EVIDENCE CASES: February 2021

5. MARECILINA SAPU-AN, ET AL v. COURT OF APPEALS

Gr no. 91869 October 19, 1992

FACTS: The subject of this dispute is a 786 sq. m. lot situated in Valencia, Negros Oriental. It has been occupied
since the last World War by both the petitioners (Briones) and the private respondents (Deloria), who now
mutually assert adverse claims of exclusive ownership over the property.

The petitioners Briones and the private respondents Deloria built their house in the lot and both made tax
payments, in the name of Alfonsa Ohoy. The petitioner claim the land by virtue of separate sales made by the
original owner – Alfonsa Ohoy to Candida Favor, the petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest.

The respondent claim the same land by inheritance from their mother, Alfonsa Ohoy. Both the petitioners and the
private respondents say they have occupied and farmed the disputed land without objection from each other.

The petitioners gave permission to Calixto Tingcay to build his house on the land after World War II. The private
respondents, on the other hand, gave permission to petitioner Marcelina Sapu-an to build her house on the land,
also after World War II.

In 1962, the petitioners allegedly demolished their old house and began constructing a bigger one over the private
respondent’s objections. When their protests were ignored, the private respondents sued the petitioners for the
recovery of the land, with damages.

At the trial, the plaintiffs (Briones) presented four witnesses and submitted in evidence the following:

(1) tax declarations in the name of Alfonsa Ohoy from 1906 to 1949 and in the name of Calixto Tingcay for 1962;

(2) receipts of tax payments made by them for the period from 1953 to 1979;

(3) two private documents dated December 15, 1964, and March 18, 1947, respectively, evidencing the sale of
coconut trees planted thereon, to third persons;

(4) a sworn statement on the current and fair value of the real property; and

(5) a survey of the land made by a geodetic engineer.

The defendants (Deloria, private respondent), for their part, presented two witnesses, Josefa Abiera, sister-in-law
of Marcelina Sapu-an, and Ester Abiera Solamillo, one of the petitioners. The defendants also presented

(1) two private deeds of sale in their favor;

(2) receipts of tax payments on the land by Teopista and Ester Abiera; and

(3) a survey contract of the land prepared by a surveyor.

The court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiffs (Briones), declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of
the land in question.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the respondent court. The petitioners (Deloria) then filed a motion for
reconsideration, raising therein the sole issue of prescription of the private respondents’ cause of action. This
motion was denied by the appellate court, prompting this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Is the Principle on Equiponderance of evidence applicable in the case at bar?

2. Is the Rule on Genuineness and Due Execution of Document requirement on specific denial applicable in
the case?
3. Is court correct in affirming the decision of the trial Court?

RULING:

The Supreme Court said that the general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. By "preponderance of evidence" is meant that the evidence as
a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability
or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as
the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, although the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number.

The Court ruled that it is true that the genuineness and due execution of the two deeds of sale presented in
evidence by the petitioners were not denied by the private respondents under oath, and that under Rule 8, Section
8, of the Rules of Court, the "genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless
the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them." However, this rule applies only to the parties to the
document and not, in the case at bar, to the private respondents. The reason is that they were not parties to the
deeds of sale but merely the heirs of the alleged vendors.

It follows that the unauthenticated deeds of sale cannot serve as valid bases for the petitioners’ claim of ownership
over the land in question.

Lastly the Court find that this case turns mainly on questions of fact, which have been correctly appreciated by
both the trial court and respondent court. Their conclusions in favor of the private respondents are based on the
evidence of record and there is no reason for this Court to reverse or modify them. Absent a convincing showing
that the challenged decision was reached arbitrarily or in disregard of such evidence, our clear and only duty on
appeal is to uphold the courts below. It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial
judge who is in better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the
testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. We so affirm.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6. EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Before us is a Petition for Review on  Certiorari of the Decision1  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
61000 dismissing the Petition for  Certiorari and mandamus filed by Expertravel and Tours, Inc

FACTS:

Korean Airlines (KAL), a foreign corporation filed a collection suit against Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI) with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila through its appointed counsel, Atty. Mario Aguinaldo. He signed and indicated
in the attached verification and certification against forum shopping that he was the resident agent and legal
counsel of KAL and he caused the preparation of the complaint.

ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The motion was opposed by KAL and Atty. Aguinaldo claimed
that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved
during a special meeting conducted through a special teleconference. However, he failed to submit a copy of the
said resolution.

ISSUE:

Evidence – Was it proper for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that in this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that
business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group
communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles.
Teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations is commonly
used in the Philippines to conduct business transactions or corporate governance.

Judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either:

(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in
the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are
of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
EVIDENCE CASES: February 2021

facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. Teleconferencing is considered a matter
of common knowledge.

7. ELIGIO MADRID VS. CA

G.R. NO. 130683 (2000)

This is a petition for review on  certiorari  of the decision1  of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, of petitioner Eligio Madrid 2  and his co-accused Arsenio Sunido of
the crime of homicide, for the killing on May 21, 1992 of Angel Sunido in Buguey, Cagayan.

Facts: The RTC rendered a decision convicting A of the crime of homicide. The only discussion in the decision of the
evidence is in the following sentences: “Their testimony convinced the Court. On the other hand, accused’s
evidence bears the indicia of fabrication. Defense witnesses from their demeanor, manner of testifying and evasive
answers were far from credible. From the evidence on record, the Court believes and so hold that the prosecution
has satisfactory proved the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecution’s witnesses testified in a
straightforward manner.

Issue: Whether the RTC satisfied the constitutional standard of clear and distinct articulation of the facts and law in
its decision

Held: No. The RTC’s decision, for all its length – 23 pages – contains no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor
reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusion. It contains nothing more than a summary of the testimonies
of the witnesses of both parties. It does not indicate what the trial court found in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses to consider the same “straightforward”.

8. Office of the Court Administrator vs Bermejo

Before this Court is an administrative case for Dishonesty against Lourdes F. Bermejo, Court Stenographer II,
stationed at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

FACTS: Respondent colluded with another person to impersonate her in taking the Civil Service Eligibility
Examination. During the examination, Bermejo used another name in taking the test while the other took the same
exam using Bermejo's name.

ISSUE: Is a certified copy of the Seat Plan of the examination admissible in evidence?

RULING: Yes. A duly accomplished Civil Service Form is a public document which is admissible in evidence.
Respondent in this case, fails to refute the documentary evidence against her. It is a settled rule that the duly
accomplished form of the Civil Service is an official document of the Commission, which, by its very nature, is
considered in the same category as that of a public document, admissible in evidence without need of further
proof. As an official document, the entries thereof made in the course of official duty are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.
EVIDENCE CASES: February 2021

9. SERINA VS. CABALLERO

G.R. No. 127382, August 17, 2004

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Spouses Jesus and Enriqueta filed a complaint for quieting of title, claiming ownership
over a parcel of land held by respondent Caballero. They presented documentary evidence, including a Deed of
Sale and a Tax Declaration, claiming that they regularly paid taxes thereon. However, petitioners failed to establish
that the parcel of land in the possession of the respondents is the same as that subject of their complaint.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed to establish that the parcel of land in possession
of the respondents is the same as the subject of their complaint, their claim of acquisitive prescription is clearly
untenable.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most,
they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the
absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership.

FACTS:

On August 11, 1982, Dr. Jesus Serina and his wife, Enriqueta Serina filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery
of possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents
Caballero and his tenants. Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are the absolute owners and have been
in actual and constructive possession for 35 years of the land in controversy.

Petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Serina, bought the land from Luca Vda . De Marbella who inherited it from
her father, Ramon Neri. They presented a Deed of Sale, dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr. Serina bought 5
hectares of rice field. Dr. Serina was issued Tax Declaration No. 4029 allegedly for the said property. As indicated in
the tax declaration and subsequent tax declarations issued in the name of Dr. Serina, they were issued for
Cadastral Lot No. 3533 and covered the same boundary owners as those in the complaint. Petitioners also averred
that they regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947 up to the present.

In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had been in actual physical
possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He averred that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot
No. 3533, C-7 of the Cagayan Cadastre and originally owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. Respondents
also claim that Eustaquio Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax purposes even before the war. Tax
Declaration No. 2442 was issued in lieu of the records that were destroyed during the war.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being claimed by them?

HELD:

NO. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or
reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court - and they carry even more weight when the Court of
Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court. The Court found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of
the CA.

It was not clearly shown that the land bought by Dr. Serina from Lucia Vda . de Marbella was the same land owned
by Victor Caballero, and that the petitioners failed to show that Lucia Vda. de Marbella bought the land from
Eustaquio Caballero, the original owner and cadastral claimant of the land. It also noted that the deed of sale
between Lucia Vda . de Marbella and Dr. Serina showed that the land had an area of 5 hectares, whereas, the
petitioners only claimed 2.5 hectares. Furthermore, the boundaries of the land stated in the complaint did not
coincide with what was stated in the Deed of Sale, or in Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of Eustaquio
EVIDENCE CASES: February 2021

Caballero. The trial court ruled that the petitioners failed to explain these discrepancies, and that there was no
showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4029 in the name of Dr. Serina.The
trial court interpreted this to mean that Eustaquio Caballero's right as owner of the land remained.

ISSUE: Whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of the petitioners?

HELD: NO. The failure to establish the identity of the land is obviously fatal to the petitioners' case. In Beo vs. Court
of Appeals , a case which also involves an action for possession and quieting of title, the Court had the occasion to
state:

...{B]ecause petitioners failed to explain the discrepancy or present other evidence to prove with certainty
the location and area of the land they seek to recover, respondent court correctly applied the invariable
rule that a person who claims ownership of real property is duty-bound to clearly identify the land being
claimed, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. When the record does
not show that the land subject matter of the action for recovery of possession has been exactly
determined, such action cannot prosper, as in the case of petitioners . In sum, proof of ownership coupled
with identity of the land is the basic rule.

Corollary, the rule is likewise well-settled that in order that an action for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also the
identity of the property claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. As the appellate
court succinctly stated, he who claims to have a better right to the property must clearly show that the
land possessed by the other party is the very land that belongs to him.
EVIDENCE CASES: February 2021

10. Alexander Vinoya vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Regent Food Corporation and/or Ricky See
(President)
G.R. No. 126586, February 02, 2000

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to annul and set aside the decision,[1] promulgated on 21 June 1996,
of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") which reversed the decision[2] of the Labor Arbiter, rendered
on 15 June 1994, ordering Regent Food Corporation ("RFC") to reinstate Alexander Vinoya to his former position
and pay him backwages.

FACTS:
On May 26, 1990, Alexander Vinoya was accepted as sales representative by Regent Food Corporation (RFC), a
domestic corporation principally engaged in the manufacture and sale of various food products. He was issued an
identification card on the same day. His task was to deliver RFC products to various supermarkets and grocery
stores where he booked sales orders and to collect payments for RFC. On 1 July 1991, he was transferred by RFC to
Peninsula Manpower Company, Inc. (“PMCI”), an agency which provides RFC with additional contractual workers
pursuant to a contract for the supply of manpower services. After his transfer to PMCI, petitioner was reassigned
to RFC as sales representative. Subsequently, on 25 November 1991, he was informed by the personnel manager
of RFC, that his services were terminated and he was asked to surrender his ID card. He was told that his dismissal
was due to the expiration of the Contract of Service between RFC and PMCI.

ISSUES:

Evidence
1. Can the court take judicial notice of the country’s economic situation?
2. Is there a particular form of proof required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship?
3. Can the court take judicial notice of the practice of employers?

RULING:

Evidence
1. Yes. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that in 1993 (the year Neri case was decided) the economic
situation in the country was not as adverse as when the present case was being decided, as shown by the
devaluation of the peso. With the economic atmosphere in the country, the paid-in capitalization of PMCI
amounting to P75,000.00 could not be considered as substantial capital and, as such, PMCI cannot qualify as an
independent contractor.

2. No, there is no particular form of proof required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Any competent and relevant evidence may show the relationship. In the present case, petitioner presented the
identification card issued to him on 26 May 1990 by RFC as proof that it was the latter who engaged his services.
The ID card is enough proof that petitioner was previously hired by RFC prior to his transfer as agency worker to
PMCI.

3. Yes. The Court takes judicial notice of the practice of employers who, in order to evade the liabilities under the
Labor Code, do not issue payslips directly to their employees. Under the such practice, a third person, usually the
purported contractor (service or manpower placement agency), assumes the act of paying the wage. For this
reason, the lowly worker is unable to show proof that it was directly paid by the true employer. Nevertheless, for
the workers, it is enough that they actually receive their pay, oblivious of the need for payslips, unaware of its legal
implications. Applying this principle to the case at bar, even though the wages were coursed through PMCI, the
funds actually came from the pockets of RFC. Thus, in the end, RFC is still the one who paid the wages of petitioner
albeit indirectly.
EVIDENCE CASES: February 2021

11. Lorenzo Jose vs. The Court of Appeals and The People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976

Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives (handgrenade) and sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of five years, seeks a new trial which was denied him by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, and by respondent Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose was arrested on February 8, 1968 for possessing hand grenade. He was convicted of illegal
possession of explosives and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five years. After promulgation of the judgment,
petitioner, on that same day filed his notice of appeal. Nine days thereafter, he filed a motion praying that the case
be reopened to permit him to present (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2)
the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and Code Name ‘Safari’. The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal
by the accused. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction and denied the motion for new trial
because the evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered evidence as both
documents are dated January 31, 1968.

ISSUE:
Should the petitioner’s motion for new trial be granted and also, the documents which are not newly discovered
be admitted in evidence?

RULING:
Yes. In the interest of justice, the case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. This is an exception to the
general rule that new trial may only be granted if there is newly discovered evidence. The evidence sought to be
presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-discovered evidence because his alleged
appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a hand grenade were supposed to
be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter.

For a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that

(a) the evidence was discovered after trial;

(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence;

(c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to
the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted:

However, under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides that upon appeal, the appellate court may
reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the
case to the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case on the ground of substantial justice.

In the present case petitioner claimed that he was an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess
explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he found himself in a situation where he had to make a
choice to reveal his identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence
work on subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the dissidents
considering that Floridablanca, the site of the incident, was in the heart of “Huklandia”, or ride on the hope of a
possible exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution.

Without revealing his identity as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he
had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The permit however could not
be produced because it would reveal his intelligence work activities. The Court held that these circumstances
justifies a reopening of the case to afford the petitioner the opportunity of producing exculpating evidence.