262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lachenal vs. Salas

*
G. R. No. L-42257, June 14, 1976.

ILDEFONSO LACHENAL, ELIAS LACHENAL, IRENEA L. SANTOS, FLORA L. SANCHEZ

and NATIVIDAD D. LACHENAL, petitioners, vs. HON. EMILIO V. SALAS, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch I, and FLAVIANA L. LEONIO, respondents.

Actions; Settlement of estate; As a general rule, questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in
the intestate or testate

___________________

* SECOND DIVISION

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proceeding; it should be ventilated in a separate action.—We hold that the title to the fishing boat should
be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leonio, the decedent’s
son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. “The administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the
administration proceedings”. This case falls under the general rule that questions as to title to property
cannot be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding but should be ventilated in a separate action.
Same; Same; Probate court may provisionally pass upon question of inclusion of a piece of property in
inventory, but final determination should be in a separate action.—Where a party in a probate proceeding
prays for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property, the probate court may
provisionally pass upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Same;  Same;  Jurisdiction;  Whether a particular matter should be resolved by a CFI in exercise of its
general or special jurisdiction is not essentially a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter but a mode
of practice which may be waived.—Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate,
land registration, etc.) is in a reality not a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is in essence a
procedural question involving a mode of practice “which may be waived”.
Same; Same; Same; Normally, question of title to property should be adjudicated in a separate action.—
Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title to property, which arises between the
decedent’s estate and other persons, should be adjudicated in a separate action because such a question
requires the presentation of appropriate pleadings (complaint, motion to dismiss, answer, counter claim and
reply). x x x The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to damages and counterclaims for money
or property. Ultimately, execution has to be issued. The execution of a judgment is usually made by the CFI
in an ordinary action and not in a special proceeding.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Alberto A. Tecson for petitioners.
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Lachenal vs. Salas

     Briñas, Atienza & Acaban Law Offices for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His testate estate is pending settlement in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (Special Proceeding No. 5836). His son, Ildefonso
Lachenal, was named executor of his will. Among the properties included in the inventory of his
estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII.
On April 1, 1971 the executor filed in that proceeding a motion to require the spouses Lope L.
Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal-Leonio to pay the rentals for the lease of  Lachenal VII  and to
return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and repair.
Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the executor’s motion. She countered
with a motion to exclude the fishing boat from the decedent’s estate. She claimed that she is the
owner of the boat because she purchased it from her father in 1967. The executor opposed the
motion for exclusion.
The probate court in its order of January 28, 1972 designated a commissioner to receive the
evidence of the parties relative to the ownership of the motorboat. Mrs. Leonio had already
finished the presentation of her evidence before the commissioner.
The executor did not present his countervailing evidence. Instead, on July 8, 1975 he and the
testator’s other children named Flora, Elias and Irenea, and the children of a deceased child filed
in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action against the Leonio
spouses and the other three children of the testator named Crispula, Modesto and Esperanza, for
the recovery of the motorboat  Lachenal VII, allegedly valued at P150,000, together with back
rentals and damages (Civil Case No. 3597).
It was alleged in the complaint that Victorio Lachenal in 1964 leased the said motorboat to his
son-in-law, Lope L. Leonio, for a monthly rental of P2,000 and that after Victorio’s death, the
executor of his estate demanded from Leonio the return of the boat and the payment of the back
rentals.
On July 20, 1975 the said plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed in the probate court their own
motion to exclude the said
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motorboat from the decedent’s estate on the ground that the probate court has no jurisdiction to
decide the question as to its ownership because that matter has to be resolved by the Caloocan
court where Civil Case No. 3597 is pending.
The probate court denied that motion. It held that it has jurisdiction over the issue of
ownership because the heirs had agreed to present their evidence on that point before a
commissioner.
It invoked the rule that generally “questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in
testate or intestate proceedings, except when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased,
in which event it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question as to title to
property and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. The
reason is that questions of collation or of advancement are generally inevitably involved therein
which are proper matters to be passed upon in the due course of administration. And it has also
been held that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under administration
may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided the
interests of third persons are not prejudiced.” (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, page 473, citing  Alvarez vs. Espiritu,  L-18833, August 14, 1965,  14 SCRA 892,
899; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Vda. de Mañalac vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661;  Cunanan vs.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Dinglasan vs. Ang Chia, 88 Phil. 476; Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
On January 5, 1976 the executor and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed these special
civil actions of prohibition and certiorari against the probate court.
The issue is whether the probate court should be allowed to continue the hearing on the
ownership of the fishing boat or whether that question should be left to the determination of the
Caloocan court where the subsequent separate action (now in the pre- trial stage) for the recovery
of the motorboat is pending.
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 because
it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L Leonio, the decedent’s son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. “The
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administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings”
(De la Cruz vs. Camon, 63 O.G. 8704, 16 SCRA 886; De Paula vs. Escay, infra).
This case falls under the general rule that questions as to title to property cannot be passed
upon in the testate or intestate proceeding but should be ventilated in a separate action
(Ongsingco vs. Tan, 97 Phil. 330, 334; Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 117 Phil. 385;  Magallanes
vs. Kayanan, L-31048, January 20, 1976; Recto vs. Dela Rosa, L-42799, March 16, 1976).
Where a party in a probate proceeding prays for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property, the court may provisionally pass upon the question without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action (Garcia vs. Garcia,  67 Phil.
353;  Guinguing vs. Abuton,  48 Phil. 144, 147;  Junquera vs. Borromeo,  L-18498, March 30,
1967, 19 SCRA 656; Borromeo vs. Canonoy, L-25010. March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 667).
The Court of First Instance is a court of general original jurisdiction invested with power to
take cognizance of all kinds of cases: civil cases, criminal cases, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty and insolvency cases (Sec. 39, Judiciary
Law; De Paula vs. Escay, 97 Phil. 617, 619; Manalo vs. Mariano, L-33850, January 22, 1976).
Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land
registration, etc.) is in reality not a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is in
essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice “which may be waived” (Cunanan vs.
Amparo, supra, page 232; Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
Probate jurisdiction includes all matters relating to the settlement of estates and the probate
of wills of deceased persons (Sec. 599, Act 190), particularly the administration of the decedent’s
estate, the payment of his debts, questions as to collation or advancements to the heirs, the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, and the partition and distribution of the estate (De La
Cruz vs. Camon, supra).
For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the decedent, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend in
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the right of the decedent, actions for causes which survive. Actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the decedent’s estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against an executor or administrator (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court).
In the instant case, the executor, by virtue of section 2 of Rule 87, filed a separate action in the
Caloocan court for the recovery of the fishing boat and back rentals from the Leonio spouses.
In the De la Cruz case, supra, it was held that rentals allegedly due to the decedent’s estate
may not be collected by the administrator by filing a motion in the testate proceeding. The said
rentals do not constitute property in the administrator’s hands and are not thus within the
effective control of the probate court. The proper procedure in collecting such rentals is to file an
independent action in the Court of First Instance so that the right of the estate thereto may be
threshed out in a full-dress trial on the merits.
The ruling in the  De la Cruz  case applies with stronger force to this case because here the
executor seeks to recover not only the rentals but also the leased property itself, as to which the
wife of the lessee had asserted adverse title.
Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title to property, which arises
between the decedent’s estate and other persons, should be adjudicated in a separate action
oecause such a question reauires the presentation of appropriate pleadings (complaint, motion to
dismiss, answer, counterclaim and reply). A resort to the modes of discovery may be necessary so
that the issues may be clearly defined and the trial may be expedited.  Those matters can be
effectively accomplished in an ordinary action rather than in the testamentary or intestate
proceeding (Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, L-21033, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462).
The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to damages and counterclaims for money
or property. Ultimately, execution has to be issued. The execution of a judgment is usually made
by the Court of First Istance in an ordinary action and not in a special proceeding
(See Magallanes vs. Kayanan, supra).
In the instant case, inasmuch as the controversy over the
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fishing boat concerns members of the same family, the Caloocan court should endeavor before
trial to persuade the litigants to agree upon some compromise (Arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code;
Sec. 1[j], Rule 16, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the probate court’s orders of September 17 and October 20, 1975, asserting its
jurisdiction to decide the title to thefishing boat, Lachenal VII, are set aside. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

     Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Martin, JJ., concur.

     Barredo, J., concurs in separate opinion.
     Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
     Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

BARREDO, J.: Concurring

I concur in the judgment setting aside the orders of respondent court upholding its jurisdiction as
probate court to pass on the isse of ownership of the subject fishing boat, Lachenal VII and
recognizing the jurisdiction already acquired by the Caloocan Court of First Instance in Civil
Case No. 3597. I am adding these few lines to the well grounded main opinion written by Mr.
Justice Aquino just to point out that the argument of estoppel advanced by respondent cannot
hold in this case, considering that according to the record, respondent judge had merely delegated
the reception of the evidence to a commissioner and the proceedings before said commissioner has
been pending for quite sometime, more than three years, without being completed. Questions of
ownerships as very aptly emphasized in the main opinion should as a rule be threshed out on the
basis of appropriate pleadings and evidence duly received by the court. Under the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, the best interests of justice require that preference be given to the
proper action which anyway has already been instituted for the purpose. It might be a different
case, however, if both parties had already presented all their evidence before the judge himself of
the probate court.
Orders set aside.

Notes.—The action for the annulment of the sale and the recovery of property allegedly
inherited from the deceased will
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not prosper and should be dismissed where the same property and the same claim are pending
adjudication in a separate proceeding for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased.
(Macias vs. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251).
In proceedings for settlement of an estate, the residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction but of venue. The court with whom the petition for probate is first filed, must also
first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts. (Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360).
As a general rule, the probate court cannot issue a writ of execution. The cases where it may
issue the writ of execution are: (a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and
heirs in possession of the decedent’s assets; (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition; (c)
to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings. (Vda. de Valera
vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96).
In a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate, the court has no jurisdiction to
determine who are the heirs of the brother of the deceased and who should inherit his estate.
(Bacani vs. Galauran, 4 SCRA 1063).
As a rule, where there are conflicting claims on the property included in the estate, the
question of ownership must first be ventilated in an appropriate proceeding, and hence, partition
cannot be done. (Gutierrez vs. Cruz, 24 SCRA 69).
——o0o