FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 46011. May 31, 1938.]

EMILIO GALVEZ , petitioner, vs . ALFONSO SALVADOR and P. M.

ENDENCIA, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan , respondents.

Miguel Tolentino for petitioner.

Garcia, Pascual & Valentin for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ELECTIONS; ELECTION PROTEST; CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY;

JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOT ALLEGED IN PLEADING. — Unless it is alleged in the
motion of election protest that the protestant has duly led his certi cate of candidacy
and received votes in the election, the Court of First Instance does not acquire
jurisdiction over the protest. (Tengco vs. Jocson, 43 Phil., 715. See also Viola vs. Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur and Adolfo, 47 Phil., 849; Ferrer vs. Gutierrez David
and Lucot, 43 Phil., 795; Pobre vs. Quevedo, 52 Phil., 359; Acerden vs. Tonolete, 52 Phil.,
409; Saldaña vs. Navarro, 60 Phil., 738; Anis vs. Contreras, 65 Phil., 923.)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The pertinent provisions of section 479 of the Election
Law, as amended by Act No. 3030, were repeated verbatim in Act No. 3210 approved in
1924. Thereafter, Act No. 3387 was enacted. This Act, approved in 1927, revised the
Election Law. Instead of speaking of "any registered candidate voted for at such
election," the new Act referred to "any candidate voted for at such election and who has
duly led his certi cate of candidacy." The motion of protest, however, was to be led
also "within two weeks after the proclamation." The law on this point, as interpreted by
this court (Tolosa vs. Court of First Instance of Leyte and Torredes [1928], G. R. No.
30134) continued undisturbed from 1927 to the present day, notwithstanding the
subsequent amendments of the Election Law by Acts Nos. 3699 and 3834 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature and, quite recently, by Commonwealth Act No. 233 of the
National Assembly.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POLICY. — The Legislature has the
undisputed right to provide for the mode and manner in which an election contest shall
be instituted and for this purpose may impose reasonable conditions and restrictions.
What these conditions and restrictions shall be is plainly a matter of legislative policy
and is left to the wisdom of the coordinate department of the government. The
requirement that the motion of protest shall be led by a candidate who has duly led
his certi cate of candidacy was, as indicated above, inserted for a good purpose. It
was not designed to discourage contests but was intended to preclude the ling of
protests by persons who, on the face of the pleading, are not, in the opinion of the
Legislature, entitled to any recognition.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — If the contention of the petitioner that the term
candidate means the candidate who has duly led a certi cate of candidacy, there was
no need for amending the original provision of Act No. 1582 which permitted the ling
of a contest by any candidate voted for at an election. The Legislature has seen t to
insert the requirement in the law and he who institutes an election contest must allege
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 the essential jurisdictional facts, if he wants the competent court to pay him any
attention. (Verceles vs. Araneta Diaz, 47 Phil., 843, 847.)

DECISION

LAUREL , J : p

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the

respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan to take cognizance of the
election protest led by the petitioner herein and Salvador A. Jose against Alfonso
Salvador and Jose Bernardo, candidates-elect for municipal mayor and municipal
councilor, respectively, of the municipality of Bigaa, Province of Bulacan.
The only question presented is one of law and that is, whether or not the motion
of protest alleges su cient jurisdictional facts to enable the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case. The following are the pertinent portions of the motion of
election protest filed with the court below:
"I. That the petitioners are of legal age and residents of the
municipality of Bigaa, Province of Bulacan, Philippines and were: candidates for
municipal mayor, and municipal councilor therein in the last general election of
December 14, 1937.
"II. That the respondents Alfonso Salvador and Jose Bernardo are also
of legal age and residents of the same municipality and province who were
likewise candidates for municipal mayor and municipal councilor, respectively;
Laureano Kapalad being another candidate for municipal mayor in the said
municipality, in the general elections held-on the aforesaid date of December 14,
1937 is also of legal age and resident of the municipality of Bigaa, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines.
"III. That on December 20, 1937, the municipal council of Bigaa,
Province of Bulacan, acting in its capacity as board of canvassers, declared that
the respondent Alfonso Salvador obtained 964 votes, as against 928 votes
obtained by the petitioner Emilio Galvez; and the respondent Jose Bernardo
obtained 586 votes, as against 561 votes obtained by petitioner Salvador A. Jose.
The other candidate Laureano Kapalad for municipal mayor obtained 556 votes.
Consequently, the said board of canvassers proclaimed the said municipal mayor,
and councilor elect in the aforementioned municipality of Bigaa, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines."
It should be observed that while in the motion it is averred that the protestants
were candidates for the elective o ces mentioned and that the protestant Emilio
Galvez received the number of votes therein indicated, it is not alleged that the
protestants or anyone of them "has duly led his certi cate of candidacy." The rst
paragraph of section 479 of the Election Law provides as follows:
"Contests in all elections for the determination of which provision has not
been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held, upon motion by
any candidate voted for at such election and who has duly led his certi cate of
candidacy. The contest shall be led with the court within two weeks after the
proclamation and shall refer to speci c charges: Provided, however, That
candidates for vice-president and councilor may le a joint motion as parties to a
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 contest."
We have already held that unless it is alleged in the motion of election protest
that the protestant has duly led his certi cate of candidacy and received votes in the
election, the Court of First Instance does not acquire jurisdiction over the protest.
(Tengco vs. Jocson, 43 Phil., 715. See also Viola vs. Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur and Adolfo, 47 Phil., 849; Ferrer vs. Gutierrez David and Lucot, 43 Phil.,
795; Pobre vs. Quevedo, 52 Phil., 359; Acerden vs. Tonolete, 52 Phil., 409; Saldaña vs.
Navarro, 60 Phil., 738; Anis vs. Contreras, 55 Phil., 923.) It is argued that the term
"candidate" when used in a motion of election protest should be given its legal
signi cance and that, upon a liberal interpretation, an allegation that both the
protestants and protestees were candidates voted for in the election implies the ling
of the corresponding certi cates of candidacy as otherwise the inspectors of election
would have considered the votes received by the protestant Emilio Galvez as scattering
votes (sec. 464, Election Law; Anis vs. Contreras, supra), instead of crediting him with
928 votes as against 964 votes received by the protestee, Alfonso Salvador. There
seems to be some weight in this argument and as we are not insensitive to the appeal
of counsel that this court, disregarding technicalities, should give the protestants
opportunity to prove the frauds and irregularities alleged in his motion of protest, we
have endeavored to ascertain the source of the requirement with a view to a
reexamination of our previous ruling on this point.
The history of section 479 of the Election Law may be brie y stated as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of section 7 of the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, the
Philippine Commission, in 1907, enacted Act No. 1582, our rst Election Law. In section
27 (par. 1) of that Act, it was provided that:
"The Assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
quali cations of its members. Contests in all elections for the determination of
which provision has not been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First
Instance having jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held,
upon motion by any candidate voted for at such election, which motion must be
made within two weeks after the election. . . ." (Italics ours.)
In 1912, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2170 amending section 27 of Act
No. 1582. Save for slight changes in phraseology, the above provisions of law were not
altered. In the amendatory Act it was provided that:
". . . Contests in all elections for the determination of which provision has
not been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held, upon motion by
any candidate voted for at such election. The contests shall be led with the court
within two weeks after the election and shall be decided by the same as soon as
possible after the hearing of the contest. . . ." (Italics ours.)
The foregoing provisions were incorporated in section 576 of the Administrative Code
of 1916 (Act No. 2657) and in section 479 of the Administrative Code of 1917 (Act No.
2711). In 1922, section 479 of the Election Law (Administrative Code) was amended by
Act No. 3030 of the Philippine Legislature. It was provided that:
"Contests in all elections for the determination of which provision has not
been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held, upon motion by
any registered candidate voted for at such election. The contests shall be led
with the court within two weeks after the proclamation. . . ." (Underscoring ours.)
Two changes are noticeable: the word "registered" was made to qualify the term
"candidate"; the motion of protest may be led, not "within two weeks after the
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 election", but "within two weeks after the proclamation." The pertinent provisions
of section 479 of the Election Law, as amended by Act No. 3030, were repeated
verbatim in Act No. 3210 approved in 1924. Thereafter, Act No. 3387 was
enacted. This Act, approved in 1927, revised the Election Law. Instead of speaking
of "any registered candidate voted for at such election," the new Act referred to
"any candidate voted for at such election and who has duly led his certi cate of
candidacy." The motion of protest, however, was to be led also "within two
weeks after the proclamation." Section 479 of the revised law provides:
"Contests in all elections for the determination of which provision has not
been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held, upon motion by
any candidate voted for at such election and who has duly led his certi cate of
candidacy. The contests shall be led with the court within two weeks after the
proclamation." (Underscoring ours.)
In 1930, section 479 was again amended by Act No. 3699, but the provisions
hereinabove reproduced were not changed in the least. In 1931, the same section of the
Election Law was further amended by Act No. 3834. The provisions regarding the
persons who may le and the time of ling contests remained unaltered. It was,
however, provided that the motion of protest shall specify charges, and the vice-
president (now vice-mayor) and councilors were allowed to le a joint motion. As thus
amended, the law reads:
"Contests in all elections for the determination of which provision has not
been made otherwise shall be heard by the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held, upon motion by
any candidate voted for at such election and who has duly led his certi cate of
candidacy. The contest shall be led with the court within two weeks after the
proclamation and shall refer to speci c charges: Provided, however, That
candidates for vice-president and councilor may le a joint motion as parties to a
contest." (Underscoring ours.)
This is the law as it now stands, Commonwealth Act No. 233 not having
amended section 479 of the Election Law. It will thus be seen that as originally provided
in section 27 of the rst Election Law (Act No. 1582) all that was required was that the
motion of protest be led "by any candidate voted for" until the enactment of Act No.
3030 in 1922, when the quali cation that the motion be presented "by any registered
candidate voted for" was inserted. This quali cation was added for a purpose, and in
Tengco vs. Jocson (43 Phil., 715, 720), we held:
". . . Considering that in Act No. 3030 the Legislature provided that election
contest 'shall be heard . . . upon motion by any registered candidate voted for,' we
must conclude that the legislature considered the amendment important, and that
it was wise and advisable. We cannot escape the conclusion, when the
Legislature provided that the motion of protest shall be made upon motion by any
'registered candidate voted for', that, that it is what the Legislature intended. The
law is perfectly plain; there is no ambiguity and it needs no interpretation. It
seems to be clear and free from doubt that the Legislature intended that no
election contest, for which provision is not otherwise made, shall be instituted
except by a 'registered candidate voted for,' and by no other person."
It was Act No. 3887, enacted in 1927, that provided for a further modi cation by
requiring the motion of protest to be led by "any candidate voted for . . . and who has
duly filed his certificate of candidacy," instead of by "any registered candidate voted for"
as required in Act No, 3080. This court, in passing upon the requirement under Act No.
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 3387, in Acerden vs. Tonolete (52 Phil., 409, 410, 411), said:
"Section 479 of the Election Law, as formerly amended by Act No. 3030,
provided for election contests to be heard by the Court of First Instance 'upon
motion by any registered candidate voted for at such election.' In a series of
cases, this court, by a close division, held that to confer jurisdiction the motion of
protest must allege that it was presented by a registered candidate voted for
(Tengco vs. Jocson [1922], 43 Phil., 715; Viola vs. Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur and Adolfo [1925], 47 Phil., 849). Undoubtedly inspired to such
action by these decisions, the Philippine Legislature amended section 479 of the
Election Law by enacting Act No. 3387 providing that contests in all elections
shall be heard by the Court of First Instance 'Upon motion by any candidate voted
for at such election and who has duly led his certi cate of candidacy.' Otherwise
stated, the word 'registered' was eliminated and the phrase 'who has duly led his
certi cate of candidacy' was added. However, section 481 of the Election Law, as
last amended, is still found to make use of the word 'registered'.
"A fair inference is that the purpose of the Legislature was to make the law
less rigorous and more practical. While the term 'registered candidate voted for at
such election' is not exactly synonymous with the phrase 'candidate voted for at
such election and who has duly led his certi cate of candidacy,' yet the rst
would appear to be the more emphatic and comprehensive. Involved in the
meaning of 'registered,' as connoted to the law, is the idea of a properly led
certi cate of candidacy. (Tolosa vs. Court of First Instance of Leyte and Torredes
[1928], G. R. No. 30134.1 )"
As already observed, the law on this point, as interpreted by this court, continued
undisturbed from 1927 to the present day, notwithstanding the subsequent
amendments of the Election Law by Acts Nos. 3699 and 3834 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature and, quite recently, by Commonwealth Act No. 233 of the National
Assembly.
We are of the opinion that the Legislature has the undisputed right to provide for
the mode and manner in which an election contest shall be instituted and for this
purpose may impose reasonable conditions and restrictions. What these conditions
and restrictions shall be is plainly a matter of legislative policy and is left to the wisdom
of the coordinate department of the government. The requirement that the motion of
protest shall be led by a candidate who has duly led his certi cate of candidacy was,
as indicated above, inserted for a good purpose. It was not designed to discourage
contests but was intended to preclude the ling of protests by persons who, on the
face of the pleading, are not, in the opinion of the Legislature, entitled to any
recognition. If the contention of the petitioner that the term candidate means the
candidate who has duly led a certi cate of candidacy, there was no need for amending
the original provision of Act No. 1582 which permitted the ling of a contest by any
candidate voted for at an election. The Legislature has seen t to insert the requirement
in the law and he who institutes an election contest must allege the essential
jurisdictional facts, if he wants the competent court to pay him any attention. (Verceles
vs. Araneta Diaz, 47 Phil., 843, 847.)
The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
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 ABAD SANTOS , J., dissenting :

I am unable to concur in the opinion of the court. I believe that the motion of
protest is su cient to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance. We have in this
jurisdiction a system of code pleading. Under the code, pleadings are to be liberally
construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code of Civil
Procedure, section 106.) No particular forms are required, but substantial compliance
with the law is su cient. (Ibid., section 784.) Contrary to the common law rule, every
reasonable intendment and presumption under the rule of liberal construction must be
made in favor of the pleader. (21 R. C. L., 466.) By the elementary rules of pleading,
facts may be pleaded according to their legal effects, without setting forth particulars
that led to them. (Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Min. Co., 109 U. S., 550; 27 Law. ed., 1028.)
Pleadings should state the ultimate facts to be proven, and not matters of evidence.
(Ely vs. New Mexico, etc., R. Co., 129 U. S., 291; 32 Law. ed., 688.)
In the instant case, the motion of protest alleges in substance that the
petitioners were candidates for municipal mayor and municipal councilor in the last
general elections of December 14, 1937; that the respondents were likewise
candidates for municipal mayor and municipal councilor, respectively, in the same
elections; that on December 20, 1937, the municipal council of Bigaa, Province of
Bulacan, acting in its capacity as board of canvassers, declared that the respondent
Alfonso Salvador obtained 964 votes, as against 928 votes obtained by the petitioner
Emilio Galvez; and the respondent Jose Bernardo obtained 586 votes, as against 561
votes obtained by the petitioner Salvador A. Jose; that, consequently, the said board of
canvassers proclaimed the respondent Alfonso Salvador as municipal mayor-elect, and
the respondent Jose Bernardo as councilor-elect; that frauds and irregularities had
been committed in said elections; and that had it not been for the frauds and
irregularities so committed, the petitioners would have obtained more votes than the
respondents. The motion of protest concludes with the prayer that the petitioners be
declared municipal mayor and municipal councilor, respectively, of the municipality of
Bigaa, Province of Bulacan.
While it is true that the motion of protest did not follow the language of the
statute, it averred facts which, in legal intendment, meet the requirement of the law.
Both upon principle and authority, this is all that is required. The su ciency of
pleadings should be determined not by the particular words employed, but by the facts
legally and reasonably deducible therefrom. The object of pleadings is to present
de nitely the issue to be tried and determined between the parties. The allegations
contained in the motion of protest are responsive to that object.
The tendency of all modern pleading is to depart from the original severities and
the technical rules of the common law. The rulings in the cases cited in support of the
conclusion reached in the prevailing opinion are, in my judgment, not in accord with
correct and sound principle, and should be expressly overruled. Those rulings are based
on a system of pleading long discredited — a system that would sacri ce substance to
form, and subordinate facts to words in the administration of justice. I think it is high
time for this court to free itself from the tyranny of forms and of words.

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