Securities Litigation in Canada
Securities Litigation in Canada
Securities Litigation in Canada
The Securities
Litigation Review
Litigation
Review
Editor
William Savitt
This article was first published in The Securities Litigation Review - Edition 1
(published in June 2015 – editor William Savitt).
Editor
William Savitt
www.TheLawReviews.co.uk
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publisher acknowledges and thanks the following law firms for their learned
assistance throughout the preparation of this book:
URÍA MENÉNDEZ
i
CONTENTS
Chapter 1 AUSTRALIA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������1
Luke Hastings and Andrew Eastwood
Chapter 2 BELGIUM��������������������������������������������������������������������������������22
Grégoire Jakhian and Mathias Lamberty
Chapter 3 BRAZIL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������38
Marcelo Trindade and Fabiana Martins de Almeida
Chapter 4 CANADA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������50
Mark A Gelowitz, Allan D Coleman and Robert Carson
Chapter 6 FRANCE�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������79
Bertrand Cardi and Nicolas Mennesson
Chapter 7 GERMANY�������������������������������������������������������������������������������91
Lars Röh, Jan Willisch, Martin Beckmann, Jonas-Benjamin Ulmrich
and Bijan Moini
Chapter 8 ISRAEL�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������109
Yechiel Kasher, Ittai Paldor and Amir Scharf
Chapter 9 ITALY��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������118
Vittorio Allavena, Monica Iacoviello, Francesco Sbisà
and Silvia Romanelli
iii
Contents
Chapter 10 POLAND��������������������������������������������������������������������������������126
Konrad Konarski
Chapter 11 PORTUGAL���������������������������������������������������������������������������140
Nuno Salazar Casanova and Nair Maurício Cordas
Chapter 12 SPAIN�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������150
Cristian Gual Grau and Manuel Álvarez Feijoo
Chapter 13 SWITZERLAND��������������������������������������������������������������������162
Matthew T Reiter and Thomas U Reutter
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EDITOR’S PREFACE
This inaugural edition of The Securities Litigation Review is a guided introduction to the
international varieties of enforcing rights related to the issuance and exchange of publicly
traded securities.
Unlike most of its sister international surveys, this review focuses on litigation –
how rights are created and vindicated against the backdrop of courtroom proceedings.
Accordingly, this volume amounts to a cross-cultural review of the disputing process.
While the subject matter is limited to securities litigation, which may well be the world’s
most economically significant form of litigation, any survey of litigation is in great part
a survey of procedure as much as substance.
As the chapters that follow make clear, there is great international variety in
private litigation procedure as a tool for securities enforcement. At one extreme is the
United States, with its broad access to courts, relatively permissive pleading requirements,
expansive pretrial discovery rules, readily available class-action principles and generous fee
incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers. At the other extreme lie jurisdictions like Poland, where
private securities litigation is complex, expensive, seldom remunerative and accordingly
quite rare. As the survey reveals, there are many intermediate points in this continuum,
as each jurisdiction has evolved a private enforcement regime reflecting its underlying
civil litigation system as well as the imperatives of its securities markets.
This review reveals an equally broad variety of public enforcement regimes.
Canada’s highly decentralised system of provincial regulation contrasts with Brazil’s
Securities Commission, a powerful centralised regulator that is primarily responsible for
creating and enforcing Brazil’s securities rules. Every country has its own idiosyncratic
mixture of securities lawmaking institutions; each provides a role for self-regulating bodies
and stock exchanges but no two systems are alike. And while the European regulatory
schemes work to harmonise national rules with Europe-wide directives, few countries
outside Europe have significant institutionalised cross-border enforcement mechanisms,
public or private.
We should not, however, let the more obvious dissimilarities of the world’s securities
disputing systems obscure the very significant convergence in the objectives and design
v
Editor’s Preface
vi
Editor’s Preface
William Savitt
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
New York
June 2015
vii
Chapter 4
CANADA
Mark A Gelowitz, Allan D Coleman and Robert Carson1
I OVERVIEW
i Sources of law
Canada does not have a national securities regulator. Canada’s provinces and territories
have enacted securities laws and regulations and established provincial securities
regulators tasked with the enforcement of those laws and regulations.2 While there is
a great degree of harmonisation across the various provinces, there can be important
differences. Securities regulation in Canada therefore consists of a patchwork of
legislation, regulations, rules, instruments and policies.
Capital markets are also regulated by stock exchanges, the most notable of which
is the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), and self-regulatory organisations such as the
Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) and the Mutual Fund
Dealers Association of Canada, all of which are subject to the oversight of the provincial
securities commissions.3 These stock exchanges and self-regulatory organisations typically
have by-laws, procedures and other rules that regulate the capital markets activity that
falls within the scope of their jurisdiction.
The Criminal Code of Canada4 contains a few offences that relate to securities
and capital market matters, including general offences such as fraud that can apply in the
1 Mark A Gelowitz and Allan D Coleman are partners and Robert Carson is an associate at
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP.
2 See, e.g., Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, Chapter S-5; General Regulation under the
Securities Act, RRO 1990, Reg 1015; and National Instrument 45-106: ‘Prospectus and
Registration Exemptions’.
3 The Ontario Securities Commission has issued recognition orders pursuant to section 21.1(1)
of the Ontario Securities Act recognising these entities.
4 Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, Chapter C-46.
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Canada
ii Regulatory authorities
The primary regulators responsible for enforcement of securities law in Canada are
the provincial securities commissions. For ease of reference, this article focuses on
the provisions of the Ontario Securities Act and the Ontario Securities Commission,
as Ontario is Canada’s most populous province and is the home of the Toronto Stock
Exchange.
The Commission has broad rights to investigate the conduct of capital market
participants in Ontario. Where the Commission concludes that an enforcement
proceeding is warranted, the Commission typically proceeds in one of two fora, as
described below.7
The staff of the Commission can bring administrative enforcement proceedings
before a panel of commissioners. The commissioners constitute an independent branch
of the Commission. These proceedings seek to prevent future harm to, and to protect
investor confidence in, Ontario’s capital markets under Section 127 of the Ontario
Securities Act. Enforcement proceedings generally take the form of a public hearing
before a panel of three commissioners, who have the power to make findings concerning
whether a breach of the Securities Act has occurred or whether there has been conduct
contrary to the public interest. The panel also has the power to impose a variety of
sanctions (see Section III.iv, infra) including fines and limiting a respondent’s ability to
participate in the capital markets in Ontario.
Alternatively, the staff of the Commission can also initiate and prosecute
quasi-criminal proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice under the Ontario Provincial
51
Canada
Offences Act.8 Although these proceedings are often considered regulatory, they carry
penal consequences, including the possibility of imprisonment for individuals and
significant monetary penalties.
In certain situations, market participants can themselves invoke proceedings
before the Commission that resemble enforcement proceedings by seeking relief from
the Commission such as a cease-trade order in the context of an unsolicited takeover bid.
Self-regulatory organisations can bring enforcement proceedings to regulate the
conduct of market participants within their sphere and protect the integrity of capital
markets.9
8 In contrast, criminal charges under the Criminal Code, a federal statute, are typically brought
by Crown counsel in the criminal court system. Those cases follow strict criminal procedures
set out in the Criminal Code.
9 See, e.g., IIROC Dealer Member Rules, Rules 19 & 20 and the IIROC Sanction Guidelines.
10 Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction and, while the Quebec Securities Act contains similar
statutory rights of action to those in the Ontario Securities Act, plaintiffs may also seek to
bring misrepresentation claims under the Civil Code of Quebec.
11 In addition, Canadian courts have imposed limits on the liability of certain defendants: see,
for example, Hercules Management v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 SCR 165, which addresses the
scope of the duty of care that auditors owe in relation to secondary market investors.
52
Canada
only provides for the party who suffered damages in a trade to seek damages against the
counter-party to that trade, and therefore does not facilitate class actions.12
There are a variety of potential claims against an issuer or its directors and officers
that may be available under business corporation statutes in Canada, including:
a oppression claims alleging that the conduct of a corporation was oppressive,
unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregarded the interests of shareholders or
other potential complainants;13
b derivative actions that allow shareholders (typically minority shareholders) and
other complainants to apply to the court for leave to bring an action on behalf of
a corporation to redress harm to the corporation;14 and
c the exercise of dissent and appraisal remedies in connection with certain corporate
transactions, including amalgamations and going-private transactions.15
In recent years, Canada has also seen a rise in litigation arising from shareholder activism,
including proxy fights in both the provincial securities commissions and the courts.
II PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
i Forms of action
As noted above, the majority of securities class actions in Canada are based on claims
of misrepresentations in an issuer’s public disclosure or its failure to make timely
disclosure of material changes. Traditionally, it had been difficult for Canadian investors
to pursue lawsuits alleging negligent misrepresentations at common law because of the
requirement that an investor prove that it actually relied to its detriment on the alleged
misrepresentation. Canadian courts have generally found that the need to prove reliance
in complex individual inquiries has rendered common law securities misrepresentation
claims unsuitable for certification as class actions.16 However, the governing securities
legislation of each province now contains statutory rights of action for misrepresentations
in both the primary and secondary markets that do not require the investor to prove
reliance. These types of action were designed to proceed as class actions in appropriate
circumstances and the courts have found they are particularly suited to that procedure.17
Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act, which contains the statutory right of
action for misrepresentations affecting the price of securities in the secondary market,
12 In contrast, the British Columbia Securities Act provides a broader right of action
(Section 136).
13 Canada Business Corporations Act, Section 241; Ontario Business Corporations Act,
Section 248.
14 Canada Business Corporations Act, Sections 238–240; Ontario Business Corporations Act,
Sections 246–247.
15 Canada Business Corporations Act, Section 190; Ontario Business Corporations Act,
Section 185.
16 See, e.g., McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc, 2010 ONSC 1591.
17 See, e.g., Bayens v. Kinross Gold Corp, 2014 ONCA 901 at paragraph 136.
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Canada
provides a variety of important statutory protections for issuers and other defendants,
including the following:18
a The plaintiff must first bring a motion seeking leave of the court to commence an
action. To obtain leave, the plaintiff must establish that the action is brought in
good faith and there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved in
the plaintiff’s favour.19
b Defendants generally have the protection of ‘liability limits’ (see subsection iv,
infra), unless found to have authorised, permitted or acquiesced in the making of
a misrepresentation with knowledge that it was untrue.20
c Defendants have the benefit of a ‘reasonable investigation’ defence and a ‘safe
harbour’ for forward-looking information, provided certain requirements are
met. In certain circumstances, reliance on an expert constitutes a defence.21
ii Procedure
Private enforcement actions are typically commenced in the courts of the relevant
province.22 The unfortunate result is that parallel proceedings regarding the same subject
matter are often brought in multiple provinces. This problem is particularly acute in
securities class actions. Ultimately, however, claims are typically litigated in a single
jurisdiction on behalf of a proposed national class of investors who are alleged to have
been harmed by the alleged misrepresentation.
For certain claims in the securities context, the applicable legislation imposes an
initial gatekeeping stage before the action can be commenced. For example, as described
above, secondary market actions brought under Part XXIII.1 cannot proceed unless the
plaintiff satisfies the court on a motion or application that the action is brought in good
faith and there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved at trial in the
plaintiff’s favour.23 A shareholder who seeks to bring a derivative action on behalf of
a corporation under the applicable business corporation statute must obtain leave of
the court, which requires the shareholder to, among other things, satisfy the court that
the shareholder is acting in good faith and that it appears to be in the interests of the
corporation that the action be brought.24
18 The primary market right of action also includes important statutory protections and
defences, including a due diligence defence.
19 Ontario Securities Act, Section 138.8.
20 Because the liability limits do not apply to common law misrepresentation claims, class
counsel often try to bring common law claims alongside the statutory claims.
21 Ontario Securities Act, Section 138.4.
22 In certain situations, particularly where a potential violation of securities law is alleged (but
has not yet occurred), jurisdiction may lie with the provincial securities commissions rather
than the courts.
23 Ontario Securities Act, Section 138.8.
24 Canada Business Corporations Act, Sections 238–240; Ontario Business Corporations Act,
Sections 246–247.
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Canada
The pleading requirements vary depending on the nature of the claim. For
example, a common law negligent misrepresentation claim requires the plaintiff to plead
that each class member detrimentally relied on the alleged misrepresentation. As there
is no fraud-on-the-market presumption in Canada, it is generally insufficient to plead
reliance on the market price of the securities.25 Another important distinction is that
Canadian misrepresentation claims, whether statutory or at common law, do not have
the scienter requirement that exists in Rule 10b-5 actions in the United States.
An action cannot be brought as a class proceeding unless the court has granted
certification of the proceeding as a class action. In Ontario, the plaintiff must establish
each of the following requirements:
a the pleadings disclose a cause of action;
b there exists an identifiable class of two or more persons;
c there are common issues as between members of the proposed class;
d proceeding by way of a class action is the ‘preferable procedure’; and
e a representative plaintiff exists who would fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class.26
In most civil proceedings, the parties have the right to both documentary discovery and
oral discovery before trial. Discovery rights are prescribed by statutes or rules of court, but
can generally be varied by agreement of the parties or by order of the court. In actions,
parties generally have a positive duty to produce copies of all relevant, non-privileged
documents to the opposing parties. Oral discovery of a corporation is commonly limited
to the examination of a single representative of the corporation.
Once certified, class proceedings will generally proceed in a manner that is largely
similar to standard civil proceedings. The common issues will usually be tried first,
followed by any remaining individual issues.
An important feature of civil proceedings in Canada is that costs typically ‘follow
the event’, which usually means that the losing party pays a portion of the successful party’s
costs. This can apply on a range of steps in a proceeding including both interlocutory
motions and trials. There are important differences among the provinces and types of
proceedings – for example, in British Columbia the loser-pays rule generally does not
apply in class actions. However, as a general rule, costs awards are at the discretion of
the courts.
iii Settlements
While settlements in commercial litigation do not necessarily require court approval
of the settlement, settlements in proceedings commenced under class proceedings
legislation generally require court approval, as may settlements brought under the
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Canada
Where the settlement occurs before the action has been certified as a class proceeding,
the general practice is that the parties will seek certification ‘for settlement purposes
only’ to facilitate the settlement and bind class members to its terms. Class members are
typically given notice of a proposed settlement and the opportunity to object and to opt
out of the settlement.
Class counsel are typically required to obtain court approval of their fees.29
Canadian courts tend to consider factors such as the time expended, the risks undertaken,
and the results achieved, among others, in establishing the quantum of fees awarded.
27 There are often differences in the regimes of different provinces as to whether a putative class
action can be settled, discontinued or withdrawn before certification without court approval.
In Ontario, Court approval is almost invariably required. In the context of the oppression
remedy, see specific requirements for court approval of steps, including withdrawal and
discontinuance in certain circumstances: Ontario Business Corporations Act, Section 249;
Canada Business Corporations Act, Section 242(2).
28 See, e.g., Metzler Investment v. Gildan Activewear, 2011 ONSC 1146.
29 Ontario Class Proceedings Act, Sections 32 and 33.
30 Ontario Securities Act, Section 130(1).
31 Ontario Securities Act, Section 138.5(1).
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Canada
The liability limits do not apply for a person or company, other than the responsible
issuer, if the person or company authorised, permitted or acquiesced in the making of
the misrepresentation while knowing that it was a misrepresentation.34
The liability limits do not apply to common law misrepresentation claims.
Accordingly, class counsel often try to bring common law claims alongside statutory
claims. The calculation of damages in common law claims is based primarily on common
law principles and attempt to put the investor back in the position that he or she would
have been in had the misrepresentation not been made.
i Forms of action
There are two principal forms of enforcement proceedings brought by the Ontario
Securities Commission: administrative proceedings and quasi-criminal proceedings.
Administrative enforcement proceedings before a tribunal of commissioners are
most common. These can take a variety of forms but typically involve an investigation
phase followed by a hearing. The tribunal has a broad power to make orders in the
public interest, including in some situations in which the respondent has not breached
securities law.
Alternatively, the Commission may bring quasi-criminal proceedings in the
Ontario Court of Justice for certain offences prescribed in the Ontario Securities Act,
including insider trading and tipping, misrepresentations in disclosure documents,
and other breaches of securities law.35 The offences generally carry a maximum fine of
C$5 million or a maximum prison sentence of five years less a day, or both.
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Canada
The Commission has the right to apply to the Court to seek certain relief, including
for a declaration that a person or company has not complied with securities law36 or
appointing a receiver or liquidator over the property of a person or company.37
The Criminal Code contains criminal offences unique to securities law (such as
market manipulation), and general economic crimes (such as fraud) that may arise in
the securities context.38 Criminal offences are typically prosecuted by Crown counsel,
regardless of whether the offences relate to securities law.
The TSX and other self-regulatory organisations, including IIROC, have their
own enforcement procedures for regulating the capital market participants within their
purview. These organisations have the ability to invoke a variety of sanctions, including
suspension or termination of market access or fines.39
ii Procedure
Most regulatory proceedings in the securities context begin with an investigation by
one or more provincial securities commissions or by another law enforcement agency,
such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. A major difference between private and
public enforcement in Canada is that the securities commissions have very broad
investigative powers, including the power to conduct examinations of a wide range of
potential witnesses, including examinations under oath.40 The Commission also has a
broad power to compel issuers and potential witnesses to produce documents as part of
the investigation.41
Administrative regulatory proceedings under Section 127 of the Ontario
Securities Act typically commence when the Commission issues a notice of hearing
and files a statement of allegations. The proceedings progress in accordance with the
Commission’s Rules of Procedure, which provide, among other things, for the parties to
make pre-hearing motions, including motions seeking the production of documents or
the exclusion of evidence.
In the ordinary course, proceedings under Section 127 are determined following
an oral hearing before a panel of commissioners. The rules are set out in the Commission’s
Rules of Procedure, and are also governed by the Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure
Act.42 As a general rule, hearings are open to the public but the panel may hold all or a
portion of the hearing in camera in certain circumstances. The hearings usually involve
live testimony of witnesses and argument by the parties.
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Canada
iii Settlements
Settlements in administrative enforcement proceedings are generally subject to
the approval of a Commission tribunal, which determines whether the terms of the
settlement are fair and reasonable in the circumstances and within acceptable parameters.
The Commission generally gives significant deference to the recommendations of the
Commission staff who negotiated the agreement. The Commission also considers
specific and general deterrence as a significant factor. The Commission may also consider
factors such as:
a the seriousness of the allegations;
b the size of any profit (or loss avoided) from the illegal conduct;
c whether the respondent has recognised the seriousness of the improprieties or
shown remorse;
d whether the respondent cooperated with the investigation; and
e the effect that the sanctions might have on the livelihood of the respondent.44
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Canada
appropriate sentence. In the securities context, courts have considered factors such as
whether there were elements of fraud or breach of trust in the offence, whether there
was planning and deliberation in the offence, whether the respondent was working
with others to carry out the offence, and mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea,
remorse or restitution.
The Commission has a very broad jurisdiction to make these orders in the public interest
and, in determining the appropriate penalty, the Commission will generally consider
factors relating to the protection of investors and the fostering of fair and efficient capital
markets and confidence in capital markets generally. The Supreme Court of Canada
has stated that the purpose of the Commission’s public interest jurisdiction is neither
remedial nor punitive; it is protective and preventive, intended to be exercised to
prevent likely future harm to Ontario’s capital markets.47 Some of the factors that the
Commission has considered in the past include the seriousness of the allegations, the
respondent’s experience in the marketplace, whether the respondent has recognised the
seriousness of the improprieties, the size of any profit or loss avoided from the illegal
conduct, whether the sanction imposed may serve to deter not only those involved in
the case being considered, but any like-minded people from engaging in similar abuses of
the capital market, and any mitigating factors.48 The Commission is generally not bound
by its previous orders.
In addition, in many cases, the Commission has the power to order respondents
to pay costs of the Commission’s investigation, the costs of the hearing, or both.49
46 The Ontario Securities Commission has the jurisdiction to issue other orders in certain
circumstances, such as the power to freeze assets of any person until the Commission or a
court orders otherwise: Ontario Securities Act, Section 126.
47 Committee for Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities
Commission), [2001] 2 SCR 132.
48 See, e.g., Spork v. Ontario Securities Commission, 2014 ONSC 2467.
49 Ontario Securities Act, Section 127.1.
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Canada
Section 122 of the Ontario Securities Act provides that a person or company found
guilty of an offence under Section 122 is liable to a fine or not more than C$5 million
or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years less a day, or to both.50 In
exercising its sentencing discretion, the Court may consider the types of factors described
in the previous section of this article.
IV CROSS-BORDER ISSUES
As a general rule, Canadian courts are able to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute where
there is a ‘real and substantial connection’ between the subject matter of the dispute and
the province or between the defendant and the province.51 Foreign issuers should be
aware that Canadian courts have tended to take broad approaches to jurisdiction and
have shown a willingness to certify a global class in certain circumstances.52
Notably, however, in a significant decision released in 2014, the Court of Appeal
for Ontario held that even though it could exercise jurisdiction to hear a claim against
BP, PLC arising from the Deep Water Horizon oil spill, it should decline to exercise
that jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens – particularly the principle of
comity, which required the Court to consider the implications of departing from the
international norms in England and the United States, where the vast majority of the
shares were traded.53 Accordingly, in appropriate circumstances, Canadian courts may
decline to exercise jurisdiction over claims against a foreign issuer where the foreign
issuer does not have a particularly substantial connection to Canada or parallel claims
are being brought in another jurisdiction with a closer connection to the subject matter
of the dispute.
V YEAR IN REVIEW
50 In criminal prosecutions under the Criminal Code, the potential sentences and penalties vary
depending on the offence. The Court has discretion, within the parameters of the Criminal
Code, to sentence a defendant as appropriate in the circumstances.
51 See, e.g., Abdula v. Canadian Solar, 2012 ONCA 211.
52 See, e.g., Silver v. Imax Corp, [2009] OJ No. 5585.
53 Kaynes v. BP, PLC, 2014 ONCA 580, leave to appeal to SCC refused. [2014] SCCA No. 452.
54 Available at: www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/PUB_Recent_Trends_
Canada_0115.pdf.
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Canada
The Court of Appeal for Ontario released a series of decisions addressing important
issues regarding securities misrepresentation claims in Ontario. These issues included
the standard and application of the test for leave to commence an action under Part
XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act,56 the certifiability of common law claims for
negligent misrepresentation (whether alongside parallel statutory claims or as stand-alone
claims),57 the limitation period for commencing claims under Part XXIII.158 and the
jurisdictional reach of Canadian courts to hear misrepresentation claims relating to
securities that trade primarily, if not entirely, on foreign exchanges.59
In 2014, the Government of Canada and the governments of several provinces
including Ontario and British Columbia (but not Alberta or Quebec) issued draft
legislation as part of an initiative named the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory
System.60 These participating jurisdictions seek to establish a national securities regulator
to replace the patchwork of different legislation, rules, instruments and policies that
regulate securities transactions and capital markets across the country. In 2014, the
participants sought comments on the draft legislation. It is expected that the participants
will issue draft regulations for public comment in 2015. The draft legislation proposed
a variety of changes to securities litigation and enforcement proceedings including by,
among other things, shifting certain onuses to defendants in misrepresentation claims
and by opening the door to collective actions to recover damages caused by insider
trading.
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Canada
63
Appendix 1
MARK A GELOWITZ
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP
Mark A Gelowitz is a senior litigation partner at Osler. He is the chair of the firm’s
national corporate governance and securities litigation group. Mark has a business-focused
civil and securities litigation, appellate and international commercial arbitration practice.
His practice covers a wide variety of issues in corporate and commercial law including
mergers and acquisitions litigation, director and officer liability, oppression, mining
litigation and class actions. He has appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada, the
Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Yukon Courts of Appeal, the superior trial courts
of numerous provinces and the Ontario and British Columbia Securities Commissions.
Mark completed two appellate judicial clerkships, the first with the late Chief Justice ED
Bayda of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in 1986 and the second with the late Justice
John Sopinka of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1989. He completed the BCL degree
at Oxford University in 1989, between his clerking experiences. Mark has had a number
of legal publications including a book co-authored with the late Justice Sopinka entitled
The Conduct of an Appeal (third edition, LexisNexis 2012). Mark maintains a blog on
recent developments in Canadian appellate law and practice at Conductofanappeal.com.
ALLAN D COLEMAN
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP
Allan D Coleman is a partner in the litigation department at Osler. He has a wide-
ranging practice, with particular emphasis on corporate and securities litigation. He has
developed significant expertise in advising public companies involved in litigation arising
from major mergers and acquisitions and other business-critical transactions. Allan also
represents public issuers in class proceedings relating to alleged misrepresentations made
in prospectuses, financial statements and other public disclosure documents. In addition,
as part of his securities litigation practice, he has advised public companies and registrants
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About the Authors
ROBERT CARSON
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP
Robert Carson is an associate in the litigation department of Osler. He has acted for
issuers and other market participants in a variety of securities and corporate governance
litigation, including securities class actions, proxy fights, and oppression proceedings.
202