G.R. No.

130845               November 27, 2000

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: This case was about a parcel of land that the Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought located in
Quezon City from Pacific Banking Corporation which it acquired from the spouses Maximo and Justina
Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupies one meter
of two meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-
interest of the private respondents, in a contract of easement of right of way. The contract provided
that the easement’s purpose was to have an outlet to Tandang Sora which was the nearest public road
and the least burdensome. Espinolas property, being the dominant estate and Gabriel spouses’ as the
servient estate. It was also provided in the contract that the easement “shall be binding to the
successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the
circumstances.”
The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house obstructing the
easement against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with prayer to quash the
writ saying that he was not made a party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should not
prosper since the easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioner’s title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists even though it was not
annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estate to which they actively
or passively belong. And that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement.
ISSUE: W/N the contract of easement between the Gabriels and Espinolas was enforceable to the
Petitioner Villanueva.
RULING: Yes, even if the easement is not annotated or expressly stated in the torrens title, it is inherent
and inseparable from the estate to which it actively belongs. The easement of right of way here was
voluntarily constituted by the Gabriels and Espinolas, also, this was an easement by necessity or a legal
easement, to which, this was mandated by law constituted for public use or public interest that
becomes a continuing property right. Thus, in Article 617 of the Civil Code, as a compulsory easement, it
is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs. In the same article, the requisites for an easement to
be compulsory are the following:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway;
2. Proper indemnity has been paid;
3. The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
4. The right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
5. To the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The lower courts declared the existence of this easement of right of way and so thus the Supreme Court.
That the legal easement that the servient estate of the Petitioner was legally bound to provide the
dominant estate of the private Respondent access to the public highway.
G.R. No. 77425             June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 77450             June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: On November 29, 1984, private respondents, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of
donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners
Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84.
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro
and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit),
located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or less.
The deed of donation provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of
one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such
condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to
the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to
dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred
on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00.

Private respondents spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation in favor
ofthe Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land wherein a resolutory condition was
imposedthat donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years
from the execution of thedeed of donation, otherwise would render ipso facto null and void and such
deed and property would revert back todonors. However, prior to the exhaustion of the period of one
hundred (100) years, the Bishop of Imus executed adeed of absolute sale to spouses Florencio and
Soledad Ignao for P114,000.00. Rieta then filed a complaint for thenullification of the deed of donation,
reconveyance of the property with damages, and for the rescission of thecontract. Ignao, in his answer
said that the action for the rescission of the contract and reconveyance of the propertyhas already
prescribed.
ISSUE: W/N the deed of donation has been revoked due to none compliance of the donee with the
conditions stipulated therein.
RULING: No, the stipulation stated in the deed of donation was against public policy, and thus void.
The private Respondents invoked Art. 764 of the Civil Code as a contention, which provides, "the
donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the... donee fails to comply with any of the
conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "this action shall prescribe after four
years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised... against the donee's heirs." As a general rule, a donation is revoked upon donee’s
failure to comply with the stipulation. However in the case at bar, the resolutory condition was held to
be an undue restriction on the rights of ownership and was contrary to public policy. A donation is an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted,
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy. The condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable
period of time.
LIST OF CASES

Voluntary Easements (688- 693)

1. Pilar Devt. Corp. v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013 - Jegobajegs
2. Reyes v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 194488(448), February 11, 2015 - Jog
3. De Guzman vs. Filinvest, G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015 - Marose
4. Williams vs. Zerda G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017 - Jared
5. Villanueva vs. CA, 330 SCRA 278 - Jotham
6. Quimen vs. CA, 257 SCRA 163 - Garchi
7. Spouses Sta. Maria vs. CA, 285 SCRA 351- Micah
8. Cristobal vs. CA, 291 SCRA 122 - Kamille
9. Camarines Norte Elec. vs. CA, 345 SCRA 85 - Ate Wella
10. Villanueva vs. Velasco Costabella vs. CA, 346 SCRA 99 - Sir Eman
11. Encarnacion vs. CA, 195 SCRA 74 - Israel
12. Dionisio vs. Ortiz, 204 SCRA 745 - Jegobajegs
13. Calimoso v. Roullo, G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016 - Jog
14. Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club G.R. No. 188213, January 11, 2016 - Marose
15. Perez v. Madrona G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012 - Jared

Donation (725- 773)

16. Cabatingan vs. Cabatingan, June 5, 2002 - Jotham

16. Gonzales vs. CA(donation), June 18, 2001 - Garchi
16. Republic vs. Silim (Acceptance), April 2, 2001 -Micah
16. Republic v. Llamas, G.R. No. 194190, January 25, 2017 - Kamille
16. Carinan v. Cueto, G.R. No. 198636, October 8, 2014 - Ate Wella
16. Roman Catholic vs. CA, 198 SCRA 300 - Sir Eman
16. Prov. of Cam. Sur v. Bodega Glassware G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017 -Israel
16. Republic vs. Guzman, 326 SCRA 90 - Jegobajegs
16. Gestopa vs. CA, 342 SCRA 105 - Jog
16. Noceda vs. CA, 312 SCRA 504  - Marose
16. Imperial vs. CA, 316 SCRA 393 - Jared
16. Eduarte v. CA, 253 SCRA 391 - Tita Keicy
16. City of Angeles vs. CA, 261 SCRA 9 - Tita Keicy

1. Pilar Development Corporation vs. Ramon Dumadag et.al

693 SCRA 96
Facts:
Petitioner Pilar Development filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents. The petitioner
alleged that the respondents built shanties in their land covered by a tct. The trial court ruled that the
land in question where the shanties were built is a three-meter strip along a creek which is covered by
legal easement hence it is the local government who has the right to recover possession and not the
petitioners. On appeal, the CA uphold the decision. It ruled that, petitioner could not close its eyes or
ignore the fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed reserved for public
easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped from claiming ownership and enforcing its
supposed right.
Anchoring its pleadings on Article 630 of the Code, petitioner argues that although the portion of the
subject property occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it
still retains ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion. As the owner of
the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession, hence, the proper party to file an action
for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with Articles 428 and 539 of the Code.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner will prosper
Ruling: No.
While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that “[t]he owner of the servient estate
retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in
such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement,” Article 635 thereof is specific in saying
that “[all] matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by
the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this
Title [Title VII on Easements or Servitudes].”
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a
stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of
the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977.20 Said law is explicit: open
spaces are “for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men” and that “the areas
reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-
buildable.”

2. ALICIA B. REYES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S. AND                  ANATALIA,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for 
easement  of right  of way  against  respondents, Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia
Ramos.Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a 450-square-meter parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 3-B-12. The property used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B and was surrounded by
estates belonging to other persons.
Petitioner also alleged that respondents' 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property, and
that a it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. A 113-square-meter portion of
respondents' property was also the "point least prejudicial to the [respondents]."
Petitioner insisted that her property was not isolated because of her own acts. When her mother gave
the property to her as part of her inheritance, there was no intention for the property to have no outlet.
In their Answer, respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner's property was due to her
mother's own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an
agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by petitioner as easement was also the
most burdensome for respondents. Respondents pointed to an open space that connected petitioner's
property to another public road.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondents, dismissing the complaint of petitioner. RTC's
reason is that a neighboring land owner of the petitioner was able to construct a short concrete bridge
wide enough even for vehicles to pass through the irrigation canal from his property to the barangay
road. The RTC sees no reason why plaintiff could not do the same and why it would not be allowed if
carried in accordance with the requirements set by National Irrigation Administration (NIA)

Issues:
1. WON the petitioner satisfied the Civil Code requirements for the grant of easement rights
2. WON the property of petitioner was isolated because of her own acts.

Ruling:
1. NO.  Petitioner failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that
the proposed easement was the least prejudicial to respondents' estate.
This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos61 that the convenience of the dominant estate's owner is
not the basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied
without imposing the easement. Thus:
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without
imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner's property had another outlet to the highway. In
between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed
by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties.
There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents' property to serve petitioner's needs. Another
adequate exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to
petitioner because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation
canal before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an
easement on respondents' property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining whether
to impose an easement of right of way over another's property.
Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate."
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement of right of way,
the requirement of "least prejudice to the servient estate" trumps "distance [between] the dominant
estate [and the] public highway." "Distance" is considered only insofar as it is consistent to the
requirement of "least prejudice."
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. 
Petitioner would have permanent structures — such as the garage, garden, and grotto already installed
on respondent's property — destroyed to accommodate her preferred location for the right of way.
The cost of having to destroy these structures, coupled with the fact that there is an available outlet that
can be utilized for the right of way, negates a claim that respondents' property is the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

2. YES. The acts of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest necessarily affect petitioner's rights over the
property. One of the requirements for the grant of an easement of right of way is that the isolation of
the property is not due to the acts of the dominant estate's owners.
As shown in the pleadings submitted to the trial court, petitioner and respondents had conflicting claims
on this issue. Petitioner alleged that it was her uncle, Dominador, who caused the isolation of her
property through his act of appropriating for himself the whole property entrusted to him by her
mother. Moreover, he closed the passage from petitioner's property to the public road.
On the other hand, respondents alleged that the isolation was due to the acts of petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest. She allegedly subdivided the property in favor of her children, including
petitioner, without regard to the pending dispute over the property. If the latter is true, petitioner could
not claim any right to compulsory easement even if it was not she who caused the property's isolation.
Petitioner is bound by her predecessor-in-interest's act of causing the isolation of her property.

3. DE GUZMAN vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 191710  January 14, 2015

 Facts: Petitioners were co-owners in a parcel of land measuring 15,063 square meters and situated in
Barrio Bulao, Cainta, Rizal, which was later subdivided among them and for which individual titles were
issued. The property is enclosed and surrounded by other real properties belonging to various owners.
One of its adjoining properties is Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A, a subdivision owned and
developed by respondent Filinvest Development Corporation (respondent) which, coming from
petitioners’ property, has a potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such,
petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo.

Unwilling to grant petitioners a right of way within its subdivision, respondent alleged in its Answer that
petitioners have an access to Sumulong Highway through another property adjoining the latter’s
property. In fact, the distance from petitioners’ property to Sumulong Highway using the said other
property is only 1,500 meters or shorter as compared to the 2,500-meter distance between petitioners’
property and Marcos Highway using respondent’s subdivision.
The RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioners the right of way across respondent’s subdivision.
According to RTC, the advertised route by respondent is unfeasible and unavailing. The route, aside from
being hilly, has to traverse raw lands denominated 3043-A which belong to different owners with no
designated road lot thus the impossibility of free access thereon. Aside from that fact it is not passable
by vehicular means. Whereas if petitioners would pass through the respondent’s road lot particularly Lot
15 access to the Marcos Highway is readily available to petitioners’ property. Only a fence separates the
Filinvest Subdivision and the petitioners’ property which could be removed anytime. The RTC granted an
indemnity in favor of respondents in the amount of 400,000. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of the right of way. However, remanded the case to the RTC
for lack of justification on the amount of indemnity. Established during the remand proceedings was the
appropriate amount of indemnity due to the respondents from the petitioners for the right of way
granted was P1,620.00 per square meter of Road Lot 15 which consists of 264 square meters and the
petitioners to contribute proportionately to the costs of the construction of the right of way on Road Lot
15 to be determined by both parties.
Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the said Order to the CA. It contended that under Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code, the measurement of the land comprising a right of way should be the distance of
the dominant estate to the public highway. Thus, respondent argued that the right of way should not
pertain only to Road Lot 15 as held by the RTC, but should also include Road Lots 3, 10, 6, 4, 2 and 1
which petitioners would likewise use or traverse before they could reach Marcos Highway. It thus
contended that the total area to be indemnified is 23,500 square meters and not the mere 264-square-
meter area of Road Lot 15. 

Petitioners argue that it is unfair to require them to pay the value of the affected road lots since the
same is tantamount to buying the property without them being issued titles and not having the right to
exercise dominion over it.

Issue:  Whether the extent of the easement covers only Lot 15.

Ruling: No.

The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of roads within respondent’s subdivision and
not merely Road Lot 15. As may be recalled, the RTC then in resolving the complaint for easement of
right of way was confronted with the contentious issue as to which between the two routes from
petitioners’ property, i.e., the one passing through respondent’s subdivision leading to Marcos Highway
or the one passing through another property leading to Sumulong Highway, is the more adequate and
less prejudicial route pursuant to the requirement of the law. Thus, when it made the following
comparison and eventually concluded that the route passing through respondent’s subdivision is the
more adequate and the less prejudicial way, what it obviously had in mind was the road network in
respondent’s subdivision since the measurement thereof in meters corresponds with that mentioned by
the RTC.
4. Spouses Williams vs Rainero Zerda
GR No. 207146
FACTS: Zerda was the owner of a parcel of  land Lot No. 1177-B dominant estate. Behind said land is the
swampy mangrove owned by the Philippines. On both side were owned by Woodbridge property and
one Luis Dilag. In front was owned by the petitioner spouses., where national highway ran along.
         Zerda later, filed a complaint against the spouses for easement of right of way, alleging having
no adequate outlet to public highway; unless and it could only do so if passing through the Spouses
William’s property; that the isolation of Zerda's property was not due to his own acts, as it was the
natural consequence of its location; that the right of way he was claiming was at a point least prejudicial
to Spouses Williams' property; and that, Zerda wrote to Spouses Williams formally asking them to
provide him with right of way, for which he was willing to pay its reasonable value or to swap a portion
of his property, but Spouses Williams refused.
         On their answer, the spouses claimed that, they were in negotiation with Agripina Sierra, the
former owner of the dominant estate, for its sale to them but the sale did not materialize due to the
intervention of Zerda. Spouses Williams further averred that they undertook visible development
projects on their property as early as May 2003 amounting to ₱6,619,678.00; that the isolation of the
dominant estate was Zerda's fault; and that his requested right of way would cause great damage and
prejudice to them.
         RTC rules that Zerda’s isolation was due to his own act having knowledge of the improvement
made by the Spouses Williams, yet intervened and bought it himself to the previous owner. However, on
the Court of Appeals ruling, it reversed the RTC’s ruling and allowed the easement complaint. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:  WON Zerda is entitled to right of way.
RULING: YES. An entitlement to the easement of right of way requires that the following requisites must
be met.
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest (Art. 650).
         All the above requisites are present in this case.
As regards the first requisite, there is no dispute that the respondent's property was surrounded by
other immovables owned by different individuals, including Spouses Williams; The second requisite of
payment of indemnity was also complied with by the respondent when he wrote Spouses Williams on
January 27, 2004, formally asking them to provide him with a right of way, for which he was willing to
pay a reasonable value or to swap a portion of his property; at  the third requisite, the isolation of the
dominant estate was not due to the respondent's own acts. They pointed out that when the respondent
purchased the dominant estate, he knew that Sierra was in negotiation with them for the sale of the
dominant estate, thus, he was in bad faith. Nonetheless, it cannot be used to defeat the respondent's
claim for a right of way. Sierra had every right to sell his property to anybody. Further, when the
respondent bought the dominant estate there could have been no existing contract of sale yet
considering that Spouses Williams and Sierra were still in negotiation; and as to the fourth requisite, the
Court finds that the right of way sought by the respondent is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and it is the shortest distance to the national highway. This is evident in the Sketch Plan.
       WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
 
5.  G.R. No. 94617. April 12, 2000
ERLINDA M. VILLANUEVA, herein represented by her Attorney-in-fact LEOPOLDO SAN
BUENAVENTURA, TEOFILA N. ALBERTO, HARRY ASAÑA, ANGEL CHENG, MA. LOURDES NG, DOMINGO
F. ISRAEL and CATALINO IMPERIAL, JR., Petitioners, v. HON. ANGEL S. MALAYA, as Judge of RTC of
Naga City, Branch XXII, ROSARIO B. TORRECAMPO, ANASTACIO BONGON, ROQUE ANGELES, REGISTER
OF DEEDS of Naga City and RUBEN SIA, Respondents.
Facts: Don Macario Mariano died on November 2, 1971 leaving behind several real properties, including
a parcel of land consisting of 2,154 square meters located in Naga City. Constructed thereon were an
ancestral house and a commercial building.
His surviving spouse, Irene, entered into a joint venture with Francisco Bautista for the development of a
memorial park. The joint venture failed. Hence, Irene filed with the RTC, a complaint for rescission of
contract. RTC rendered a Decision ordering the rescission of the contract. The 2,154 square meter lot,
including the house and building constructed thereon, was levied on execution.
It appears that Irene sold the lot to one Raul Santos. After Irene passed, Jose and Erlinda, the legally
adopted children of Macario and Irene, filed with the RTC, a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale
between Irene and Raul Santos.
For rescission of contract, the subject lot was sold in public auction to Ruben Sia, herein petitioner,
being the highest bidder. Erlinda tried to redeem the property, but Ruben refused to accept her
payment. So Erlinda, consigned the redemption price to the trial court. Later, she sold the lot and its
improvements to the lessees and both parties agreed that the sale shall be effective after she has
redeemed the lot and its improvements from Ruben.
Jose died leaving his adoptive sister Erlinda as the sole surviving heir of Macario and Irene. The sheriff
issued a Final Deed of Sale of the lot in Ruben’s favor and the Register of Deeds issue a new TCT in
Ruben’s name. Erlinda filed a "Manifestation for Perfection of Consignation" and a petition for
mandamus.
The trial court treated this manifestation as a motion for consignation, but denied the same on the
ground that a Final Deed of Sale had already been signed by the sheriff in favor of Ruben. Erlinda then
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
dismissing her petition,
Erlinda filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated September 13, 1990. Erlinda filed with this Court two separate petitions, assailing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals. This Court rendered the Decision of the Court of Appeals ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
Ruben then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision dismissing his petition.
Issue: Whether or not Erlinda’s right to redeem pertains to the entire lot.
Ruling: No. We note that the dispositive portion of the Decision in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281 does not
state that Erlinda’s right to redeem was limited only to a portion of the subject lot. If petitioner indeed
felt that the dispositive portion is so vague as to leave doubt on how it shall be executed, then his
proper remedy is not to file a petition for certiorari, but a motion for clarification. This is a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the contemplation of the law. Verily, his resort to certiorari under Rule 65 is
misplaced.
More than three decades have passed since this legal wrangling began. It is time to write finis to this
case. In our Decision in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281, we directed the provincial sheriff of Camarines Sur
to "accept the payment of redemption money for the property levied in Civil Case from petitioner
Erlinda Mariano." Erlinda’s right of redemption in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281 applies to the said "2,154
square meter prime land and the ancestral house and commercial building standing thereon."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
6. ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, respondents.
G.R. No. 112331      May 29, 1996
Facts:
         Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves,
abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left, is bounded on the right
by the property of Sotero. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their
brother Antonio which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, one is located behind Anastacia's,
while the other lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
         In 1982, Yolanda purchased a lot (which was located behind Anastacia's lot) from her Aunt
Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her
the property for sale, she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia assured
her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact, she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from
passing through her property.
         Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's
property. An ocular inspection was conducted and the report was that the proposed right of way was at
the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's
sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5)
meters to avoid the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal road and the way was unobstructed
except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
The trial court however, dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and concluded that it was
more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store
blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the
parties concerned than passing through Anastacia's property. CA, however, reversed and held that
Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacia’s property.
Petitioner now comes to the SC imputing error to respondent Court of Appeals in holding that the right
of way proposed by Yolanda is the least onerous to the parties. Petitioner strongly maintains that the
proposed right of way is NOT the shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that,
moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from
the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree.
Issue:
         Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the right of way to Yolanda through
Anastacia’s property.
Held:
         No. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when
there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest
distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other
words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However,
as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which
will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
         In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme
right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean destroying the sari sari
store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of
factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As
between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public
highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut
down, the second alternative should be preferred. In sum, this Court finds that the decision of
respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence. The Court granted the
longer right of way over therein respondent’s property because the shorter route required that a
structure of strong materials needed to be demolished.

7. SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and ROSLYNN FAJARDO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: G.R. No. 127549 January 28, 1998

FACTS: 

Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124 of
the Obando Cadastre, containing an area of 1,043 square meters, located at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, and
covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCD No. T-147729 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan (Exhibit "B", p. 153 Orig. Rec.). They acquired said lot under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 6, 1992 Said land is entirely surrounded by pieces of lots belonging to different owners, one of
them are herein petitioners, spouses Raquel and Cesar Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria. 
Plaintiff-respondent spouses Fajardo filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint against petitioners
for the establishment of an easement of right of way passing through either of the alternative
defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial road. They further allege that it is the
only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; and that despite plaintiff-
respondents' request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, petitioners
refused to grant them an easement. 

Petitioners in their answer alleged that the granting of the easement in favor of plaintiff-respondent
spouses would cause them great damage and inconvenience; that defendants' mother even promised
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged
the absence of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative defendants and that there
is another access route from plaintiff-respondents' property to the main road. The trial court in a
decision ruled in favor of plaintiff-respondents, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
petition. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove the third requisite or that the isolation was not caused by
the plaintiffs themselves.

RULING: 

NO. The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by themselves cause the isolation.
All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following requirements for an estate to be
entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit: 

1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1); 

2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); 

3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and 

4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest (Art. 650). xxx Going now to the fourth requisite of "least prejudice" and "shortest distance," 

The Supreme Court agree with the lower court that this twin elements have been complied with in
establishing the easement of right of way on defendants-appellants' properties. It has been commented
upon that where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may
be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. And if the conditions of the
various tenements are the same, all the adjoining owners should be cited and experts utilized to
determine where the easement shall be established (Tolentino, ibid., pp. 108- 109, citing Casals
Colldecarrera). 
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three options open to the plaintiffs
appellees as a route to reach the national road. Among the three possible servient estates, it is clear that
defendants-appellants' property would afford the shortest distance from plaintiffs-appellees' property
to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, "it appears
that there would be no significant structures to be injured in the defendants' property and the right-of-
way to be constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to by the
defendants" (p. 4, RTC, Decision; p. 223, ibid.). 

Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where
the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. The conditions of "least damage"
and "shortest distance" are both established in one tenement — petitioners' property. 

As to the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property, it must be stressed that under Article
651 the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. Therefore, the needs of the
dominant estate determine the width of the easement. The needs of private respondents' property
could hardly be served by this "daang tao" located at the back and which is bordered by a fishpond.

8. CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM, DAMASO MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR

HERMALINO and PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES
FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE MAKIMKIM and
GINA MAKIMKIM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS C.
PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE, respondents.
G.R. No. 125339 June 22, 1998

FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City.
Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of the disputed residential lots, Lot 1
and Lot 2, located adjacent to petitioners' property. Petitioners were using Road Lot 2 in going to and
from the nearest public road. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road, Cesar
Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots, which was
granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as lot 1 and lot 2.
Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma , Inc., sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor transfer
Certificates of Title. In turn, the latter conveyed the lots to respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma
Pacione.

When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, found out that the lot was occupied
by a squatter and a portion was being used as passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue.
Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their property to the Barangay Office,
hence, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione
spouses rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses
started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence.

Petitioners protested the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential
houses belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except
through the property of the Pacione spouses. As their protests went unheeded, petitioners instituted an
action for easement of right of way with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
On 3 June 1987 the trial court issued a TRO directing the Pacione spouses to cease and desist from
fencing the disputed property. The Pacione spouses objected, arguing that petitioners were not entitled
to a TRO since they showed no valid basis for its issuance, and that petitioners had no cause of action
against respondents because there were actually two (2) accessible outlets and inlets.

The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of right
of way was not proved. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the trial court erred in
finding that they failed to sufficiently establish the essential fact that from their property no adequate
outlet or access to a highway existed; and, that the conversion of the Road Lot into two (2) residential
lots by Cesar Ledesma, Inc., was violative of PD No. 957, hence illegal, and the titles issued as a
consequence of the conversion were null and void. The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision
affirming the findings of the trial court. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement of right of way may be granted to the petitioners.

RULING: NO. To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under
Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the
dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners' property and
which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn,
leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was
determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants estate, hence petitioners
have no cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.

Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on
private respondents' property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. For
emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an improvident imposition of the easement on the lot
may unjustly deprive private respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their property,
considering that its already small area will be reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may even
render the property useless for the purpose for which private respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the obligations
imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of
the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way be granted. Petitioners
miserably failed in this regard.
9.  CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R.
MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 109338, FIRST DIVISION, November 20, 2000, PARDO, J. 

FACTS: 
On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
Corporation (PSC). 
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff
Leviste to present evidence ex-parte.
When the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent
sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land covered TCT Nos. T-13505 and T-13514
issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of land were sold at
public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). On April 25, 1990, the Clerk of Court,
as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Sale, which Judge Luis D. Dictado, in his capacity as
executive judge, approved. 

On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of possession over said property. On
June 25, 1992, the trial court granted the motion. 
On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines
standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an
amended motion for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land. 

Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner.

ISSUE: 
Whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public
auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. 

RULING: 
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. A court denies a party due process if it
renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity to present its evidence. 
We find that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated private respondent’s
claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the exercise of
justice and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of
demolition on the same day. 
It is incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence on petitioner’s right over the property to be
demolished. 
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of , thcondemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property mayrough expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way." 
However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains
full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to
do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. 
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis.1âwphi1 Considering the nature and effect
of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives
private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.

G.R. No. 130845               November 27, 2000

10. BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, Vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA,
respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: This case was about a parcel of land that the Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought located in
Quezon City from Pacific Banking Corporation which it acquired from the spouses Maximo and Justina
Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupies one meter
of two meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-
interest of the private respondents, in a contract of easement of right of way. The contract provided
that the easement’s purpose was to have an outlet to Tandang Sora which was the nearest public road
and the least burdensome. Espinolas property, being the dominant estate and Gabriel spouses’ as the
servient estate. It was also provided in the contract that the easement “shall be binding to the
successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the
circumstances.”
The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house obstructing the
easement against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with prayer to quash the
writ saying that he was not made a party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should not
prosper since the easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioner’s title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists even though it was not
annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estate to which they actively
or passively belong. And that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement.
ISSUE: W/N the contract of easement between the Gabriels and Espinolas was enforceable to the
Petitioner Villanueva.
RULING: Yes, even if the easement is not annotated or expressly stated in the torrens title, it is inherent
and inseparable from the estate to which it actively belongs. The easement of right of way here was
voluntarily constituted by the Gabriels and Espinolas, also, this was an easement by necessity or a legal
easement, to which, this was mandated by law constituted for public use or public interest that
becomes a continuing property right. Thus, in Article 617 of the Civil Code, as a compulsory easement, it
is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs. In the same article, the requisites for an easement to
be compulsory are the following:
1.       The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
2.       Proper indemnity has been paid;
3.       The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
4.       The right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
5.       To the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest.
The lower courts declared the existence of this easement of right of way and so thus the Supreme Court.
That the legal easement that the servient estate of the Petitioner was legally bound to provide the
dominant estate of the private Respondent access to the public highway. 
11. Encarnacion vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77628. March 11, 1991.

Facts:
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun
are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the
dominant estate which was an area of 2, 590 square meters and private respondents co-own the 405
square meter servient estate. The servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the national
road. Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going
to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. In 1960, private
respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and
about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway.  At the same time, petitioner
started his plant nursery business on his land and he would use said pathway as passage to the highway
for his family and for his cutomers. In January 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep for
his business. Said jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate
owners and requested that they sell him 1 and ½ meters of their property to be added to the existing
pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. His request was turned down. Petitioner instituted an
action before the RTC of Batangas to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an
additional width of at least 2 meters. During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the
existence of another exit to the highway, only 80 meters away from the dominant estate. On December
2, 1985, the lower court dismissed petitioner’s complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an increase in the already existing pathway.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner is entitled to have the existing pathway increased. 
According to Article 651 of the Civil Code, “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which
is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time”.
This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the passage. The Court also found that while there is a dried rived bed less than
100 meters from the dominant estate, that access is grossly inadequate. The right of way may be
demanded when: 1. When there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and 2. When, even if there
is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. The river bed route is traversed by a
semi-concrete bridge  and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. Moreover, during the rainy
season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the
year. 
12. Adriana Dionisio et al, vs. Hon. Rodolfo Ortiz
204 SCRA 745
Facts:
By virtue of an agreement entered into between the owners of lots and members of Quezon City
Industrial Estates, a right of way was granted over Howmart Road which is a private road traversing the
contiguous lots owned by the petitioners. In return for its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the
petitioners for this right of way.
In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a gate in private respondents lot fronting Howmart
Road and another gate in Lot 272. As a result of the subdivision of Lot 272, the private respondents
opened a new gate in lot 272-b also fronting Howmart Road which is now the gate in question.
In 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced the digging of four
holes in a parallel line and afterwards put up steel posts welded to a steel plate in front of the newly
constructed gate of private respondents amidst the latter’s protestations. The petitioners claim that the
surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into the house of Maxima Dionisio, exposing them to
air and noise pollution arising from the respondents’ delivery trucks and service vehicles.
The private respondents instituted a civil action for damages against the petitioners. The complaint
sought the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the petitioner to remove the
barricade erected by them in front of the iron gate.
Respondent Judge Ortiz issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
Fifteen days later, the petitioners removed the barricade in front of the gate of the private respondents
after they failed to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Court of Appeals enjoining the
lower court from implementing its order. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the issue has
already become moot and academic since the petitioners have already complied with the Order of the
lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road.
Ruling:
NO.
Private respondents alleged that they have every right to use the Howmart Road by virtue of a standing
oral contract of easement of right of way even after its alleged expiration in 1988. Hence petitioner do
not have the right to put barricade in the lot in question and to stop them from using the gate.
However, such right of way expired in December, 1988. The continued use of the easement enjoyed by
QCIEA including the private respondents is by the mere tolerance of the owners pending the
renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way.
In addition, private respondents failed to comply with the requisites for a valid compulsory easement of
right of way.
The private respondents cannot assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they
themselves have caused the isolation of their property from the access road. Article 649 of Civil Code
justifies petitioners’ claim
The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small passageway between them is an act
imputable to the private respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way. The opening
of the new gate would definitely be very convenient to the private respondents but mere convenience is
not enough to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.

13. HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO and LIBY P. CALIMOSO, Petitioners, vs. AXEL D.
ROULLO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198594 January 25, 2016
Facts:
Respondent alleged that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a public road; and that the
shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public road, passes through the petitioners’ lot.
The petitioners claimed that  while the establishment of the easement through their lot provided for the
shortest route, the adjudged right-of-way would cause severe damage not only to the nipa hut situated
at the corner of the petitioners’ lot, but also to the bedroom portion of the other concrete house that
stood on the property. They also alleged that the respondent has other right-of-way alternatives, such
as the existing wooden bridge over Sipac Creek bounding the respondent’s lot on the northeast; that the
bridge, if made concrete, could provide ingress or egress to the Fajardo Subdivision Road.
The RTC granted the respondent’s complaint and ordered the petitioners to provide the respondent an
easement of right-of-way "measuring 14 meters in length and 3 meters in width (42 square meters,
more or less).The petitioners appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA.
The CA, in its assailed decision, affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision and held that all the requisites for the
establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way were present in the respondent’s case:
first, that the subject lot is indeed surrounded by estates owned by different individuals and the
respondent has no access to any existing public road; second, that the respondent has offered to
compensate the petitioners for the establishment of the right-of-way through the latter’s property;
third, that the isolation of the subject lot was not caused by the respondent as he purchased the lot
without any adequate ingress or egress to a public highway; and, fourth and last, given the available
options for the right-of-way, the route that passes through the petitioners’ lot requires the shortest
distance to a public road and can be established at a point least prejudicial to the petitioners’ property.

Issue:
WON the right-of- way passing through the petitioners’ lot is established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate.

Ruling:
NO. Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded right-of-way: the first
option is to traverse directly through the petitioners’ property, which route has an approximate distance
of fourteen (14) meters from the respondent’s lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second option is
to pass through two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-1 and 1461-B-2) located on the southwest of the
respondent’s lot, which route has an approximate distance of forty-three (43) meters to another public
highway, the Diversion Road; and the third option is to construct a concrete bridge over Sipac Creek and
ask for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr. Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision
Road.
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the
tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage
would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single
tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest
distance criterion
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners’ lot would cause the destruction
of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners’ property. Although this right-of-way has the shortest
distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that
an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the
basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the
servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about
way."
G.R. No. 188213, January 11, 2016
14. NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ AND BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, PRISCILAILAO, Respondent

Facts: Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz was Punong Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City
of Manila. On November 10, 2006, around five o'clock in the afternoon, and along Central Street,
Pandacan, Manila, within the vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing
basketball with the following statements: Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong
karapatang maglaro sa court na 'to, barangay namin ito! xxx xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang
chairman dito. Mga walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!

Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz, to
destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw which Dela Cruz promptly complied with, thus
rendering the said basketball court unusable.

The acts of petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority) by the group that claims
to be the basketball court's owners.

In answer to the complaint, Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in the barangay
and was the subject of many complaints from residents asking for its closure. She alleged that the
playing court blocked jeepneys from passing through and was the site of rampant bettings and fights
involving persons from within and outside the barangay. She claimed that innocent persons have been
hurt and property had been damaged by such armed confrontations, which often involved the throwing
of rocks and improvised "molotov" bombs. She also averred that noise from the games caused lack of
sleep among some residents and that the place's frequent visitors used the community's fences as
places to urinate. Cruz maintained that the court's users never heeded the barangay officials' efforts to
pacify them and when the basketball ring was once padlocked, such was just removed at will while
members of the complainants' club continued playing. When Cruz asked for the PHC to return the steel
bar and padlock, the request was simply ignored, thus, prompting her to order Dela Cruz to destroy the
basketball ring. The destruction was allegedly also a response to the ongoing clamor of residents to stop
the basketball games.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s order to destroy the basketball ring for being a public nuisance is
proper.

Ruling: No.
There is a nuisance when there is "any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the
senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
property."33 But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that the term "nuisance"
is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of
the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort. 

A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its
susceptibility to summary abatement.

As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a nuisance may either be:
(a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which "affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal";
or (b) a private nuisance, or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" which, in
jurisprudence, is one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few
persons." 

A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which
case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and
property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per
accidens, which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question
of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such
a thing does in law constitute a nuisance;" it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose and may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention. 

In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the basketball ring was a
nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in the records,
it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect upon
the safety of persons and property, the definition of a nuisance per se. Culling from examples cited in
jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed "on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people; nor is it like pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs which are inherently pernicious and which may be summarily
destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant which may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an
object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of
the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing. 

But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without
posing any immediate harm or threat that required instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement
performed by petitioners failed to observe the proper procedure for such an action which puts the said
act into legal question.
15. Jaime Perez vs. Spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda Pante
G.R. No. 184478
FACTS:  Respondent spouses  are the registered owner of a residential lot in Greenheights Subdivision in
Marikina where they built their house and enclosed it with fence and steel gate.
In 1999, respondents received the following letter dated May 25, 1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez,
Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office:
Bakod umusli sa Bangketa
Ang naturang pagtatayo ng bahay/istruktura ay isang paglabag sa umiiral na batas/programa na
ipatutupad ng Pamahalaang Bayan ng Marikina Bakod umusli sa Bangketa
Ang naturang pagtatayo ng bahay/istruktura ay isang paglabag sa umiiral na batas/programa na
ipatutupad ng Pamahalaang Bayan ng Marikina na nauukol sa:
PD 1096(National Building Code of the Philippines);PD 772(Anti-Squatting Law); Programa sa Kalinisan
at Disiplina sa Bangketa; RA 7279(Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992; PD 296
(Encroachment on rivers, esteros, drainage channels and other waterways);RA 917 as amended by
Section 23, PD. No. 17, DO No. 4 Series of 1987.
Dahil po dito, kayo ay binibigyan ng taning na Pitong (7) araw simula sa pagkatanggap ng sulat na ito
para kusang alisin ang inyong istruktura. Ang hindi ninyo pagsunod sa ipinag-uutos na ito ay
magbubunsod sa amin upang gumawa ng kaukulang hakbang na naa[a]yon sa itinatadhana ng Batas.
More than a year later or on February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents as
the May 25, 1999 letter but this time giving respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the
structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk. This prompted respondents to file a complaint for
injunction before the Marikina City RTC on March 12, 2001.
The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful
and open possession of every inch of their property and petitioner’s threat to demolish the concrete
fence around their property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who are
entitled to protection under the Constitution and laws. The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that
respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare,
nor is there basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its
summary demolition.
Court of Appeals affirmed the Injuction.
ISSUE: Are the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction present(with respect to the nuisance of
the fence encroaching the sidewalk)
RULING:  For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected
and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Here, the
two requisites are clearly present: there is a right to be protected, that is, respondents’ right over their
concrete fence which cannot be removed without due process; and the act, the summary demolition of
the concrete fence, against which the injunction is directed, would violate said right.
         If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is
not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead,
he should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed violations in the construction of the concrete
fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.
16. MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN, Petitioners, v. THE
HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002
Facts: On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot covering one-half portion of
the formers house and lot located at Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently
executed by Conchita Cabatingan, bestowing upon:
(a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one in Cogon, Cebu and the other, a portion
of a parcel of land in Masbate;
(b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate; and
(c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property.
Conchita Cabatingan died. Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for Annulment
And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four
(4) deeds of donation alleging that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and
taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingans fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of
donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the
Civil Code on solemnities of wills and testaments. Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed and,
that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares, together with petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan.
Petitioners denied respondents allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and
voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan in consideration of the love and affection of the donor for the donee, and there is nothing in
the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingans death. 11 In
addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of
Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Issue: Whether or not donation is inter vivos.
Ruling: No. Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition
is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. In determining whether a donation is one of
mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior
to Cabatingans death. The phrase to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis
causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of
donation, to wit:
That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the terms and
conditions set forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the
kindness and generosity of the DONOR.
That the donations were made in consideration of the love and affection of the donor does not qualify
the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.
As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have been
complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on
solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the
Clerk of Court. (n)
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee, the
documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of donation null
and void. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

17. IGNACIO GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 110335            June 18, 2001 
Facts:
         The now deceased spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners
of two parcels of agricultural Land. Herein petitioners are the successors-in-interest of said Gonzales
spouses. On the other hand, private respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have
been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II either personally or through their
predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina died intestate and appointed as administratrix of her estate was petitioner Lilia
Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio executed a Deed of Donation, conveying his share
of the property in favor of his 14 grandchildren. The said donation however, was not registered. Thus,
when Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took effect, the landholdings of the spouses Gonzales
were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private respondents were
accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents.
On March 5, 1974, the administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention, requesting that
their property be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, to which the DAR granted,
cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of private respondents. In so ruling, the DAR
Secretary reasoned:
As the donation had been duly accepted by the donees who were already of legal age on the date of the
donation and by the legal guardians of the donees who were still minors at that time, and the donor
having known of said acceptance, the donation had therefore been perfected in accordance with the
law, and the donees had acquired a valid title to the portion donated on the date the instrument was
executed.
Aggrieved by this ruling, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
which rendered its decision reversing the action of the DAR and upholding the certificates of land
transfer and emancipation patents. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
         Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No.
27 took effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
Held:
         No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code
explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not
duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not prejudice third persons."
From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and
Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of
registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry creates
constructive notice to the whole world. It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by
Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been
registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who
did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation
is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers
who were not parties to the donation.
From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation cannot
operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27,
which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise would render ineffectual the rights and
interests that the tenants-farmers immediately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27,
especially so because in the case at bar, they have been cultivating the land even before World War II.
Accordingly, the Certificates of Land Transfer and the Emancipation Patents respectively issued to
private respondents over the land in question cannot be cancelled. It should be noted that one of the
recognized modes of acquiring title to land is by emancipation patent which aims to ameliorate the sad
plight of tenants-farmers. By virtue of P.D. No. 27, tenants-farmers are deemed owners of the land they
till.

18. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT,
respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.: G.R. No. 140487            April 2, 2001
FACTS: 
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a parcel
of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS).
Respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for
school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay
Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan
could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare parcel of land. To
remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent authorized District Supervisor
Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of Kauswagan
Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government.
The donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot. When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise,
that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why
he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he
is already the owner of the said property. Respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and
Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and
Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District
Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on
the grounds that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation
was violated. Hence, the present case 
ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not the donation is null and void due to an invalid acceptance by the donee. 
2. Whether or not the donation is null and void due to an alleged violation of a condition in the
donation. 

RULING: 
1. YES. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null and void for the reason that the
acceptance was not allegedly donee in accordance with Articles 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code. An
onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise,
this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than
the thing donated. Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 733. Donations with an onerous
cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the
present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. ‘The donation
involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the
donee to build a school on the donated property. There was a valid acceptance of the donation. Private
respondents admit that in the offer of exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered in evidence. 
The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving at its
decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals. Nowhere in their brief did respondents
question the validity of the donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the acceptance thereof. The
purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is
duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after
the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up
on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan. It
was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to
know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence
of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee
be communicated to the donor. 

2. With regard to the respondents' submission that the donee violated the condition in the
donation that the lot be exclusively used for school purposes only, the condition for the donation was
not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. 
What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes" convey? "School" is simply an institution or
place of education. "Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an
end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with the ends sought, an object to be
attained, an intention, etc."  "Exclusive" means "excluding or having power to exclude (as by preventing
entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to possession, control
or use.

The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger
one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger
lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which
could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

19. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS,
respondents.   G.R. No. 194190                   January 25, 2017

FACTS: 

The Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action for expropriation for the widening of
Dr. A. Santos Ave. in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila. The Commissioners appointed by the
Regional Trial Court in the expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just
compensation for the expropriated areas be set to ₱12,000.00 per square meter.
The Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate
Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and Improvements." The DPWH filed its
Comment/Opposition to the Llamas Spouses' that only 41 square meters was affected by the road
widening project. Thus, it emphasized that the Llamas Spouses were entitled to just compensation only
to the extent of those 41 square meters and the spouses failed to adduce evidence of any
improvements on the affected area. 
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a Motion, where the latter
faulted the Department of Public Works and Highways for what was supposedly its deliberate failure to
comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous Orders and even with its own undertaking to facilitate
the payment of just compensation to the Llamas Spouses. The non-payment of the Llamas Spouses'
claims was due to their continued failure to comply with their undertaking. The Department of Public
Works and Highways then filed a Comment/Opposition asserting that, from its inquiries with the City
Assessor's Office and the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds, the documents the Llamas Spouses
submitted "did not originate from the concerned offices." 
The Regional Trial Court ordered the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just compensation at
₱12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for the lot covered by TCT No. 217267. It denied
payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted that these were subdivision road lots, which
the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which "belonged to the community for whom they were
made." The Llamas Spouses then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. It reversed
and set aside the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the Department of Public
Works and Highways to pay the Llamas Spouses P12,000.00 per square meter as just compensation for a
total of 237 square meters across three lots, inclusive of the portions excluded by the Regional Trial
Court. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not just compensation must be paid to Llamas Spouses for the subdivision road lots covered
by TCT No. 179165.

RULING: 

YES. To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must necessarily proceed freely from the
donor's own, unrestrained volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from compulsion, be
borne by a requirement, or otherwise be impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that
are external to him or her. Article 726 of the Civil Code reflects this commonsensical wisdom when it
specifically states that conveyances made in view of a "demandable debt" cannot be considered true or
valid donations. 
In jurisprudence, animus donandi (that is, the intent to do an act of liberality) is an indispensable
element of a valid donation, along with the reduction of the donor's patrimony and the corresponding
increase in the donee’s patrimony. 
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first be made by the "owner-developer
before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As there is no such
thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be
effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the
government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local
government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized
as a public road." 
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of  Paranaque to acquire
dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character (albeit all parties
acknowledge them to be subject to an easement of right of way). Accordingly, just compensation must
be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
20. ESPERANZA C. CARINAN, Petitioner, -versus- SPOUSES GAVINO CUETO and CARMELITA
CUETO,Respondents.
G.R. No. 198636, THIRD DIVISION, October 8, 2014, REYES, J. 

FACTS: 
The case originated from a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Spouses Gavino C.
Cueto and Carmelita J. Cueto against Esperanza C. Carinan and her son, Jazer C. Carinan. The
respondents alleged that sometime in May 1986, Esperanza and her husband, Jose Carinan , acquired
from one Roberto Ventura the rights over a parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-129128 under
the name of the GSIS, measuring 180 square meters and more particularly described as Lot 24, Block 20,
Juana Complex I, Biñan, Laguna. Their transaction was covered by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of
Rights with Assumption of Obligations. Esperanza and Jose were to assume the payment of the
applicable monthly amortizations for the subject land to the GSIS. 
Several amortizations remained unpaid by Esperanza and Jose, resulting in an impending cancellation in
2005 of GSIS’ conditional sale of the subject property to Roberto. It was then that Esperanza, then
already a widow, sought financial assistance from her brother, Gavino, in October 2005. The
respondents then paid from their conjugal savings Esperanza’s total obligation of ₱785,680.37 under the
subject deed of assignment.  
The respondents alleged that Esperanza and Jazer undertook to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of the respondents once the title over the subject property was transferred to their names, subject to
the condition that they would be given the first option to buy it back within three years by reimbursing
the expenses incurred by the respondents on the property. Besides satisfaction of the unpaid
amortizations to GSIS, the respondents paid for the transfer of the subject property from Roberto to
Esperanza, and the renovation of the residential house erected on the subject land, resulting in
additional expenses of ₱515,000.00. TCT No. T-636804 already under the name of Esperanza was
surrendered to the respondents. Sometime in 2006, the respondents demanded from Esperanza and
Jazer the fulfillment of their commitment to transfer the subject property to the respondents’ names
through the execution of a deed of sale. When Esperanza and Jazer failed to comply despite efforts for
an amicable settlement, the respondents filed with the RTC of Biñan, Laguna the subject complaint for
specific performance with damages. 

The RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. CA rendered its
Decision that affirmed the rulings of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that the respondents’
payment of the GSIS obligation could not have been gratuitous, considering its substantial amount. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the money paid by the respondents was a donation.

RULING: 
NO. There was a clear intention for a return of the amounts which the respondents spent for the
acquisition, transfer and renovation of the subject property. The respondents then reasonably expected
to get their money back from Esperanza. Esperanza’s claim that the expenses and payments in her
behalf were purely gratuitous remained unsupported by records. 

Esperanza’s refusal to pay back would likewise result in unjust enrichment, to the clear disadvantage of
the respondents. "The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from
enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration." While Esperanza
claims that her brother’s generosity was the consideration for the respondents’ payment of her
obligations, this was not sufficiently established, that even the respondents vehemently denied the
allegation. In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents was
actually a donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in court a copy of their written contract
evincing such agreement. Article 748 of the New Civil Code (NCC), which applies to donations of money,
is explicit on this point as it reads: 
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. 
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the
right donated. 
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the
acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void. 
As the Court ruled in Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff, a donation must comply with the mandatory formal
requirements set forth by law for its validity. When the subject of donation is purchase money, Article
748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its acceptance should be in
writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by
law. 
The respondents’ statement that they paid for Esperanza’s obligations because they wanted to help her
did not contradict an understanding for the return of the claimed amounts. Clearly, the aid then needed
by Esperanza was for the immediate production of the money that could pay for her obligations to the
GSIS and effect transfer of title, in order that her payments and interest over the property would not be
forfeited. The help accorded by the respondents corresponded to such need. It did not follow that the
respondents could no longer be allowed to later demand the repayment. In disputing the claim against
her, Esperanza imputed deceit upon the respondents and claimed that they misled her into their real
intention behind the payment of her obligations and possession of TCT No. T-636804. Deceit, however,
is a serious charge which must be proven by more than just bare allegations. 
Although the Court affirms the trial and appellate courts' ruling that, first, there was no donation in this
case and, second, the respondents are entitled to a return of the amounts which they spent for the
subject property, it still cannot sustain the respondents' plea for Esperanza's full conveyance of the
subject property. To impose the property's transfer to the respondents' names would totally disregard
Esperanza's interest and the payments which she made for the property's purchase. Thus, the principal
amount to be returned to the respondents shall only pertain to the amounts that they actually paid or
spent. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's resolve to require in its Decision
dated December 15, 2009, around four years after the sums were paid for the subject property's
acquisition and renovation, the immediate return of the borrowed amounts. 
 G.R. No. 77425             June 19, 1991
21.THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and
the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners, Vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by
MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 77450             June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the
SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
Vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA
RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:       
FACTS: On November 29, 1984, private respondents, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of
donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners
Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84.
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro
and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit),
located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or less.
The deed of donation provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of
one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such
condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to
the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to
dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred
on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00.

ISSUE: W/N the deed of donation has been revoked due to none compliance of the donee with the
conditions stipulated therein.
RULING: No, the stipulation stated in the deed of donation was against public policy, and thus void.
The private Respondents invoked Art. 764 of the Civil Code as a contention, which provides, "the
donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the... donee fails to comply with any of the
conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "this action shall prescribe after four
years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised... against the donee's heirs." As a general rule, a donation is revoked upon donee’s
failure to comply with the stipulation. However in the case at bar, the resolutory condition was held to
be an undue restriction on the rights of ownership and was contrary to public policy. A donation is an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted,
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy. The condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable
period of time.

22.  Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware

G.R. No. 194199. March 22, 2017.

Facts:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City. On September 28, 1966,
through then Provincial Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza, petitioner donated 600 square meters of this
land to the Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos.
The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause which states:
“That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above described portion of land
subject of the present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned
and to be constructed by the above named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines
Sur Teachers’ Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED,
FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated
including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party and provided, lastly, that the
construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of 1 year
from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically
revoked and voided and of no further force and effect”.
CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law and complied with the
conditions stated in the deed. However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease 
with Bodega over the donated property. Under the Contract of Lease, CASTEA lease the property to
Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on September 1, 1995 and ending on September 15, 2015.
Bodega took actual possession of the property on September 1, 1995. On November 11, 2007, petitioner
sent a letter to Bodega stating that Bodega’s occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner. As it now intended to use the property for its developmental projects, petitioner demanded
that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply with
the demand. Petitioner, through its then Provincial Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its
donation through a Deed of Revocation of Donation dated October 14, 2007. It asserted that CASTEA
violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. Thus, invoking
the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation, petitioner revoked, annulled and declared void
the Deed of Donation. On March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against
Bodega before the MTC Naga City. The MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the petitioner. Bodega appealed
the Decision before the RTC Naga City which reversed the ruling of the MTC Naga City. The CA affirmed 
the decision of the RTC Naga City. 
Issue:
1. Whether or not the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation was validly exercised. 
2. Whether or not petitioner’s action to file the ejectment suit against Bodega has already
prescribed.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation was validly exercised. 
According to the Court, the provision identifies 3 conditions for the donation: 1. That the property shall
be used for “no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed
by the above named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers’
Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and bylaws and the Naga City
Teachers’ Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association”, 2. CASTEA shall
“not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements
thereon in favor of any party,” and 3. “the construction of the building or buildings referred to above
shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution”. The last clause of
automatic revocation clause states that “otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically
revoke”. The Court read the final clause of the provision as an automatic revocation clause which
pertains to all 3 conditions of the donation. When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached
the first and second conditions. Petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the
automatic revocation clause, this revocation was automatic and immediate, without the need of judicial
intervention. Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested
it, the property donated effectively reverted  back to it as owner. 
2. No. Petitioner’s rights to file the ejectment suit has not yet prescribed. 
According to the Court, Article 764 of the Civil Code does not apply in cases where the donation has an
automatic revocation clause. Also, the breach of the condition laid down in the donation causes the
automatic revocation of the Deed of Donation. Lastly, according to the Court, under the Civil Code and
the Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject another from a property for unlawful detainer must file the
action for ejectment within one year from the last demand to vacate. This is the prescriptive period  that
the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case. Petitioner served  its last demand letter on
November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or around 4 months from the
last demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive period. 

23. Republic vs. David Ray Guzman

326 SCRA 90

Facts:
David Rey Guzman and Helen Guzman, both American citizen were survived by Simeon Guzman, a
naturalized American. Simeon left his heirs Helen and David parcels of land in Sta. Maria Bulacan. Helen
and David executed a deed of Extrajudicial settlement of estate of Simeon Guzman. The document was
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds in 1971. The taxes thereon were paid by their attorneys-
in-fact Abela and Austria.
In 1981, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed, assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided ½ interest on all the parcels of land subject of the extrajudicial settlement of estate. The
quitclaim appeared not to be registered so Abela advised helen to execute another quitclaim confirming
the first quitclaim and modifying it to cover all her property in the Philippines.
In 1989, David executed an SPA where he acknowledged that he became the owner of the lands subject
in the quitclaim deed subsequently empowering Abela to sell the lands. 
The Government filed before the RTC, Malolos Bulacan a petition for escheat praying that ½ of David’s
interest in each of the parcels of land be forfeited in favor of the state on the ground that his ownership
in the ½ of the estate of Simeon was defective.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid donation in the case at bar

Ruling: No.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the
same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to
be noted in both instruments.
When the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of property the document that evidences the
acceptance if this has not been made in the deed of gift should also be recorded. And in one or both
documents, as the case may be, the notification of the acceptance as formally made to the donor or
donors should be duly set forth. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else
noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no proof of compliance
appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of land by
Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special
Power of Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and
notice thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-settled that if the notification and notation
are not complied with, the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been
complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.
24. SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL, respondents

G.R. No. 111904               October 5, 2000

Facts:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed
three deeds of donation mortis causa,to four parcels of land, in favor of private respondent Mercedes
Danlag-Pilapil. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or
revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated
during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.

On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of
donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels, respectively,
again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag
spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not
sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and
approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes
on them.

However, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa.
The Danlags also executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject of the
aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.

Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent) filed for quieting of title over the above parcels of land. She
alleged that the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its
perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and
that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the subject donation and then in selling the two
parcels of land to the Gestopas. RTC ruled that the second donation was mortis causa. The CA ruled that
it was a donation inter vivos.

Issue:

WON the second donation was a donation inter vivos

Ruling:

YES. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together. The
deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes contained the following:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor inspires in the Donee and as an
act of liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveys by way of
donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and successors, the above-described parcels of land;

That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land
during his lifetime and that of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the
lands without the prior consent and approval by the Donor and her spouse during their lifetime.
xxx

That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states that he has reserved for
himself sufficient properties in full ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent
livelihood in consonance with his standing in society.

That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and gratitude for the kindness
and generosity of the Donor."

Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for
the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates
that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the
Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the
owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of
land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977),
we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement
for donations inter vivos. Donation mortis causa, being in the form of a will, is not required to be
accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the properties
belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his
usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors'
lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the
donors' lifetime.

G.R. No. 119730 September 2, 1999

25.RODOLFO NOCEDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO, respondents

Facts: Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson,
and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956, extrajudicially settled a parcel of
land located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square
meters. Plaintiff Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square
meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same date, plaintiff
Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son
of her deceased sister, Carolina. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-
partition was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said
land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. 
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff
Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the
donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda removed the
fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts, and fenced the entire land of
plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her
land, but the latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the
lower court. 

The Regional Trial Court, rendered a decision which reads as follows:

(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19, 1981, valid;
(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked;
(c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the
Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns;
(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside the donated portion at the defendant’s
expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00 .

Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Noceda’s acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude sufficient
to grant the revocation of the donation?

Ruling: Yes.

Art. 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude
cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the
donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action." 

As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time
he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the
donor to institute the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must
be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He
reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of
plaintiff Directo in the first week of September 1985, and not from the time the latter had the
knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff
Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action
for revocation of her donation.
26. Eloy Imperial vs C.A
G.R. no. 112483
Facts:  Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land. Leoncio sold
the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over
the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that
despite the contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, the transaction was in fact a donation.
         Barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement, approved by the
Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961, under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the
legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a
designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a
bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncios death, it was agreed that the balance of
the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs. Pending judgment Leonicio died
leaving his 2 heirs the herein petitioner and his adopted son Victor Imperial who substituted and said
motion granted.
         Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his natural father,
Ricardo Villalon, Four years after died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa
Villalon.
         Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation with the
Regional Trial Court. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the
compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
         On their amended complaint they alleged that the donation was inofficious, and that the
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural
brother and predecessor-in-interest.
         The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of
its finding that at the time of Leoncios death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter
parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The C.A. affirmed said decision. Hence, a petition to
this court. He alleged laches.
Issue:  WON action already prescribed
Ruling : We cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code.
         What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The
Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in
cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-
compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his
relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of  legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must
resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent
that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which
involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of
action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only
then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action,
therefore, has long prescribed.

27. SPOUSES ROMULO AND SALLY EDUARTE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PEDRO CALAPINE (substituted by ALEXANDER CALAPINE and ARTEMIS CALAPINE), respondents.
 
Facts: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land in which he executed a deed entitled
"Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion InterVivos)" ceding one-half portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-2129. Another deed identically entitled was purportedly
executed by Pedro Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. P-2129, on the basis of which said original certificate was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-23205 was issued in her name. Further, Helen S. Doria donated a portion of 157
square meters of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-23205 to the Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc on the basis of which said transfer certificate of title was cancelled and TCT No. T-24444 was
issued in its name covering 157 square meters and TCT No. T-24445, in the name of Helen S. Doria
covering the remaining portion of 12,042 square meters. Helen S. Doria sold, transferred and conveyed
unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the
portion of 700 square meters on which the vendor's house had been erected, on the basis of which TCT
No. 24445 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-27434, issued in the name of the vendees.
Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that she was unworthy of his
liberality, Pedro Calapine brought suit against Helen S. Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church,
Inc. and the Spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte to revoke the donation made in favor of Helen S. Doria,
to declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan
Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte and to cancel TCT Nos. T-
24444, 24445 and T-27434. Defendants spouses denied knowledge of the first deed of donation and
alleged that after a part of the property was donated to the defendant Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc., the remaining portion thereof was sold to them by the defendant Helen S. Doria; and that
the plaintiff's purported signature in the second deed of donation was his own, hence genuine.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Donation made by Calapine to Helen Doria is revoked by reason of
ingratitude.
Ruling: Yes, Deed of Donation made by Calapine to Helen Doria is revoked by reason of ingratitude.
Art. 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the
following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the
donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself,
his wife or children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the
donor.
In the present case, It is ruled that by falsifying Pedro Calapine's signature, Helen Doria committed an
act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation made in her favor in accordance
with the above article.
Hence, Deed of Donation made by Calapine to Helen Doria is revoked by reason of ingratitude.
28. THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon. ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, in his capacity as MAYOR of Angeles City,
and the SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF ANGELES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
         A Deed of Donation was subsequently superseded by a Deed of Donation, which in turn was
superseded again by an Amended Deed of Donation, private respondent donated to the City of Angeles,
51 parcels of land situated in Barrio Pampang, City of Angeles, with an aggregate area of 50,676 square
meters, more or less, part of a bigger area also belonging to private respondent.        Along with the
Deed are the conditions that the properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of
the Angeles City Sports Center (which excludes cockfighting) pursuant to the plans to be submitted
within six (6) months by the DONEE to the DONOR for the latter's approval, which approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld as long as entire properties donated are developed as a Sports Complex. Any
change or modification in the basic design or concept of said Sports Center must have the prior written
consent of the DONOR. That  No commercial building, commercial complex, market or any other similar
complex, mass or tenament housing/building(s) shall be constructed in the properties donated nor shall
cockfighting, be allowed in the premises. And that the construction of the Sports Center shall commence
within a period of one (1) year from March 9, 1984 and shall be completed within a period of five (5)
years from March 9, 1984. Moreover, the properties donated  shall constitute the entire open space for
DONOR's subdivision and all other lands or areas previously reserved or designated, including Lot 1 and
Lot 2A of Block 72 and the whole Block 29 are dispensed with, and rendered free, as open spaces, and
the DONEE hereby agrees to execute and deliver all necessary consents, approvals, endorsements, and
authorizations to effect the foregoing. The properties donated are devoted and described as "open
spaces" of the DONOR's subdivision, and to this effect, the DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation,
releases the DONOR and/or assumes any and all obligations and liabilities appertaining to the properties
donated. Any substantial breach of the foregoing provisos shall entitle the DONOR to revoke or rescind
this Deed of Donation, and in such eventuality, the DONEE agrees to vacate and return the premises,
together with all improvements, to the DONOR peacefully without necessity of judicial action.
         Petitioners started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated
land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for being violative of the terms
and conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of its clients and
residents. Private respondent also offered another site for the rehabilitation center. However,
petitioners ignored the protest, maintaining that the construction was not violative of the terms of the
donation. 
Issue: Whether the donation by respondents subdivision owner/developer of the "open space" of its
subdivision in favor of petitioner City of Angeles may be revoked for alleged violation of the Amended
Deed of Donation.
Ruling: No, the Amended Deed of Donation may not be revoked because of the alleged violation
thereof.
Art. 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply
with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.
In the present case, Article 764 won’t apply.
Article 1412 of the Civil Code which provides that:
If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;
The above article comes into play here. Both petitioners and private respondents are in violation of P.D.
957 as amended, for donating and accepting a donation of open space less than that required by law,
and for agreeing to build and operate a sports complex on the non-buildable open space so donated;
and petitioners, for constructing a drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area.
         Here, since the condition to construct a sport complex on the donated land has previously been
shown to be contrary to law, therefore, stipulation of the amended deed cannot be implemented
because no valid stipulation of the amended deed had been breached.
         Therefore, no legal basis whatsoever to revoke the donation of the subject open space and to
return the donated land to private respondent. The donated land should remain with the donee as the
law clearly intended such open spaces to be perpetually part of the public domain, non-alienable and
permanently devoted to public use as such parks, playgrounds or recreation areas.