The Doctrine of Perception in Buddhism

Ven. Mokesh Barua

International Buddhist College, Thailand
Corresponding Author Email:E-mail: mokesh.barua81@gmail.com

Abstract

In the Indian classical epistemology major and, perhaps the most

controversial issue is the etymology of perception. Most of the
Indian philosophical schools accept perception as the primary
means of knowledge, but differ on the nature, kinds and objects of
perceptual knowledge. The Buddhist epistemology which is known
as pramāna is the study of right knowledge which is classified into
two perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Perception or
pratyakṣa was declared as direct knowledge while anumāna was
understood as indirect knowledge.

The perceptual objects such as svabha, svalaksaṇa, self or the

particular nature of the object etc. and whether the external world
truly exists or not—all these issues were crucially debated, disputed
during the period of Northern Main Buddhist stream or Nikāya
Buddhism within and out of the Buddhist schools. All these factors
are indirectly and directly related to the concept of perception. This
paper will broadly focus on the doctrinal controversies such as what
can we know, and how we know it i.e. direct and indirect perception
among the different Buddhist schools.

Keywords: Buddhist Epistemology (pramāna), Perception

(pratyakṣa), Inference (anumāna), Perceptual objects, Buddhist Schools.

1. Introduction

Knowledge plays a very significant role in Buddhism as it is a

doorway to enlightenment and nirvana. Gautama, the Buddha, who
initiated Buddhist thought was not mere speculative and
individualistic thinker. He acquired knowledge and enlightenment
not for the only eradication of his own suffering but also eradication
suffering of others as well as all living beings. The Buddhist
epistemology which is known as pramāṇa is the study of right
knowledge or the means of right knowledge which is classified into
two, 1. Perception (pratyaksa) and 2. Inference (Anumāna).
Philosophically, Buddhist thought in India has four broad divisions,
namely, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamaka, and Yogācāra. The
development of Buddhist epistemology was done by with this four
early Buddhist schools.

However, according to Buddhist theory of mind all cognitions must

have an object and not every cognition, is an act of knowing.
Instead, only two types of cognitions – perception (pratyakṣa) and
inference (anumāna) – can be acts of knowing because only they are
reliable (avisaṁvāda) and motivators of action (pravartaka),
(Buddhist Epistemology, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006).

What is the Perception?

The goal of the perception is to provide a coherent and systematic

account of the nature of our sensory experiences. Perception simply
means cognition, observation, sensitivity, awareness etc. The oldest
definition of perception in the Buddhist tradition is the one by
Vasubandhu (C. 4th century CE), “perception is a cognition [ that
arise] from the object [ which is represented there in]”,
(Frauwallner, 1957). However, later on found more influential and
much discussed view on perception, which is simply a cognition
“devoid of conceptual construction (kalpanāpodhaṁ)”.

Perception is again classified into two. They are:

1. Direct perception (pratyakṣa) and

2. Indirect perception or representational perception
(apratyakṣa)

How and what we perceive? What is the instrument of seeing?

What are the sources of knowledge? What are the processes of
perception? Whether we perceive is corresponded to validity or
not? The question of perceptual objects such as svabha, svalakṣaṇa,
self or the particular nature of the object etc. and whether the
external world truly exists or not—all these issues were crucially
debated, disputed during the period of Northern Main Buddhist
stream or Nikāya Buddhism within and out of the Buddhist schools.
All these factors are indirectly and directly related to the concept of
perception.

In this paper, I would like to address about the doctrinal

controversies such as what can we know, and how we know it i.e.
direct and indirect perception among the different Buddhist schools.

2. Sarvāstivāda’s view point on the Direct perception

The central importance of mind continued in the Sarvāstivāda

school, the realistic and pluralistic school that developed (in the
time of Emperor Asoka that means at least by the middle of the 3rd
century B. C.) prior to the emergence of the Middle Way and the
Mind Only schools (Dhammajoti,KL 2002). Besides the other
Buddhist schools, Sarvastivadins held the view that every dharma is
momentary (kṣaṇikavāda).

They say that cognition and the object are the two different
momentary entities. They are holding the simultaneous causality
because cause and effect has a simultaneous relationship i.e.
perception and perceptual object change simultaneously giving rise
to the direct perception. For the example of the simultaneous
arising, they say that when an eye sees the rūpa (the perceptual
object), at the same time effect (the perception or visual
consciousness) is produced. As a result, there is no time gap
between them. In other words, the perceptual object as the cause
and the perception as the effect arise and cease at the same time.
That is to say, the visual faculty and visual object do serve as the
conditions for the arising of the visual consciousness.

Therefore, in the Sarvāstivāda point of view, “the sense faculty (the

eye) serving as the supporting basis (āṣraya) and the object serving
as the object qua condition (alambana-pratyaksa), necessarily exist
in one and the same moment as the sensory consciousness; or the
principal of these two requisites started by the Buddha for the
arising of the consciousness would be violated. And thanks to the
operation of simultaneous causality, the external object can be
directly grasped, in spite of universal law of momentariness
(Dhammajoti, KL, 2004).” Different Sarvāstivāda masters, especially,
Sanghabhadra put forward counter arguments, questions and
answers of the opponents’ questions in different treatises to show
their positions especially against the Sautrānatika.

3. Sautrāntika’s view point on the indirect perception

Sautrāntika was an interesting school because it rejected the

authenticity of the abhidharma, emphasizing the role of
discrimination (vikalpa) and it wanted to go back to the original
teaching of the Buddha contains in sutras. Sautrāntika formulated a
very interesting theory of indirect perception and according to them
everything is momentary i.e. mental and external dharmas. They
believed that we never really know the external world directly and
what we perceive-what we take to be an external object is a mental
reflection or representation of the object, so that the perception is
the process of perceiving mental reflection of the external objects.
Sautrāntika claimed that despite the doctrine of successive
causation, these mental representations are the effect of the
external objects. Consequently, they held that we know of the
existence of the external objects by inference (anumāna).

Mental images or the reflections of an external object are evidence

of that object’s existence, although we cannot know it directly. For
instance, an object is perceived by the eyes, since everything is
momentary, the moment eye perceives an object, it changes, but it
leaves its imprint behind the mind. That means in the first moment
the eyes absorb the image of it with the help of eye -consciousness,
and in the second moment the mind experiences the image (akara)
from the eye consciousness, not from the object itself. In other
words, mind sees the mind itself.
Therefore, this school promotes the idea of one moment gap that is
required the second moment thought (this school is also known as
sakara-vijnanavāda or sakara-jnavāda for that) yet, they “defend by
saying that, though these two moments are past moment, and past
is not real for Sautrāntika, but there arises a definite serial
continuity (santati). There is a definite causal continuity likewise the
eye in the present moment comes from the eye in the previous
moment. There is a serial continuity, that efficacy is passed on the
next moment. The requirement is that there must be two conditions
for the arising of the consciousness is not violated So for them
consciousness is, as it were, the mirror in which the external realities
are reflected.

4. Yogācāra’s view point on perception

The Mind Only School (cittamatra) is the philosophical background

of the Mahayana tradition besides Middle Way school. The Mind
Only school (founded by two brothers, Asanga and Vasubandhu)
arose as an independent and identifiable philosophical tradition in
the fourth century C.E. Some people misunderstood Yogācāra as it is
a form of metaphysical idealism for its theory of denying the
existence of the external object. Yogācāra doctrine is summarized in
the term vijṇapti-mātra, “nothing but cognition only” which also
known as “Consciousness Only” or “Mind Only”. This school
advocates the existence of the consciousness and cognitive object,
not the metaphysical (speculative) object. A metaphysical object is
not real, only the mind is real.

Now the question is “what we perceive with our eyes is real?”

An object that we think we see is an illusion according to Yogācāra

School. This illusion is due to our habits. These habits come from our
minds. This is for our habitual conditioning that we see that things
as real and in different way. In other words, only subjective aspect
(darsanabhaga) is real, not the objective aspect (nimittabhaga). The
object world is merely the transformation of our consciousness
(vijnanaparinama). There are a number of appearances along which
the Mind Only philosophy developed its doctrines of the primary of
consciousness. Its supporters were convinced that objects depend
on mind for their nature and being. First, the school put forward the
view that a single object appeared differently to different sentient
beings. This argument is shown with respect to the six realms of
existences. For example, a cup of milk appeared to us as milk, but it
would appear as nectar to the gods, as molten iron to hell beings,
and as pus or blood to hungry ghosts.

A single object appears differently to different sentient being in the

Samsara due to their respective karma. In other words, an object
appears in different forms according to the conditioned, subjective
state of mind. Even we can have this sort of practical examples in
our daily lives. For example, an itinerant ascetic, an amorous person
and a dog, all catch sight of a woman, but they all have three
different notions. The ascetic looks upon her as a mere carcass
(made up of five aggregates), the voluptuary or sensualist takes her
to be an object of amorous delight while the dog takes her to be
something eatable. Thus with reference to one and the same body
of the woman, diverse judgments arise according to the
preconception and the mental inclination of the different observers.
Similarly, the diversity of judgments on part of the empirical world is
due to the individual susceptibilities of the subject. Consciousness is
indivisible or non-separable and unitary in its nature.

However, Yogacāra School is divided into two schools concerning

the doctrinal controversies:

Sākāravāda:

cognition has some form in which it appears to represent an

external object: it argues: if cognition has the form of a blue (object)
or the like, why one should admit external things? If, again,
cognition has no form of a blue (object) or the like, how one can
admit external things? In the first case cognition itself serves the
purposes of the external things and in the second case in the
absence of any form in cognition, external things, if any, cannot be
established as there is no other means of cognizing objects except
through cognition which must have some forms.

Nīrakavāda:

cognition has no form: it says there is no external reality as has been

supported by the ignorant people. Consciousness under the
influence of vasana appears as external entities. All appearances are
mere illusions (maya) . Cognition is devoid of any form but has a
self-illuminating nature. In reality, mind is free from any imprint of a
supposed external object and is like the sky clear and infinite.

However, the genuine nature of perception, is it in-determinate or

determinate, if the importance is given to grasping the object with
all the details perception will be define as determinate. But if the
importance is given to the directness of the cognition then
perception will be defined as in-determinate. So, it is matter of
choice rather than what is factually there.

The two kind of paradigm realistic and constructive are operating

field of epistemology. The non-Buddhist school Naiyāyikas are
operating within the realistic paradigm where the object is given
independently of the knower. It is the phenomenon of knowledge
that makes the perceiver aware of the determinate cognition of the
object.

The Buddhist are operating within the constructivist paradigm,

where the subject is grasping momentary reality with the help of
concepts which are necessarily mental constructs, the knower is
therefore also constructing the object. The object is partly given and
partly constructed whether the object is independent or partly given
and partly constructed is not a factual issue.

This is conceptual issue and so in the debates on perception we can

see the actual concrete example of philosophical debate where the
two parties are arguing for the justification of their paradigm rather
than arguing about a specific matter of fact. The problem of
perception or other concept of perception is one of the fundamental
issues in philosophy both Indian as well as western.

5. Conclusion

During the Abhidharmic period, the topic of perception is heartedly

discussed and debated among the Buddhist and non-Buddhist
schools and they arrived in two contrasting views—direct and
indirect perception.

Although there cannot be two truths concerning one issue,

however, different sages and philosophers see same manner from
different perspectives with the logical argument and proper
disciplines desiring proper, fully and systematically understand the
Buddha’s profound teachings. Therefore, ultimate purpose of this
Abhidharmic analysis on perception is not for mere intellectual
studies but must serve the only purpose of spiritual development
and realization.

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