G.R. No.

L-1403             October 29, 1948

VICENTE CALUAG and JULIANA GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON and ANGEL H. MOJICA, Judges of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, and LEON ALEJO, respondents.

Marcial G. Mendiola for petitioners.

Antonio Gonzalez for respondent L. Alejo.
The respondent Judge Pecson in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioners on the ground that the
respondent judge acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the court in rendering the resolution
dated April 1, 1947, which declares the petitioners guilty of contempt of court for not complying or
performing the order of the court of January 7, 1947, in case No. 5486 of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, requiring the petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff over one-half of the
land pro indiviso in question, within ten days from the receipt of copy of said resolution, and which
orders that the petitioners be imprisoned until they perform the said act.

The first ground on which the petition is based is that the judgment of the court which the petitioners
are ordered to perform has not yet become final. This ground is unfounded. From the pleadings and
annexes it appears that the judgment of the lower against the petitioners was appealed to the Court
of Appeals and was affirmed by the latter in its decision promulgated on May 30, 1944; that the
petition to appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari filed by the petitioners was denied on July 24,
1944; that a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was also denied on August 21, 1944;
that the record of the case, having been destroyed during the liberation, was reconstituted; that on
September 24, 1945, the Deputy Clerk of this Court wrote a letter to and notified the petitioners of
the resolution of the Court declaring said record reconstituted, together with the copies of the
decision of the Court of Appeals and resolutions of the Supreme Court during Japanese occupation
of June 24 and August 21, 1944; and that on October 23, 1946, the clerk of Court of First Instance of
Bulacan notified the attorneys for both parties of the said decision of the Court of Appeals and
resolutions of the Supreme Court. There can be no question, therefore, that the judgment of the
Court of First Instance above-mentioned, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has become final and
executory.

The other two grounds alleged by the petitioners in support of the present petition for certiorari are:
that plaintiff's action abated or was extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff Fortunato Alejo,
because his right of legal redemption was a personal one, and therefore not transferable to his
successors in interest; and that, even assuming that it is a personal one and therefore transferable,
his successors in interest have failed to secure the substitution of said deceased by his legal
representative under section 17, Rule 3. These reasons or grounds do not deserve any serious
consideration, not only because they are without merits, but because the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, having jurisdiction to render that judgment, the latter cannot be disobeyed however
erroneous it may be (Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co., 33
Phil., 503; Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil., 941). And this Court cannot in this proceeding correct any
error which may have been committed by the lower court.

However, although not alleged, we may properly take judicial notice of the fact that the respondent
Judges have acted without jurisdiction in proceeding against and declaring the petitioners guilty of
contempt of court.
The contempt supposed to have been committed by the petitioners is not a direct contempt under
section 1, Rule 64, for it is not a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the administration of justice. It is an indirect contempt or disobedience of a lawful order of
the court, under section 3, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court. According to sections 4 and 5 of said rule,
where a contempt under section 3 has been committed against a superior court or judge the charge
may be filed with such superior court, and the accused put under custody; but if the hearing is
ordered to be had forthwith, the accused may be released from custody upon filing a bond in an
amount to be fixed by the court for his appearance to answer the charge. From the record it appears
that no charge for contempt was filed against the petitioners nor was a trial held. The only
proceeding had in this case which led to the conviction of the defendants are: the order of January 7,
1947, issued by the lower court requiring the defendants to execute the deed of conveyance as
direct in the judgment within ten days from the receipt of the copy of said order, with the admonition
that upon failure to do so said petitioners will be dealt with for contempt of court; the motion of March
21, 1947, filed by the attorney for the respondent Leon Alejo, administrator of the estate of Fortunato
Alejo, that the petitioners be punished for contempt; and the resolution of the court of April 1, 1947,
denying the second motion for reconsideration of March 17, 1947, of the order of January 7, 1947,
filed by the petitioners, and ordering the petitioners to be imprisoned in the provincial jail until they
have complied with the order of the court above mentioned.

It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than the
general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases of the general class to
which the particular case belongs. It is not enough that a court has power in abstract to try and
decide the class of litigations to which a case belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly
invoked, or called into activity, by the filing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading. A
Court of First Instance has an abstract jurisdiction or power to try and decide criminal cases for
homicide committed within its territorial jurisdiction; but it has no power to try and decide a criminal
case against a person for homicide committed within its territory, unless a complaint or information
against him be filed with the said court. And it has also power to try civil cases involving title to real
estate situated within its district; but it has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a dispute or
controversy between two persons over title of real property located in his province, unless a proper
complaint be filed with its court. So, although the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has power
conferred by law to punish as guilty of indirect contempt a party who disobeys its order or judgment,
it did not have or acquire jurisdiction of the particular case under consideration to declare the
petitioners guilty of indirect contempt, and order their confinement until they have executed the deed
of conveyance in question, because neither a charge has been filed against them nor a hearing
thereof held as required by law.

The respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted not only without jurisdiction in proceeding against and
declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
confinement of the petitioners, because it had no power to impose such punishment upon the latter.

The respondent judge has no power under the law to order the confinement of the petitioners until
they have compiled with the order of the court. Section 9, Rule 39, in connection with section 7 of
Rule 64, provides that if a person is required by a judgment or order of the court to perform any other
act than the payment of money or sale or delivery of real or personal property, and said person
disobeys such judgment or order while it is yet in his power to perform it, he may be punished for
contempt and imprisoned until he performs said order. This provision is applicable only to specific
acts other than those provided for or covered by section 10 of the same Rule, that is, it refers to a
specific act which the party or person must personally do, because his personal qualification and
circumstances have been taken into consideration in accordance with the provision of article 1161 of
the Civil Code. But if a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds
or other documents or to perform any specific act which may be performed by some other person, or
in some other way provided by law with the same effect, as in the present case, section 10, and not
said section 9 of Rule 39 applies; and under the provision of said section 10, the court may direct the
act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party, by some other person appointed or designated by
the court, and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party himself.

It is also well settled by the authorities that a judgment may be void for want of power to render the
particular judgment, though the court may have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. A wrong decision made within the limits of the court's authority is erroneous and may be
corrected on appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or for that matter a correct, decision is void,
and may be set aside either directly or collaterally, where the court exceeds its jurisdiction and
power in rendering it. Hence though the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the particular case has been submitted properly to it for hearing and decision, it will overstep its
jurisdiction if it renders a judgment which it has no power under the law to render. A sentence which
imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty different from or in excess of the
maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense of which the defendant was
convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction, as to the excess in the latter case. And a
judgment of imprisonment which the court has no constitutional or statutory power to impose, as in
the present case, may also be collaterally attacked for want or rather in excess of jurisdiction.

In Cruz vs. Director of Prisons (17 Phil., 269, 272, 273), this Court said the following applicable to
punishment imposed for contempt of court:

. . . The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the
power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts
hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that
such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the
rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless
he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid. (Ex parte Erdmann, 88 Cal., 579;
Lowrey vs. Hogue, 85 Cal., 600; Armstrong vs. People, 37 Ill., 459; State vs. Brannon, 34 La
Ann., 942; People vs. Liscomb, 19 Am. Rep., 211; In re Taylor, 7 S. D., 382, 45 L. R. A.,
136; Ex parte Mooney, 26 W. Va., 36, 53 Am. Rep., 59; U. S. vs. Pridgeon, 153 U. S., 48; In
re Graham, 138 U. S., 461.)

In the present case, in view of the failure of the petitioners to execute the deed of conveyance
directed in the judgment of the court, the respondent may, under section 10, Rule 39, either order its
execution by some other person appointed or designated by the court at the expense of the
petitioners, or enter a judgment divesting the title of the petitioner over the property in question and
vesting it in Leon Alejo, administrator of estate of the deceased Fortunato Alejo, and such judgment
has the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.

In view of the foregoing, the order of the court of April 7, 1947, ordering the confinement of the
petitioners in the provincial jail until they have complied with the order of the court, is set aside
without costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

On August 10, 1937, Fortunato Alejo filed a complaint against the spouses Vicente Caluag and
Juliana Garcia, herein petitioners, for the redemption of one-half pro indiviso of a parcel of land in
Guiguinto, Bulacan, covered by transfer certificate No. 19178. After trial, the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan rendered judgment on June 23, 1941, ordering petitioners to execute a deed of sale in
favor of Fortunato Alejo, upon payment by plaintiff, as purchase price, of the amount of P2,551. The
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Central Luzon on May 30, 1944. A petition for
review on certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the so-called Republic of the Philippines on
July 28, 1944. Petitioners' counsel alleges, under oath, that he was not notified of said denial. The
record of the case was lost or burned during the liberation of Manila. Fortunato Alejo died on
December 10, 1944, petitioners made aware of the fact only on December 1, 1946. The record,
upon petition, was duly reconstituted on August 30, 1946, a resolution to said effect having been
issued by this Court.

On October 21, 1946, respondent Leon Alejo, judicial administrator of the estate of Fortunato Alejo,
filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the execution of the judgment. On
October 28, the motion was indefinitely postponed. On November 21, Leon Alejo filed another
motion for the execution of the judgment, which was granted on January 7, 1947, Judge Potenciano
Pecson ordering defenda