FLORES-PINTO, MA. SARAH S.

2019119288
JD-2C

ASYNCHRONOUS ASSIGNMENT (3)

DOMESTIC WORKERS

1. CELIA. R. ATIENZA  v. NOEL SACRAMENTO SALUTA

G.R. No. 233413
JUNE 17, 2019

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work on holidays and rest day,
illegal deduction, and issuance of a certificate of employment filed by respondent
Saluta against petitioner Atienza and CRV Corporation before the NLRC.

The respondent alleged that he was hired as a company driver by CRV Corp and
was assigned to drive for the petitioner Celia Atienza, one of the company’s top
officials and shall received monthly salary of Php9,000.00. On the part of the
petitioner, she contended that respondent was not dismissed from work, rather he
abandoned his job when he refused to report for work and took a leave of absence
without permission. She claimed that respondent was not an employee of CRV
Corp., and that the latter was merely hired as her personal/family driver with the
duty to simply drive for her and her family to anywhere they wish to go. Aside
from his monthly salary, he enjoyed free board and lodging.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is merely a personal/family driver of petitioner

Atienza.

RULING:

Yes. Respondent Saluta is merely as personal/family driver of petitioner Atienza.

To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship, jurisprudence has

invariably adhered to the four-fold test, to wit:
 (1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employee's conduct, or the so-called "control
test."

Although no particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of an

employer-employee relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to
prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must
nonetheless rest on substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this
case, a scrutiny of the records will bear out that the respondent failed to
substantiate his claim that he was a company driver of CRV Corporation.

Apart from his staunch insistence that he was a company driver of CRV
Corporation, respondent did not proffer any competent evidence, documentary or
otherwise, as would prove his claimed employment with the company. In the case
at bench, the respondent did not present any documents that would show that his
services had been engaged by CRV Corporation. Evidence is wanting that the
company monitored the respondent in his work. Considering that the respondent
failed to establish his employment with CRV Corporation, the Court must
necessarily agree with the Labor Arbiter that respondent was the personal/family
driver of the petitioner.

2. MANSION PRINTING CENTER, ET. AL., vs. DIOSDADO BITARA, JR. 

G.R. No. 168120
January 25, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners engaged the services of respondent as a helper (kargador) who was

later promoted as the company’s sole driver. The petitioners closely monitored the
attendance of respondent and noted his habitual tardiness and absenteeism
considering that the timely delivery of the products to the clients is one of the
foremost considerations material to the operation of the business.

The following year, petitioners issued a Memorandum requiring respondent to

submit a written explanation why no administrative sanction should be imposed on
him for his habitual tardiness. Several months after, respondent’s attention on the
matter was again called where he asked for apologies, nevertheless, he continued
to disregard attendance policies despite the said undertaking to report on time.

Consequently, Davis Cheng and his son issued another Memorandum (Notice to
Explain) requiring respondent to explain why his services should not be
terminated. The latter, after reading the directive, refused to acknowledge receipt
thereof. He did not submit any explanation and, thereafter, never reported for work.
On another date, Cheng personally served another Memorandum (Notice of
Termination) upon him informing him that the company found him grossly
negligent of his duties, for which reason, his services were terminated. On the
same date, respondent met with the management requesting for reconsideration of
his termination from the service. However, after hearing his position, the
management decided to implement the Memorandum.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners before the
Labor Arbiter which was dismissed. On appeal to the NLRC, the findings of the
Labor Arbiter was AFFIRMED en toto. On appeal, the CA found for the
respondent and reversed the findings of the Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Bitara was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

No. Respondent Bitara was not illegally dismissed.

In order to validly dismiss an employee, the employer is required to observe both

substantive and procedural aspects the termination of employment must be based
on a just or authorized cause of dismissal and the dismissal must be effected after
due notice and hearing.

The imputed absence and tardiness of the complainant are documented. He faltered
on his attendance 38 times of the 66 working days. His last absences on 11, 13, 14,
15 and 16 March 2000 were undertaken without even notice/permission from
management. These attendance delinquencies may be characterized as habitual and
are sufficient justifications to terminate the complainants employment.

On this score, Valiao v. Court of Appeals is instructive:

xxx It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated
incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. xxx The totality of infractions or
the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be
considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The
offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and separately but in their
totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight
little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and independent
of each other.

In Valiao, gross negligence is defined as want of care in the performance of ones

duties and habitual neglect as repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period
of time, depending upon the circumstances. These are not overly technical terms,
which, in the first place, are expressly sanctioned by the Labor Code of the
Philippines, to wit:

ART. 282.Termination by employer.- An employer may terminate

an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) xxx
(b)Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
xxx

Clearly, even in the absence of a written company rule defining gross and habitual
neglect of duties, respondents omissions qualify as such warranting his dismissal
from the service.

We cannot simply tolerate injustice to employers if only to protect the welfare of

undeserving employees. As aptly put by then Associate Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing: Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not
deserve a place in the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative xxx
to terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of
employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are
clearly management prerogatives. As long as the company’s exercise of those
rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or
valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES

1. ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES vs. MAILA CLEMEN F. SERRANO

G.R. No. 175433
March 11, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner invited respondent Serrano, along with her officemates, to eat lunch at
Buddy's Restaurant. While seated at the table waiting for their food to be served,
petitioner suddenly took hold of respondent's face and forcefully kissed her lips in
the presence of their companions. Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by
pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on kissing her against her will.
She was so shocked, terrified, and humiliated that she could hardly talk and move.
She wanted to cry, but held her tears for fear of further embarrassment.

It was likewise alleged by the respondnet that prior to that “kissing” incident,
petitioner had already degraded her person on four (4) separate occasions, to wit:
(1) on the very first day she met him in the office, he offered to purchase her a cell
phone so that he can text her, which offer she straightforwardly refused; (2) on that
same day, he wanted her to join him in his car in going home, which she likewise
refused; (3) a week later, he asked her to eat out for lunch; again, she refused; and
(4) on August 23, 2000, after her sick leave from office, petitioner called her in his
office and scolded her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of sexual harassment.

RULING:

The petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment.

In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As correctly pointed
out by the CA, petitioner used his position and authority as Head of the Legal
Division of PHILRACOM, as well as his moral ascendancy, to elicit sexual favors
and to indulge in sexually malicious acts from his respondent, his female
subordinate.29 As to petitioner's sole defense that he merely gave respondent an
innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is unconvinced in view of the Joint
Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly kissed her on the lips and
said: "Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila. x x x”

In Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr., the Court found the respondent public officer, who
merely attempted to forcibly kiss the complainant, guilty of grave misconduct
through sexual harassment, thus:

In the case at bar, respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss
her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had
made similar but subtler overtures to [complainant] De la Cruz, who made it clear
that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent
committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that
the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that
petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might
have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their
companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other
persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored
petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation.

2. MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA 

G.R. No. 155831
February 18, 2008

FACTS:

Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In the complaint
she narrated that the respondent held and squeezed her shoulders, ran his fingers
across her neck, tickled her ear, made inappropriate conversions with her and gave
her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges.

After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be
immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment
with the DOLE, the same was referred to the Office of the President considering
that Rayala is a presidential appointee. The Office of the President through
Executive Secretary Zamora investigated the said allegations through the
committee created for such purpose. A decision was rendered dismissing NLRC
Chairman Rayala having found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged

with the President who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus
and offices.

RULING:

No. Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service both provide that the first offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good
behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for
cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the
office. When the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose
a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense.

3. ROGELIO I. RAYALA vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V.

ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his
capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of
RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National labor
Relations Commission); and MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO,
G.R. No. 155840
February 18, 2008,

FACTS:

Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In the complaint
she narrated that the respondent held and squeezed her shoulders, ran his fingers
across her neck, tickled her ear, made inappropriate conversions with her and gave
her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges.
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be
immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment
with the DOLE, the same was referred to the Office of the President considering
that Rayala is a presidential appointee. The Office of the President through
Executive Secretary Zamora investigated the said allegations through the
committee created for such purpose. A decision was rendered dismissing NLRC
Chairman Rayala having found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Rayala committed the crime of sexual harassment.

RULING:

Yes. Respondent Rayala committed the crime of sexual harassment.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3

thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:

“Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. –

Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence
or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,
re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate,
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee.”
It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned,
with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. All the acts of Rayala resound
with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or
requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to
a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. That the acts of
Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly
shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and
the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last
incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

4. The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, petitioners vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA  (NACHURA, J.)
G.R. No. 158700
February 18, 2008

FACTS:

Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In the complaint
she narrated that the respondent held and squeezed her shoulders, ran his fingers
across her neck, tickled her ear, made inappropriate conversions with her and gave
her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges.

After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be
immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment
with the DOLE, the same was referred to the Office of the President considering
that Rayala is a presidential appointee. The Office of the President through
Executive Secretary Zamora investigated the said allegations through the
committee created for such purpose. A decision was rendered dismissing NLRC
Chairman Rayala having found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent
Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment.

RULING:

No. The President of the Philippines may not validly dismiss herein respondent as
Chairman of the NLRC for committing sexual harassment.

In this particular case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper

disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the
removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the
phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala
was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not
have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by
law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of
either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and
immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.
Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the
penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon
commission of a second offense. Even if the OP properly considered the fact that
Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it still could not validly
dismiss him from the service.

5. DIOSCORO F. BACSIN vs. EDUARDO O. WAHIMA

G.R. No. 146053
April 30, 2008

FACTS:

Sometime in year 1995, petitioner Bacsin, a public school, asked the victim, AAA,
to be at his office to do an errand. Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one
of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his table. He then asked
AAA to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled
her breast. AAA claimed that Bacsin fondled her breast five times, and that she felt
afraid. One Vincent B. Sorrabas, a classmate of the victim, claimed to have
witnessed the said incident and corroborated the testimony of AAA. Petitioner was
charged with Misconduct by the Regional Director of the CSC which found the
petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed
him from the service, hence, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied.

Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA. It ruled that, even if petitioner was
formally charged with "disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct," the
CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioner’s guilt
of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty with the crime of Sexual Harassment
otherwise known as “The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.”

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner is guilty with the crime of Sexual Harassment.

The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by
said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need
not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, "It is true that this
provision calls for a ‘demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.’ But it is
not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender." The CSC found, as did the CA, that
even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of
AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b)
(4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is
committed "(w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice." In this case, AAA
even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her. It cannot then be
said that the CSC lacked basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law.
The CSC found the evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a
finding of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative
agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.

6. ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO VS. HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA

429 Phil. 498
[ AM No. CTA-01-1, Apr 02, 2002 ]
FACTS:

Petitioner Aquino reported for work after her vacation in the United States,
bringing gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the
afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her
hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek. The
following month, the respondent entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her,
"Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to
free herself by slightly pushing him away. On the first working day of the
following year, respondent asked petitioner through phone if the latter could see
him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. Upon arrival to the said
chamber, respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt.
Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction
of the CTA, while complainant and her companions were congratulating and
kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and
kissed her.

As to the last incident, respondent called complainant and asked her to see him in
his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. The complainant sat in front of
respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill.
Respondent then approached complainant saying, "me gusto akong gawin sa iyo
kahapon pa." Thereupon, he tried to "grab" her. Complainant instinctively raised
her hands to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her
towards him and kissed her. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself
inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed
a note stating, "sorry, it won't happen again.”

ISSUE:

Whether or nor the respondent Judge is guilty of sexual harassment.

RULING:

Respondent judge could is not guilty of sexual harassment.

In a work-related or employment environment, the following are elements of

sexual harassment:
 1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working
environment; and
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or any other person
having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor.

In the case at bar, the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the
acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso'
fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by
malice or ill-motive. It is clear under the circumstances that most of the kissing
incidents were done on festive and special occasions. Notably, complainant
declared in her affidavit-complaint that she brought some 'pasalubongs' for the
respondent judge from her trip abroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not have
been 'taken aback' by the respondent's act of greeting her in a friendly manner and
thanking her by way of a kiss on the cheek. Atty. Aquino failed to state
categorically in her affidavit-complaint that respondent demanded sexual advances
or favors from her, or that the former had committed physical conduct of sexual
nature against her.

7. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO

G.R. No. 177580
October 17, 2008

FACTS:

Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher, filed a sworn letter-complaint before the Office
of the Ombudsman charging her superior herein respondent, Officer-In-Charge of
the school and concurrently the principal with (1) violation of Republic Act No.
7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) and (2) grave misconduct
(administrative case). The administrative complaint, in essence, alleged that in the
afternoon of March 28, 2003, respondent made sexual advances on Ma. Ruby and
abused her sexually.

Ma. Ruby then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, which
was granted and ordered the preventive suspension of respondent for six (6)
months without pay. Respondent, through the assistance of her counsel moved for
the lifting of the preventive suspension Order but was denied. Undaunted,
respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the
Schools Division Superintendent Lilia T. Reyes had already designated one
Hereberto Jose D. Miranda as the new OIC of the school in his stead. By Order,
petitioner lifted the preventive suspension Order.

A decision in the administrative case was then rendered and petitioner adjudged
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint against Medrano.

RULING:

Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution “created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman.” Hailed as the “protectors of the people,” the Ombudsman and his
Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties
to act on complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in
Sections 12 and 13.

When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher,

however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically
provides that the same shall be heard initially by an investigating committee
composed of the school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers‘ organization, and a supervisor of the division. Thus, Section 23 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner “may refer certain complaints
to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees.”

In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is
concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.

While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing the administrative

complaint against Medrano and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given
that it had already concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon,
Medrano is now barred from assailing Ombudsman‘s acts under the principle of
estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before the
Ombudsman. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked Ombudsman for affirmative relief
by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for being
baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsman‘s acts
belatedly.

8. YOLANDA FLORALDE v. CA
GR No. 123048
August 08, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners employees of the Agricultural Training Institute charged respondent

Paulino W. Resma with grave misconduct in office (sexual harassment) in three
separate complaints filed directly with the Civil Service Commission. In his
answer to the said complaints, Resma specifically denied all the accusations
against him and asked for the dismissal of the complaints. The Commission
resolved to conduct a formal investigation of the case. Petitioners categorically
narrated the various incidents of sexual harassment, and they were subjected to
extensive cross-examination. Respondent’s defense is that the complaints were
instigated by a certain Atty. Ola, who was his rival for promotion. The defense
alleged that the three complaining petitioners were all convinced by Atty. Ola to
file charges against respondent Resma so that he would be out of contention for
promotion.

The Commission issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct

and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory
penalties, hence, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, however,
denied. On appeal, respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
petition for review. The same was reversed and set aside the resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission on the ground that the same were not supported by substantial
evidence.

RULING:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission on the ground that the same were not supported by substantial
evidence.

The sexual harassment charges against Resma were filed by three (3) rank and file
employees of the Agricultural Training Institute, where respondent Resma is an
OIC. Being rank and file employees, they were all reporting to their superior. Their
time records were signed by the latter. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not
about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire; it is about
power being exercised by a superior officer over his women subordinates. The
power emanates from the fact that the superior can remove the subordinate from
his workplace if the latter would refuse his amorous advances.

The respondent’s allegations that the Civil Service Commission erred in its
resolutions since the petitioners were unable to prove his guilt by the quantum of
substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings is unworthy. The
evidence adduced before the Commission consists of the positive testimonies of
petitioners. On the other hand, respondent claimed that it was impossible for him to
be at the office on the days that the sexual harassment occurred. In other words,
respondent presented an alibi.

Also, as to the defense of the said respondent that complaints were instigated by a
certain Atty. Ola, who was his rival for promotion, is not convincible. Filing a
charge for sexual harassment is not a trivial matter. It entails having to go public
with an incident that one is trying to forget. It means opening oneself to public
ridicule and scrutiny. The version of the defense that the charges were all
fabricated.

MAGNA CARTA FOR OVERSEAS

1. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. v. JOY C. CABILES

G.R. No. 170139
August 05, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and

placement agency. Respondent Cabiles applied thereto and was hired as quality
control job in Taiwan. She was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract
for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. On June 26, 1997, she was deployed to
work for Wacoal. In her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter. On July 14,
1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that
she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get
her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy
claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total
of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane
ticket to Manila.

Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations
Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. The said complaint was thereafter
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter, hence, Joy filed an appeal. The NLRC declared
that Joy was illegally dismissed. The CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her
three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Cabiles was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

Yes. The Court of Appeals’ ruling that the respondent was illegally dismissed is
correct.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, the following
must be shown:

1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against

which the employee will be judged;
2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been
communicated to the employee; and
3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the
employee’s performance assessment.

In this case, Sameer merely alleged that Cabiles failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was
shown to support such allegations. The agency did not even bother to specify what
requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what
particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency. There was also no showing
that Cabiles was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her work
efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the position
held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not
clear. The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that
there is just cause for termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally
terminated.

Northworthy is the fact that a valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and
adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The employer is required to give the
charged employee at least two written notices before termination, to wit: (i) notice
to inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause her dismissal; and (ii)
notice to inform the employee of the employer’s decision.” Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be given “an opportunity to be heard.”

In the case at bar, Sameer failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing
requirements. Respondent started working on June 26, 1997, however, she was told
that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely a
month from her first workday. She was likewise repatriated on the same day that
she was informed of her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated
any finding that she was properly notified and given the opportunity to be heard.
Further, her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.