G.R. No.

197818               February 25, 2015 At about 4:00 a.m. the next day, the team along with the informant proceeded to Kahilum I,
Pandacan on board three vehicles. From a distance, they saw appellant chatting with a male
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, companion. The informant and PO2 Coronel approached appellant who was by then already
vs. alone. The informant introduced PO2 Coronel to the appellant as a buyer of shabu. Appellant
ALLAN DIAZ y ROXAS, Accused-Appellant. informed them that he has available shabu by saying "mayroon." Thus, PO2 Coronel gave
appellant the previously initialed three 100-peso bills and, in exchange therefor, the latter
gave him a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be
RESOLUTION
shabu. At that juncture, PO2 Coronel made the pre-arranged signal and immediately arrested
appellant. After appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights, the buy-bust team brought
DEL CASTILLO, J.: him to the police station and turned him over to the investigator. At the police station, the
plastic sachet containing the suspected shabu was marked by PO2 Coronel with "ARD-1,"
Challenged in this final recourse is the February 11, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals the initials of appellant. A request for laboratory examination7 of the subject item was
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04206, which affirmed in toto the November 5, 2009 thereafter prepared by Police Senior Inspector Peter L. Nerviza. Later, the submitted
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 08- specimen weighing 0.018 gram was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
263032 convicting appellant Allan Diaz y Roxas (appellant) of violation of Section 5, Article II shabu, a dangerous drug, per Chemistry Report No. D-725-08.8
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Appellant, on the other hand, claimed that between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. of August 1, 2008,
Factual Antecedents he was walking home when he was suddenly arrested, allegedly for verification purposes
only, by policemen whose names he cannot recall. He was brought to a police station and
In an Information3 dated August 7, 2008, appellant was charged with illegal sale of shabu thereafter to an inquest prosecutor in the City Hall of Manila where he first came to know that
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 committed as follows: he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165.

That on or about August 2, 2008, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver, or give away to another any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale one (1) After trial, the RTC convicted appellant as charged and accordingly sentenced him in its
heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "ARD-1" containing ZERO POINT Decision9 of November 5, 2009 as follows:
ZERO ONEEIGHT (0.018) [gram] of white crystalline substance known as "SHABU", [or]
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. WHEREFORE, finding accused, Allan Diaz y Roxas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 ₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Appellant entered a pleaof not guilty upon his arraignment on August 22, 2008 and filed a xxxx
petition for bail. The petition was denied for lack of merit on November 17, 2008.
SO ORDERED.10
The parties' respective versions of the incident are as follows:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On August 1, 2008, a confidential informant reported to the Pandacan Police Station (PS-10),
Manila Police District, about appellant's illegal drug trade activities in Kahilum I, Pandacan, Appellant appealed to the CA contending that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
Manila. At around10:00 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was held and a buy-bust team reasonable doubt since the police officers failed to mark, conduct a physical inventory of, and
composed of PO2 Arthuro Coronel, (PO2 Coronel), as poseur-buyer, PO3 Edgar Lacson, photograph the subject item in his presence and those of the persons mentioned under Sec.
PO1 Ramil Carel and PO1 Richard Sibayan, as back-ups, was created. PO2 Coronel was 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165.
provided with three pieces of 100-peso bills which he marked with his initials "AC1-AC3."5 A
Pre-Operation Report and Coordination Sheet6 were then prepared and sent to the Philippine
By its assailed Decision11 of February 11, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. It
Drug Enforcement Agency.
found that the prosecution was able to establish appellant's guilt to a moral certainty.
Moreover, the CA did not doubt that the shabu presented before the RTC was the same
shabu seized from appellant since the prosecution likewise established its unbroken chain of before the CA. Thus, following established jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not adversely
custody. Thus: affect the prosecution's case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 2 In any event, it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to
dated November 5,2009 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as long
as the chain of custody remains unbroken." 17 Here, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was
SO ORDERED.12 able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the
moment it was seized from appellant up to the time it was presented during trial as proof of
the corpus delicti. As aptly observed by the CA:
Hence, this appeal.

[T]he contention of appellant that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of
Our Ruling
paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and
disposition of the seized drugs, is untenable. Record shows that PO2 Coronel marked the
The appeal has no merit. confiscated sachet of "shabu" at the police station and in the presence of appellant and the
duty investigator. PO2 Coronel clarified that the reason why he marked the said "shabu" at
Appellant assails the trial court's assessment of the credibility of prosecution witness PO2 the police station and not at the scene of the crime was because the place where they
Coronel. He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to PO2 Coronel's testimony transacted was dark. Thus, it is only proper to preserve the confiscated item and mark it in a
regarding the buy-bust operation over his defense of denial. lighted and safe place which is at the police station. Then, the said "shabu" was properly
turned over to the duty investigator, together with the marked money. Afterwards, the alleged
"[P]rosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility of the police "shabu" was brought to the forensic chemist for examination. Likewise, the members of the
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that the factual findings of buy-bust team executed their affidavits of arrest immediately after appellant was
the trial [court] and those involving credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no apprehended and at the trial, PO2 Coronel positively identified the seized drugs. Indeed, the
glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported prosecution evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs from
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a better position to the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic chemist. Thus, there is no
decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their doubt that the "shabu" presented before the court a quo was the same "shabu" seized from
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent appellant and that indeed, he committed the crime charged in the information.18
application where said findings are sustained by the [CA]," 13 as in this case. The Court has
thoroughly examined the records of this case and finds the testimony of PO2 Coronel All told, the Court finds appellant's conviction of the offense charged, as well as the imposition
credible. The said testimony is pertinently supported by documents such as the marked buy- upon him of the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of fine of ₱500,000.00,
bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of arrest, among others, which all clearly attest to the proper.1âwphi1 It must be added, however, that appellant shall not be eligible for parole.19
fact that a sale of shabu took place between him and appellant. On the other hand,
appellant's defense of denial, aside from being self-serving, is unsubstantiated and thus, has WHEREFORE, the assailed February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
little weight in law. Hence, the lower courts correctly gave more credence to the evidence of CR-H.C. No. 04206 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Allan Diaz y Roxas
the prosecution. shall not be eligible for parole.

Appellant banks on the prosecution's alleged failure to comply with the requirements of SO ORDERED.
law14 with respect to the proper marking, inventory, and taking of photograph of the seized
specimen. However, it does not escape the Court's attention that appellant failed to contest
G.R. No. 179786               July 24, 2013
the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. In fact, at no instance did he
manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the
seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. As held by the Court in People JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,
v. Domado,15 citing People v. Hernandez,16 objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot vs.
be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal. In this case, appellant raised the police operatives' DECISION
alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on appeal
ABAD, J.: Question Presented

This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and The central question presented in this case is:
submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are
The Facts and the Case covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional The Ruling of the Court
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records
gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in
to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted
due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He
him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons
save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The
marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated xxxx
crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage
relationship could no longer be repaired.
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
1 without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form  that Johnny any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from would blacken the reputation of the patient.
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who
The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
sought by subpoena duces tecum.2 without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This
rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history
of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician- diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be
patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and
Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.4
special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made
allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and
pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited evidence for admission in court. Thus:
purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the
the offer is made. results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall without the
be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. 3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC
that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces
privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of
tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the
Evidence that provides:
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those
records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to
their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder
Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters. admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also
tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
be given in evidence.1âwphi1
procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had
already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good
would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement.
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party,
request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her
party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to
be disclosed are "not privileged." G.R. No. 155619               August 14, 2007

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged LEODEGARIO BAYANI, Petitioner,
since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. vs.
Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at DECISION
the trial.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: to the account of the accused, Leodegario S. Bayani whose name appears therein in
bold print at the upper portion of the said check;
Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in an
Information, to wit: 3. That said Check No. 054924, is a post-dated check, was subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank, PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, for insufficiency of funds;
That on or about the 20th day of August 1992, in the Municipality of Candelaria, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named 4. That the checking account of the accused Leodegario S. Bayani with PS Bank,
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. Candelaria Branch, was closed on September 1, 1992 (Exh. "B-3"), which at the time
054924 dated August 26, 1992, in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) had only remaining deposit in the amount of ₱2,414.96 (Exh. "B-4").3
Philippine Currency, drawn against the PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, Candelaria, Quezon,
payable to "Cash" and give the said check to one Dolores Evangelista in exchange for cash The trial court also made the following findings:
although the said accused knew fully well at the time of issuance of said check that he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored The check in question is postdated, issued and drawn on August 20, 1992, and dated August
and refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, had no 26, 1992. It was presented to complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, for encashment by
sufficient funds therein, and that despite due notice said accused failed to deposit the Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the check was deposited with the bank, it was
necessary amount to cover said check, or to pay in full the amount of said check, to the returned to Evangelista for insufficiency of funds (Exh. "A-5"). Thereafter, she pursued the
damage and prejudice of said Dolores Evangelista in the aforesaid amount. following events to demand payment of the value of the check:

Contrary to law.1 xxxx

After trial, petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch After the confrontation at the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco, Evangelista has had another
55, in a Decision rendered on November 20, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads: confrontation with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia at Candelaria municipal building
before Brgy. Captain Nestor Baera, but again the accused and Rubia pointed to each other
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused for the settlement of the amount involved in the check in question.
Leodegario S. Bayani, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 1, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby sentences him to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and a fine Of these two (2) confrontations Evangelista had with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia,
of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He including the chances to have met or known the complaining witness Evangelista since 1977
shall likewise pay the complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, the sum of ₱10,000.00, the up to the filing of the instant case in the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, all what the
value of Check No. 054924 he issued and drew against PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, which accused Leodegario Bayani could say were flat denials of having talked with, or otherwise
was subsequently dishonored by the said drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. met Evangelista, regarding the latter’s claim of payment of the value of Check No. 054924,
admittedly from the check booklet of the said accused Bayani issued by PS Bank, Candelaria
The accused Leodegario Bayani is further ordered to pay Dolores Evangelista the amount of Branch.4
₱5,000.00 representing attorney's fees. He shall also pay double the cost of this suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)5 affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. The CA’s
SO ORDERED.2 Decision dated January 30, 2002 provides for the following dispositive portion:

In convicting petitioner, the trial court made the following findings of facts: WHEREFORE, and it appearing from the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
which does not indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact in accordance with the
1. That the Philippine Savings Bank, Candelaria Branch, has issued to the accused Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with
check booklet (Exh. "C") on December 12, 1991, with the Check No. 054924 as one costs.
of those included in said booklet of checks;
SO ORDERED.6
2. That the said Check No. 054924 dated August 26, 1992, was drawn and issued
payable to Cash in the amount of ₱10,000.00; said drawn check was made to apply
Thus, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, with the following Under the above rule, any evidence — whether oral or documentary — is hearsay if its
assignment of errors: probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some
other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former
THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN REFUSING TO ACQUIT by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.10
THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS UTTERLY BASED
ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE; In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was approached by Alicia
Rubia who told her that she was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE cash, as he needed money badly.11 Obviously, Evangelista’s testimony is hearsay since she
CONSIDERATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CHECK WAS NOT DULY had no personal knowledge of the fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the
ESTABLISHED; check exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when petitioner supposedly
made this request. What she testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not derived from
her own perception but from Rubia’s.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN THEY CONVICTED
THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE LATTER'S EVIDENCE AND NOT
ON THE STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE; However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Evangelista’s testimony even
if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial court
shall not consider any evidence which has not been finally offered. Section 35 of the same
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALED (sic) ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time
ACCUSED SOLELY ON THE BASES OF PRESUMPTIONS.7
the witness is asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a
question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, soon as the ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
argues that: (1) petitioner’s denial of his liability for Check No. 05492 cannot overcome the
primordial fact that his signature appears on the face of such check; (2) want of consideration
Thus, it has been held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
is a personal defense and is not available against a holder in due course; and (3) the
hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted." 12 Since no objection to the admissibility of
constitutional presumption of innocence was overcome by the requisite quantum of proof.8
Evangelista’s testimony was timely made – from the time her testimony was offered 13 and up
to the time her direct examination was conducted14 – then petitioner has effectively
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA waived15 any objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her
are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of testimony excluded for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case. Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated
While Evangelista’s statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow
from the CA is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the CA, whose factual
that the same should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be
findings are conclusive and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of
equated with weight of evidence.16 In this regard, it has been held that although hearsay
the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record
evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is
or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.9
nonetheless without probative value,17 unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule.18
The Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioner’s conviction by the RTC.
In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently relevant
Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the evidence statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the
pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay. fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or
the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant. 19 When Evangelista
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on hearsay evidence, to wit: said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for
cash, Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness the truth or veracity of Rubia’s statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. of such independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the
statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of that fact.20 Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista’s statement The elements of the offense penalized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are:
is relevant to the issues of petitioner’s falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and
consequently, his culpability of the offense charged. (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

In any event, petitioner’s conviction did not rest solely on Evangelista’s testimony. There are (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are
other pieces of evidence on record that established his guilt, to wit: the subject check was no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
included in the booklet of checks issued by the PSBank to petitioner; the subject check was full upon its presentment; and
made to apply to the account of petitioner whose name appears on the upper portion of the
said check; and most telling is that petitioner never categorically denied that the signature (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
appearing on the check was his. What petitioner claimed was that the signature on the check funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
was similar to his signature, although there were "differences," viz.: cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.22

Q: I am showing to you a certain document purpurting (sic) to be PSB Check No. As regards the first element, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks and in the absence
054924, will you please look at this particular document and tell this Honorable Court of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration. 23 Under the
if this particular check is one of those issued to you by the Philippine Saving’s Bank? Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that every party to an instrument acquired the
same for a consideration or for value.24 In alleging that there was no consideration for the
A: Yes, sir. subject check, it devolved upon petitioner to present convincing evidence to overthrow the

Q: Now, there appears a signature above a line located at the bottom of the said presumption and prove that the check was issued without consideration.
check which appears to be Leodegario Bayani, please tell this Honorable Court if you
know this particular signature? Valuable consideration may consist either of some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
the party who makes the contract; or some forbearance, detriment, loss of some
A: Although it is similar to my signature I could not tell if this is my signature, sir. responsibility to act; or labor or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is
an obligation to do or not to do, in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the
Q: Please explain to this Honorable Court why is it so? maker or indorser.25 It was shown in this case that the check was issued and exchanged for
cash. This was the valuable consideration for which the check was issued.
A: Because there are some differences, sir.
At any rate, what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
Q: Please tell this Honorable Court the particular differences you are referring to? purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The law
does not make any distinction on whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in
payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. The thrust of the law is to
A: At the middle of the signature I usually put my middle initial and also the beginning
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.26
of my family name is almost connected with each other, sir.21

Thus, the Court cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that the prosecution failed to prove his
Neither did petitioner claim that the signature was a forgery. Had he done so, then a forensic
guilt. As ruled in Lee v. Court of Appeals:
examination of the signature in appearing on the check and his signature would have been
made in order to determine the genuineness or authenticity of the signature appearing on the
check. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty.1awphi1 Suffice it to say
the law requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in a
prejudiced mind.27
All these pieces of evidence, taken together, inevitably support the finding of petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
After going over the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense in this case, the
Court finds no reason to overturn the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC, as
Petitioner also argues that he cannot be convicted due to the prosecution’s failure to prove
affirmed by the CA, as the prosecution sufficiently proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
that the subject check was issued to apply on account or for value.
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. considering further that she had also filed with said Office a motion for re-raffle of this
case, on grounds of partiality and bias on the part of said Judge, while such grounds
SO ORDERED. for re-raffle are unfounded and while there is no legal basis for inhibition, if only to
assuage her fears of not obtaining a fair and impartial trial, and having already
entertained serious doubt on her objectivity in trying and eventually deciding the
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2005             July 14, 2006
case, the undersigned Presiding Judge deems it wise to voluntarily inhibit herself
[OCA-IPI No. 04-2122-RTJ]
from trying the case.
JOSEFINA CRUZ-AREVALO, complainant,
Accordingly, undersigned Presiding Judge hereby inhibits herself from trying this
vs.
case.
JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN-LAYOSA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon
City, respondent.
Let the entire record be forwarded to the Office of the Executive Judge through the
Clerk of Court of this Court for re-raffle.8
DECISION

In her Comment9 dated January 12, 2005, respondent judge explains that the letter presented
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
by complainant allegedly authorizing her to represent Cruz in the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-
03-50379 is defective because it was not duly notarized and authenticated. She likewise
This administrative Complaint1 filed by Josefina Cruz-Arevalo charges Judge Lydia Querubin- found the SPA defective as it pertains to complainant's authority to receive Cruz's contribution
Layosa2 with manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. to the PAG-IBIG Provident Fund and not to represent him in the pre-trial of the civil case.
Q-03-50379, entitled Josefina Cruz-Arevalo and Conrado R. Cruz v. Home Development Thus, finding the absence of Cruz during the pre-trial inexcusable and without any proper
Mutual Fund and Federico S. Quimbo. representation in his behalf, respondent judge dismissed the complaint insofar as he is
concerned.
Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization letter3 and a special
power of attorney (SPA)4 in her favor to represent him in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 while he As regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the Affidavit constituting as the direct
undergoes medical treatment in the United States of America (USA). Notwithstanding the testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., respondent judge points out that she gave the other
presentation of the authorization letter and SPA during the pre-trial, respondent judge party the chance to go over the affidavit and make objections thereto like any direct
declared Cruz non-suited due to his absence. She also refused to issue an order to that effect testimonial evidence. She claims that no written order is necessary as demanded by
thus depriving Cruz the right to challenge her order by way of petition for certiorari. complainant's counsel because her rulings were made in open court during the course of trial
Complainant also assails the order of respondent judge to exclude several paragraphs in the and are already reflected in the transcript of the stenographic notes. With regard to
Affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without giving her counsel complainant's Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum,
a chance to comment on the objections raised by the defendants. Moreover, she refused to respondent judge avers that they were not given due course because the legal fees for said
issue a written order excluding certain paragraphs thus depriving complainant the opportunity motions were unpaid and the person alleged to have possession or control of the documents
to file certiorari proceedings. sought to be produced is not named or specified therein.10

Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or collusion by In its Report11 dated October 18, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
silence5 with the defendants for not acting on her Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces complainant's accusations unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of the
Tecum and Ad Testificandum6  thus providing opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid administrative case for lack of merit.12
compliance therewith. Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality
and proper dispensation of justice.7
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
On November 14, 2004, respondent judge made the following ruling in Civil Case No. Q-03-
The records clearly show that Conrado R. Cruz was absent during the pre-trial of Civil Case
50379:
No. Q-03-50379, despite the specific mandate of the Rules of Court for parties and their
counsel to personally appear therein.13 While non-appearance of a party may be excused if a
Considering that plaintiff Josefina Cruz-Arevalo had filed a Complaint against duly authorized representative shall appear in his behalf,14 however Cruz failed to validly
undersigned Presiding Judge with the Office of the Court Administrator and constitute complainant because his authorization letter and SPA were not respectively
authenticated and specific as to its purpose. Without any authorized representative, the proceeding shall be paid in full.19 However, this issue has become moot as respondent judge
failure of Cruz to appear at the pre-trial made him non-suited. Respondent judge thus subsequently issued the subpoena prayed for after the complainant paid the required fees.
correctly dismissed the complaint in so far as he is concerned. 15
Finally, complainant failed to present evidence to show the alleged bias of respondent judge;
As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of complainant's witness, the mere suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough.20 Bare allegations of partiality will not
rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a suffice in an absence of a clear showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge
party's offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it dispensed justice without fear or favor. It bears to stress again that a judge's appreciation or
be attached to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the parties, or the correctness of a
state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the judge's orders or rulings on the objections of counsels during the hearing, without proof of
substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender malice on the part of respondent judge, is not sufficient to show bias or partiality. 21 The Court
of excluded evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench.
eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits
the excluded evidence. The appellate court will better understand and appreciate the that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in the record of the case.16
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge Lydia Querubin-Layosa,
On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately after an objection is Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, is DISMISSED for lack of
made, as what respondent judge did, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to merit.
inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the trial
and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the SO ORDERED.
situations presented by the ruling.17 Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out of
portions in Atty. Arevalo's affidavit which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise A.M. No. RTJ-03-1747               July 31, 2003
improper.18 Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality need no specification or
explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a matter of logic, since it is determined
simply by ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in issue in the case. We agree with ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., Complainant,
OCA's observation that: vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO G. PADERANGA, RTC-Br. 38, Cagayan de Oro City, Respondent.
There is also nothing irregular when respondent [judge] did not issue an order to
reflect the objections of the defense counsel to each of the allegations in the sworn DECISION
affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of complainant's counsel as the
court's rulings thereto were made during the trial. As pointed out by respondent BELLOSILLO, J.:
[judge], these matters are already reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes
and are not subject to written order. Orders resolving motions for continuance made Atty. Procopio S. Beltran Jr. charges respondent Judge Maximo G. Paderanga, RTC-Br. 38,
in the presence of the adverse party, or those made in the course of a hearing or trial, Cagayan de Oro City, with "Undue Delay in Rendering an Order" and "Making Untruthful
may properly be made orally. (Echaus vs. CA, GR No. 57343, July 23, 1990, [187 Statements in the Certificate of Service" stemming from Civil Case No. 98-381, "Ponce de
SCRA 672]). Moreover, the acts of a judge in his/her judicial capacity are not subject Leon v. Orteza" where respondent is the Presiding Judge and complainant is counsel of
to disciplinary action even though erroneous in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or record for the plaintiff.
corruption which complainant failed to prove in the instant case.
On 21 March 2001, after the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence in Civil Case No. 98-381,
Further, while records show that the person alleged to have possession or control of the respondent issued an Order granting plaintiff fifteen (15) days to offer her evidence. On 17
documents sought to be produced is actually named or specified in the Motions for Writs of April 2001 plaintiff through counsel filed a Motion to Admit Formal Offer of Exhibits. On 23
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum filed by complainant in Civil Case No. Q-03- April 2001, since the motion contained confusing references to the exhibits, respondent
50379, respondent judge was correct not to have entertained the same as the legal fees Judge was constrained to give plaintiff another ten (10) days to make "an orderly and proper
corresponding thereto were not paid. Respondent judge is not obliged to remind complainant offer of exhibits" and another five (5) days from receipt of the motion for defendants therein to
or her counsel regarding said fees as the rules of procedure and practice already mandate proffer their objections thereto.1
that fees prescribed in filing of pleadings or other application which initiates an action or
As a result of the errors of plaintiff’s counsel, complainant herein, the presentation of the by respondent Judge to depend upon his ruling on the Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits.
evidence for the defense was deferred from 23 April 2001 to a later date to be determined The prolonged inaction in effect adversely impinged on the prompt termination of the civil
"[o]nly after the matter [i.e., admission of plaintiff’s offer of exhibits] shall [have] been case.
resolved by the Court x x x x" 2
Moreover, the delay of nine (9) months cannot be excused by respondent’s allegation that
On 5 June 2001 respondent Judge received from complainant in behalf of plaintiff an he had misplaced the appropriate folders of the civil case. Incompetent court management
Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits with Apology for his gaffe. Unfortunately, respondent does not help him explain and gloss over a serious violation of the constitutional right to
Judge Maximo G. Paderanga failed to rule on the offer of exhibits within a reasonable time speedy disposition of cases which was brought about by his failure to resolve incidents within
and to expedite the trial of Civil Case No. 98-381; his omission in fact delayed the progress of the period fixed by law. 9 In fact, such respondent’s inefficiency bolters the allegation of his
the case since the defense evidence was to be presented only after plaintiff’s offer of culpable omission since it is his responsibility as well to "organize and supervise the court
exhibits was resolved. It was only on 6 March 2002 when complainant filed a Manifestation personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business and require at all times the
asking respondent to rule on plaintiff’s Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits that respondent observance of high standards of public service and fidelity." 10 A well-organized court includes
realized his "miscue" and issued his Order of 7 March 2002 admitting plaintiff’s formal offer of the proper physical inventory of cases which is as much Judge Paderanga’s duty as his
exhibits after nine (9) long months. adjudicative functions, for which he is provided a court staff and a branch clerk of court
who assist him in accomplishing these tasks.11
Respondent admits his "actions and inactions" and apologizes for his "shortcomings" and
"inadequacies." 3 He however proffers an excuse: he had misplaced the case folder of Civil There should be no more doubt that undue inaction on judicial concerns is not just
Case No. 98-381 and believed in good faith that he had disposed of all pending incidents in undesirable but more so detestable especially now when our all-out effort is directed towards
that case, for which he certified, although inaccurately, that he had no backlog in his minimizing, if not totally eradicating the perennial problem of congestion and delay long
Certificate of Service. 4 With respondent’s admission, he and complainant submitted this plaguing our courts. The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary
administrative case for our resolution.5 period is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, for obviously, justice
delayed is justice denied. An unwarranted slow down in the disposition of cases erodes the
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent Judge be held faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
accountable for "Undue Delay in Rendering an Order" and fined ₱1,000.00 with warning disrepute.
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Significantly, the
OCA notes that respondent has another administrative case, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-01- We do not find however any transgression of respondent Judge’s ethical obligations when he
1660 for "Serious Misconduct" and "Grave Abuse of Authority" pending before this Court. collected his salaries upon his certification that he had no pending cases or incidents
submitted for decision. While indeed a Certificate of Service is not merely a means to a
We agree with `the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent is judge’s paycheck but an instrument by which courts can safeguard the fundamental right of
administratively liable for the delay of nine (9) months in resolving a routine and the people to a speedy disposition of their cases, 12 it bears stressing that respondent Judge
perfunctory Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits, but we have serious reservations on executed this document before he was informed by complainant that his Amended Formal
penalizing him for the inclusion of inaccurate statements in his Certificate of Service. 6 Offer of Exhibits was still awaiting his action, and that the delay was caused by complainant
himself. Clearly, in the absence of any evidence or circumstances res ipsa loquitur that he
allowed himself to be an unwitting instrument of fraud, we have to give credit to his defense
Actionable tardiness in resolving controversies and incidents therein violates Rule 3.05 of the
that his imprecise statements were done with "the honest belief that he has faithfully complied
Code of Judicial Conduct which requires a judge to "dispose of the court’s business promptly
with his duties." 13 The rule is that in case of doubt the case must be resolved in favor of the
and decide cases within the required periods." Under the Rules of Court, a judge is
respondent. Hence, the charge of "Making Untruthful Statements in the Certificate of Service"
mandated to rule on every offer of testimonial and documentary evidence "immediately
must be dismissed.
after the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself
on the question presented," but the ruling "shall always be made during the trial and at such
time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation Moreover, while it is true that Sec. 4, Rule 140, of the Rules of Court 14 punishes the less
presented by the ruling."7 In any event, a reasonable time must not extend beyond the ninety serious charges of "Undue Delay in Rendering an Order" with either suspension from office
(90)-day reglementary period from the date of submission of the formal offer of evidence.8 without salary and other benefits for one (1) to two (2) months and twenty-nine (29) days, or a
fine of not less than ₱10,000.00 but not more than ₱19,999.00, nevertheless, the strict
imposition of any of these penalties is unwarranted in the case at bar. As stated above,
In the instant case, observance of these deadlines is especially important since the
complainant himself was responsible for the delay for which he apologized as his own
presentation of defense evidence and other proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-381 was made
blunder. If complainant only complied faithfully and diligently with his part of dispensing
justice in Civil Case No. 98-381 by marking his exhibits correctly and comprehensively, Factual Antecedents
perhaps there would have been no occasion for respondent Judge to err in the
performance of his task to decide efficiently the incidents of the civil case. The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.

Besides, it is our view that respondent Judge did not act maliciously nor contumaciously Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while
when he was delayed in ruling upon complainant’s Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits for private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II with
respondent immediately rectified his innocent and innocuous mistake by issuing an Order Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).3
admitting the formal offer of exhibits. Hence, out of respondent Judge’s own volition and
eagerness to do what was right, he averted any material injury to complainant or his On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative
client’s case that could have been triggered by the tardiness other than the common and Region, appointed and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III
general concern for the speedy administration of justice.1âwphi1 with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT.4 These promotional appointments were duly approved and
attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997. 5 Being then
Verily, the fine of ₱1,000.00 suggested by the OCA for the administrative offense of "Undue the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT, the approved appointments were formally transmitted to the
Delay in Rendering an Order" is legally and justly commensurate with the ingenuous petitioner on June 6, 1997,6 copy furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the
miscalculation committed by respondent. We adopt this recommendation and impose appointment letter, the private complainants were not able to assume their new position since
this penalty upon respondent Judge not so much to chastise him as to gently and petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not
sympathetically remind him to be more prudent and efficient henceforth in his difficult implement them despite written orders from CHED7 and the CSC, Caraga Regional
vocation as a magistrate of the law. Office.8 Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint against
petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maximo G. Paderanga, RTC-Br. 38, Cagayan de Oro City, Ombudsman for Mindanao.9
is held LIABLE for the less serious charge of "Undue Delay in Rendering an Order" as a first
offense and fined ₱1,000.00, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act will be In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao
dealt with more severely. City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended, committed in the following
manner, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the
G.R. No. 175991               August 31, 2011 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of
Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below
JOSE R. CATACUTAN, Petitioner, 27, while in the performance of his official duties, thus committing the act in relation to his
vs. office, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully did then and there, with grave abuse of authority
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. and evident bad faith, refuse to implement the promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano
and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of
the valid appointments by the appointing authority and despite the directive of the Regional
DECISION
Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil Service Commission in the
region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to receive a higher
DEL CASTILLO, J.: compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were
deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and
It is well within the Court’s discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors [III].
believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Jose R. Catacutan seeking
to set aside and reverse the Decision1 dated December 7, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan which During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
affirmed the Decision2 dated July 25, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Surigao City convicting him of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No.
For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments
3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
of the private complainants because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the
preparation of the appointment papers. According to him, the appointment papers were October 13, 2005.
prepared by SNSAT Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the
letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional Office who made the appointments. He Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
also averred that the appointment papers cited the entire plantilla 11 (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-
DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of only the particular page on which the vacant On appeal, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.18 The appellate
item occurs. He likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of the court ruled that the Decision of the trial court, being supported by evidence and firmly
appointments contrary to the usual procedure where the original appointment papers and anchored in law and jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner failed to show that the trial
other supporting documents are returned to his office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal court committed any reversible error in judgment.
letter from the CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments. These alleged
infirmities, he contended, were formally brought to the attention of the CHED Regional
Director on June 20, 199712 who, however, informed him that the subject appointments were Hence, this petition.
regular and valid and directed him to implement the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought
the intercession of CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative In the Court’s Resolution19 dated February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
problem13 but the latter did not respond. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the was required to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment20 on June 5, 2007 while the
appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just wanted Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the Comment21 for respondent People of the Philippines
to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the preparation of on February 22, 2008.
appointment papers.
Issue
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is:
14
On July 25, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision  holding that the act of the petitioner in
defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the subject promotional Whether the [petitioner’s] constitutional right[s] to due process x x x and x x x equal protection
appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his palpable and patent of [the] law x x x were violated x x x [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in]
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some evidence [the Court of Appeals’] Decision dated April 18, 2001 x x x in CA-G.R. SP No.
perverse motive or ill will. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s refusal to implement the 51795 entitled "Jose R. Catacutan, petitioner, versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao,
appointments of the private complainants had caused undue injury to them. Thus, it held et al., respondents."22
petitioner guilty of the crime charged and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month and perpetual disqualification from public Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,23 petitioner argues that the Decision
office. rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be heard and to
present evidence. He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court
The RTC disposed of the case as follows: since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
51795 which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt in refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or
[of] VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and wrongful intent.
Corrupt Practices Act, this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment [of]
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION FROM Our Ruling
PUBLIC OFFICE, and to pay the costs.
The petition lacks of merit.
The aforementioned accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainants Georgito
Posesano and Magdalena Divinagracia the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) each, Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.
for moral damages.
"Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard." 24 "Due process is satisfied when
SO ORDERED.15 the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy."25 "Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
Petitioner moved for reconsideration16 but it was denied in an Order17 dated through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process."26
Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare that
denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to the courts below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA Decision. "Due
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent
explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence which
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel
for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process. states as the ground for offering it."30

There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as
as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the court’s discretion evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have
to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:
to the proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in
a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative matter. As the Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If documents or things offered in evidence are
Sandiganbayan aptly remarked: excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record.
If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other
The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
present the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 (Jose R. Catacutan
vs. Office of the Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CA’s
court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his offer of
incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal case does exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it
not foreclose administrative action or necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all should ask the court’s permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.
respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an administrative case does not operate to
terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject matter. x x x27 As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it has no
probative weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the
This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not without court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected and cannot even
legal precedent. In Paredes v. Court of Appeals,28 this Court ruled: be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction
the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not formally offered.
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are
independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:
criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is
administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
xxxx any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure xxxx
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings
and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private
presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
presented in the criminal cases. x x x administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,29 the Court reiterated: government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied, viz:
bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the
administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the
resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. x x x
 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private
functions; complainants’ valid appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith
when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation. "It is well to
negligence; and remember that good intentions do not win cases, evidence does."34

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government or gave Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of certainty. Here, the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to
his functions.31 assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their valid
appointments. As borne out by the records, they were able to assume their new positions
only on November 19, 1997. So in the interregnum from June to November 1997, private
All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by
complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary corresponding to their newly
the prosecution.
appointed positions. Likewise established is that as a result of petitioner’s unjustified and
inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments notwithstanding clear and mandatory
First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time directives from his superiors, the private complainants suffered mental anguish, sleepless
material to this case were it not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-Charge nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damages under Article 2217 of the New
(Principal) of SNSAT. As such public officer, he exercised official duties and functions, which Civil Code.
include the exercise of administrative supervision over the school such as taking charge of
personnel management and finances, as well as implementing instruction as far as
At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were
appointment of teachers.32
threshed out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by the
Sandiganbayan. Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court
Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of coincide, the same are binding on this Court. In any event, apart from these factual findings of
private complainants.1awphil As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked: the lower courts, this Court in its own assessment and review of the records considers the
findings in order.
The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion
was no longer anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14, 1997 letter of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan
the CHED Regional Director addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in promulgated on December 7, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
the latter’s protest letter. x x x In light of the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court
that Catacutan’s reason for not implementing the appointments was a personal dislike or ill
SO ORDERED.
feelings towards Posesano, this Court believes that Catacutan’s refusal was impelled by an ill
motive or dishonest purpose characteristic of bad faith. x x x
G.R. No. 154115 November 29, 2005
xxxx
PHILIP S. YU, Petitioner,
vs.
In the August 1, 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director, Catacutan was
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, and VIVECA LIM YU, Respondents.
once again directed, in strong words, to cease and desist from further questioning what has
been lawfully acted upon by competent authorities. Catacutan deliberately ignored the
memorandum and even challenged the private complainants to file a case against him. Such DECISION
arrogance is indicative of the bad faith of the accused-appellant.
Tinga, J.:
Yet again, the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5, 1997,
clarifying with finality the validity of the appointment. Still, Accused-appellant failed to This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ Decision and
implement the subject promotions. This stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 66252 dated 30 April 2002 1 and 27 June 2002,2 respectively,
directive of competent authorities established the evident bad faith of Catacutan and belies which set aside the Order  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City 3 dated 10 May
any of his claims to the contrary.33 2001, declaring an application for insurance and an insurance policy as inadmissible
evidence.
The facts of the case are undisputed. mooted her petition before the Court of Appeals when she filed her formal offer of rebuttal
exhibits, with tender of excluded evidence before the trial court.17
On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her husband, Philip
Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on For her part, private respondent maintains that the details surrounding the insurance policy
the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. The case was filed before the RTC of are crucial to the issue of petitioner’s infidelity and his financial capacity to provide support to
Pasig and raffled to Branch 158, presided by Judge Jose R. Hernandez. her and their children. Further, she argues that she had no choice but to make a tender of
excluded evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the insurance
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum  and ad application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.18
testificandum4 to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of
the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be petitioner’s illegitimate A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction and
child.5 The trial court denied the motion.6 It ruled that the insurance contract is inadmissible grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by a lower
evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which court.19 Where a respondent does not have the legal power to determine the case and yet he
presumably prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged does so, he acts without jurisdiction; where, "being clothed with power to determine the case,
information pertaining to insurance policies.7 It added that the production of the application oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of
and insurance contract would violate Article 2808 of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil jurisdiction."20
Registry Law,9 both of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the parents of an
illegitimate child.10 Private respondent sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals passed upon errors of judgment, not errors of
was denied by the trial court.11 jurisdiction, since it delved into the propriety of the denial of the subpoena duces
tecum and subpoena ad testificandum.  The argument must fail.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised
Judge Hernandez in issuing the 10 May 2001 Order.12 The Court of Appeals summarized the only when the evidence has been formally offered. 21 For a long time, the Court has
issues as follows: (i) whether or not an insurance policy and its corresponding application recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a trial
form can be admitted as evidence to prove a party’s extra-marital affairs in an action for legal court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus the practice
separation; and (ii) whether or not a trial court has the discretion to deny a party’s motion to of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be avoided. 22 As well
attach excluded evidence to the record under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.13 elucidated in the case of Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co.:23

According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent was merely seeking the production of Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides a
the insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the same as part of her judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a
evidence. Thus, it declared that petitioner’s objection to the admission of the documents was fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
premature, and the trial court’s pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible, erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
precipitate.14 The contents of the insurance application and insurance documents cannot be possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, —
considered as privileged information, the Court of Appeals added, in view of the opinion of the a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof
Insurance Commissioner dated 4 April 2001 to the effect that Circular Letter No.11-2000 "was in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is
never intended to be a legal impediment in complying with lawful orders".15 Lastly, the Court doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed
of Appeals ruled that a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a party’s privilege to to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the
tender excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on appeal the exclusion relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the
of such evidence.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail. cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material
before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
In the present petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals blundered in delving into
errors of judgment supposedly committed by the trial court as if the petition filed therein was In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be
an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action. Further, he claims that the Court of Appeals presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was
failed to show any specific instance of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
in issuing the assailed Order. Additionally, he posits that private respondent had already testificandum  when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming that the
documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a
position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 30 April
subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As observed by petitioners, 2002 and Resolution dated 27 June 2002 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
the assailed Order  was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it was, more
importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.24 SO ORDERED.

Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling within the general powers of the
judge is not authorized and is consequently void with respect to the particular case because
the conditions under which he was only authorized to exercise his general power in that case
did not exist and therefore, the judicial power was not legally exercised.25 Thus, in declaring
that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even before they were formally offered,
much less presented before it, the trial court acted in excess of its discretion.

Anent the issue of whether the information contained in the documents is privileged in nature,
the same was clarified and settled by the Insurance Commissioner’s opinion that the circular
on which the trial court based its ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful court
orders.26 Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting the insurance application and
policy.

Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondent’s tender of excluded

Section 40, Rule 132 provides:

Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If documents or things offered in evidence are

It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must have
been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the
evidence must have been identified and presented before the court. While private respondent
made a "Tender of Excluded Evidence,"  such is not the tender contemplated by the above-
quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not formally offered
much less presented before the trial court. At most, said "Tender of Excluded Evidence" was
a

manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by
the trial court even before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain,
speedy and adequate remedy which private respondent could have resorted to instead of the
petition for certiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the
said petition moot.