Civil Law Bar Exam Answers Land Transfer and Deeds

Civil Law Bar Exam Answers: Land Transfer and Deeds
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How to Get to Giovanni
Acquisition of Lands; Citizenship Requirement in Silph Co Maze
(2003) (29,652)
2014 Case Digest: Arigo
In 1970, the spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz, then Filipinos, bought
v. Swift (24,380)
the parcel of unregistered land in the Philippines on which
Pokemon Revolution:
they built a house which became their residence. In 1986, they
How to Get HM01 – Cut
migrated to Canada and became Canadian citizens.
(24,291)
Thereafter, in 1990, they applied, opposed by the Republic, for Case Digest: Estrada v.
the registration of the aforesaid land in their names. Should Escritor (22,642)
the application of the spouses de la Cruz be granted over the Case Digest: LA BUGAL
Republic’s opposition? Why? B’LAAN TRIBAL
ASSOCIATION…
SUGGESTED ANSWER: (22,589)
Case Digest: THE
Yes, the application should be granted. As a rule, the
PROVINCE OF NORTH
Constitution prohibits aliens from owning private lands in the
COTABATO, et al .…
Philippines. This rule, however, does not apply to the spouses
(22,555)
Juan and Juana de la Cruz because at the time they acquired
Pokemon Revolution:
ownership over the land, albeit imperfect, they were still
Eevee Mission at Game
Filipino citizens. The application for registration is a mere
Corner Guide (22,053)
confirmation of the imperfect title which the spouses have
2015 Case Digest:
already acquired before they became Canadian citizens.
Diocese of Bacolod v.
http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

(Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]).
COMELEC (21,675)
Adverse Claims; Notice of Levy (1998) 2017 Case Digest:
Estipona v. Lobrigo and
Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, concerning adverse People (20,012)
claims on registered land, provides a 30-day period of Case Digest: Republic of
effectivity of an adverse claim, counted from the date of its the Philippines v.
registration. Suppose a notice of adverse claim based upon a Cagandahan (15,986)
contract to sell was registered on March 1, 1997 at the instance
of the BUYER, but on June 1, 1997, or after the lapse of the
30-day period, a notice of levy on execution in favor of a This work by Law Tech World
JUDGMENT CREDITOR was also registered to enforce a final is licensed under a Creative
judgment for money against the registered owner. Then, on Commons Attribution 4.0
June 15, 1997 there having been no formal cancellation of his International License.
notice of adverse claim, the BUYER pays to the seller-owner
the agreed purchase price in full and registers the
corresponding deed of sale. Because the annotation of the
notice of levy is carried over to the new title in his name, the
BUYER brings an action against the JUDGMENT CREDITOR
to cancel such annotation, but the latter claims that his lien
is superior because it was annotated after the adverse claim
of the BUYER had ipso facto ceased to be effective. Will the
suit prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly annotated

at the back of a title under Section 7O of P.D. 1529 is good
only for 30 days, cancellation thereof is still necessary to
render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription thereof will
remain annotated as a lien on the property. While the life of
adverse claim is 3O days under P.D. 1529, it continuous to be
effective until it is canceled by formal petition filed with the
Register of Deeds.
The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified under Section

108 of P.D. 1529 considering that the levy on execution can
not be enforced against the buyer whose adverse claim against
the registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of levy
on execution.
Annotation of Lis Pendens; When Proper (2001)

Mario sold his house and lot to Carmen for P1 million payable
in five (5) equal annual installments. The sale was registered
and title was issued in Carmen’s name. Carmen failed to pay
the last three installments and Mario filed an. action for
collection, damages and attorneys fees against her. Upon
filing of the complaint, he caused a notice of lis pendens to be
annotated on Carmen’s title. Is the notice of lis pendens
proper or not? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The notice of lis pendens is not proper for the reason that the
case filed by Mario against Carmen is only for collection,
damages, and attorney’s fees.
Annotation of a lis pendens can only be done in cases

involving recovery of possession of real property, or to
quiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for partition or any
other proceeding affecting title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof. The action filed by Mario does not fall on
anyone of these.
Foreshore Lands (2000)
Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of

Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for the past 15 years.
Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to obtain a free
patent from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering the same
land, on the basis of a certification by the District Forester
that the same is already “alienable and disposable”.
Moreover, Jorge had already registered the patent with the
Register of Deeds of the province, and he was issued an
Original Certificate of Title for the same. Regina filed an
action for annulment of Jorge’s title on the ground that it was
obtained fraudulently. Will the action prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An action for the annulment of Jorge’s Original Certificate of

Title will prosper on the following grounds:
(1) Under Chapter IX of C .A, No. 141, otherwise known as the

Public Land Act, foreshore lands are disposable

for residential, commercial, industrial, or similar productive

purposes, and only by lease when not needed by the
government for public service.
(2) If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or

aquaculture purposes, it comes under the Jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and can
only be acquired by lease (P.D. 705).
(3) Free Patent is a mode of concession under Section 41,

Chapter VII of the Public Land Act, which is applicable only
for agricultural lands.
(4) The certificate of the district forester that the land is

already “alienable and disposable” simply means that the land
is no longer needed for forest purposes, but the Bureau of
Lands could no longer dispose of it by free patent
because it is already covered by a lease contract between
BFAR and Regina. That contract must be respected.
(5) The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab

initio, not only because the Bureau has no statutory
authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore area, but also
because of the false statements made in his sworn application
that he has occupied and cultivated the land since July 4,
1945, as required by the free patent law. Under Section 91 of
the Public Land Act, any patent concession or title obtained
thru false representation is void ab initio. In cases of this
nature, it is the government that shall institute annulment
proceedings considering that the suit carries with it a prayer
for the reversion of the land to the state. However, Regina
is a party in interest and the case will prosper because she has
a lease contract for the same land with the government.
Forgery; Innocent Purchaser; Holder in Bad Faith

(2005)
Rod, the owner of an FX taxi, found in his vehicle an
envelope containing TCT No. 65432 over a lot registered in
Cesar’s name. Posing as Cesar, Rod forged Cesar’s signature
on a Deed of Sale in Rod’s favor. Rod registered the said
document with the Register of Deeds, and obtained a new title

in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to Don, a buyer in

good faith and for value, who also registered the lot in his
name.
a) Did Rod acquire title to the land? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Rod did not acquire title to the land. The inscription in the
registry, to be effective, must be made in good faith. The
defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not extend to
a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a
flaw. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled
to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a
shield for frauds.
(Samonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104223, July 12, 2001)
In the case at bar, Rod only forged Cesar’s signature on

the Deed of Sale. It is very apparent that there was bad faith on the
part of Rod from the very beginning. As such, he is not
entitled to the protection of the Land Registration Act.
b) Discuss the rights of Don, if any, over the property.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that persons

dealing with registered land have the legal right to rely on the
face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the
need to inquire further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel
a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry (Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128573, January 13, 2003).
In the given problem, the property was already registered in

the name of Rod when he bought the same from the latter.
Thus, Don could be considered as a buyer in good faith and for
value. However, since Rod did not actually sell any property to
him, Don has no right to retain ownership over the property.
He has only the right to recover the purchase price plus
damages.

Forgery; Innocent Purchaser; Mirror Principle (1991)
Bruce is the registered owner, of a parcel of land with a building
thereon and is in peaceful possession thereof. He pays the real
estate taxes and collects the rentals therefrom. Later, Catalino,
the only brother of Bruce, filed a petition where he,
misrepresenting to be the attorney-in-fact of Bruce and
falsely alleging that the certificate of title was lost, succeeded
in obtaining a second owner’s duplicate copy of the title and
then had the same transferred in his name through a
simulated deed of sale in his favor. Catalino then mortgaged
the property to Desiderio who had the mortgage annotated on
the title. Upon learning of the fraudulent transaction, Bruce
filed a complaint against Catalino and Desiderio to have the
title of Catalino and the mortgage in favor of Desiderio
declared null and void.
Will the complaint prosper, or will the title of Catalino and the
mortgage to Desiderio be sustained?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The complaint for the annulment of Catalino’s Title will

prosper. In the first place, the second owner’s copy of the title
secured by him from the Land Registration Court is void ab
initio, the owner’s copy thereof having never been lost, let
alone the fact that said second owner’s copy of the title was
fraudulently procured and improvidently issued by the Court.
In the second place, the Transfer Certificate of Title procured
by Catalino is equally null and void, it having been issued on
the basis of a simulated or forged Deed of Sale. A forged deed
is an absolute nullity and conveys no title.
The mortgage in favor of Desiderio is likewise null and void because
the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property.
While it may be true that under the “Mirror Principle” of
the Torrens System of Land Registration, a buyer or
mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears on the
Certificate of Title, and in the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate
and investigate the mortgagor’s title, this rule does not
find application in the case at hand because here. Catalino’s

title suffers from two fatal infirmities, namely:
a)
The fact that it emanated from a forged deed of a simulated
sale;
b)
The fact that it was derived from a fraudulently procured
or improvidently issued second owner’s copy, the real owner’s
copy being still intact and in the possession of the true owner,
Bruce.
The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled without

prejudice to his right to go after Catalino and/or the
government for compensation from the assurance fund.
Fraud; Procurement of Patent; Effect (2000)
In 1979, Nestor applied for and was granted a Free Patent over
a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 30 hectares,
located in General Santos City. He presented the Free
Patent to the Register of Deeds, and he was issued a
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 375,
Subsequently, Nestor sold the land to Eddie. The deed of sale
was submitted to the Register of Deeds and on the basis
thereof, OCT No, 375 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 4576 was issued in the name of Eddie. In
1986, the Director of Lands filed a complaint for annulment of
OCT No, 375 and TCT No. 4576 on the ground that Nestor
obtained the Free Patent through fraud. Eddie filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that he was an innocent purchaser
for value and in good faith and as such, he has acquired a title
to the property which is valid, unassailable and indefeasible.
Decide the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint for annulment

of O.C.T. No. 375 and T.C.T. No. 4576 should be denied for the
following reasons:
1) Eddie cannot claim protection as an

innocent purchaser for value nor can he interpose the defense

of indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on a

void title. Under Section 91 of CA No. 141, as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, statements of
material facts in the applications for public land must be
under oath. Section 91 of the same act provides that such
statements shall be considered as essential conditions and
parts of the concession, title, or permit issued, any false
statement therein, or omission of facts shall ipso facto
produce the cancellation of the concession. The patent issued
to Nestor in this case is void ab initio not only because it was
obtained by fraud but also because it covers 30 hectares which
is far beyond the maximum of 24 hectares provided by the
free patent law.
2) The government can seek annulment of the original and
transfer certificates of title and the reversion of the land to
the state. Eddie’s defense is untenable. The protection
afforded by the Torrens System to an innocent purchaser for
value can be availed of only if the land has been titled thru
judicial proceedings where the issue of fraud becomes
academic after the lapse of one (1) year from the issuance of
the decree of registration. In public land grants, the action of
the government to annul a title fraudulently obtained does not
prescribe such action and will not be barred by the transfer of
the title to an innocent purchaser for value.
Homestead Patents; Void Sale (1999)
In 1950, the Bureau of Lands issued a Homestead patent to A. Three years later,
A sold the homestead to B. A died in 1990, and his heirs filed
an action to recover the homestead from B on the ground that
its sale by their father to the latter is void under Section 118 of
the Public Land Law. B contends, however, that the heirs of A
cannot recover the homestead from him anymore because
their action has prescribed and that furthermore, A was in
pari delicto. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance of the

homestead patent, being in violation of Section 118 of the
Public Land Act, is void from its inception.

The action filed by the heirs of B to declare the nullity or

inexistence of the contract and to recover the land should be
given due course.
B’s defense of prescription is untenable because an action

which seeks to declare the nullity or inexistence of A
contract does not prescribe.
(Article 1410; Banaga vs. Soler, 28 SCRA 765)
On the other hand, B’s defense of pari delicto is equally

untenable. While as a rule, parties who are in pari delicto have
no recourse against each other on the principle that a
transgressor cannot profit from his own wrongdoing, such
rule does not apply to violations of Section 118 of the
Public Land Act because of the underlying public policy in the
said Act “to conserve the land which a homesteader has
acquired by gratuitous grant from the government for himself
and his family”. In keeping with this policy, it has been held
that one who purchases a homestead within the five-year
prohibitory period can only recover the price which he has
paid by filing a claim against the estate of the deceased seller
(Labrador vs. Delos Santos 66 Phil. 579) under the
principle that no one shall enrich himself at the expense of
another. Applying the pari delicto ruleto violation of Section
118 of the Public Land Act, the Court of Appeals has ruled that
“the homesteader suffers the loss of the fruits realized by the
vendee who in turn forfeits the improvement that he has
introduced into the land.” (Obot vs. Sandadi
Uas, 69 OG,April 35,1966}
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action to declare the nullity of the sale did not prescribe
(Art. 1410}, such sale being one expressly prohibited and
declared void by the Public Lands Act [Art. 1409, par. (7)].
The prohibition of the law is clearly for the protection of the
heirs of A such that their recovering the property would
enhance the public policy regarding ownership of lands
acquired by homestead patent (Art. 1416). The defense of pari
delicto is not applicable either, since the law itself allows
the homesteader to reacquire the land even if it has been sold.

SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Prescription does not arise with respect to actions to declare a

void contract a nullity (Article 1410). Neither is the
doctrine of pari delicto applicable because of public policy.
The law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff so as to
enhance the public policy of the Public Land Act to give land
to the landless.
If the heirs are not allowed to recover, it could be on the

ground of laches inasmuch as 40 years had elapsed and the
owner had not brought any action against B especially if the
latter had improved the land. It would be detrimental to B if
the plaintiff is allowed to recover.
Innocent Purchaser for Value (2001)
Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High Rise

Co. and paid the price in full. He moved into the unit, but
somehow he was not given the Condominium
Certificate of Title covering the property. Unknown to him,
High Rise Co. subsequently mortgaged the entire
condominium building to Metrobank as security for a loan of
P500 million. High Rise Co. failed to pay the loan and the
bank foreclosed the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, the
bank acquired the building, being the highest bidder. When
Cesar learned about this, he filed an action to annul the
foreclosure sale insofar as his unit was concerned. The bank
put up the defense that it relied on the condominium
certificates of title presented by High Rise Co., which were
clean. Hence, it was a mortgagee and buyer in good faith. Is
this defense tenable or not? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Metrobank’s defense is untenable. As a rule, an innocent

purchaser for value acquires a good and a clean title to the
property. However, it is settled that one who closes his eyes to
facts that should put a reasonable man on guard is not an
innocent purchaser for value. In the present problem the bank
is expected, as a matter of standard operating procedure, to
have conducted an ocular inspection, of the promises before

granting any loan. Apparently, Metrobank did not follow this

procedure. Otherwise, it should have discovered that the
condominium unit in question was occupied by Cesar and that
fact should have led it to make further inquiry. Under the
circumstances, Metrobank cannot be considered a mortgagee
and buyer in good faith.
Mirror Principle (1990)
In 1950’s, the Government acquired a big landed estate in

Central Luzon from the registered owner for subdivision into
small farms and redistribution of bonafide occupants, F was a
former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares in area. After
completion of the resurvey and subdivision, F applied to buy
the said land in accordance with the guidelines of the
implementing agency. Upon full payment of the price
in 1957, the corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed in
his favor and was registered, and in 1961, a new title was
issued in his name. In 1963, F sold the said land to X; and
in 1965 X sold it to Y, new titles were successively issued in
the names of the said purchasers.
In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to F, X and

Y and their titles, on the ground that he (C) had been in actual
physical possession of the land, and that the sale to F and the
subsequent sales should be set aside on the ground of fraud.
Upon motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the
complaint, upholding their defenses of their being innocent
purchasers for value, prescription and laches. Plaintiff
appealed.
(a) Is the said appeal meritorious? Explain your answer
(b) Suppose the government agency concerned joined C in

filing the said action against the defendants, would that
change the result of the litigation? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled

correctly in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for the
following reasons:

1. While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee of the

land was aware of the fact that C was the bona
fide occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer
certificate of title may be vulnerable, the transfer of the same
land and the issuance of new TCTs to X and Y who are
innocent purchasers for value render the latter’s titles
indefeasible. A person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law
will not in any way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property in search for any
hidden defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or
diminish the right to the land. This is the mirror principle of
the Torrens System of land registration.
2. The action to annul the sale was instituted in 1977 or more

than (10) years from the date of execution thereof
in 1957, hence, it has long prescribed.
3. Under Sec 45 of Act 496, “the entry of a certificate of title

shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land, and
binding upon the applicant and all his successors in title that
the land shall be and always remain registered land. A title
under Act 496 is indefeasible and to preserve that character,
the title is cleansed anew with every transfer for value
(De Jesus v. City of Manila; 29 Phil. 73; Laperal v. City
of Manila, 62 Phil. 313; Penullar v.
PNB, 120 SCRA 111).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Even if the government joins C, this will not alter the
outcome of the case so much because of estoppel as an express
provision in Sec 45 of Act 496 and Sec 31 of PD 1529 that a
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued in
pursuance thereof “shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the national government and all branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or
not.”
Mirror Principle; Forgery; Innocent Purchaser

(1999)

The spouses X and Y mortgaged a piece of registered land to
A, delivering as well the OCT to the latter, but they continued
to possess and cultivate the land, giving 1/2 of each harvest to
A in partial payment of their loan to the latter, A, however,
without the knowledge of X and Y, forged a deed of sale
of the aforesaid land in favor of himself, got a TCT in his
name, and then sold the land to B, who bought the land
relying on A’s title, and who thereafter also got a TCT in his
name. It was only then that the spouses X and Y learned
that their land had been titled in B’s name. May said spouses
file an action for reconveyance of the land in question against
b? Reason.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance of the land

will not prosper because B has acquired a clean title to the
property being an innocent purchaser for value.
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title. The

fact that the forged deed was registered and a certificate of
title was issued in his name, did not operate to vest upon an
ownership over the property of X and Y. The
registration of the forged deed will not cure the infirmity.
However, once the title to the land is registered in the name of
the forger and title to the land thereafter falls into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, the latter acquires a clean
title thereto. A buyer of a registered land is not required to
explore beyond what the record in the registry indicates on its
face in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which
may subsequently defeat his right thereto. This is the
“mirror principle‘ of the Torrens system which makes it
possible for a forged deed to be the root of a good title.
Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are guilty of

contributory negligence when they delivered this OCT to the
mortgagee without annotating the mortgage thereon.
Between them and the innocent purchaser for value, they
should bear the loss.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

If the buyer B, who relied on the teller A’s title, was not aware
of the adverse possession of the land by the spouses X and Y,
then the latter cannot recover the property from B. B has in
his favor the presumption of good faith which can only be
overthrown by adequate proof of bad faith. However, nobody
buys land without seeing the property, hence, B could not
have been unaware of such adverse possession. If after
learning of such possession, B simply closed his eyes and did
nothing about it, then the suit for reconveyance will prosper as
the buyer’s bad faith will have become evident.
Notice of Lis Pendens (1995)
Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in
Quezon City. One year later Rachelle, the legitimate
owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent registration
obtained by Rommel. She filed a complaint against Rommel
for reconveyance and caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on the certificate of title issued to Rommel. Rommel
now invokes the indefeasibility of his title considering that one
year has already elapsed from its issuance. He also seeks the
cancellation of the notice of Lis pendens.
May the court cancel the notice of lis pendens even before final
judgment is rendered? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A Notice of Lis Pendens may be cancelled even before final

judgment upon proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse party or that
the notice of lis pendens is not necessary to protect the right of
the party who caused it to be registered. (Section 77, P.D. No.
1529)
In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate owner of

the land in question. It can be said, therefore, that when she
filed her notice of lis pendens her purpose was to protect
her interest in the land and not just to molest Rommel. It is
necessary to record the Lis pendens to protect her interest
because if she did not do it, there is a possibility that the
land will fall into the hands of an innocent purchaser for

value and in that event, the court loses control over the land
making any favorable judgment thereon moot and academic.
For these reasons, the notice of lis pendens may not be
canceled.
Notice of Lis Pendens; Transferee Pendente Lite

(2002)
Sancho and Pacifico are co-owners of a parcel of land.

Sancho sold the property to Bart. Pacifico sued Sancho and
Bart for annulment of the sale and reconveyance of
the property based on the fact that the sale included his one-
half pro-indiviso share. Pacifico had a notice of lis pendens
annotated on the title covering the property and ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. The notice of lis
pendens could not be cancelled immediately because the title
over the property was with a bank to which the property
had been mortgaged by Bart. Pacifico appealed the case. While
the appeal was pending and with the notice of lis pendens
still uncancelled, Bart sold the property to Carlos, who
immediately caused the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens, as well as the issuance of a new title in his name.
Is Carlos (a) a purchaser in good faith, or (b) a transferee pendente
lite? If your answer is (a), how can the right of Pacifico as co-
owner be protected? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The notice of lis pendens was

still annotated at the back of the title at the time he bought the
land from Bart. The uncancelled notice of lis pendens operates
as constructive notice of its contents as well as interests, legal
or equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with
the knowledge of what it contains. In an earlier case, it was
held that a notice of an adverse claim remains effective and
binding notwithstanding the lapse of the 30 days from its
inscription in the registry. This ruling is even more applicable
in a lis pendens.
Carlos is a transferee pendente lite insofar as Sancho’s share

in the co-ownership in the land is concerned because the land

was transferred to him during the pendency of the appeal.
B. Pacifico can protect his right as a co-owner by pursuing his

appeal; asking the Court of Appeals to order the re-annotation
of the lis pendens on the title of Carlos; and by invoking his
right of redemption of Bart’s share under Articles 1620 of the
New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. Carlos is a purchaser in good faith. A possessor in good

faith has been defined as “one who is unaware that there
exists a flaw which invalidates his acquisition of the thing”
(Art. 526, NCC). Good faith consists in the possessor’s belief
that the person from whom he received the thing was the
owner of the same and could convey his title. In the case [at
bar], in question, while Carlos bought the subject property
from Bart while a notice of lis pendens was still annotated
thereon, there was also an existing court order canceling the
same. Hence, Carlos cannot be considered as being “aware
of a flaw which invalidates [their] the acquisition of the
thing” since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was
already being ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase.
On this ground alone, Carlos can already be considered a
buyer in good faith.
(PoLam v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 86, [2000]).
B. To protect his right over the subject property, Pacifico

should have timely filed an action for reconveyance and
reinstated the notice of lis pendens.
Prescription &Laches; Elements of Laches (2000)
In an action brought to collect a sum of money based on a

surety agreement, the defense of laches was raised as the
claim was filed more than seven years from the maturity of the
obligation. However, the action was brought within the ten-
year prescriptive period provided by law wherein actions
based on written contracts can be instituted.
a) Will the defense prosper? Reason.
b) What are the essential elements of laches?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the defense will not prosper. The problem did not give
facts from which laches may be inferred. Mere delay in filing
an action, standing alone, does not constitute laches
(Agra v. PNB, 309 SCRA 509).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) The four basic elements of laches are; (1) conduct on the

part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complainant seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct
and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3)
lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief
is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.
Prescription & Laches; Indefeasibility Rule of

Torrens Title (2002)
Way back in 1948, Winda’s husband sold in favor of Verde Sports
Center Corp. (Verde) a 10-hectare property belonging to
their conjugal partnership. The sale was made without
Winda’s knowledge, much less consent. In 1950, Winda
learned of the sale, when she discovered the deed of sale
among the documents in her husband’s vault after his demise.
Soon after, she noticed that the construction of the sports
complex had started. Upon completion of the construction in
1952, she tried but failed to get free membership privileges in
Verde.
Winda now files a suit against Verde for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that she did not consent to the sale. In
answer, Verde contends that, in accordance with the Spanish
Civil Code which was then in force, the sale in 1948 of the
property did not need her concurrence. Verde contends that in
any case the action has prescribed or is barred by laches.
Winda rejoins that her Torrens title covering the property is

indefeasible, and imprescriptible.
A. Define or explain the term “laches”.
B. Decide the case, stating your reasons for your decision.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. LACHES means failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do what, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time. (De Vera v. CA, 305 SCRA 624 [1999])
B. While Article 1413 of the Spanish Civil Code did not require
the consent of the wife for the validity of the sale, an
alienation by the husband in fraud of the wife is void as held
in Uy Coque v. Navas, 45 Phil. 430 (1923). Assuming
that the alienation in 1948 was in fraud of Winda and,
therefore, makes the sale to Verde void, the action to set
aside the sale, nonetheless, is already barred
by prescription and laches. More than 52 years have already
elapsed from her discovery of the sale in 1950.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
B. Winda’s claim that her Torrens Title covering the

property is indefeasible and imprescriptible [does not hold
water] is not tenable. The
rule of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title means that after one
year from the date of issue of the decree of registration or if
the land has fallen into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, the title becomes incontestable and incontrovertible.
IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY, on the other hand, means that no

title to the land in derogation of that of the registered owner
may be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive
prescription or that the registered owner does not lose by
extinctive prescription his right to recover ownership and
possession of the land.
The action in this case is for annulment of the sale executed by

the husband over a conjugal partnership property covered

by a Torrens
Title. Action on contracts are subject to prescription.
Prescription (1990)
In 1960, an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged by owner
O to M, a family friend, as collateral for a loan. O acted
through his attorney-in-fact, son S, who was duly authorized
by way of a special power of attorney, wherein O declared that
he was the absolute owner of the land, that the tax
declarations/receipts were all issued in his name, and that
he has been in open, continuous and adverse
possession in the concept of owner.
As O was unable to pay back the loan plus interest for the past
five [5) years, M had to foreclose the mortgage. At the
foreclosure sale, M was the highest bidder. Upon issuance of
the sheriff’s final deed of sale and registration in
January, 1966, the mortgage property was turned over to M’s
possession and control M has since then developed the said
property. In 1967, O died, survived by sons S and P.
In 1977, after the tenth (10th) death anniversary of his

father O. son P filed a suit to annul the mortgage deed and
subsequent sale of the property, etc., on the ground of
fraud. He asserted that the property in question was
conjugal in nature actually belonging, at the time of the
mortgage, to O and his wife, W, whose conjugal share went to
their sons (S and P) and to O.
(a) Is the suit filed by P barred by prescription? Explain your
answer.
(b) After the issuance of the sheriff’s final deed of sale in 1966
in this case, assuming that M applied for registration under
the Torrens System and was issued a Torrens Title to the said
property in question, would that added fact have any
significant effect on your conclusion? State your reason.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is barred by
prescription because the wife had only ten (10) years from the

transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the

annulment of the mortgage deed.
Alternative Answers to (a) first Alternative Answer:
(a) The mortgage contract executed by O, if at all, is only a

voidable contract since it involves a conjugal partnership
property. The action to annul the same instituted in 1977, or
eleven years after the execution of the sheriff’s final sale, has
obviously prescribed because:
1) An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must

be brought within four (4) years from the date of discovery of
the fraud. Since this is in essence an action to recover
ownership, it must be reckoned from the date of
execution of the contract or from the registration of the
alleged fraudulent document with the assessor’s office for the
purpose of transferring the tax declaration, this being
unregistered land, (Baelu
v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. L-74423, Jan.
30, 1989, 169 SCRA 617).
2)
If the action is to be treated as an action to recover ownership
of land, it would have prescribed just the same because more
than 10 years have already elapsed since the date of the
execution of the sale.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(a) The action to recover has been barred by acquisitive

prescription in favor of M considering that M has possessed
the land under a claim of ownership for ten (10) years with a
just title.
(b) If M had secured a Torrens Title to the land, all the more
S and P could not recover because if at all their remedies
would be:
1. A Petition to Review the Decree of Registration. This can

be availed of within one (1) year from-the entry thereof, but
only upon the basis of “actual fraud.” There is no showing that
M committed actual fraud in securing his title to the land; or

2. An action in personam against M for the reconveyance of

the title in their favor. Again, this remedy is available within
four years from the date of the discovery of the fraud but not
later than ten (10) years from the date of registration of the
title in the name of M.
Prescription; Real Rights (1992)
A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the Tarlac side
of the boundary between Tarlac and Pangasinan. His brother
B owned the adjoining parcel of unregistered land on the
Pangasinan side.
A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed as a

public instrument by A and X. After X paid in full the, price of
the sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan parcel in the
belief that it was the Tarlac parcel covered by the deed of sale
executed by A and X.
After twelve (12) years, a controversy arose between B and X

on the issue of the ownership of the Pangasinan parcel, B
claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan
parcel because B never sold that parcel to X or to anyone else.
On the other hand, X claims a vested right of ownership over

the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive prescription, because X
possessed this parcel for over ten (10] years under claim
of ownership.
Decide on these claims, giving your reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
At this point in time, X cannot claim the right of vested

ownership over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive
prescription. In addition to the requisites common to
ordinary and extraordinary acquisitive prescription
consisting of uninterrupted, peaceful, public, adverse and
actual possession in the concept of owner, ordinary acquisitive
prescription for ten (10) years requires (1) possession in good
faith and (2) just title. “Just title” means that the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of
the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership

but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right (Art. 1129. Civil Code). In this case, there is no
“just title” and no “mode” that can be invoked by X for the
acquisition of the Pangasinan parcel. There was no
constructive delivery of the Pangasinan parcel because it was
not the subject-matter of the deed of sale. Hence, B retains
ownership of the Pangasinan parcel of land.
Primary Entry Book; Acquisitive Prescription;

Laches (1998)
In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of registered land
evidenced by a duly executed deed of sale. The owner
presented the deed of sale and the owner’s certificate of title to
the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the
daybook and corresponding fees were paid as evidenced by
official receipt. However, no transfer of certificate of title was
issued to Renren because the original certificate of title in
Robyn’s name was temporarily misplaced after fire partly
gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds. Meanwhile, the
land had been possessed by Robyn’s distant cousin,
Mikaelo, openly, adversely and continuously in the concept of
owner since 1960. It was only in April 1998 that Renren sued
Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo invoked a) acquisitive
prescription and b) laches, asking that he be declared owner
of the land. Decide the case by evaluating these defenses.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Renren’s action to recover possession of the land will

prosper. In 1965, after buying the land from Robyn, he
submitted the Deed of Sale to the Registry of Deeds for
registration together with the owner’s duplicate copy of the
title, and paid the corresponding registration fees. Under
Section 56 of PD No. 1529, the Deed of Sale to Renren is
considered registered from the time the sale was entered in
the Day Book (now called the Primary Entry Book).
For all legal intents and purposes, Renren is considered the

registered owner of the land. After all, it was not his fault that
the Registry of Deeds could not issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title.

Mikaelo’s defense of prescription can not be sustained. A

Torrens title is imprescriptible. No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 47,
P.D. No, 1529)
The right to recover possession of registered land likewise

does not prescribe because possession is just a necessary
incident of ownership.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Mikaelo’s defense of laches, however, appears to be more

sustainable. Renren bought the land and had the sale
registered way back in 1965. From the facts, it appears that it
was only in 1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33 years that
he took the first step asserting his right to the land. It was not
even an action to recover ownership but only possession of the
land. By ordinary standards, 33 years of neglect or inaction is
too long and maybe considered unreasonable. As often held by
the Supreme Court, the principle of imprescriptibility
sometimes has to yield to the equitable principle of laches
which can convert even a registered land owner’s claim into a
stale demand.
Mikaelo’s claim of laches, however, is weak insofar as the

element of equity is concerned, there being no showing in the
facts how he entered into the ownership and possession of the
land.
Reclamation of Foreshore Lands; Limitations (2000)
Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and chartered

cities to reclaim foreshore lands bordering them and to
construct thereon adequate docking and harbor facilities.
Pursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an
agreement with the Fil-Estate Realty Company, authorizing
the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from the sea
bordering the city, with 30% of the land to be reclaimed to be
owned by Fil-Estate as compensation for its services. The
Solicitor General questioned the validity of the
agreement on the ground that it will mean reclaiming land

under the sea which is beyond the commerce of man. The City
replies that this is authorized by RA. 1899 because it
authorizes the construction of docks and harbors. Who is
correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of

Cavite under RA 1899 to reclaim land is limited to
foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim land
from the sea. “The reclamation being unauthorized, the City of
Cavite did not acquire ownership over the reclaimed land.
Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed any portion
thereof to the contractor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If the reclamation of the land from the sea is

necessary in the construction of the docks and the harbors,
the City of Cavite is correct. Otherwise, it is not. Since
RA 1899 authorized the city to construct docks and harbors,
all works that are necessary for such construction are deemed
authorized. Including the reclamation of land from the sea.
The reclamation being authorized, the city is the owner of the
reclaimed land and it may convey a portion thereof as
payment for the services of the contractor.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
On the assumption that the reclamation contract was

entered into before RA 1899 was repealed by PD 3-A, the City
of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are “beyond the
commerce of man” in the sense that they are not susceptible
of private appropriation, ownership or alienation. The
contract in question merely calls for the reclamation of 300
hectares of land within the coastal waters of the city. Per
se, it does not vest, alienate or transfer ownership of land
under the sea. The city merely engaged the services of Fil-
Estate to reclaim the land for the city.
Registration; Deed of Mortgage (1994)
How do you register now a deed of mortgage of a parcel of land

originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) After the Spanish Mortgage Law was abrogated by

P.D. 892 on February 16, 1976, all lands covered by Spanish titles that
were not brought under the Torrens system within six (6)
months from the date thereof have been considered as “unregistered
private lands.”
Thus, a deed of mortgage affecting land originally registered

under the Spanish Mortgage Law is now governed by the
system of registration of transactions or instruments
affecting unregistered land under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Under this
law, the instrument or transaction affecting unregistered land
is entered in a book provided for the purpose but the
registration thereof is purely voluntary and does not
adversely affect third persons who have a better right.
b) By recording and registering with the Register of Deeds of

the place where the land is located, in accordance with Act
3344. However, P.D. 892 required holders of Spanish title to
bring the same under the Torrens System within 6 months
from its effectivity on February 16, 1976.
Remedies; Judicial Confirmation; Imperfect Title

(1993)
On June 30, 1986, A filed in the RTC of Abra an application
for registration of title to a parcel of land under P. D. No. 1529,
claiming that since June 12, 1945, he has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of said parcel of land of the public domain which
was alienable and disposable, under a bona fide claim of
ownership. After issuance of the notice of initial hearing and
publication, as required by law, the petition was heard on July
29, 1987. On the day of the hearing nobody but the applicant
appeared. Neither was there anyone who opposed the
application. Thereupon, on motion of the applicant, the RTC
issued an order of general default and allowed the applicant to
present his evidence. That he did. On September 30, 1989, the

RTC dismissed A’s application for lack of sufficient evidence.

A appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The appellant urged that the RTC erred in dismissing his

application for registration and in not ordering registration of
his title to the parcel of land in question despite the fact that
there was no opposition filed by anybody to his application.
Did the RTC commit the error attributed to it?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the RTC did not commit the error attributed to it. In an
application for Judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title to public agricultural land under Section 48 of
the Public Land Act, the lack of opposition and the consequent
order of default against those who did not answer or show
up on the date of initial hearing, does not guarantee the
success of the application. It is still incumbent upon the
applicant to prove with well nigh incontrovertible evidence
that he has acquired a title to the land that is fit for
registration. Absent such registrable title, it is the clear duty of
the Land Registration Court to dismiss the application and
declare the land as public land.
An application for land registration is a proceeding in rem. Its

main objective is to establish the status of the res
whether it is still part of our public domain as presumed
under the Regalian doctrine or has acquired the character of a
private property. It is the duty of the applicant to
overcome that presumption with sufficient evidence.
Remedies; Judicial Reconstitution of Title (1996)
In 1989, the heirs of Gavino, who died on August 10, 1987, filed
a petition for reconstitution of his lost or destroyed Torrens
Title to a parcel of land in Ermita, Manila. This was opposed
by Marilou who claimed ownership of the said land by a series
of sales. She claimed that Gavino had sold the property to
Bernardo way back in 1941 and as evidence thereof, she
presented a Tax Declaration in 1948 in the name of Bernardo,
which cancelled the previous Tax Declaration in the name of
Gavino. Then she presented two deeds of sale duly registered

with the Register of Deeds, the first one executed by Bernardo

in 1954 selling the same property to Carlos, and the second
one executed by Carlos in 1963, selling the same property to
her. She also claimed that she and her predecessors in interest
have been in possession of the property since 1948.
If you were the judge, how will you decide the petition?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I will give due course to the petition of the
heirs of Gavino despite the opposition of Marilou for the
following reasons:
a) Judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title under

RA. No. 26 partakes of a land registration proceeding and is perforce
a proceeding in rem. It denotes restoration of an existing
instrument which has been lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. The purpose of reconstitution of title or
any document is to have the same reproduced, after
proceedings. In the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred.
b) If the Court goes beyond that purpose, it acts without or

in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, where the Torrens Title sought
to be reconstituted is in the name of Gavino, the court cannot
receive evidence proving that Marilou is the owner of the land.
Marilou’s dominical claim to the land should be ventilated in a
separate civil action before the Regional Trial Court in its
capacity as a court of general jurisdiction.
REFERENCES: Heirs of Pedro Pinate vs. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12-
20 (1990); Bunagan vs. CF1 Cebu Branch VI, 97 SCRA
72 (1980); Republic vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 62, 66
(1988); Margolles vs. CA, 230 SCRA 709; Republic vs.
Feliciano, 148 SCRA 924.
Remedies; Procedure; Consulta (1994)
What is the procedure of consult
a when an instrument is denied registration?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) The Register of Deeds shall notify the interested party in

writing, setting forth the defects of the instrument or the
legal ground relied upon for denying the registration,
and advising that if he is not agreeable to such ruling, he
may, without withdrawing the documents from the
Registry, elevate the matter by Consulta to the Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
2) Within five {5) days from receipt of notice of denial, the
party-in-interest shall file his Consulta with
the Register of Deeds concerned and pay the consulta fee.
3) After receipt of the Consulta and payment of the

corresponding fee the Register of Deeds makes an annotation
of the pending consulta at the back of the certificate of title.
4) The Register of Deeds then elevates the case to the LRA
Administrator with certified records thereof and a summary of
the facts and issues involved.
5) The LRA Administrator then conducts hearings after due
notice or may just require parties to submit their memoranda.
6) After hearing, the LRA Administrator issues an order

prescribing the step to be taken or the memorandum to be
made. His resolution in consulta shall be conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds unless reversed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court.
(Section 117, P.D. 1529).
• The procedure of consulta is a mode of appeal from denial

by the Register of Deeds of the registration of the instrument
to the Commissioner of Land Registration.
• Within five days from receipt of the notice of denial, the
interested party may elevate the matter by consulta to the
Commissioner of Land Registration who shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made.
Resolution in consulta shall be binding upon all Registers of
Deeds provided that the party in interest may appeal to the
Court of Appeals within the period prescribed (Sec. 117, P.D.

1529).
Remedies; Reconveyance vs. Reopening of a

Decree; Prescriptive Period (2003)
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five- star
hotel in New York, U.S.A., entrusted to his first-degree cousin
Dewey an application for registration, under the Land
Registration Act, of a parcel of land located in Bacolod
City. A year later, Louie returned to the Philippines and
discovered that Dewey registered the land and obtained an
Original Certificate of Title over the property in his Dewey’s
name. Compounding the matter, Dewey sold the land to Huey,
an innocent purchaser for value. Louie promptly filed an
action for reconveyance of the parcel of land against Huey.
(a) Is the action pursued by Louie the proper remedy?
(b) Assuming that reconveyance is the proper remedy, will

the action prosper if the case was filed beyond one year, but
within ten years, from the entry of the decree of registration?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) An action for reconveyance against Huey is not the proper
remedy, because Huey is an innocent purchaser for value.
The proper recourse is for Louie to go after Dewey for
damages by reason of the fraudulent registration and
subsequent sale of the land. If Dewey is insolvent, Louie
may file a claim against the Assurance Fund
(Heirs of Pedro Lopez v. De Castro 324 SCRA 591 [2000]
citing Sps. Eduarte v. CA, 323 Phil 462, 467 [1996]).
(b) Yes, the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes
in ten (10) years, not within one (1) year when a petition for
the reopening of the registration decree may be filed. The
action for reconveyance is distinct from the petition to reopen
the decree of registration (Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49
[1910}). There is no need to reopen the registration
proceedings, but the property should just be reconveyed to the
real owner.
The action for reconveyance is based on implied or

constructive trust, which prescribes in ten (10) years from the

date of issuance of the original certificate of title. This rule
assumes that the defendant is in possession of the land.
Where it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the land, the
action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting for the title which action is imprescriptible
(David v. Malay, 318 SCRA 711 [1999]).
Remedies; Reconveyance; Elements (1995)
Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in Quezon City.
One year later, Rachelle, the legitimate owner of the land,
discovered the fraudulent registration obtained by Rommel.
She filed a complaint against Rommel for reconveyance and
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the
certificate of title issued to Rommel. Rommel now invokes the
indefeasibility of his title considering that one year has
already elapsed from its issuance. He also seeks the
cancellation of the notice of Lis pendens.
Will Rachelle’s suit for reconveyance prosper? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Rachelle’s suit will prosper because all elements for an

action for reconveyance are present, namely:
a) Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the same

land.
b) Rommel procured his title to the land by fraud.
c) The action was brought within the statutory period of four
(4) years from discovery of the fraud and not later than ten
(10} years from the date of registration of Rommel’s title.
d)
Title to the land has not passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
Rommel can invoke the indefeasibility of his title if Rachelle

had filed a petition to reopen or review the decree of
registration. But Rachelle instead filed an ordinary action in
personam for reconveyance. In the latter action,

indefeasibility is not a valid defense because, in filing such

action, Rachelle is not seeking to nullify nor to impugn the
indefeasibility of Rommel’s title. She is only asking the court
to compel Rommel to reconvey the title to her as the
legitimate owner of the land.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for

the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered.
The Torrens system was not designed to shield one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds the title
in bad faith.
(Walstrom v. Mapa Jr.,(G.R 38387, 29 Jan. 1990) as
cited in Martinez, D., Summary of SC Decisions,
January to June,1990,p.359].
Remedies; Reconveyance; Prescriptive Period (1997)
On 10 September 1965, Melvin applied for a free patent covering
two lots – Lot A and Lot B – situated in Santiago, Isabela.
Upon certification by the Public Land Inspector that Melvin
had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive and
adverse possession of the lots since 1925, the Director of Land
approved Melvin’s application on 04
June 1967. On 26 December 1967, Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-2277 was issued in the name of Melvln.
On 7 September 1971, Percival filed a protest alleging

that Lot B which he had been occupying and cultivating since 1947
was included in the Free Patent issued in the name of Melvin.
The Director of Lands ordered the investigation of Percival’s
protest. The Special Investigator who conducted the
investigation found that Percival had been in actual
cultivation of Lot B since 1947.
On 28 November 1986, the Solicitor General filed in behalf of

the Republic of the Philippines a complaint for cancellation of
the free patent and the OCT issued in the name of Melvin and
the reversion of the land to public domain on the ground of
fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining the free patent. On
the same date, Percival sued Martin for the reconveyance of

Lot B.
Melvin filed his answers interposing the sole defense in

both cases that the Certificate of Title issued in his name
became incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse of
one year from the issuance of the free patent.
Given the circumstances, can the action of the Solicitor

General and the case for reconveyance filed by Percival
possibly prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
“If fraud be discovered in the application which led to the

issuance of the patent and Certificate of Title, this Title
becomes ipso facto null and void. Thus, in a case where a
person who obtained a free patent, knowingly made a false
statement of material and essential facts in his application for
the same, by stating therein that the lot in question was part of
the public domain not occupied or claimed by any other
person, his title becomes ipso facto canceled and consequently
rendered null and void.”
“It is to the public interest that one who succeeds In

fraudulently acquiring title to public land should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom and the State, through the
Solicitor General, may file the corresponding action for
annulment of the patent and the reversion of the land
involved to the public domain” (Dinero
vs. Director of Lands; Kayaban vs. Republic L-33307,
8-20-73; Director of Lands
vs. Hon. Pedro Samson Animas, L-37682,3-29-74).
This action does not prescribe. With respect to Percival’s

action for reconveyance, it would have prescribed, having
been filed more than ten (10) years after registration and
issuance of an O.C.T. in the name of Melvin, were it not for the
inherent infirmity of the latter’s title. Under the facts, the
statute of limitations will not apply to Percival because Melvin
knew that a part of the land covered by his title actually
belonged to Percival. So, instead of nullifying in toto the title
of Melvin, the court, in the exercise of equity and jurisdiction,

may grant prayer for the reconveyance of Lot B to Percival

who has actually possessed the land under a claim of
ownership since 1947. After all, if Melvin’s title is declared
void ab initio and the land is reverted to the public domain,
Percival would just the same be entitled to preference right to
acquire the land from the government. Besides, well settled is
the rule that once public land has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a
bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for the period
prescribed by Section 48 of the Public Land Act, the same ipso
jure ceases to be public and in contemplation of law acquired
the character of private land. Thus, reconveyance of the
land from Melvin to Percival would be the better
procedure (Vitale vs. Anore, 90 Phil. 855; Pena, Land Titles
and Deeds, 1982, p. 427).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action of the Solicitor General should prosper,

considering that the doctrine of indefeasibility of title does not
apply to free patent secured through fraud. A certificate of title
cannot be used as shield to perpetuate fraud. The State is not
bound by the period of prescription stated in Sec. 38 of Act
496. (Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358).
The action for reconveyance filed by Percival may still prosper

provided that the property has not passed to an innocent third
party for value (Dablo
vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 618), and provided that
the action is filed within the prescriptive period of ten years
(Tale vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 266). Since the
action was filed by Percival 19 years after the issuance of
Melvin’s title, it is submitted that the same is already barred
by prescription.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER (to second part of question)
The action for reconveyance filed by Percival will prosper,

because the land has ceased to be public land and has become
private land by open, continuous, public, exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty
years, and Percival is still in possession of the property at

present. His action for reconveyance can be considered as an

action to quiet title, which does not prescribe if the plaintiff is
in possession of the property. (Olviga v.CA, G.R.
No. 1048013, October 21,1993)
Remedies; Reopening of a Decree; Elements (1992)
What are the essential requisites or elements for the allowance
of the reopening or review of a decree of registration?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The essential elements are: (1) that the petitioner has a real or
dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof through
fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one (1) year from the
issuance of the decree; and (4) that the property has not yet
been transferred to an innocent purchaser
(Rublico vs. Orellana 30 SCRA 511; Ubudan vs.Gil 45 SCRA 17).
OPTIONAL EXTENDED ANSWER:
Petition for review of the Decree of Registration. A remedy

expressly provided in Section 32 of P. D. No. 1529
(formerly Section 38. Act 496), this remedy has the
following elements:
a)
The petition must be filed by a person claiming dominical
or other real rights to the land registered in the name of
respondent.
b) The registration of the land in the name of respondent

was procured by means of actual, (not just
constructive) fraud, which must be extrinsic. Fraud is actual
if the registration was made through deceit or any other
intentional act of downright dishonesty to enrich oneself at
the expense of another. It is extrinsic when it is something
that was not raised, litigated and passed upon in the main
proceedings.
c) The petition must be filed within one (1) year from the
date of the issuance of the decree.
d) Title to the land has not passed to an Innocent

purchaser for value (Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 27, 1972),

Rublico vs. Orrelana. 30 SCRA 511, 1969);
RP vs. CA, 57 G. R No. 40402. March 16, 1987).
Torrens System vs.Recording of Evidence of Title

(1994)
Distinguish the Torrens system of land registration from the

system of recording of evidence of title.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION is a

system for the registration of title to the land. Thus, under this
system what is entered in the Registry of Deeds, is a record
of the owner’s estate or interest in the land, unlike the
system under the Spanish Mortgage Law or the system under
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Act 3344 where only the evidence of such title is
recorded. In the latter system, what is recorded is the deed of
conveyance from hence the owner’s title emanated—and not
the title itself.
b) Torrens system of land registration is that which is

prescribed in Act 496 (now PD 1529), which is either
Judicial or quasi-judicial. System or recording of evidence of
title is merely the registration of evidence of acquisitions of
land with the Register of Deeds, who annotates the same on
the existing title, cancels the old one and issues a new title
based on the document presented for registration.
Unregistered Land (1991)
Maria Enriquez failed to pay the realty taxes on her
unregistered agricultural land located in Magdugo, Toledo
City. In 1989, to satisfy the taxes due, the City sold it at public
auction to Juan Miranda, an employee at the Treasurer’s
Office of said City, whose bid at P10,000.00 was the highest.
In due time, a final bill of sale was executed in his favor.
Maria refused to turn-
over the possession of the property to Juan alleging that (1)
she had been, in the meantime, granted a free patent and on

the basis thereof an Original Certificate of Title was issued to

her, and (2) the sale in favor of Juan is void from the
beginning in view of the provision in the Administrative Code
of 1987 which prohibits officers and employees of the
government from purchasing directly or indirectly any
property sold by the government for nonpayment of any tax,
fee or other public charge.
(a) Is the sale to Juan valid? If so, what is the effect of the Issuance
of the Certificate of Title to Maria?
(b) If the sale is void, may Juan recover the P10,000.00? If not,
why not?
(c)
If the sale is void, did it not nevertheless, operate to divert
Maria of her ownership? If it did, who then is the owner of the
property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The sale of the land to Juan is not valid, being contrary to

law. Therefore, no transfer of ownership of the land was
effected from the delinquent taxpayer to him. The original
certificates of title obtained by Maria thru a free patent grant
from the Bureau of Lands under Chapter VII, CA 141 is valid
but in view of her delinquency, the said title is subject to the
right of the City Government to sell the land at public auction.
The issuance of the OCT did not exempt the land from the tax
sales. Section 44 of P.O. No. 1529 provides that every
registered owner receiving a Certificate of Title shall hold the
same free from an encumbrances, subject to certain
exemptions.
B. Juan may recover because he was not a party to the

violation of the law.
C. No, the sale did not divest Maria of her title precisely
because the sale is void. It is as good as if no sale ever took
place.
In tax sales, the owner is divested of his land initially upon

award and issuance of a Certificate of Sale, and finally after

the lapse of the 1 year period from date of registration, to

redeem, upon execution by the treasurer of an instrument
sufficient in form and effects to convey the property. Maria
remained owner of the land until another tax sale is to be
performed in favor of a qualified buyer.
From the ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION

QUESTIONS in CIVIL LAW by the UP LAW
COMPLEX and PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW
SCHOOLS.
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Published by adminC on May 8, 2013 | Leave a response Pokemon Revolution:

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly annotated

The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified under Section

Annotation of Lis Pendens; When Proper (2001)

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

Annotation of a lis pendens can only be done in cases

Foreshore Lands (2000)

Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of

An action for the annulment of Jorge’s Original Certificate of

(1) Under Chapter IX of C .A, No. 141, otherwise known as the

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

for residential, commercial, industrial, or similar productive

(2) If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or

(3) Free Patent is a mode of concession under Section 41,

(4) The certificate of the district forester that the land is

(5) The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab

Forgery; Innocent Purchaser; Holder in Bad Faith

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to Don, a buyer in

In the case at bar, Rod only forged Cesar’s signature on

It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that persons

In the given problem, the property was already registered in

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

Forgery; Innocent Purchaser; Mirror Principle (1991)

The complaint for the annulment of Catalino’s Title will

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

title suffers from two fatal infirmities, namely:

The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled without

Fraud; Procurement of Patent; Effect (2000)

The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint for annulment

1) Eddie cannot claim protection as an

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

of indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on a

Homestead Patents; Void Sale (1999)

The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance of the

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

The action filed by the heirs of B to declare the nullity or

B’s defense of prescription is untenable because an action

On the other hand, B’s defense of pari delicto is equally

FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Prescription does not arise with respect to actions to declare a

If the heirs are not allowed to recover, it could be on the

Innocent Purchaser for Value (2001)

Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High Rise

Metrobank’s defense is untenable. As a rule, an innocent

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

granting any loan. Apparently, Metrobank did not follow this

Mirror Principle (1990)

In 1950’s, the Government acquired a big landed estate in

In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to F, X and

(b) Suppose the government agency concerned joined C in

(a) The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled

http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/05/civil-law-bar-exam-answers-land-transfer-and-deeds/[13/04/2021 2:22:00 pm]

1. While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee of the