TLR Shareholder Rights and Activism

The Shareholder
Rights and
Activism Review
Editor
Francis J Aquila
Law Business Research

The Shareholder
Rights and Activism
Review
Editor
Francis J Aquila
Law Business Research Ltd

PUBLISHER
Gideon Roberton
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Anna Andreoli
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Gina Mete
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Paul Howarth
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2016 Law Business Research Ltd
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publisher acknowledges and thanks the following law firms for their learned assistance
throughout the preparation of this book:
BAKER & MCKENZIE CIS, LIMITED
BOWMANS
DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK NV
HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP
MANNHEIMER SWARTLING
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i
CONTENTS
Editors Preface vii

Francis J Aquila
Chapter 1 ARGENTINA 1
Brbara Ramperti, Diego Krischcautzky and Lorena Aim
Chapter 2 JAPAN 11
Akira Matsushita
Chapter 3 NETHERLANDS 22
Paul Cronheim, Willem Bijveld and Frank Hamming
Chapter 4 RUSSIA 36
Max Gutbrod
Chapter 5 SINGAPORE 43
Lee Suet-Fern and Elizabeth Kong Sau-Wai
Chapter 6 SOUTH AFRICA 52

Ezra Davids, Cathy Truter and Xolani Ntamane
Chapter 7 SWEDEN 61
Eva Hgg and Patrik Marcelius
Chapter 8 UNITED KINGDOM 71

Gavin Davies and Mark Bardell
Chapter 9 UNITED STATES 81

Francis J Aquila
iii
Contents
Appendix 1 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 93
Appendix 2 CONTRIBUTING LAW FIRMS CONTACT DETAILS 99
iv
EDITORS PREFACE
Over the years since the financial crisis, shareholder activism has been on the rise around the
world. Increasingly institutional shareholders are taking a range of actions to leverage their
ownership position to influence public company behaviour. Activist investors often advocate
for changes to the company, such as its corporate governance practices, financial decisions
and strategic direction. Shareholder activism comes in many forms, from privately engaging
in a dialogue with a company on certain issues, to waging a contest to replace members of a
companys board of directors, to publicly agitating for a company to undergo a fundamental
transaction.
Although the types of activists and forms of activism may vary, there is no question
that shareholder activism has become a more prominent, and likely permanent, feature of
the corporate landscape. Boards of directors, managements and the markets have increasingly
become more attuned to shareholder activism, and engaging with investors has become a
priority for boards and managements as a hallmark of basic good governance.
Shareholder activism has become a global phenomenon that is effecting change to the
corporate landscape not only in North America but also in Europe, Australia and Asia. While
shareholder activism is still most prevalent in North America, and particularly in the United
States, shareholder activism is expanding its reach across the globe. This movement is being
driven by, among other things, a search by hedge funds for new investment opportunities
and a cultural shift toward increased shareholder engagement in Europe, Australia and Asia.
As both shareholder activists, and the companies they target, become more
geographically diverse, it is important for legal and corporate practitioners to understand
the legal framework and emerging trends of shareholder activism in the various international
jurisdictions facing activism. This inaugural edition of The Shareholder Rights and Activism
Review is designed as a primer on these aspects of shareholder activism in such jurisdictions.
v
Editors Preface
My sincere thanks to all of the authors who contributed their expertise, time and
labour to this first edition of The Shareholder Rights and Activism Review. As shareholder
activism continues to increase its global footprint, I am confident that this review will serve
as an invaluable resource for legal and corporate practitioners worldwide.
Francis J Aquila
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
New York
October 2016
vi
Chapter 1
ARGENTINA
Brbara Ramperti, Diego Krischcautzky and Lorena Aim1
I OVERVIEW
Over the last 70 years and at least once per decade, the Argentine economy has suffered severe
economic, financial or political crises, if not all of the above together. A country that was
once comparable in terms of GDP, development and income per capita to Australia, lost its
way due to lack of long-term policies, irrational public spending, political instability (after
the then-unusual military coup of 1930, the first democratic-to-democratic presidential
transition took place only in the late 1980s) and even war.
This slide-to-the-bottom process peaked in early 2002, following the resignation of
the incumbent president in the middle of his four-year term and amid the virtual crack of the
Argentine financial system. The country stopped its sovereign debt payments in what gave
rise to the then-largest sovereign default ever.2 Only recently, 14 years later, has Argentina
reached a settlement with the last significant group of holdout bondholders and returned to
a certain level of normal status, financially speaking. However, in the interim time Argentina
isolated itself and became the pariah of the international capital markets. The inward-looking
approach functioned as a barrier for local companies trying to obtain financing in the equity
or corporate finance markets. Increased foreign exchange regulations effectively helped to put
an end to cross-border financing and reaching out to international equity markets became a
dream for the privileged few.
At local level, things were not different. The number of IPOs in the Buenos Aires
Stock Exchange in the years running from 20052015 was less than 15, and within the same
1 Brbara Ramperti and Diego Krischcautzky are partners and Lorena Aim is a senior associate
at Marval, OFarrell & Mairal.
2 http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/02/dont-cry-for-them-the-worlds-biggest-
sovereign-defaults-since-2000/.
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period of time a greater number of companies actually took the delisting route. As a matter
of fact, 40 years ago the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange (the largest and most important of
the country) had over 370 listed companies, while the current number hardly exceeds 100.
The absence of clear rules, a history of high inflation rates and the lack of fiscal discipline
also explain why Argentines have historically distrusted their own currency. The US dollar
is the currency in which the most significant transactions (real estate, company acquisitions,
etc.) are negotiated. Therefore, mid to long-term investment in local currency-denominated
equity has been traditionally regarded as highly speculative and risky. Then, unlike what
happens in other mature markets, the Argentine equity market is not widely regarded as a
valid saving option for households and is left to a little group of savvy traders.
In addition to macroeconomic concerns, there are legal constraints that conspire
against the development of the equity market: mainly, the historical perception that our legal
system does not provide adequate protection for minority shareholders or small investors.
Even after some regulatory efforts to the contrary in the recent past, the 2015/2016 Scorecard
published by the Latin American Private Equity and Venture Capital Association3 still ranks
Argentina in the lower brackets when considering the minority shareholder right protection
item across the region.
The unfortunate combination of economical and legal obstacles results in little
room for a sophisticated large capital market. The aggregate capitalisation market was in
2014 less than 12 per cent of the Argentine GDP, compared to 35 per cent in Brazil, 37 per
cent in Mexico and 90 per cent in Chile.4 Of the listed companies, none could actually be
described as purely public in the sense that shareholder power is atomised and no controlling
group exists. On the contrary, except for a very limited number of companies, a controlling
shareholder or control group is easily identifiable in each of the listed companies on the
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange.
In an environment like ours it is hardly surprising that shareholder activism be rather
limited. There was an incipient activity in the mid-1990s when the pension system was
privatised and several pension funds entered the market. With relatively significant holdings
in listed companies there were attempts, which never fully materialised, to improve corporate
governance for the benefit of the ultimate beneficiaries of the funds. However, a change in
political direction led in 2008 to the takeover by the Argentine state of the whole pension
system. Such reform consolidated all of the holdings then disseminated among the private
pension funds in a single hand: the Argentine state. The resulting scenario was anything
but attractive: few listed companies, all with single or identifiable group of controlling
shareholders and a new large minority shareholder with powers much greater than voting:
taxation and regulation powers.
The co-existence proved in many cases difficult. Boards made efforts to accommodate
the states needs and requirements and majority holders accepted to have one or more
state-nominated members of the Board and Supervisory Committee.
In late 2015, prior to an anticipated change of administration, a law was passed
requiring two-thirds of Congress member votes in order to dispose of those holdings in
3 LAVCA, 2015/2016. The Private Equity and Venture Capital Environment in Latin America.
Available at https://lavca.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Scorecard-2015-16-hirez.pdf.
4 Federacin Interamericana de Bolsas (Interamerican Federation of Stock Exchanges). Anuario
2016 (2016 Annual Report), available at http://www.fiabnet.org/anuarios/Anuar-16web.pdf.
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listed companies. In mid-2016, already with a new, more business-friendly administration

in place, the aforesaid law was repealed requiring simple majority Congress approval for the
disposition of holdings. This is probably the first step in the right direction: a state focused
on running policies for the achievement of the common good instead of interfering in the
management of listed corporations.
In an environment like ours, there does not seem to be fertile ground for shareholder
activism these days. However, in line with international trends, and with the will to play a
more economically and politically relevant role in the region and in the world, Argentina
will have no option but to adapt to international standards and improve its capital market,
structurally, economically and legally. A natural consequence of that should be the generation
of increased room for shareholder activism.
II LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF SHAREHOLDERS

RIGHTS
The Argentine Companies Law No. 19,550 as amended (ACL) is the legal framework
applicable to companies incorporated in Argentina, whether they are listed companies in the
country or not.
In the case of listed companies, besides being subject to the ACL, they are ruled by the
Argentine Capital Market Law No. 26,831 as amended (ACML).
Besides the above, it is worth mentioning that Argentina has recently enacted its new
civil and commercial code (CCC), which within its provisions establishes a prevailing order
for the application of rules to companies incorporated in Argentina. Said order is as follows:
a ACL/ACML mandatory provisions, as applicable;
b CCC mandatory provisions;
c company by-laws and amendments;
d ACL/ACML supplementary provisions, as applicable; and
e CCC supplementary provisions.
The ACL provides a specific system based on the principle of majorities to adopt decisions
within the company. This system is aimed at guaranteeing investors and shareholders minimum
rules and procedures, and therefore, rights. Notwithstanding that the ACL contains certain
provisions that are mandatory (e.g., quorum for ordinary shareholders meetings in the first
call), the ACL provides the shareholders with freedom to agree on the rules applicable to the
companies, to the relation between the company and its shareholders, as well as the relation
between the members of the board of directors and the shareholders, always within the ACL
specific system and parameters.
Notwithstanding that Argentinas legal and regulatory framework provides minority
shareholders and investors with broad rights which are briefly analysed below the fact that
currently in Argentina the capital is concentrated in certain groups of control, means that
there is not much place for shareholder activism. This is even true in non-listed companies.
To illustrate the above, we will briefly walk the reader through the following matters:
a the mechanism for electing and removing the members of the board of directors;
b conflict of interest treatment between shareholders and the board of directors;
c minority shareholders rights; and
d special considerations concerning ACML.
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i Appointment and removal of directors

The general principle stated in the ACL (Section 234 subsection 2) is that the members of the
board of directors are appointed by shareholders gathered in a general ordinary shareholders
meeting by an absolute majority of votes of the attending shareholders unless the companys
by-laws establish a different mechanism.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, and in order that not only the will of the
majority prevails over the minority shareholders, the ALC authorises the appointment of
directors by cumulative vote or classes of shares.
Appointment of directors by classes of shares (Section 262 of the ACL): it is one
of the mechanisms provided by the ACL in order to allow minority shareholders to have
representation on the board. In this regard, companies are able to include in their by-laws the
provisions that recognise the existence of classes of shares that represent as many groups of
shareholders in the share capital as may exist, and determining the mechanism of appointment
of the companies directors based on the existence of different classes.
Accordingly, each of the minority groups may appoint the number of members of
the board in proportion to the number of shares of the group or the total votes that may
correspond to them in the shareholders meeting.
The existence of classes of shares do not determine or entitle the shareholders to
appoint directors by this mechanism but needs to be expressly provided in the companies
by-laws.
Appointment of directors by cumulative vote (Section 263 of the ACL)

Shareholders are entitled to elect up to one-third of the seats to be filled on the board of
directors by means of cumulative voting. This method consists of multiplying the number of
votes held by each shareholder by the number of vacancies to be filled, and distributing the
obtained result in the most convenient way for the shareholder, that is to say, which grants
him or her the greatest representation.
The shareholder wishing to cast cumulative votes must give notice of intention to do
so to the company at least three business days prior to the date of the shareholders meeting at
which the members of the board of directors are to be chosen; such notice must specify those
shares to be so exercised. Once notice has been received that one shareholder has elected to
use this system, all the other shareholders are also empowered to use this system, should they
consider it advisable.
Same as providing the ACL the shareholders with the right to appoint the members of
the board of directors, it provides the right to revoke their appointment with or without cause
at any time (Section 256 of the ACL). The shareholders meeting is not obliged to justify the
cause of revocation.
The removal with no justified cause provides the removed director with no right to
judicially challenge the shareholders decision, as the shareholders meeting has the right to
revoke the appointments even without cause. This alternative does not affect the right of the
company and of its shareholders to file a legal action against the director within the term
provided by applicable laws.
The removal with justified cause needs to be based on the violation of law, fraud,
abuse of power or gross negligence or any other justified cause. It is necessary to clearly state
the justified cause that gives sufficient grounds to remove a member of the board from his or
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her office and companies should have sufficient evidence to such extent. Under this scenario,
the member of the Board that has been removed may judicially challenge the cause justifying
his or her removal.
As may be noticed, the shareholders meeting is the corporate body entitled to
appoint and remove, with or without cause, the members of the board of directors following
the procedures and majorities required by the company by-laws and the ACL. This differs
substantially from other jurisdictions and explains why the real power lies within the
controlling group rather than within the board.
The shareholders meeting is also the corporate body entitled to appoint and remove
the members of the supervisory committee or the statutory supervisors.
ii Conflicts of interest
The ACL and CCC impose a duty on directors to act loyally toward the company and its
shareholders and to perform their responsibilities with the diligence of a good businessman
(Section 59 of the ACL). Any failure to adhere to these standards will result in the imposition
of unlimited and several liabilities for damages arising therefrom.
The concept of loyalty encompasses the obligation to meet the standard of an honest
person and defend the interests of the company. Thus, and according to the provisions set
forth in Section 272 of the ACL, this duty prohibits any director from participating in the
discussion of any matter at board meetings in which he or she has an interest that conflicts
with the interest of the company.
Furthermore, according to Section 273 of the ACL, the directors cannot participate on
their own or on behalf of third parties in activities that imply competing with the company,
unless prior express authorisation of the shareholders meeting is granted.
Moreover, Section 159 of the CCC states that the directors cannot pursue or promote
interests that are contrary to the ones of the entity.
If, in a certain matter, a director has an interest that conflicts with the companys
interest, he or she should communicate said circumstance to the other members of the board
and refrain from intervening in any matter related to that operation.
The board should implement preventive measures to reduce the risk of conflicts of
interest in its relations with the company.
iii Basic shareholders rights

Rights of all shareholders
Right to be informed in advance as to the matters to be discussed in the shareholders meeting
(Section 246 of the ACL)
All the matters to be discussed at a shareholders meeting must be included in the agenda of
such meeting. Otherwise, any decision made on matters that were not included in the agenda
are void, except, inter alia, (i) unanimous shareholders decision; that is, a decision taken by
the affirmative vote of all the shareholders; (ii) the decision to initiate legal actions against
directors which is a direct consequence of a matter included in the agenda.
Notice of meetings are to be published in the Official Gazette (legal newspaper) and
in a newspaper with nationwide coverage for five days, at least 10 but no more than 30 days
prior to the date on which the meeting is to be held. The notice should include the type of
shareholders meeting, the date, time and place of the meeting, the agenda of the meeting and
any other provisions required by the by-laws for the attendance of shareholders. If a quorum
is not available at the first meeting, notice must be published for a meeting on second call,
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which must be held within 30 days of the date for which the first meeting was called. Notice
for a meeting on second call must be published for three days, at least eight days before the
date of the second meeting. In the case of simultaneous notifications, if the meetings are
convened on the same day, the meeting shall be convened not less than an hour from the time
fixed for the first meeting. Shareholders meetings may be validly held without the need to
publish notices if shareholders representing all the outstanding share capital of the company
are present and resolutions are adopted unanimously.
The shareholders have the right to request copies of all documents and information
related to the matters to be dealt with at the shareholders meetings.
Right to discuss and vote at the shareholders meetings

All shareholders, regardless of their ownership percentage in the company are entitled to
participate and vote at all shareholders meetings, except in those cases provided by the ACL.
Right to obtain copies of the minutes of shareholders meetings (Section 249 of the ACL)
Any shareholder may request, at his or her own expense, signed copies of the minutes of
shareholders meetings.
Pre-emptive right (Section 194 of the ACL)

As a general principle subject to certain exceptions provided by the ACL, holders of common
shares have a pre-emptive right to subscribe to new shares of the same kind in proportion to
his or her shareholding in the company.
The company must make an offer to the shareholders by publishing notice thereof
for three days in the Official Gazette, and also in a leading newspaper in the case of certain
companies (inter alia, companies whose capital exceeds 10 million Argentinian pesos,
companies that operate public concessions or services, etc.). The shareholders may exercise
their pre-emptive rights within 30 days following the date of the last publication.
If the company violates the shareholders pre-emptive rights, the affected shareholder
may initiate legal actions against the company to obtain the cancellation of share issuance
or, if that were not possible, the shareholder may seek indemnification for damages in an
amount not lower than three times the face value of the shares to which he or she had the
right to subscribe.
Right to object to the resolutions of the shareholders meeting (Section 251 of the ACL)
Resolutions of the shareholders meeting adopted in violation of the law, by-laws or internal
regulations, may be judicially challenged by the shareholders who did not vote in favour of
them and by absentee shareholders who evidence their status as shareholders at the time of
the resolution objected to. The shareholders who voted in favour of such a resolution may
object to it, if their vote is voidable due to defects in consent. Any claim in this respect must
be filed within three months of the relevant meeting.
Right of withdrawal (Section 245 ACL)

The shareholders right to separate from the company with reimbursement of the value of his
or her shares may be exercised by any shareholder disagreeing with the resolutions approved
by the shareholders meeting on the following matters:
a change in the form of organisation;
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b extension of the companys term or decision to continue if the company has started
the winding-up process;
c transfer of the legal domicile of the company to a foreign country;
d fundamental change of the corporate purpose;
e total or partial reimbursement of capital;
f capital increases decided by extraordinary shareholders meetings that require
contributions from the shareholders;
g voluntary withdrawal of the company from the public offering regime or delisting of
shares from the stock exchange; and
h continuation of the company, should the extraordinary shareholders meeting resolve
to avoid winding up the company due to cancellation of the public offering or listing
of its shares.
In the case of mergers and spin-offs, the right of withdrawal may not be exercised by the
shareholders of the absorbing company. Likewise, the right of withdrawal may not be
exercised in the winding up of a company prior to the date of expiry of its normal term.
The right of withdrawal may only be exercised by shareholders who voted against the
resolution of the shareholders meeting at which the above decisions were adopted, within
five days from the adjournment of the shareholders meeting; and by absentee shareholders
who evidence their status as shareholders at the time of the meeting, within 15 days from the
adjournment of the shareholders meeting.
Shares shall be reimbursed in accordance with the value resulting from the companys
most recent balance sheet or the balance sheet to be drawn up in compliance with applicable
legal provisions.
Right to action against directors (Section 277 of the ACL)

Shareholders may individually initiate legal actions against the directors for breach of duties,
violation of the law, by-laws or other internal regulations, or for any other damage caused by
willful misconduct, abuse of authority or gross negligence.
Right to request receivership (Section 113 of the ACL)

Any acts or omissions of the directors which may seriously endanger the company entitles
any shareholder to request judicial receivership of the company as a protective measure, after
showing his or her status as a shareholder, the existence of the danger and its seriousness, the
fact that the shareholder has exhausted all remedies provided in the by-laws and the filing of
an action for their removal.
Additional rights of shareholders holding al least 2 per cent of the share capital
Right to obtain information (Section 294, subsection 6 of the ACL)
The statutory supervisor has the duty to provide information on any subject within the scope
of his or her duties, to shareholders representing at least 2 per cent of the share capital, upon
their request.
If the company does not have statutory supervisors, the shareholders may examine the
corporate books and papers, and request the relevant information from the board of directors
pursuant to Section 55 of the ACL.
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Right to report irregularities (Section 294, subsection 11 the ACL)

The statutory supervisor must investigate all written complaints filed by shareholders
representing at least 2 per cent of the share capital. When the statutory supervisor deems that
the situation under investigation has not received appropriate treatment from the board of
directors and that the matter requires prompt action, he or she must immediately call for a
shareholders meeting to resolve the matter.
Additional rights of shareholders representing at least 5 per cent of the share capital
Right to request that shareholders meetings be called (Section 236 of the ACL)
Unless the by-laws establish a lower percentage, shareholders representing at least 5 per
cent of the share capital may request shareholders meetings to be called. The request must
specify the matters to be considered at the meeting and the board of directors or the statutory
supervisor must call the meeting to be held within 40 days of receipt of such request. Should
such meeting fail to be held, the meeting may be called by the Public Registry of Commerce
or by the competent judge.
Right to object to the expiry of directors and managers liability (Section 275 of the ACL)
In principle, directors liability to the company expires by approval of the performance of
their duties or by express waiver or settlement, resolved by the shareholders meeting, except
in case of violation of the law, the by-laws or internal regulations, and provided that there is
no objection from shareholders representing at least 5 per cent of the share capital.
Right to object to the statutory supervisors dismissal without cause (Section 287 of the ACL)
The shareholders meeting may revoke the appointment of the statutory supervisor without
cause only if there is no objection from shareholders representing 5 per cent of the share
capital.
Additional rights of shareholders representing at least 10 per cent of the share capital
Right to request surveillance by the enforcement authority (Section 301 of the ACL)
The regulatory authority (i.e., the Public Registry of Commerce) may exercise surveillance
duties over companies not included within Section 299 of the ACL, when requested by
shareholders representing 10 per cent of the share capital. In this case, the control shall be
restricted to the facts constituting the grounds for the request.
Right to request partial distribution during winding up (Section 107 of the ACL)
During the winding-up process, shareholders representing 10 per cent of the share capital
may request partial distribution of the remaining assets of the company, provided that all
corporate obligations are sufficiently guaranteed.
iv Special considerations concerning the ACML

The ACML provides certain rights to protect minority shareholders in listed companies.
The ACML grants minority shareholders certain exit rights in the event that a
single shareholder or group of shareholders take control of a listed company. In this case, a
mandatory tender offer must be made before the takeover.
The mandatory tender offer will have to comply with all the requirements imposed by
the laws and the securities exchange commission in Argentina (CNV) and will be supervised
by it.
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The procedure will need to ensure and provide, among other requirements, equal
treatment among the shareholders of the same class, a fair price, a reasonable period of
acceptance by the addressees of the offer, and the offerors obligation to provide the investors
with all the necessary information for them to make a decision.
On the other hand, the ACML also provides for a squeeze-out mechanism in favour
of a quasi-total controlling shareholder, provided certain additional requirements are met.
According to the ACML quasi-total control means holding 95 per cent or more of the
companys share capital.
Also, minority shareholders are entitled to benefit from any payable control premium.
CNVs regulations impose a number of objective criteria to be complied with in order to
ensure equal and fair treatment of minority shareholders.
Also, all mandatory tender offer rules apply upon change of control, thus ensuring
minority shareholders that they will not be prejudiced by the payment of any control
premium or differential pricing for selected shareholders.
III KEY TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
While it is clear that shareholder activism is basically a greenfield in our country and mostly
everything is to be done, there are initial positive signs that the protection of minority interest
rights has begun to be taken seriously. The relatively recent rejection by the board of directors
of Solvay Indupa of the mandatory tender price offered by Braskem in late 2013 and the
fallout of the transaction as a whole (a fact that would have been daily news anywhere else,
but in Argentina was a novelty) initiated a course from which there is no turning back. This
does not qualify as shareholder activism exactly (board activism would be more appropriate),
but the underlying concept is that the implied powers and rights of the shareholders, as
described elsewhere herein, are growing and are here to stay.
IV RECENT SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM CAMPAIGNS
For the reasons mentioned throughout this article, there are no shareholder campaigns worth
discussing in this section of the article.
V REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
As mentioned above, the latest major development in terms of regulating the capital markets
was the ACML (December 2012) which incorporated the mandatory tender offer and
strengthened the rights of small investors and minority shareholders. Among these innovations
it also gave the CNV the right to ask for reports, documents, conduct investigations and
when as a result the CNV deems that the interest of minority shareholders or other holders
of publicly listed securities have been affected, such agency has the power to either appoint
overseers of the issuers board of directors with veto rights (appealable only before the head of
the CNV) or even remove the board of directors for a maximum of 180 days. This decision
is appealable before the Finance Minister. At the time the draft bill was under discussion in
Congress, these discretionary powers were greatly criticised but they still made their way into
the ACML. At the issuers level, many feared that minority shareholders would try to increase
their leverage by leading the CNV into exercising these discretionary powers. However, this
9
Argentina
did not happen. The CNV preferred to have those powers as deterrent weapons against
controlling shareholder abuse and refrained from actually removing members of the Board
or appointing overseers. Still, the mere possibility of governmental intervention in listed
companies reflected a high level of interventionism (even if potential) that counted as a
negative factor.
At the time of writing (September 2016) a reform of the ACML is in the making.
This was announced by government officials in early 20165 and confirmed later in the year
simultaneously with a tax amnesty intended to boost internal investment. While many details
of the proposed reform are yet unknown, the government has anticipated its intention to
abrogate its intervention powers and to improve the mandatory tender offer mechanism in
order to further protect minority shareholder rights.
The nature of the announced reforms implies that, in essence, the ownership structure
of the local entities is not expected to change in the near future. If the focus of a reform is
to further protect minority shareholders, the other side of the coin is that control structure
is expected to stay the way it is now. Stricter scrutiny might be imposed on controlling
shareholders and boards but other than that nothing extraordinary should be expected.
Control and ownership will continue to go hand in hand for a long while.
VI OUTLOOK
In a given scenario like ours, the chances that we will see shareholder activism in the American
fashion are highly unlikely. However, the veracity of the preceding statement may be proved
wrong if certain things happen.
We know the current administration wants to boost internal and foreign investment.
The international perception of Argentina as a friendlier business environment and a better
relationship with the capital exporting countries are already an undeniable fact. An expected
stronger recovery of the Argentine economy in the next few years should attract institutional
investors to our local markets.
Political constraints make the return to a local institutional investor presence (at least
in the form of pension funds) unrealistic. Insurance companies may play a part but their
history has been one of passive investment and little activism due to regulatory restrictions.
However, an improvement of the general macroeconomic conditions might make Argentine
securities attractive for foreign institutional investors. If this happens, the chances that
activism is imported into the country will substantially increase, therefore driving regulations
to contemplate this and even promote a healthy level of activism.
If and until that happens, the focus has to remain on making sure that boards and
controlling shareholders of listed companies pursue the collective interest of all of the
shareholders rather than their own. Thus, all efforts to that end in the upcoming legislation
and by our courts will be welcome.
5 CNV Chairman Inteview by Diario La Nacion of 6 May 2016 available at http://www.

lanacion.com.ar/1895980-marcos-ayerra-vamos-a-modificar-la-ley-de-mercado-de-capitales.
10
Chapter 2
JAPAN
Akira Matsushita1
I OVERVIEW
A decade ago in Japan, there was much media attention on shareholder activism that often
took a hostile approach against the managements of companies. Such shareholder activism
significantly decreased due to the worldwide economic crisis in 2008. However, shareholder
activism in Japan has been growing again over the last few years due to certain developments
in corporate governance policies and the economy in Japan and the increase in assets under
management (AUM) of global shareholder activists.
Pursuant to the structural reform prong of Abenomics (the label for the economic
policies advanced by Japanese Prime Minister Shinz Abe) and to improve corporate
governance of listed companies in Japan, the Tokyo Stock Exchange issued Japans Corporate
Governance Code (the Governance Code) on 1 June 2015. The Governance Code promotes
five general principles to guide listed companies in conducting good governance. One of
the principles provides that listed companies should engage in constructive dialogue with
shareholders. In addition, a council of experts established by the Financial Services Agency
(FSA) released Japans Stewardship Code (the Stewardship Code) on 26 February 2014 that sets
forth principles considered to be helpful for institutional investors who behave as responsible
institutional investors in fulfilling their stewardship responsibilities. The Stewardship Code
provides that institutional investors should fulfil their stewardship responsibilities through
enhancing the medium to long-term investment returns for their clients and beneficiaries
through constructive engagement or purposeful dialogue with investee companies. The
Governance Code and the Stewardship Code are expected to work as the two wheels of a
cart to achieve effective corporate governance in Japan.
Historically, the management of listed companies in Japan tended to not fully consider
or heed the voices of shareholders in the companies because the shareholders are often stable
shareholders who do not sell their shares and support the management in the ordinary course
1 Akira Matsushita is a partner at Mori Hamada & Matsumoto.
11
Japan
in any case. However, the Governance Code provides that companies who hold shares of other
listed companies in cross-shareholding structures should disclose their policies with respect
to such cross-shareholding structures. As a result, the number of such stable shareholders
in companies might decrease. For example, in November 2015, three megabanks in Japan
released their plans to substantially reduce their cross-shareholdings within a few years. In
addition, the ratio of ownership of shares in listed companies in Japan by foreign entities
increased for three consecutive fiscal years until March 2015 (such ownership ratio slightly
decreased in 2015 in response to the decline in stock market prices in Japan).2 The foregoing
developments mean that shareholders who may be supportive of shareholder activism might
have increased in the Japanese market.
This article discusses details of shareholder rights and shareholder activism with
respect to a stock company (kabushiki kaisha) that has shares listed on a financial instruments
exchange.
II LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
i Shareholder rights
In Japan, rights of shareholders are provided under the Companies Act (Act No. 86 of
26 July 2005). Outlines of the shareholder rights that may typically be exercised by shareholders
in the context of shareholder activism, among others, are set out below.3
Shareholder proposals
The Companies Act provides shareholder proposal rights that are quite favourable to
shareholders. A shareholder of a listed company who owns, consecutively for the preceding
six months or more, at least 1 per cent of the voting rights of all shareholders in the company
or at least 300 votes may demand directors of the company to present proposals submitted
by the shareholder as an agenda at the shareholders meeting and demand the directors to
describe the summary of the proposals in convocation notices of the shareholders meeting
by submitting such demand to the directors no later than eight weeks prior to the day of
the shareholders meeting (Articles 303 and 305 of the Companies Act). Additionally, a
shareholder attending the shareholders meeting may submit proposals at the shareholders
meeting with respect to the matters that are within the purpose of the shareholders meeting
(Article 304 of the Companies Act).
Under the Companies Act, the number of proposals that an eligible shareholder can
submit is not limited. The company may not refuse a shareholder proposal unless it does not
satisfy the requirements set out in the Companies Act or its content violates the law or is
considered abusive.4 If the shareholder notifies the company of the reasons for its shareholder
proposal, the company shall describe such reasons in a reference document accompanying
the convocation notice dispatched to its shareholders, regardless of the content of the
2 Tokyo Stock Exchange Inc., et al., Result of Survey of Distribution Condition of Shares in
2015, 20 June 2016.
3 The numerical requirements under the Companies Act that are described below may be
changed by a company by setting out the changed numerical requirements in the companys
articles of incorporation.
4 See Tokyo High Court, judgment, 19 May 2015, Kinyu Shoji Hanrei No. 1473 at 26.
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Japan
shareholder proposal, unless such reasons are obviously false or the proposals are made solely
for defamation or insult. The company may set an appropriate limit for the character count
of the description of the shareholder proposal set forth in the reference document.
In this way, a shareholder who submits proposals to the company can deliver the
proposals to the other shareholders at the companys expense, and cause the other shareholders
to vote on the shareholder proposals using the voting card mailed by the company without
conducting a proxy solicitation by itself at its expense.
Calling of a shareholders meeting

A shareholder of a listed company who owns, consecutively for the preceding six months
or more, at least 3 per cent of the voting rights of all shareholders in the company may
demand the directors of the company to call a shareholders meeting regarding any matter
that the shareholder calling the meeting is entitled to vote on. If (1) the calling procedure
is not effected without delay after the demand or (2) the notice calling the shareholders
meeting designates the date of the shareholders meeting to be a date falling within the period
of eight weeks from the date of the demand, the shareholder who made the demand may
call the shareholders meeting by itself with the permission of the court (Article 297 of the
Companies Act).
Enjoinment of acts of directors

In the event a director of a company engages, or is likely to engage, in any act in violation of
laws and regulations or the articles of incorporation, if such act is likely to cause irreparable
damage to the company, a shareholder who owns the shares consecutively for the preceding
six months or more may enjoin such directors act usually by obtaining an order of provisional
disposition from the court (Article 360 of the Companies Act). Violations of a directors
duties of care and loyalty may constitute a violation of such laws and regulations.
Derivative actions
A shareholder who owns shares consecutively for the preceding six months or more may
demand the company to file an action to recover for damages and liabilities caused by its
director, and in the event the company does not file such action within 60 days from the
date of such demand, such shareholder may file a derivative action on behalf of the company
(Article 847 of the Companies Act). A shareholder who contemplates filing a derivative
action may gather evidence by exercising its shareholder rights, such as the right to inspect
or copy minutes of meetings of the board of directors of the company or its subsidiaries with
the permission of the court (Article 371, Section 2 of the Companies Act) and the right to
inspect or copy account books of the company (Article 433 of the Companies Act).
Dissenting shareholders appraisal rights

Shareholders who object to certain agenda items at the shareholders meeting, such as a merger,
consolidation of shares or certain amendments to the articles of incorporation that may be
related to a merger and acquisition transaction, may demand that the company purchase
their shares in the company at a fair price. If dissenting shareholders and the company cannot
reach agreement on the price of the shares within a certain period, the dissenting shareholders
or the company may file a petition to the court for a determination of the price.
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Japan
ii Regulations on shareholder activism

Large-scale shareholding report
A shareholder is generally required to file a large-scale shareholding report with the relevant
local finance bureau within five business days after the shareholders shareholding ratio in a
listed company exceeds 5 per cent (Article 2723 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange
Act (Act No. 25 of 13 April 1948) (FIEA)). The shareholding ratio is calculated by aggregating
shares held by such shareholder with any other shareholders with whom the shareholder has
agreed to jointly acquire or transfer shares in the company, or to jointly exercise the voting
rights or other rights as shareholders of the company (a joint holder). After filing the report,
if the shareholding ratio increases or decreases by 1 per cent or more, an amendment to the
report must be filed within five business days from the date of such increase or decrease.
The FSA expressed its position that in the event different shareholders communicate
to each other their plans to exercise their voting rights in a certain manner and their plans
happen to be the same, such event does not cause such shareholders to be deemed as
joint holders because an agreement means an undertaking to act (whether in writing or
orally and explicitly or implicitly) rather than the mere exchange of opinions.5 Therefore,
activist shareholders may not be required to file a large-scale shareholding report even if
they communicate with each other privately and act in the same manner without explicit
agreement.
Under the FIEA, rights to request delivery of shares under a sales and purchase
contract as well as options to purchase shares and borrow shares are subject to the large-scale
shareholding reporting obligations. However, the holding of equity derivatives that are
cash-settled and that do not involve the transfer of the right to acquire shares would likely not
trigger the reporting obligations. The FSA released guidelines that provide that derivatives that
transfer only economic profit and loss in relation to target shares, such as total return swaps,
are generally not subject to the disclosure obligations, provided that holding such cash-settled
equity derivatives may trigger such obligations if a holder purchases long positions on the
assumption that a dealer will acquire and hold matched shares to hedge its exposure.6
Proxy regulations
Any person who intends to solicit a proxy with respect to shares in a listed company shall
deliver a proxy card and reference documents containing the information specified in the
Cabinet Office Ordinance to the person solicited (Article 194 of the FIEA and Article 36-2 of
the Order for Enforcement of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (Cabinet Order
No. 321 of 30 September 1965)). However, a solicitation of a proxy with respect to shares in
a listed company that is made by persons other than the company or the officers, including
the directors and the executive officers, thereof and in which the solicited persons are less than
10 persons is exempt from the proxy regulations.
When a solicitor has delivered the proxy card and reference documents to the solicited
persons, the solicitor shall immediately submit a copy of such documents to the relevant
local finance bureau, provided that if the reference documents and form of voting card are
5 FSA, Clarification of Legal Issues Related to the Development of the Japans Stewardship
Code, 26 February 2014, at 11.
6 FSA, Q&A Regarding Large Scale Shareholding Report of Share Certificates, etc.,
31 March 2010, at 10.
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Japan
delivered by the company to all of the shareholders of the company who are entitled to
vote with respect to the relevant shareholders meeting pursuant to the Companies Act, the
solicitor does not have to submit those documents to the relevant local finance bureau. No
solicitor may make a solicitation of a proxy by using a proxy card, reference documents or any
other documents, or an electromagnetic record, in each case that contains false statements or
records on important matters, or that lacks a statement or record on important matters that
should be stated, or a material fact that is necessary to avoid a misunderstanding.
iii Rules for directors

Directors duties
Directors facing shareholder activism must abide by their duties of care and loyalty and treat
all shareholders equally under the Companies Act.
The Governance Code has had a major effect on the corporate governance of listed
companies in Japan since its release in June 2015. The Governance Code does not adopt a
rule-based approach, rather, it adopts a principle-based approach that is not legally binding
on companies with a comply or explain approach (i.e., either comply with a principle or, if
not, explain the reasons why the company is not complying).
The Governance Code provides that companies should, positively and to the extent
reasonable, respond to requests from shareholders to engage in dialogue, and the board of
directors should establish, approve and disclose policies relating to measures and organisational
structures that aim to promote constructive dialogue with shareholders. Specifically, the
senior management or directors, including outside directors, are expected to be more directly
involved in dialogue with shareholders. Furthermore, while listed companies cannot accurately
know their substantive shareholder ownership structure without conducting shareholder
identification searches due to indirect shareholding, such as shareholding through trusts or
custodians, the Governance Code provides that companies should endeavour to identify their
shareholder ownership structure as necessary in order to promote constructive dialogue with
their shareholders.
Stand-still agreement
Stand-still agreements, which may include agreements regarding agenda items of shareholders
meetings, the exercise of voting rights and restraint in acquiring additional shares in the
company, have not often been entered into between activist shareholders and listed companies
in Japan. There are several precedents of such stand-still agreements though, such as the case
of Aderans Holding Ltd entering into an agreement with Steel Partners, a US-based hedge
fund, regarding a slate of directors to be submitted to the extraordinary shareholders meeting
in 2008.
Since the Companies Act prohibits a company from giving any property benefits
to any person in connection with the exercise of shareholder rights, including voting
rights (Articles 120 and 970 of the Companies Act), the company generally cannot agree
to reimburse any costs incurred by activist shareholders from their shareholder activism
campaigns in connection with their entering into any voting agreement.
Takeover defence measures

The board of directors of a company may adopt takeover defence measures to deter the
building of a large stake in the company by activist shareholders. Most common takeover
defence measures adopted by Japanese listed companies are the so-called advance-warning
15
Japan
type of defence measures. Under such defence measures, a company establishes rules that
must be followed by any potential acquirer who intends to acquire more than a certain level
of shares (typically, 20 per cent) in the company, and the company publicly announces such
rules before an acquirer actually emerges. No rights or stock options are issued upon the
adoption of such rules. If an acquirer violates such rules or an acquisition is considered to be
harmful to the corporate value of the company or the common interest of the shareholders of
the company, the company would allot stock options to all shareholders without contribution
that are only exercisable by, or callable for new shares by the company from, those shareholders
other than the acquirer.
Although the number of takeover defence measures adopted by listed companies has
gradually decreased in recent years (as of 2015, approximately 480 companies have adopted
takeover defence measures), many corporate law practitioners still consider takeover defence
measures to be effective safeguards against shareholder activism.
i Profile of activist shareholders

Activist shareholders who engage in shareholder activism in Japan are mainly domestic and
global hedge funds and individual investors. In particular, in recent years, foreign activist
funds have invested in the Japanese market.
ii Types of companies targeted by activist shareholders

Activist shareholders in Japan have targeted companies of different sizes and in all types of
industries. In particular, activist shareholders are more likely to target companies that own
a large amount of surplus cash or other assets, have a low return on equity (ROE) or have
share prices that are undervalued by the market. Until the end of 2007, activist shareholders
often focused on building large stakes in small-cap or mid-cap companies to apply pressure
on the managements of those companies. In recent years, activist shareholders have also been
targeting large prominent companies, including companies with market capitalisation of over
US$20 billion. Another source of targets for activist shareholders is listed companies that
have a parent company or a controlling shareholder, and in which there is a structural conflict
of interest between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.
iii Objectives of shareholder activism

The most common objective of shareholder activism in Japan is to improve capital efficiency
of Japanese companies. ROEs of Japanese companies are consistently low compared to the
ROEs of many foreign companies. Activist shareholders, therefore, usually demand that
Japanese companies conduct a buyback of their shares or increase the amount of dividends.
Moreover, activist shareholders urge the companies to carve out their non-profitable
businesses and sell their assets that are not utilised or not related to their primary business,
including cross-holding shares. Activist shareholders may gain returns on their investments
from these activities in the short term.
In recent years, proposals for companies by activist shareholders to conduct potential
mergers and acquisitions transactions with another company or to undertake changes in
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Japan
business strategy of companies are becoming common in Japan. Some activist shareholders
usually conduct detailed due diligence on the companys business prior to engaging in such
kind of shareholder activism.
Improving corporate governance is also a common objective of shareholder activism.
Although the corporate governance of many listed companies have changed as a result of the
application of the Governance Code, which, for example, recommends that listed companies
appoint at least two independent directors, activist shareholders have continued to advocate
for changes in the corporate governance of companies such as with respect to increasing the
number of independent directors and adopting stock-price-linked remuneration of directors.
Furthermore, activist shareholders often bring attention in their campaigns to
incidents and actions in which directors are not abiding by their duties of care and loyalty.
For instance, as activist shareholders often acquire large amounts of shares in companies that
have a controlling shareholder, the activist shareholders speak against transactions that may
involve conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.
Activist shareholders are also engaging in so-called deal activism with respect to
mergers and acquisitions transactions, including mergers, share exchanges or tender offers, in
which the support of a certain number of shareholders is necessary to successfully complete
such transactions. Activist shareholders may speak against the transactions, and demand
that the company amend certain terms that are, in their view, inappropriate. Some activist
shareholders also exercise their appraisal rights as dissenting shareholders, and file a petition
to the court for a determination of the fair price for the relevant shares.
There are also activist shareholders who take actions mainly in consideration of social
issues, which is different from the more common type of shareholder activism that focuses
on the increasing shareholder value of the company. For example, shareholder proposals
concerning nuclear power generation have been submitted to electric power companies.
iv Tactics used by activist shareholders

Closed engagements
An activist shareholder typically initiates contact with the company in which it has acquired
shares by sending a letter to the company describing its demands, after which the shareholder
and company engage in private communications. An activist shareholder usually requests
quarterly or semi-annual meetings with the management of the company. Some activist
shareholders try to resolve issues of the company by proposing alternatives or solutions or
providing advice in a friendly manner, and are reluctant to make their engagement with the
company public.
Public campaigns
If activist shareholders decide that they cannot achieve their objectives through non-public
engagements with the company, they may wage public campaigns with the aim of attracting
the support of other shareholders for their objectives. Elements of public campaigns include
issuance of press releases, postings of relevant information on websites prepared by them for
the campaigns, dissemination of letters to shareholders, provision of information through
the media and holding information sessions for other shareholders. Given that the support of
public opinion is important in the public campaigns, the tools used by activist shareholders
to conduct public campaigns are becoming more sophisticated as ways to deliver information
to the public have become more diverse. If the company and the activist shareholder reach
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Japan
agreement prior to submission of a shareholder proposal or commencement of a proxy

fight, the activist shareholder can avoid bearing the expenses relating to such submission or
commencement.
Shareholder proposals/proxy fights

To effect changes in companies, activist shareholders can use the right of shareholder proposals
under the Companies Act, and conduct proxy solicitation in accordance with the FIEA. As
explained above, activist shareholders who intend to obtain an approval for certain agenda at
the shareholders meeting do not necessarily have to make a proxy solicitation because they
can communicate their proposals and the reasons for such proposals to other shareholders
by having the company dispatch the convocation notice and reference documents describing
such proposals and reasons at the companys expense. However, there are practical advantages
for an activist shareholder to engage in proxy solicitation for certain reasons, including (1)
the submission by shareholders of a voting card to the company that is left blank is generally
treated as a vote in favour of the companys proposal and against the shareholders proposal,
(2) the reason for the shareholder proposal that is set forth in the companys reference
documents is subject to a character count limit set by the company, but there is no such limit
in the case of a proxy solicitation, and (3) a proxy can authorise a procedural motion at a
shareholders meeting.
If an activist shareholder conducts the proxy solicitation, it often approaches and tries
to persuade proxy advisers, such as Institutional Shareholder Services Inc (ISS) and Glass,
Lewis & Co, LLC (Glass Lewis) to support its cause. The proxy advisers generally have a
strong influence, especially on US-based institutional investors.
Empty voting/morphable ownership

Empty voting (i.e., votes by shareholders who have more voting rights of shares than economic
ownership in the shares because the shareholders own voting rights of shares that are decoupled
from the economic ownership of such shares) may be used by activist shareholders. Empty
voting may be implemented by, among other means, equity swaps or record date capture by
borrowing shares. Empty voting deviates from the principle of one-share-one-vote in stock
companies, and may result in resolutions of shareholders meetings that are not properly
aligned with the interests of the company or its shareholders as a whole because empty
voters voting rights in the company are not in proportion to their economic interests in the
company. Thus far, there has been no reported case in Japan in which a grossly improper
resolution was made or a proper agenda item was voted down at a shareholders meeting as a
result of empty voting.
As a related issue, activist shareholder may substantively own shares in the company
without disclosure by using equity derivatives. Given that dealers that sell equity derivatives
usually purchase matched shares in practice to hedge their risks involved in the equity
derivatives, activist shareholders, when necessary, may have the ability to terminate the equity
derivatives and purchase the matched shares held by the dealers (morphable ownership).
Activist shareholders may suddenly emerge in this way as shareholders owning a large amount
of the shares without giving the company adequate time to prepare for the shareholder
activism.
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Japan
Litigations
Activist shareholders sometimes engage in litigation as a tactic of shareholder activism, such as
seeking an order of provisional disposition for enjoinment of directors actions and bringing
a derivative action against directors of the company to recover for damages and liabilities
caused by such directors.
Hostile takeovers
The most aggressive approach of shareholder activism is a hostile takeover, which is
an acquisition of shares in a company by an activist shareholder without consent of the
management of the company through on-market transactions or tender offers. However, few
hostile takeovers have been successfully consumated in Japan partly because there have been
stable shareholders in the companies subjected to such takeovers and public opinion in Japan
has been generally against hostile takeovers thus far.
Activist shareholders have recently targeted large-cap companies in Japan as in the case with
the US and other countries. One of the most well-known activist hedge funds in the US,
Third Point, holds shares of several Japanese large-cap companies. For example, Third Point
proposed to the electronic company Sony Corporation (market cap as of August 2013:
approximately US$20 billion) that it should carve out its entertainment business and make
an offering of shares in the entertainment business to the public, although Sony Corporation
ultimately announced that it refused to undertake such proposal in August 2013. According
to public information, Third Point also urged the machinery manufacturing company Fanuc
Corporation (market cap as of April 2015: approximately US$43 billion) to repurchase a
large amount of its shares and to increase the amount of dividends to improve its capital
efficiency. Third Points conduct may have prompted Fanuc Corporation to take actions to
increase its shareholder returns during 2015 when Fanuc Corporation made a buyback of its
shares and paid a large amount of dividends.
C&I Holdings Co, Ltd, which has some connection to the well-known Japanese
activist fund Murakami Fund, made a demand in June 2015 to the electronic trading company
Kuroda Electric Co, Ltd to convene an extraordinary shareholders meeting and submitted
a shareholder proposal to elect four outside directors nominated by C&I Holdings Co, Ltd
Although the shareholder proposal was not passed at the extraordinary shareholders meeting,
ISS recommended voting for the shareholder proposal (whereas Glass Lewis recommended
voting against the shareholder proposal), and shareholders who owned almost 40 per cent of
the voting rights in the company voted for the shareholder proposal. This case is an example
suggesting that shareholders in Japan are becoming comfortable with, and supportive of,
shareholder activism.
Another activist fund, Effissimo Capital Management, have acquired a number of
listed companies who have a parent company. Effissimo Capital Management, which owned
approximately 30 per cent of shares in automaker Nissan Shatai Co, Ltd, brought a derivative
action to recover for damages caused by directors of the automaker and sought an injunction
in court against certain acts of the directors on the grounds that the directors were violating
their duties of care and loyalty. The fund claimed that the directors were violating their duties
because Nissan Shatai Co, Ltd deposited a large amount of cash in a subsidiary of Nissan
Motor Co, Ltd which is a parent company of Nissan Shatai Co, Ltd by participating in the
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Japan
cash management system (CMS) of the Nissan Motor group without reasonable reasons,
and the directors of Nissan Shatai Co, Ltd did not manage its cash efficiently. Although the
Yokohama District Court dismissed the case in favour of the directors in February 2012,7
this case indicates that activist shareholders are willing to engage in court and litigation
procedures to accomplish their goals.
Although it is not a recent shareholder activism campaign, the proposed share
exchange between Tokyo Kohtetsu Co, Ltd and Osaka Steel Co, Ltd was rejected at the
shareholders meeting of Tokyo Kohtetsu Co, Ltd in 2007 as a result of a proxy fight waged
by the Japanese activist fund Ichigo Asset Management, which opposed the share exchange.
This proxy fight is representative of cases in which shareholder activism may hamper mergers
and acquisitions transactions.
The Companies Act was amended on 1 May 2015. One of the purposes of the amendment
is to enhance the corporate governance of companies. For example, although the amended
Companies Act does not require companies to elect outside directors, directors of a listed
company have to explain at the companys annual shareholders meeting why it is not
appropriate for the company to have any outside director if the company does not have any
outside director. To prompt companies to have outside directors, the amended Companies
Act allows a company to adopt a new governance structure in which the company has an
audit and supervisory committee. An audit and supervisory committee audits the activities of
directors of the company, and a majority of the members of the committee must be outside
directors.
In addition, as discussed above, the Governance Code was issued in June 2015 and
the Stewardship Code was issued in February 2014. Consequently, 2015 is often referred
to as the first year of corporate governance for listed companies in Japan, and the corporate
governance of Japanese companies has in fact improved to some extent. Moreover, the FSA
established the Council of Experts Concerning the Follow-up of Japans Stewardship Code
and Japans Corporate Governance Code in August 2015 for the purpose of following up
with the prevalence and adoption of the Stewardship Code and the Governance Code and to
further improve the corporate governance of all listed companies.
7 Yokohama District Court, judgment, 28 February 2012, not cited in digests.
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Japan
VI OUTLOOK
The Governance Code has prompted, and will continue to prompt, listed companies to
place greater importance on establishing and maintaining dialogue and relationship with
their shareholders. If more cross-shareholdings are dissolved in the future, the number of
shareholders who support the managements of companies may decrease and the number
of shareholders who are supportive of activist shareholders may increase. As a result, the
influence of shareholder activism on the management and direction of companies may be
further enhanced. Therefore, managements of listed companies should operate the companies,
including conducting proactive engagement and communications with the companies
shareholders, and make appropriate preparations to take into account increasing shareholder
activism in the event they are actually targeted by activist shareholders.
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Chapter 3
NETHERLANDS
Paul Cronheim, Willem Bijveld and Frank Hamming1
I OVERVIEW
Shareholder activism is a hot topic in many Dutch boardrooms. Discussions between

boards and shareholders on matters such as strategy, corporate governance and executive
compensation have become a regular feature within Dutch listed companies. This chapter
gives an overview of the Dutch regulatory and legal framework in which listed companies
and their shareholders operate, points out the key trends concerning shareholder activism
in the Dutch market, and zooms in on a few topical battles between companies and activist
shareholders.
i Primary sources of law, regulation and practice

Dutch Civil Code
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) is the primary source of law with regard to Dutch
corporate law. As such, the DCC also covers the rights and duties of, and the division of
powers between, the (one or two-tier) board and the general meeting of shareholders.
Dutch Corporate Governance Code

The Dutch Corporate Governance Code complements the DCC as it lays down principles
and best practice provisions that regulate the relationship between the board(s) and the
general meeting. The Corporate Governance Code is currently under revision and a new
version is expected to come into force in 2017. The Corporate Governance Code applies on
a comply-or-explain basis to, briefly stated, all Dutch listed companies.
1 Paul Cronheim is a partner and Willem Bijveld and Frank Hamming are senior associates at
De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek NV.
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Netherlands
Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act and Market Abuse Directive

The Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act (FMSA) contains, among others, disclosure
obligations for listed companies, major shareholders and board members, and rules on
takeovers of listed companies. The FMSA has implemented numerous EU directives, such
as the Transparency Directive and the Takeover Directive. As per 3 July 2016, several market
abuse provisions have been removed from the FMSA and are now dealt with in the Market
Abuse Regulation. The MAR has direct effect in all EU Member States.
EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive

For hedge funds and private equity funds specifically, the Alternative Investment Fund
Managers Directive (AIFMD) is also relevant as it sets out rules and requirements for the
authorisation, ongoing operation and transparency of AIFMs.
ii Division of powers roles of the executive board, the supervisory board and the
general meeting
Most Dutch public limited liability companies with a listing on the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange have a twotier board, consisting of an executive and a supervisory board.2 In a
two-tier board governance model, the roles of the main corporate bodies can be summarised
as follows.
The executive board manages the company and is in charge of the companys aims,
strategy, risk profile, results and corporate social responsibility issues. The executive board is
accountable to the supervisory board and the general meeting of shareholders. The executive
board has a fiduciary duty to the companys stakeholders (including, but not limited to, its
shareholders).
The supervisory board is charged with supervising and advising the executive board.
The supervisory board has certain rights regarding the appointment, suspension and dismissal
of executive board members, and the approval of the supervisory board is required for certain
important resolutions. The supervisory board is accountable to the general meeting and also
has a fiduciary duty to all stakeholders of the company.
The general meeting monitors the performance of the executive board and the
supervisory board. The powers of the general meeting are vested in the DCC and the
companys articles of association. For example, in principle, a decision of the general
meeting is needed for resolutions concerning issuance of shares, dissolution of the company,
adoption of the annual accounts, board compensation, and amendment of the companys
articles of association. Transactions regarding an important change in the companys identity
or character (e.g., sale of the company) require prior approval of the general meeting. The
general meeting also has the power to appoint and dismiss board members. The companys
articles of association, however, may limit this power by stating that the appointment and
dismissal occurs upon a (binding) proposal from the executive or the supervisory board, or
can only be taken with an increased majority requirement.
2 Dutch law provides companies with the option to structure their boards based on a one-tier
model (single board with both executive and non-executive board members) or a two-tier
model (separate executive and supervisory boards). One-tier board structures are often seen
with Dutch public limited liability companies with a listing on the NYSE or NASDAQ, for
example Mylan NV, NXP Semiconductors NV, and Unilever NV.
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iii The activist shareholders toolbox

This section provides an overview of common tools that activist shareholders use in pursuing
their agenda. See Table 1 for the different levels of aggression of these tools.
Table 1
Level of aggression Tools
Least aggressive Private discussions and engagement with the company
Public engagement with the company
Stakebuilding
Right to participate in and vote at general meeting
Right to place an item on the agenda
Right to convene a meeting
Most aggressive Initiate litigation
Private discussions and engagement with the company

In the Netherlands, the vast majority of shareholder activism starts with the activist engaging
with the boards of the company in a private setting. This could take the form of informal
one-on-one discussions or conference calls with the companys CEO to discuss strategy and
measures to maximise shareholder value, or more formal communication by sending private
Dear Board letters.
Public engagement with the company

When a shareholder activist is not satisfied with the companys response to issues raised in
private discussions, starting a public campaign might be an alternative to realise its agenda.
Generally, this includes the use of (social) media, teaming up with other shareholders and
institutional investors, and gaining support of the investor community at large.
In the Netherlands there have been few public campaigns by activist shareholders. The
most notorious example in this respect is still the 2007 campaign of UK-based hedge fund
The Childrens Investment Fund against ABN AMRO.
Stakebuilding
For an activist shareholder to ramp up the pressure on the companys boards, enlarging its
stake could be an effective tool. Even with a small stake, an activist shareholder could have
significant influence.
When buying shares, the activist shareholder must observe the rules on disclosure of
substantial shareholdings. Pursuant to the FMSA, a shareholder must immediately notify the
AFM if its percentage of capital interest or voting rights exceeds (or falls below) a number of
specific thresholds. Currently, the thresholds are: 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 75 and
95 per cent.3
3 For non-EU entities with a listing on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange that choose the
Netherlands as their EU home Member State, the thresholds are: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30,
50 and 75 per cent.
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An activist shareholder building up its stake should also be aware of the mandatory
offer rules. Under the FMSA, a mandatory offer is triggered by a person, or a group of
persons acting in concert, acquiring predominant control (at least 30 per cent of voting
rights). When a shareholder reaches this threshold it is in principle obliged to make an offer
for all remaining shares of the target company.4
Right to participate in and exercise right to vote at general meeting

Every shareholder has the right to participate in and exercise its voting right at the companys
general meeting. In principle, the holder of one share is entitled to one vote (one share - one
vote principle). The articles of association may stipulate a voting record date 28 days prior to
a general meeting. The record date therefore determines those shareholders entitled to vote at
a general meeting. Shareholders may vote in person or by proxy, which proxy may be granted
electronically.
In the Netherlands a vote no campaign has been seen on numerous occasions.
Recently, hedge fund Highfields Capital Management opposed the plans of insurer Delta
Lloyd to pursue a rights offering. Another example is the 2016 vote no campaign of Dutch
shareholders association VEB against the pay package for Shell board members.
Right to place an item on the agenda

Shareholders holding individually or jointly 3 per cent of the companys stock have a right to
submit items for the agenda of the general meeting. The companys articles of association can
prescribe a lower percentage. The Corporate Governance Code stipulates that a shareholder
may exercise this right only after he consulted the executive board. See in this respect also the
companys right to invoke a 180-day response time (see below).
A notable example in this respect is the case concerning ASMI, a Dutch multinational
active in the semiconductor industry, where hedge funds Fursa and Hermes put a proposal
on the agenda of the 2008 general meeting to replace the CEO and most of the supervisory
board members. More recently, Dutch civil rights group Follow This put a green resolution
on the agenda of the general meeting of oil giant Shell in which it requested the board to
invest the profits from fossil fuels into renewable energy.
Shareholders can submit items on the agenda as either a voting item or a discussion
item. However, shareholders cannot force the board to put an item on the agenda as a voting
item if the general meeting does not have the power to resolve upon the topic; in other words,
shareholders cannot use this right to organise referenda or motions on topics belonging to
the primacy of the board. See the recent (2016) case of Boskalis against Fugro in paragraph
IV.
Right to convene a meeting

Shareholders holding individually or jointly 10 per cent of the companys stock are entitled
to call a general meeting and put such items on the agenda as they deem appropriate. The
4 A mandatory offer will not be required if, within 30 days following the acquisition of control,
the controlling party reduces its stake below the 30 per cent voting rights threshold, provided
that the voting rights held by that controlling party have not been exercised during this
period and the shares are not sold to another controlling shareholder of the company. The
Enterprise Chamber may extend this period by an additional 60 days.
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companys articles of association can prescribe a lower percentage. A prominent example

of activists exercising this right is Centaurus and Paulson & Co, who called shareholder
meetings at Dutch industrial conglomerate Stork to vote on alternative strategies, including a
public-to-private transaction, and on the dismissal of the entire executive board.
Initiate litigation
Shareholder litigation typically takes place in inquiry (mismanagement) proceedings before
the Enterprise Chamber.5 Any shareholder that alone or acting jointly holds sufficient shares6
may initiate inquiry proceedings and request the Enterprise Chamber to order an inquiry
into the policy of the company by independent court-appointed investigators.
The Enterprise Chamber may order an inquiry into the policy of a company if it is
demonstrated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is mismanagement.
This may, for instance, consist of abuse of minority shareholders, insufficient disclosure
to shareholders, conflicts of interest of board members, or the unjustified use of takeover
defences.
The Enterprise Chamber may at any time during the proceedings order interim
measures. The interim measures ordered by the Enterprise Chamber may play an important
role in takeover situations and activist campaigns. Interim measures may include suspending
executive or supervisory board members, appointing interim executive or supervisory board
members and suspending shareholders voting rights. These interim decisions tend to carry
great weight and, despite being provisional, are often decisive in the outcome of the matter.
The Enterprise Chamber has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to act promptly
and take rigorous action in takeover and activist situations. In the context of takeovers of
public companies, shareholder interest groups and other activist shareholders often use (the
threat of ) inquiry proceedings to protect the interests of minority shareholders against the
boards of the target company (the members of which may no longer be independent) or a
majority shareholder.
5 A shareholder can also initiate summary proceedings before the competent Dutch district
court. However, summary proceedings are much less common, since the Enterprise Chamber
is regarded as the specialised court regarding corporate litigation.
6 If the companys issued share capital does not exceed 22.5 million: persons who alone
or acting jointly hold shares representing at least 10 per cent of the issued share capital or
representing a nominal value of at least 225,000. If the companys issued share capital
exceeds 22.5 million: persons who alone or acting jointly hold shares representing at least
1 per cent of the issued share capital or, if the shares are listed, representing a value of at least
20 million based on the closing price of the last trading day.
The threshold for an activist shareholder to have standing in the Enterprise Chamber can be
extremely high as a result of the capital structure of the company. This was the case at Mylan
where the nominal value of each share was set at 0.01 and the issued share capital did not
exceed 22.5 million. As a result, a shareholder wanting to initiate inquiry proceedings would
need to hold shares with a market value of more than US$1 billion to reach the threshold of
225,000 in nominal value.
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iv The companys toolbox

Dutch corporate law provides for several structural mechanisms that enable a company to
prevent or deter shareholder activism. Many Dutch listed companies have adopted such
mechanisms in their articles of association. Examples include the use of listed depositary
receipts without voting rights, shares with double or multiple voting rights, voting caps, the
use of change of control clauses in financing arrangements, golden parachutes and structures
that limit shareholders control of the board. However, no company is immune to shareholder
activism even with structural mechanisms in place. In the following, we describe some typical
response measures that a targeted company could use.7 See Table 2 for different levels of
aggression regarding these tools.
Table 2
Level of aggression Tools
Enter into a dialogue with the activist shareholder
Least aggressive
Get the companys message out to shareholders
Relationship agreement
Just say No
Invoke the response time
Put up or shut up rule
Trigger call-option on anti-takeover preferred shares
Issue ordinary shares
Sale of treasury shares
Most aggressive Initiate litigation
Enter into a dialogue with the activist shareholder

The most informal response measure for a company is to enter into a dialogue with the
activist shareholder. This provides the opportunity for the companys boards to assess
the activists views on the companys strategy, and shows their willingness to listen to the
activist shareholders concerns and suggestions. Building a relationship of trust and creating
consensus with the activist shareholder might be a strong tool for the executive board from
which the company can benefit in the long run. Entering into discussions with the activist
shareholder may give the executive board breathing space and time to determine its strategy
when private discussions do not result in a long-term solution.
Get the companys message out to shareholders

A company dealing with shareholder activism could reiterate and emphasise the companys
current strategy (in combination with a just say no strategy). The executive board can give
7 According to the Dutch Supreme Court, defensive measures can be justified if they
are necessary with a view to the (long-term) continuity of the company and its various
stakeholders, provided that the measures are taken in order to maintain the status quo
pending negotiations between the target and the bidder, and provided that they constitute
an adequate and proportional response. Implementing defensive measures for an indefinite
amount of time, generally, will not be justified.
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presentations to key shareholders and potential investors in which it explains that its current
strategy is in the best interest of the company and is the preferred path to maximise value for
its shareholders. Gaining support of key shareholders might prove pivotal in fending off an
activist shareholder.
Relationship agreement
A growing trend in the Dutch market is that listed companies conclude relationship
agreements with large and vocal shareholders. In a relationship agreement, the company
and the shareholder agree on topics such as strategy, governance, financing and exchange
of information. The company could give one or more supervisory board seats to the activist
shareholder in order to gain support from the activist for the companys strategy. Although the
concluding of a relationship agreement provides a (temporary) ceasefire between a company
and an activist shareholder, the boards must be aware of the fact that the representation
of the activist shareholder on the board inevitably has an impact on the dynamics in the
boardroom. Examples include the relationship agreements between telecom company KPN
and its Mexican suitor Amrica Mvil (see paragraph IV), and between critical materials
company AMG and hedge fund RWC (see paragraph IV).
Invoke response time

Pursuant to the current Corporate Governance Code, the executive board may invoke a
180-day response time when shareholders request certain agenda items that could lead to a
change in the companys strategy, such as the request to appoint a new CEO. The executive
board must use the response time for further deliberation and constructive consultation.
Case law has further defined that in principle shareholders must respect the response time
as invoked by the executive board; the response time may only be set aside if there are
sufficiently important reasons for this. The response time provides the executive board with
some breathing space and the opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the activist and to
seek alternative measures.
Put up or shut up rule

The objective of the put up or shut up rule is to prevent a listed company from being the
object of rumour and speculation regarding a potential public offer for its securities. At the
request of the potential target company, the Dutch securities authority AFM can impose
disclosure obligations on an entity or person that has published information that could create
the impression that it is considering the preparation of a public offer. This could be, for
example, an activist shareholder who is building up a stake in a company. Following the
AFMs instructions, the potential bidder must put up or shut up, that is, within a given
period announce a public offer for the target company or indicate that it does not intend to
launch a public offer, in which case it will be prohibited from announcing or launching an
offer for the target company for a period of six months. So far, there have been no instances
in which the AFM has actually given such instructions.
Issue ordinary shares

As noted earlier, the general meeting has the power to issue ordinary shares. However,
pursuant to the DCC, the general meeting may delegate this power to another corporate
body for a period of up to five years. The same applies for the limitation and exclusion of
pre-emptive rights that shareholders have. Typically, as is the case for the vast majority of
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Dutch listed companies, the general meeting authorises the executive board to issue ordinary
shares. In general, the authorisation stipulates that the executive board can issue a certain
percentage of shares for general corporate purposes and a certain percentage for the purpose
of mergers and acquisitions.8 As a measure to defend itself from activist shareholders or
hostile bidders, the executive board could decide to issue shares to a friendly third party
for example, a long-time strategic party. Although perceived as aggressive, such an issuance
dilutes the activist shareholders stake in the company and accordingly reduces its influence.
Sale of treasury shares

When a company holds a certain number of its own shares, for example, as a result of a share
buyback, and these shares have not yet been cancelled (treasury shares), a company could
sell these to a friendly third party. As a result, similar to issuing ordinary shares, the third
party acquires a stake in the company and dilutes the shareholding of the activist shareholder.
Alternatively, a company could use treasury shares as consideration when purchasing certain
assets from a third party. Depending on the specific situation, the companys boards must be
aware that this defensive measure, similar to issuing ordinary shares, is likely to be perceived
as aggressive not only by existing shareholders, but also by the investor community and
regulators.
Protective foundation: issuing anti-takeover preferred shares

The most common Dutch defensive measure consists of the possibility for a company to
issue preferred shares to an independent, yet friendly, foundation. The company grants
the foundation a call option, pursuant to which the foundation can effectively obtain up to
50 per cent of the votes.
The board of the foundation must be independent from the company. Accordingly,
the company is not able to determine whether the call option is exercised the foundation has
to make its own decision in accordance with its objects as stated in its articles of association.
In general, the foundations articles of association state that the foundation serves the
interest of the company and its stakeholders by safeguarding, among others, the continuity,
independence and identity of the company and its business.
Foundations rarely exercise their call option. One of the few and most recent of
examples is the defence foundation of KPN, which exercised its call option as a reaction to
the announcement of Amrica Mvil to launch a hostile bid. Another example is the defence
foundation of global pharmaceutical company Mylan NV (which has its registered office in
the Netherlands), which made use of its call option in order to deter Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries. Examples of hostile takeovers where a foundation was in place, but the foundation
did not exercise its call option, include Staples/Corporate Express (2008), Boskalis/Smit (2009),
and Mexichem/Wavin (2012).
8 In general, a prospectus is required for both the offering and the listing of shares. Under
Dutch law, companies can make use of an exemption to publish a listing prospectus if it issues
less than 10 per cent of the companys stock to qualified investors, or to publish an offering
prospectus if it issues shares to fewer than 150 retail investors.
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Initiate litigation
Although not common, a targeted company can also initiate summary proceedings before the
district court or enquiry proceedings, before the Enterprise Chamber. In such proceedings,
the company can request interim or provisional measures to neutralise the attack or campaign
of an activist shareholder.
i General overview
Shareholder activism is a hot topic in boardrooms in the Netherlands, even though in absolute
terms the number of activist shareholder campaigns is relatively limited when compared
with those in the US and the UK. Shareholder activism reached its first peak between
2000 and 2007, when various US and UK-based hedge funds targeted listed companies in the
Netherlands. Examples include the financial conglomerate ABN AMRO, Dutch industrial
giants ASMI and Stork, and other well-known multinationals such as Ahold and Philips.
Shareholder activism is currently approaching precrisis levels as a result of market
and economic conditions and a boost in M&A activity in the last few years. Market studies
mention in particular the following key drivers for increasing shareholder activism post-crisis
in Europe:9
a access to debt financing against historically low interest rates;
b high levels of cash on company balance sheets;
c stagnating revenues resulting in an increased pressure from investors to create
shareholder value through dividend policy, operational improvements and changes in
strategy;
d peak in M&A activity that supports activists in pushing companies to merge, acquire
or be acquired, or divest or spin off non-core businesses; and
e less tolerance for poor governance and high executive compensation among the public
and investors.
Since 2010, we have seen around 15 publicly disclosed activist shareholder campaigns in the
Netherlands. The total level of shareholder activism is most likely higher, since shareholder
activism in the Netherlands predominantly takes place behind closed doors.
In this section, we describe the activist shareholder landscape in the Netherlands as
well as the main trends observed in the last decade. Given the relatively low number of
activist shareholder campaigns in the Netherlands, trends described in this section are not
only based on statistics, but also on more subjective observations and anecdotal evidence.
ii Activist shareholders: increased attention for activism from institutional investors

Activist shareholders in the Netherlands are predominantly US or UK-based hedge funds with
a European or global investment focus, which applies to roughly 40 per cent of all activist
hedge funds.10 Activism comes from both pure-play activist hedge funds, which acquire a
stake in a company and subsequently put pressure on the management to adopt their views to
9 See for instance: JP Morgan 2014, Knocking on the door shareholder activism in Europe.
10 Preqin Hedge Fund Activist Report, June 2014.
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maximise shareholder value, and multi-strategy hedge funds, for which shareholder activism
is only one of their strategies. Over the last decade, some of the largest global activist hedge
funds have been active in the Netherlands, including:
a The Childrens Investment Fund, known for initiating the takeover of ABN AMRO;
b Centaurus, which launched a campaign against Stork and had positions in Ahold and
SBM Offshore;
c Hermes, which together with Fursa battled in court against ASMI, and initiated
litigation against Oc, which was backed by hedge fund Orbis;
d Third Point, which suggested a split-up of DSM;
e Southeastern Asset Management, which had a stake in Philips;
f RWC, known for building up positions in Corbion and AMG;
g Paulson & Co, which teamed up with Centaurus against Stork, and bought a stake in
KPN and Ahold;
h JANA Capital, which targeted Philips and TNT Express;
i Highfields Capital Management, which holds a position in Delta Lloyd; and
j TT International, which suggested a break-up of TomTom.
Besides these usual suspects, we observe an increased attention for shareholder activism from
institutional investors. The (potential) role of Dutch pension funds is especially noteworthy,
since together they hold approximately 1,200 billion in assets under management (AUM)
and have substantial investments in Dutch listed entities.
After the crisis, European and Dutch politicians called upon institutional investors to
take a more active role as shareholder. Even though this did not result in legislative changes,
the pressure fuelled the increased engagement of Dutch pension funds in the debate with the
companies they invest in. Activism from institutional investors in the Netherlands focuses
mainly on corporate governance issues, such as remuneration policy and corporate social
responsibility. Campaigns carried out by institutional investors often take place behind the
scenes and are, on average, less aggressive than the campaigns from pure-play activist hedge
funds. There are several examples, however, of institutional investors publicly criticising
Dutch listed companies.
In 2015, the largest Dutch pension fund ABP announced that it would look at the
sustainability of its investments with more scrutiny and that it would enter into a dialogue
with the companies it invests in to realise its sustainability goals. ABP claimed that its criticism
at the general meeting of Shell contributed to Shells decision to cease its exploration activities
in Alaska.
Another recent example of institutional investors becoming more vocal is the
2014 public campaign that Dutch pension fund manager APG, together with Dutch insurer
NN, waged against animal and fish feed company Nutreco. APG and NN disagreed with the
boards decision to sell the company to SHV claiming that the offer significantly undervalued
Nutrecos business while, at the same time, Cargill and private equity firm Permira had
expressed their interest in Nutreco (although they did not make an offer). In a public
letter, APG and NN questioned the Nutreco boards decision to sell the company to SHV.
Eventually, SHV raised its offer and APG and NN sold their shares.
iii Targets for activist shareholders: size is no deterrence

One of the recent global trends also observed in the Netherlands is activist shareholders
expanding their focus to some of the largest companies. This trend is largely driven by the
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increased financial capacity of the large activist hedge funds. In the early 2000s, there were
only a few activist funds with AUM in the US$1015 billion range. Currently, more than
10 funds manage over US$10 billion. On aggregate, activist funds worldwide are estimated
to hold at least US$200 billion in AUM.
In the Netherlands, this trend was first observed with hedge funds targeting Ahold in
2006 (market cap at that point over 10 billion in 2006), ABN AMRO in 2007 (market cap
at that point over 50 billion) and Philips in 2007 (market cap at that point over 30 billion).
More recently, Shell (market cap over 180 billion) was targeted in 2015 and 2016 by activist
shareholders who were pushing for more focus on sustainable energy and a business model
that is more climate-change proof. The size of a company thus does not seem to deter activist
shareholders from acquiring a stake and putting pressure on the boards.
iv Objectives of activist shareholders: five common themes

We see five common themes in activist campaigns in the Netherlands, largely in line with US
and UK practice:
Conglomerate discount
Several Dutch companies were pressured by shareholders to unlock shareholder value
by divesting or spinning off non-core divisions or breaking up the company. The most
well-known examples include Ahold, where Paulson & Co and Centaurus demanded the sale
of Aholds US activities; Stork, where Paulson & Co and Centaurus pushed to break up the
company; and DSM, where Third Point pushed for a split-up.
M&A situations
Although less common, there are examples of activist shareholders pushing mergers and
acquisitions, such as sale of the company. TCIs public Dear Board letter to ABN AMRO is
notorious is this respect as it brought the bank in play, resulting in the largest ever takeover
battle in the Netherlands.
Strategic
Activist investors have pushed companies to make strategic changes and to improve their
performance. This is often part of campaigns aimed at breaking up or selling the company, as
discussed directly above. A prominent example is ASMI, where activist hedge funds Hermes
and Fursa criticised the front and back-end strategy of ASMI.
Inefficient balance sheet

In several cases activist investors demanded a return of capital to the shareholders in the
form of a share buyback or dividend payment. Well-known examples include Philips, where
shareholders demanded that the capital raised by spinning off Philips semiconductors unit
NXP be returned to the shareholders; and SBM Offshore, where Centaurus pressured the
board to adopt a different financing structure for its fleet.
Governance or board composition

Activist shareholders often target the governance structure and composition of the companys
boards. Demands made by activist shareholders include being represented on the supervisory
board, dismissal of certain board members, amending executive compensation and challenging
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the companys defence measures. Examples include TNT Express, where hedge fund JANA
Capital requested appointment of three new supervisory board members, and AMG, where
RWC questioned AMGs governance and remuneration practices.
v Tactics used by activist shareholders

Another trend we observe is that following the landmark cases concerning ABN AMRO in
2007 and ASMI in 2010, the strategy deployed by activist shareholders is, on average, less
aggressive.
Tactics used until ABN AMRO (2007) and ASMI (2010): direct attacks on strategy at
general meetings
Between 2005 and 2010, several large activist hedge funds initiated aggressive US-style
campaigns in the Netherlands. These hedge funds typically started their campaigns with
Dear Board letters in which they presented their ideas to the company. As a next step in
their campaign, these hedge funds generally submitted shareholder proposals at the general
meeting to split up or sell the company or to change the companys strategy.
In several cases, the activist shareholders and the company ended up in court to
determine who had the final say on the matter. In landmark cases ABN AMRO and ASMI,
the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the companys strategy is within the remit of the
executive board subject to the approval of the supervisory board. As a result, shareholders
cannot impose a strategy to be followed on the executive board. If shareholders disagree
with the execution of the strategy by the executive board or otherwise disagree with how the
executive board is running the company, they should exercise the specific powers vested in
them in the DCC and the companys articles of association, such as the power to appoint and
dismiss board members. These cases most likely led to a change in how activist shareholders
approach Dutch listed companies.
Tactics used in recent years: persistent, but less direct attacks on strategy at general meetings
After ABN AMRO and ASMI, activist shareholders rarely put forward shareholder resolutions
to force a change in strategy or to break up the company. Instead, activist shareholders tend
to build up pressure on the company by acquiring a stake, sometimes demanding seats on the
board, and trying to influence the companys strategy through private or public engagement
with the boards.
Typically, activists aiming to change the companys strategy put pressure on the boards
by challenging them on a broad spectrum of matters, such as the appointment and dismissal
of board members, operational performance, and board compensation. In an aggressive
campaign, activist shareholders may demand that their own candidates replace current board
members.
This strategy was, for example, followed by US-based activist hedge fund JANA
Capital against TNT Express. JANA put pressure on the board of TNT for a long period of
time, both publicly and privately, in an effort to improve TNTs operational performance,
likely to prove its potential to possible buyers. JANA demanded seats on the supervisory
board, including one for a former M&A executive of UPS, which may have been seen by
some as an indirect effort of JANA to arrange a deal between TNT and UPS (TNT was
eventually acquired in a friendly deal by FedEx in 2016).
In sum, direct confrontations between boards and activist shareholders at general
meetings are now generally restricted to topics on which the general meeting has the power
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to resolve, such as board composition, annual accounts, compensation policy and board
members compensation. This trend seems to be largely influenced by landmark cases
regarding ABN AMRO and ASMI. In addition, in a recent case concerning Fugro, Dutch
courts barred shareholders from putting pressure on the executive board by demanding a
referendum vote on a topic on which the general meeting cannot resolve.
In this section, we describe some examples that are illustrative of the trends regarding
shareholder activism in the Netherlands.
i Amrica Mvil v. KPN (2014)

An example of a strategic party acting as an activist shareholder concerns Amrica Mvil
and KPN. Over the course of two years, Amrica Mvil built up a stake of 29.9 per cent
and eventually announced a hostile offer for all KPN shares in order to gain full control.
The takeover was countered by KPNs defence foundation based on inter alia national
security interests. In its battle, KPN deployed numerous defensive mechanisms to fend off its
Mexican suitor, including divesting its crown jewel E-Plus to Telefnica, and eventually KPN
concluded a relationship agreement with Amrica Mvil in an effort to at least temporarily
bury the hatchet. Amrica Mvil did not pursue its offer, and it eventually sold its stake and
moved on to acquire full control of Telekom Austria in order to set foot on the European
telecom market.
ii RWC v. AMG (2015)

Hedge fund RWC, run by former managers of hedge fund Hermes, built up a stake of
approximately 20 per cent in global critical materials company AMG and initiated
discussions regarding AMGs strategy, governance and remuneration practices. AMG and
RWC eventually reached a ceasefire and signed a relationship agreement. The relationship
agreement included the endorsement of AMGs strategy by RWC, the nomination of RWCs
managing director and another person for appointment as member of AMGs supervisory
board, and the undertaking of AMG to review its prevailing executive compensation policy.11
iii Boskalis v. Fugro (2016)

Dutch dredging contractor Boskalis built up a stake of more than 20 per cent in Dutch
geoscience service provider Fugro and subsequently submitted a shareholder proposal to the
general meeting to urge the boards to take down one of Fugros defence measures. The board
of Fugro agreed to put the proposal of Boskalis on the agenda of the annual general meeting
for discussion, but not as a voting item, since decisions regarding defensive measures are
the exclusive domain of the boards. Boskalis challenged this decision in court, but without
success in both first instance and on appeal.
11 Press release, AMG signs Relationship Agreement with its largest shareholder RWC European
Focus Master Inc., 9 March 2015.
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iv Highfields Capital Management v. Delta Lloyd (2016)

Highfields Capital Management, with a stake of approximately 10 per cent, publicly opposed
Delta Lloyds plan for a rights offering. This eventually resulted in Highfields Capital
Management commencing litigation before the Enterprise Chamber in which it requested
to prohibit the voting on the proposed rights offering at the upcoming general meeting.
Highfields Capital argued that the information given by Delta Lloyd to the shareholders
was inadequate to form an opinion and that the rights offering was not necessary since
Delta Lloyd was adequately capitalised. The Enterprise Chamber dismissed the hedge funds
request holding that the shareholders were properly informed and that the general meeting is
the appropriate forum to discuss the merits of, and decide on, a rights offering.
At the national level, the Dutch Corporate Governance Code is currently under revision. A
new version is expected to come into force in 2017.
At the European level, negotiations are pending regarding a proposal for revision of
the EU Shareholder Rights Directive.12 Topics that are dealt with in the proposal include
the identification of shareholders, voting rights concerning executive compensation (say on
pay), and transparency on and shareholder engagement in related party transactions.
VI OUTLOOK
Over the last decade, there have been a number of high-profile cases where activist shareholders
pushed companies to break up, to sell divisions and to change their corporate governance
structures. Following decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court in ABN AMRO and ASMI,
while still pursuing the same objectives, the approach of activist shareholders seems to have
shifted from direct confrontations on the companys strategy in general meetings to private
and public engagement with the boards in order to change the target companys direction.
Shareholder activism is expected to continue to be a hot topic in many Dutch boardrooms.
Apart from the usual suspects, such as hedge funds, mutual funds and other event-driven
institutions, institutional investors and shareholder lobby groups seem poised to take a more
active role in the corporate governance debate within Dutch listed companies.
12 Proposal (COM 2014/213) to amend Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament

and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed
companies.
35
Chapter 4
RUSSIA
Max Gutbrod 1
I OVERVIEW
Shareholder activism in the Western sense existed in Russia between 2000 and 2008. In the
1990s, some isolated issues had been focused on by institutional investors. Since around 2008,
shareholder activism has been dying down, except for some action against state companies
that is politically influenced, and there are currently no signs of a revival or of changes in law
favourable to investors being adopted. Although the Russian government has conducted and
announced privatisation plans that would benefit from an increase in investor interest, there
is no sign that the Russian government intends to facilitate shareholder activism.
Companies with their main business in Russia frequently use foreign stock exchanges to
attract investors. Sometimes that is linked with foreign corporate vehicles being used for the
listing.2 More frequently, however, the corporate forms used are Russian. Sometimes, there is
a conflict between the rules in Russia and the listing rules.3 In case of a conflict, the manner
in which Russian law and practice treat questions and issues is likely to prevail. Accordingly,
1 Max Gutbrod is a partner at Baker & McKenzie CIS, Limited.

2 See Vimpelcom. Group Highlight. http://www.vimpelcom.com/Profile/
Understanding-VimpelCom/Group-highlights/ (accessed date: 5 September 2016).
3 In the public domain, a conflict between Kazakh and international listing rules has played
some rule, see: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/
market-news-detail/KMG/12917715.html (accessed date: 5 September 2016). Most of the
information here and in the following footnotes is general information that is in the public
domain as there does not seem to be a consistent overview of shareholder activism in Russia.
36
Russia
the following discussion of Russian corporate law, in our view, is relevant for companies with
their main business in Russia. In addition to Russian corporate law, sometimes, Russian rules
on listing would be likely to be relevant to questions related to shareholder conflicts.
Under Russian joint stock law (only joint stock companies are entitled to list), each
shareholder has the right to particpate in the shareholders meeting. Such shareholder meeting
is to be held in person and to deal with the main issues relating to the life of the company,
such as, for instance, annual reports, the approval of the activity of management, capital
increases and transactions that exceed a certain value. Generally, decisions are to be taken
with a simple majority of votes, with some, like the increase in charter capital, requiring a
75 per cent majority. Accordingly, activist shareholders could potentially influence decision
making. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that the shareholders who own the majority
of the voting shares are normally represented at the shareholders meetings. Accordingly, it
would be difficult for activist shareholders to obtain a majority at voting. Also, decisions
will be invalidated only if they would not have been taken had it not been for the violation.
Accordingly, reversal of decisions of shareholders meeting is the exception rather than the
rule. As a consequence of all this, not many substantive discussions take place at shareholders
meetings.4
For the election of the board of directors, shareholders have as many votes as
directors are elected (see Article 66 Section 4 Sentence 2 JSL-Law). In other words, minority
shareholders, by putting all their votes on the few candidates they have pre-selected, can
have their candidates elected even if the shareholders with controlling votes do not agree.
In general terms, the German dual system of division of responsibilities applies to the
governance of Russian JSCs, with the board of directors having supervisory power. It
is generally to be expected that boards of directors meet frequently, and that boards are
entrusted with substantial power relating to the ongoing business of the company. As a
consequence, it would be possible to exert substantial influence by being a member of a
board. Indeed, some hope has been put in independent directorship,5 in particular, in the
period from 2000 to 2004 some issues seemed to have been resolved through the activity
of independent directors,6 and some prominent persons, like Mr Borys Fyodorov, publicly
stressed the importance of independent representation on boards.7 None of the independent
4 As a casual example of a bigger issuer that might be seen characteristic https://

www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/event.aspx?EventId=DW8pjssHfU65IWf4cPwyjg-B-B , http://
www.sberbank.com/ru/investor-relations/corporate-governance/general-shareholders-meeting/
annual-meeting-2016, https://www.nsd.ru/ru/db/news/ndcpress/?id36=669403 (accessed:
5 September 2016).
5 Kirill Galetski. Independent directors on the rise, The Russia Journal, issue 438, 2002. URL:
http://russiajournal.com/node/12117 (accessed: 5 September 2016).
6 Andrew Jack. Gazprom Feuding Factions Fight PR Battle, Financial Times,
27 June 2001. URL:http://www.sovereignglobal.com/p_5.asp?ItemID=150 (accessed date:
5 September 2016).
7 Oleg Anisimov. Boris Fedorov about Gazprom, Sberbank and himself, Finance Journal. URL:
http://www.ippnou.ru/print/000072/ (accessed date: 5 September 2016), Boris Fedorov, The
Economist, 27 November 2008. URL: http://www.economist.com/node/12675842 (accessed:
5 September 2016).
37
Russia
board representations, however, seem to have a focus on active shareholder representation.

Also, where independent members of boards are mentioned, it seems that mostly they do not
specialise in active representation of shareholders interests.8
Shareholders have the right to dividends. Sometimes, this right has been seen as not
being complied with by issuers, and accordingly, some shareholder activists have focused on
implementation of this right.9
If purchasing 30 per cent or more of the stock of shares, the shareholder taking
over must make an obligatory tender offer.10 Accordingly, shareholders could benefit from
receiving such an offer. However, the number of related offers has been decreasing in recent
years.11
Some funds seem to be involved in asset tracing.12
When, in the early 1990s, market reforms began, minority shareholders rights, in a certain
sense, were at the centre of attention of regulators. Since the main aim was to distribute the
peoples wealth to the people, shares were distributed to the population at large through
voucher auctions, and therefore protection of the many recipients of such vouchers should
have been a major concern.13 However, concern with the detail of implementation of such
rights was low, and no funds or associations to represent minority shareholders have emerged.
In the early years of stabilisation (20002005),14 there were some signs that shareholder
activism would play a major role going forward. Some of the major corporates benefited from
8 See the board representation at Sberbank comprising analysts and active and former
bank managers, but not really investors http://www.sberbank.com/investor-relations/
corporate-governance/supervisory-board (access 20. September 2016).
9 See http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/investigation-against-surgutneftegaz-asg
ty-for-possible-failure-to-pay-required-dividends-being-conducted-by-bernstein-liebhard-
-lifshitz-llp-73176852.html (accessed: 5 September 2016).
10 Federal Law dd. 26 December 1995, No. 208-FZ on Joint Stock Companies, Article 84.2.
11 Statistics regarding voluntary tender offers, mandatory tender offers and squeeze-out
requests is available at https://www.e-disclosure.ru/poisk-po-soobshheniyam (accessed:
5 September 2016) with the filter to be set on ()
plus
() ).
12 See Prosperity Capital Management challenged a deal. URL: http://www.arbitr.ru/press-centr/
press_arb_sud/50188.html (accessed: 5 September 2016).
13 Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. Privatizing Russia, Brookings Paper-s
on Economic Activity, 2:1993. P. 151. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/1993/06/1993b_bpea_boycko_shleifer_vishny_fischer_sachs.pdf, (accessed:
5 September 2016).
14 See a brief account of economic history in: Pekka Sutela. Russias Economic Prospects, Getty,
28 March 2011. URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/28/russia-s-economic-
prospects-pub-43290 (accessed: 5 September 2016).
38
Russia
internal reforms, which in turn depended upon minority shareholder activism. Part of some
government programmes, such as electricity and pension reforms, was raising or investing in
capital through stock exchanges.
Publicly, shareholder activism has frequently been associated with Mr Bill Browder.15
Mr Browder, after having maintained a high public profile for some time, came under attack
from sources that must have been close to government, which culminated in sanctions
against people involved in the matter16 and countersanctions17 being imposed. Limitation of
the influence of foreign investors has been seen as being a political move directed at what was
seen as unwelcome influence that was not controlled by the state.18 Also, while Mr Browder
shareholders rights-related activity may have substantially contributed to the aggressiveness
of the reaction towards him and his allies, this shareholders rights-related activity does not
seen to have been the main cause of such reaction. However, to my mind, the evidence
presented for this theory is not conclusive as the actions taken against Mr Browder and his
allies were not tailored to prevent minority shareholders influence, but rather, if one follows
the allegations that Mr Browder made against the economical wellbeing of Mr Browder
himself and the physical wellbeing of his allies. In any case,19 it appears that the reaction
to Mr Browder has showcased the dangers to others interested, and accordingly, interest in
shareholder activism has only been renewed where a political motive of the activism was at
15 See: William Browder. Hermitage Capital, the Russian State and the Case of Sergei Magnitsky,
Chatham House, 15 December 2009. URL:https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/
chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/151209browder.pdf (accessed:
5 September 2016) and Amir Manzoor. Hermitage Fund: Shareholder Activism and
Corporate Governance, Journal of Business Studies Quarterly, 2013, Volume 4, Number
4. URL: http://jbsq.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/June_2013_2.pdf (accessed:
5 September 2016).
16 See: Lilia Shevtsova, David J. Kramer. What the Magnitsky Act Means, The American
Interest. 18 December 2012. URL: http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/12/18/
what-the-magnitsky-act-means/ (accessed date: 5 September 2016), Magnitsky Sanctions
Listings // US Department on Treasury. URL: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20130412.aspx (accessed date: 5 September 2016);
Tara McKelvey. William Browder: The man behind the Magnitsky List, BBC News Magazine,
10 December 2013. URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25190975 (accessed:
5 September 2016).
17 See: Russia strikes back with Magnitsky list response https://www.rt.com/news/anti-
magnitsky-list-russia-799/ (accessed 5 September 2016).
18 Nigel Gould-Davies. Russias Sovereign Globalization: Rise, Fall and Future, Russia and
Eurasia Programme, January 2016. Footnote 43. URL:https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20160106RussiasSovereignGlobalizatio
nGouldDavies.pdf (accessed: 5 September 2016); see James M. Goldgeier. Russias No
Democracy. So What?, The Washington Post, 9 April 2006. URL: http://www.cfr.org/world/
russias-no-democracy-so-/p10414 (accessed: 5 September 2016).
19 A summary of controversial proceedings also in: John Lough. End of an Era for BP in Russia,
Chatham House, 7 June 2012. URL: https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/
view/183859 (accessed date: 5 September 2016).
39
Russia
least likely, and such initiatives have been marginalised.20 In addition, in my opinion there is
some element of dislike of controversy and misunderstanding of the value of such controversy
for corporate governance. In any instance, this difference of asessment does not make any
difference to the result, namely that investors rights are limited to an extent that does not
seem to allow activist investment.
In addition, in parallel with the above, the regulators appeared to be particularly
concerned with inappropriate action leading to unforeseen consequences.21 As a consequence,
legal options have substantially decreased over time. Also, information rights for shareholders
that in the outset of joint stock law had been very broad have been gradually reduced. Namely
in 2001 the law clarified that only shareholders with more than 25 per cent of shares are
entitled to receive the accounting documents and minutes of the meetings of the collective
executive body.22
Additional limitations of the information rights have been introduced by the court
practice. For instance, a company is entitled to limit the right of shareholders with less
than 25 per cent of shares to get information on issues of extended competence, that is, the
exclusive competence of the board of directors, as opposed to the competence of the executive
bodies of the company.23 Additionally, court practice has allowed a company to refuse the
shareholder to get information in case of lack of legitimate interest to receive the requested
information.24 Moreover, companies can refuse to provide information to their shareholders
referring to commercial confidentiality, and sometimes companies use this right extensively.25
Furthermore, majority ownership in listed companies has mostly been consolidated.
As a result of all this, corporate takeovers have become the exception rather than
the rule. Even when disputes about more significant groups of shareholders have arisen,26
they have typically not been resolved with a focus on the stock exchange and the resulting
opportunities for independent shareholders, but rather through negotiations or court
disputes among the majority owners. Significantly, while a procedure of takeover offers had
been introduced and finetuned, the number of such takeovers has significantly decreased.
20 See: The Domestic Context of Russian Foreign Policy. URL: Philip Hanson. Reiderstvo:
Asset-Grabbing in Russia, Russia and Eurasia PP 2014/03. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Chapter-One-12.pdf, page 23. (accessed: 5 September 2016).
21 An examination of the practices that lead to such concern can be found in https://www.
chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20
140300AssetGrabbingRussiaHanson1.pdf (accessed: 5 September 2016).
22 See also the Decision of the Constitutional Court of RF dd. 16 June 2004, No. 263-O, which
considered this rule as being constitutional.
23 See Decision of the Constitutional Court of RF dd. 18 January 2011, No. 8-O-.
24 See, e.g., Decision of the Arbitrazh Court of the Central District dd. 30 June 2015, No.
F10-1836/2015.
25 See e.g., Danshin A. Shareholders rights to information about the acticity of the company,
Economics and Life, 2011. No. 6 (9372). URL: http://www.eg-online.ru/article/126635/
(accessed: 5 September 2016).
26 BP-TNK takover by Rosneft (see John Lough. End of an Era for BP in Russia, Chatham
House, 7 June 2012. URL: https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/183859)
has used capital markets, but capital markets had no central role, random.
40
Russia
Technically, and for the reasons described, shareholder activism is limited to random
pheonomena like simple access to information27 or to a shareholders meeting.28 Also, there
has been some argument that shareholders have a right to correction of the accounts of
companies.29 However, in the light of existing legislation there is little basis for such an
argument.
There have been many changes in corporate law recently, and, similarly to what was concluded
in another context,30 it is not always easy to determine what purpose the many changes in
relevant laws have.31 Our impression is that even where it seems that options for minority
shareholders are to be strengthened, in fact, the control of the management and majority
shareholders over the procedure is increased.
27 Peter B. Maggs, Olga Schwartz, William Burnham. Law and Legal System of
the Russian Federation. Juris Publishing, Sixth Edition. URL: https://books.
google.ru/books?id=J0jwCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA428&lpg=PA428&dq=trans
neft+access+to+shareholders+meeting&source=bl&ots=uN-Vp7Km9J&sig=
6H5g392kHiS6dE2aXAl18UgZvsI&hl=ru&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj-x5bV-
evOAhVLKcAKHaeDBxEQ6AEILTAC#v=onepage&q=transneft%20access%20to%20
shareholders%20meeting&f=false (accessed date: 5 September 2016), in the cases reported,
the interest appears to mainly be politically (as opposed to economically) caused.
28 Information about important act.12 August 2012. URL: http://www.transneft.ru/u/
important_fact_file/5902/15-08-2016.pdf (accessed date: 5 September 2016).
29 Veronika Goryacheva. Auditors are brought into the court, Kommersant. 17 August 2016.
URL: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3065415 (accessed date: 5 September 2016).
30 See Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes on IOSCO Objectives and Principles
of Securities Regulation for the Russian Federation, July 2016. URL: http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16233.pdf (accessed date: 5 September 2016). 2. ... While some
have argued that the absence of overarching provisions is an inevitable consequence of the
principles of Russian law, others have correctly pointed out that there are some overarching
obligations already in the legal framework and steps are being taken to develop the approach
to legislation on these lines.
31 A different (more positive) assessment of the legal framework appears to be displayed relating
to corporate governance in http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebrd.com%2Fdocuments%2Flegal-
reform%2Frussia-country-law-assessment.pdf&usg=AFQjCNH0wixFsX_xzrjv9WD0R2TeC
F0ulQ&sig2=NQ1Yu5bBARDclCFyUwNzXw&cad=rjt Corporate governance assessment,
EBRD. URL: page 14. (accessed: 5 September 2016).
41
Russia
On the other hand, while earlier privatisation attempts have not led to results, the
current difficulty with planned sales of Russian state assets and the concern with increasing
the investor base32 may lead to more attention and openness to shareholder activism.
VI OUTLOOK
There has not been much shareholder activism recently, and it remains to be seen whether
there will be any over time.
32 While currently pension funds do not hold many shares, see Guidelines for the Development
of the Russian Financial Market in 20162018, Bank of Russia. URL: http://www.cbr.ru/
eng/finmarkets/files/development/DRFM_1618.pdf (accessed: 5 September 2016), An
effort to increase their investment abilities appears to be planned, see: Alexey Lossan. Russia
mulls investing pension funds in start-ups, Russia and India Report, 31 August 2016.
URL: http://in.rbth.com/economics/finance/2016/08/31/russia-mulls-investing-pensio
n-funds-in-start-ups_625683 (accessed date: 5 September 2016).
42
Chapter 5
SINGAPORE
Lee Suet-Fern and Elizabeth Kong Sau-Wai1
I OVERVIEW
Shareholders play an important role in preserving balance in the corporate governance of

a company. While shareholding is intended to enable passive investment participation in a
company, shareholders have legitimate interest in the governance of a company and a right to
hold the board accountable. Management has traditionally often been able to push through
their agenda without much shareholder resistance in Singapore, but the trend is changing
slowly but surely.
Shareholder rights and engagement in Singapore are regulated by a combination of statutory

and non-statutory instruments as well as under common law. The Companies Act (CA)
and the Securities and Futures Act (SFA) make up the relevant core statutory framework,
which is supplemented by non-statutory instruments such as the Listing Manual of the
Singapore Stock Exchange (Listing Manual), the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance
(Governance Code) and the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover Code).
The full breadth of the legal options, strategies and pitfalls relevant to an activist shareholder
is beyond the scope of this publication, but key considerations are summarised below.
i Requisitioning a general meeting

Shareholders can procure the holding of a general meeting if they have a sufficient proportion
of the voting rights in the company. The CA provides that two or more shareholders holding
at least 10 per cent of the total number of issued shares of a company may requisition a
general meeting, and the board must convene the general meeting as soon as practicable but
1 Lee Suet-Fern is the managing director and Elizabeth Kong Sau-Wai is a director at Morgan
Lewis Stamford LLC.
43
Singapore
in any case not later than two months thereafter. If the board does not proceed to convene the
meeting within 21 days of the requisition date, the requisitionists, or any of them representing
more than 50 per cent of the total voting rights of all of them, may themselves convene the
meeting. A meeting will require 14 days notice or such longer period as is provided in the
constitution of the company, unless it is convened for the passing of a special resolution,
which requires at least 21 days notice.
ii Shareholder transparency
An activist shareholder of a listed company will be able to identify all key shareholders having
an interest in not less than 5 per cent of the total voting shares of the company, as well as the
shareholding interest that any of the companys director or chief executive officer may have
in the company, which information is required to be publicly disclosed under the CA and
the SFA.
iii Removal of director

Unlike a private company where it is possible for the directorship of a person to be entrenched
in the constitution, a director of a public company can always be removed by an ordinary
resolution of its shareholders, regardless of anything to the contrary in the companys
constitution or in any agreement between the company and such director. The person
proposing the resolution must give a special notice to the company and its shareholders at
least 28 days before the meeting to be convened to approve the resolution, and a copy of the
resolution must be sent to the director concerned, who will be entitled to be heard on the
resolution at the meeting.
iv Concert party obligations

Where shareholders act in concert to obtain or consolidate effective control of a company,
implications arising under the Takeover Code should be borne in mind, including the
obligation to make a general offer for the shares in the company upon crossing sensitive
shareholding thresholds. Shareholders voting together on resolutions at a general meeting
would not normally be regarded as an action that would lead to an offer obligation, but
coordinated voting patterns in more than one general meeting may be taken into account
as an indication that the shareholders are acting in concert. Shareholders who requisition or
threaten to requisition the consideration of a board control-seeking proposal at a general
meeting will generally, however, be presumed to be acting in concert with one another and
with the proposed directors, such that subsequent acquisitions of shares of the company by
any member of the concert party group could give rise to an obligation to make a general
offer for the company under the Takeover Code.
v Derivative action
Directors who have committed wrongdoings or have otherwise breached their fiduciary duties
to the company would naturally have little incentive to procure the company to bring an
action against themselves. To ensure accountability, the CA provides for a statutory derivative
action that gives shareholders an ability to bring an action on behalf of the company against
errant directors or third parties in respect of the directors conduct, which is subject to
obtaining leave of court and is dependent on the company itself having a claim, given that the
action is brought in the companys name. The complainant is required to give 14 days notice
44
Singapore
to the board of his or her intention to apply for the action if it is not pursued by the board,
and is required to demonstrate that he is acting in good faith and that the action is prima facie
in the interests of the company. The statutory derivative action is available to all companies
incorporated in Singapore, including listed companies. While foreign incorporated companies
do not currently fall within the scope of the statutory derivative action regime, they may avail
themselves of the common law derivative action, which requirements entail the complainant
establishing that the errant directors committed fraud on the minority.
vi Oppression or unfair prejudice

Shareholders may also apply to court for what is commonly known as the oppression remedy
under the CA if they can establish essentially that they have been treated in a manner that is
commercially unfair, which is an exception to the principle of majority rule in companies.
As contrasted with a statutory derivative action, the oppression remedy is not brought in the
name of the company but is personal to the complainant. However, the oppression remedy
is often considered difficult to succeed and is usually a remedy of last resort. It is very rarely
seen in the context of listed companies.
vii Market manipulation and insider dealing

When pursuing any activist strategy, shareholders should be careful not to fall afoul
of regulations against market manipulation, making false or misleading statements or
fraudulently inducing persons to deal in securities, among other offences relating to
dishonesty, all of which attract civil and criminal penalties under the SFA. Where an activist
shareholder engages with the board on matters not otherwise made available by the board to
the rest of the shareholders, it is possible that insider information may have been divulged,
in which event the shareholder must not deal or encourage another to deal in the companys
securities until such price-sensitive information has been disseminated to the public.
viii Defamation
An activist shareholder wishing to launch a media campaign and level criticisms against a
company or other individuals in the public domain should be aware of the risk of defamation.
While defences such as justification and fair comment are available, the law in this area
is complex and an activist shareholder should ideally seek expert advice on what is legally
permissible in order not to end up at the wrong end of a libel action.
i Hedge fund activism

Corporate raids, which were common during the 1980s in the US, where hedge fund activists
buy a large stake in a company and then engage in proxy fights for control of the board to
break up the company, have hitherto been rare in Singapore. It appears that only 15 per
cent of activist hedge funds focus their activities in the Asia-Pacific region2 and less than
one-fifth of the city states approximately 750 public listed companies have a free float in
2 Preqin Special Report: Hedge Fund Activist Report (June 2014).
45
Singapore
excess of S$200 million,3 limiting its appeal to institutional investors. Where there is hedge
fund activism, media campaigns are more commonly used in the local context to influence
shareholders and to put pressure on the targets board of directors and its management.
However, the corporate landscape in Singapore may change as new hedge funds are
now being set up with the exclusive focus on influencing the way local listed companies are
run.4 Smaller construction and engineering companies, which often have a lot of cash or
reserves due to the recent building boom may be targeted by activists, who may push for
payment of special dividends or share buybacks by way of open confrontation or with much
less fanfare through the exercise of voting power. While such activist pressure on Singapore
companies are, when exerted responsibly, generally welcome by minority shareholders, such
demands may not always be successful given that it is not uncommon for founder shareholders
in many smaller to mid-cap issuers to hold a significant block of shares in such companies.
ii Influential investor lobby groups

The Securities Investors Association (Singapore) (SIAS) is one of the biggest investor lobby
groups in Asia and has mediated many high-profile shareholder issues in Singapore and the
region. The association was formed in 1999 during the Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) saga
when, as part of Malaysias capital control measures, the Malaysian authorities froze the shares
of more than 100 Malaysian listed companies worth more than US$4.47 billion, which were
held by 172,000 minority shareholders in Singapore.5 When negotiations between Malaysia
and Singapore were deadlocked for months, SIAS canvassed a global media campaign to
convey the public angst and outcry in Singapore. However, Malaysia refused to relent even
when foreign investors threatened to withdraw their existing investments from Malaysia,
US-based MSCI Index declined to admit Malaysia and foreign direct investments into the
country declined. SIAS subsequently approached the Singapore authorities to consider taking
the issue to the World Trade Organization, a course of action that had already been within the
contemplation of Singapore and was subsequently announced in Parliament.6 Eventually in
2000, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to settle the issue by a staggered release of the affected
shares back to the minority shareholders in Singapore.
SIAS continues to champion investor rights today and has often stated that it prefers
a conciliatory approach to resolving investors right issues.7 However, in the wake of recent
market and corporate governance lapses in listed companies, SIAS fired warning shots for
the first time that SIAS will not hesitate to take errant companies to court on behalf of their
minority shareholders if the situation warrants it.8 Representative actions are available in
3 Thomson Reuters Starmine; Cheap Buyout Plans in Singapore? Not So Quick, Say Minority
Shareholders, The Straits Times (Reuters), 28 March 2016.
4 Klaus Wille, New Singapore Activist Hedge Fund Seeks to Shake Up Companies, Bloomberg,
4 February 2015.
5 About SIAS, SIAS website, at the following link: http://sias.org.sg/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=6.
6 David vs Goliath The Incredible Story of a Fearless Asian Activist, The World Post,
10 February 2014.
7 See Note 5 supra.
8 Michelle Quah, SIAS Says It Will Take Errant Companies to Court If Need Be, The Business
Times, 19 April 2016.
46
Singapore
Singapore to enable an individual or a large number of people to sue, for themselves and
on behalf of others, a wrongdoer for a common harm inflicted upon all of them provided
that there is a common interest among the claimants. SIAS has commented that it may set
up a litigation fund to which minorities can contribute, although SIAS itself, as a registered
charity, may not contribute to the fund.9 Nonetheless, SIAS emphasised that representative
actions should be a last resort to avoid unnecessary adverse publicity for the board and the
company, which has serious consequences for share value.10
Earlier in June 2016, SIAS announced that it intends to launch an initiative to
empower retail shareholders by guiding them to ask relevant questions at annual general
meetings (AGMs).11 The initiative will kick off in the same year with SIAS engaging
a team of analysts to research the annual reports of 200 listed companies, which will be
gradually increased over the course of the next five years to cover all listed companies in
Singapore, subject to funding.12 SIAS actively advocates progressive industry practices and
organises investor education programmes through collaborative arrangements with financial
institutions and listed companies interested in investor education as part of its corporate
social responsibility agenda. On an annual basis, SIAS tracks and grades listed companies for
their corporate governance practices and rewards those who have excelled with the Singapore
Corporate Governance Award.
iii The medias catalytic role

The media has played a catalytic role in the ascendancy of shareholder activism in Singapore,
with corporate governance analysts and commentators often being the first to highlight
shortfalls in corporate governance best practices, define issues and set the agenda for change.
Shareholders are thus galvanised to hold the relevant boards and management to account,
with companies caught in the crosshairs of the media often feeling compelled to respond
publicly to concerns raised. Unrelenting media storms have sometimes created enough
damage to public perceptions of the targeted companies and their boards that the relevant
directors announce their retirement from their positions even before shareholders vote on
whether to keep the incumbents in office at the next re-election cycle.
Companies whose board composition does not meet best practice expectations, such
as where it lacks diversity, or where existing directors have served for very long periods, have
come under the spotlight. While the Governance Code recommends progressive renewal
of the board and discourages the reappointment of independent directors who have served
for more than nine years, the nine-year mark is not a hard line, unlike other jurisdictions.
Indeed, more than a quarter of independent directors in Singapore have tenures that exceed
nine years,13 although as pointed out by the Singapore Institute of Directors, some of these
companies have nonetheless outperformed large-cap companies in Australia and the UK in
terms of total shareholder returns.14
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Lorna Tan, AGMs Need Not Be Annual Gluttons Meetings, The Straits Times,
19 June 2016.
12 Ibid.
13 SID-ISCA Singapore Directorship Report, 2014.
14 Willie Cheng, Are Singapore Board Killing Value?, The Straits Times, 19 April 2016.
47
Singapore
i Noble Group
In April 2015, SGX-listed Hong Kong commodities firm, Noble Group, came under attack
by Carson Block, a well-known US-based short seller and founder of Muddy Waters Research,
which joined Iceberg Research in questioning the firms accounting methods and asserted that
the company used aggressive interpretations of accounting rules to inflate the value of assets
and contracts.15 The short-seller questioned several past transactions and the way they were
accounted by the firm, and also included a behavioural analysis report ostensibly to show
that the firms management cannot be trusted.16 While Noble has categorically rejected the
allegations as inaccurate, unreliable and misleading, it was not enough to prevent its share
price from tumbling.17 Nobles efforts to restore investor confidence were complicated by
the loss of its investment grade ratings, and while Noble recently managed to get fresh funds
from its lenders, it was reported that Noble had to pay more than twice the rate of interest as
it did a year ago.18 Noble was not the first target of Carson Block and his research group in
Singapore. Olam International, a leading agricultural commodity supply chain manager, was
also attacked by the same short-seller in 2012, which sent Olams shares into a tailspin and
wiped nearly half a billion dollars off its market capitalisation in the immediate aftermath.
ii Tiger Airways
In November 2015, Singapore Airlines (SIA) launched a conditional general offer for the
shares in Tiger Airways, its listed subsidiary on the SGX, at S$0.41 per share, which included
an option for Tiger shareholders to subscribe for SIA shares at S$11.1043. However, the
investor lobby group, SIAS, highlighted that the offer price was unreasonable and was lower
than the average price of S$0.67 per share that a long-term minority investor who came in at
the initial public offer and who subscribed to all three rights issue since its listing, would have
paid.19 While SIA did not ultimately match SIAS suggested price, SIA did sweeten its offer
by 10 per cent to S$0.45 per share and eventually garnered enough acceptances to privatise
the budget carrier.
iii Singapore Post

Singapore Post (SingPost)s corporate governance practices attracted intense and sustained
media scrutiny in 2015 and 2016. Concerns over the corporate governance of the leading
mail, logistics and e-commerce service provider, were first flagged by a corporate governance
analyst and shareholder of the company, who highlighted to the media the issue of, among
15 Noble Rejects Muddy Waters Allegations as Inaccurate, Unreliable, Misleading, Channel

News Asia, 10 April 2015.
16 Grace Leong, The Latest on the Noble Group, Muddy Waters Saga: What Analysts Say, The
Straits Times, 11 April 2015.
17 Temasek Lifts Olam From Muddy Waters to Winning S$1.4 Billion Loan, Today Online,
3 November 2015.
18 Noble Group Set to Clinch US$3B in Credit Facilities: Sources, The Straits Times,
11 May 2016.
19 Marissa Lee, SIA Offer for TigerAir Not Reasonable, says SIAS, The Straits Times,
25 November 2015.
48
Singapore
others, the lack of board renewal and the long tenure of independent directors in the
company. SingPosts media troubles came to a head when it transpired that the company
disclosed inaccurately that its lead independent director did not have an interest in various
acquisitions made by the company when in fact he had, resulting in vociferous criticisms
by commentators and shareholders. SingPosts board eventually arranged for a special audit
of its corporate governance practices to answer to its shareholders. The saga ended with the
resignations of a string of its long-tenured directors, including the independent director who
sat at the centre of the controversy.
i Multiple proxies
In January 2016, a multiple-proxies regime was introduced in the CA. Previously, nominee
shareholders were limited to appointing only two proxies, as a result of which not all the views
of their indirect investors can be represented. Under the new regime, specified intermediaries,
such as banks whose business includes the provision of nominee services and that hold shares
in that capacity, and capital markets services licence holders providing custodial services
and which hold shares in that capacity, are allowed to appoint more than two proxies to
attend and vote at general meetings. The legislative change enfranchises indirect investors by
enabling them to participate in shareholders meetings with the same voting rights as direct
shareholders, and also raise any queries they may have to the board of the company.
ii Dual-class share structure

With effect from January 2016, public companies in Singapore may offer shares with
different voting rights to investors, subject to the rights of such shares being clearly specified
in the companys constitution and certain other safeguards, including requiring the approval
of shareholders by way of special resolution for the issuance of such shares, and requiring
holders of non-voting shares to have equal voting rights for resolutions on winding-up or
resolutions to vary the rights of non-voting shares. The dual-class share structure provides
greater flexibility in capital management and gives investors a wider range of investment
opportunities. However, to be clear, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and SGX
are still reviewing whether dual-class share structures should be permitted for companies
listed on the SGX, and pending conclusion of the review, the existing policy of SGX of not
listing issuers with dual-class share structures will continue to apply. Proponents of dual-class
share structures argue that weighted voting would allow founding shareholders more
protection to pursue their long-term vision for the company against shareholder demands for
short-term returns. Detractors point out that such structures remove a significant channel of
accountability by the management, who are typically the ones holding shares with superior
voting rights, and who could potentially exercise untrammelled control over the company
despite owning much less equity than the rest of the investors. Nevertheless, SGX is set to
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Singapore
lay out ground rules allowing for multiple class share structures which, coupled with support
from investor lobby group SIAS, suggest that it is likely only a matter of time before the first
dual-class shares begin trading in Singapore.20
iii Conduct of shareholder meetings

Earlier in 2014, SGX amended the listing rules for both the Mainboard and Catalist to require
all SGX primary-listed companies and trusts to hold their general meetings in Singapore
unless they are prohibited from doing so by laws and regulations in their jurisdiction of
incorporation. Where general meetings are convened outside Singapore, issuers should make
arrangements such as video conference or webcast to enable shareholders based in Singapore
to follow the proceedings during the general meetings, in addition to holding information
meetings for the shareholders in Singapore. With effect from August 2015, all issuers are
also required to ensure that all resolutions at general meetings are voted by poll and that at
least one scrutineer is appointed for each general meeting. The appointed scrutineer should
be independent of the persons undertaking the polling process, and will be responsible to
direct and supervise the count of votes cast through proxy or in person, and to ensure that
satisfactory procedures of the voting process are in place before the general meeting. Issuers
are required to make prompt disclosure of the voting decisions and outcomes reached at
general meetings, which must be made immediately after each general meeting and before the
commencement of the pre-opening session on the market day following the general meeting.
The announcement must provide a breakdown of all valid votes cast at the general meeting,
details of parties who were required to abstain from voting on any resolution and the name
of the person who was appointed as scrutineer. Further, to promote greater efficiency and
better administration of companies, notices or documents may be given to members by way
of electronic communications with the consent of such members and as long as the specified
modes of electronic transmission are set out in the constitution of the company.
iv Enhanced audit disclosure

In July 2015, the Institute of Singapore Chartered Accountants issued new and revised
auditor reporting standards which calls for more informative auditors reports, most notably
requiring the introduction of key audit matters (KAMs) as a new section of the new auditors
report. KAMs are matters which, in the auditors judgment, are of the most significance in
the audit of the financial statements, and are typically areas that involve difficult or complex
auditor judgments. Auditors are required to describe each KAM, include a reference to related
financial statement disclosures if any, and address why the matter is considered to be one of
significance in the audit and how it is addressed in the audit. Auditors are also expected to
take into account areas of higher risk of material misstatement, and the effect on the audit
of significant events or transactions that occurred during that year. The changes are effective
for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after 15 December 2016, although
companies may opt for early adoption. Currently, KAMs are communicated by auditors to
the Audit Committees of companies but are otherwise kept largely out of the public domain.
20 Kenneth Lim, SGX Close to Allowing Exceptions for Dual-Class Share Listings, The Business
Times, 23 August 2016.
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Singapore
The move to compel the disclosure of KAMs to the public will enable investors to gain
insights on the significant audit risks identified and to have more focused and meaningful
discussions with the board.
v Stewardship Code
In 2014, Singapores Deputy Prime Minister called for the need for balance between the
three pillars of market governance, comprising government regulation, market-based
disclosure and investor responsibility, highlighting that investor responsibility has yet to be
fully developed in Singapore as shareholders have only rights, but not duties or obligations
to date.21 However, there is growing expectation that institutional investors should step up
to undertake more responsibility towards improved stewardship and corporate governance
as they are in a better position than retail investors to make a difference, given their
sophistication, resources, as well as their international experience and influence to push for
change in companies in which they have investments. The failure of institutional investors to
adequately engage with their investee companies was seen by many as a material contributory
factor to the global financial crisis in 2008. Taking inspiration from the Stewardship Code
that was published in 2010 by the UK Financial Reporting Council which operates on a
comply-or-explain basis by participating signatories, the Singapore Stewardship Working
Group, chaired by think-tank, the Stewardship Asia Centre, is working towards developing a
Stewardship Code for the city state that is expected to primarily target institutional investors
but emphasising collaboration between investors.22
VI OUTLOOK
Shareholder activism is expected to rise in Singapore as a result of a confluence of factors,

including the flood of facilitative regulatory changes, increasing investor sophistication,
louder voices by investor lobby groups, and Singapores growing role as one of Asias leading
economic and financial hubs. In the wake of such a trend, companies and their boards need to
prepare themselves for a changing corporate landscape by proactively developing a shareholder
engagement plan so that mutual understanding and different expertise can converge through
conciliatory dialogues. At the same time, companies and their boards should also be cognisant
of the fact that not all shareholder activism is constructive as profiteers may masquerade as
activists and do not necessarily have the best interests of the company and the other investors
in mind. As such, it is crucial for any company to understand its shareholder base, appreciate
that their interests are not monolithic, and critically assess its own performance, practices and
risk factors from time to time in preparation for the contingency of any activist campaign.
21 Adrian Chan, Time For a Stewardship Code for Singapore, The Business Times, 7 July 2014.
22 Hans-Christoph Hirt, The Success of Stewardship Codes, Hermes Investment Management
Online, 3 March 2016.
51
Chapter 6
SOUTH AFRICA
Ezra Davids, Cathy Truter and Xolani Ntamane1
I OVERVIEW
Historically, shareholder activism has not been an important force in South Africa. It is more
common to see activism in the South African context from interested parties such as trade
unions, rather than shareholders. More recently, following global trends attributable to an
increasingly internationalised shareholder base, for instance, shareholder activism has been on
the rise and the market has started to take note of the influence shareholders can wield. The
regulatory framework in South Africa, which creates platforms for shareholder engagement
and the enforcement of shareholder rights, has created a somewhat enabling environment
for shareholder activism. While much of the publicised shareholder activism in South Africa
has been focused on aspects of corporate governance and executive remuneration, there has
also been some shareholder activism influence, although to a lesser extent, on mergers and
acquisitions. While in most deals there is no legal obligation to consult with trade unions
and other potential activists in advance of a transaction, it is often in the best interests of the
parties to do so, since these activists often use the media and regulatory approval processes as
hurdles to getting a deal through.
The South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the SA Companies Act) is the main source
of company law in South Africa and contains the majority of the provisions that relate to
shareholder rights, activism and engagement. The main regulatory authorities under the
SA Companies Act include the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC),
1 Ezra Davids is the chairman of the corporate/M&A practice, Cathy Truter is a partner and
Xolani Ntamane is a senior associate at Bowmans.
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South Africa
tasked broadly with powers of enforcement under the SA Companies Act (including
receiving, initiating and investigating complaints concerning alleged contraventions) and the
Companies Tribunal.
Chapter 5 of the SA Companies Act read together with the Companies Regulations,
2011 promulgated thereunder (the Takeover Regulations), regulate takeovers and other
affected transactions (i.e., mergers, schemes, asset disposals, etc.). These Takeover Regulations
are applicable in respect of public companies and state-owned companies. They also have
limited application to private companies (i.e., where there has been a transfer of 10 per cent
or more of the private companys shares within the last 24 months). The primary regulatory
authority tasked with enforcing the Takeover Regulations is the Takeover Regulation Panel
(TRP). The TRP ensures, among other things, that shareholders have the same information
from an offeror during the course of an affected transaction and are afforded enough time to
consider the information to make an informed decision. The TRP also investigates complaints
where necessary in relation to affected transactions.
The Listings Requirements (the Listings Requirements) of the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange Limited (JSE), enforced by the JSE, apply to entities whose shares are listed on
the JSE. These Listings Requirements, among other things, provide for the fair and equal
treatment of shareholders, access to information, certain voting thresholds and pre-emptive
rights.
The King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, the King Code of Governance
Principles for South Africa 2009 and Practice Notes to King III issued by the Institute of
Directors (the King Code) contain various principles of corporate governance, many of which
deal with shareholder rights and engagement. For instance, the King Code recommends
that the board of directors must encourage shareholders to attend general meetings and that
the board of directors should engage with the shareholders through various means such as
websites, advertising and press releases. Certain parts of King III have been incorporated into
legislation by reference. A draft King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa
2016 has also been published for public comment, whereafter it is expected to replace the
existing report in its entirety.
Although not intended as a regulatory means for shareholder activism, there are
other regulatory avenues that indirectly create platforms for shareholder engagement and the
enforcement of shareholder rights. As an example, shareholders may use the public interest
considerations factored in by the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal
in determining whether or not to approve a merger from a competition perspective as a
means to trip up a transaction.
We have set out below some of the regulatory avenues for shareholder activism.
i Dissenting shareholders
The SA Companies Act in Section 164 provides for appraisal rights that allow dissenting
minority shareholders, in the context of a scheme of arrangement, a merger or a sale of all
or a greater part of the assets or undertaking of the target, to require the target company to
purchase such dissenting shareholders shares at fair value. These appraisal rights are available
to dissenting shareholders that have objected to a resolution to approve such a transaction in
advance of it being voted on, and that have voted against the resolution.
Also, in accordance with the provisions of Section 115 of the SA Companies Act, if
15 per cent or more of the shareholders vote against a resolution proposed for implementing
a scheme of arrangement, a merger or a sale of all or a greater part of the assets or undertaking
53
South Africa
of a target company, any dissenting shareholder may within five days of the resolution being
passed require the company, at its expense, to obtain court approval before implementing
the resolution. Even if less than 15 per cent of the shareholders vote against such resolution,
a shareholder who can satisfy a court that there is a prima facie case for review, may within
10 days apply to court for a review of the resolution. Such shareholder should first have
indicated prior to the meeting that it intended voting against such resolution and subsequently
indeed voted against such resolution. A court may only set aside the resolution if it is satisfied
that there is manifest unfairness to shareholders or a material procedural irregularity.
ii Actions and remedies

Pursuant to Section 161 of the SA Companies Act, a shareholder may apply to court for an
order necessary to protect any right or rectify any harm done to the securities holder by the
company (as a consequence of an act or omission that contravened the SA Companies Act or
the constitutive documents of the company) or the directors of the company (to the extent
that they are liable for a breach of their fiduciary duties).
Similarly, pursuant to Section 163 of the SA Companies Act, a shareholder may apply
to court for relief from oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct of the company or a
related person. The court has a wide range of remedies including restraining the conduct,
declaring a person delinquent or under probation or setting aside transactions.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 165 of the SA Companies Act, a
shareholder (and other stakeholders such as trade unions and directors) may bring proceedings
in the name of and on behalf of a company to protect the legal interests of the company.
iii Shareholder approvals

Certain corporate actions require shareholder approval prior to adoption. This may be by way
of an ordinary resolution (supported by more than 50 per cent of the voting rights exercised
on the resolution) or a special resolution (supported by at least 75 per cent of the voting rights
exercised on the resolution). These thresholds may be adjusted in the constitutive documents
of the company (upwards for an ordinary resolution and up or down for a special resolution),
provided that there is always a 10 per cent margin between the lowest threshold for passing a
special resolution and the highest threshold for passing an ordinary resolution.
In certain instances, the SA Companies Act also imposes additional approval
requirements or restrictions. For example, in respect of any resolutions to be passed approving
a disposal of all or a greater part of the assets or undertakings of a company, a merger or
amalgamation or a scheme of arrangement and certain buybacks, not only must the resolution
be approved at a meeting (affording minorities an opportunity to attend and ask questions)
but only the votes of disinterested shareholders will be taken into consideration (i.e., any
voting rights controlled by an acquiring party, a person related to an acquiring party, or
a person acting in concert with either of them, must not be included in the calculation).
Similarly, in respect of companies listed on the JSE, for example, votes of related parties and
its associates will not be taken into account in relation to any resolution in connection with
the related party transaction.
A shareholders meeting must be called if 10 per cent of all voting rights entitled to
vote on a matter submit a demand for a shareholders meeting (or such lower threshold as
stipulated in the constitutive documents of the company), unless a court finds the demand
frivolous or vexatious. Any two shareholders may propose that a resolution be submitted to
shareholders for consideration.
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South Africa
A resolution may not be taken at a shareholders meeting on a matter unless persons are
present to exercise in aggregate at least 25 per cent of all voting rights entitled to be exercised
in respect of that matter (subject to a lower or higher threshold stipulated in the constitutive
documents of the company); and if the company has more than two shareholders, at least
three shareholders must be present. At an adjourned meeting, adjourned for lack of quorum,
the shareholders present will constitute a quorum.
iv Protection for making disclosures

Section 159 creates protection for shareholders who disclose information to the relevant
regulators where the shareholder reasonably believed at the time that the company or a
director had contravened the SA Companies Act; failed to comply with a statutory obligation;
engaged in conduct that endangered or harmed an individual or the environment; unfairly
discriminated against a person; or contravened other legislation that could potentially place
the company at risk. These shareholders are immune from any civil, criminal or administrative
liability and the relevant shareholder has qualified privilege in relation to the disclosure made,
which would encourage shareholder activists seeking to hold the board accountable for their
conduct.
v Defences available to companies and directors duties

There are several defences available to companies when faced with instances of shareholder
activism, for example, by planning ahead for various scenarios from a legal and commercial
perspective, evaluating a companys shareholding profile and anticipating the concerns or
needs of each group of shareholders. Strategic private engagements with various stakeholders,
tactics such as bear hugs and accounting for potential shareholder activist activity in the
course of creating transaction timelines will also play an important role in preventing or
resolving shareholder activist issues in a transactional context. The SA Companies Act also
generally excludes some of the aforementioned platforms for activism in the event that they
are exercised in a manner that is vexatious, frivolous or without merit.
Directors need to take care not to engage in any conduct that is directed at frustrating
an offer made in good faith. Directors have a duty to act in the best interests of the company
and shareholders at all times.
i Profile of activist investors

In broad terms, a distinction can be drawn between shareholder activists who are economic
activists and governance activists.
Economic activists in South Africa primarily comprise institutional investors and
fund managers who have been active in seeking out greater shareholder value. Some examples
of economic activists in South Africa include the Public Investment Corporation (SOC)
Limited (PIC), an investment management company that is wholly owned by the South
African government and is focused on managing government employees pension funds; and
other institutional and pension funds that hold sizeable stakes in companies listed on the JSE.
Governance activists in South Africa are mainly shareholders seeking to influence
policy and improve corporate governance principles, such as transparency and increased
shareholder involvement on issues such as executive remuneration. Although there is some
55
South Africa
overlap in the distinction between economic activists and governance activists, some examples
of shareholders who have engaged in governance activist activity in South Africa include:
the PIC; Allan Gray; Foord Asset Management, a privately owned investment management
company; and certain key individuals who have queried a number of companies on aspects
such as good corporate governance, ethics and executive compensation.
Although not yet commonplace in South Africa, shareholder activist activity has been
on the rise in companies engaged in a variety of sectors, as shareholders with diversified
portfolios seek to enhance shareholder value and activists with various public interest drivers
seek to achieve their goals.
A number of recent shareholder activism campaigns have focused on management and
executive compensation and remuneration policies. An example is Allan Grays involvement
in the scheme proposed by Sasol Limited (Sasol), an energy and chemical company listed
on the JSE. The strategy of shareholder activist involvement by funds such as Allan Gray
is to proactively engage with the board and executives of companies in which the fund has
invested, with the aim of shaping the relevant companies into better and more sustainable
long-term financial prospects, which they believe is likely to unlock shareholder value.
Allan Gray acquired shares in Sasol over the course of 2010 and 2011. After
scrutinising Sasols executive remuneration scheme, Allan Gray was of the view that the
executive remuneration scheme was sub-optimum and recommended that its clients vote
their shares in Sasol against the scheme at the 2011 annual general meeting. Allan Grays
concerns with the scheme included the minimal level of disclosure, low performance targets
and the fact that the majority of the long-term incentives were not subject to performance
conditions and simply vested over time.
Allan Gray engaged with Sasols Remuneration Committee (Remco) with a view
to improving the scheme. This included analysis and benchmarking of the remuneration
scheme, meeting with the Remco and further formal correspondence with Sasols board,
culminating in Allan Grays recommendation to its clients that they vote their shares in
favour of Sasols remuneration scheme in 2012, 2013 and 2014 on the basis that disclosure
had been enhanced, performance targets required for incentives to vest had been made more
challenging, all the long-term incentives were subject to stringent performance conditions
and executives were formally required to build substantial shareholdings in the company.
Allan Gray believes that these changes went a long way towards ensuring that executives act
in the long-term best interests of shareholders.
Another example of shareholder activism, but in the context of public interest
considerations, is the case of Woolworths Holdings Limited (Woolworths), where consumer
activists acquired a minority shareholding in the company for the purposes of attending
shareholder meetings and raising governance, transparency, political and ethical issues.
A relatively novel shareholder activism tactic that was recently used by a shareholder
is a request for information under the South African Promotion of Access to Information
Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA). In broad terms, PAIA allows persons to access any information held
by the state, and any information held by private bodies, that is required for the exercise and
protection of any rights.
An individual shareholder, who held one share in Coronation Fund Managers
(Coronation) at the relevant time, recently requested further details on Coronations
remuneration policy on the basis that the information set out in Coronations annual
report was not sufficiently detailed. He was not satisfied with the level of detail provided by
Coronation and subsequently used PAIA to launch an information request at Coronations
56
South Africa
annual general meeting in January 2016. Coronation refused that PAIA request on the
basis that it believed it had complied fully with JSE and SA Companies Act requirements
to disclose information related to remuneration to its shareholders. The refusal has not been
contested in court as yet and the effectiveness of this tactic remains to be seen.
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, activists have also been seen to use the
rights and remedies afforded to them under the Companies Act (as discussed above) or other
regulatory procedures (such as the public interest considerations that regulators take into
consideration when deciding to allow a merger from a competition perspective or other
regulatory approval process) to delay or thwart the implementation of a transaction. Trade
unions and other shareholders focused on guarding employee interests, for example, have
appealed to the competition authorities to address public interest concerns, such as the effect
that a merger will have on a particular industrial sector or region, employment, the ability
of small businesses, or firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons, to become
competitive, and the ability of national industries to compete in international markets.
Public interest concerns are generally resolved by the imposition of conditions rather than
the prohibition of a merger.
ii Outcomes and the path to resolution

Recent shareholder activist examples indicate that shareholder activists have had an impact on
the manner in which South African companies engage with their shareholders. As shareholders
become increasingly concerned with executive remuneration policies, transparency and other
corporate governance issues, companies will need to pay closer attention to adherence with
principles of good governance and engagement in the context of mergers and acquisitions.
Examples of other recent shareholder activism campaigns in South Africa are set out below.
i Sovereign Foods
This years annual general meeting for poultry group Sovereign Food Investments Limited
(Sovereign Foods) intended to approve a scheme comprising members of the executive
management team, other and newly introduced shareholders. Minority shareholders,
dissatisfied with the costs and structure of the scheme, indicated their intention to exercise
their appraisal rights (discussed above), which in turn forced Sovereign Foods to reconsider
the scheme.
ii PPC
The most prominent example of shareholder activism in South Africa unfolded from the
highly publicised activities in PPC Limited (PPC), the largest cement company in South
Africa, during 2014 where a group of shareholders requisitioned a special shareholder meeting
to consider the removal of the entire board of PPC and to replace it with the nominees of the
requisitioning shareholders.
The board had refused to back the decision of the then chief executive officer to
dismiss PPCs chief financial officer. The chief financial officer had been appointed by and
reported to the board.
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South Africa
The chief executive officer had developed a strong relationship with the employees
of PPC and had pioneered initiatives in the Company aimed at redressing the economic
differences between employees and management. Following the lack of support from the
board, he resigned and following an unsuccessful retraction of his resignation, he approached
major shareholders encouraging them to reappoint him and reconstitute the entire board.
Certain minority shareholders of PPC collectively met the minimum threshold
required to force a special shareholder meeting in terms of the SA Companies Act and
requisitioned a meeting of the shareholders for 8 December 2014. The aim of the meeting
was to remove the existing board by a majority vote of the shareholders and then appoint new
directors (PPCs constitutive documents only allowed shareholders to propose directors for
nomination if there are no directors).
In the interim, the board, mindful of key corporate governance principles and led
by the acting executive chairman, engaged with a number of shareholders, including the
requisitioning shareholders, and decided to embark on the process of reconstituting the board
at the next annual general meeting, thus cancelling the meeting called by the requisitioning
shareholders.
The board successfully countered a public bear hug approach adopted by the
shareholder activists, with targeted engagements with various stakeholders. This allowed
the board to refocus on its role as ultimate custodian and fiduciary of the company, its
stakeholders and all its shareholders (in contrast to narrow possible short-term interest of a
small but vocal group of shareholder activists).
A noteworthy point to consider is that that PPC employees also held a minority
shareholding in PPC and had indicated their support for the chief executive officer, had the
board not been able earn the trust of the requisitioning shareholders, the outcome of the
meeting that was to be held on 8 December 2014 may have resulted in a different outcome.2
iii AngloGold Ashanti

In 2014, following public disapproval by one of its shareholders, AngloGold Ashanti Limited
(AngloGold), a leading global gold producer, abandoned a planned demerger and rights offer
just five days after making the announcement. AngloGold intended to split its international
assets from its South African mines to form a new London-listed company. In addition, a
rights offer was planned to reduce the high debt of the company.
The proposed transaction was common practice in the industry and was accepted by
analysts and shareholders alike, specifically given that the industrial upsets in South Africa
tarnished the countrys reputation as an attractive destination for mining investment.
A hedge-fund that held a minority shareholding in AngloGold had been one of the
most outspoken critics of the proposed transaction. That entity, while supportive of the
concept of restructuring, found the limited benefits of the rights issue would be outweighed
by the dilution.3
2 Financial Mail: Nick Hedley, PPC Shareholder vote: How the chips may fall,
6 November 2014; Rand Daily Mail: Sikonathi Mantshantsha, The odds are stacked against
Ketso Gordhans PPC comeback, 16 October 2014; Times Live: Ann Crotty, PPC fallout
cements need for oversight, 6 December 2014 (internet source, accessed 18 August 2016).
3 Business Day Live: Ed Stoddard and Silvia Antonioli, AngloGold makes quick U-turn
on planned overhaul after shareholder revolt, 15 September 2014; Financial Times:
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The effect of the actions of the hedge fund, apart from causing the company to
abandon the rights issue, almost instantly caused a general negative reaction when the
proposed transaction was announced.
iv Adcock
Another example of shareholder activism in South Africa, which took place in 2014, was
the PICs involvement in pharmaceuticals firm Adcock Ingram Holdings Limiteds (Adcock)
proposed takeover by a Chilean competitor. The PIC held shares in both Adcock and in the
Bidvest Group Limited (Bidvest). Bidvest, with the support of the PIC (its shareholder) put
in a last-minute bid to become a significant shareholder of Adcock. Suffice it to say, the deal
with the Chilean entity fell through.
v Sun International
In 2013 the board of Sun International (Sun), the resort hotel chain and casinocompany,
suffered a surprising setback after nearly 50 per cent of its shareholders rejected the companys
new executive remuneration policy at its annual general meeting. Despite the overwhelming
vote against the resolution, there were no legal consequences for Sun. The vote clearly
indicated the shareholders view of the remuneration policy, which would allow the board to
address the concerns of the shareholders going forward.4
The introduction of the King IV Report, which builds on the aforementioned King Code and
is still in draft form, encourages shareholder activism and further develops principles such as
shareholder engagement through some of its recommendations.
One of the ways in which this is demonstrated is in the King IV Reports
recommendation for shareholders to pass a non-binding advisory vote on the remuneration
policy and its implementation. Compulsory shareholder engagement is triggered in the
event that the policy or implementation is not supported by a vote of at least 75 per cent
of the voting shares. The King IV Report provides an opportunity for a framework for the
responsibilities of shareholders to be incorporated in the corporate governance system of
checks and balances.
VI OUTLOOK
In the course of preparing for increased shareholder activism in South Africa, companies
need to monitor their shareholder portfolio and anticipate the kinds of activists that are likely
to emerge, as well as the type of demands that these shareholders are likely to make, on a
case-by-case basis. However, as discussed above, shareholder activists who hold insignificant
stakes in companies are also afforded certain rights and protections, and companies will need
James Wilson and Andrew England, John Paulson attacks AngloGold spin-off plan
11 September 2014 (internet source, accessed 18 August 2016).
4 Business Day Live: Max Gebhardt, Sun International shareholders reject pay policy,
27 November 2013 (internet source, accessed 18 August 2016).
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to ensure that they practise good corporate governance and proactively participate in the
appropriate level of shareholder engagement with particular focus on unlocking shareholder
value. Failure to do so may leave the board exposed to shareholder disapproval sparked by
shareholder activists who are armed with an increased amount of information and a variety
of regulatory rights and protections.
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Chapter 7
SWEDEN
Eva Hgg and Patrik Marcelius1
I OVERVIEW
The traditional strategy among activists in the Swedish market has been private approaches
and until recently there have been few examples of investors having taken public and
adversarial approaches. There are, however, clear signs of a growing trend of activism with
recent examples of both public and adversarial strategies. This has resulted in a heightened
awareness among listed companies.
i The Swedish corporate governance regime

To understand the legislative and regulatory landscape for shareholder engagement and
shareholder activism, the Swedish corporate governance regime should be considered.
Corporate governance of Swedish listed companies is regulated by a combination of legislation,
self-regulation and codes of practice, statements by self-regulatory bodies and generally
accepted practices. The main source of corporate legislation is the Swedish Companies Act
(the Companies Act). Other regulatory sources include the Swedish Corporate Governance
Code (the Code), the rules of regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities, such as
Nasdaq Stockholms rule book for issuers, as well as statements and rulings by the Swedish
Securities Council on what constitutes good practice on the Swedish securities market. Other
legislation also forms a part of the regulatory framework, including the Annual Accounts Act,
the Swedish Securities Market Act and the EU Market Abuse Regulation.
The Swedish Corporate Governance model recognises the benefit of long-term engaged
controlling shareholders, but is at the same time neutral in respect of ownership structures.
The right of a majority shareholder to exercise control over a company is counterbalanced by
certain minority protection.
1 Eva Hgg and Patrik Marcelius are partners at Mannheimer Swartling.
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The Swedish corporate governance model is based on a hierarchical governance

structure where each body can issue directives to a subordinated body and to a certain extent
take over the subordinated bodys decision-making authority. The different bodies are the
shareholders meeting, the board of directors appointed annually by the shareholders and
the managing director appointed by the board of directors. The shareholders meeting is the
highest decision-making body of the company, which also reflects the shareholders strong
position in Swedish corporate governance.
ii The Swedish market for publicly traded companies

There are around 300 companies whose shares are traded on a Swedish regulated market. The
ownership structure of Swedish publicly traded companies has undergone significant changes
over the last half-century during which the direct share ownership by private households has
decreased. Instead, domestic institutional investors, such as pension funds, life insurance
companies and mutual funds, have picked up households savings in listed shares. This has
led to an increasing institutional ownership that plays a significant role on the Swedish
stock market. More recently there has been a significant increase in foreign ownership stakes
of mainly UK and US-based institutional investors. Despite the institutionalisation of
ownership, several listed companies have one or limited number of majority shareholders and,
with respect to ownership concentration, approximately two-thirds of the listed companies
have at least one shareholder in control of more than 20 per cent of the voting rights. The
Swedish Companies Act permits different classes of shares with differentiated voting rights.
Several of the listed companies have two classes of shares, where one of the classes may have
up to 10 times the voting power of the other class.
Majority owners in Swedish listed companies often take an active ownership approach
and engage in the governance of the relevant company, in particular by being represented
on the board. Also domestic institutional investors are engaged in the governance of
companies, normally through representation on nomination committees and participation
at shareholders meetings.
iii The Corporate bodies

The Companies Act provides the statutory background against which shareholders
engagement and activism will be framed. The Companies Act sets out fundamental provisions
regarding the governance of a company, including the responsibilities and authority of each
corporate body.
iv The board of directors

Powers
The board structure in Sweden has one tier. Swedish law does not include provisions for a
separate controlling body or supervisory board. The board of directors is responsible for the
companys organisation and the management of the companys affairs. A limited number
of issues are, according to the Companies Act, reserved exclusively for the board, but other
than those the shareholders meeting can pass resolutions on any company matter, including
issuing instructions to the board. Swedish boards are invariably non-executive. Instead, the
executive power rests with the managing director, who is appointed by the board.
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Election of board members

A particular characteristic of Swedish corporate governance is the engagement of shareholders
in the nomination processes to appoint the boards of directors and the auditors through
the participation in companies nomination committees. Nomination committees are not
regulated by the Companies Act, but by the Code. Under the Code, which is based on the
comply or explain principle, all Swedish companies listed on a regulated market must put in
place a nomination committee pursuant to a shareholder resolution that either appoints the
committee members or sets out the principles on the basis of which the committee members
are to be appointed.
The nomination committee is typically composed of representatives of the three to five
largest shareholders. Under the Code the majority of the nomination committee members
must be independent from the company and management and at least one of its members
should be independent, both in relation to the companys largest shareholders but also from
a cooperating group of shareholders. The Code sets out certain independent requirements
in respect of composition of the board. There are also requirements aimed at encouraging
gender balance on boards.
Even though director nomination is typically made through the nomination
committee, any shareholder can nominate directors for election to the board and have the
nomination included in the notice to the general meeting. Furthermore, any shareholder has
the right to propose a candidate as late as at the meeting itself (provided board election is on
the meeting agenda).
Responsibilities of the board

The board of directors has wide discretion to regulate its own work, typically through the
rules of procedure that the board is required to adopt each year. The board members hold
fiduciary positions in relation to the company and must therefore exercise due care and act in
the best interests of the company. They are required to comply with the Companies Act and
other applicable rules and regulations and with the companys articles of association.
The Companies Act sets out certain general principles, primarily the general clause and
the principle of equal treatment, the purpose of which are to protect minority shareholders.
The general clause provides that the board of directors or any other representatives of
a company may not adopt resolutions that are liable to unduly benefit a shareholder or
another party to the disadvantage of the company or another shareholder. Resolutions by
the shareholders meeting are also subject to the general clause. Under the principle of equal
treatment all shares have equal rights in the company, if not provided otherwise by the articles
of association.
If a board member intentionally or negligently causes the company harm, he or she
may be liable for damages. Board members may also in certain circumstances be liable to
third parties, including individual shareholders, creditors and employees, if the relevant board
member intentionally or negligently breaches the Companies Act, the Annual Accounts Act
or the articles of association.
v The shareholders
Shareholder rights
Under the Companies Act, the shareholders meeting is the highest decision-making body
of the company. At the shareholders meeting the shareholders participate in the supervision
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and control of the company. There are a number of matters where a resolution must be passed
by the shareholders meeting such as, alterations of the companys articles of association and
changes to the companys share capital, mergers and demergers of the company.
To balance the power of major shareholders, the Companies Act provides for certain
protection of minority shareholders. Some rights under the Swedish Companies Act may be
exercised by each shareholder (i.e., regardless of the number of shares owned or the number
of votes they represent) whereas some rights may only be exercised by a shareholder whose
shareholdings represent 10 per cent or more of the share capital. There are also certain rights
that can be exercised by various majorities of shareholders.
Shareholders with a single share may attend, express views and vote at general
meetings; introduce matters to the agenda and present proposals for resolutions at general
meetings; and take court actions against the company to set aside or amend a resolution on
the grounds that it has not been duly passed or that the correct procedure for its adoption
was not followed. Also, as is described further below, anyone (i.e., not only shareholders) can
request a copy of a companys share register, which shows all holdings of 500 shares or more.
Shareholders with 10 per cent of the shares, or more, may:
a requisition an extraordinary shareholders meeting;
b block a decision to discharge board members or the managing director from liability
for damages;
c bring derivative claims against any board member, managing director, auditor or
shareholder;
d block the squeeze-out of minority shareholders following a takeover offer;
e block certain mergers or demergers;
f request the appointment of one or more special examiners to investigate the companys
management, accounts or certain measures taken by the company or a minority
shareholders auditor; and
g request that the general meeting resolves on a dividend of at least a portion of the
distributable profit.
Shareholders with more than one-third of the shares may block certain shareholder resolutions
(including resolutions to alter the articles of association, issue shares, warrants or convertible
instruments on a non-pre-emptive basis, buy back shares or reduce the share capital).
Shareholder responsibilities
Under Swedish law, a shareholder can be subject to claims in relation to damage caused to the
company, a shareholder or a third party as a consequence of participating, intentionally or
though gross negligence, in any breach of the Swedish Companies Act, the Annual Accounts
Act or the companys articles of association. A shareholder may not vote in respect of legal
proceedings against him or her, or his or her discharge from liability for damages or other
obligations towards the company. Claims against shareholders based on the liability rules
in the Companies Act are very uncommon. Other than as set out above shareholders do
not have any statutory fiduciary duties under Swedish law and therefore have no general
obligation to act in the best interest of the company. Nor is there any code of best practice
for shareholders. Even if there are no particular duties resting with controlling shareholders
or institutional investors from a corporate governance perspective, controlling shareholders
nevertheless often engage in the corporate governance of the company.
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There are clear signs of a growing trend of shareholder activism in Sweden. Recent examples
of activist campaigns have also heightened the awareness among Swedish companies. These
examples are not limited to attempts to influence corporate events, such as the outcome of
a takeover, but include for instance open letters about the alleged lack of transparency and
attempts to influence the contents of the agenda of annual general meetings. Furthermore,
recent shareholder engagement has moved into the area of sustainability, aiming for instance
to improve the companys environmental or social policies. On this basis, many companies
actively monitor their share registers and put in place response manuals that address not only
the receipt of a takeover offer but also approaches by activists.
i Shareholder engagement and activism

With one or a few majority owners in many Swedish listed companies, there are few examples
where shareholders other than the majority owners have tried to influence the companies in
which they own shares. This has, to a certain extent changed during the last decade, arguably
following the increase in shareholder activism in the US and generally as a result of the
globalisation of the financial markets.
ii Initiatives
Where shareholders do engage in activist strategies, they may include the following:
a Purchasing shares in a company to build a stake that can be voted to influence
decisions at shareholders meeting. This could be combined with stock borrowing,
which enables a borrower of shares to exercise voting and shareholder rights.
b Purchasing shares or other long positions using CFDs or other derivatives to influence
decisions at shareholders meetings.
c Requesting a copy of the companys share register with a view to contacting and
cooperating with other shareholders to voice concerns and obtain support for actions
that a company should take.
d Making a private approach to a companys board to convey concerns and potentially
bring about changes to the strategy or management.
e Purchasing shares in a company to qualify for a seat on the companys nomination
committee and, as a result, to influence the composition of the board.
f Using public announcements, press articles, open letters or social media to voice
concerns and propose actions that a company should take.
g Exercising minority rights, such as requisitioning an extraordinary shareholders
meeting to consider resolutions to effect changes, such as changes to the composition
of the board, the return of funds to the shareholders, etc.
h Threatening or taking legal action, such as a derivative action, for breach of directors
duties or a claim for unfair treatment of minority shareholders.
i Seeking to have the company taken over to realise a premium to the share price.
j Seeking to have a company undertake a specific transaction.
The preferred response to an activist initiative is fact specific and dependent on the particular
strategy (or combination of strategies) used by the activist. The way the company deals with
the situation can affect the reputation of the company and the board of directors and it may
impact the general view of the companys engagement with its shareholders.
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iii Preparing for activist approaches

There are a number of steps that a company could take prior to being targeted by a shareholder
activist. Such steps may include the following:
a Maintaining a good relationship with its major shareholders and communicating its
strategy clearly and how it is maximising long-term shareholder value.
b Monitoring press, research reports and social media in respect of both the company
and its industry.
c Conducting regular strategic reviews to identity areas of interest to activists.
d Monitoring the companys shareholder base to identify beneficial ownership, increased
levels of stock borrowing and the use of derivatives.
e Maintaining good corporate governance standards, including complying with legal
and regulatory requirements and best practice, including ensuring that proper
procedures, systems and controls are in place.
f Generally identifying and anticipating areas of vulnerability.
iv Rules and processes impacting activism

Stakebuilding and disclosure requirements
Monitoring the shareholder base of the company could form part of an activists strategy
and stakebuilding scheme. Information about the shareholder base, individual shareholders
investment horizon and investment strategies could be used by an activist to plan acquisitions
and sales to fit stakebuilding processes. Information about the shareholder base could also be
a useful tool in initiatives that involve cooperation with other shareholders
Monitoring trades, shareholders and shareholdings is also useful for a company to
determine whether relevant disclosure or mandatory bid thresholds are reached or exceeded.
The company could monitor the activist shareholders behaviour and the shareholdings
closely to see whether relevant thresholds are crossed and the consequences this may bring,
such as making a disclosure or having to make a mandatory bid. Furthermore, two or more
activists or other shareholders pursuing a common strategy may be acting in concert. If this is
the case, their shares may be aggregated for the purposes of these requirements.
The ownership structure of Swedish listed companies is in theory transparent. Pursuant
to the Swedish Companies Act, all companies must, through their appointed central securities
depositories, maintain a public share register, comprising shareholders with a shareholding of
more than 500 shares in the company. However, in practice, the use of nominee or custody
accounts will often reduce the transparency of the share register. The share register may not
therefore reveal the true identity of beneficial holders.
The Swedish regime on shareholding disclosure implements the EU Transparency
Obligations Directive (as amended). The regime requires the purchase and sale of shares
to be notified to the Financial Supervisory Authority as well as to the target within three
trading days where any of the following thresholds is reached, exceeded or fallen below:
every 5 per cent up to and including 30 per cent; 50 per cent; two-thirds; and 90 per cent
of the total number of shares or voting rights (including any shares held in treasury). The
Financial Supervisory Authority will make the relevant information public by no later than
at noon on the next trading day following receipt by the Financial Supervisory Authority
of the notification. These disclosure rules do not only apply to shares. They also apply to
financial instruments that entitle the holder to acquire shares that have been issued as well
as long cash-settled derivatives (holdings through cash settled-derivatives are calculated on
a delta-adjusted basis). However, warrants and convertible debt instruments that entitle the
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holder to subscribe for newly issued shares are not caught by the shareholding disclosure
rules. Also stock-lending could be used, allowing a borrower of shares to exercise voting
and shareholder rights without incurring a long-term economic exposure to the value of the
shares. Disclosure requirements apply when the holdings of borrowed stock reach, exceed or
fall below the relevant thresholds according to the above.
Market Abuse Regulation

The EU Market Abuse Regulation requires listed companies to announce any price-sensitive
information as soon as possible unless they are able to delay such disclosure requiring that
there is a legitimate interest to delay the disclosure, that the public is not being misled and
that confidentiality can be ensured. On the one hand, an activist could use the argument
of diligent application of the rules as a tool to force disclosure. On the other hand, since
the Market Abuse Regulation prevents the board and management from disclosing inside
information selectively, these rules could be used to resist information requests from an
activist. Furthermore, an obvious concern in relation to dealings on the basis of confidential
information is where the activist or shareholder has been in discussions with the board and, as
a result, has received inside information. While individual dealings by an activist on the basis
of its own intentions and knowledge of its own strategy would not typically be abusive, certain
other activities could constitute market abuse. If the activist has received inside information
from the company, dealings in shares or other financial instruments may constitute an insider
dealing offence. In addition, where false rumours and expectations are generated to take
advantage of short-term price movements, this could constitute a market abuse offence.
Shareholder concertedness
A shareholder activist who cooperates with other shareholders will need to consider the
implications of acting in concert for the purposes of the shareholding disclosure requirements
and the mandatory bid requirement.
In particular, where the parties have entered into an agreement that obliges them to
adopt, by concerted exercise of the voting rights they hold, a lasting common policy towards
management, such an agreement would generally qualify as relevant concertedness
for the purposes of both the shareholding disclosure requirements and the mandatory bid
requirement.
In this context it may be worth noting that the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) has published a statement that addresses the extent to which shareholders
may cooperate on governance issues without being regarded as acting in concert under the
EU Takeovers Directive. The statement includes a White List of activities that are deemed
not to be acting in concert. However, ESMA stresses the importance of early consultation
with the relevant national authority where there is any uncertainty. If there are additional facts
that indicate that the shareholders should be regarded as acting in concert, then the national
authority should take those facts into account for the purposes of determining whether or
not the parties are acting concert, even if the relevant activity is on the White List. As a result,
each case will be determined on its own facts.
The activities in the White List include:
a entering into discussions with each other about possible matters to be raised with the
companys board;
b making representations to the companys board about company policies, practices or
particular actions;
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c other than in relation to board appointments, exercising shareholders statutory rights

in relation to general meetings (e.g., the right to call a general meeting, adding items
to the agenda and tabling draft resolutions); and
d other than in relation to board appointments, and insofar as such a resolution
is provided for under national company law, agreeing to vote the same way on a
resolution put to a general meeting (e.g., to approve or reject a proposal relating to
directors remuneration or rejecting a related-party transaction).
Duties of the board of directors and management

Since the Swedish corporate governance landscape is strongly based on the principle of equal
treatment of all shareholders, the board has a duty to act in the best interests of the company.
A board member owes his or her duties to the company as a whole (i.e., to all shareholders,
and not to a particular shareholder). On this basis it may, therefore, be legitimate to resist any
activist pressure to accept initiatives, propose dividends, give a recommendation in favour
of a bid or proposal or allow access for due diligence in such a process. Further, the legal
duties only require that the interests of the shareholders are taken into account and not
those holding derivatives. Activists may, however, challenge the exercise of directors duties
by bringing derivative claims for damages but such claims will in practice often prove to be
unpredictable and will rarely result in any immediate effect. The use of litigation is therefore
typically not regarded as a key tool for activists in Sweden.
Shareholder resolutions
With few exceptions, the general meeting of shareholders may decide on any issue that does
not expressly fall within the exclusive authority of another corporate body. The strategy of an
activist shareholder could therefore involve engaging in the shareholders resolution process,
including with the aim of being represented in the companys nomination committee.
Typically, the nomination committee members are appointed by the three to five largest
shareholders in the company. The nomination committee instructions normally include
principles for the appointment of the members, who are usually appointed by the shareholders
identified as the largest at a set time well before the annual general meeting. This implies that
an activist may stakebuild in order to be among the largest shareholders at the specified time.
A shareholder could also take activist initiatives by requisitioning resolutions at the
shareholders meeting. A shareholder may also request information at the shareholders
meeting.
Each shareholder has the right to attend the shareholders meeting and shareholders
who are not able to attend in person could be represented by a proxy. Proxy solicitation by
the company is not permitted. The Companies Act, however, provides for the proxy voting,
but this is a possibility that is rarely used by Swedish companies. To introduce proxy voting,
the company must alter its articles of association, by introducing a provision on proxy voting.
This would enable the distribution of proxy forms where the shareholders may indicate their
votes (as yes or no) regarding the relevant proposals, which are then executed without the
shareholders being present at the shareholders meeting.
A timeline for shareholders resolution initiatives could look as follows:
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Q2 Year 1 Q1 Year 2 Q2 Year 2

Propose matters to the AGM agenda
Appointment of nomination in ample time before publication of Give notice to attend the AGM.
committee the AGM notice. Attendance at the AGM.
Furthermore, an activist shareholder holding 10 per cent of more of the shares in the company
may exercise or threaten to exercise minority rights to put pressure on the board of directors.
Such minority rights include requisitioning an extraordinary shareholders meeting, blocking
decisions to discharge liability, bringing claims for damages, requesting a special examiner or
requiring certain minimum dividend payments.
Generally accepted market practice

In addition to the regulatory framework described above, self-regulation has long characterised
the Swedish securities market.
The self-regulating body, the Swedish Corporate Governance Board, is responsible
for managing and administrating the Code and generally promoting good governance of
listed companies in Sweden. The Code is a form of self-regulation and compliance with it is
mandatory for all Swedish companies listed on a regulated market subject to the comply or
explain principle.
The Code has received general acceptance on the Swedish market and a majority of
companies report no or only minor instances of misapplication of the Code.
Another self-regulation body is the Swedish Securities Council. The role of the Swedish
Securities Council is to promote good practices on the Swedish stock market by issuing
statements on points of interpretation of the Takeover Rules and what constitutes good
market practice. The Swedish Securities Council is consequently an important rule-maker
in this context. Any action by a Swedish limited company that has issued shares listed on a
regulated market in Sweden or by a shareholder of such a company may be subject to the
Swedish Securities Councils assessment.
Examples in activism in Sweden include the following.
In October 2003, Amaranth Capital (now Cevian) acquired 10.4 per cent of Lindex
shares, thereby becoming its second-largest shareholder.
Amaranth Capital/ Amaranth Capital gained board representation in 2004. Board and management changes
Lindex were initiated, as well as changes to the companies and strategy.
(20042007) Amaranth Capital sold its stake in 2006 and 2007.
Cevian, together with Carl Icahn, acquired 3 per cent of Skandias shares in
December 2004.
Cevian/Skandia: Cevian gained board representation in 2005 and used this position to support a takeover
(20042006) bid by Old Mutual. The bid was eventually successful (in 20052006).
In September 2006, Violet Partners (a JV between Parvus and Cevian) acquired shares
representing 5.3 per cent of the voting rights in Volvo.
Violet Partners sought to gain a position on the board and pushed for changes to the
capital structure and amendments to the composition of the board.
Violet Partners/Volvo Violet Partners gained a seat on the nominations committee but did not succeed in its
(20062007) attempt to gain board representation. Parvus eventually left the JV.
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In 2015, the activist Muddy Waters declared a short position in an open letter
questioning the extent of the Swedish phone companys transparency about its Eurasian
businesses. TeliaSonera shares fell the most in more than three years.
TeliaSonera responded that it fully cooperated with ongoing investigations in Sweden,
the Netherlands and the United States, that it was as open and transparent as possible
with respect to listing requirements and the investigations, that it had not received any
Muddy Waters/ claims from US authorities and that its financial statements were in accordance with
TeliaSonera (2015) international financial reporting standards (IFRS).
In 2015/2016, a number of the large institutional investors (including Norges Bank
Investment Management) campaigned for individual board election and transparency of
voting at the shareholders meeting. According to the investors it should be mandatory to
present proposals to the board of directors as a set of individual proposal and that voting
Norges Bank should take place individually and be announced for, for each proposed candidate, as
(2015/2016) opposed to bundled elections commonly undertaken.
In 2015, Canon made a recommended public takeover offer for the Swedish listed
surveillance camera manufacturer Axis.
During the acceptance period Elliot Capital took a corner position of just over 10 per
cent of the issued share capital preventing Canon from squeezing out the remaining
minority shareholdings.
Axis is still listed despite Canons stake of around 86 per cent and Elliot Capitals corner
Elliot Capital/Canon position. Elliot has exercised a number of minority rights, including requiring certain
(2015) minimum dividends, the appointment of a special examiner and a minority auditor.
In 2016, EQT made a mandatory takeover offer for IFS, following the purchase of
around 63 per cent of the shares in IFS.
During the acceptance period, Elliot Capital took a corner position of just over 11 per
cent of the issued share capital, preventing Canon from squeezing out the remaining
minority shareholdings.
IFS is still listed despite EQTs stake of more than 80 per cent and Elliot Capitals corner
Elliot Capital/EQT position. Elliot has exercised a number of minority rights, including requiring certain
(2015) minimum dividend, the appointment of a special examiner and a minority auditor.
As discussed above, the Swedish stock market has a long history of long-term engaged
controlling shareholders that are typically willing to invest the time and resources in the
governance of companies. Corporate governance reforms, such as the introduction of the
Code, have been undertaken in order to make legislation superfluous. While self-regulation
has become more difficult to uphold, following the introduction of EU legislation in this
area, the introduction of EU legislation is not likely to have any major impact on activism
and its potential impact on Swedish companies.
VI OUTLOOK
While Europe is generally regarded to be significantly behind the US in terms of activism,

there are clear indications of a growing trend of shareholder activism in Sweden and elsewhere
in Europe. From a Swedish perspective it is likely that this increased activism is a long-term
phenomenon. From a regulatory perspective, increased transparency and accountability are
likely to reinforce this trend and may potentially strengthen activists. While the traditional
strategy among activists in Sweden has been private approaches, we have seen several recent
examples of public campaigns to voice concerns or propose actions. This will in turn likely
increase the attention of listed companies to activism as a continuing and increasing issue.
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Chapter 8
UNITED KINGDOM
Gavin Davies and Mark Bardell 1
I OVERVIEW
Shareholder activism continues to grow in prevalence and significance in the UK, in common
with global trends. While shareholder activism is not a new concept in the UK market, the
type of investors undertaking activism, the companies that they are targeting and the outcomes
that they are seeking to achieve have continued to evolve over recent years, influenced in large
part by the development of such activity in the US.
Shareholder activism is a generic term that is usually used to describe an approach
by a shareholder or shareholder group to a companys board, and if necessary to its fellow
shareholders, seeking to effect change within a company. While shareholder activism in the
UK has historically been focused on obtaining board representation, activist investors have
begun to utilise the legal and regulatory tools available to them to achieve a more diverse
range of outcomes, short of a full control transaction.
Shareholder activism campaigns in the UK can be categorised in many different ways.
One simple approach is to distinguish between: (1) event-driven activism, where an activist
shareholder will seek to assert its influence on a companys then-current corporate activity,
particularly in relation to a takeover or other M&A situation; and (2) strategic or operational
activism, where outside of a companys then-current corporate activity, a shareholder activist
seeks to address operational performance, balance sheet or other strategic issues, or some other
longer-term concern at a company, such as governance or remuneration. While strategic or
operational activism is often associated with management or leadership changes, achieving
control in the strict company law sense is not usually an objective and paying a control
premium is something activists will seek to avoid.
Just as the type of shareholder activism can vary broadly, there is no one type of
shareholder activist in the UK, and the term can cover a wide range of investors. Some
activists are specific investment funds with activism as their business model, and it is these
1 Gavin Davies and Mark Bardell are partners at Herbert Smith Freehills LLP.
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investors that are generally classed as activist shareholders. Equally, existing shareholders
may become active shareholders, for example, where they consider that the company is
underperforming or they disagree with the decisions being made by the companys board.
Traditionally, institutional investors in the UK have refrained from voicing their concerns
or criticisms of management in the public domain and the vocal activist community has
historically been composed of hedge funds, specific investment funds and other alternative
investors. Increasingly, however, institutional investors and other shareholders are becoming
more prepared to air their concerns in the open, or to lend their support (publicly or
privately) to those who are more willing or able to do so, when they feel that their concerns
are not being registered by management. Activist shareholders are sometimes described as
performing a lightning rod role for such dissent in the public market; they can sometimes
provide a useful channel for such dissatisfaction felt by a wider group of shareholders.
The specific shareholder activist funds operating in the UK are generally well
researched, tactically astute and determined, and come armed with the funds needed to
support their campaigns. Such activists will be prepared for a hostile response (and will
not shy away from public disagreement) but may prefer to reach a consensual agreement
with a board if they can. They are persistent (some with multi-year time horizons on their
investment) and relatively resistant in the face of an initial knockback (with a number of
examples of activists willingly reiterating arguments and returning to shareholders for a
second shareholder vote).
This chapter considers: (1) the legal and regulatory framework relating to shareholder
activism campaigns in the UK; (2) the key trends in shareholder activism in the UK that have
emerged in recent years; (3) examples of recent shareholder activist campaigns in the UK; and
(4) future regulatory developments that may affect shareholder activism in the UK.
The global focal point of shareholder activism over the past decade has been and remains the
US market, where activist investors have been ready and willing to employ the legal means
available to them to achieve their objectives. In the UK, corporate law has always provided a
strong basis of shareholder rights from which to challenge management. This, together with
concerted efforts over many years by UK regulators and policy-makers to encourage more
active shareholder engagement (particularly following the failures identified in the global
financial crisis), has resulted in a legal and regulatory framework in the UK that is arguably
the most benign framework for possible activist activities in Europe. This state of affairs is
likely to increase in a post hard-Brexit environment.
The most important legal tools available to an activist shareholder are enshrined in
English company law (the Companies Act 2006), which provide an activist shareholder with
the means of amplifying its influence beyond the size of its shareholding (which in some cases
may be quite small) and becoming the lightning rod for the shareholder voice of change
referred to above. The most powerful tool in an activist shareholders toolkit is the ability
to call for a general meeting of a company. Provided that a shareholder holds at least 5 per
cent of a companys issued share capital, it may requisition a general meeting of its fellow
shareholders and propose one or more resolutions to be considered at that meeting (Section
303). Alternatively, shareholders holding at least 5 per cent, or a group numbering at least
100 shareholders, may requisition specific resolutions to be considered at a companys annual
general meeting (Section 338).
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It is this ability to introduce a resolution, taken with the ability of a simple majority
of those voting at the relevant meeting to remove or appoint a new director, that gives
the shareholder its most potent threat. Accordingly, in strategic and operational as well as
governance and pay situations, the requisition will be to remove existing directors from the
board or appoint new directors nominated by the activist investor, to ensure new voices on
the board to help achieve the desired outcome. However, provided that it relates to a matter
that is not defamatory or vexatious and, if passed, would be effective (noting that merely
directive resolutions by shareholders to the board are not generally regarded as such), there
is no limit to the type or wording of a resolution that an activist may propose.
Ordinary resolutions of a company may be passed by a simple majority (50 per cent
plus one share), whereas special resolutions require a majority of 75 per cent. This means that
a group of shareholders holding 50 per cent of the shares voted at a meeting have the power
to pass ordinary resolutions, or conversely, a minority bloc of 25 per cent may block special
resolutions. These thresholds refer to percentages of shareholders present and voting at the
meeting, so in fact a much smaller overall bloc of shareholders may be able to pass or block
resolutions, depending on turnout. The National Association of Pension Funds 2015 AGM
Report cited average voting turnout across FTSE 350 AGMs that year at 72.5 per cent.
It should also be noted that for a UK listed company, in particular, one with a premium
listing, certain significant corporate transactions will require shareholder approval (for
example, a class 1 major transaction under the UK Listing Rules or where non-pre-emptive
issuances of consideration shares are required). Therefore, significant corporate activity will
often present a voting opportunity for a shareholder to intervene (and likewise on a takeover,
by exercising votes on a scheme of arrangement, or accepting or not a contractual takeover
offer).
The Companies Act 2006 contains a number of other ancillary rights that may also
assist a shareholder in conducting its activist campaign. Under Section 116, Section 809 and
Section 811, shareholders have the right to inspect and copy a companys register of members
and any register of beneficial interests, which can allow other shareholders to be identified
and subsequently communicated with, or (in circumstances where the directors of a company
have failed to comply with a shareholders requisition) allow the activist shareholder to call
the general meeting itself at the companys expense (Section 305).
In addition, any shareholder has the right to attend and speak at a general meeting
of a company (whether that meeting has been requisitioned or is being held in the ordinary
course of business), giving that shareholder the opportunity to state a view or ask difficult
questions to the directors. This right may be exercised by a representative of the shareholder
or via a proxy.
Listed companies in the UK are required to hold an annual general meeting each year,
which will include re-election of directors by rotation and, in the case of FTSE 350 companies,
will typically propose resolutions to re-appoint each of their directors in order to comply
with the UK Corporate Governance Code. This can provide shareholders with an annual
opportunity to effect change. Another common means of activist shareholders voicing
their discontent with how a company is run has been to vote against the annual directors
remuneration report, the subject of an annual advisory vote at each AGM (high-profile
examples being Burberry in 2014, and Smith & Nephew in 2016). The introduction in
2013 of a binding AGM vote every three years on the directors remuneration policy provides
another more significant opportunity for shareholder say-on-pay intervention.
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In extreme cases, an activist shareholder may decide to exercise its right under the
Companies Act 2006 to take legal action in the form of a derivative claim against a companys
directors (which is a claim on behalf of the company) (Section 260) or an unfair prejudice
petition (Section 994). Such shareholder litigation is very rare in the UK in relation to listed
companies.
While the legal and regulatory framework in the UK is generally favourable to activist
shareholders, the UK has tended to see a higher level of cooperation between activists and
boards of directors when compared to the US. In a substantial majority of cases, a disgruntled
investor in a UK company will begin by reaching out to the board of that company and
attempt to persuade the directors round to its view, or to take certain actions, through
informal engagement in the first instance. A host of other soft or non-legal options are open
to activists, including private discussions with other shareholders and public press or social
media campaigns. The shareholder activist will gauge support for certain resolutions which
a group of investors may come together to require the board to propose at a general meeting
(as discussed above), or to cooperate in opposing certain resolutions proposed by the board.
While shareholders are generally free, and indeed encouraged by policy (such as
the Stewardship Code) to talk to one another, it is important to take account of all of the
regulatory contexts for any such discussions. As further discussed below, investors will need
to be careful that they do not unlawfully disclose any inside information (as defined in the
EU Market Abuse Directive EU, or MAR) in relation to their intentions, or (if they have such
information) the company, which could amount to market abuse under MAR.
A strategy often employed by activist funds, acting individually, is to build up a stake
in a company to increase its leverage to call for change. Such stake building exercises require
particular care. Under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code), a person will
be required to make an offer for all of the remaining shares of a company subject to the
Code for a price not less than the price paid for any shares by the potential controller during
the previous 12 months in the event that he or she (together with any persons acting in
concert with him or her) becomes interested in shares carrying 30 per cent or more of
voting rights. Although shareholders will not generally be deemed to be acting in concert
as a result of agreeing to vote on resolutions in a certain way, the Code states that where a
group of shareholders requisition a board control seeking resolution (or threaten to do so),
and subsequently acquires shares taking the aggregate interest of the group above 30 per cent,
a mandatory offer will be required (Note 2 to Rule 9.1; see also Practice Statement 26 for
further guidance).
Activist investors building a stake will, in the usual way, need to consider their
disclosure obligations under the FCAs Transparency Rules. Where a shareholders interests
in shares in a listed UK issuer reach or fall below 3 per cent, and every 1 per cent increment
thereafter, such person must notify the issuer, who is then required to announce to the market.
For these purposes, indirect and derivative interests will both be counted as well as direct
holdings. This prevents an activist from building up a significant stake in secret. Limited
exemptions may apply (for example, investment firms will only be required to disclose from
5 per cent). The disclosure thresholds are less onerous for companies that are listed in the UK
but incorporated in a third country.
The activist wishing to deal in shares will also need to be well advised on the restriction
contained in MAR on dealing on the basis of inside information, and the criminal offence
of insider dealing under the Criminal Justice Act 1993. If the only inside information in a
stakebuilders possession is its own intentions, a safe harbour is available under MAR (and
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the FCAs Market Watch 20 publication has also generally been regarded as clear that this will
not amount to market abuse). However, care needs to be taken where information is obtained
from the target or from other shareholders.
Institutional investors in UK listed companies should have regard to the Stewardship
Code, which sets out good practice for their duties to engage as shareholders, and is applied
on a comply or explain basis. It recommends that institutional investors establish clear
guidelines on when and how they will escalate stewardship activities. It says engagement is
likely to begin with confidential discussions but may be escalated where a company does not
respond constructively. The Stewardship Code recognises the role that activism may play in
improving corporate governance.
The board of a company facing an approach from activist shareholders is unlikely to
sit idly by, but may select from various strategies to defend its position. Some of these are
legal defences. For example, a company may refuse to allow a resolution to be requisitioned
on the grounds that it is frivolous or vexatious or defamatory, or it may challenge a
requisitioned resolution on technical grounds. In the long run, such an approach is generally
unlikely to be effective, since the impression given is one of a board unwilling to openly
engage with shareholder concerns. An engagement on the substantive issues of concern and
a demonstration that directors are open to measured and thoughtful challenge is generally
regarded as an approach more likely to defuse activist pressure.
Globally, shareholder activism has seen a substantial increase over the past five years. In
2015, the number of activist campaigns launched by shareholders reached a recorded high
of 507, a 73.6 per cent increase from 2014 and a 28 per cent increase from the prior all-time
high in 2012.2 The UK market has followed this global trend. Between 2010 and 2015, the
number of shareholder activist campaigns in Europe (including the UK) increased by 126 per
cent,3 with 24 shareholder activist actions being launched in the UK between June 2015 and
June 2016.4
Both historically, and reinforced by the introduction of say-on-pay legislation,
shareholder intervention in the UK has been focused on board-related matters such as
executive remuneration and requests for board representation. In H1 2016, requests for
board representation and issues with executive remuneration or other corporate governance
matters accounted for 65.1 per cent of all shareholder activism activities in Europe (including
the UK).5 The number of activist matters relating to company M&A and other corporate
activities is, however, also on the increase (as outlined in further detail below).
i Event-driven activism
As outlined above, shareholder activism in the UK market has been traditionally focused on
the performance and remuneration of executive directors and requests for board representation
by activists. Over the past decade, however, the type and objectives of shareholder activist have
2 Thomson Reuters Global Shareholder Activism Scorecard 2015.

3 Forbes Europe sees 126% rise in activist investor action in five years, 15 November 2015.
4 Activist Insight Monthly, Volume 5 Issue 6, July 2016.
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evolved and an increasing number of activist campaigns have been event driven, involving
company M&A (both private and public) or other corporate activity (including the return of
value to shareholders via dividends or share buybacks). In H1 2016, 28.3 per cent of activist
campaigns launched in Europe (including the UK) were related to company M&A or other
company balance sheet concerns.6
Whenever a company is required to obtain prior shareholder approval to acquire or
dispose of a company or business (for example, if the transaction is a class 1 or related party
transaction for the purposes of the UK Listing Rules), shareholders are given the ability
to reject a deal after it has been conditionally agreed by the companys board. In M&A
situations that are dependent on shareholder approval, activists may seek to influence a
particular outcome through public criticism, proxy solicitation, lobbying of institutional
investors or proposing alternative transactions.
Activists may also seek to instigate or put pressure on a company to undertake an
acquisition or disposal or otherwise return value to its shareholders, particularly if a company
is perceived to be sitting on too much cash, or shareholders would prefer a return of cash to
it being spent on a transaction that they do not support.
In public takeover situations, where the ultimate decision as to whether to proceed
with the transaction rests with the shareholders of the target company (by shareholder vote
on a takeover by scheme, or acceptance of the offer on a takeover by contractual offer),
activist investors can wield a significant influence. This is the case even at the early stages of
a potential bid, by encouraging a target board to negotiate with the bidder or, on the other
hand, indicating that they will not accept an offer below a certain minimum level to attempt
to encourage an increase in the bidders offer price.
ii Activism as a more acceptable activity and name-calling

Shareholder activism has historically had pejorative connotations in the UK with activists
being stereotypically cast as opportunistic and aggressive corporate raiders concerned with
realising short-term returns at the expense of long-term shareholder interests.
Both the rise of an activism advisory community in the UK, and the terminology
being used suggest that, as in the US, in the UK there is increasing acceptance of activism as
a valid and indeed desirable public market business model, as evidenced by the more neutral
language used.
In the UK, in addition to the traditional broker role for the company, financial advisers
have been establishing specialist teams to advise listed companies on activist situations.
Specialist proxy solicitation agents have moved across from the US to support the hunt for
votes on both sides. The big four accountancy firms have built up teams to support their
listed clients, and, like the financial advisers, the PR consultancies are increasingly seeing
activism as a specialist area of advice. Interestingly the terminology has changed; a few years
ago terms such as corporate defence were prevalent among this type of advisory work. Now
corporate preparedness, shareholder engagement and valuation solutions are the sort of
terms in widespread use.
Similarly in the US, a new nomenclature shows a change in attitudes. White hat has
been introduced in recent years to identify a less contentious form of constructive activism
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with a focus on medium to long-term value creation. White-hat activists are characterised as
typically favouring more collaborative measures conducted in private (usually on a consensual
basis) and as only instigating a public activist campaign as a last resort.
iii US style tactics and developments the adoption of the settlement agreement
The global focal point of shareholder activism over the past decade has been and remains the
US market, with activist investors such as Carl Icahn, Pershing Square Capital Management,
ValueAct Capital Partners and Elliott Management playing prominent and well-publicised
roles in the US activist community.
While some of the tactics and approaches developed by US activist investors have
been adopted in the UK market, regulatory and legal limitations on the types of influences
activists can have on UK boardrooms has meant that many of the bolder forms of US
activism have not translated across the Atlantic. However, one US trend that is beginning
to be implemented in the UK is the use of settlement agreements or activist relationship
agreements.
Settlement agreements have been in use in the US over the past decade and provide
a means of settling a potential contest between an activist investor and a company, while
avoiding the significant drain on resources that a protracted proxy battle may entail. US-style
settlement agreements typically include the following basic components:
a an agreed set of actions to be taken by the company, which may include the
appointment of board representatives for the activist investor;
b a standstill agreement on activists share ownership in the company;
c a standstill agreement in relation to certain corporate governance matters (e.g., a
restriction on the activist from taking certain actions designed to gain additional
board representation); and
d other material provisions, which may include non-disparagement clauses, remedy
provisions and the term of the agreement.
A recent example of a US-style settlement agreement with an activist investor being adopted
by a UK company was announced by Rolls-Royce in March 2016, considered further below,
even though the company labelled it a relationship agreement, which is more familiar and
more neutral sounding to a UK audience familiar with such agreements. These agreements
are required under the UK Listing Rules for shareholders with interests of 30 per cent or
more of voting rights, a level of shareholding ValueAct had not reached. Another example
includes the terms reached between Elliott Management and the board of Alliance Trust in
April 2015, also further described below.
iv Use of dedicated websites and microsites

A practice that has become more common among activist shareholders in the UK is the use
of dedicated websites or microsites as a platform to promote their message more widely. Such
sites provide activists with the means of collating their arguments (generally from RNS press
releases, shareholder circulars, etc.) with other supporting data and third-party resources in
a public forum that is easily accessible for other shareholders, journalists and the public in
general.
Well-advised activist shareholders will carefully evaluate the legal and regulatory basis
on which such information is made available. They will consider financial services and market
abuse law and regulation, as well as defamation issues, just as they would with any public
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release or circular. They will also consider the full range of legal challenges as they would for
contents of any website or microsite before it is launched to avoid breaching any copyright,
third-party confidentiality or data protection laws.
v Board diversity
A topic that is not yet widely raised in relation to activist campaigns, but may become more
important is the role of gender diversity on the boards of listed companies.
According to a study conducted by Bloomberg, in the past five years the five biggest
US activist funds have only nominated women for a board seat in seven out of 174 occasions.7
In the UK, the charge of male, pale and stale has been levelled in the context of a proposed
board slate. With increasing focus being given to the diversity of company boards by
regulators, policy-makers and investors, the question of diversity, both of existing boards and
whether nominees of activist shareholders improve or worsen that position, may be raised
more often.
i Rolls-Royce
ValueAct Capital Partners investment into Rolls-Royce Holdings Plc provides a recent
example of white-hat activism and the adoption of a US-style settlement agreement.
Following several months of stake-building, in July 2015 ValueAct became
Rolls-Royces largest shareholder with a shareholding of 5.4 per cent. ValueAct positioned
itself as an engaged investor not an activist and began to exert pressure on Rolls-Royce
privately. Following an initial rejection of board representation in November 2015, on
2 March 2016, Rolls-Royce announced that it had entered into a bespoke relationship
agreement with ValueAct, which contained the following key terms:
a ValueAct to be granted one representative on the Rolls-Royce board, subject to certain
conditions relating to ValueActs shareholding;
b a standstill on ValueActs share ownership (ValueAct cannot acquire more than a
12.5 per cent shareholding);
c a standstill on certain corporate governance matters, including restrictions on
ValueAct requisitioning general meetings, soliciting proxies, proposing mergers or
other change of control transactions, proposing changes to Rolls-Royces strategy or
publicly criticising or disparaging Rolls-Royce; and
d a commitment for ValueAct to vote in accordance with the boards recommendation
on customary resolutions at general meetings.
ValueAct now holds a 10.8 per cent shareholding and has one seat on the board.
7 Bloomberg Icahn, Loeb and other Activists Overlook Women for Board Seats
8 March 2016.
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ii Electra Private Equity

Sherborne Investors activist campaign in relation to Electra Private Equity Plc is a high-profile
example of a contentious proxy battle for board representation, in furtherance of a call for an
operational turnaround.
Following a period of stake-building and a public rebuttal of its request for board
representation, in October 2014 Sherborne requisitioned a general meeting for shareholders
to vote for the appointment of two Sherborne nominee directors to the board of Electra
and the removal of one existing director. Sherbornes campaign was centred on the belief
that it had identified significant value in the Electra portfolio that the existing board had
failed to realise and that could be unlocked by certain changes to the companys strategy. The
proposals were defeated at the general meeting and Electras board subsequently announced
its own strategic review.
Following the release by the company of its strategic review and a further period of
stakebuilding in Electra, Sherborne requisitioned a second general meeting in November 2015.
At that meeting, Electra shareholders voted in favour of the appointment of two Sherborne
nominee directors to the board of the company.
iii Alliance Trust

Elliott Managements public campaign against Alliance Trust Plc in 2015 is an example of an
activist using its right to requisition resolutions at a companys AGM.
Arguing that Alliance Trust had underperformed its peers, Elliott sought to appoint
three new non-executives to the board at the companys AGM to improve governance and
focus the directors on raising returns. Elliott and Alliance Trust came to an agreement prior
to the AGM in which Alliance Trust undertook to appoint two new non-executive directors
(as nominated by Elliott) in return for Elliott supporting the board on all other resolutions.
Elliott also agreed not to agitate against the company, its board or management publicly until
after the companys 2016 AGM.
iv Poundland
Elliott Managements involvement in the 600 million takeover of Poundland by South
African retailer Steinhoff is a recent example of an event-driven activist intervention.
In July 2016, Steinhoff announced a recommend takeover bid for Poundland priced
at 220p per share (plus a 2p dividend) valuing the business at 597 million. Shortly after
the announcement of the takeover offer, Elliott (an existing shareholder in Poundland)
announced that it had increased its stake to 17.6 per cent. As the takeover offer required the
vote of 75 per cent of shareholders to proceed (excluding Steinhoffs 23.6 per cent holding),
Elliotts increased stake would have been enough to block the takeover. Although Elliott did
not make its intentions regarding Poundland public, following the announcement of Elliotts
increased stake, Steinhoff increased its offer by 5p to 225p per share (plus a 2p dividend).
Perhaps the most significant recent change in the regulatory landscape as far as shareholder
activism is concerned was the coming into force of MAR on 3 July 2016. MAR, as an EU
Regulation, has direct effect in each Member State without the need for any implementing
measures by national legislatures. It aims to impose a more uniform market abuse regime across
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the European Union than that possible under its predecessor, the Market Abuse Directive, and
is also broader in scope. It governs, among other things, market abuse and the obligation on
issuers to disclose inside information regarding themselves or their financial instruments to the
market. There are some detailed changes with potential relevance to shareholder activism, in
particular, the introduction of formal provisions regarding market sounding.
A market sounding is defined for the purposes of MAR as the communication of
information (whether or not inside information) prior to the announcement of a transaction in
order to gauge the interest of one or more potential investors in the transaction or by a bidder
to sound out target shareholders on a takeover. Detailed requirements apply to all persons who
disclose information in a market sounding. These include requirements for an assessment of
whether the information is inside information, the use of scripts, recorded telephone lines (if
available), sounding lists, cleansing and recorded keeping. While the market sounding regime
will be most relevant to a company being targeted by an activist, it will be important for all
parties to an activist campaign to ensure continued compliance with MAR.
The aspects of the regime which are most important to shareholder activism (i.e.,
market abuse and disclosure of inside information by issuers) have not been altered materially
by MAR from the previous regime applicable in the UK (and indeed much of the case
law is likely to remain informative for interpretation). However there are areas that active
shareholders, and companies targeted by them will focus on. These include questions of inside
information (including inside information of the shareholder itself ), and the applicability of
the new investment recommendation regime to shareholder activist situations.
A further development still in the pipeline is the proposed amendment to the
Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC). The Shareholder Rights Directive is the source
of many of the shareholder rights discussed above which have been given effect in English
company law through amendments to the Companies Act (including shareholders rights to
requisition meetings and resolutions). A proposal for the planned amendments was published
by the EU Commission on 9 April 2014, including provisions which would introduce new
rules for proxy advisers, but has not yet been adopted. The question of the timing for the
adoption of the Directive and its implementation into UK national law may mean the
relevance of these potential changes becomes a question of the UKs Brexit timetable.
VI OUTLOOK
The legal and regulatory framework in the UK relating to shareholder rights and engagement
has continued to evolve to encourage active shareholder engagement, and will continue to
provide a benign environment for shareholder activists. The market will continue to develop,
as activists increasingly seek to distinguish themselves, and as institutional shareholders, listed
companies, advisers, commentators and the investment community more widely become more
accepting of this activity and seeks to understand the nuances between its various protagonists.
For a number of market structural reasons, shareholder activism in the UK market
is unlikely to reach the prevalence currently seen in the US. But the UK remains a fertile
ground for activists to continue to seek targets for strategic campaigns, as well as companies
with a range of corporate events in which they will choose to intervene. While the extent
of the change to the UKs legal and regulatory framework resulting from a hard Brexit is
impossible to judge at this stage, it will certainly provide activists with new opportunities
as listed company boards seek to address their own business strategies in an economically
turbulent post-hard-Brexit environment.
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Chapter 9
UNITED STATES
Francis J Aquila1
I OVERVIEW
Shareholder activism is and will continue to be a prominent feature of the corporate

landscape in the United States. Following a wave of corporate scandals in the early 2000s
(most memorably Enron Corporation), there was a sea change in US corporate governance.
Subsequently enacted federal regulations that focus on corporate governance have dramatically
changed the face of US corporate boards of directors; shareholder engagement has become
a priority for companies and a hallmark of basic good governance; and a number of other
legal and cultural changes have increased the power of shareholders of US public companies.
Shareholder activism historically referred to an asset class of hedge funds that raided
and agitated US publicly traded companies. In present times, however, there is broader
recognition that shareholders more generally have a desire to engage with management and
boards of directors regarding governance reforms and other aspects of a companys business.
This trend has caused the lines between the traditional shareholder activists and other
shareholders of public companies to blur, thereby diluting the brand of shareholder activism.
There is now an increased expectation that shareholders will seek to have more influence over
governance and strategic decisions made by public companies, although it is still the case
that certain activist campaigns become a public display of the differences of strategic vision
between the shareholder activist and its subject company.
While the term activist may have become diluted by more types of shareholders
entering the mix, the increased acceptance of activism in the corporate landscape has by no
means decreased its frequency. To the contrary, activist activity in the US continues to steadily
rise. The number of shareholder activists and the number of US public companies that have
been subject to a public activist demand is more pronounced than ever. Those numbers
do not even tell the entire story: for every public activist demand, there may be another
1 Francis J Aquila is a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. The author thanks Lauren S
Boehmke for her assistance in drafting this chapter and overall assistance with this project.
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activist campaign that never becomes public knowledge. Success by activist hedge funds in
raising capital, coupled with activists achieving their objectives and gaining board seats at
public companies (through both settlements with companies and proxy contests), has fuelled
increased activity. As a result, US public company boards of directors and management teams
have intensified their focus on understanding shareholder activism as well as working to
prevent, and preparing to respond to, activist campaigns.
The legal and regulatory framework relating to shareholder rights, activism and engagement
in respect of US publicly traded companies is primarily comprised of federal laws and
regulations and state corporations laws. US public companies also must comply with the
listing rules of their stock exchange (either the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ Stock
Market), which include corporate governance requirements. Additional sources of practice
with respect to shareholder activism and engagement include proxy advisory firms and
guidelines set forth by other investment community members. Taken together, the applicable
laws and regulations, as well as other influential sources of practice govern, the means by
which a shareholder activist pursues an activist campaign and the structural defences against
shareholder activists available to US public companies.
i Federal laws
Federal securities laws relating to shareholder activism and engagement include the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act). The federal securities laws, and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder, are administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). A key focus of the federal securities regulations is on disclosure and
ensuring that shareholders and the market have the information required to make fully
informed investment decisions.
The Exchange Act provides the SEC with broad authority to regulate the securities
industry. Pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, the SEC requires periodic and
current reporting of information by public companies, and companies must consider these
disclosure requirements in reporting on corporate governance matters. Section 13(d) of
the Exchange Act requires reporting by persons who have directly or indirectly acquired
beneficial ownership of more than 5 per cent of an outstanding class of a companys equity
securities. An activist investor that crosses the 5 per cent threshold must file a report with the
SEC within 10 calendar days disclosing its ownership and certain additional information,
including its activist intentions. Section 13(d) also governs whether investors are considered
a group for purposes of acquiring, holding and disposing of a companys securities, a very
relevant consideration for shareholder activists who may form a wolf pack to work together
on an activist campaign.
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act imposes disclosure and communications
requirements on proxy solicitations, or the materials used to solicit shareholders votes
in annual or special meetings held for the election of directors and the approval of other
corporate actions. Shareholder activists that wage a proxy contest to nominate directors for
election in opposition to a companys slate of director nominees must comply with these
proxy solicitation rules. These rules apply to, and require the timely filing of, all written
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communications made as part of the solicitation, including investor presentations, transcripts

of speeches and certain interviews, and social media postings. Further, the Exchange Act
governs disclosure by anyone seeking to acquire more than 5 per cent of a companys securities
by means of a tender offer.
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD), which aims to promote full and fair
disclosure by ensuring that companies do not engage in selective disclosure, requires a public
company to make public disclosure of any material non-public information disclosed to
certain individuals, including shareholders, who may trade on the basis of that information.
Regulation FD applies to discussions between a company and a shareholder activist and,
therefore, companies must be mindful of this regulation when holding discussions with an
activist.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in response to the corporate scandals in the early
2000s, mandated numerous reforms to enhance corporate responsibility and financial
disclosures. The Dodd-Frank Act implemented further reforms, including with respect to
trading restrictions, corporate governance, disclosure and transparency. Both statutes have had
a significant influence on corporate governance and shareholder activism and engagement.
In addition to the federal securities laws, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act (HSR Act) may apply to an investment by a shareholder activist in a public
company if such investment exceeds a certain size threshold, currently set at $78.2 million
for 2016.2 If an activist will cross the size threshold with respect to the amount of voting
securities of a company it intends to acquire, the activist is required to make a filing with US
antitrust authorities and observe a waiting period prior to completing the transaction. The
HSR Act provides an exemption from reporting requirements for acquisitions that result in
the acquiror holding 10 per cent or less of a companys outstanding voting securities if made
solely for the purpose of investment.3 This investment-only exception has been construed
narrowly; it does not apply if an investor intends to participate in and influence business
decisions, which is often the case with shareholder activists.4 In July 2016, activist hedge
fund ValueAct Capital agreed to pay a record $11 million fine to settle a lawsuit filed by the
US government alleging that ValueAct violated the HSR Act by improperly relying on the
investment-only exception in connection with its $2.5 billion investment in Halliburton
Company and Baker Hughes Inc.5
ii State laws
State corporations law governs actions by companies in the states jurisdiction and establishes
the fiduciary duty regime that applies to a companys directors and officers. This chapter
focuses on corporate law in the state of Delaware because it is the most popular state of
formation for legal entities and its laws significantly influence corporate law in other states.
2 The current threshold, which is adjusted annually for inflation by the Federal Trade
Commission, is available at www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/
current-thresholds.
3 See 15 U.S.C. Section 18a(c)(9) and 16 C.F.R. Section 802.9.
4 See 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,465 (1978).
5 See U.S. Department of Justice press release, Justice Department Obtains Record Fine and
Injunctive Relief against Activist Investor for Violating Premerger Notification Requirements,
dated 12 July 2016.
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Many provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) govern the relationship
between a corporation and its shareholders, impacting the processes by which a shareholder
activist may pursue, and a company may defend against, an activist campaign.
The DGCL includes laws governing, among other things, the composition of the
corporations board of directors, annual and special meetings of shareholders, actions by
written consent, voting thresholds for approving corporate actions, requests by shareholders
for books and records and appraisal rights. Certain activist investors are known to exercise
appraisal rights in the context of a merger as an arbitrage strategy. As described further below,
a corporation may use its organisational documents (certificate of incorporate and by-laws)
to customise certain elements of its corporate governance to the extent not inconsistent with
the DGCL.
All directors and officers of Delaware corporations owe the company and its
shareholders fundamental fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith. Subject to certain
exceptions, when reviewing a companys decision the Delaware courts apply the business
judgment rule, which presumes directors satisfied these fiduciary duties, and will not
second-guess the directors decision if it has a rational business purpose. However, enhanced
judicial review applies in certain circumstances, including when a board of directors takes
defensive measures in response to a perceived threat to corporate control. Under the Unocal
test, a board that implemented a defensive measure has the burden of demonstrating that (1)
it had reasonable grounds to believe a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness existed and
(2) its defensive response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.6 The Unocal test is
particularly relevant to shareholder activism because it applies to defensive measures such as
poison pills. Shareholder activists may, as part of their campaign strategy, file lawsuits against
a corporation and its directors and officers alleging fiduciary duty violations.
iii Additional sources of practice

Shareholder activism and engagement are influenced by other sources of practice and various
members of the investment community. Although their impact has waned somewhat in
recent years, proxy advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and, to a
lesser extent, Glass Lewis have an impact on a companys corporate governance policies and
may affect the outcome of a proxy contest with a shareholder activist. These advisory firms
set forth policy guidelines as well as make recommendations with respect to proposals to be
voted upon at a shareholders meeting, such as director elections, fundamental transactions
and other governance matters. As an adviser to many institutional shareholders, ISS is keen on
shareholder engagement and is often inclined to recommend in favour of at least one activist
director candidate in a proxy contest for minority representation on the board of directors if
the shareholder activist has demonstrated that change is warranted at the company.
Large traditional institutional investors such as Blackrock, Fidelity and Vanguard have
generally stopped relying on the analysis of proxy advisory firms and have instead developed
internal proxy advisory functions to make decisions in proxy contests and put forth corporate
governance initiatives. Given that the stock ownership of many US public companies is
concentrated at a relatively small number of these large institutions, it is critical for both the
company and the shareholder activist to garner the support of these investors.
6 Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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Other members of the investment community, such as TIAA-CREF, CalSTRS, and

the Council of Institutional Investors, also set forth policy guidelines and express opinions
on governance and activism. In July 2016, a group of 13 executives from some of the largest
US public companies and asset managers, as well as shareholder activists, public pension
funds and mutual fund companies, released a statement of corporate governance principles
for public companies, their board of directors and shareholders, which the group named the
Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance.7
iv Company defences
A companys best defence against shareholder activism is strong financial performance, a solid
record of shareholder engagement and adoption of corporate governance best practices. A
company must also adopt a proactive strategy to anticipate and defend against the potential
for an activist campaign, including actively monitoring the companys shareholder base and
conducting regular and thorough reviews of the companys business plan, strategic alternatives
and intrinsic value. In the current environment, in which there is now an expectation that
shareholders will be more involved in governance and strategic decisions made by public
companies, it is crucial for companies to maintain a positive dialogue, relationship and
credibility with its shareholders, particularly key institutional investors and other large
holders. Practising consistent shareholder engagement, including articulating the companys
current and long-term vision for creating shareholder value and practising good governance,
will pay dividends for the company in terms of both understanding investor concerns and
securing support in the face of future shareholder activism campaigns. A shareholder activist
may face an uphill battle if the company already has a strong relationship with, and the
support of, its large institutional shareholders.
The prevalence of shareholder activism in the US has created an entire cottage industry
of firms, such as proxy solicitors, dedicated to helping companies monitor their shareholders
and set up meetings with institutional investors. Investment banks and law firms also have
groups of professionals dedicated to activist defence. A company facing an activist investor
requires a core response team of outside advisers, including a law firm, proxy solicitor,
investment bank and public relations firm. The most prepared companies create these teams
in advance and establish procedures that are ready to be implemented on a moments notice
should an activist come knocking. In addition to monitoring a companys shareholders and
facilitating shareholder engagement, a companys adviser team can assist the company with
thinking like an activist by routinely assessing the companys strengths and vulnerabilities
to activism, reviewing its structural defences and keeping current on the evolving corporate
governance practices and preferences of its shareholders and the broader market.
Companies have structural governance defences that may protect them against
shareholder activists. It is important to note that the value of any particular structural defence
will depend on the specific activist situation and no defence will fully protect a company
against activism. As mentioned above, a company may customise certain governance
elements in its organisational documents. For example, most public companies have by-laws
7 For further information, refer to the Sullivan & Cromwell LLP publication Executive
Group Publishes Statement of Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance, dated
22 July 2016, available at www.sullcrom.com/executive-group-publishes-
statement-of-commonsense-principles-of-corporate-governance.
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that require a shareholder to provide advance notice and certain information to the company
before it is permitted to nominate a director for election to the companys board of directors
or propose business before a shareholders meeting, which by-laws eliminate the possibility of
surprise from last-minute proposals. Companies also specify in their by-laws that the board of
directors has the sole right to determine its own size and fill vacancies, both of which prevent
activist shareholders from packing the board of directors with their preferred candidates.
Companies may also restrict its shareholders ability to call special meetings or take actions
by written consent, either entirely or below certain ownership thresholds.
Some companies have adopted even more stringent structural defences, such as having
two classes of stock (one of which has additional voting rights and is not publicly traded,
limiting an activists ability to obtain voting power) or creating a classified board of directors
(directors are divided into three classes with staggered, multi-year terms, making it more
difficult for an activist to replace board members). Companies may also adopt a shareholder
rights plan, commonly known as a poison pill, which can be triggered by the company
to dilute the equity and voting stake of a shareholder activist that has purchased over a
certain percentage of the companys stock by allowing all other shareholders to purchase
additional shares at a steep discount. Most large US companies have abandoned these harsher
defences in recent years in light of scrutiny from the institutional investor community and
proxy advisory firms. It is recommended that companies keep a poison pill on the shelf and
ready to be implemented in response to a threat from a particular activist (note the Unocal
defensive measures discussion above), although the company must weigh the possibility that
it will lose some credibility in the market even if it successfully blocks an activist campaign.8
DGCL Section 203 includes an anti-takeover provision that prevents a corporation
from entering into certain business combination transactions with an interested shareholder
(generally one that owns more than 15 per cent of the companys stock) for a period of three
years after becoming an interested stockholder unless the business combination is approved
in the manner prescribed by the statute.
The HSR Act requires an investor to provide written notice to a company before
acquiring shares that are subject to the HSR Acts filing requirements, which may serve as
the first warning to the company that an activist intends to take a significant stake in the
company and advocate for change, or alternatively that an existing shareholder has altered its
intentions with respect to the company from passive to active and plans to increase its stake.
i The shareholder activists

Shareholder activists primarily fall into two categories: hedge fund activists and Rule
14a-8 activists. Hedge fund activists are investors whose investment strategy is to identify
what they consider to be vulnerabilities at certain companies and purchase a sizeable minority
stake in those target companies with the view that changes they recommend and agitate for,
if successful, will increase shareholder value and result in a financial gain for their investment
8 For further information, refer to Francis J Aquila, Adopting a Poison Pill in Response to
Shareholder Activism, Practical Law The Journal, April 2016, at page 22, available at www.
sullcrom.com/publications-aquila-column-issues-considering-adoption-poison-pill-
published-practical-law-journal-2016.
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portfolio. Rule 14a-8 activists are shareholders that submit proposals to companies under
Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act, a rule that requires a public company to include a
shareholder proposal in its proxy materials for a shareholders meeting if certain requirements
are met by the shareholder. A companys preparation for and response to activism will differ
depending on the type of shareholder activist it faces.
Hedge fund activists are the main focus of this chapter. Hedge funds pursuing activist
strategies have had tremendous success in raising capital in recent years, with aggregate assets
under management of hedge funds engaged in activism exceeding $100 billion since 2014.
This trend is expected to continue in the near term and has been instrumental in driving
increased activist activity. Each hedge fund activist has its own strategy, objectives, personality
and frequency of engaging in activism. Some activists, such as Carl Icahn and Third Point,
are long established, while others are second generation. The investment horizon of an
activist hedge fund can range from very short term to somewhat longer term. Certain hedge
fund activists invest their own funds, while others invest third-party funds. Additionally, an
activist hedge funds redemption policy (e.g., whether investors have the right to redeem their
funds quarterly or have longer-term lock up commitments) may impact its behaviour and
investment strategy.
Rule 14a-8 activism is often socially driven, with activists including retail shareholders,
advocates of social issues (e.g., environmentalists), religious organisations, pension funds
and a variety of other groups. During the 2016 proxy season, corporate governance related
proposals continued to represent approximately half of the Rule 14a-8 proposals voted on
and a majority of proposals that received the support of a majority of votes cast.9 Other
2016 Rule 14a-8 proposals included social and political proposals as well as compensation
proposals, which have a very low pass rate.10 The vast majority of Rule 14a-8 proposals are
targeted at S&P 500 companies.
Traditional institutional investors such as Blackrock, Fidelity and Vanguard may be
considered shareholder activists as well. These institutions have developed internal proxy
advisory functions and are displaying an increased willingness to directly express their views
on governance matters in recent years. These investors are long-term shareholders by nature,
and their inability to exit investments nimbly increases their incentive to advocate for changes
that will increase enterprise value and protect their investment. F William McNabb III, the
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Vanguard, has explained, we are permanent
stockholders. That is precisely why we care so much about good governance.11 Traditional
institutional investors also increasingly support activism, although in certain cases there may
be a tension between the institutional investors long-term outlook and a shareholder activists
near-term focus. In February 2016, Laurence D Fink, the Chairman and CEO of Blackrock,
9 For further information, refer to the Sullivan & Cromwell LLP publication 2016 Proxy
Season Review, dated 11 July 2016 (S&C 2016 Proxy Season Review), available at www.
sullcrom.com/2016-proxy-season-review.
10 Id.
11 F William McNabb IIIs keynote address at the Lazard 2015 Director Event, Shareholder
Expectations: The New Paradigm for Directors, as posted to the Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation on 24 June 2015.
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sent a letter to company CEOs in which he warned against companies expos[ing] themselves
to the pressures of investors focused on maximizing near-term profit at the expense of
long-term value.12
ii The target companies

Hedge fund activists target companies in which they think there is potential to
increase shareholder value, and often look for traditional red flags such as stock price
underperformance, operational challenges relative to peers, significant unused cash on the
balance sheet, perceived management weakness, multiple business lines, undervalued assets
or perceived excessive executive compensation. However, more recently shareholder activists
have also been targeting companies that have performed in line with or better than their
peers. A companys liquidity and size of its market cap can play a role in its susceptibility
to activism; it is inherently more difficult for a shareholder activist to amass a large enough
stake to influence a company with illiquid stock or a large market cap. Nevertheless, activists
have been successful with small stakes (under 1 per cent) and have targeted even the largest
and most well-run companies (e.g., AIG, Apple, DuPont and General Electric) as they have
gained more capital and credibility, proving that no company is immune to activism. In
2015, 62 S&P 500 companies were publicly subjected to activist demands.13 All industries
are susceptible to activism, with the services, financial, basic materials and technology sectors
being the most popular targets in recent years.14
iii The activist campaigns

The number of campaigns by shareholder activists has continued to increase each year as
the activists have become empowered by their success in achieving their objectives and
gaining board seats at public companies. Shareholder activists pursue a variety of objectives,
including pursuing a companys sale to a third party (or conversely seeking to block a planned
merger), pushing for another type of fundamental transaction such as a spin-off, balance sheet
demands such as dividends or share repurchases, operational and capital structure demands
and governance demands. Shareholder activists frequently pursue multiple objectives in the
same campaign, with governance demands particularly board representation or seeking
changes in management often used as a means of achieving economic objectives.
Shareholder activists utilise a number of different strategies to achieve their objectives,
depending on factors such as the activist itself (many have a consistent modus operandi) and
the subject companys defensive posture. The standard activist playbook, while not applicable
to every campaign, follows a series of escalating tactics with the key objective of creating an
impression of inevitability. A shareholder activist often begins a campaign by engaging in a
private dialogue with the companys management before its stake in the company becomes
public. If successful, these discussions can avoid further agitation by leading to either an
informal or formal settlement between the company and the shareholder activist. If private
12 Laurence D Fink, Blackrock, 2016 Corporate Governance Letter to CEOs, dated

1 February 2016. The full text of the letter is available at www.blackrock.com/corporate/
en-gb/literature/press-release/ldf-corp-gov-2016.pdf.
13 Activist Insight, Activist Investing: An annual review of trends in shareholder activism, 2016,
at page 23.
14 Id. at page 13.
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discussions fail, the shareholder activist may initiate a public campaign to apply pressure on
the company through press releases, open letters to management, the board of directors and/
or shareholders, issuing white papers presenting its investment thesis and analysis, and using
other means of communication to rally the companys other shareholders to support its cause.
Shareholder activists have become increasingly adept at using the media to their advantage.
The shareholder activist may then threaten and eventually initiate a proxy contest for
representation on the companys board of directors. Most shareholder activists seek to gain
representation by replacing only a minority of the companys directors, but in more extreme
scenarios activists have tried to replace a full board of directors. If a shareholder activist is
well funded, it may also commence a lawsuit (sometimes in conjunction with other tactics)
to obtain information from the company, reverse board decisions or redeem the companys
poison pill, among other claims. With some notable exceptions, shareholder activists do not
usually make an offer for the entire company, although hostile offers have been made by
hedge fund activists in past campaigns.
iv Paths to resolution
Activist campaigns have continued to achieve high levels of success, with approximately 69 per
cent of activist demands in the US achieving at least partial success in 2015.15 Shareholder
activists place a high value on the public perception of a successful campaign, including a
partial victory or settlement, even without achieving an outright win for all of its demands.
Partial success can entail the shareholder activist receiving at least one board seat (either
through a settlement or proxy contest that goes to a vote) or the company agreeing to pursue
one of the activists economic objectives.
As shareholder activism and campaigns by activist hedge funds have become more
mainstream, it has also become increasingly common for a company and shareholder activist
to settle and enter into a cooperation agreement. The typical cooperation agreement provides
the shareholder activist with minority board representation and includes customary standstill
restrictions for the benefit of the company, such as prohibiting the activist from soliciting
proxies in opposition to management prior to the companys next annual meeting. Recently
a trend has evolved toward settlements being announced shortly after the shareholder activist
has publicly announced its stake in a company or even prior to any public disclosure. In
many cases, companies are concluding that settling with a reputable activist is preferable
to expending significant time and resources on a protracted and distracting proxy contest.
A companys board of directors has an interest in appearing firm but open-minded about
an activists credible suggestions to its other shareholders and the investment community at
large. Most shareholder activists also have an interest in creating working relationships with
the companys board of directors and building a public reputation for playing fair, which can
facilitate future negotiations with the company and the future subject companies.16
Companies must recognise that providing a shareholder activist with board
representation is simply the beginning and not the end of the companys discussions with the
15 Id. at page 10.

16 For further information, refer to Francis J Aquila, Negotiating a Settlement with an Activist
Investor, Practical Law The Journal, April 2015, at page 22, available at www.sullcrom.com/
publications-aquila-column-negotiating-settlement-activist-investor-appears-practical-law-
the-journal-2015.
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shareholder activist. Once the shareholder activist is represented on the board of directors,
it will likely seek changes that it believes are in the best interests of the company and its
shareholders. In addition, the presence of the activists director designees may alter boardroom
dynamics.
While there are many recent US shareholder activism campaigns worthy of discussion in
this chapter, this section highlights three campaigns by US activist hedge funds against US
public companies that helpfully demonstrate the varying nature and objectives of shareholder
activists.17
i Yahoo! Inc/Starboard Value LP

Starboard first contacted Yahoos CEO Marissa Mayer and board of directors in
September 2014, urging the board to take a series of steps outlined by Starboard to unlock
shareholder value. Over the next year, during which Yahoo abandoned a plan to spin off its
minority equity stake in Alibaba, Starboard continued to express public concern that Yahoos
core business was in major financial distress as its revenue and profit continued to decline.
Starboard became increasingly frustrated with what it considered to be Yahoos dismissive
approach to its concerns and agitated the company to hire a financial adviser to sell the core
business. In February 2016, Yahoo formed a special committee of independent directors
to help the company continue to explore strategic alternatives. In March 2016, Starboard
disclosed that it was seeking to replace Yahoos entire board of directors (including Mayer)
at the 2016 annual meeting, citing the current boards failure to deliver results and lack of
perspective to make decisions in the best interests of Yahoos shareholders. In April 2016,
Yahoo and Starboard announced an agreement to settle the potential proxy contest, pursuant
to which Yahoo agreed to appoint four of Starboards director nominees to the board of
directors (out of 11 total directors up for election). Yahoo agreed to reimburse Starboard
for up to $2 million of expenses, including legal expenses. In July 2016, Yahoo ended the
speculation surrounding a very public sale process by announcing that it had agreed to be
acquired by Verizon Communications.
ii Xerox Corporation/Carl Icahn

In November 2015, Carl Icahn filed a Schedule 13D with the SEC disclosing a 7.13 per
cent stake in Xerox Corporation. Within the Schedule 13D filing, Mr Icahn stated his
intent to engage in discussions with representatives of the companys board of directors
and management regarding improving operational performance and pursuing strategic
alternatives, including the possibility of seeking board representation. In January 2016,
following completion of a review of the companys portfolio and capital allocation options
made public in October 2015, Xerox announced that its board of directors approved a plan to
separate Xerox into two separate publicly traded companies. The same day, Xerox announced
that it had reached an agreement with Mr Icahn relating to one of the future companies,
17 The campaign detail included in this section was sourced from SharkRepellent, FactSet
Research Systems Inc.
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pursuant to which three of the nine board members would be chosen by Mr Icahn (at least
one of which is an Icahn insider). Xerox also agreed that Mr Icahn would have an observer to
oversee the CEO selection process for that company.
iii United Continental Airlines/Altimeter Capital Management LP and PAR Capital

Management, Inc
Two long-time airline investors that do not typically engage in activism teamed up against
United in one of only three campaigns in 2016 that targeted companies with a market
cap above $10 billion. In January 2016, Altimeter and Par filed Schedule 13Ds with the
SEC disclosing that they had formed a group and collectively hold a 5.5 per cent stake in
United. The Schedule 13D stated that the shareholder activists were engaging in discussions
with Uniteds board and management regarding capital structure and allocation, corporate
governance, board composition and strategic alternatives to enhance shareholder value. In
March 2016, United announced that it expanded its board to appoint three new independent
directors. The next day, Altimeter and Par sent a letter to the board announcing their intent
to nominate six candidates to Uniteds board of directors at the 2016 annual meeting, citing
a company record of sustained underperformance and an underqualified, ineffective and
entrenched board. United responded publicly that it was disappointed Altimeter and Par
had become hostile and noted that the company had offered to negotiate a settlement and
even amend its by-laws to extend its director nomination deadline. After further public
dialogue, in late April 2016 the two sides entered into a cooperation agreement to revamp the
composition of the board and add three new independent directors approved by the activists.
The US corporate regulatory and governance landscape is constantly undergoing reform.

Proxy access, which was the defining corporate governance matter in the 2015 and 2016 US
proxy seasons, is the latest in a series of initiatives by shareholders to effect structural changes
that facilitate increased accountability of directors. Proxy access provides one or more
shareholders (almost always up to 20 shareholders) that hold a required percentage of shares
(almost always 3 per cent) for at least a specified time period (almost always three years)
with the right to nominate a certain percentage of directors to a companys board (typically
the greater of two directors or 20 per cent) and to include those nominees in the companys
proxy materials.18 The proponents of proxy access are Rule 14a-8 shareholder activists. In
both 2015 and 2016, the New York State Comptroller put forth a sizable proportion of
the proxy access proposals. Companies that have not yet received a proxy access proposal
should prepare for the possibility of a future proxy access initiative and consider proactive
implementation of proxy access.
As this chapter is being written, the US is in the midst of presidential and congressional
elections that will take place on 8 November 2016. It remains to be seen how the results of
the elections will impact the federal governments legislative and administrative agenda and
influence the US corporate landscape, including the shareholder activism and engagement
regimes, moving forward into 2017 and beyond.
18 See S&C 2016 Proxy Season Review.
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VI OUTLOOK
All indications are that shareholder activism will continue to play a prominent, and likely
permanent, role in the US corporate landscape. US public companies are increasingly
devoting considerable resources to shareholder engagement and activism preparedness, and
their enhanced focus on corporate governance and strategic review may further push the
envelope of good governance practices. It is important to remain alert to developments in
shareholder activism as the types of activists, companies targeted by activism and activist
campaigns evolve.
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Appendix 1
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
LORENA AIM
Marval, OFarrell & Mairal
Lorena Aim joined Marval, OFarrell & Mairal in 2000. She specialises in corporate and
contract law. Her practice focuses on full corporate general advice for multinational and local
corporations. She advises on regulatory compliance of day-to-day transactions of companies,
filings before the Public Registries of Commerce of several jurisdictions, matters related
to reorganisations (mergers, spin-off and conversions). She attends board of directors and
shareholders meetings, supervises corporate books and records of the company. She also
advises on domestic and international contracts (share purchase agreements, purchase of
assets, distribution agreements, among others).
FRANCIS J AQUILA
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Frank Aquila is a partner in Sullivan & Cromwells general practice group and a member of
the firms management committee. Mr Aquila has a broad multidisciplinary practice that
includes extensive experience in negotiated and unsolicited mergers and acquisitions, activist
and takeover defence, complex cross-border transactions, global joint ventures, and private
equity transactions. He regularly counsels boards of directors and board committees on
corporate governance matters and crisis management.
Mr Aquila is consistently recognised as one of the worlds leading mergers and
acquisitions lawyers, including as one of a small number of lawyers ranked by Chambers
Global in Band 1 (their top tier), as an American Lawyer Dealmaker of the Year and as
a recipient of the Atlas Award as Global M&A Lawyer of the Year. Mr Aquila is widely
acknowledged as an innovator and thought leader in the profession. In 2015 The Financial
Times recognised his representation of Kraft in its merger with Heinz to form The Kraft
Heinz Company as one of the most innovative in North America. For his work in corporate
governance, Mr Aquila has been regularly named by the National Association of Corporate
Directors to their Directorship 100 one of the 100 most influential people in corporate
governance and inside the boardroom.
93
About the Authors
MARK BARDELL
Herbert Smith Freehills LLP
Mark is a corporate partner with considerable experience across a wide variety of advisory
and transactional work, comprising domestic and cross-border, corporate finance and M&A,
including public takeovers, private M&A, joint ventures and corporate governance.
He has a particular focus on advising companies listed on the main market in the
UK or traded on AIM and is frequently involved in advising on significant challenges that
face boards including board or governance disputes, regulatory investigations and corporate
transactions.
Mark is recommended in The Legal 500 for M&A premium deals and noted for
his public takeover expertise. In September 2011, he completed a two-year secondment as
Secretary to the UKs Takeover Panel.
WILLEM BIJVELD
De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek NV
Willem Bijveld is a senior associate in De Brauw Blackstone Westbroeks corporate
department. Willem concentrates on advising on corporate law, mergers and acquisitions,
corporate governance and securities law. He has particular experience in public takeovers and
matters concerning shareholder activism.
PAUL CRONHEIM
Paul Cronheim is a partner in De Brauw Blackstone Westbroeks corporate department.
Pauls practice focuses on corporate law and mergers and acquisitions, including corporate
governance, and shareholder matters. Paul has handled a wide range of Dutch and cross-border
public takeovers, private acquisitions and disposals, auctions and joint ventures. He has also
acted as counsel or arbitrator in numerous ICC, AAA and NAI arbitrations.
EZRA DAVIDS
Bowmans
Ezra Davids is the chairman of corporate/M&A at Bowmans specialising in mergers and
acquisitions, capital markets and securities law.
GAVIN DAVIES
Herbert Smith Freehills LLP
Gavin is a corporate partner with 22 years of experience in public and private equity M&A.
He acts on cross-border M&A, JVs, VC and other investments, as well as governance,
across Europe and Africa. Gavin represents financial investors, corporates and government
agencies. His matters regularly involve complex or novel structures, contentious situations or
distressed situations.
Gavin has particularly strong experience in shareholder activism situations in the UK,
having acted on a number of the most significant campaigns in the UK in the last 10 years.
Gavin is cited as a leading M&A lawyer in The Legal 500 and is identified in Whos
Who Legal as a leading practitioner in the field of international M&A.
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About the Authors
MAX GUTBROD
Baker & McKenzie CIS, Limited
Dr Max Gutbrod is a German trained lawyer working in Russia for more than 20 years. He
started his career in Stuttgart in 1990 with Gleiss & Partner and moved to Russia in 1995.
He represented shareholders and investors in mergers and acquisitions, disputes, negotiated
and drafted charters for joint venture companies, shareholders and investment contracts,
and given advice on regulatory matters relating to securities holdership, depositary business,
securities settlement issues and related disputes. In additon, he has frequently advised on
legislative issues related to corporate, banking and capital markets law as well as corporate
governance, and has participated in discussions aimed at improving the infrastructure of
Russian capital markets. Furthermore, Mr Gutbrod was a member of the group that drafted
the CIS Model Law on Joint Stock Companies, has published comments on the draft law in
a specialised journal and has been a member of the Commission on Corporate Governance.
EVA HGG
Mannheimer Swartling
Eva Hgg is the chairman of the public M&A and equity capital markets practice group.
She specialises in securities and company law, and works specifically with public company
transactions. Such transactions include IPOs, mergers and acquisitions, and capital market
transactions such as stock exchange listings, the raising of capital and recapitalisation. Her
work also includes company law issues, information issues and regulatory issues concerning
the stock market.
FRANK HAMMING
Frank Hamming is a senior associate in De Brauw Blackstone Westbroeks corporate litigation
department and previously worked in the firms corporate department. Frank has worked on
various public M&A transactions and matters concerning shareholder activism.
ELIZABETH KONG SAU-WAI

Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC
Elizabeth Kong Sau-Wai manages a wide range of corporate matters that include mergers and
acquisitions, equity fund raising, corporate finance and securities regulation. Clients routinely
trust her with some of the largest and the most complex cross-border corporate transactions
in Asia. Her strong negotiation skills, strategic thinking and consummate dedication in
pursuing her clients goals have earned her recognition in an array of regional and international
legal industry publications. IFLR Asia Awards and Asian Legal Business Southeast Asia
Law Awards have recognised the complexity of her deal work. Singapore Business Review
named her one of the most influential lawyers aged 40 and under, and Prestige Singapore
magazine included her on its list of 40 under 40. Chambers Asia-Pacific, The Legal 500 Asia
Pacific, Asialaw Leading Lawyers, Lawyer Monthly and Acquisition International have noted
and acknowledged Ms Kongs impressive record of corporate transactions. Prior to joining
Morgan Lewis Stamford, she worked as a management associate and legal counsel in the
Singapore and Belgium offices of the PSA Group, and was involved in various cross-border
joint ventures, acquisitions and tender projects in Europe and Asia. Ms Kong graduated with
a double-first in law from Cambridge University, where she won university prizes for best
performance in contract law, company law and administrative law, as well as various college
95
About the Authors
prizes and scholarships for outstanding overall performance. She qualified as an advocate
and solicitor in the Supreme Court of Singapore, and also sits on the Board of Trustees of
Cambridge Assessment Singapore.
DIEGO KRISCHCAUTZKY
Diego Krischcautzky joined Marval, OFarrell & Mairal in 1997 has been a partner of the
firm since 2006. His practice is focused on business law, mainly on mergers and acquisitions.
He has extensive experience in M&A transactions, structuring and financing of private equity
investments and counselling and structuring of local and international investments. He works
regularly with companies and investment funds.
PATRIK MARCELIUS
Mannheimer Swartling
Patrik Marcelius specialises in securities law, and his principal areas of practice include public
takeovers and mergers. His practice also includes equity offerings and IPOs. Patrik also
advises listed companies on corporate governance and disclosure matters.
AKIRA MATSUSHITA
Mori Hamada & Matsumoto
Akira Matsushita is a partner at the Tokyo office of Mori Hamada & Matsumoto. He focuses
on cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions transactions, corporate governance,
shareholder activism, takeover defence and general corporate and securities law matters.
He has extensive experience in advising listed companies subject to shareholder activism,
proxy fights or unsolicited takeovers, and in representing clients in high-profile inbound and
outbound cross-border mergers and acquisitions transactions.
Mr Matsushita was admitted to the Japanese Bar in 2006 and the New York Bar in
2013. He received his LLB from Keio University in 2005 and his LLM from Cornell Law
School in 2012. He also worked at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, from 2012 to 2013.
XOLANI NTAMANE
Bowmans
Xolani Ntamane is a senior associate in Bowmans corporate department. He specialises
primarily in mergers and acquisitions, capital market transactions and general corporate law.
BRBARA RAMPERTI
Brbara Ramperti was promoted to partner in 2012. She has 18 years experience in corporate
law and is an expert in M&A, joint ventures, reorganisations, general corporate and contractual
matters. She has advised national and international clients within different industries and
participated as leading counsel in high-profile M&A transactions and complex cross-border
deals, providing support in the negotiation process, analysis of corporate structures and
funding mechanisms. She also provides advice on a daily basis to Fortune 500 companies.
LEE SUET-FERN
Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC
Lee Suet-Fern is the managing director of Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC. Ms Lee advises
clients on mergers and acquisitions, equity and debt capital markets, and corporate finance.
96
About the Authors
She routinely leads some of the largest corporate transactions in Singapore and the Asia-Pacific
region. She has been involved in many significant corporate transactions and has been named
a leading practitioner in numerous professional publications including Chambers Global
Guide to the Worlds Leading Lawyers, Euromoney Worlds Leading M&A Lawyers, Euromoney
Worlds Leading Capital Markets Lawyers, PLC Cross-Borders Equity Capital Markets and The
International Whos Who of Capital Markets Lawyers. She was also awarded the inaugural
Asian Legal Business Life Time Achievement Award. She has served as a member of the
board of directors of various publicly listed companies in Singapore and the region. She
currently serves as director on the boards of global Fortune 100 companies AXA and Sanofi,
as well as Macquarie International Infrastructure Fund Ltd. She is a former president of the
Inter-Pacific Bar Association and a council member of the International Bar Association. Ms
Lee graduated with a double-first in law from Cambridge University in 1980, where she was a
senior scholar at her college and won various book prizes. She qualified as a barrister-at-law at
Grays Inn, London in 1981 among the top candidates at the London Bar examinations and
also won the prize for the best performance in international trade law. She was later admitted
to the Singapore Bar in 1982, winning the prize for the top candidate at the Singapore Bar
examinations as well as the prize for professional ethics.
CATHY TRUTER
Bowmans
Cathy Truter is a partner in Bowmans corporate department. She specialises primarily in
mergers and acquisitions, capital market transactions and general corporate law.
97
Appendix 2
CONTRIBUTING LAW FIRMS

CONTACT DETAILS
BAKER & MCKENZIE CIS, DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE

LIMITED WESTBROEK NV
White Gardens, 10th floor Claude Debussylaan 80
Lesnaya str. 9 1082 Amsterdam
Moscow 125047 The Netherlands
Russia Tel: +31 20 577 1519 / 1713 / 1788
Tel: +7 495 787 27 00 Fax: +31 20 577 1775
Fax: +7 495 787 27 01 paul.cronheim@debrauw.com
max.gutbrod@bakermckenzie.com willem.bijveld@debrauw.com
www.bakermckenzie.com frank.hamming@debrauw.com
www.debrauw.com
BOWMANS
165 West Street HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP
Sandton Exchange House
Johannesburg 2146 Primrose Street
South Africa London EC2A 2EG
Tel: 011 669 9000 / 9320 / 9417 United Kingdom
Fax: 011 669 9001 Tel: +44 207 374 8000
ezra.davids@bowmanslaw.com Fax: +44 207 374 8888
cathy.truter@bowmanslaw.com gavin.davies@hsf.com
xolani.ntamane@bowmanslaw.com mark.bardell@hsf.com
www.bowmanslaw.com www.hsf.com
99
Contact Details
MANNHEIMER SWARTLING MORI HAMADA & MATSUMOTO

Norrlandsgatan 21 16th Floor, Marunouchi Park Building
111 87 Stockholm 2-6-1 Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku,
Sweden Tokyo 100-8222, Japan
Tel: +46 8 595 060 00 Tel: +81 3 6266 8553
Fax: +46 8 595 060 01 Fax: +81 3 6266 8453
eva.hagg@msa.se akira.matsushita@mhmjapan.com
patrik.marcelius@msa.se www.mhmjapan.com
www.mannheimerswartling.se
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

MARVAL, OFARRELL & MAIRAL 125 Broad Street
Av. Leandro N. Alem 882 New York
C1001AAQ Buenos Aires NY 10004
Argentina United States
Tel: +54 11 4310 0100 Tel: +1 212 558 4048
Fax: +54 11 4310 0200 Fax: +1 212 291 3588
www.marval.com aquilaf@sullcrom.com
www.sullcrom.com
MORGAN LEWIS STAMFORD LLC

10 Collyer Quay
#27-00 Ocean Financial Centre
Singapore 049315
Tel: +65 6389 3000
Fax: +65 6389 3099
suetfern.lee@morganlewis.com
elizabeth.kong@morganlewis.com
www.morganlewis.com
100

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The Shareholder

Law Business Research

Law Business Research Ltd

THE RESTRUCTURING REVIEW

THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW

THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REVIEW

THE EMPLOYMENT LAW REVIEW

THE PUBLIC COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW

THE BANKING REGULATION REVIEW

THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW

THE MERGER CONTROL REVIEW

THE TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA AND

THE INWARD INVESTMENT AND

THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW

THE CORPORATE IMMIGRATION REVIEW

THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW

THE PROJECTS AND CONSTRUCTION REVIEW

THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS REVIEW

THE REAL ESTATE LAW REVIEW

THE PRIVATE EQUITY REVIEW

THE ENERGY REGULATION AND MARKETS REVIEW

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW

THE ASSET MANAGEMENT REVIEW

THE PRIVATE WEALTH AND PRIVATE CLIENT REVIEW

THE MINING LAW REVIEW

THE EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION REVIEW

THE ANTI-BRIBERY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION REVIEW

THE TAX DISPUTES AND LITIGATION REVIEW

THE LIFE SCIENCES LAW REVIEW

THE INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE LAW REVIEW

THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REVIEW

THE DOMINANCE AND MONOPOLIES REVIEW

THE AVIATION LAW REVIEW

THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION REVIEW

THE ASSET TRACING AND RECOVERY REVIEW

THE INSOLVENCY REVIEW

THE OIL AND GAS LAW REVIEW

THE FRANCHISE LAW REVIEW

THE PRODUCT REGULATION AND LIABILITY REVIEW

THE SHIPPING LAW REVIEW

THE ACQUISITION AND LEVERAGED FINANCE REVIEW

THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW

THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP LAW REVIEW

THE TRANSPORT FINANCE LAW REVIEW

THE SECURITIES LITIGATION REVIEW

THE LENDING AND SECURED FINANCE REVIEW

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW REVIEW

THE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

THE INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION REVIEW

THE GAMBLING LAW REVIEW

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST REVIEW

THE REAL ESTATE, M&A AND PRIVATE EQUITY REVIEW

THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AND ACTIVISM REVIEW

BAKER & MCKENZIE CIS, LIMITED

DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK NV

HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP

Editors Preface vii

Chapter 6 SOUTH AFRICA 52

Chapter 8 UNITED KINGDOM 71

Chapter 9 UNITED STATES 81

Appendix 1 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 93

Appendix 2 CONTRIBUTING LAW FIRMS CONTACT DETAILS 99