People Vs Obsania
People Vs Obsania
People Vs Obsania
Facts: A criminal complaint of rape with robbery was filed against Obsania.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further
proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the
accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment
that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure
to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which
averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity.
The CFI granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure
of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the
accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case."
From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
Issue: Does the present appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?
Held: In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an
accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to
the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a
quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that
the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and
decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case was without the express consent
of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon
his motion to dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that under the prevailing
jurisprudence, citing People vs. Bangalao, et al. (94 Phil. 354, February 17,
1954), People vs. Labatete (L-12917, April 27, 1960), People vs. Villarin (L-19795, July
31, 1964), and People vs. Cloribel (L-20314, August 31, 1964), an erroneous dismissal
of a criminal action, even upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or
dismiss, does not bar him from pleading the defense of double jeopardy in a
subsequent appeal by the Government or in a new prosecution for the same offense.
The accused suggests that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the previous
ruling of this Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed, other than on the merits,
upon motion of the accused personally or through counsel, such dismissal is to be
regarded as with the express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to
have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped from claiming
such defense on appeal by the Government or in another indictment for the same
offense.
This particular aspect of double jeopardy — dismissal or termination of the original case
without the express consent of the defendant — has evoked varied and apparently
conflicting rulings from this Court.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non
conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or
through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must
not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within
the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus
of our jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is set aside. This case is hereby remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law.