASEC is also understaff and has no ASEAN Community, they lack the
executive or legislative power knowledge regarding its process and
(Wunderlich, 2012). Furthermore, ASEAN policymaking which means that the
member countries deliberately avoid process excludes them greatly. However,
creating a strong supranational institution, this is not to say that ASEAN’s
making ASEAN Secretariat highly intergovernmental is less favorable that
underpowered (Hill & Menon, 2010). In EU’s supranationalism since ASEAN
contrast to EU which is highly offers flexibility that EU does not always
supranational, ASEAN limits rulemaking have. All in all, although state-centric
ability and involvement of other sectors regionalism is not necessarily bad, it can
other than the central government. In generally reduce the public’s awareness
supranationalism, regionalism is usually a
and involvement in the overall process, difference of 20-100 per cent between
particularly those who are marginalized. western and eastern Indonesia. For
example, a sack of cement can cost 10
Aside from ASEAN’s times more in eastern Indonesia than it is
characteristics, Indonesia also faces a in the western area (Pambudy, 2011).
problem in provincial disparity at various Under this condition, competitiveness will
economic sectors, such as trade and also vary greatly between provinces in
investment. In terms of foreign trade, data Indonesia since provinces which have
shows that Indonesia has average export access to international ports will be more
growth of 1.59 per cent in non-oil and competitive. Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta
non-gas sector (Ministry of Trade, (Indonesia’s capital) currently accounts
Republic of Indonesia, 2015). However, 18 for two-thirds of Indonesia’s international
provinces (out of 32 provinces) records a trade (World Bank, 2014b) meaning that
lower growth rate than the average rate as only one-third of Indonesia’s international
well as 17 provinces experiencing a trade is done outside of the capital city.
decline in export growth (Indonesian This shows that international trade is still
Ministry of Trade, 2015). In terms of highly concentrated in the wealthiest area.
investment, foreign investments are also
mostly dominated in Java area Conclusion
particularly in DKI Jakarta, West Java and
Banten (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2015). Based on the discussion, it can be
One exception is for East Kalimantan viewed that despite the implementation of
province that records a high amount of decentralization, problem of inequality in
foreign investment. This disparity Indonesia still exists (as is shown by Gini
attributes to the fact that Indonesia has a Index). With regards to economic
large gap in terms of conducting integration in Southeast Asia, positive
international trade and attracting effects of ASEAN economic integration to
investment. Not all provincial or city reduce intra-state inequality is still not
government are equipped with the ability present. The implementation of ASEAN
to create, promote, communicate or Free Trade Area in 1994 does not translate
engage in foreign activities due their to reduced inequality and on the contrary,
limited human resources. This in turn increases inequality. For Indonesia, the
creates limitation for them to reap the biggest problem is the high discrepancy
benefits of freer trade and investment between provinces and the limited
flows. This situation is also worsened by capacity of provincial and city
the high transactional cost between government. With limited capacity to
provinces in Indonesia. engage in productive international
relations, these cities and provinces may
The high cost of domestic trade is lose their opportunity to benefit from the
one element that can reduce Indonesia’s economic integration under ASEAN’s
competitiveness at the global level (Asia scheme.
Foundation, 2008). It is reported that
Indonesia’s cost of transporting goods is About the Authors
around USD 0.34 per kilometer which is
higher than Asia’s average cost at USD Agus Suman is a lecturer at
0.22 per kilometer (Asia Foundation, 2008). Department of International Relations,
This high logistics cost results in a price
Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Community. Journal of Current

University of Brawijaya. Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(1), 39-67.
Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian is a Carbaugh, R. J. (2005). International

lecturer at Department of International economics (10th ed.). Mason, Ohio:
Relations, Faculty of Political and Social Thomson/South-Western.
Sciences, University of Brawijaya.
Gavin, B. (2005). Reconciling regionalism
and multilateralism: Toward
Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih is a
multilevel governance. Bruges: UNU
lecturer at Department of International
Institute on Comparative Regional
Relations, Faculty of Political and Social
Integration Studies.
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Research Note
Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics:
A Southeast Asian Perspective
Moch Faisal Karim University of Warwick, United Kingdom
Abstract
There is no question that the current liberal world order faces yet another challenge. The
upcoming challenge that we are about to confront is an exceptionally different kind of
challenge. This challenge is the emergence of what I call a disruptive politics in the heartland
of consolidated liberal states. The two main side effects of disruptive politics can be seen at
both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, there is growing rise of populism
in stable western democracies epitomized with the election of Donald Trump as President of
the United States of America. Internationally, there is a growing rejection of globalization
and integration, exemplified by the UK leaving the EU. Many commentators and pundits
have observed that the rise of disruptive politics is the very threat to the liberal world order
that could eventually cause it to collapse from within. While the side effects of disruptive
politics should be addressed with caution; however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive
politics with its side effects such as the rise of populism and the growing contend with the
globalization. I would argue that disruptive politics is necessary for the survival of the liberal
world order. Disruptive politics is a way to make us realize that liberal democracy is not
perfect, and we need to fix it. This essay explores the notion of disruptive politics and the
challenge it poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It then offers three insights on how to
maintain the liberal world order in an age of disruptive politics.
Key words: disruptive politics, Liberal World Order, Donald Trump
The Challenges from within the non-western rising power that

seemingly challenges the liberal world
There is no question that the order has, for the most part, accepted this
current liberal world order faces yet order and hugely benefitted from it.
another challenge. Indeed, since its
inception by the western power from the Nevertheless, the upcoming
ashes of World War II, the liberal world challenge that we are about to confront is
order has always been challenged, by the an exceptionally different kind of
spread of communism during the Cold challenge. Many have thought that the
War, and the rise of terrorism after 9/11, main challenges of the liberal world order
which is becoming even more diffused and come from the without especially pressure
decentralized. Despite the challenges, the from the others. Surprisingly the challenge
liberal world order has survived and in fact comes from the within. This
flourished. It provides a relatively more challenge is the emergence of what I call a
stable world than before it existed. Even disruptive politics in the heartland of

DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.2129
consolidated liberal states. The two main the liberal world order should be
side effects of disruptive politics can be maintained.
seen at both the domestic and international
levels. Domestically, there is growing rise Understanding Disruptive Politics
of populism in stable western democracies within the Liberal Order
epitomized with the election of Donald
In 1995, Clayton Christensen (1997)
Trump as President of the United States of
put forward the notion of disruptive
America. Internationally, there is a
innovation as “an innovation that creates a
growing rejection of globalization and
new market and value network and
integration, exemplified by the UK leaving
eventually disrupts an existing market and
the EU.
value network.” Borrowing the notion of
Many commentators and pundits disruptive innovation, I define disruptive
have observed that the rise of disruptive politics as a politics that interrupts the
politics is the very threat to the liberal established order of things, particularly in
world order that could eventually cause it the core constituency of the liberal order.
to collapse from within. International
Disruptive politics is particularly
experts like Stephen Walt (2016), Ian
different from conventional contentious
Buruma (2017), and the New York Times’
politics, defined as “a politics that uses
Roger Cohen (2017) have warned about the
disruptive methods to make a political
dark times facing the liberal world order
point or to change particular government
with the recent disruptive politics
policies” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). While
happening in the western liberal
contentious politics can be seen
democracies. Joe Biden even stated that the
throughout both democracies and
liberal world order is at risk of collapsing
autocracies, disruptive politics is a slow
in his last international remarks as US Vice
process within liberal democracy that
President at the World Economic Forum in
strikes at the very core of the liberal world
Davos (Biden, 2017).
order, namely liberal democracy and
While the side effects of disruptive global capitalism. Just like the call for
politics should be addressed with caution; democracy in an authoritarian regime,
however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive politics within democracies is
disruptive politics with its side effects. I mainly caused by the politics of
would argue that disruptive politics is resentment, particularly towards the status
necessary for the survival of the liberal quo and the elites who undermine the
world order. Disruptive politics is a way to ordinary people.
make us realize that liberal order is not
In the authoritarian setting,
perfect, and we need to fix it.
disruption often occurred due to the lack of
This policy note explores the notion freedom to contend the authoritarian rule
of disruptive politics and the challenge it and demand on regime change. In liberal
poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It democracies with a stable democratic
then considers the way in which global transfer of power, the very same
leaders should manage the liberal world disruption rarely happened. Liberal
order in the age of disruptive politics. This democracy has embraced protests and
note concludes that there is a need for dissidents as part of its legitimation
world leaders to rethink the way in which strategy and provided democratic
platforms that neutralize resistance
70 Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics
towards the status quo. But it does not opposite. Disruptive politics can have
address the issue of inequality where the dangerous outcomes, but this is by no
accumulation of power in the hands of the means the end of the liberal world order. It
few has made the voice of most of the is Janus-faced. On the one hand, it might
people unheard. An interesting study lead to the decline of liberal democracy
conducted by political scientist Martin with the rise of populist nationalism where
Gilens and Benjamin Page on the US angry democratic majorities rule, which
democracy reveals that ordinary citizens might lead to the rise of authoritarian
have a non-significant influence on public strong men. On the other hand, it could
policies compared to the economic elites provide us with an opportunity to reform
(Gilens & Page, 2014). With this condition, the core principles of liberal world order,
democracy has been habituated as a which the national and global agenda have
ceremonial celebration for the ordinary been aggressively pursuing, particularly
citizens while the decisions are dominated since the end of the Cold War. Disruptive
by rich and powerful elites. politics is a harsh wake up call to both the
elites and the average citizens that the
In the long run, just like in liberal world order is not without its
authoritarian rule, liberal democracies, shortcomings. Through disruptive politics,
instead of being the government of the we have been given a chance to step back
people, by the people, and for the people, and reassess the national and global
as envisioned by Abraham Lincoln, have agenda of the liberal world order.
metamorphosed to become an oligarchy.
The recent predicament in the liberal Managing Disruptive Politics: A
democracies is perfectly summed up in Southeast Asian Perspective
Animal Farm’s famous remarks, “all
animals are equal, but some animals are With the emergence of disruptive
more equal than others” (Orwell, 2003). To politics, what kind of global political order
tame these circumstances, disruptive will emerge in the aftermath? This is
politics is needed. indeed a very important question that has
attracted the attention of the brightest
Borrowing from Carol Hanisch minds. To contribute to the debate, I offer
(1969), the occurrence of disruptive politics three insights on how to maintain the
has made politics become more personal liberal world order in an age of disruptive
and personal is political. While the status politics.
quo within democracies has disconnected
the politics from the people, disruptive First, the disruptive politics
politics could empower people to be more happening in the western world could
involved in politics for better or worse. provide fresh voices from the non-western
Some commentators have even argued that powers to come up in defense of the liberal
the recent rise of populist nationalism in world order. Rather than antagonizing
mainstream western political discourse over the non-western powers’ motives in
might have been made possible by a pursuing global leadership, it is time for
collective loss of faith in democracy. western leaders to trust the non-western
world in terms of the burden of leadership
It is possible to read what I have sharing to maintain the global order. The
written here as a defense of the rise of disruptive politics unfortunately has
populism and the decline of liberal brought the discourse of protectionism and
principles. But my message is the exact
anti-globalization into mainstream important in the region. The disruptive

western politics, with President Trump’s politics with the election of Trump that
statement “Buy American Hire American” focus on his “American first” slogan, has
(Chu, 2017). Surprisingly it was the indeed shaken this progress and thus
Chinese president, Xi Jinping who might change the balance in favor of China.
denounced protectionism and defended
globalization (Fidler, Chen, & Wei, 2017). However, the disruptive politics
The so-called rising power that is certainly create a new space for second-tier
considered illiberal is the one that countries in the Asia-Pacific to show their
seemingly holds the principle of the liberal willingness to cooperate and initiate their
order dearly. This suggests that even own commitment without the need to have
though non-western powers may not yet the great power on board. Although
fully embrace the liberal principles, they Donald Trump has succeeded in getting
are aware of the importance of maintaining the United States out of the Trans-Pacific
the liberal world order. Partnership (TPP), it does not necessarily
make Asia-pacific countries unable to
In the case of Southeast Asia, spawn similar things without the United
Indonesia has tried to play a constructive States. At the APEC summit in Danang,
role in supporting global world order Vietnam, Trade ministers from 11 Asia-
particularly through the promotion of its Pacific countries agreed on to press ahead
democratic values albeit in its own way with a major trade deal without the United
and with its own caveats (Karim, 2017b). States, as they seek to go it alone without
Indonesia has been a promoter of the involvement of Donald Trump’s
democratic ideals and human rights values America.
at the regional level. This shows that non-
western power could become the Secondly, the disruptive politics
supporter of western-dominated world has demonstrated how economic
order in promoting western liberal norm. resentment towards global capitalism
other than being supporter of western- emanating from perceived inequality
dominated liberal order, countries within could tear apart the social fabric of the
Southeast Asia also concern on the liberal order. Global capitalism has indeed
importance of the western military lifted hundreds of millions of people out of
presence as a force of balancing in the poverty around the world, especially in
region (Karim & Chairil, 2016). Asia. Yet, it also brings huge inequality and
social injustice too. In the eastern world,
Indeed that disruptive politics China’s embrace of economic globalization
create uncertainty for Southeast Asia given has not only made it an economic
that regional architecture built by ASEAN powerhouse but has also led to it becoming
has been based on US-sponsored liberal a country with one of the highest levels of
international order through which ASEAN income inequality in the world, where one
aimed to diffuse the norms into its regional percent of the richest households own a
norm and mechanisms (Chong, 2017). third of the country’s wealth. The
Moreover, under Obama’s leadership, conundrum that most of the time is
ASEAN has been leveraged into one of the happening on the periphery has now
most important agenda within the US reached its core. In the US, inequality has
foreign policy with its pivot to Asia become even greater, reaching its most
strategy thus boost ASEAN strategic extreme point since the Great Depression
(Desilver, 2013). In Europe, inequality has ASEAN countries should pay attention to
risen substantially since the mid-1980s concept of inclusive growth seriously. The
(Fredriksen, 2012). Basically, inequality has inclusive growth could start with the
become the Achilles heel of the liberal economic policy that focus on investing in
order. I believe that the explanation for the public goods such as infrastructure,
rise of racism and xenophobia as well as healthcare and the environment.
the allure for the strong men in western
democracies cannot be separated from the Thirdly, we need to reconsider the
growing inequality within society. way in which the core values of the liberal
Inequality will incite fear and insecurity order should be promoted. Democracy will
among people. In return they can be easily be the most desirable form of government
mobilized for hatred towards others and the global standard for legitimate
(Karim, 2017a). It is time for the global governance, despite the seemingly
leaders to genuinely focus on solving the democratic decline and the variety of
tension between the inequality produced models that might not be particularly
by market capitalism and the equality that liberal (Ikenberry, 2011). And so is
is required by democracy. capitalism. Though not always subscribing
to the notion of a liberal free-market, most
Southeast Asia is also home for the of countries will eventually embrace
rise of inequality particularly due to the capitalism as the way in which to govern
impact the lack of the government to their economy in the foreseeable future.
address market failure and reduce rent- However, the assumption that liberal
seeking activities. While in general, the principles should be universally accepted
case of inequality has been experienced by is not only wrong but also dangerous.
Southeast Asian countries, however, Lao
PDR and Indonesia have inequality trends We should learn on how the two
that should be a cause of concerns (Yap, decades of liberal interventionist policy
2013). In a long run, the economic growth have failed and created more instability in
without inequality would only create some parts of the world. It has even
dissatisfaction that may lead to social nurtured antipathy from the periphery
unrest. The inequality could also endanger states of the liberal order. The challenge
the regional integration project in posed by disruptive politics also cautiously
Southeast Asia once the project deemed to shows us that even mature liberal
be detrimental toward the poor and democracy is not immune from shifting
vulnerable section of the society given the towards an illiberal one. We should learn
benefits of economic integration have often from history that there is always a danger
been unequally distributed. of imperial overstretch even when it comes
to ideas. Liberal principles might be the last
It is the time for Southeast Asian man standing in history. Yet just like many
countries to find out what is the best way other ideas, it is far from perfect. It is time
to increase its wealth while at the same to be humble and let the two core liberal
time reduce the gap of inequality. To do principles evolve into a variety of models
this, at least, there should be a shift in how that stem from different cultural and
the economic elites should see the historical contexts.
development paradigm of neoliberal
economic agenda which shows its failure Indeed, that there is a steady
in creating wealth with equality. Thus, decrease of democratic space as well as the
protections of human rights in Southeast
Asia. Many countries remain International Studies, University of

undemocratic, and others have taken a Warwick, United Kingdom. His research
worryingly repressive turn (Edwards & interest lies in the intersection of political
Karim, 2016). This might be caused by the economy and International Relations (IR)
negative views on democratic norm due to with an emphasis on Southeast Asia,
the liberal interventionist policies that are particularly Indonesia.
failing in any other parts of the world.
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ARTICLES

The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Sue Thompson

Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Inter- M. Faishal Aminuddin,

The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda Leni Winarni

Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Teuku Rezasyah,

Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Agus Suman,

Layout Editors Theodora

Advisory International Editorial Board

Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in 23-36

The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda 37-50

Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Network Case 51-59

Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN 60-67

Journal of ASEAN Studies publishes the following types of manuscripts:

Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies

Jakarta, 31 July 2017

Prof. Dr. Tirta N. Mursitama, Ph.D.

Sue Thompson Australian National University, Australia

Key words: regionalism, Southeast Asia, economic development, security

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 1-22

regional cooperation. Australia and New

Until Confrontation ended, regional depending on Indonesia’s participation.

Debate on the future role of ASEAN Later in the Philippines, Nixon

changing role of future American facing any possible contingencies (Memo

Melby Papers, China File, Jorden on Elements of Progress in

Minute, A.J. de la Mare to Mr. Samuel, 23 Administrative History of the Department of

Record of meeting between Colin Jackson A9564, 221/4/16, NAA.

Kuala Lumpur to Washington, 3 June 1966, Washington to Canberra, 17 August 1967,

Singapore to Washington, 14 November 14, GRFL.

3004/13/21 Part 28, NAA. Response to Proposed Parliamentary

A thirty-year review of the Association of (eds.), Australia and the United

Redefining ASEAN Way:

M. Faishal Aminuddin University of Brawijaya, Indonesia

This paper reviews inter-state relations in Southeast Asia countries.

This paper ends by providing an alternative type of political diplomacy by

Key words: regional cooperation, non-interference principal, political

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 23-36

taking place in Asia. First, political processes

policy priorities in maintaining domestic 2) explanation on the extension of the

merely on country’s interests rather than Democratization, however, may contribute

democracy, semi-authoritarian, structure and kinship containing a set of

second is ideological reason, where on reducing in consensus’s effectiveness.

M. Faishal Aminuddin is a lecturer at Anwar, D. F. (1994). Indonesia in ASEAN:

Leni Winarni Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia

Regarding Southeast Asia as a multi-ethnic region, this paper attempts to examine

Key words: ethnic-religion violence, Muslim Rohingya, Buddhist Rakhine, state’s

Introduction Throughout history, the conflict

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 37-50

According to Minahan (2012), In 1942, the Japanese forces have

ethno-national movements at all… nomenclature of Rakhine was designed for

impossible to endure them legally Bengali. When Arakan was Bengal’s

On the other hand, according to the It is significant since Buddhists in

Myanmar after many years of militaristic 2016). Otherwise, according to historian

About the Author 29, 2017, from BBC:

International Crisis Group. (2014). Selth, A. (1986). Race and resistance in

years of humanitarian action. USA: Yegar, M. (2002). Between integration and

Higher Education Integration in ASEAN:

Teuku Rezasyah Padjadjaran University, Indonesia

Key words: AUN, regional integration, higher education, Association of Southeast

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 51-59