In the first place, the finality of the 1957 decision declaring the husband ofKua Suy to be qualified for

naturalization does not automatically make him a Filipino citizen, since the law prescribes a further
probationary period of two years before he can take an oath of allegiance. Until then, and only upon
proof that he complied with the statutory requirements, the applicant does notbecome naturalized as
a citizen; much less would citizenship be extended to his wife and children, appellees herein.
Therefore, the latter remained aliensat the time the appealed decision was rendered, and since there
is no questionthat they had exhausted the maximum period allotted them as temporary visitors, it
was the appellant Commissioner's right, nay, his duty, to expel appellees.

Appellees invoke the benefits of an alleged Cabinet resolution of 29 February 1956 that authorized
the extension of the period of stay of aliens Tan Ban andGo Sick Yan. But paragraph 5 of the
stipulation of facts clearly shows that in the case of present appellees, the extension granted by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs was definitely terminated on 2 August 1957, and the Immigration
Commissioner was then set free to proceed with the appellees' expulsion. Only the injunction issued
by the trial court stopped the Commissioner from doing so.

It is also agreed that the Secretary of Justice who is the administrative superior of the Commissioner
of Immigration by Opinion No. 287, dated 7 December 1958, extended appellees' stay until the
expiration of the husband's two-year probationary period. It appears, however, that the same time
Secretary revoked the opinion referred to on 5 February 1959, because his prior opinion was
obtained without full disclosure of facts and circumstances.

That the husband Liu Giok In should have finally taken his oath of allegiance in 1959, when this
appeal was already pending, does not improve the case for appellees. Under section 15 of the
Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized", so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to
confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and
in Cua vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of
record as to thequalifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy. As to the minor
children, it is to be observed that the same section (paragraph 3) of the naturalization law extends
citizenship to a foreign-born minor child "if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization
of the parent" and, of course, "dwelling" must necessarily be construed to mean "lawful residence".
Since prior to the time the father of these appellees tookhis oath of allegiance (on 24 August 1959)
the lawful period of stay of those children had already expired in 1957, and they had been already
required to leave the Islands, plainly they were no longer lawfully residing therein and have no right
to be considered as also naturalized. The Naturalization Act was certainly not intended to be an
excuse for violations of our immigration laws.

This case, and many others of the same nature that this Court has had to decide, are strong
evidence of a tendency on the part of certain aliens to enter on temporary visitors' permits and
thereafter rely on the improvident issuance of injunctions in immigration cases by the Courts of First
Instance for even if the error is subsequently corrected on appeal, such aliens are meanwhile able to
unduly prolong their illegal stay in violation of our country's immigration laws and policies. He can
not, therefore, overemphasize the need of extreme caution in issuing such injunctions. Aliens who
voluntarily enter under temporary permits must be strictly required to abide by the periods fixed
therein, because laxity in this matter would merely encourage entry under false pretenses.

The appellees' plain remedy is to first leave the country as they promised, and thereafter secure
permission to reenter permanently.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby
revoked and set aside. Costs against appellees.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., concurring and dissenting:

The facts are stated in the decision. Based on tho facts, the trial court rendered its decision enjoining
respondent or whoever acts in his behalf from causing the forcible removal of petitioners from the
country and confiscating their P34,000 bond until after the expiration of the period of two years
provided in Republic Act No. 530 should Liu Giok In be disqualified from taking his oath of allegiance
as a naturalized citizen.

The Commissioner of Immigration appealed.

He claims that the lower court erred in (1) holding that upon the grant of Liu Giok In's petition for
naturalization the issue herein became moot since his wife and children acquired the right to follow
his abode.; and (2) in declaring consequently that appellant acted in excess of his power in
orderingappellees to leave the Philippines within 3 days from notice of his order.

During the pendency of this appeal, Liu Giok In took his oath as a Philippine citizen. As of that time
his oldest son Liu Kang was already of age, but the other two were still minors, Liu Yack Hua having
been born on September 7, 1942, and Liu Su Lim on August 16, 1944.

The issue is whether or not a Chinese alien's wife and minor children who entered the Philippines as
temporary visitors may be deported after said Chinese alien has become naturalized as a Philippine
citizen.

The Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, provides:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines Permanently.

To obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some
foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine
port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of
thisAct. (last par., Section 9).

Kua Suy alias Kwan Say Dee has not, by the fact of her husband's naturalization, become a
Philippine citizen. This Court has had occasion to lay down the rule that marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she 'herself may be lawfully
naturalized'." (Ly Giok Ha alias v. Galang, L-10760 54 O.G. 356; Cua vs. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; Lee Suan Ay v. Galang, L-11855, December 23, 1959). A distinction
can be noted between the present case and the cited cases. Whereas in the former the husband
was an alien who subsequently became naturalized, in the latter, the alien women weresingle in
when they came to the Philippines as temporary visitors, and while here married Filipino citizens.
Nevertheless, since the basis for the rule (enunciated in the three cases) is Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, which states that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines," the same applies with equal force to appellee Kua Suy. She cannot allege she is
Philippine citizen becauseshe has not proven that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of one who may be naturalized.

The issue with respect to her minor children stands on a different footing. Asto the effect on them of
their father's naturalization, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law also provides that:

A foreign born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of thenaturalization of the
parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen,and a foreign-born minor child, who is
not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine
citizen, only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines
when stilla minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even
afterbecoming of age.

May the minors Liu Yack Hua and Liu Su Lim be considered as dwelling in the Philippines at the
time their father was naturalized? To "dwell" means "to abide as a Permanent resident, to live in a
place, to reside or to have a habitation for some time or permanently." (13 minors were in the
Philippines as "temporary visitors" when their father took his oath, they may not be considered as
dwelling herein. But even so, they are deemed1 Filipino citizensduring their minority — a status
which shall become permanent upon establishment by them of permanent residence here during
their minority. "Deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "adjudged"; and whatever an Act
requires to be deemed or taken as true of any person must in law be consideredor adjudged, and
have full force and effect accordingly. (11 Words and Phrases 479).

To these minors, considered Philippine Citizens as they are, Section 9 of the Immigration Act, does
not apply. This section covers only aliens — nonimmigrant aliens seeking permanent admission to
the Philippines — who are enjoined to first leave the country voluntarily and then secure the
appropriate papers and undergo an examination by the Bureau of immigration to determine their
admissibility as Permanent residents. They may be shown to be undesirable for admission and thus
prevented from entering the Philippines permanently.

The cases that may be cited as interpretative of the last paragraph of Section 9 of Immigration Law
are all concerned with where alien temporary visitors sought to become permanent residents without
first leaving the country (Ong Se Lun v. Board of Immigration, L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954; Sy Hong v.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-10224, May 11, 1957; Tui Chun Hao v. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-10009, Dec. 22, 1958; Ng Him v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13026, March 30,
1960). If the same situation obtained here, there would be no alternative to deporting petitioning
minors in accordance with the law's clear mandate. But we have here a case, not of alien temporary
visitors seeking to become alien permanent residents, but of alien temporary visitors who now are,
by law deemed Filipino citizens. The change is not in the character of an alien's stay in this country,
that is, from temporary to permanent, without changing the fact of his being an alien, but in his status
from that of alien to citizen. The first situation concerns an alien who is requesting our hospitality,
which request we may deny by excluding him from admission; the latter involves an alien, who has
become a citizen and seeks to exercise his rights as such, which rights may not be curtailed. If the
law not only allows but indeed confers a change in the citizenship status of the minors in question, I
see no reason why a change of lesser magnitude — regarding their right of residence — should not
be countenanced.

The question may be asked: Suppose the petitioning minors, before they may acquire permanent
residence, are first ordered to leave the country, should they do so as Philippine citizens or as
aliens? They must be either one or the other. If they are Philippine citizens (which no doubt they are
at least during their minority, for otherwise the aforequoted Section 15 of the RevisedNaturalization
Law would be meaningless), then they may not be subject to deportation. 2 On the other hand, to
consider them as aliens would be to ignorethe explicit provision of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Or should they be deemed citizens under the said law and at the same aliens under the Immigration
Act. The suggestion, on its face, is unthinkable. It is contrary to the intendment of Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, particularly that portion which refers to foreign-born minor children who,
at the time of the naturalization of their father outside the Philippines. They are deemed Philippine
citizens only during their minority, unless they begin to reside permanently here when still minors in
which case will continue to be citizens even after becoming of age. Implicit in this provision is the
right of these minors to establish a permanent residence in this country in order that they may not
lose their citizenship status conferred by law, which loss would inevitably result if during minority
they are deported and thus prevented from complying with the requisite of the law as to the
establishment of a permanent residence.

The purpose of Section 9, last paragraph, of the Immigration Act is to preventan alien from
converting his temporary visit into a permanent stay without prior determination of his desirability as
Philippine resident. Since the right of the petitioning minors to be admitted into the country cannot be
seriously questioned, by reason of their Philippine citizenship, it would be unreasonable and
impractical to require them to go through the rigmarole of first leaving the country before their
admission as permanent residents at least during their minority. Whether or not, after becoming of
age, they will continue to be citizens will of course depend upon the fact of the permanence of their
residence here within the meaning of the aforesaid provision of the law.

I concur with the decision insofar as appellee Kua Suy alias Kuan Say Dee is concerned, and
dissent therefrom with respect to appellees Liu Yack Hua and Liu Su Lim who were minors when
their father took his oath of naturalization.

Footnotes

Makalintal, J.: concurring and dissenting:

1
 The phrase, "Shall be deemed a citizen", Section 1994, Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat.
1901 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Sta- at L-604, Chapt. 71, See. 2), "shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen", while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has
not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment
of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet does not follow that such a
person is not on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the
equivalent of "considered" or "adjudged", and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress
requires to be "deemed" or "taken as true" of any person or thing must, in law, be considered
as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and have the
force, and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall,
under certain circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the
contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or
in the usual mode thereby prescribed. Velayo's Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization, p.
127, citing Van Dyne, Op- Cit., pp. 239-240.

2
 There is no question that as the power to deport is limited to aliens only, the alienage of the
respondent in deportation Proceedings is a basic and fundamental fact upon which the
jurisdiction of the Deportation Board depends. If the alienage of the respondent is not
denied, the Board's jurisdiction an proceedings are unassailable; if the respondent is
admittedly a citizen or conclusively shown to be such, the Board lacks jurisdiction and its
proceedings are null and void ab initio may be summarily enjoined in the courts. Naturally
the Board must have the power, in the first instance, to determine respondent's nationality.
And the respondent must present evidence of his claim of citizenship before the courts alone
in a subsequent action of habeas corpus. (Armona v. Aldanese, Phil. 696). It must quash the
proceedings if it is Satisfied that respondent is a citizen, and continue it if it find that he is
even if the respondent claims citizenship and denied alienage. Its jurisdiction is not divested
by the mere claim of citizens (Miranda, et al. vs. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-6784, March
12, 1954.).

There is also no question that respondent who claims to be citizen and not therefore subject
to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the
deportation proceedings. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should
promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without
molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding,
he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection either by a writ of
habeas corpus or of prohibition,on legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a
citiz