Low Observable Principles, Stealth Aircraft and Anti-Stealth Technologies

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Low Observable Principles, Stealth Aircraft and Anti-Stealth Technologies
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Journal of Computations & Modelling, vol.4, no.1, 2014, 129-165
ISSN: 1792-7625 (print), 1792-8850 (online)
Scienpress Ltd, 2014
Low Observable Principles, Stealth Aircraft and

Anti-Stealth Technologies
Konstantinos Zikidis (Maj, HAF)1, Alexios Skondras (2nd Lt, HAF)2,

Charisios Tokas (2nd Lt, HAF)3,
Abstract
During the last decades, stealth technology has proven to be one of the most
effective approaches as far as the endeavor to hide from radar systems is concerned.
Especially for military aircraft, “stealth” or “low observable” technology has become
ubiquitous: all new aircraft types are designed taking into account low observable
principles and techniques, while existing jet fighters are considered for modification
in order to reduce their radar signature. Low radar signature for a target means that it
is detected and tracked at a shorter distance from a radar.
However, low observable does not mean no observable, i.e., complete

disappearance from the radar screens. Furthermore, stealthiness comes at a price.
Apart from the development cost, stealth aircraft have higher flyaway cost and
important maintenance costs, while they have significant operational limitations due
to the specific aircraft shape imposed and materials used, and also due to the limited
fuel and weapons, which have to be carried internally. Any pylon, tank, missile or pod
carried externally increases the radar signature.
Having realized the capabilities of stealth aircraft, many countries have been
developing anti-stealth technologies. The following systems have been reported to be
potential counter-stealth approaches: passive / multistatic radars, very low frequency
radars, over-the-horizon radars and sensitive IR sensor systems. It is commonly
1
Department of Aeronautical Sciences, Hellenic Air Force Academy, Dekelia Air Force
Base, Attica, Greece
E-mail: kzikidis@cs.ntua.gr
2
3
130 Low Observable Principles, Stealth Aircraft and Anti-Stealth Technologies
accepted that the U.S. exhibit an important advantage on the stealth domain, while
Russia and China are leading the anti-stealth effort, followed by other countries.
This paper will begin by a brief history of the development of stealth aircraft
and a short presentation of the most important stealth fighters of today. It will
continue by exploring the basic concepts of low observable principles, mainly
reduction of RCS – Radar Cross Section. Focusing on the F-35 stealth aircraft, there
will be an attempt to calculate the expected detection ranges for a number of
representative radar systems, taking into account an open-source estimation of the F-
35 fuselage RCS. Finally, there will be a brief presentation of systems which are
reported to have anti-stealth capabilities. Considering all such anti-stealth proposals, it
will become evident that no system alone seems to be capable of providing adequate
protection: a suitable combination of radar, sensors, weapon systems, tactical data
links, as well as tactics, should be employed to effectively counter stealth threats.
Keywords: Stealth aircraft, low observable, RCS, passive radars, multistatic radars,
VHF radars, IR sensors, IR Search and Track.
Introduction – Historical background of stealth aircraft
Man has always tried to evade the enemy by keeping his profile or “signature”
low. In the past, that meant to take care and hide from the eyes of the enemy, i.e., to
take into account the optical region. From the time of appearance and development of
the radar systems, the meaning of hiding expanded also to other parts of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Today, all military equipment take into account low
observable principles (l.o.), trying to be discreet at all aspects, reducing acoustic,
radio, radar and infrared emissions, as well as in the optical region, trying to blend
into the surrounding environment.
Historically, the first attempt towards the construction of an aircraft with l.o.
characteristics is considered to be the German Horten Ho-229, built a little before the
end of WWII. That aircraft, which never saw operational action, is said to incorporate
some special graphite paint absorbing radar waves. Its special “flying wing” shape is
supposed to have inspired Northrop to design later the B-2 stealth bomber.
K. C. Zikidis et al. 131
Until the '70s, among the aircraft types which exhibited, intentionally or not,
l.o. characteristics, one would include the British Avro Vulcan and two planes by
Lockheed, the U-2 Dragon Lady and most notably the impressive, Mach 3+, SR-71
Blackbird. Despite the efforts mainly of the U.S., none of these aircraft was really
difficult to detect by radar.
In the meantime, during the '60s, the Russian physicist Petr Ufimtsev studied
the scattering of electromagnetic waves and formulated what is known today as the
Physical Theory of Diffraction [1]. His work was not considered by the U.S.S.R. as
classified and was published. The main conclusion of his work (although it may have
not been explicitly stated) was that radar return is related to the edge configuration of
an object, not its size. U.S. engineers came across Ufimtsev's work and realized that
he had set the foundations of finite analysis of radar reflections [2]. The advances in
computer technology during the '70s allowed the performance of computer
simulations using concepts of Ufimtsev's work, while also allowed the design of fly-
by-wire systems, which would be essential for the control of aircraft not optimized
from the aerodynamic point of view. Following all these, after the 1975 static model
project Hopeless Diamond, Lockheed constructed two aircraft demonstrators, under
the code name Have Blue. Although both planes were lost during flight testing, the
program was deemed successful, proving the concept of a stealth fighter aircraft.
Figure 1. The Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth ground attack aircraft. First flight in
1981, revealed to public in 1988, took part in all major conflicts and was retired in 2008. In
the first Gulf war, it flew 1300 sorties, undetected and unharmed. It is true that if an F-117A
was spotted during flight testing at Groom Lake (or Area 51, as it is most commonly known),
in the '80s, it would be hard to realize that it is just a new jet fighter...Photo: public domain,
en.wikipedia.org
After the positive results of the Have Blue project, the U.S. awarded in 1978 a
contract to Lockheed to develop the F-117A. First flight was in 1981 and initial
operational capability was achieved in 1983. In total, 64 F-117s have been built. All
this series of projects were “black”, until late 1988, when the F-117A was revealed to
public. Since then, it saw operational action in almost every conflict of the U.S. Until
its retirement in 2008, the F-117A suffered only one loss due to enemy action, in 1999
in Kosovo war, when a Serbian Air Defense Battalion achieved to engage an F-117A,
using modified targeting radar.
Shortly after the decision to develop the F-117A, the U.S. decided to develop
also a long-range strategic bomber. In this way, the Northrop B-2 Spirit was born, a
subsonic four-engine strategic stealth bomber, 20 of which are still operational today.
The B-2 is capable to reach any place in the world (with air refueling), virtually
undetectable. L.o. principles were applied also to the Rockwell B1, resulting to the
B1-B Lancer supersonic strategic bomber, with lower radar signature but also lower
maximum speed at high altitude with respect to the B1-A prototype. However, this
compromise, along with several other improvements, allowed the rebirth of the B1
program, helping Rockwell (now part of Boeing) to obtain a contract for 100 aircraft.
2. Stealth Aircraft: Today
The F-117A, B-2 and B1-B can be regarded as the three emblematic l.o.
aircraft of the late '80s [3]. Having realized the capabilities offered by l.o. technology,
the U.S. went on developing a number of stealth jet fighters, such as:
1. The famous F-22A Raptor (first flight in 1997, production ended in 2011, with
195 planes built, 182 planes operational today): 5th generation air superiority
stealth fighter. Lockheed Martin (L.M.) was the prime contractor and Boeing
the main partner.
Figure 2. An F-22A Raptor, ready to go (photo by USAF). A single-seat, twin-engine, super-

maneuverable, 5th gen., air superiority stealth fighter. Taking into account its all-aspect
stealth, speed, agility, situational awareness and combat capabilities, it is considered as one of
the most capable jet fighters today. The U.S. have decided not to export it.
2. The L.M. F-35 Lightning II, a multirole 5th gen. fighter with stealth
capabilities (first flight in 2006, currently in initial production and testing).
There are three variants, the F-35A CTOL (Conventional Take-Off and
Landing), the F-35B STOVL (Short-Take Off and Vertical-Landing) and the
F-35C CV (Carrier Variant). The F-35 is based on the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) program, which started in the mid '90s. In 2001 the L.M. X-35 won the
JSF competition over the Boeing X-32. Consequently, L.M. was awarded the
System Development and Demonstration contract, to develop the F-35, based
on X-35. The development of the F-35 is funded primarily by the U.S. and
also by several other partner-nations, at varying levels [4].
3. Boeing is proposing a l.o. variant of its venerable fighter F-15E, the F-15SE
Silent Eagle. Initially, Boeing declared that the F-15SE would exhibit a l.o.
level comparable to the one of a 5th gen. aircraft, implying the F-35 [5]. In the
following days, a Boeing spokesman clarified that they meant that “the Silent
Eagle could meet the level of stealth approved by the U.S. Government for
release to international customers” [6], a point still reflected in their most
recent description of F-15SE (Aug. 13) [7].
4. Also, Boeing has extensively applied l.o. techniques on the F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet. Furthermore, in August 2013, Boeing started flight-testing of the
“Advanced Super Hornet”, a new variant of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, with
conformal fuel tanks, an enclosed weapons pod and “signature enhancements”

designed to substantially increase the range and reduce further the radar
signature ([8]).
Even though the U.S. retain a clear advantage, other countries are entering the
"stealth domain" as well:
5. The Sukhoi PAK FA is being developed by Sukhoi for the Russian Air Force.
Its prototype, T-50, flew for the first time in 2010. The PAK FA is a 5th gen.,
multirole, twin-engine jet fighter, which will replace a number of older
Russian fighters. According to available information, the PAK FA is not
expected to reach the stealth levels of F-22 ([9]), however, it may outperform
it in other aspects ([10]). Based on PAK FA, Sukhoi will develop with HAL
(Hindustan Aeronautics Limited), the “Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft”
(FGFA) for India.
6. China is developing the Chengdu J-20 (first flight in 2011) and more recently
the smaller Shenyang J-31 (first flight in 2012), both twin-engined. Both
designations (J-20, J-31) are rather unofficial [11].
7. In Europe, l.o. techniques have been applied to Rafale (Dassault Aviation) and
Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS), reducing drastically their radar signatures, even
though technically they are not stealth aircraft ([12]). Rafale is supposed to
employ also active techniques to hide from enemy radars, using its advanced
countermeasures suite ([13]).
8. Among other efforts towards developing a l.o. aircraft, one should also
mention TF-X, a 5th gen. fighter being developed by Turkish Aerospace
Industries ([14]), in partnership with SAAB AB, according to Turkish press.
First flight is scheduled for 2023 ([15]). In the next decade, more than 250 TF-
X are expected to serve alongside the 100 F-35 which Turkey intends to
procure.
Apart from manned aircraft, l.o. technology is applied to Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) as well. An indicative list would include the Boeing X-45, the BAE
Systems Taranis, the Dassault nEUROn (Greece participates in this project), the
EADS Barracuda, the L.M. RQ-170 Sentinel, the MiG Skat and the Northrop
Grumman X-47B, which on 10-07-13 landed on an aircraft carrier at sea (for the first
time for a UAV).
Figure 3. The F-35A Lightning II during development phase. A single-engine, 5th gen.
multirole fighter with stealth capabilities, set out to repeat the success of the F-16 ([4]).
3. Radar Cross Section
The Radar Cross Section (RCS) is a measure of the power scattered from a
target to a certain direction, when the target is illuminated by electromagnetic
radiation, i.e., a measure of how detectable a target is by radar. Concerning
monostatic radars, where the antenna is used for both transmission and reception (the
majority of radar systems), RCS is a measure of the backscatter or radar return of a
target. A larger RCS means that an object is more easily detected with radar.
Trying to avoid formal definitions, the most intuitive description of RCS is the
comparison with a metal sphere with a cross section of 1 m², i.e., with a diameter of
roughly 1,13 m: the RCS of an object is the cross sectional area of a perfect metal
sphere which yields the same radar return with the object. RCS is measured usually in
m². To cope with the large dynamic range of the RCS values, it can be measured also
in decibel with reference to one square meter (dBsm), which equals 10·log (RCS in
m²) ([16]). Typical RCS values for various targets can be found in Table 1. Real RCS
values are highly classified. Thus, these values are indicative and should be
considered in the sense of the “order of magnitude”.
The importance of the RCS relies on the fact that it takes part in the radar
equation, affecting directly the maximum detection range of a target. The fundamental
form of the radar equation is as follows ([17]):
where is the maximum detection range, the transmission power, and the
gain and the effective area of the transmitting and receiving antennae (which coincide
in the monostatic radar), is the RCS of the target and the minimum detectable
signal. Therefore, for given radar parameters , , and , the maximum
detection range is proportional to the 4th root of the target RCS: .
Figure 4. A Sukhoi T-50 during the recent MAKS 2013 air-show (photo from lenta.ru). The
T-50 is the prototype for the PAK FA, a 5th gen. stealth multirole fighter, expected to equip
the Russian Air Force and Navy in 2016. It will also be the basis for the FGFA for India.
For example, if a typical air-defence radar could detect a target with an RCS
of 1 m² (small fighter) at 200 nautical miles (NM), it would detect a target of 5 m²
RCS (large fighter) theoretically at 299 NM (however, the upper limit of most ground
radars is set to 255 NM). A reduced RCS fighter of 0,1 m² RCS would be detected at
112 NM and a stealth fighter of 0,001 m² RCS would be detected at 36 NM. The same
logic applies to any kind of radar. However, concerning fighter aircraft radars, as well
as air-to-air missile seeker radars, the respective ranges are considerably shorter
compared to the ones of a ground radar.
In theory, the RCS of some simple objects, such as a perfect sphere, can be
well defined. In practice, most targets are rather complex objects and their RCS
usually fluctuates considerably, as they move with respect to a radar. In fact, the
monostatic or backscatter RCS depends on the following ([18]):
 Target geometry
 Target material composition, especially for the surface
 Position of radar antenna relative to target

 Angular orientation of target relative to radar antenna
 Frequency of the electromagnetic energy
 Radar antenna polarization.
4. Radar Cross Section Reduction
The four basic methods of reducing RCS are shaping, use of radar energy
absorbing materials, passive cancellation and active cancellation ([18]), and will be
analyzed in the following paragraphs.
4.1 Shaping
The most important factor affecting the RCS is the geometry or the shape of
the target, not its size. In order to reduce the RCS, the surfaces and edges should be
orientated in such way so as to reflect the radar energy away from an expected radar
antenna and not back to it. Considering the flat surfaces (facets) and the acute angles
of the F-117, it is understood that it was designed in a way that the expected radar
energy would be reflected to irrelevant directions and not back to the emitting radar.
The designers tried to avoid any possible surface or edge whose normal vectors would
look at a direction where a possible enemy radar might be found, especially for the
frontal aspect.
Therefore, in the frame of RCS reduction, all bumps, curves etc should be
avoided. In the same way, any external load (pylons, bombs, missiles, fuel tanks,
pods) would considerably augment the total RCS. This is the reason why l.o. aircraft
carry their armament internally, in special bays. Furthermore, armament bay and
landing gear bay doors should close tightly, with no gaps in between. Generally, any
irregularity of the surface could incur an RCS increase. Propellers are strictly
forbidden, while the first stage engine blades should be carefully hidden inside the
intake duct. The whole air intake construction is critical, when designing a low RCS
aircraft.
Figure 5. The Dassault nEUROn stealth Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). It is a
"technology demonstrator" developed by Dassault (France), Alenia Aermacchi (Italy), SAAB
(Sweden), EADS-CASA (Spain), Hellenic Aerospace Industry (Greece) and RUAG
(Switzerland)4.
Sharp dihedral corners and parallel surfaces contribute also to the RCS.
Therefore, the twin vertical fin empennage, as in the classic F-15E (not the F-15SE),
is prohibited. Stealth aircraft have either canted tail fins or no tail fin at all (as in the
B-2 Spirit). Regarding existing stealth aircraft, it is also evident that the leading edges
of the wings and of the horizontal tail fins (stabilizers) are parallel. This applies to the
trailing edges, as well. The aim is always the same: reflect the radar energy to certain,
irrelevant directions, and thus keeping the (monostatic) RCS low.
Conventional (mechanically scanning) radar antennas should also be avoided,
since the antenna itself is an ideal radar energy reflector, increasing the RCS when
another radar is looking at it. For this reason, the F-117A carried no radar at all. More
recent l.o. aircraft make use of electronically scanned array radars, which offer lower
RCS contribution, notably AESA (Active Electronically Scanning Array) radars.
Furthermore, these radars should exhibit LPI (Low Probability of Intercept)
characteristics, in an attempt to avoid detection by enemy ESM (Electronic Support
Measures) systems, trying to detect and locate radar emissions.
Apart from the reduction of the aerodynamic drag, which is a positive side-
effect of the absence of external loads, optimizing the aircraft design for RCS
reduction is generally incompatible with the aerodynamic principles. Furthermore, it
4
Photo: Zikidis, K. "nEUROn at Le Bourget air show". 2007. JPEG file
would be impossible to control aircraft such as the F-117A and the B-2 without the
help of the electronic flight control system (Fly-By-Wire). In general, the application
of low RCS principles is a trade-off of cost, aerodynamic performance, RCS and other
parameters.
4.2 Radar absorbing materials
The special shaping is the most important l.o. method and it is responsible for
the main part of RCS reduction. The second technique is the use of special Radar-
Absorbent Materials (RAM) which absorb (part of) the received radar energy and
convert it to heat, reducing in this way the reflected energy. RAM neither absorb all
received radar energy, nor are efficient at all frequency bands. It is considered as a
supplementary approach, helping in reducing RCS when shaping techniques cannot
be applied, e.g., in leading edges or engine intakes.
Target RCS (m2) References
Navy cruiser (length 200m) 14000 [19]
Β-52 Stratofortress 100 – 125 [3], [19], [20], [21]
C-130 Hercules 80 [19]
F-15 Eagle 10 – 25 [22], [23], [20]
Su-27 Flanker 10 – 15 [22], [23]
F-4 Phantom 6 – 10 [3], [19]
Mig-29 Fulcrum 3–5 [3], [22], [23]
F-16 A 5 [20]
F-18 C/D Hornet 1–3 [20], [22], [21]
M-2000 1–2 [22], [23]
F-16 C (with reduced RCS) 1,2 [20], [21]
T-38 Talon 1 [19]
B-1B Lancer 0,75 – 1 [3], [19]
Sukhoi FGFA prototype* 0,5 [24]

Tomahawk TLAM 0,5 [20]
Exocet, Harpoon 0,1 [21]
Eurofighter Typhoon 0,1 class [22], [23], [21]
F-18 E/F Super Hornet 0,1 class [22], [23], [21]
F-16 IN Super Viper** 0,1 class [12]
Rafale 0,1 class [3], [12], [22], [23], [21]
B-2 Spirit 0,1 or less [3], [21]
F-117A Nighthawk 0,025 or less [3], [21], [20]
bird 0,01 [17], [20]
F-35 Lightning II 0,0015 – 0,005 [20], [22], [23], [21], [25]
F-22 Raptor 0,0001 – 0,0005 [20], [22], [23], [21]
insect 0,00001 [17]
Table 1. Indicative RCS values for various targets. All values given “as is”. Real RCS values
are highly classified. The above values, most probably, refer to the frontal aspect (“head on”)
RCS of a “clean” aircraft (without external loads), in the Χ-band (8 − 12 GHz).5 6
This approach has been followed since WWII, where special paints containing
carbon (an imperfect conductor) have been used to reduce the radar return of the
snorkels of German submarines. Even though carbon is still being used for such
purposes, today magnetic absorbers, based on compounds of iron, are preferred for
operational systems [18]. The iron ball paint is a common RAM type and has been
used in various l.o. aircraft.
In any case, the application of RAM is also a trade-off, since any special paint
or coating add to cost and weight (reducing performance), while RAM may require
5
* Refers to the derivative of the Sukhoi PAK FA for India. It is expected that the
production versions of PAK FA (for Russia) and FGFA (for India) will incorporate
more stealthy features than the T-50, their common prototype. In any case, perhaps it
is too early to estimate the RCS of these types.
6
** An F-16 variant proposed to India, for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
competition
special treatment and maintenance. For example, the B-2 Spirit requires air-
conditioned hangars and costly maintenance to retain its l.o. capabilities [26]. It
should be mentioned that the F-35 features a new l.o. substance called fiber mat,
which according to L.M. officials has been “cured into the composite skin of the
aircraft”, implying that it requires no maintenance [27].
4.3 Passive cancellation
Sometimes also mentioned as “impedance loading”, passive cancellation is

based on the idea of creating a (passive) echo source, whose amplitude and phase
would be adjusted to cancel another echo source (e.g., by drilling a cavity or port of
specific dimensions and shape on the object body). This may be possible for very
simple objects, however it is prohibitively difficult for complex objects like an
aircraft, while a small change of the radar parameters or the simple movement of the
object-target could lead to the amplification of the radar return. In fact, this approach
attracted some interest in the past but now seems not so promising anymore ([18]).
4.4 Active cancellation
Also called “active loading”, active cancellation is based on the same principle
as passive cancellation, which is the creation of an appropriate “destructive” echo,
which would cancel the real echo of the target to the radar. Therefore, the target
should emit electromagnetic energy synchronized with the received radar energy, with
proper amplitude and phase in order to minimize the reflected signal. In other words,
the target should take into account the direction of arrival of the radar energy, the
amplitude, the frequency, the phase, its own RCS characteristics for the specific
frequency and direction, and should be adequately intelligent to create the proper
waveform, emitting the right pulse at the right time to the right direction. The
technical difficulties are obvious, as well as the possibility to convert the target into a
“beacon” of radar energy, in case of wrong implementation. This technique has been
reported to be applied by the Rafale ([28], [29]) and has been implicitly confirmed by
Dassault ([13]), without revealing any details ([30]).
Another attempt in the category of “active stealth” is the so-called “plasma

stealth” technology. There have been reports that the Russians were conducting
experiments on this idea. According to available information, this technology employs

ionized gas (plasma), which is produced by a special device on-board and injected in
front of the aircraft, creating a protective cloud and reducing considerably the aircraft
RCS. However, apart from an interview in 1999 ([31]), there were no further updates
on the issue ever since ([32], [33]).
5. F-35: the Hype, the Skepticism and the Reality
According to L.M. officials, the 5th gen. F-22 Raptor brings a considerable
increase in capability and survivability over legacy fighters, combining situational
awareness, fire power, speed, maneuverability and sufficient l.o. levels from every
aspect ([34]). Actually, this point of view is shared also by many specialists. The U.S.
have decided not to export the F-22.
On the other hand, the F-35, the derivative of JSF, began as an export
program, funded by the U.S. and several partner nations. The F-35 is expected to
equip mainly the U.S. (U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy) and 11 other partner
nations. More than 3000 planes are expected to be acquired over the years (2443 by
the U.S., the rest by the other partner nations) ([4]). Therefore, it is considered as one
of the most important aircraft programs today. L.M. officials have claimed that the F-
35 is a multirole, air-superiority stealth fighter, several times more capable than the
aircraft types which is expected to replace, while it has been implied that it is
comparable to the F-22 ([34]).
However, various issues which have been reported during the years of the F-
35 development have proven such claims overwhelming. Since Nov. 11, DoD has
officially acknowledged 13 issues which should be solved ([35]). Among these issues,
there are possible structural problems concerning the life of the airframe, taking into
account that the fatigue testing program had reached only 20% at that time. However,
the main problems are the significant delays, with respect to the original schedule, and
the cost, which has nearly doubled ([36]). The integration of the various subsystems is
also retarded. Millions of lines of C++ code have yet to be written ([37]).
Furthermore, the flight testing program has still a long way ahead, which means that
new issues may appear.
Figure 6. F-35 RCS (Radar Cross Section) estimation as a function of the viewing angle,
from lower altitude (depression angle < –20°), at the VHF, L, S and X frequency bands ([44]).
Green corresponds to very low RCS, yellow to low RCS and red means just “reduced” RCS.
The best stealth performance is expected at the X-band, mainly from the frontal aspect and to
a lesser extend from the rear aspect.At lower frequency bands, stealth performance is
degraded.
Apart from the above, there have been serious doubts concerning the real
operational capabilities of the F-35, e.g., the thrust-to-weight ratio, the limited ability
to carry armament and fuel, the combat radius, the maneuverability etc [38][39][40].
There are also some concerns for the stealth levels of the export versions [41],
especially after the U.S. denial to provide the source code to their partners [42], even
to the U.K., the sole “Level 1” partner.
Concerning the stealth capabilities of the F-35, the well known think tank “Air
Power Australia” has published a series of articles, highlighting the weaknesses of the
F-35 in comparison with the F-22 and also modern Russian fighters and air-defence
systems ([43][44]). Their line of thinking has raised controversy and they have been
criticized ([45]). However, their approach is a relatively well documented one, among
the very few publicly available, which leads to some plausible estimations.
Therefore, it is claimed that the F-35 fuselage design, as a result of a trade-off

between cost and requirements, did not follow the “standard way”, as in F-117 or the
B-2. For the F-35, the approach was the construction of a l.o. aircraft, taking seriously
into account the cost parameter. Therefore, in the frame of cost reduction, some
capabilities were “sacrificed”: RCS is really low in the X-band (8 – 12 GHz) and in
the Ku-band (12 – 18 GHz), while it is not so low at lower frequency bands. The
scope is the break of the killing chain: even if the F-35 is detected by surveillance
radar, it will not be easy to be engaged by a fire control radar, which usually operate
in the X or Ku bands. On the other hand, the F-22 presents a lower RCS from all
aspects and at more frequency bands, of course at a considerably higher cost.
The production F-35 is expected to present a higher RCS than the prototype
X-35, since more volume was required for the internal equipment and armament bays.
The curves of the redesigned fuselage will incur an RCS increase, from some certain
directions. It was calculated that the RCS will remain very low from the frontal sector
and more precisely from a sector of 29ο in front of the aircraft. However, the RCS will
not be so low from the lateral aspect and also from the rear aspect. The whole
behavior deteriorates at lower frequency bands. The researchers of the Air Power
Australia created a 3-D model of the underside of the fuselage and tried to calculate
the RCS ([46]), using the POFACETS algorithm, developed at the Naval Postgraduate
School of the USN ([47][48]), proving in this way their arguments.
After the initial hype and the subsequent criticism, a more balanced line of
thinking is that many complex programs face cost overruns and schedule delays, but
finally they reach their goals, which are maybe readjusted on the way. It is true that
the F-35 is one of the most ambitious programs ever, trying to integrate state-of-the-
art technologies, such as two complex electro-optical systems with a Helmet Mounted
Display System, power-by-wire with electrohydrostatic actuators, a new AESA radar,
a lift fan mechanism for the -B variant, etc, while retaining stealth capabilities, at a
tight time schedule and certain cost constraints ([49], [50]). Even more, this program
involves several partner nations, which contribute also to the manufacturing process.
Some specialists say that the F-35 program is just too big to fail. Even though this is
not so reassuring in today's volatile environment, it is expected that eventually most

of the F-35 issues will be dealt with, more or less. The aircraft should live up to the
expectations, even if some of them may have to be redefined to a certain degree.
6. F-35 detection estimation for various radar systems
In any case, no-one doubts that the F-35 will exhibit stealth capabilities,
maybe not as good as the F-22 but most probably better than any other aircraft. In
order to estimate the maximum detection range for the F-35, first there should be an
estimation of the F-35 RCS, and then a calculation, using the radar equation and the
logic mentioned before, with respect to the detection range for a standard target used
for comparison purposes. As a “standard target” for the comparison, a 1 m² RCS
target will be used. A target of 1 m² RCS corresponds to a small fighter, such as the
Northrop T-38 Talon ([19]). The detection ranges for the standard target of 1 m² RCS
for the radar systems under consideration are estimated as follows:
a. AN/APG68(V)9 (Northrop Grumman): the fire control radar of the most

recent variants of F-16, like Block 52+, operating in the X-band. The detection range
for a 1 m² RCS target is assumed to be 40 NM [51].
b. S-743D Martello (Alenia Marconi Systems): a 3-D long range surveillance

radar, operating in the L-band (1 – 2 GHz). The detection range of a target with an
RCS of 1 m² is of the order of 400 km (216 NM) [52].
c. AR 327 Commander (British Aerospace): an S-band (2 – 4 GHz) long-range
tactical radar, providing 3-D coverage up to 470 km [53]. The 1 m² RCS detection
range is estimated at 350 km (190 NM) [54].
d. HR 3000 HADR (Raytheon): another 3-D radar in the S-band. Maximum
range: 500 km, a “standard target” is detected at 320 km (173 NM) [55].
e. Search radar 64N6E of the S-300 PMU-1 system (Almaz - Antey):
operating in the S-band, with a maximum range of 300 km (162 NM), and 280 km for
a target with RCS ≥ 4 m² [56]. The detection range for a 1 m² RCS target is calculated
at 110 NM.
f. Engagement radar 30N6E1 of the S-300 PMU-1 system (Almaz - Antey):
operating in the X-band, with a maximum range of 150 km (81 NM) [57]. Assuming
that this range also corresponds to an RCS of 4 m², the detection range for the
“standard target” is 55 NM.
g. AN/MPQ-65 of the Patriot PAC-3: operating in the C-band (4 – 8 GHz), it
exhibits a max. range of 170 km, in a 120° sector [58]. Assuming that this range
corresponds to a large fighter with an RCS of 5 m², then the “standard target” can be
seen approximately at 60 NM.
h. DA08 (Thales): S-band, medium range surveillance radar used in some
frigates, with a detection range of 78 to 92 NM for 2 m² RCS targets [59]. For
calculation purposes, it is assumed that the “standard target” can be detected at 76
NM.
i. LW08 (Thales): L-band, long range surveillance radar used in some frigates,
with a detection range of 145 NM for 2 m² RCS targets [59], i.e., 122 NM for the
“standard target”.
Frequency / IEEE Band Peak value Average value Peak value Average value
(in dBsm) (in dBsm) (in m²) (in m²)
1 GHz / L –14 –22 0,04 0,0063
3 GHz / S –15 –25 0,0316 0,00316
8 GHz / X –13 –35 0,05 0,0003
16 GHz / Ku –18 –42 0,016 0,000063
Table 2. Estimated peak / average RCS of the F-35 fuselage, for an angle 45° off-beam from
the front and a depression angle of –3,6° to –20° from below, taking into account the
application of RAM (Radar-Absorbent Materials) by a further reduction of 10 dBsm ([46]).
Having established the base of comparison, the next step is to estimate the
RCS of the F-35 for the respective frequency bands. As mentioned earlier, the
researchers of the Air Power Australia created a 3-D model of the underside of the F-
35. In [46], there are matrices of the calculated RCS for certain conditions: in
“angles off beam” 10°, 20°, 30° and 45°, for various depression angles (simulating
long, medium and short range surface-to-air missile systems) and for 4 frequency
bands. At all cases, the peak and the average RCS values were recorded. The
calculated values (in dBsm) were further reduced by 10 dBsm, assuming the
application of Radar-Absorbent Materials. However, the actual RCS is expected to be

higher, since there will be other parts contributing to it, apart from the fuselage
underside.
Taking into account the case of an angle of 45° “off beam” (i.e., looking at the
plane from the front-left or front-right side) and a depression angle of -3,6° to -20°
(corresponding to a long range detection), the relevant RCS values are depicted in
Table 2.
Following the above and taking into account that the maximum detection
range is proportional to the 4th root of the RCS, the estimated detection ranges for the
radar systems under consideration can be found in Table 3. For comparison
purposes, there are also the corresponding detection ranges for a target of 5 m² RCS
(large fighter or conventional fighter in combat configuration) and of 0,0015 m² (F-
35 RCS revealed by the US Air Force ([25])).
The results from Table 2 confirm the argument that the average RCS increases
as the frequency gets lower. However, they also confirm that the F-35 RCS is really
low, at least as far as the fuselage is concerned. Especially in the X-band, the
calculated (average) RCS is even lower than the one revealed by USAF and the
decrease in detection range with respect to the “standard target” is dramatic. For
example, the APG68 of the F-16 is expected to “see” the F-35 at a distance of
roughly 5 NM. The expected decrease of the detection range for the F-35 with respect
to conventional aircraft depicted in Table 3 indicates that the F-35 will be a real
danger, and not only as a first strike weapon. In the following sections, certain
systems that are believed to exhibit anti-stealth capabilities will be presented.
Radar system (ΙΕΕΕ RCS RCS F-35 @ 45° F-35 @ 45° F-35 @ 0°
Radar Band) 5 m² 1 m² peak value average value RCS 0,0015 m²
AN/APG68(V)9 (X) 59 40 19 5 8
S743D (L) 255 216 97 61 >>43
AR327 (S) 255 190 80 45 >37
HR-3000 (S) 259 173 73 41 >34
S-300 64Ν6Ε (S) 162 110 46 26 >22

S-300 30N6E1 (X) 81 55 26 7 11
Patriot MPQ-65 (C)* 90 60 25 14 >12
DA-08 (S) 113 76 32 18 >15
LW-08 (L) 182 122 55 34 >>24
* Operates in the C-band (4 - 8 GHz) but the 3 Ghz RCS was used for the calculations.
Table 3. Estimated detection ranges for the F-35 in nautical miles (NM)
7. Multistatic Radars
Taken into account that l.o. aircraft have been optimized mainly for the
monostatic radar type, the multistatic approach (where there is one or more
transmitter antennae and many receiver antennae, at different locations) has been
proposed as a possible counter-stealth candidate. It is reminded that the basic l.o.
principle is shaping, in order to reflect the radar energy to irrelevant directions and not
back to the emitting radar. The main idea of the multistatic radar approach is that one
or more receiver antennae will be in such a position to receive the scattered echo.
Such radar systems exhibit increased survivability, due to the redundancy of
the receivers and their passive operation. If one receiver is eliminated, the system may
continue to operate, even with degraded performance.
52E6MU Struna-1MU / Barrier E (NNIIRT, Russia): Actually, this seem to be
the only proposed multistatic system. It provides early warning against low RCS
targets, at medium to low altitudes. The transmitters operate at low power rating (1 –
10 Watt) at 390 – 430 Mhz. Up to 10 such systems can be connected together,
separated by 40 – 50 km, forming a radar fence up to 400 km, controlled by a central
station ([60], [61] and [62]).
AASR – Associative Aperture Synthesis Radar (Saab Microwave Systems,
Sweden): This program was stopped in 2000, just before being tested, after 8 years of
development. It was a system of UHF transmitters and 900 nodes – antennae.
Expected to provide high accuracy (of the order of 1,5 m) but it was also quite costly
(150 mUSD). However, the most important drawback was that, in order for the target
to be detected, it should be between transmitters and receivers, i.e., it should already
be over friendly ground ([63] and [64]).
8. Passive Coherent Location (PCL) Radars

Systems of this category consist of receivers utilizing the existing radio waves,
e.g., radio (SW, FM, DAB), TV (analog, DVB, HD), mobile telephony (GSM, 3G)
and Wi-Fi. They employ advanced techniques like digital beamforming, adaptive
filtering and cross-correlation between the directly received signal and the one
received after reflection on the target. There can be more than one receivers or
transmitters used (multistatic passive radar).
Passive radars offer lower procurement and operating costs. The absence of
any emission protects them also from being detected by ESM and targeted by anti-
radar missiles. Their potential anti-stealth capabilities rely on the use of low
frequency bands, where l.o. aircraft may be more vulnerable to detection, as well as to
the fact that they are bistatic, i.e., the transmitter is at a different location from the
receiver. On the other hand, there are some issues, due to the fact that such radio
transmissions are not designed for radar use. PCL systems are expected to be used as
complements to conventional radar systems, to cover gaps of the airspace monitoring,
especially at medium to low levels. For example, they can be used for Air Traffic
Control at terminal areas, since no transmission permissions are required ([65],[ 66]).
During the last couple of years, it seems that there is a considerable ongoing research
and development on PCL systems and new systems are continuously revealed. E.g.:
Figure 7. The Thales Homeland Alerter 100 ([68]). Figure 8. The Cassidian passive radar ([71]).
Homeland Alerter 100 (Thales, France): Introduced in 2005, the HA 100

utilizes FM radio and mobile telephony signals. It covers medium to low altitudes,
protecting sensitive facilities, such as factories, airports and other high value assets. It
exhibits a range of 100 km, with an operational ceiling at 20000 ft. It can be fixed or
movable, operating autonomously or connected with other radars or Control and
Reporting Centers ([67] and [68]).
AULOS Passive Covert Location Radar (Selex Sistemi Integratti, Italy):

Presented for the first time at Farnborough 2012, even though development had begun
in 2005. Employs FM radio and digital TV signals and exhibits a range of “several
hundred kilometers”. It is a compact system, transportable on a 4-wheel towed
vehicle. Apart from its possible military use, it is suggested for Air Traffic Control,
covering medium to low altitudes ([69] and [70]).
Passive Radar (Cassidian, Germany): In July 2012, Cassisian, a subsidiary of

EADS, stated that they have developed a passive radar system utilizing existing radio
and TV signals, for civil and military use, capable of detecting stealth aircraft.
According to Cassidian, this is a state-of-the-art system and can be installed and used
on a van type vehicle ([71]).
Recently, in September 2013, South Africa was reported to have successfully

developed a prototype passive radar system, with a range of 150 km ([72]).
Silent Sentry (L.M., U.S.A.): Introduced in 1999, it can provide long range
detection with fairly good resolution, tracking 100 targets up to 150 NM. It utilizes
FM radio and TV transmissions. It is able to track aircraft, missiles, ships and ground
vehicles, with a 250 m accuracy on the horizontal plane, 1000 ft for the vertical plane
and ±2 m/sec for the speed. An HD signal would offer higher accuracy ([73] and
[74]). In fact, this system has disappeared from the L.M. website, maybe in order to
avoid competing with other L.M. products, like the F-35.
CELLDAR – CELL PHONE RADAR (BAE Systems – Roke, U.K.): It is

supposed to use mobile telephony signals to detect and locate air and surface targets
in 2D, up to 60 km and to an altitude of 10000 ft. However, there is no update during
the last years ([75] and [76]).
9. ESM (Electronic Support Measures) Passive Sensors

ESM systems are able to detect and locate targets, exploiting any radio
transmissions from these targets. Due to their passive operation, sometimes they are
also referred to as passive radars. Their principle of operation is based on

triangulation or multilateration, using TDOA (Time Difference Of Arrival) methods.
Such systems exploit mainly omni-directional aircraft transmissions, such as V/UHF
communications, SSR/IFF, TACAN/DME, tactical data links, and to a lesser extend
radar and jammer transmissions.
Evidently, in order to detect a target with an ESM system, the target is

required to emit something. However, strike aircraft, like the F-35, are not expected to
use any of the above systems when in operational conditions, apart perhaps from their
radar, which is anyway not so easy to detect, due to its narrow beam. Therefore, such
systems do not offer any real operational advantage in detecting stealth aircraft ([77]).
Among the proposed ESM systems, one could suggest the following:
 Kolchuga (Topaz, Ukraine) ([78]).
 Tamara (Tesla) and its successor, Vera-NG (Era, Czechoslovakia) ([79]).
 VEGA 85V6-A (Rosoboronexpoert, Russia) ([77]).
 DWL002 (China Electronics Technology Corp. – CETC, China)( [77]).
Figure 9. The 3D VHF AESA Radar 1L119 NEBO SVU, developed by NNIIRT (Russia) and
offered for export by Rosoboronexport (the sole state export entity for defence products in
Russia). It is a mobile, long range surveillance radar, featuring modern technology, able to
detect stealth aircraft from considerable distances ([80]).
10. Low Frequency Band Radars
L.o. aircraft have been designed with the aim to reduce radar energy
backscatter mainly in the X and Ku bands. At lower frequency bands, the RCS of a
l.o. aircraft is expected to increase. This is due to the fact that, in that case, the
wavelength becomes comparable with parts of the aircraft, e.g., the stabilators or the
wings, and therefore scattering enters the resonance or Mie region ([17] and [30]): the
RCS fluctuates considerably as a function of the wavelength, depending on the shape
of the target, and it may become up to 10 times higher or even more, with respect to
the RCS in the optical region ([81]). Furthermore, RAM are not so efficient at lower
frequencies. For these reasons, low frequency band radars are expected to exhibit
serious anti-stealth capabilities ([65] and [82]).
Most of the WWII radars were low frequency band radars, operating in the
VHF or UHF bands, due to technological constraints. The U.S.S.R. kept using such
radars, at least during the '50s and the '60s. However, the advances in electronics
during the Cold War allowed the design of radars using higher frequencies, offering
better performance and requiring smaller antennae. Thus, surveillance radars
operating in the L or S bands were becoming more and more common. After the first
Gulf war in 1990, where the Iraqi air-defence was proven impotent against the F-
117A, Russia restored its interest on low frequency band radars, applying new
technologies. It is noted that the only case of a stealth aircraft lost due to enemy action
(the F-117A shot during the Kossovo war [30]) was associated with the use of a
modified soviet-made VHF radar (P-18 "Spoon Rest") ([83]).
Another advantage that such radars offer is that they do not "warn" the targets
they follow, since their transmission frequency is too low to be detected by an
ordinary countermeasures system. For the same reason, they cannot be engaged by the
majority of anti-radar systems, such as the AGM-88 HARM or the UAV Harpy. Some
representative examples of low frequency band radars are the following:
Figure 10. The pioneering Nebo M combines three existing 3D radars, the VHF band Nebo
SVU, the L-band Protivnik G and the S/X-band Gamma S1. All tracks are fused in the
command post. It is designed to counter l.o. threats like the F-35. Placing the radars as in
drawing, left, with respect to the threat axis, the VHF radar offers early warning, while the L-
and X-band radars offer finer track, illuminating the targets from angles where the RCS is
increased. Furthermore, Nebo M exhibits better jamming resistance ([80]).
11. 3D VHF Radar AESA 1L119 NEBO SVU

(Rosoboronexport, Russia).
Developed by NNIIRT (Russia), the 3D surveillance radar NEBO SVU has

been operational since 2004. It uses digital processing and solid state electronics,
employing an array of 84 Yagi type antennae. Installed on a vehicle, it can be
transported within 20 min. The maximum ranges reported for its later export version,
for a target of 2,5 m² RCS (typical target used as reference in many Russian systems)
are as follows:
– 65 km for a target at 500 m altitude,
– 270 km for a target at 10000 m altitude,
– 380 km for a target at 20000 m altitude.
Accuracy: 200 m in range, 1,5° vertically and 0,5° for the azimuth. It can track
up to 100 targets and can be connected to an S-300 system anti-aircraft system, to
designate l.o. targets to the engagement radar [80][56].
3D Multiband Radar RLM-M NEBO-M (Rosoboronexport, Russia): Presented
in 2008, the Nebo-M is a system of 3 pre-existing 3D radars of NNIIRT, which were
properly upgraded and modified to provide radar picture to a central command and
control station. These radars are: the above-mentioned Nebo SVU (VHF-band), the
Protivnik G (L-band) and the Gamma S1 (S/X-band). All subsystems are on-board 8
× 8 trucks. There are no official statements concerning the range, however according
to estimations, it is expected to be 40 % higher than the one of the NEBO SVU, with
better resolution [62][80][81].
2D VHF Radar VOSTOK E (Agat/KB Radar, Belarus): mobile radar (on a 6 x
6 truck), able to deploy in 6 min, featuring digital, solid state design. In the case of a
"heavy" environment of electronic warfare, it can detect the F-117 at 57 km
(according to other sources, at 72 km [62]) and the F-16 at 133 km. In a clear
environment, the F-117 can be detected at 350 km [84].
AESA L-band Airborne Radar (Tikhomirov NIIP, Russia): Presented at
MAKS 2009, it is designed to be installed inside the leading edge of the wings of a
fighter, such as the Su-35. It is expected to provide higher detection and tracking
ranges for l.o. targets with respect to other airborne X-band AESA radars ([85]).
12. Over The Horizon Radars
If HF-band (3 – 30 MHz) waves are transmitted towards the ionosphere, under

certain conditions, they may be reflected back to earth. The ionospheric reflection of
the HF waves is the principle of operation of the Over-The-Horizon Radars (OTHR).
Such radars offer extremely long detection ranges (from 700 to 4000 km) but also
very low resolution (from some hundreds of meters up to 20 km). Apart from using
very low frequencies, they “see” their targets from above, offering considerable
capabilities of detecting l.o. targets. It is noted that stealth aircraft are optimized for
radars in front and from below, while from above they may present higher RCS, due
to the cockpit and the engine intake and exhaust.
An OTHR system requires large facilities of antenna arrays, offering a

strategic advantage. Obviously, their cost and limitations, especially their very high
minimum range, constrain their use. Some of the few existing OTHR systems are the
following:
– AN/FPS-118 Over-The-Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) Radar, covering
distances from 900 to 4800 km (L.M., U.S.A.) [86].
– AN/TPS71 Relocatable Over The Horizon Radar (ROTHR), covering
distances from 925 to 3000 km (Raytheon, U.S.A.) [87].
– Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), covering distances up to

4000 km (Australia) [88][89]. It has been reported that this system has detected F-117
aircraft [90].
– NOSTRADAMUS, from 700 to 2000 km (ONERA, France) [91].
13. Infrared Detection Systems
The infrared (IR) area of the electromagnetic spectrum is the part between
microwaves and visible light. It can be defined as the electromagnetic radiation with
frequency from 300 Ghz to 400 THz or wavelength from 1 mm to 0,75 μm,
respectively. It corresponds to the thermal radiation emitted by everybody at any
temperature above the absolute zero. There are quite many applications of the IR
radiation, as in medicine, meteorology, telecommunications, etc, as well as in the
common remote-controls.
IR allows night vision with FLIR (Forward Looking IR) systems and also
target detection. Any aircraft flying has various hot points emitting IR radiation, such
as the jet engine, the engine exhaust and certain surfaces due to aerodynamic friction.
IR seekers of air-to-air missiles (e.g., AIM-9, IRIS-T, MICA IR etc), as well as IRST
(IR Search and Track) systems, allow for passive detection and tracking of aerial
targets, exploiting their own thermal radiation. In this way, the targets are not warned,
since there is no emission from the seeker. Furthermore, IR seekers cannot be
jammed, like a radar seeker.
Missiles with IR guidance have been used from the '50s and since then they
have been continuously upgraded and improved. During the last 25 years, 90% of all
US air combat losses can be attributed to infrared missiles, including surface-to-air
systems ([92]). On the other hand, IRST systems appeared during the '60s but their
evolution soon slowed down, as they were put to shade by the advances in radar
systems. They were re-discovered later by the West, after being installed on most
Russian fighters since the '80s. Today, all modern jet fighters are equipped with IRST
systems, offering target detection (both air and surface), covering up to ±90° in
azimuth and at considerable distances. Sometimes, a laser system is combined for
range-finding or a zoom-able TV camera for identification purposes.
Even though stealth aircraft make use of various techniques for reducing their
thermal signature, IR radiation cannot be totally eliminated. In the case of F-35, the
F135 engine used is the most powerful jet fighter engine, with the highest combustion
chamber temperature (more than 2.200° C ([93])). Even if this does not necessarily
mean also high “external” temperature, it is expected that the F135 has a considerable
thermal signature ([94] and [95]), allowing the detection of the F-35 by IR systems
from a considerable distance. Some examples of IRST systems are the following:
AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS) of the F-

35 (Northrop Grumman): comprises 6 Imaging IR sensors, providing 360° spherical
situational awareness. It provides day/night vision, IRST capabilities with fire control,
missile detection and tracking, etc ([96]).
AN/AAQ-40 Electro-optical Targeting System (EOTS) of the F-35 (L.M.):

this is the second electro-optical system of the F-35, combining FLIR, IRST and laser.
It provides detection, tracking and designation of ground targets, and also
identification of aerial targets. It is based on the L.M. AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced
Targeting Pod [97].
Figure 12. The OSF (Optronique Secteur

Figure 11. The PIRATE IRST system on a
Frontal) system of the Dassault Rafale.
Spanish Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon.
Photo from http://optronique.net/defense/
Photo from http://www.eurofighter.com/media
systeme/optronique-secteur-frontal-rafale
PIRATE (Passive Infra Red Airborne Tracking Equipment) of the Eurofighter

Typhoon (EUROFIRST consortium): A 2nd gen. system (Imaging IR), combines FLIR
and IRST, allowing the tracking of up to 200 targets, to distances up to 50 – 100 km
([98]).
OSF (Optronique Secteur Frontal) of the Rafale (Thales Optronique –

SAGEM): Comprises an IR subsystem (with IRST and FLIR) with a range of 100 km
and a second subsystem with a high resolution TV camera (range up to 40 km) and
laser for range-finding. OSF is fully integrated to the aircraft weapon system. Due to
cost constraints, the Rafale F3 aircraft were delivered without the IR subsystem,
which can be substituted to a certain degree by the MICA IR seeker. If required, the
IR subsystem can be easily installed, so fighters taking part in military exercises or
war missions are equipped with a complete OSF system. The IR subsystem is
expected to be replaced by a newer type in the future [99][100][101].
OLS-35 of the Sukhoi Su-35 BM (NIIPP): Includes an IRST, with a maximum
range of 50 km on the frontal and 90 km on the rear aspect of the (non afterburning)
target, a TV camera and a laser for range-finding and target designation [102].
SpectIR (L.M.): An IRST system based on the AN/AAS-42 of the F-14D
Tomcat. It is in advanced testing stage. Is is designed to be installed in the front part
of an external fuel tank (for the F-18 E/F) or as an external pod (for the F-15, F-16
etc) [103][104].
14. Conclusion
Stealth technology has become sine qua non: all military aircraft, tanks, ships
etc, are designed or redesigned according to low observable (l.o.) principles. This
technology allows a potential intruder to enter enemy area undetected and deliver a
first strike before the defender realizes he is being attacked or at least before he has
the time to respond effectively. Furthermore, l.o. techniques help to "break the kill
chain": even if the l.o. aircraft is detected, it cannot be easily engaged by a fire control
radar or a missile radar seeker.
On the other hand, stealthiness is not panacea: stealth aircraft are not
invincible, they are just detected at shorter distances. Generally, the application of l.o.
principles incurs a considerable cost, both in procurement as well as for maintenance.
Actually, the l.o. approach is a trade-off among cost, stealth capability and operational
performance, i.e., maneuverability, amount of weapons and fuel, etc. The point is that
a few fighters with l.o. characteristics but with inherent operational constraints will
not necessarily prevail against more fighters with not so l.o. characteristics but better
operational capabilities.
In any case, a stealth threat is a serious threat, which should be dealt with
appropriately. Traditional surveillance and engagement systems have proven to be
inadequate. In fact, no radar system alone seems capable to confront effectively such
threat.
A promising approach relies on a combination of the following:
 Very low frequency band radars, for medium to high altitude

surveillance: as the frequency decreases, the wavelength increases and becomes
comparable with major parts of the aircraft. Thus, scattering enters the resonance
region, exhibiting a higher Radar Cross Section (RCS), at least momentarily. Also, the
Radar-Absorbent Materials (RAM) are not very effective at lower frequencies. For
these reasons, radars operating, e.g., in the VHF band, are expected to see a l.o. target
at a longer distance with respect to “conventional”, higher frequency radars,
transmitting in the L or S-band.
 Passive radars can complement their active counterparts, covering low

to medium altitudes: such radars detect and track targets passively, measuring
distortions and disturbances on existing signals from radio, TV, mobile telephony,
Wi-Fi etc. They feature low frequency and bistatic operation (different locations of
transmitter and receiver), offering increased probability of revealing stealth aircraft,
which are optimized for monostatic radars.
 All information from every radar system or sensor should be fused in a

central command and control entity (data fusion). If possible, low level, raw data
should be taken into account. A few “hits” from a radar may not result to a “plot”,
however a few “hits” from different radars corresponding to the same location
certainly indicate a possible target.
 Any unidentified track should be transferred to combat aircraft via

tactical data link, in order to be intercepted.
 The interceptors should be equipped with an IRST (InfraRed Search

and Track) system, allowing detection and tracking of l.o. targets at longer distances,
with respect to their radar sets. Ideally, they should be also capable of engaging a
designated target sent to them via data link, even if they cannot “see” the target by
their on-board sensors.
 Following the same way of thinking, IR air-to-air missiles should be

preferred to radar seeker missiles, even for BVR (Beyond Visual Range) distances.
As a final conclusion, it should be noted that the development of l.o.

technology and the proliferation of stealth aircraft have changed the modern warfare,
rendering most legacy systems almost useless. In order to cope with this new type of
threats, older systems should be upgraded, modified accordingly and interconnected,
following the principles of the net-centric warfare doctrine, while new, suitable
systems should also be employed, as described in this paper. If not, the danger of
realizing you are being attacked, after having received several bombs on your air-
force bases and facilities, is looming. However, as Dr. W. Edwards Deming has put it:
“It is not necessary to change. Survival is not mandatory.”
References
(All web-based references accessed Sep.13, except if otherwise noted)
[1] P.Ya. Ufimtsev: Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction, Soviet
Radio, Moscow, 1962
[2] M.W. Browne: Lockheed credits Soviet theory in design of F-117, Aviation Week
Space Technology, p. 27, December 1991.
[3] D. Richardson: Stealth Warplanes, Zenith Press, 2001.
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Low Observable Principles, Stealth Aircraft and Anti-Stealth Technologies

Article · January 2014

presentation at the HAF Air Power Conference View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Low Observable Principles, Stealth Aircraft and

Konstantinos Zikidis (Maj, HAF)1, Alexios Skondras (2nd Lt, HAF)2,

However, low observable does not mean no observable, i.e., complete

Introduction – Historical background of stealth aircraft

2. Stealth Aircraft: Today

Figure 2. An F-22A Raptor, ready to go (photo by USAF). A single-seat, twin-engine, super-

conformal fuel tanks, an enclosed weapons pod and “signature enhancements”

3. Radar Cross Section

 Position of radar antenna relative to target

4. Radar Cross Section Reduction

4.2 Radar absorbing materials

Target RCS (m2) References

Navy cruiser (length 200m) 14000 [19]

Β-52 Stratofortress 100 – 125 [3], [19], [20], [21]

C-130 Hercules 80 [19]

F-15 Eagle 10 – 25 [22], [23], [20]

Su-27 Flanker 10 – 15 [22], [23]

F-4 Phantom 6 – 10 [3], [19]

Mig-29 Fulcrum 3–5 [3], [22], [23]

F-18 C/D Hornet 1–3 [20], [22], [21]

M-2000 1–2 [22], [23]

F-16 C (with reduced RCS) 1,2 [20], [21]

T-38 Talon 1 [19]

B-1B Lancer 0,75 – 1 [3], [19]

Sukhoi FGFA prototype* 0,5 [24]

Tomahawk TLAM 0,5 [20]

Exocet, Harpoon 0,1 [21]

Eurofighter Typhoon 0,1 class [22], [23], [21]

F-18 E/F Super Hornet 0,1 class [22], [23], [21]

F-16 IN Super Viper** 0,1 class [12]

Rafale 0,1 class [3], [12], [22], [23], [21]

B-2 Spirit 0,1 or less [3], [21]

F-117A Nighthawk 0,025 or less [3], [21], [20]

bird 0,01 [17], [20]

F-35 Lightning II 0,0015 – 0,005 [20], [22], [23], [21], [25]

F-22 Raptor 0,0001 – 0,0005 [20], [22], [23], [21]

insect 0,00001 [17]

4.3 Passive cancellation

Sometimes also mentioned as “impedance loading”, passive cancellation is

4.4 Active cancellation

Another attempt in the category of “active stealth” is the so-called “plasma

experiments on this idea. According to available information, this technology employs

5. F-35: the Hype, the Skepticism and the Reality

Therefore, it is claimed that the F-35 fuselage design, as a result of a trade-off

not so reassuring in today's volatile environment, it is expected that eventually most

6. F-35 detection estimation for various radar systems

a. AN/APG68(V)9 (Northrop Grumman): the fire control radar of the most

b. S-743D Martello (Alenia Marconi Systems): a 3-D long range surveillance

1 GHz / L –14 –22 0,04 0,0063

3 GHz / S –15 –25 0,0316 0,00316

8 GHz / X –13 –35 0,05 0,0003

16 GHz / Ku –18 –42 0,016 0,000063

application of Radar-Absorbent Materials. However, the actual RCS is expected to be

S743D (L) 255 216 97 61 >>43