Abaoag, Czar Lorenzo

1651-18
Case Digest for first week

Case #1

Pacific Banking Corporation vs CA

GR No. 109373

FACTS:

Pacific Banking Corporation was placed under receivership and later was
placed under liquidation. A Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific
Banking Corporation was filed by Central bank and was approved. Pacific Banking
Corporation Employees Organization, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking
payment due its members as employees of the Bank. In its order, the court ordered
payment of the principal claims of the Union.

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On

October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the
order but in effect was denied by the Court. This order was received by the
Liquidator on December 9, 1991.The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. In
his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice
of Appeal on the ground that it lapsed for more than 15 days after the decision.

The RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents and such order
was received by the Liquidator on September 16, 1992.On September 30, 1992 he
moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2,
1992.

Issue:

WON a liquidation proceeding is a special proceeding.

Held:

Yes. The Court distinguishes an action and a special proceeding. An action

is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding
is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact.

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent

corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action.
Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the
prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative
relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of
action that can be enforced against any person. What it seeks is merely a declaration
by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to
file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in
another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation’s state of
insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their
claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Case #2

Natcher vs CA
GR. No. 133000

Facts:

Sps. Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a
parcel of land located in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano,
together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana
and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate.

On 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an “Agreement of

Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights”. Graciano then
donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered
under Graciano’s name.

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.

During their marriage, Graciano sold his land to his wife Patricia. On 07 October
1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first
marriage, as heirs.
 Private respondents filed a complaint alleged that upon Graciano’s death,
petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation and the issuance of title in the name of
Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that
as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

RTC ruled that the sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity.
Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.”

CA reversed and set aside the lower court.

Issue:

WON an RTC may adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made
by the decedent to any of the heirs.

Held:

No. The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as
Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not,
to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the
present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted
as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by
the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil

action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such
as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Case #3

Hernaez vs IAC
GR No. 73864

Facts:

On September 2, 1980, petitioner represented by his mother and natural

guardian, Evelyn Palmes, filed a complaint with the then Juvenile and Domestic
Court against Teodoro Hernaez for acknowledgment and support with support
pendente lite. Teodoro Hernaez filed a notice of appeal of said decision. As the
appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days as mandated by
Section39 of Batas Pambansa 129, petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal as the
decision of the trial court has become final and executory.Realizing the defect in his
notice of appeal, Teodoro Hernaez filed a Motion to Give Due Course to Appeal or
Petition for Relief which was denied on the ground that the motion was filed out of
time and the petition did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

Teodoro Hernaez thru his new counsel, filed another Petition for Relief from
Judgment alleging that he was not aware of the decision of the lower court. On the
same date, private respondent's wife, Estrella Hernaez, together with their six
children likewise filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Motion to Intervene
because they were not included as parties in the instant case, which petitions and
motion were denied for lack of merit and on the ground that the decision had already
become final and executory. Private respondents then filed a motion for clarification
inquiring as to whether their appeal which was granted on January 25, 1986 was
subsequently denied.

The trial court issued an order declaring that there is no need for a
clarification. On March 20, 1985, petitioner filed a motion to require private
respondent Teodoro Hernaez to deposit support in arrears or to be cited for contempt.
During the hearing of the motion for contempt, private respondents' counsel
requested for 10 days within which to comply with the questioned decision.
However, on April 10, 1986, private respondents, instead of complying with said
decision, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an
action for the annulment of judgment with preliminary injunction with the
Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 which declared the decision of the trial court null
and void for lack of summons by publication being an action in rem.
Issue:

WON an action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not

among cases of special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court.

Held:

Yes. An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not

among cases of special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court. Consequently, such an action should be governed by the rules on ordinary
civil actions. The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Court since
the same applies only to cases falling under Article 281 of the Civil Code where
there has been a voluntary recognition of the minor natural child, i.e., prior
recognition of the minor natural child in a document other than a record of birth or
a will, which is absent in the case.

Case #4

Portugal vs Portugal-Beltran
GR No. 155555

Facts:

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner

Isabel de la Puerta and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner.
Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and

Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate.
In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over
a parcel of land in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-
Beltran executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person” adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued
the title in her name.
 Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit
of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal,
hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC
for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status and
right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court, and lack of
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

WON Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to

determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name.

HELD:

No. The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the
case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship
should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.

However, in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case,
to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome
to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
Case #5

Rebong vs Ibaňez
GR No. L-1578

Facts:

Petitioner Rebong applied for a petition to cancel the annotation on the

certificate of title of a land which he inherited from his parents. In which the
annotation was pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, on
settlement of estate, to the effect that the property is still subject to any claim by
creditors and other heirs of his deceased parents within 2 years from settlement of
estate.

Petitioner based her petition for cancellation on section 112 of Act no. 496.
Which provides, “SEC. 112. ... Any registered owner or other person in interest may
at any time apply petition to the court, upon the ground that the registered interests
of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created which do
not appear upon the certificate; ... and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry
of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or
grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary,
as it may deem proper; . . . .

Since the respondent Judge denied her petition, petitioner claims that the
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

WON petition to cancel annotation should be allowed?

Held:

No. The annotation could not be cancelled because the registered interests
have not yet terminated and ceased. The two-year period required by Rule 74 has
not yet lapsed when the petition for cancellation was filed. Neither section 4, Rule
74 nor Act 496 authorizes the substitution of a bond for a lien or registered interest,
whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or
ceased.
Case #6

Torres vs Torres
GR No. L-19064

Facts:

Petitioner claims to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz E. Siguion

Torres who died intestate on December 18, 1959, prayed for the issuance in his favor
of letters of administration in connection with the properties left by the decedent,
with an aggregate value of about P300,000.00. It was also alleged therein that
petitioner was unaware of any existing debt or obligation contracted by the deceased
or by her estate, from any of the heirs or from third persons.

This petition was opposed by Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, on the ground
that the appointment of an administrator is unnecessary in view of the fact that on
January 27, 1960, the heirs of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered
into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate, pursuant to Section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner who, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed by
the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares
had failed thus needing the court’s intervention. It was also claimed that some
properties of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial partition.

On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial settlement had
already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed the petition. Hence, the institution
of the present appeal.

Issue:

WON a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is necessary.

Held:

No. Where the decedent left no debts and the heirs or legatees are all of age,
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment
of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected
either extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition.
Case #7

Ermac vs Medelo
Gr No. L-32281

Facts:

Spouses Mariquit both died leaving as the only property to be inherited by

their heirs a parcel of land with an assessed value of P590.00. Accordingly, herein
respondent Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren of the said spouses, filed a
petition for summary settlement of said estate. All requirements having been
complied with, and there being no opposition thereto, respondent court issued an
order granting the same, enumerating all the heirs entitled to participate in the
inheritance and ordering petitioner to present the proper project of partition of the
lot aforementioned.

On February 2, 1970, however, petitioner, one of the children of the deceased

spouses, moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement, praying for the
elimination of Lot 1327 from the estate on the ground that it belongs to him and his
wife. This motion was denied, the court ruling that the proper remedy is a separate
suit. Accordingly, petitioner, together with his children, filed a corresponding action.
And when upon submission of the project of partition, the respondent court approved
the same over his objection predicated on the pendency of Civil Case No. 1564,
petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:

WON the settlement proceeding should go on.

Held:

Yes. The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time.

The settlement proceeding must go on, and not be delayed. The probate court
is NOT the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of any
property ostensibly belonging to the decedent’s estate. While there are settled
exceptions to this rule, it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of deceased
person’s estate just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties
do not belong to the estate but to him. Adverse claims of ownership must be
ventilated in an INDEPENDENT ACTION. For the protection of the claimant, the
appropriate step is to have the proper annotation of lis pendens.

Case #8

Buot vs Dujali
GR No. 199885

Facts:

Buot filed before the RTC a petition for letters of administration of the estate
of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir
of Gregorio who died intestate. She also claimed that since Gregorio’s death, there
had been no effort to settle his estate. And that Dujali purportedly continued to
manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further
alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle the estate.
Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio’s
estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established;
and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed in accordance with law among the legal
heirs.

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss. According to Dujali, when

an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only when
there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or
out of court) is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding.

Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for
administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action for
partition. In her case, she claims that there are good reasons justifying her recourse
to administration proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not
cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali
seeks to challenge Buot’ s status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the
properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and
Marilou Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment
of an administrator.
ISSUE:

WON Petition for letters of administration filed by Buot be granted.

HELD:

No. The Court held that the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant
of her petition for letters of administration do not suffice to warrant the submission
of Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings.

Buot’s allegation that the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover
Gregorio’s entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the
administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover
the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire
estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to
order the administration of the estate

An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s entitlement
to participate in the proceedings as an heir. Not only would it allow for the full
ventilation of the issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the partition
and the true heirs entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the
appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain if
partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to
judicial administration proceedings.There are, however, several exceptions.

If the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs
may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs
may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the
Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action
for partition.
Case #9

Pereira vs CA
GR No. L-81147

Facts:

Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3,

1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of
ten months, and his sister. Rita instituted for the issuance of letters of administration
in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira and
alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving
heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the
deceased; that the deceased left several properties,

Victoria filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters
of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving
spouse.

Issue:

WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no

debts left by the decedent

Held:

No. What constitutes good reason to warrant a judicial administration of the

estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will
depend on the circumstances of each case. The general rule is that when a person
dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6,
Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail
to name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of
Rule 74.

Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without
instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action for partition.

The Court ruled that to subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which
does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been
extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would
only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most
instances of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to the properties left by
the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the
creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.

Case #10

Sheker vs Estate of Sheker

GR No. 157912

Facts:

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against
the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on a contingent claim for agent’s
commission due him in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to
the estate, and reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by
petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice Sheker (MEDINA) moved for the
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite
docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not
been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping;
and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was
not filed and served personally.

The RTC-Iligan City issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice
the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner’s MR
was denied. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
 Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate
proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written
explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of
the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the ROC provides that rules in
ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Issues:

WON rules in ordinary civil actions are only suppletory to rules in special
proceedings.

Held:

No. Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same ROC provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. – In the absence of special

provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the ROC govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part
I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable

of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of
special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings
as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the ROC does it categorically say that rules in ordinary
actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of
the ROC requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and
the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way
obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such
as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Case #11

Ventura vs Ventura
GR No. L-11609

Facts:

Petitioner is the widow of Agustine del Valle, who died in Paniqui, Tarlac, on
May 19, 1955. Soon thereafter, she instituted Special Proceedings with a petition
for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of the deceased. After the
issuance of the corresponding notice of hearing, the publication of said notice and
the service of copies thereof upon all parties concerned, petitioner filed a motion
stating that the heirs instituted in the will had agreed to partition, among themselves,
the estate of the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of said instrument, and
praying that an order be issued "terminating and closing" the aforementioned
proceedings.

However, Antonia Ventura filed another partition for the probate of the
probate of the aforementioned last will and testament of her deceased husband which
petition was docketed on the same court. Appellees Maura, Milagros, Deogracias
and Jacinta, all surnamed Ventura, moved for the dismissal of the case.

The lower court granted this motion upon the theory that it " no longer" had
"jurisdiction to entertain" the case, "because to do so would be for the court to reopen
Special Proceedings No. 912", notwithstanding the fact that it had been "definitely
declared terminated, closed and archived" by an order which has already "become
final and executory", no appeal having been taken therefrom. Hence, the present
appeal taken by petitioner Antonia Ventura.

Issue:

WON the dismissal of the Special Proceedings bars the consideration of the
petition.

Held:

No. Although final and executory; said order of dismissal of Special

Proceedings No. 912 does not bar the consideration of the petition herein. Pursuant
to rule 30, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
 "An action may be dismissed by the by the plaintiff without order of court
by filling a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed
by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based
on or including the same action."

Although found in Part I of the Rules of Court, which refers to civil actions, this rule
is applicable to Special Proceedings, for Rule 73, section 2, of said Rules provides:

"In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."

The order issue in Special Proceedings No. 912, directing that the same be closed,
terminated and archived, had filed a pleading or raised an issue, is deemed, therefore,
to be "without prejudice", the contrary not being stated either in said order or in the
motion that prompted its issuance. Needless to say, the aforementioned order may
not be regarded as a judgment, barring a subsequent action upon the ground of "res
adjudicate”.

Case #12

Bunyi vs Factor
GR No. 172547

Facts:

Respondent is one of the co-owners of a piece of land in Las Pinas City owned
by her grandparents. Her father E caused the construction of several houses in the
compound including the subject property, a rest house, where members of the Factor
family stayed during get-togethers and visits. Petitioners, were tenants in one of the
houses inside the compound City 1999. When Enrique Factor died, the
administration of the Factor compound was transferred and entrusted to Enrique’s
eldest child, who lives with her husband.
Gloria died in 2001 and the administration of the Factor compound passed on
to respondent Fe as co-owner of the property. As an act of goodwill, considering that
Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income, respondent allowed him to
stay at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor
family. Ruben Labao later on married herein petitioner.
On November 10, 2002, Ruben Labao died. Respondent discovered that
petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest house and stole all the personal
properties owned by the Factor family and then audaciously occupied the premises.
Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family
of the subject property’s lawful use and possession. Respondent also added that
when she tried to enter the rest house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified person
who claimed to have been authorized by petitioners to occupy the premises, barred,
threatened, and chased her with a jungle bolo.

Respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein petitioners

Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi. Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe’s claim of
ownership of the subject property and the alleged prior ownership of her father
Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property was owned by Ruben Labao,
and that petitioner Precy with her husband moved into the subject property.

Issue:

WON petitioner has better right of physical and material possession of the
subject property.

Held:

No. The private respondent Fe S. Factor has a better right of physical and
material possession of the subject property. In ejectment cases, the only issue for
resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-
litigants.

The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself. Possession de facto is the physical possession of real
property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible
entry case.

In this case, while petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied
the subject property, they failed to prove that they had prior possession of the subject
property. On record, petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria Factor-Labao and
Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used the
subject property whenever they visit the same. The right of respondent’s
predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to uphold respondents
right to possession over the same. Also, the right over the property was vested to the
heirs, Fe being a co-heir of Gloria, from the moment of death of their father Enrique
and there being no showing of evidence that would contradict such, Fe has a better
right over the subject property.

Case #13
Lim vs CA
GR No. 124715

Facts:

On June 11, 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving
spouse and duly represented by her nephew, George Luy filed on March 17, 1995, a
joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent corporations whose properties were
included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a Motion for the
Lifting of Lis Pendens and Motion for Exclusion of Certain Properties from the
Estate of the decedent, Pastor Y. Lim.
RTC, as probate court, granted these 2 motions. Petitioner filed a verified
Amended Petition. RTC acting on petitioner's motion issued an order directing the
Registry of Deeds to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens. Probate court also issued
an order denying private respondents' Motion for Exclusion.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for Certiorari before the CA
questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court. The
CA ruled in favor of herein private respondents and reversed the RTC constituted as
a probate court. Petitioner files this instant petition praying that SC affirm the orders
issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner on her appeal via Rule 45 assigned the lone error committed by
the CA in that she alleged that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the orders of the lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional
inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased, Pastor
Y. Lim, with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to
repeal, to disobey, or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81, 83, 84,
and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing
her duty as special administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said Rules.

Issue:
 WON the Petitioner’s contention is meritorious to warrant a reversal of the
CA’s ruling.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court stated that settled is the rule that a Court of First
Instance, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed
by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of
third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the
question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court, is
in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of
practice which may be waived.

Case #14

Roberts vs Leonidas
GR No. L-55509

Facts:

Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by

his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two
children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23,

1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property
of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by
Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate
petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the
two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration
of the stipulation between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills
(already probated in Utah), praying inter alia that the partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, and that she
be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received
by them and return the same to her. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due
to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the
intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was
contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Issue:

WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.

Held:

No. A testate proceeding is proper in case the decedent died testate and no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed. As
a consequence, the probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate
of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.

In this case, there was sufficient proof that the decedent died leaving a will
and to allow intestate proceedings where a will was proven to be executed by the
decedent will be contrary to both logic and law. In such scenario where an
intestate and testate proceeding were commenced, the latter shall govern.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.

Case #15

Uriarte vs CFI of Negros Occidental

GR Nos. L-21938-39

Facts:

Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the
Philippines. Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the
deceased, filed a petition for the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Said petition was opposed by the
nephews of Juan stating that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy
of which is being requested.

The nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the
basis of the alleged will of the deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement
of estate in the court of Manila stating that the court of Negros Occidental has already
acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The opposition of Vicente was dismissed
together with the intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros.

Issue:

WON the intestate settlement filed in the CFI of Negros Occidental prior to
the institution of the testate settlement in Manila should be dismissed.

Held:

Yes. Under the Rules on the settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate
proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

In cases where an intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of the will
of the deceased, and because of such find, a probate proceeding regarding such will
is filed thereafter, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority
to the testate proceeding.

Case #16

Cuenco vs CA
GR No. L-24742

Facts:

Senator Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor
sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
One of the children from the first marriage filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator
died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu at the time of his death and that he
left real and personal properties with in Cebu and Quezon City.

On Mach 12, 1964, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance
resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate
proceedings.
 Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to
dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a Writ
of Prohibition against the CFI Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings in view of the prior acquisition of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu.

Issue:

WON the ruling of the Court of Appeals is proper.

HELD:

No. Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
Rule on venue though does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate
petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The court with whom the
petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in
order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

In this case, the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of
the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue
of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon
City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate
court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's
will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.

Case #17

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs Dumlao

GR No. 44888

Facts:
 Ricardo M. Gonzales, filed a Petition with the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying that he be appointed judicial
administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy.
Private respondents, opposed the prayer asserting that the petition did not
allege that the petitioner is an interested person and for that reason the case must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It contended that when you file a petition for
intestacy, you must state that you are an interested person because the opening
sentence of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court dictates that, a petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person.

Issue:

WON an allegation that the petitioner is an interested person is a jurisdictional

fact which must be stated in the petition.

HELD:

No. Under the law, a jurisdictional fact in intestacy proceedings or a petition

seeking Letters of Administration means that the applicant must allege, among
others: (1) the death of the testator, (2) the place of residence of the deceased at the
time of his death, (3) the place, area, or territory where the probate court is sitting,
(4) if he is inhabitant of the foreign country, and (5) his having left his estate in such
country.

The allegation that the petitioner seeking Letters of Administration is an

interested person is not within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts to be
established in such proceedings. Thus the contention that establishing locus standi
in such proceeding is not a jurisdictional fact. However, the Court in this case
emphasized that it is undeniable that an allegation that a person is an interested
person in such proceeding is also required and Motion to Dismiss will lie not on
ground of lack of jurisdiction but on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute
the proceeding.
Case #18

San Luis vs San Luis

GR No. 1337434

Facts:

Felicisimo San Luis, the former Governor of the Province of Laguna, during
his lifetime, contracted three marriages.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration
before the RTC of Makati City.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and

failure to state a cause of action, claiming that the Petition for Letters of
Administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.

A similar motion to dismiss was filed by Linda, sister of petitioner. The trial
court denied the Motions to Dismiss. In her opposition thereto, respondent submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in Alabang which
they bought sometime in 1982.

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed Motions for Reconsideration from the Order denying their Motions to Dismiss.
The court a quo issued an Order denying the Motions for Reconsideration. The trial
court dismissed the Petition for Letters of Administration on grounds of improper
venue and lack of legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

Issue:

WON the CA’s decision as to venue of action is proper.

RULING:
 Yes. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court states that the Petition for Letters
of Administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of the
province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” For purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place
and domicile in another.

In this case, it is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for

purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with “domicile.” Needless to say, there is a distinction between
“residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.

From the foregoing, it is thus clear that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in
the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

Case #19

Utulo vs Pasion
GR No. 45904

Facts:

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the
CFI of Tarlac for the administration of his property Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia,
the surviving spouse and the herein Oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix.

The said deceased left legitimate children, who, with the widow, are the
presumptive compulsory heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and
during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died
in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only heirs being her
mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial
administration of the property of his deceased wife (Special Proceedings No. 4188),
stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the
Oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due
her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that
he be named administrator of the property of said deceased.

The Oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration

of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administrator.
She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no
occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court
grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix
thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant. The trial proceeded and
the court finally issued the appealed order to which the Oppositor excepted and
thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and approved.

ISSUE:

WON the judicial administration of the property left by the deceased lies with
the consequent appointment of an administrator.

HELD:

No. In this case, the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of legal age,
thus there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses
of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence
of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in
anyway whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners
of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same
among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs
requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way
whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not
received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the
said estate.
Case #20
Hernandez vs Andal

Facts:

Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and Basilia Hernandez are siblings, who
acquired in common, a parcel of land from their deceased father. Maria and Aquilina
sold to the spouses Andal a portion thereof, which they purport to be their combined
shares. After the sale, Cresencia attempted to repurchase the land but Andal refused
to sell the same.

Andal resold the same to Maria and Aquilina. Maria and Aquilina alleged that
there had been an oral partition among them and their brother and sisters, and that
there are witnesses ready to prove such partition. However, Cresencia asserted that
under the Rules of Court, oral evidence of partition is inadmissible.

Issue:

WON oral evidence is admissible in proving a contract of partition among

heirs.

Held:

Yes. As a general rule, transactions are required to be reduced to writing either

as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the
existence of such transactions. However, written form in a contract of partition
among heirs are not governed by the statute of frauds, as the same is not a
conveyance of property but simply a separation and designation of that part of the
land which belongs to each tenant in common.

The Civil Code, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public

instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy
so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound
may be compelled to execute the document. It must be noted that where the law
intends a writing or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of the
transactions it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public
instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of
its effectiveness as between the parties.