Philosophy of Mind: The Coherence of The Concept

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Philosophy of mind[edit]

Most writers on the philosophy of consciousness have been concerned with defending a particular
point of view, and have organized their material accordingly. For surveys, the most common
approach is to follow a historical path by associating stances with the philosophers who are most
strongly associated with them, for example, Descartes, Locke, Kant, etc. An alternative is to
organize philosophical stances according to basic issues.

The coherence of the concept[edit]


Many philosophers have argued that consciousness is a unitary concept that is understood intuitively
by the majority of people in spite of the difficulty in defining it. [8] Others, though, have argued that the
level of disagreement about the meaning of the word indicates that it either means different things to
different people (for instance, the objective versus subjective aspects of consciousness), or else it
encompasses a variety of distinct meanings with no simple element in common. [32]
Philosophers differ from non-philosophers in their intuitions about what consciousness is. [33] While
most people have a strong intuition for the existence of what they refer to as consciousness,
[8]
 skeptics argue that this intuition is false, either because the concept of consciousness is
intrinsically incoherent, or because our intuitions about it are based in illusions. Gilbert Ryle, for
example, argued that traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a Cartesian
dualist outlook that improperly distinguishes between mind and body, or between mind and world.
He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the world, but of individuals, or persons, acting
in the world. Thus, by speaking of "consciousness" we end up misleading ourselves by thinking that
there is any sort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understandings.
[34]

Types of consciousness[edit]
Ned Block argued that discussions on consciousness often failed to properly
distinguish phenomenal (P-consciousness) from access (A-consciousness), though these terms had
been used before Block.[35] P-consciousness, according to Block, is simply raw experience: it is
moving, colored forms, sounds, sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies and responses at
the center. These experiences, considered independently of any impact on behavior, are
called qualia. A-consciousness, on the other hand, is the phenomenon whereby information in our
minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we perceive,
information about what we perceive is access conscious; when we introspect, information about our
thoughts is access conscious; when we remember, information about the past is access conscious,
and so on. Although some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have disputed the validity of this
distinction,[36] others have broadly accepted it. David Chalmers has argued that A-consciousness can
in principle be understood in mechanistic terms, but that understanding P-consciousness is much
more challenging: he calls this the hard problem of consciousness.[37] Kong Derick has also stated
that there are two types of consciousness: high level consciousness, which he attributes to the mind,
and low level consciousness, which he attributes to the submind. [38]
Some philosophers believe that Block's two types of consciousness are not the end of the
story. William Lycan, for example, argued in his book Consciousness and Experience that at least
eight clearly distinct types of consciousness can be identified (organism consciousness; control
consciousness; consciousness of; state/event consciousness; reportability; introspective
consciousness; subjective consciousness; self-consciousness)—and that even this list omits several
more obscure forms.[39]
There is also debate over whether or not A-consciousness and P-consciousness always coexist or if
they can exist separately. Although P-consciousness without A-consciousness is more widely
accepted, there have been some hypothetical examples of A without P. Block, for instance, suggests
the case of a "zombie" that is computationally identical to a person but without any subjectivity.
However, he remains somewhat skeptical concluding "I don't know whether there are any actual
cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness, but I hope I have illustrated their conceptual
possibility."[40]

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