G.R. No.

181539               July 24, 2013 The prosecution established that, as shown in the medico-legal report prepared by Police
Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Elizardo Daileg of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, Laboratory who autopsied the victim’s cadaver, the cause of death was "hemorrhagic shock
vs. secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax." In particular, three penetrating stab wounds
EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS, Accused-Appellant. were inflicted on the upper left portion of the victim’s chest, "piercing the upper lobe of the left
lung and perforating the heart." He also suffered stab wounds in the right eye, stomach and
left forearm and incised wounds in the left upper eyelid and left palm.5
DECISION

The victim, Ramon Jaime Birosel, was a 55-year old real estate broker at the time of his
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
death. He was survived by his widow, Maria Filomena Birosel, with whom he had no child.
Filomena spent a total of ₱477,054.30 in funeral expenses in connection with the burial of her
Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision1 dated September 28, 2007 of deceased husband. Filomena stated that the Nokia 3315 and Siemens S-45 cellular phones
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision 2 dated November taken away from Ramon were valued at ₱3,500.00 each, while the necklace snatched from
16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. him was worth ₱20,000.00.6
Q-03-118348 which found him guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness
Accused-appellant was charged under the following Information: account of Mark Almodovar:

That on or about the 10th day of February 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Mark went out of his house to
accused, conspiring and confederating with another person whose true name, identity and play ball in the basketball court. He walked to the basketball court, played there, and at about
other personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping each 9:00 o’clock, he stopped playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one RAMON JAIME basketball court where there were five cars parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man walking
BIROSEL y VILLA in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned towards a car. The fat man was talking on his cellular phone. He then noticed two men
while said victim was inside his car having a conversation over his cellphone, the said following the fat man, who entered a parked car. The two male persons who were then
accused suddenly appeared and with intent to gain and by means of violence approached the following the fat man then separated: one went to the left side of the fat man’s car and stood
said vehicle and ordered said victim to open it and once opened thereafter stabbed the said by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle. While the other positioned himself by the door
victim with a bladed weapon hitting him on the thorax thereby inflicting upon him serious and at the opposite side of the car. Mark made a diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, and both sides, (Exhibit "L") depicting the car and the positions of the two men. The man who
thereupon took, stole and carried away the following, to wit: stood by the door at the driver’s side had a knife while his companion was armed with a gun.
He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing the fat man repeatedly on
a) Two (2) NOKIA cellular phones different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the fat man’s
personal belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men left. He
b) One (1) brown leather wallet followed them to a place which he described as far and there, he saw them buried the knife
and covered it with soil. He made a drawing representing the place where he followed them
c) Undetermined amount of cash money (Exh. "M"). After burying the knife in the ground, the men left and he followed them again to a
place which he described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his
face. He recognized him as the person who went to the left side of the car and stabbed the
d) One (1) necklace
victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin Aleman. After which, the two men
left. He decided not to follow them and went home instead. It was about 11:00 o’clock in the
e) One (1) men’s ring all with undetermined value, belonging to said RAMON JAIME evening when he arrived home. After waking up at 8:00 o’clock the following morning, he
BIROSEL y VILLA, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said RAMON JAIME returned to the scene of the incident. There were many people gathered in the area, including
BIROSEL y VILLA.3 policemen. He saw a chubby girl and requested her to call the policemen. He rode in a car
with the police officers and the chubby girl. They went to a house in a far place, but no one
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned.4 After pre-trial was was there. He recognized and identified the face of the fat man depicted in the picture
conducted, trial ensued. (Exhibit "N") shown to him.
On cross-examination, he stated that he did not receive any death threat. In the year 2003, removed his bonnet." He stated that the light near the flowing water came from a light bulb
his grandfather died in Nueva Ecija and he attended the wake. He stayed there until his and the distance from the witness stand up to second door outside the courtroom represents
father, grandmother and another person, whom he does not know but of the same age as how far he was from the man with the knife when the latter took off his bonnet.7
that of his father, fetched him on September 12, 2003. He was taken to Antipolo where he
stayed at the house of the relatives of the victim until December 10, 2003, the day he initially Mark was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was assisted in his testimony
testified in court. There was no sign language interpreter in the said house. The relatives of by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of
the victim gave him some money which he used to buy for two shirts, two pants and a pair of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since
shoes. 1990. Catinguil had also completed a five-year course at the Philippine Normal University
with a degree in teaching special education children.8
Before going to the basketball court which is a little farther from their house at 7:00 o’clock in
the evening, he already ate his evening meal at 6:00 o’clock. There were six of them, boys Accused-appellant was 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay Botocan, Project 2,
and girls playing basketball. The basketball court was a full court but they were not playing a Quezon City when he testified. He interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He claimed
real game, just running and shooting. At about 8:00 o’clock, they stopped playing, they sat that, at the time the incident happened on February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall
down and had soft drinks. After finishing his soft drink, he urinated in the shrubbery near the which was a 15-minute walk from his residence. A road separates the billiards hall from
five parked cars. Sikatuna Bliss.9

He added that he is familiar with Sikatuna Bliss but he does not know what building in On that particular night, accused-appellant went to the billiards hall at around 7:00 in the
Sikatuna Bliss was fronting the five cars that were parked near the basketball court. It was the evening and played billiards against a certain Ruben. They played until around 10:00 in the
first time that he saw the fat man and the two male persons who wore black bonnets which evening. Just as they were finished playing, accused-appellant’s sister, Hilda Aleman, arrived
covered their whole face. The fat man was already inside his car when he was repeatedly to fetch him for dinner. He went home with her. The following morning, after having breakfast,
stabbed. The fat man was not using his cell phone when the one with the knife knocked twice he watched a basketball game and talked to his friends. At around noon, while on his way
on the window of the car. The window of the car was half-opened when the fat man was back to his house, a neighbor, Vangie Barsaga, called him and informed him that police
immediately stabbed. The man with a gun was on the other side of the car when he fired his officers came to his house looking for him. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of that day, he
gun once. He did not notice any argument between the fat man and his attacker. He kept a went to the nearest police station, Camp Karingal, where he presented himself to Senior
distance of about eight to ten meters between him and the two men as he followed them. Police Officer (SPO) 1, at that time Police Officer 3, Leonardo Pasco of that station’s District
There were no persons around when the two men attacked the fat man. After witnessing the Police Intelligence Unit. He asked SPO1 Pasco if they were looking for a certain Edwin
stabbing, his initial reaction was to follow the culprits. He did not call his playmates because Aleman and, upon receiving a positive answer, he introduced himself. He was informed that
they were still playing. In fleeing, the two male persons did not run. They just walked fast. He he was a suspect in a killing incident. He was told to stay put while they were waiting for the
had been [on] their trail for about nine minutes before they removed their bonnets. He alleged eyewitness to arrive. On February 13, 2003, he was twice made to join a police line-
followed them for about thirty minutes. up together with five others. In both instances, they were ordered to turn around several times
and they complied. Thereafter, he was given a spot report: re: Voluntary Surrender of Alleged
When he gave his statements to the police, he did not tell them that the knife was buried Suspect in a Robbery w/ Homicide Case by a police officer and was informed that he would
under the ground. It was 9:56 o’clock when the men took off their bonnets. The man with the be turned over to the custody of the Criminal Investigation Division of Camp Karingal.10
knife removed the bloodstained white t-shirt that he was wearing and, along with his bonnet,
threw it away in a place he described as flowing or running water. At about 10:00 o’clock, the Accused-appellant’s testimony that he was at the billiards hall on February 10, 2003 playing
two men boarded a motorcycle and left. It was the man with the gun who drove the against Ruben until around 10:00 in the evening was corroborated by Filomena Fungo,
motorcycle. He took the same route when he walked back home. It was about 10:00 o’clock grandmother of Ruben, who saw accused-appellant and Ruben playing when she went to the
when he passed by the car of the fat man again. There were no persons when he went back billiards hall twice that night to fetch Ruben.11 Hilda, accused-appellant’s sister, also
to the basketball court. Thus, he just went home to sleep and the following morning, he gave corroborated accused-appellant’s testimony that she fetched him from the billiards hall at
his statement to the police. around 10:00 in the evening of February 10, 2003. She further stated that, upon getting
home, she and accused-appellant ate dinner together and, thereafter, watched some
On re-direct examination, he was asked and he made a drawing (Exhibit "O") showing the television shows until accused-appellant went to sleep some 30 minutes later.12
basketball court (Exhibit "O-1"), the five parked cars near the place where he urinated (Exhibit
"O-2"), the exact spot where he urinated (Exhibit "O-3") and the car of the fat man (Exhibit "O- Accused-appellant also attempted to show that the eyewitness, Mark, failed to identify him
4"). When asked how he was able to see the face of the accused, he answered that "there during the police line-up. Defense witness SPO1 Leonardo Pasco stated that he was the one
was light in the area which he described as near the flowing water where the accused
who prepared the spot report although it was his superior who signed it. He further stated that First, accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness. Accused-
Mark failed to identify accused-appellant during the police line-up. Another defense witness, appellant argued that, being a deaf-mute who cannot make known his perception to others as
barangay kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos, stated that he was with Mark on February 13, 2003 he has no formal education on sign language, Mark is unqualified to be a witness. In fact, he
when Mark was asked to identify the robber-killer of the victim from a line-up. According to was unable to give a responsive answer to some questions propounded to him through the
Barrientos, a police officer made a gesture to Mark by slashing his throat with the use of his interpreter such as when he could not answer why he preferred to play in a basketball far
hand and, after viewing the persons in the line-up, Mark shook his head. The line-up was from his house than in a nearer one.16
presented to Mark twice and he shook his head in both instances.13
Second, accused-appellant asserted that Mark’s testimony was not corroborated by his
After studying the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court rejected the defenses of alleged playmates or by the "chubby girl" he mentioned in his testimony. Such lack of
accused-appellant for their inherent weakness and implausibility. On the other hand, it viewed corroboration weakened Mark’s testimony.17
the prosecution’s evidence favorably, particularly the eyewitness testimony of Mark and his
positive identification of accused-appellant as the one who stabbed the victim. In particular, Third, accused-appellant contended that Mark admitted receiving money, new clothes and
the trial court found Mark’s testimony simple and credible. He had no ill motive that would shoes from the private complainant before he took the witness stand. This made his
make him testify falsely against accused-appellant. While there were minor inconsistencies in testimony highly suspicious.18
his testimony, the discrepancies were inconsequential and did not affect the truthfulness of
Mark’s narration. Thus, in its Decision dated November 16, 2005, the trial court found Fourth, accused-appellant highlighted Mark’s failure to identify him as the perpetrator of the
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The crime in the two instances that he was presented to Mark in a line-up. This made Mark’s
dispositive portion of the Decision reads: alleged positive identification of accused-appellant doubtful.19

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the In its Decision dated September 28, 2007, the Court of Appeals held that the contentions of
crime of Robbery with Homicide, described and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised accused-appellant lacked merit.20
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Ramon Jaime Birosel as follows: The Court of Appeals declared that the capacity of a deaf-mute to testify has long been
recognized. The witness may communicate his perceptions to the court through an
interpreter. In this case, Mark’s testimony was facilitated by Catinguil, a licensed sign
1. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the language interpreter who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990.
death of the victim; With the help of Catinguil, the trial court determined that Mark is not mentally deficient and
that he was able to tell time, space and distance. He was able to draw and make sketches in
2. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; and open court to show the relative position of things and persons as he perceived like a normal
person. By using signs and signals, he was able to recount clearly what he witnessed in the
3. The amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIFTY-FOUR evening of February 10, 2003. According to the appellate court, the above established Mark’s
PESOS AND THIRTY CENTAVOS (₱477,054.30) as actual damages. competence as a witness.21

He is also ordered to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of THREE THOUSAND The Court of Appeals also found that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱3,500.00) representing the value of the Nokia 3315 cellular the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was
phone, the amount of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱3,500.00) hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax. This physical evidence
representing the value of the S-45 Siemens cellular phone, and the amount of TWENTY is an eloquent manifestation of truth and its evidentiary weight is far more than that of
THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) representing the value of the necklace, which were all corroborative testimonies.22
taken from the victim.
The Court of Appeals rejected as groundless accused-appellant’s imputation to Mark of
With costs against the accused.14 improper motive or bias. It also pointed out the irrelevance of non-identification of an accused
in a police line-up. What is important is the positive identification of the accused as the
Accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He anchored his appeal on the perpetrator of the crime by the witness in open court.23
claim that the trial court erred in convicting him for robbery with homicide. His claim was four-
pronged, all aimed at discrediting the eyewitness, Mark.15
Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the prosecution was able to comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of robbery with homicide. It upheld the qualified interpreter. Thus, in People vs. De Leon and People vs. Sasota, the accused was
conviction of accused-appellant for the said felony. The decretal portion of the Decision dated convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
September 28, 2007 reads:
When a deaf-mute testifies in court, "the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its
Trial Court [(RTC)], National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal discretion, and the method adopted will not be reviewed by the appellate court in the absence
Case No. Q-03-118348 is AFFIRMED.24 of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the particular
method adopted."28
Accused-appellant is now before this Court insisting on the failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the very same grounds he raised in the Court of In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and
Appeals. appreciated the sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on. This
Court sees no reason in ruling otherwise.
This Court is not persuaded.
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant stabbed the victim from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the
several times, causing the latter’s death, for the purpose of depriving the victim of his Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990 and possessed special education and training for
personal properties, which personalties accused-appellant took away with him before leaving interpreting sign language. The trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act
the scene of the crime. The killing of the victim was by reason of the robbery. It therefore as interpreter for Mark. No ground to disturb that finding exists.
constitutes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. This finding of the trial court
as affirmed by the appellate court is conclusive to this Court. Also, a review of the records Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that fateful February 10,
show that both the trial and the appellate courts did not miss, misapply or misinterpret any 2003 – the situation of the victim who had just boarded his car; the respective positions of
relevant fact that would warrant an alteration of their identical conclusions as to the criminal accused-appellant and his still unidentified cohort vis-à-vis the victim; accused-appellant’s
responsibility of accused-appellant.25 knock on the window of the victim’s car and the sudden series of stabs accused-appellant
inflicted upon the victim; the taking of the victim’s various personal properties; accused-
The Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the concerns of accused-appellant. appellant’s walk away from the crime scene; and, the revelation of accused-appellant’s
Accused-appellant has presented no compelling reason that would justify the reversal of his identity when he finally removed the bonnet that covered his face, unaware that someone
conviction. was secretly and silently watching. In this connection, the Court of Appeals correctly
observed that "despite intense and grueling cross-examinations, the eyewitness responded
with consistency upon material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the
WON Mark is a competent witness. YES
shocking events which unfolded before his eyes."29 The imperfections or inconsistencies cited
by accused-appellant were due to the fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The where the witness is a deaf-mute.30 Besides they concerned material details which are neither
rule is that "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception material nor relevant to the case. As such, those discrepancies do not detract from the
to others, may be witnesses."26 A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her credibility of Mark’s testimony, much less justify the total rejection of the same. What is
other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make material is that he positively identified accused-appellant and personally saw what accused-
observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and speak appellant did to the victim on the fateful night when the incident happened. The trial court’s
may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but he/she may still assessment of the credibility of Mark, which was affirmed by the appellate court, deserves the
communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case, highest respect of this Court.
sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty
to make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. As this
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by
Court held in People v. Tuangco27:
the findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of
death was "hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax." 31 The
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, multiple mortal wounds inflicted on the victim constitute physical evidence which further
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent establish the truth of Mark’s testimony. Its evidentiary value far outweighs any corroborative
witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can
testimony which accused-appellant requires of the prosecution. Moreover, the settled rule is true for the payment of the value of the items taken from the victim, namely, two cellphones at
that the positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to secure the ₱3,500.00 each and the necklace at ₱20,000.00.
conviction of an accused.32
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards
The RTC and the Court of Appeals saw no improper motive which would impel Mark to testify for damages (namely, the civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages) interest at the
falsely against accused-appellant. As the determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.40
question of fact, this Court respects the unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts
on the matter. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Accused-appellant’s attempt to render doubtful Mark’s identification of him Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which found accused-
fails.1âwphi1 Indeed, the law requires not simply an eyewitness account of the act of appellant Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
committing the crime but the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in so far as legal interest at the
crime.33 Here, Mark has positively pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages
crime. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Mark’s failure to identify accused-appellant in awarded to the heirs of the victim, which shall commence from the date of finality of this
a police line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police decision until fully paid.
line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open SO ORDERED.
court.34 Nevertheless, the records show that Mark identified accused-appellant as the robber-
killer of the victim in a police line-up on February 18, 200335 and, more importantly, in open G.R. No. 195244               June 22, 2015
court in the course of Mark’s testimony.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
In sum, the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused-appellant for the special vs.
complex crime of robbery with homicide. Accused-appellant’s crime is punishable under ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA, Accused-Appellant.
Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, by
reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the law
prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is not attended by DECISION
any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.36 Considering that no
modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the penalty imposed by the BERSAMIN, J.:
trial and the appellate courts, reclusion perpetua, is proper.
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's
The civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, the current amount of civil competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.
indemnity awarded in cases of murder.37 Robbery with homicide belongs to that class of
felony denominated as "Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons" 38 under Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and the killing or death of a person is committed "by (CA) affirmed with modification the conviction of the appellant for the composite crime of
reason or on occasion of the robbery." The increase in the amount of civil indemnity is called robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in
for as the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, like murder, involves a greater Mandaluyong City through its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006.2
degree of criminal propensity than homicide alone where the civil indemnity awarded is
₱50,000.00. Antecedents

The ₱50,000.00 imposed as moral damages is proper and conforms to recent The information charged the appellant with robbery with homicide, alleging as follows:
jurisprudence.39
That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
The reimbursement of actual damages in the total amount of ₱477,054.30 for various funeral- place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
related expenses is proper as it is fully supported by evidence on record. The same holds gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to
₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice appellant (TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 3 12; October 6, 2004, pp. 5-6; November 17, 2004, pp.
of the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there 3-4).
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon said
JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs
directly caused her death. when they were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry
for help. She saw that there was blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 the hospital, she noticed that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying.
They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and had
The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the Prosecution, to wit: him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but
she did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked
Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his
how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was
younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their
present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumaso k sa
house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with
bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes
a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground
watches the television at the house of the victim (TSN, February 9, 2005, pp. 3-14).
floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant.
Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the
hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident,
the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took he went to the hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later,
money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and
perpetra tor because there was no light (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-23, 28, 30-32). robbed them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station (TSN,
March 16, 2005, pp. 2, 5-6).
Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his
mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl
which illumined the ground floor through the stairway (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 33-34). pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions
when he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his
mother. They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having committed
Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the victim’s death was
the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in arresting appellant
hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was located at the epigastric region,
was the information relayed by Carl (TSN, April 27, 2005, pp. 2, 12-17; June 15, 2005, p. 5).4
measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left of the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior
and upward, piercing the right ventricle of the hear t, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left
lung (TSN, April 21, 2004, pp. 1, 6; Exh. "I," Records, p. 103). In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had frequented the victim’s
billiard hall, which was situated only four houses away from where he lived, and, on the
evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o’ clock p.m. and had
Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he and the victim were
then gone home. He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help
married for nine years before the incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years
around two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he had
old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m.
then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had later on
on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby,
approached him to inquire what he knew about the killing because they told him that Carl, the
while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m.,
young son of the victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary
his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty minutes
suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had
later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw that their
assured the police officers that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his years of
door was open. He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned
living in the neighborhood.
and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood on her back. He
shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital where she
eventually died. He spent ₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00 for the wake and burial. The appellant’s mother corroborated his version.5
On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who stabbed his
wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the Judgment of the RTC
As mentioned, the RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged under its Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution did not prove that violence or
judgment rendered on January 27, 2006,6 disposing: intimidation was employed in the course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held
liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that the culprit had neither broken
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA @ any wall, roof, floor, door or window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house through
"NONOY" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he could be liable only for the separate crimes
under Article 293 and punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the court of theft and homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with homicide.12
hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of JOSEPHINE
CASTRO y BARRERA as follows: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence showed that the
appellant’s principal intent had been to rob the victim’s house, with the homicide being
1) ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity; perpetrated as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl positively identified the appellant
as the person who had stabbed the victim, his identification bearing "all the earmarks of
credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about the identity of the accused."13
2) ₱57,500.00 as actual damages;

Ruling of the Court

3) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

The appeal is bereft of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

The most important task of the St ate in the successful prosecution of the accused is his
Decision of the CA
credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this appeal turns
on whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable homicide was credible and competent YES
doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl,
a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.8
considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony
positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who had entered their
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.
inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the appellant, 9 ruling
thusly:
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and
events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 27, 2006 and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in Crim. Case No. MC03-7597,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the award of ₱57,500.00 as actual
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
damages should be DELETED and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
₱25,000.00 should be AWARDED the heirs of Josephine Castro y Barrera.
others, may be witnesses.
SO ORDERED.10
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwis e provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)
Issues
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following
In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being persons cannot be witnesses:
filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who
were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl’s
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on the victim occurred
such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
because his father said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody shouting "
Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.11
 (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime
the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a) charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an
qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications adult. Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of
as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to communicate
apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual
unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.14 issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or
misappreciation on the part of the trial court.18
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness
with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of the trial bare and
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect especially
every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden when affirmed on appeal by the CA.19This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the
of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt trial court’s direct and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its presence,
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during intensive
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and
on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.15 prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC and the CA sharing the
conviction on Carl’s credibility, his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his
perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according credence
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court. 16 All
to Carl’s testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v.
questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by
Mendiola,20 the Court considered a 6-y ear-old victim competent, and regarded her testimony
virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the
against the accused credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals,21 the testimony of the three-year-
witnesses’ deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
old victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl’s testimony was entitled to full probative
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of
weight.
actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of
fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the
the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room
generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the maintained by the child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that
appellate court has concurred with the trial court.17 the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.

The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that to sustain
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as conclusively as
perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic the other essential element of the crime; and that it was not established that the taking of
qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination personal property was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or
of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the by using force upon things.
Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the
Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to The contention lacks persuasion.
communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must prove the
concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his and (4) the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery.22 A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.23 offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The fact that the but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a deadly weapon, aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
competently proved the presence of violence or intimidation against persons that qualified the rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
offense as robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant was an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being committed only in the course or on the to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
occasion of the perpetration of the robbery. As the records show, Dennis was awakened by Code.27
someone shouting " Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by the victim, whom
the appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that the original In line with current jurisprudence,28 we increase the civil indemnity to
criminal design to rob had been consummated with the taking of the money amounting to
₱13,000.00, the killing of the victim under the circumstances rendered the appellant guilty ₱75,000.00, and the moral damages to ₱75,000.00.
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
In addition to the damages awarded by the CA, the appellant should be liable to pay the heirs
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special complex crime. It is of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for
composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique damages from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid.
offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010 subject to the
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.24 A composite crime is truly distinct and different from a MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to the
complex or compound crime. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed heirs of the late Josephine Castro y Barrera civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral damages of
by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00; temperate damages of ₱25,000.00; and
but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all monetary awards for damages reckoned
to commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid, plus the costs of
is specific, but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the most suit.
serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the
commission of a complex or compound crime may be made the subject of a separate
information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed. The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not appreciated to raise the SO ORDERED.
penalty to be imposed because the information did not specifically allege them. But they
should be appreciated in order to justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the G.R. No. 199740
victim in the amount of ₱30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence.25 Under Article
2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at least one aggravating PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance for this vs.
purpose need not be specifically alleged in the information, and can be either a qualifying or JERRY OBOGNE, Accused-Appellant.
attendant circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:26
RESOLUTION
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.1âwphi1 The commission of an DEL CASTILLO, J.:
offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the
other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
Appellant Jeny Obogne was charged with the crime of rape m an Information that reads as
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
follows:
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, We are not persuaded.
municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:
and feloniously x x x succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA",1a 12-year old mentally
retarded person, to the damage and prejudice ofthe said "AAA".2 Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
When arraigned on December 17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3 On March 13, may be witnesses.
2008, the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, rendered a Judgment,4 viz:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is, hereby, rendered finding Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple rape committed against "AAA" and, hereby, sentences him to Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -
suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify "AAA" the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
to pay the costs. The following persons cannot be witnesses:

SO ORDERED.5 (a)Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
The trial court did not consider "AAA’s" mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance
considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of "AAA’s" mental (b)Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving
disability. the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.6 In its Decision7 of March 28, 2011, In this case, "AAA" is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental
the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with modifications, viz: condition. As correctly observed by the trial court:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment, dated March 13, 2008, of the When "AAA" was presented on November 14, 2006, defense counsel manifested his
Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 34,8 in Criminal Case No. 3303, is objection and called the Court’s attention to Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, which
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused- appellant is further ordered to pay "AAA" the lists down persons who cannot be witnesses; i.e. those whose mental condition, at the time of
additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity apart from the award of P50,000.00 as their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
moral damages and of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. their perception to others x x x.

SO ORDERED.9 During the continuation of AAA’s testimony x x x she was able to recall what [appellant] did to
her x x x.
Hence, this appeal.
"AAA" recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him
10 because he would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought "AAA" to his house and while
In a Resolution  dated February 15, 2012, we required both parties to file their Supplemental inside, ‘he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the
Briefs. However, they opted to adopt the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals as their knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.’
Supplemental Briefs.11
xxxx
Appellant argues that the testimony of "AAA" deserves no credence because she was
incapable of intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her mental
disability. NO This Court finds "AAA" a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to
defense counsel’s objection that "AAA" was not capable of intelligently making known her
perception to others, "AAA" managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the
hands of the accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner x x x.
"AAA’s" simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity and truthfulness. For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
While it is true that, on cross-examination, "AAA" faltered in the sequence of events x x x this committed with the qualifying circumstance of ‘(10) when the offender knew of the mental
is understandable because even one with normal mental condition would not be able to disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
recall, with a hundred percent accuracy, events that transpired in the past. But "AAA" was commission of the crime.’ Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent
certain that ‘it was a long time x x x after the incident’ when it was reported to the police. said circumstance, which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the
Likewise, she was very certain that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x x.12 conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266-B (10), RPC, could not be sustained,
although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.16
WON AAA is a competent witness. YES

xxxx
In the same vein, the appellate court found "AAA" qualified to take the witness stand, viz:

[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically merit the
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that "AAA" was shown to be able to perceive, to
imposition of the death penalty. Under Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code,
make known her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents. Her narration of
knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap
the incident of rape given in the following manner is worthy of note:
at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the
imposition of the death penalty. As such this circumstance must be formally alleged in the
xxxx information and duly proved by the prosecution.

Private complainant "AAA" provided a clear, convincing and competent testimonial evidence Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating
to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. As circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But in the absence of a
found by the trial court, the testimony of "AAA" was replete with consistent details, negating specific or particular allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her mental
the probability of fabrication. disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact,
Article 266-B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied x x x
We stress that, contrary to accused-appellant’s assertions, mental retardation per se does not
affect a witness’ credibility.1âwphi1 A mental retardate may be a credible witness.13 Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under Article 266-A of
the [Revised] Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.17
Appellant’s assertion that the trial court and the appellate court should have considered his
alibi must likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that appellant was at However, it must be mentioned that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section
another place at the time of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for 318 of Republic Act No. 9346.19
him to be present at the crime scene. In this case, appellant attempted to show that he was
at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape incident. However, as found by the trial court,
The awards of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity are likewise
the distance between barangay Ananong and barangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and
proper. However, the award of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00 in line
could be traversed in one hour or even less.14
with prevailing jurisprudence.20 Also, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed
from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape
and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B,
WHEREFORE, the March 28, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that "AAA’s" mental disability
03270 finding appellant Jeny Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple
could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay "AAA" civil
that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As
indemnity of PS0,000.00 and moral damages ofPS0,000.00 is AFFIRMED with
held in People v. Limio:15
MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole; the amount of exemplary damages
is increased to P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for annum from date of finality ofthis judgment until fully paid.
the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental
disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 140634. September 12, 2002 Rogelio Fullente, neighbor of the victim. For its part, the defense presented the appellant as
its lone witness.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERTO PANSENSOY, Accused-
Appellant. Version of the Prosecution

DECISION Analie Pansensoy (Analie for brevity), twenty-eight years old, is the legitimate wife of
appellant. She testified that she had been living-in with the victim, Hilario Reyes (Hilario for
CARPIO, J.: brevity), since February 1994. On May 8, 1994, she and Hilario were in the house they were
renting at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal. Hilario was lying down inside the house. She stood
up when she heard a knocking on the door. As she opened the door, she saw appellant
The Case
holding a gun. She embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun away from him but she
failed. Hilario went out of the house and sat on a bench. Appellant approached Hilario and
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated September 13, 1999 in Criminal Case asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario answered in the affirmative. Appellant next asked
No. 94-11527 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, convicting appellant Hilario if he was still single. Hilario answered yes. Appellant counted one to three and at the
Roberto Pansensoy (appellant for brevity) of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer count of three shot Hilario. Hilario was hit on the forehead and sprawled on the
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court also ordered appellant  to pay the heirs of the ground.4cräläwvirtualibräry
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P40,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as
moral damages.
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, physician, conducted the autopsy on the victim at the St. James
Funeral Parlor at past midnight on May 9, 1994. He found a single gunshot wound on the
The Charge forehead which was the cause of death. He opined that the entry shows the area of smudging
which indicates that Hilario was shot at close range. The distance of the muzzle of the gun
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando L. Gonzales filed an Information2 charging appellant with from the forehead could be less than three inches. He also opined that the person who fired
the crime of murder, committed as follows: the shot and Hilario were facing each other.5cräläwvirtualibräry

That on or about the 8th day of May, 1994, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote, member of the Philippine National Police, conducted the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, investigation on the shooting of Hilario. He took the statements of Gregoria Reyes and Analie
armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident in the police station a day after the incident. He did not conduct an ocular inspection at the
premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and scene of the crime.6cräläwvirtualibräry
shoot one Hilario Reyes y Inovero, hitting him on his forehead, thereby inflicting upon him a
mortal gunshot wound, which directly caused his death. Gregoria Reyes (Gregoria for brevity), mother of Hilario, testified that she came to know
about the death of her son through a neighbor, Roger. She found out that her son was dead
CONTRARY TO LAW. upon arrival at the hospital and was taken to the funeral parlor. She saw the gunshot wound
on the forehead of her son. On the same night of May 8, 1994, she went to the police station
Arraignment and Plea where she saw Analie give her statement to the police. She also gave her statement to the
police. As a result of the death of her son, she incurred expenses in the amounts of
When arraigned on February 20, 1995, the appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea P10,000.00 and P30,000.00 for the funeral and the burial, respectively. At the time of his
of not guilty.3 Thereafter, trial on the merits followed. death, her son was managing two passenger jeepneys, one of which he was also driving. He
was earning P800.00 a day.7cräläwvirtualibräry
The Trial
Rogelio Fullente (Rogelio for brevity), fifty-six years old, is a co-driver of Hilario in the
Antipolo-Marikina route. He was the neighbor referred to by Gregoria in her testimony as
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Analie Pansensoy, eyewitness to the
Roger, who reported to her the shooting incident. He has known Hilario for ten to fifteen
actual shooting of the victim; (2) Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the medico-legal officer who
years. In the evening of May 8, 1994, he was in his home in Lumang Bayan which was about
conducted the autopsy on the victim; (3) SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote, the police officer who
ten meters away from where Hilario was staying. According to him, their houses were
conducted the investigation of the incident; (4) Gregoria Reyes, mother of the victim; and (5)
separated by a driveway which could accommodate one jeep. He heard several knocks and
opened the door of his house. When he opened the door he found out that somebody was He confronted his wife and pulled her hair and slapped her. His wife was just seated in the
knocking on the door of Hilario and ordering him to come out. The first time he saw the man corner of the room. He asked her where their child was. But before she could answer, their
knocking on Hilarios door, the man was not carrying anything. When he heard a gunshot, he child went inside the room and embraced her mother very tightly. He tried to pull their
opened the door again and saw the man carrying something before he left. Rogelio further daughter away from Analie but the latter did not let go of the child. He told Analie that he
narrated that when the man asked Hilario to come out, Hilario was standing by the door. The would kill her too if she did not release the child. He started to count one, two, which made
man asked Hilario if he loved his wife and Hilario answered yes. The man then fired a shot his wife release their daughter. He left the room with the child and proceeded to their house.
and Hilarios head bent forward before he fell down. He does not know the caliber of the gun Tisoy was still sprawled on the ground face down when he left.9
but just heard the gunshot. He went to the parents of Hilario to report the incident. On cross-
examination, Rogelio testified that when appellant knocked on the door, it was Hilario who The Trial Courts Ruling
opened the door. Hilario sat on the bench by the door. When Hilario answered yes to
appellants question of whether he loved his wife, appellant immediately fired a shot. Rogelio The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie and rejected the
testified that he watched appellant fire the shot and then left to report the incident to the version of the appellant that he acted in self-defense. It found the testimony of Analie credible
parents of Hilario.8 and observed that she remained unperturbed during the cross-examination. The trial court
also noted that appellant, who was then a security guard, was charged by his employer with
Version of the Defense the crime of qualified theft for the loss of a .38 caliber revolver. Appellant allegedly committed
the theft on May 8, 1994, the very same day the shooting incident happened. The gun used in
As expected, the defense had a different version as told by the appellant himself. shooting the victim was not found at the scene of the crime but the slug recovered was that of
a .38 caliber revolver. Although appellant was subsequently acquitted of the charge, the trial
Appellant, twenty-eight years old and a security guard, invoked self-defense in his testimony. court considered this as evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime. The trial court
He testified that Analie is his wife and they have three children. According to him, their further noted that appellant went into hiding from the time the shooting incident happened
relationship as husband and wife was normal. until the case was filed in court on August 24, 1994.

On May 8, 1994, at about 6:30 p.m., a certain Amadong Bisaya (Bisaya for brevity) told him The trial court pronounced judgment thus:
that he saw his wife with their youngest child and Tisoy, referring to Hilario, board a jeep on
their way to Lumang Bayan. He had met Bisaya before when the latter told him some time in WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
April 1994 that he always saw appellants wife with another man. He asked Bisaya to doubt with the crime of murder and is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
accompany him to Lumang Bayan where Bisaya pointed to the room where his wife and The accused is hereby further ordered to pay the heirs of Hilario Reyes y Inovero the amount
Tisoy entered. of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P40,000.00 and P20,000.00 as actual or
compensatory and moral damages, respectively.
The appellant kicked the door of the room and there he found his wife and Tisoy lying beside
each other. They were only clad in their underwear. He dragged his wife out of the room by Costs against the accused.
her hair and while doing so, he saw Tisoy pull a gun from the table which was covered with
clothes. He let go of his wife and jumped on Tisoy to grab the gun. SO ORDERED.10cräläwvirtualibräry

While they struggled for possession of the gun he hit the testicles of Tisoy with his knees. Hence, the instant appeal.
Tisoy fell on his knees but was still holding the gun. Still grappling for possession of the gun,
appellant held on to the back portion of the gun and part of the trigger, while his other hand The Issues
held Hilarios hand which was holding the butt of the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant
was able to twist Hilarios hand and to point the barrel of the gun towards the latter.
Appellant is before this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
The gun suddenly went off. At that moment, Tisoy was holding the trigger of the gun. Tisoy
was shot on the head and fell down. It was Tisoy who was holding the trigger when the gun I
fired and hit him on the head. Tisoy was still holding the gun when he fell to the floor.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II the prosecutions eyewitness, Analie. According to him, Analies testimony is flawed as she
insisted that she and appellant had been separated for more than three years but this is
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME belied by the fact that their youngest daughter is barely a year old. He also points out that
OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE ANY OF THE appellants version that he dragged his wife outside by pulling her hair was more believable
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES. and in accord with human behavior rather than Analies version that appellant took time to
interrogate the victim regarding how much the latter loved his wife and other personal
circumstances before shooting him.
The Courts Ruling

We find no reason to reverse or alter the evaluation of the trial court. We reiterate the time
The appeal is partly meritorious.
tested doctrine that a trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
weight even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
First Issue: Self-Defense or circumstance of weight and influence.14 The alleged flaws in the testimony of Analie do not
serve to impair her credibility or diminish the truthfulness of her remarks as to who initiated
Appellant insists that he acted in self-defense. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance may the aggression and fired the shot.
exempt an accused from criminal liability when the following requisites are met, namely: (1)
there has been an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the means employed to The allegedly incredible statements do not pertain to the act of killing, but rather to minor or
prevent or repel such aggression are reasonably necessary; and (3) the person defending incidental matters which happened before and after the fact of killing. Analies testimony that
himself has not provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.11 The burden of she had been separated from appellant for three years which, as pointed out by appellant,
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified is on the accused. 12 In was belied by the age of their youngest daughter, does not necessarily impair her credibility.
doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of Analies 3-year separation from appellant does not preclude Analies still having a child with
the prosecution.13cräläwvirtualibräry appellant. As to Analies version that appellant interrogated Hilario before shooting him,
suffice it to say that it is a matter of common observation that the reaction of a person when
Appellant asserts that the unlawful aggressor was the victim and his death could be attributed confronted with a shocking or unusual incident varies.15 As admitted by appellant himself, it
to himself alone. By his own testimony, appellant tried to prove unlawful aggression on the was the first time he saw his wife and Hilario together, veritably confirming what Bisaya had
part of Hilario. According to him, he kicked the door, and when it opened he saw his wife and told him some time in April 1994 that Bisaya always saw his wife with  someone else. It was
Hilario inside the room clad in their underwear. He pulled the hair of his wife and dragged her not at all strange for appellant to have asked Hilario if he really loved his wife. Were we to
outside while she was embracing him. At this point, Hilario pulled a gun from the table. He let agree with the appellant and treat each strange or unusual event in the occurrence of a
go of his wife, jumped on Hilario and grappled for possession of the gun. While trying to wrest crime, such as appellants interrogation of the victim, as basis for reasonable doubt, no
the gun from Hilario, he hit Hilarios testicles with his knees. Hilario fell on the floor but was criminal prosecution would prevail.16cräläwvirtualibräry
still holding the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant was able to hold and twist Hilarios
hand, pointing the gun towards the latter. The gun suddenly went off and Hilario was hit on In any event, a thorough evaluation of the transcript of stenographic notes indicates that
the head. Analie, as observed by the trial court, testified in a candid and straightforward manner as
follows:
On the other hand, Analie testified that when she opened the door to their room, she saw
appellant holding a gun. She embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun from him but Q: Why do you know said Hilario Reyes?
failed. Hilario went out and sat on a bench. Appellant approached him and asked him
questions. Appellant counted and, at the count of three, shot Hilario in the head.
A: He is my live-in partner.
The conflicting versions of the prosecution and of the defense as to who initiated the
Q: When did you start to be the live-in partner of Hilario Reyes?
aggression was settled by the trial court which gave full faith and credence to the testimony of
Analie over that of appellant. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, was convinced of the truthfulness of Analies A: February 1994.
testimony and not that of appellants.
Q: Up to what time did you become to be the live-in partner of Hilario Reyes?
Undeterred, appellants first assignment of error is focused on the sufficiency of the evidence
for the prosecution, questioning in particular the trial courts assessment of the credibility of A: Three months.
Q: What was the reason why your live-in relationship lasted only three months? A: Inside the house, sir.

A: Because Roberto killed Hilario Reyes. Q: How long was he lying down?

Q: When was this Hilario Reyes killed? A: Around fifteen minutes.

A: May 8, 1994. Q: After lying down for fifteen minutes, what did you do next?

Q: Where was he killed? A: I stood up because Roberto knocked on the door.

A: At Lumang Bayan. Q: What happened next after this Roberto knocked on the door?

Q: In what municipality? A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto holding a gun.

A: Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal. Q: After you opened the door and you saw Roberto holding a gun, what happened next?

Q: How did you know that he was killed? A: I embraced Roberto and tried to wrestle the gun away from him but I did not succeed.

A: He was shot by Roberto Pansensoy. Q: When you were not able to succeed in taking the gun away from him, what happened
next?
Q: How did you know that he was shot by Roberto Pansensoy?
A: Hilario went out, sat on the bench and Roberto approached him.
A: Because Roberto went there and he was holding a gun.
Q: And after Hilario went out and sat on the bench and Roberto approached him, what
Q: On May 8, 1994 that you said Hilario Reyes was shot by Roberto Pansensoy, where were happened next?
you?
A: Roberto asked Hilario; do you really love my wife? And Hilario said, Yes.
A: Inside the house, sir.
Q: Who was this wife Roberto was referring to when he asked Hilario?
Q: Whose is that house you are referring to?
A: Thats me.
A: We are renting that house.
Q: After Hilario answered that he really loved his wife which is you that is being referred to,
Q: With whom? what happened next?

A: Hilario Reyes. A: Roberto asked Hilario; are you still single, are you not married?

Q: Before this Hilario Reyes was shot, what was he doing? Q: What was the response of Hilario if there was any?

A: He was already lying down. A: He answered yes.

Q: Lying down where? Q: What happened next?

A: Roberto counted one to three and at the count of 3 he shot Hilario. A: The victim.

Q: Was Hilario hit by the shot that was made by Roberto? Q: What is your relation with the victim?

A: Hilario was hit on the forehead and he sprawled on the ground.17cräläwvirtualibräry A: Live-in partner.

Analie remained straightforward and consistent all throughout her cross-examination: Q: How long have you been living in together, Madam Witness?

Q: Madam witness, you stated that you are the wife of the accused Roberto Pansensoy, is A: Three months.
that correct?
Q: On that date May 8, 1994 you stated a while ago that you were resting together with
A: Yes, sir. Hilario Reyes, is that correct?

Q: Are you legally married to accused Roberto Pansensoy? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Inside the room of the house being rented by Hilario Reyes?

Q: And if you remember, when were you married? A: Yes, sir.

A: 1990. Q: What was Hilario Reyes doing then?

Q: Where were you married? A: He was laying (sic).

A: At Negros Occidental. Q: Lying where?

Q: You stated that on May 8, 1994, you were at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal, am I correct? A: Inside.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Thereafter, what happened next while Hilario Reyes was resting?

Q: In what particular place at Lumang Bayan is that? A: I heard Roberto knock on the door.

A: Inside the village. Q: After which, what happened next, Madam Witness?

Q: What were you doing then inside the village? A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto.

A: We are renting a house there. Q: What did you do upon seeing Roberto on the door?

Q: Who is your companion while renting that house? A: He was holding a gun and I embraced him, because I wanted to take the gun away from
him.
A: Hilario Reyes.
Q: Is it not because you feel that Roberto Pansensoy might inflict harm on your living in
Q: And who is this Hilario Reyes? partner, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir, I wanted to avoid trouble.18cräläwvirtualibräry Second Issue: Passion and Obfuscation

From Analies testimony, it is all too apparent that the first requisite of self-defense is absent. Appellant argues for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of passion and
The unlawful aggression did not come from the victim but from appellant himself. The obfuscation in his favor. According to appellant, when he confirmed with his own two eyes
aggression not having come from the victim, appellants claim of self-defense cannot prosper. that his wife was cheating on him, he lost his self-control and that his actuation arose from a
The trial court relied on Analies testimony to convict appellant and we find that her testimony natural instinct that impels a husband to protect his wounded feelings. There is basis for this
is sufficient to support appellants conviction. claim.

As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analies testimony would have been disregarded had In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following
appellant timely objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule. elements should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce
Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without such condition of mind; (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants might recover his normal equanimity.25cräläwvirtualibräry
or ascendants.19 However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a
criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses Appellant was on his way home from his duty as a security guard when he met Bisaya who
generally.20 The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is told him that he saw his wife and youngest child board a jeepney with the victim, Hilario.
first offered as a witness.21 In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellants failure to Appellant and Bisaya followed them. Appellant claims that he saw his wife and the victim
make a timely objection to the admission of Analies testimony. lying beside each other, clad only in their underwear. Analie claims that they were just resting
inside the house at the time appellant arrived. Under any of these two circumstances, it is
We note that Rogelio was presented to corroborate Analies testimony, but he gave a rather easy to see how appellant acted with obfuscation because of jealousy upon discovering his
confusing account of what he allegedly saw or heard on the night of the shooting. During his legitimate wife in the company of another man and the brazen admission by this man that he
direct examination, he claimed that he heard a gunshot, but on cross-examination he claimed loved his wife. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Analie brought their child along
that he opened the door of his house and actually saw appellant shoot Hilario. In any event, it to her trysting place with Hilario. Extreme emotional pain could result from such a situation
is well-settled that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to and produce such passion and anguish in the mind of a betrayed husband as to deprive him
convict an accused.22 On the other hand, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably of self-control. To be blinded by passion and obfuscation is to lose self-control.26 In this case,
appreciated, if it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also there is a clear showing that there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful
extremely doubtful by itself23 as in the instant case. passion as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control.27cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, appellants behavior after the incident runs contrary to his proclaimed innocence. Furthermore, the act producing the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
Appellants act of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the appellant might have regained
police authorities are circumstances highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self- his equanimity. It appears that only a few minutes elapsed between the time appellant
defense.24cräläwvirtualibräry discovered the two in the room and the killing. Thus, appellant can be given the benefit of this
mitigating circumstance.
Lastly, we find it unnecessary to consider as corroborative evidence the charge of qualified
theft for the loss of a .38 caliber revolver filed against appellant by his employer security Third Issue: Qualifying Circumstances
agency. The trial court discussed at length that the offense was committed on the same day
the shooting incident happened and that the slug recovered from the scene of the crime was The Information alleges two qualifying circumstances: treachery and evident premeditation. If
from a .38 caliber revolver. According to the trial court, while the gun was not recovered from appreciated, any one of these will qualify the killing to murder. However, the trial court
the scene of the crime, it was safe to assume that the accused had a gun when he went to convicted appellant of murder without stating the circumstance which qualified the killing to
the place of the victim. While SPO1 Anclote testified regarding the nature of the slug, he murder.
admitted that he never inspected the scene of the crime and that the slug was merely handed
to him by SPO2 Catanyag who was not presented in court to testify. Hence, reliance on this In view of our earlier pronouncement crediting in favor of appellant the mitigating
as evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime rests on shaky ground and is circumstance of passion and obfuscation, we have to rule out treachery and evident
superfluous in light of Analies credible eyewitness account. premeditation as qualifying circumstances. Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and
obfuscation.28 The reason for this is that in passion, the offender loses his control while in
treachery the means employed are consciously adopted. One who loses reason and self- period. Appellant is entitled to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as well, which
control cannot deliberately employ a particular means, method or form of attack in the allows the imposition of an indeterminate sentence, with the minimum period within the range
execution of the crime.29cräläwvirtualibräry of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law and the maximum period within the range
of the latter after appreciating any modifying circumstances. Appellant can thus be sentenced
Similarly, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot co-exist with the to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.30 The essence of premeditation is that the fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by calm thought and reflection upon the maximum.35cräläwvirtualibräry
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a
composed judgment.31cräläwvirtualibräry As for damages, the trial court ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the victim the following
amounts: P50,000.00 as indemnity; P40,000.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) submits that evident damages; and to pay the costs.
premeditation is present to qualify the killing to murder. According to the OSG, premeditation
is apparent from the fact that appellant went to the scene of the crime already carrying the Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of
gun which he used to shoot the victim. The OSG argues that while appellant may have been Hilario. The amount is awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the
a security guard, he had no legal justification for bringing the gun to the victims residence. His crime36 and the consequent death of the victim.
act of bringing the gun to the crime scene is a clear indication of his preconceived plan to kill
his wifes lover. The elements of evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance are: (1) An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the
that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the subject of an assignment of error or not.37 Therefore, we delete the award of P40,000.00 as
determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to actual damages. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.32cräläwvirtualibräry amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable.38 Since the prosecution did not present receipts to prove the
Verily, a finding that there was a preconceived plan to kill would negate passion and actual losses suffered, such actual damages cannot be awarded. We raise the award of
obfuscation. moral damages from P20,000.000 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence39 for the
pain wrought by Hilarios death as testified to by Gregoria, mother of the
However, nothing in the records shows how and when appellant hatched his plan to kill, or victim.40cräläwvirtualibräry
how much time had elapsed before appellant carried out his plan. On the contrary, appellant
was on his way home from his duty as a security guard when he chanced upon Bisaya who The trial court overlooked the award for loss of earning capacity despite the testimony of
told him that he saw his wife and child with Hilario. The mere fact that he brought his gun Gregoria on her sons daily income. The absence of documentary evidence to substantiate
along or happened to have it in his person does not, by itself, necessarily indicate a the claim for the loss will not preclude recovery of such loss.41 Gregoria testified that her son
preconceived plan to kill. The carrying of arms, if customary, does not indicate the existence had been earning P800.00 daily as manager and driver of two passenger jeepneys. 42 This
of the second requisite. In People vs. Diokno,33 the Court held that the accused being from amounts to P19,200.00 monthly excluding Sundays. The defense did not object to Gregorias
the province of Laguna and it being customary on the part of the people of Laguna to carry testimony on her sons earning capacity. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed
knives, it cannot be inferred with certainty that the intention of the accused who carried knives admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.43 It was also
was to look for the deceased in order to kill him. In like manner, it cannot be inferred with established that at the time of his death, Hilario was thirty-six (36) years old.44 Loss of earning
certainty that appellant already had the intention to kill Hilario when appellant carried his gun capacity is computed based on the following formula:45cräläwvirtualibräry
on his way home after his duty as a security guard.
Net = life expectancy x Gross Annual - living expenses
Fourth Issue: Damages and Penalty
Earning Income (GAI) (50% of GAI)
In view of the foregoing, the crime proven in this case is not murder, but only homicide 34 with
the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The penalty for homicide under Capacity [2/3(80-age
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. With the mitigating circumstance
of passion and obfuscation, the penalty which may be imposed pursuant to the second at death)]
paragraph of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its minimum
x = 2(80-36) x GAI - [50%of GAI] undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction."1 Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas (Pedro) that he
3 entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with the petitioners cannot be used as evidence
against the herein respondent as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the
same.
x = 2(44) x P 230,400 - P 115,200

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 seeks to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007
3
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90403; 4 as well as its December
13, 2007 Resolution5denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
x = 88 x P 115,200
Factual Antecedents
3
Flora Makapugay (Makapugay) is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Barangay Lugam,
x = 29.33 x P 115,200 Malolos, Bulacan (the land) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) RT-65932 (T-
25198)6 and being tilled by Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as agricultural lessee under a
Net earning capacity = P 3,379,200.00 leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was succeeded by her nephews and
niece, namely Amanda dela Paz-Perlas (Amanda), Justo dela Paz (Justo) and Augusto dela
WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City in Paz (Augusto). On the other hand, Eugenio’s children – Modesta Garcia (Garcia), Cristina
Criminal Case No. 94-11527 is MODIFIED. Appellant ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found Salamat (Salamat) and Pedro – succeeded him.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After
Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of passion and Eugenio died, or in 1974, Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled "Kasunduan
obfuscation, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from sa Buwisan",7 followed by an April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract, 8 covering the
Eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) land. In said agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone agricultural lessee
months of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The award of actual damages of and cultivator of the land.
P40,000.00 is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and loss of earning capacity in the amount of Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de
P3,379,200.00. Caparas (Dominga), took over as agricultural lessee.

SO ORDERED. On July 10, 1996, the landowners Amanda, Justo and Augusto, on the one hand, and Pedro’s
sisters Garcia and Salamat on the other, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
G.R. No. 180843               April 17, 2013 Lupa"9 whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as Pedro’s co-lessees.

APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and On October 24, 1996, herein petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint10 for
CRISTINA SALAMAT, Petitioners, nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro’s
vs. heirs, represented by his surviving spouse and herein respondent Dominga. Before the office
DOMINGA ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS, Respondent. of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan, the case was docketed
as Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Case No. R-03-02-3520-96.
DECISION
In their Complaint, Garcia and Salamat claimed that when their father Eugenio died, they
DEL CASTILLO, J.: entered into an agreement with their brother Pedro that they would alternately farm the land
on a "per-season basis"; that the landowner Makapugay knew of this agreement; that when
Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, "if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from Makapugay passed away, Pedro reneged on their agreement and cultivated the land all by
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the himself, deliberately excluding them and misrepresenting to Amanda that he is Eugenio’s sole
heir; that as a result, Amanda was deceived into installing him as sole agricultural lessee in
their 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract; that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s 4. ORDERING the MARO of Malolos, Bulacan to execute a new leasehold contract
misrepresentations, she executed on July 10, 1996 an Affidavit11 stating among others that between the landowner and defendant Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas;
Pedro assured her that he would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights";
that in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed in their favor the 1996 5. No pronouncement as to costs.
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them as Pedro’s co-lessees; that when Pedro
passed away, Dominga took over the land and, despite demands, continued to deprive them SO ORDERED.17
of their rights as co-lessees; that efforts to settle their controversy proved futile, prompting the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee to issue the proper certification authorizing the filing of
a case; and that they suffered damages as a consequence. Petitioners prayed that the 1979 The PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing the July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan
Agricultural Leasehold Contract between Pedro and Amanda be nullified; that they be sa Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro’s landholding and rights without
recognized as co-lessees and allowed to cultivate the land on an alternate basis as originally cause; that Amanda’s 1996 disclaimer, after having installed Pedro as tenant in 1979, was
agreed; and that they be awarded ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. belated and unjustified; that petitioners have not shown by evidence that they actually
cultivated the land, or that they paid rentals to the landowners; that petitioners’ cause of
action has prescribed in accordance with Section 38 of RA 3844; that for failure to timely
In her Answer,12 herein respondent Dominga claimed that when her father-in-law Eugenio question Pedro’s leasehold, his rights were transferred, by operation of law, to Dominga upon
died, only her husband Pedro succeeded and cultivated the land, and that petitioners never his death. Finally, the PARAD held that petitioners’ July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
assisted him in farming the land; that Pedro is the sole agricultural lessee of the land; that Lupa" is null and void for being issued against Pedro’s existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold
Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even date Contract, which has not been cancelled by competent authority.
between her and the petitioners are self-serving and violate the existing 1979 Agricultural
Leasehold Contract; that under Section 3813 of Republic Act No. 384414 (RA 3844),
petitioners’ cause of action has prescribed. Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in DARAB Case No. 03-03-10307-99
possession of the land even while Eugenio lived; that petitioners have never cultivated nor
possessed the land even for a single cropping; that Pedro has been the one paying the lease It appears that sometime after the execution of the July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
rentals as evidenced by receipts; that when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his rights Lupa" and during the pendency of DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, petitioners entered
as lessee by operation of law, and that she had been remitting lease rentals to the the land and began tilling the same. For this reason, Dominga filed DARAB Case No. 03-03-
landowners since 1985; and that petitioners had no right to institute themselves as her co- 10307-99, for maintenance of peaceful possession with injunctive relief, against the
lessees. She prayed that the Complaint be dismissed; that the July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa landowners and petitioners. On petitioners’ motion, the case was dismissed.18
Buwisan ng Lupa" be nullified; that the execution of a new leasehold agreement between her
and the landowners be ordered; and by way of counterclaim, that moral damages15 and Ruling of the DARAB
litigation costs be awarded her.
Petitioners appealed the May 4, 1998 PARAD Decision in DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-
Ruling of the PARAD 96 to the DARAB, where the case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 972219 (DCN 9722).
Dominga likewise appealed the dismissal of DARAB Case No. 03-03-10307-99, which appeal
After hearing and consideration of the parties’ respective position papers and other was docketed as DARAB Case No. 11155 (DCN 11155). On motion, both appeals were
submissions, the PARAD issued on May 4, 1998 a Decision,16 which decreed as follows: consolidated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant On June 15, 2005, the DARAB issued its Decision, 20 the dispositive portion of which reads, as
and against the plaintiffs and Order is hereby issued: follows:

1. ORDERING the dismissal of the case; WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is hereby rendered:

2. DECLARING defendant Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas as lawful successor- 1. DECLARING Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas as the lawful successor-tenant of
tenant; Pedro Caparas over the subject landholding;

3. ORDERING plaintiffs to maintain defendant in her peaceful possession and

cultivation of the subject landholding;
 2. ORDERING the plaintiffs in DCN 9722 and the respondents in DCN 11155 or any allowed. The CA added that it could not decide the case on the basis of a question which was
person acting in their behalves [sic], to maintain Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas in not placed in issue during the proceedings below.
peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding;
The CA held further that even granting that the issues are resolved on the merits, the petition
3. ORDERING the MARO of Malolos, Bulacan, to execute a new leasehold contract would fail; the cancellation of the survey returns and plans covering TCT RT-65932 reverts
between the landowner and Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas; and the property to its original classification as agricultural land which thus vindicates the
leasehold agreements of the parties. And speaking of leasehold agreements, the CA held
4. ORDERING for the dismissal of DCN 11155 for being moot and academic. that petitioners may not be considered as Pedro’s co-lessees, for lack of proof that they
actually tilled the land and with petitioners’ own admission in their pleadings that they merely
received a share from Pedro’s harvests; that the original 1974 and 1979 leasehold
SO ORDERED.21
agreements between Makapugay, Amanda and Pedro categorically show that Pedro is the
sole designated agricultural lessee; and that without proper legal termination of Pedro’s lease
In upholding the PARAD Decision, the DARAB held that contrary to petitioners’ claim, there in accordance with RA 3844, the landowners cannot designate other tenants to the same
was no alternate farming agreement between the parties, and thus petitioners may not claim land in violation of the existing lessee’s rights.
that they were co-lessees; that Pedro merely shared his harvest with petitioners as an act of
generosity, and Dominga’s act of stopping this practice after succeeding Pedro prompted
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that the land has been re- classified as
petitioners to file DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96 and claim the status of co-lessees; that
residential land, and has been actually used as such. Petitioners cited a 1997 ordinance,
Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between the landowners
Malolos Municipal Resolution No. 41-97,23 which adopted and approved the zoning ordinance
and petitioners cannot defeat Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract and his rights as
and the Malolos Development Plan prepared jointly by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
the sole tenant over the land; that for sleeping on their rights, petitioners are now barred by
Board and the Malolos Sangguniang Bayan. In the assailed December 13, 2007
laches from claiming that they are co-lessees; and that petitioners’ 1996 "Kasunduan sa
Resolution,24 the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Buwisan ng Lupa" is null and void for being contrary to law, morals, public policy, and Pedro’s
1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract, which was subsisting and which has not been
cancelled by competent authority. Issues

Ruling of the Court of Appeals In this petition, the following errors are assigned:

Petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP 1. x x x RESPONDENT’S ACT OF HAVING BUILT THREE (3) HOUSES (FOR
No. 90403, seeking to set aside the DARAB Decision. The sole basis of their Petition rests on HERSELF AND TWO OF HER CHILDREN), WAS "CONVERSION OF THE
the argument that as a result of a May 9, 2005 Order issued by the Regional Technical FARMHOLD INTO A HOUSING-RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISION" AND THEREFORE,
Director (Region III) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the survey SHE IS NOT BEING PUT IN SURPRISE NOR IN UNFAIR SITUATION.
returns and plans covering TCT RT-65932 have been cancelled, which thus rendered the CONSEQUENTLY, SHE IS THE PARTY IN ESTOPPEL. AND FROM THE TIME BY
June 15, 2005 DARAB Decision null and void and a proper subject of certiorari. HER ACTS OF SELF-CONVERSION OF THE LAND, IN THE EARLY ‘90S OR
EARLIER, SHE "LOST HER SECURITY OF TENURE" AS AGRICULTURAL
LESSEE.
On August 31, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Decision which decreed as follows:

2. THE DECISIONS OF THE DARAB PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR, DARAB

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision
CENTRAL OFFICE, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPEAK OF NO
is AFFIRMED in toto.
HOMELOT HAVING BEEN AWARDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.22
3. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CHANGE IN THE USE OF THE LAND FROM
The CA held that the issue raised by petitioners – the cancellation of the survey returns and AGRICULTURAL TO "RESIDENTIAL" MAY OCCUR AFTER TRIAL, BUT DURING
plans covering TCT RT-65932 – was not part of their causes of action in the PARAD or THE APPEAL, WHICH THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MAY CONSIDER.
DARAB, and this new issue changed the theory of their case against Dominga, which is not
 4. "CONVERSION" (WHICH REQUIRES PRIOR APPROVAL BY THE DAR) have they shown that they actually cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No
HAVING BECOME A "FAIT ACCOMPLI", SECTION 220 OF THE REAL ESTATE receipt evidencing payment to the landowners of the latter’s share, or any other documentary
TAX CODE AND ARTICLE 217 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 evidence, has been put forward.
AFFIRM THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE TAX DECLARATION THAT IS, THE
PREVIOUS FARMHOLD HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO "RESIDENTIAL" LAND, What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda’s declaration
AND CONFIRMED BY THE CITY ZONING DIRECTOR. in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming
scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute,29 which provides that
5. IN NOT HAVING CONSIDERED THE TAX DECLARATION AND THE ZONING "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or
CERTIFICATION x x x, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A VERY other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR.25 own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."30 Thus, since Pedro is
deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the
Petitioners’ Arguments 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners,
and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s surviving
spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and
In their Petition and Reply,26 petitioners this time argue that in building houses upon the land
used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to
for herself and her children without a homelot award from the Department of Agrarian
contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior
Reform, Dominga converted the same to residential use; and by this act of conversion,
death.
Dominga violated her own security of tenure and the land was removed from coverage of the
land reform laws. They add that the Malolos zoning ordinance and the tax declaration
covering the land effectively converted the property into residential land. If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual agreement
with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they should have
confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their
Petitioners justify their change of theory, the addition of new issues, and the raising of factual
institution as co-lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the passing
issues, stating that the resolution of these issues are necessary in order to arrive at a just
away of their father Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was
decision and resolution of the case in its totality. They add that the new issues were raised as
installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they came forward to
a necessary consequence of supervening events which took place after the Decisions of the
question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners
PARAD and DARAB were issued.
slept on their rights, and are thus precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural
leasehold contract.
Respondent’s Arguments
Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro deceived her into believing that he is the
In her Comment,27 Dominga argues that the Petition raises questions of fact which are not the sole successor to the leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner’s representative or
proper subject of a Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules. She adds that petitioners raised anew administrator was to know the personal circumstances of the lessee Eugenio; more especially
issues which further changed the theory of their case, and which issues may not be raised for so, when Eugenio died. She was duty-bound to make an inquiry as to who survived Eugenio,
the first time at this stage of the proceedings. in order that the landowner – or she as representative – could choose from among them who
would succeed to the leasehold. Under Section 9 of RA 3844, Makapugay, or Amanda – as
Our Ruling Makapugay’s duly appointed representative or administrator – was required to make a
choice, within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would succeed as agricultural lessee.
The Petition is denied. Thus:

DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedro’s death in Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the
1984, has no leg to stand on other than Amanda’s declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit Parties - In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
that Pedro falsely represented to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of the landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who
land, and that when she confronted him about this and the alleged alternate farming scheme can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month
between him and petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had an from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse;
understanding about it and he did not have the intention of depriving them of their cultivatory (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or
rights."28 Petitioners have no other evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which proves descendants in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent
the existence of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be
exercised at the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed August 31, 2007 Decision and
agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority December 13, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
SO ORDERED.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind
his legal heirs. (Emphasis supplied) G.R. No. 153476             September 27, 2006

Amanda may not claim ignorance of the above provision, as ignorance of the law excuses no HKO AH PAO, HENRY TENG and ANNA TENG, petitioners,
one from compliance therewith.31 Thus, when she executed the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold vs.
Contract with Pedro, she is deemed to have chosen the latter as Eugenio’s successor, and is LAURENCE TING, ANTHONY TING and EDMUND TING, respondents.
presumed to have diligently performed her duties, as Makapugay’s representative, in
conducting an inquiry prior to making the choice. DECISION

The same holds true for petitioners. They should be held to a faithful compliance with Section AZCUNA, J.:
9. If it is true that they entered into a unique arrangement with Pedro to alternately till the
land, they were thus obliged to inform Makapugay or Amanda of their arrangement, so that in
the process of choosing Eugenio’s successor, they would not be left out. But evidently, they This is a petition for review1 of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
did not; they slept on their rights, and true enough, they were excluded, if there was any such January 31, 2002 and May 7, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47804, entitled "Hko Ah
alternate farming agreement between them. And after Pedro was chosen and installed as Pao, et al., v. Laurence Chua Ting, et al."
Eugenio’s successor, they allowed 17 years to pass before coming out to reveal this claimed
alternate farming agreement and insist on the same.1âwphi1 The controversy involves two feuding families of the same clan battling over a piece of
property registered in the name of respondents. Petitioners claim that the property was
With the above pronouncements, there is no other logical conclusion than that the 1996 bought by their patriarch, the late Teng Ching Lay, who allegedly entrusted the same to his
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda and petitioners, which is grounded on son from a previous marriage, Arsenio Ting, the deceased father of herein respondents.
Pedro’s inadmissible verbal admission, and which agreement was entered into without
obtaining Dominga’s consent, constitutes an undue infringement of Dominga’s rights as The antecedents2 are as follows:
Pedro’s successor-in-interest under Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such rights and
dispossess her of the leasehold against her will. Under Section 732 of RA 3844, Dominga is On June 12, 1961, the spouses Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay sold for P70,000 the
entitled to sennity of tenure; and under Section 16, 33 any modification of the lease agreement property subject of this case which is located at 1723 Vasquez St., Malate, Manila to Arsenio
must be done with the consent of both parties and without prejudicing Dominga's security of Ting. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63991 was subsequently issued in the name of
tenure. Arsenio Ting on June 14, 1961.

This Court shall not delve into the issue of re-classification or conversion of the land. Re- Arsenio Ting was the son of Teng Ching Lay by his first marriage. At the time of the sale,
classification/conversion changes nothing as between the landowners and Dominga in regard Arsenio was a practicing lawyer and, being a Filipino, was qualified to acquire and own real
to their agreement, rights and obligations. On the contrary, re-classification/conversion can property in the Philippines. Arsenio was likewise the manager and controlling stockholder of
only have deleterious effects upon petitioners' cause. Not being agricultural lessees of the Triumph Timber, Inc. in Butuan City. Teng Ching Lay, on the other hand, was a Chinese
land, petitioners may not benefit at all, for under the law, only the duly designated lessee citizen, and although his name did not appear in the corporate records of Triumph Timber,
-herein respondent - is entitled to disturbance compensation in case of re- Inc., he was the one making business decisions for the company.3 He became a naturalized
classification/conversion of the landholding into residential, commercial, industrial or some Filipino citizen on January 18, 1966.
other urban purposes.34 Besides, a valid re-classification of the land not only erases
petitioners' supposed leasehold rights; it renders them illegal occupants and sowers in bad A colonial-style house was standing on the disputed lot when it was bought. Teng Ching Lay
faith thereof, since from the position they have taken as alleged lessees, they are not the occupied the same, together with his second wife, petitioner Hko Ah Pao, and their children,
owners of the land. petitioners Henry and Anna Teng. Arsenio also stayed in the same house.
Several years later, Arsenio married Germana Chua. They moved to a new house that was which is the property in question. Appearing on the dorsal side of the estate tax return was a
erected on the same lot behind the old colonial house. Germana bore three sons, list of properties belonging to Teng Ching Lay. The only properties that were listed, however,
respondents herein, namely, Laurence, Anthony and Edmund, all surnamed Ting. were those located in Cavite and Butuan City.

Later, Arsenio and his family relocated to Butuan City but they would stay in their old house in On May 27, 1991, respondents, through counsel, sent a demand letter to petitioners to vacate
Malate whenever they came to Manila. A caretaker was hired to oversee it. Teng Ching Lay the property in question. When the latter refused, respondents instituted an ejectment case
also transferred to Butuan City. Petitioners remained in the colonial house, and Teng Ching against them in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Lay would join them each time he went to Manila.
Petitioners, in turn, on January 21, 1992, filed a complaint for the cancellation of title and
Arsenio died in 1972, predeceasing his father, Teng Ching Lay, and leaving as compulsory partition with damages and prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against
heirs, the surviving spouse, Germana, and respondents who were all minors at that time. respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Petitioners, who have been
residing in the property since 1961, demanded the reconveyance of its title in their favor on
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Arsenio's estate before the Court of First the ground that Arsenio merely held the property in trust for Teng Ching Lay.
Instance (CFI) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, the court issued an Order on October
23, 1975 approving the project of partition which included, among others, the property in According to petitioners, Teng Ching Lay purchased the property from the spouses Aristeo
question which was adjudicated in favor of respondents. Mayo and Salud Masangkay but it was made to appear in the contract of sale that Arsenio
was the vendee because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning land in the
On February 4, 1976, Germana filed a petition for guardianship with the City Court of Butuan Philippines. They claim that they became aware of the TCT in the name of respondents only
over the persons and properties of her minor children. The court appointed her as guardian when the latter instituted an ejectment suit against them, and notwithstanding the efforts on
on November 21, 1978. their part to settle the dispute, respondents refused to recognize their ownership of the
property.
In view of the Order of the CFI adjudicating the disputed property in favor of respondents,
TCT No. 63991 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 134412 was issued in the name of Petitioners' principal witness was Angel Sembrano, corporate accountant of Triumph Timber,
respondents on July 3, 1979. Inc., and Teng Ching Lay's personal accountant. According to Sembrano, he met Arsenio
when he was hired as an accountant of Triumph Timber, Inc. in 1959. As Teng Ching Lay's
personal accountant from 1960 to 1989, he prepared the latter's income tax returns and
Two years later, trouble brewed between Teng Ching Lay and his daughter-in-law, Germana,
purchases. In June of 1961, Arsenio allegedly told him that his father was going to buy a
concerning the properties in Manila and Butuan City, as well as the stocks of Triumph Timber,
house in Manila, and directed him to prepare a voucher and a check of the corporation
Inc. which involved millions of pesos. On April 28, 1981, Teng Ching Lay filed before the City
for P200,000 payable to Teng Ching Lay. Said voucher and check, however, along with the
Court of Butuan a motion to recall Germana's guardianship over her minor children for her
other records of the corporation, were allegedly lost during the flood that hit Butuan City in
failure to give him, as the paternal grandfather of the minors, notice of the guardianship
1981.
proceedings pursuant to Articles 344 and 355 of the Civil Code.4 He added that Germana
sought the guardianship merely to seek authority to sell the properties of the wards. On her
part, Germana averred that Teng Ching Lay had raised this issue only as a leverage against Sembrano likewise stated that when he went to Manila in November of 1961, Teng Ching Lay
her in their case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pertaining to the brought him to the house that he purportedly bought but since he was a Chinese national at
liquidation of the assets of Timber Triumph, Inc. that time, the title to the property was placed in the name of Arsenio.6

On July 21, 1987, the court rendered a decision revoking the letters of guardianship of On cross-examination, Sembrano mentioned that he did not know who the vendor of the
Germana, from which she appealed. On January 30, 1989, Teng Ching Lay died. His property was but the purchase price, as he was supposedly told by Arsenio, was P150,000;
surviving heirs, however, decided not to contest any further the letters of guardianship that not all the documents of the corporation were presented in the proceedings at the SEC;
previously granted to Germana. Hence, on November 3, 1989, the case was ordered that he did not know where the proceeds of the check went; and, that Teng Ching Lay filed
terminated.5 income tax returns for 1961 and 1962. He insisted that Arsenio informed him that the check
was intended for the purchase price of the house and lot in Manila, and that he even saw the
unsigned deed of conveyance.7
An estate tax return signed by petitioner Anna Teng was filed for the estate of Teng Ching
Lay whose given address when he was alive was in Buhangin, Butuan City. The residence of
petitioners who were listed as heirs was stated to be on A. Vasquez Street, Ermita, Manila,
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that the property was paid for and legally III
acquired by their father, Arsenio, and that it was among those adjudicated to them by virtue of
a special proceedings before the CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. They asked for WHETHER SECTION 38, RULE 130, OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE
the dismissal of the complaint, and filed a counterclaim that prayed for damages as well as MAY BE APPLICABLE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ANGEL SEMBRANO AFFECTING
compensation for the use of a portion of the property by petitioners. THE DECLARATION TO HIM OF ARSENIO TING, I.E. "BIBILI SI TATAY NG
BAHAY SA MAYNILA" AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
Meanwhile, on February 24, 1993, the MeTC rendered a decision in the ejectment case
ordering petitioners to vacate the premises. Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Manila but the IV
RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC, stating that petitioners failed to take earnest efforts to
reach a compromise agreement with respondents prior to the filing of the ejectment case. WHETHER THE HOLDING IN PEOPLE V. ULPINDO, 256 SCRA 201 AND PEOPLE
V. LIAN, 255 SCRA 532 MAY BE APPLIED TO ANGEL SEMBRANO'S TESTIMONY
On September 30, 1994, the RTC, in the aforestated civil case, rendered its decision AS CONTAINED IN THE TSN.
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on the ground that petitioners failed to prove that
Arsenio was merely holding the subject property in trust for his father, Teng Ching Lay, thus: V

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs against WHETHER SECTION 34, RULE 130, OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE
plaintiffs. MAY BE APPLICABLE TO RESPONDENT ANTHONY TING'S ADMISSION AS
EXTANT IN THE RECORD TO SHOW SPECIFIC INTENT, HABIT AND THE LIKE
SO ORDERED.8 ON THE PART OF TENG CHING LAY IN HAVING HIS SON, ARSENIO TING, ACT
AS HIS TRUSTEE OF SEVERAL PROPERTIES.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC on January 31, 2002, thus:
VI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the lower court in
Civil Case No. 92-60333 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto by this Court. WHETHER SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE (ON
ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST) AND SECTION 4, RULE 129 (ON JUDICIAL
SO ORDERED.9 ADMISSION) OF THE SAME RULES MAY BE APPLIED TO RESPONDENT
ANTHONY TING'S ADMISSION AS EXTANT IN THE RECORD, I.E., THE
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS OWNED BY TENG CHING LAY.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues: VII

I WHETHER, AS APPLIED TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE, THE

RULE ON BURDEN OF EVIDENCE, I.E., TO SHOW THAT ARSENIO TING PAID
THE PRICE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, BEING CAPABLE OF DOING SO,
WHETHER THE RULE ON LACHES MAY BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE.
WAS SHIFTED TO RESPONDENTS AFTER PETITIONERS HAD SUCCESSFULLY
PROVEN, BY TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE
II PROPERTY WAS PAID BY TENG CHING LAY AND MERELY ENTRUSTED THE
SAME TO HIS SON, ARSENIO TING, AS THE FORMER WAS THEN A CHINESE
WHETHER SECTION 42 (2nd SENTENCE), RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES CITIZEN WHO WAS NOT ALLOWED TO OWN REAL ESTATE PROPERTY (1935
OF EVIDENCE AND THE HOLDINGS IN SEVERAL CASES MAY BE APPLICABLE CONSTITUTION) LET ALONE THE FACT THAT THE FORMER, BY PREVIOUS
TO THE TESTIMONY OF ANGEL SEMBRANO RELATIVE TO THE DECLARATION, CONDUCT, HAD ALREADY ENTRUSTED TO HIS SON SEVERAL PROPERTIES
AS WELL AS ACTION, OF THE LATE TENG CHING LAY THAT THE LATTER UNDER THE SAME REASON.
OWNED THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.
The Court notes that while the petition had been filed under Rule 45, the issues and the Time and again, the Court has held that it will not interfere with the trial court's assessment
contentions advanced herein have been presented in a manner that a resolution of such will regarding the credibility of witnesses, absent any showing that it overlooked, misapplied or
require this Court to re-examine the findings of fact of both the RTC and the CA. misunderstood some facts or circumstances of weight and substance or that it gravely
abused its discretion. Here, both the RTC and the CA were not convinced of the truthfulness
The basic rule is that factual questions are beyond the province of this Court in a petition for of Sembrano's bare testimony. He did not present any documentary proof to support his
review10 because only questions purely of law may be raised in such a petition. One test to statements, particularly with regard to the P200,000 check that he supposedly gave to
determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the Court can Arsenio for the payment of the property in question.
resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a question of fact. Thus, the petition must not Furthermore, Sembrano's testimony on behalf of petitioners is about an alleged declaration
involve the calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented. 11 In addition, the facts against an interest of a person who is dead in an action that is in effect a claim against his
of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide estate. Such a testimony if coming from a party would be barred by the surviving parties rule,
is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was or the dead man's statute, in the Rules of Court:
appropriate.12
Section 23, Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.
In the present case, however, the circumstances surrounding the ownership of the property – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
that is central to the parties' disagreement are put at issue. A resolution of this point will prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
require a re-evaluation of the evidence on record. In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
not review the factual findings of the CA,13 and petitioners have not shown that this case falls against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind,
under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.14 cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Nonetheless, even if the Court were to exercise utmost liberality and veer away from the rule,
the records will show that, indeed, petitioners failed to establish their case by a And while Sembrano is not a party, he is practically a surrogate of petitioners since he was
preponderance of evidence. the personal accountant of their predecessor-in-interest and the corporate accountant of the
corporation he controlled.
In civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by a preponderance of evidence is on the
party who is asserting the affirmative of an issue.15 Preponderance of evidence means At any event, the issues propounded by petitioners have been discussed lengthily and ruled
probability of truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than upon by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions. Hence, the Court does not deem it
that which is offered in opposition thereto.16 necessary to further delve into these matters. The evidence on record supports the assailed
findings and conclusions specifically with regard to the ownership of the property in question
Petitioners primarily rely on Angel Sembrano's testimony to substantiate their claim. The that is reflected in the Torrens title20 which was issued in the name of Arsenio pursuant to the
latter's testimony, however, consists mainly of hearsay, which carries no probative value. 17 He deed of sale.
did not have personal knowledge as to the execution of the contract of sale between Arsenio
and the Masangkay spouses nor the alleged agreement between the former and Teng Ching As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when adopted and affirmed by the
Lay. He could only testify as to what the deceased had allegedly told him. Thus, any CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court. 21 This Court is
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its evidentiary weight is not based on not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by
the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the the CA.22 Absent any showing that some facts of certain weight and substance were
witness stand.18 overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case, the Court, as in this
case, will uphold the findings of the RTC and the CA.
Even if the alleged statement of Arsenio to Sembrano relating to the fact that his father, Teng
Ching Lay, was buying a house in Manila, can be admissible in evidence as a declaration Consequently, since petitioners failed to prove that Teng Ching Lay was the real owner of the
against his pecuniary interest under Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,19 still, the property involved herein, their proposition that a constructive trust exists must likewise fail.
veracity as to whether the deceased actually made this statement is subject to scrutiny.
Clearly, the RTC and the CA cast doubt on Sembrano's credibility, and the Court does not WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
find any reason to hold otherwise. dated January 31, 2002 and May 7, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47804,
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.