Cases in KPL:

1. [ G.R. No. L-62339, October 27, 1983 ]

SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES
VICTOR GO AND FLORA C. GO AND HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., JUDGE, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH XI, RESPONDENTS.

Facts. A complaint for damages was filed in the RTC. The parties in the said case are all
residents of Cebu City. A motion to dismiss the said case was filed for failure of the
dispute to be referred first to the barangay.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution. Except in the instances enumerated in Sections 2 and 6 of the law, the
Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who
actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction
whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at
the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by
paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in
defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in
consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law
does not distinguish, We should not distinguish."

Are disputes cognizable by first level courts the only cases which should
undergo barangay proceeding?

No. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of
the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the
nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay
level. These sections conferred upon he city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass
upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of
settlement/arbitration wards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or
the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to
justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies
exclusively to said inferior courts.

2. [ G.R. No. 220533, January 30, 2017 ]

ROSALINA F. CALICA VDA. DE LEE V. ESTELA F. CALICA-ECLIPSE, KATHLEEN GRACE
ECLIPSE-ESCANO, AND LEO AUGUSTO CALICA-ECLIPSE

Facts. A complaint for reconveyance was filed in RTC San Fernando City, La Union
involving a lot located in the said city. The parties are all residents of Quezon City. The
case was sought to be dismissed on the ground of failure to refer first the dispute to
barangay settlement proceedings.

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution. It was argued that an exception applies, to wit, when real properties are
located in different cities or municipalities.

A reading of the provision shows that for the dispute to be an exception to the lupon's
jurisdiction, the subject of the dispute must involve two (2) or more real properties
situated in two (2) or more cities or municipalities. This is further subject to an exception
that "the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon[.]"

In light of this provision, the general rule applies. The dispute must first be brought to
the lupon for amicable settlement since the parties reside in the same barangay and
there is only one (1) real property involved.

No waiver. As the defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint. They raised it as
one of their special and affirmative defenses in their Answer. When the trial court failed
to resolve their defenses, respondents filed a Motion to Resolve Special and Affirmative
Defenses. Respondents have consistently questioned the lack of conciliation before the
barangay lupon. They cannot be deemed to have waived this defense.

That the parties already went through conciliation and mediation proceedings as ordered
by the trial court is immaterial. Conciliation before the lupon is compulsory[63] and is a
pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court under Section 412(a)[64] of the Local
Government Code. For failure to comply with a condition precedent, the Complaint should
be dismissed.[65 ]

3. [ G.R. No. 94436, April 30, 1991 ]

LAGRIMAS V. ABALOS AND JOSEFINA A. PANGAN, HEIR OF THE LATE JOSE R. ABALOS,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PEPITO LACULOB, NICOLAS
LACURUM, MATEO RESPICIO, LUIS DE LA CRUZ, BENJAMIN MARACHA, FEDERICO
MIONES AND ONOFRE FUJIWARA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Facts. A complaint for recovery of possession was filed in RTC Quezon City. The original
complaint states that the parties are all residents of Quezon City. The defendant raised
the defect of failure to comply with the KPL. The complainant amended the complaint by
indicating that the residence is Caloocan City. There was no objection given by the
defendant.

Issue. Should the case be dismissed for failure to comply with the KPL?

Resolution. From the foregoing set of facts, the requirement of conciliation before the
barangay where the property is located cannot be enforced. Petitioners reside in
Caloocan City while private respondents reside at Barangay Piñahan, Quezon City.
Moreover, while private respondents raise this defense in their answer, they effectively
waived their right thereto when they failed to object to the correction of the residence of
petitioners from Quezon City to Caloocan City, in the reply, with leave of the court. And
without raising this issue any further, private respondents participated in the trial of the
merits of the case. The fact that private respondents took part in the trial, argued their
case and adduced their evidence amounts to a waiver of this defense.

4. [ G.R. No. 70245, May 05, 1989 ]

ELEUTERIO DOMINGO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO A. ROSERO, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXVI, NAGA CITY; LEONILO BERCASIO AND CANDIDA
DELA TORRE, RESPONDENTS.

Facts. A complaint for declaration of ownership was filed in the court. The complaint
alleges that the residence of the plaintiff is in Manila, while the defendant is in Pacasao,
Camarines Sur. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff was transient in
Pacasao, Camarines Sur. The dispute was not referred to barangay settlement
proceeding prior to institution of civil action. A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed

Issue. Rule on the motion.

Resolution. The parties are therefore not only residents of different barangays and

municipalities but are also, in fact, residents of different provinces.  P.D. No. 1508
only applies to residents of the same municipalities or at most, under par. 1 of Section
3 thereof, residents of adjoining barangays situated in two different municipalities.  It[9]

would therefore be absurd if the compulsory conciliation process is made to apply to

residents of different and distant provinces, as the parties herein, when the law itself is
inapplicable to residents of different municipalities unless they are from
adjacent barangays.  Undoubtedly, the dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent is beyond the jurisdiction of any barangay court and could immediately be
filed in the regular courts of justice as the petitioner here did.

The private respondents submit that the subject dispute between them and the
petitioner is cognizable by the barangay Lupon.  They premise their contention on the
allegation that at the time the petitioner filed his complaint, he was temporarily
residing in Barangay Sto. Domingo, in Pacasao, Camarines Sur.  But even if the
[10]

foregoing allegation were a fact, the private respondents' argument remains seriously
flawed.  Residence in a barangay within the same municipality if only transient or
temporary is not enough to vest jurisdiction upon the barangay Lupon.

In the case of Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,  we have had the occasion to rule
[11]

that residence as contemplated in P.D. No. 1508 compels not only actual residence but
also membership in the barangay.  Here, it has not been shown that the petitioner
became a member of Barangay Sto. Domingo during his brief sojourn
in Pacasao, Camarines Sur.  It follows, lacking in that qualification, that he could not
then be considered, for the purpose of applying the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, as an
actual resident of Barangay Sto. Domingo.  There is therefore no need for the dispute
between him and the private respondents to be brought before a barangay Lupon.

Waiver. At any rate, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, even

assuming ex gratia argumenti that the dispute is cognizable by a barangay court, the
requirement of submission or referral to the Lupong Tagapayapa under P.D. 1508 is
merely a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court  and not [12]

jurisdictional.  It is the Judiciary Revamp Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) and the
[13]

Judiciary Act of 1948, and not P.D. No. 1508, which vest jurisdiction.  Accordingly,
[14]

the failure of the private respondents to raise timely this ground in a motion to dismiss
filed before their answer to the complaint, or in their answer, constitutes a waiver
thereof.  We have consistently adhered to that rule and we see no cogent reason to
[15]

deviate from it now.

5. [ G.R. No. 60367, September 30, 1982 ]

ATTY. VENUSTIANO T. TAVORA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROSARIO R. VELOSO, IN HER
CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA,
AND JULIETA CAPATI, RESPONDENTS.

Facts. A complaint for ejectment was filed. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a
resident of Marikina, while the defendant is a resident of Manila. The trial court dismissed
the case upon motion that the KPL was not complied with, reasoning that the KPL
provides that the “all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."

Issue. Was the dismissal correct?

Resolution. No. The quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule
on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus:
Although venue is generally determined by the residence of the parties, disputes
involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any
part thereof is situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere within the
same city/municipality.

6. [ G.R. No. 211966, August 07, 2017 ]

JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN, JOHN ABAGATNAN,
JENALYN A. DE LEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, AND JOY ABAGATNAN,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO AND ELSA CLARITO, RESPONDENTS.

Facts. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed in MTCC Roxas City. The complaint
alleges that not all the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City:
one resides in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while another resides in Brgy. de La Paz,
Pasig City. These two, however, authorized their sister and co-defendant, Josephine, a
resident of Roxas City, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings
before the MTCC. In the PTC, the issue on failure to comply with the KPL was not raised.

Issue. Should the case undergo KPL proceedings?

Resolution. No. In Pascual v. Pascual[32] the Court ruled that the express statutory
requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in
interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to
apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the
meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2,[33] in relation to Section 3,
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

The same ruling was reiterated in Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz[34] where the Court held
that "the requirement under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for
conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those
cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or municipality."

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all
the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City:[35] Jimmy resided in
Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City.[36] As
such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for
barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.

This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their
sister and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment
proceedings before the MTCC. As previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-
fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual residence" requirement
under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is concerned.

Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings
cannot be brought on appeal because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order,

7. [ G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008 ]

LIBRADA M. AQUINO, Petitioner, vs. ERNEST S. AURE[1], Respondent.

Facts. An ejectment complaint was filed in MTCC Roxas City. The complaint alleges that
the parties are residents of Roxas City. No KPL proceeding was availed prior to the filing
of the case. The defendant, in the answer, did not assail the lack of KPL proceeding.

Issue. May the case be resolved in its merits even if there was no compliance with the
KPL?

Resolution.

The conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance

therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the
jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself
voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC in
Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency
in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition.
By Aquino’s failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is
deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto.
Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for
Aure and Aure Lending’s failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she
is already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the
pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to
barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.

8. [ G.R. No. 157830, November 17, 2005 ]

DANTE M. PASCUAL, REPRESENTED BY REYMEL R. SAGARIO, PETITIONER, VS MARILOU
M. PASCUAL, RESPONDENT.

Facts. A complaint for annulment of TCT was filed. The complaint was filed by an agent,
as the principal is permanently residing abroad. The defendant and the agent are
residents of the same municipality. There was no compliance with the KPL prior to the
filing of the case.

Issue. Should the case be dismissed for non-compliance with the KPL?

Resolution. To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as

applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent,
would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2 of Rule
3[14] of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier
quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual
resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon
has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a
pre-condition to its filing in court.

9. [ G.R. No. 101328, April 07, 1993 ]

EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE
DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS, RESPONDENTS.

Facts. A complaint for annulment of deed of EJS was filed. Some but not all of the
parties are residing in the same municipality. The complaint was filed without compliance
with the KPL.

Issue. Should the case be dismissed?

Resolution. The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all
types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality, city or
province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or it
does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or it does not have a
certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case
could be dismissed on motion.[8] In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private
respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify
compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants reside in
barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces.

Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the purpose of the
law in discouraging litigation among members of the same barangay through conciliation
where the other parties reside in barangays other than the one where the Lupon is
located and where the dispute arose.

10. [ G.R. No. 160032, November 11, 2005 ]

ESTELA L. BERBA, PETITIONER, VS. JOSEPHINE PABLO AND THE HEIRS OF CARLOS
PALANCA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed. All the parties are residents of the
same municipality/city. KPL proceeding was conducted between some, but not all of the
parties, prior to the filing of the complaint.

Issue. Should the complaint be dismissed?

Resolution. The Court thus rules that the petitioner's complaint against respondent
Heirs of Carlos Palanca was premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded
by the petitioner as parties-respondents before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her
complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent
heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it. If the
complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Government
Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies.

In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in the City
of Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the petitioner and the
respondent heirs was thus a matter within the authority of the Lupon. Hence, the
petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer and the collection of back rentals should have
been first filed before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an
opportunity to settle the case amicably. However, the petitioner filed her complaint
against the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her
complaint was premature. The execution of the June 5, 1999 Agreement between
petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo does not amount to substantial compliance to
the requirements of the Local Government Code on mandatory barangay conciliation
proceedings.

11. [ A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184, March 02, 2000 ]

AMPARO S. FARRALES AND ATTY. RAUL S. SISON, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE RUBY B.
CAMARISTA, RESPONDENT.

Facts. A complaint for ejectment was filed. The respondent judge referred the parties to
KPL proceedings.

Issue. Was the referral correct?

Resolution. The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the
lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case
to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

The last paragraph of the aforecited provision apparently gives the Court discretion to
refer the case to the lupon for amicable settlement although it may not fall within the
authority of the lupon (such as the civil cases subject of this administrative proceeding).
However, referring the subject civil cases to the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of
discretion considering that the matter falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. As
aptly explained in Gachon vs. Devera, Jr. (274 SCRA 540 [1997]), the Rule on Summary
Procedure was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases." The fact that unlawful detainer cases fall under summary
procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of public policy. Thus, the
Rule frowns upon delays.

Manifestly, respondentÕs act of referring the subject cases to the lupon subverts the very
nature of the Rule and defeats its objective of expediting the adjudication thereof.
Besides, as correctly explained by the Court Administrator, the preliminary conference
under Sections 7 and 8 serves the purpose of a possible amicable settlement