Judicial Guardian-Appellant Movant-Appellee Martin T. Suelto Jose M. Kimpo
Judicial Guardian-Appellant Movant-Appellee Martin T. Suelto Jose M. Kimpo
Judicial Guardian-Appellant Movant-Appellee Martin T. Suelto Jose M. Kimpo
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
BARREDO, J : p
Appeal from the order dated November 12, 1966 approving the "Motion
for Confirmation of Deed Of Transfer of Right on Lots Nos. 632 and 633,
Cadastre No. 102 in favor of Justiniano San Agustin" of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch I, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. presiding, in Special
Proceedings (Case) No. 282, entitled "Guardianship of the Incompetent
Leonora Navarro and the Minors Adolfo Yuson and Others." prcd
"c) All rights and interests under the portion of Lot No. (632
and 633) situated at Panabo, Davao with an area of 1.5 hectares, more
or less adjacent to the parcel of land described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1297."
However, the true area of the two lots — i.e., eleven (11) instead of only one
and one-half (1-1/2) hectares — was disclosed in this petition, thus:
"That among the properties of the insane, Leonora Navarro, as
inheritance from the deceased spouses, Enrique Navarro and Maximina
Bonleon, are two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 632 and 633
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Cad. 102, consisting of 11 hectares, more or less, and situated at
Lasang, Davao." (Emphasis supplied) (Id., p. 2)
On the same day that this second petition was filed, Mrs. de Pua also
filed a "Motion to Approve Sale of Property" because Lots Nos. 632 and 633
had in the meantime been already sold by her to Dr. Justiniano San Agustin
the day before, i.e., on January 19, 1959, as evidenced by an instrument
titled "Transfer of Rights", that is to say, simultaneously with the other deed
which was duly authorized and approved by the court.
Acting on this second motion, on February 7, 1959, the Court denied
the petition to sell Lots Nos. 632 and 633, thus:
"Inasmuch as the judicial guardian sold just recently Lot No. 634-
A, TCT No. 1296, belonging to the ward, in the amount of Thirteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Pesos (P13,750.00), the sale of the
property mentioned in her petition filed on January 20, 1959, is not
necessary or would not be beneficial to the ward; hence, the petition to
sell is hereby denied." (Id., pp. 26-27).
The record does not disclose the lower court's action on this "Amended
Ex-Parte Motion," Neither does it appear there that appellee ever took any
step to enforce the sale to him of the two lots in question evidently because,
as he very well knew, the Court had disapproved the same. According to
appellant on page 11 of her brief, it was only after she filed a civil action,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5160, seeking the reconveyance of the said lots
that appellee began to move by filing on September 28, 1966 a "Motion for
Confirmation of Deed of Transfer of Rights Over Lots 632 and 633, Cad. 102"
in his favor. He prayed that ". . . in the interest of justice and equity . . . the
Transfer of Rights over Lots 632 and 633 in favor of Justiniano San Agustin
be approved and confirmed by the Honorable Court." He based his alleged
right over the two lots on the "Supplemental Project of Partition" of June 9,
1960 and the "Amendment to the Supplemental Project of Partition" of July
29, 1960, which were executed by the Judicial Administrator and by the
heirs, respectively, and approved by the probate court in the intestate
proceeding, to modify, as already stated earlier, the original Project of
Partition because of the discovery of the true area of Lots Nos. 632 and 633,
which is eleven (11) hectares and not one and one-half (1.5) hectares only,
and that all the heirs agreed in said "Supplemental Project of Partition" and
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the amendment thereto, among other things, to recognize and confirm the
sale of Lots Nos. 632 and 633 in his favor, instead of partitioning the same in
some other manner. LLphil
Over said opposition, the court issued the following order, granting Dr.
San Agustin's motion for confirmation:
"Finding the Motion for Confirmation of Deed of Transfer of Right
over Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cad. 102 in favor of Justiniano San Agustin
filed by his counsel on September 28, 1966, meritorious, the Order of
this Court of February 7, 1959, based on erroneous facts, is hereby set
aside and the aforesaid transfer of rights signed by Justiniano San
Agustin and Leanora Navarro represented by Eldegardes Yuson de Pua,
her judicial guardian . . . is hereby approved." (Emphasis supplied)
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied "for lack of merit,"
the judicial guardian, Mrs. de Pua, is now before Us and urges the following
assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT APPROVING THE TRANSFER OF
RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF JUSTINIANO SAN AGUSTIN IS CONTRARY TO
LAW ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
I. THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IS VOID AB INITIO; HENCE,
COULD NOT BE APPROVED NOR CONFIRMED.
II. THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IS NOT NECESSARY NOR
BENEFICIAL TO THE WARD.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT IN SETTING ASIDE ITS ORDER
DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1959 IS CONTRARY TO LAW ON THE GROUND
THAT IT SETS ASIDE AN ORDER WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
In support of the first assigned error, judicial guardian-appellant Mrs.
de Pua argues through counsel that the transfer of rights is void ab initio and
cannot be approved nor confirmed, because under Rule 95, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court, property under guardianship can be sold only by prior
authority granted by the guardianship court; that in the instant case "not
only was the transfer of rights executed by the judicial guardian without any
authority, but the petition seeking authority to sell, which was filed a day
after the actual execution of the transfer of rights, was expressly denied by
the lower court"; and, therefore, the transfer of rights is void because "a sale
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of the ward's realty by the guardian without authority from the court is void,"
citing Inton vs. Quintana, (81 Phil. 97). Furthermore, she adds that the
transfer of rights is not necessary nor beneficial to the ward. In fact, there is
no allegation at all to such effect in appellee's motion for confirmation.
Relative to the second assigned error, judicial guardian-appellant
argues that the Order of the lower court of February 7, 1959, which denied
her petition to sell Lots 632 and 633 completely disposed of her petition and,
therefore, the challenged Order of November 12, 1966, which summarily set
aside the said previous order is contrary to law.
The foregoing assignment of errors/arguments raise only one decisive
issue, which is: Whether or not, under the circumstances related above, the
lower court acted correctly in issuing the order of November 12, 1966,
approving the Motion for Confirmation of Sale of Lots 632 and 633 filed by
the appellee Dr. San Agustin and setting aside its previous order of February
7, 1959, which earlier disapproved the sale of the same lots. cdrep
We agree with appellant that the impugned order cannot stand legal
scrutiny.
To start with, it must be emphasized that what appellee asked the
court to confirm was a sale in 1959, or seven years before the filing of said
motion, and what is more, it was a sale which the court refused to authorize
in its order of February 7, 1959, for the simple reason that in its opinion,
considering that a previous sale of Lot 634-A for P13,750.00 had just been
approved, it could not see why it would again be "necessary," after just a
few days, "or beneficial to the ward" that the two lots, Lots 632 and 633
should still be sold.
Reiteratedly, this Court has ruled that under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule
96 (now Rule 95) that the properties of Leonora, the ward of appellant Mrs.
de Pua could be sold only under authority of the guardianship court in
Special Proceedings No. 282. Without such authority, any sale would
necessarily be illegal. Indeed, even on the assumption posited by appellee
that the lack of authority from the guardianship court resulted only in a
voidable sale which could be ratified, there is no showing in the record that
there was any such ratification. We cannot go along with the proposition that
the approval by the probate court in Case No. 64-R of the amended
"Supplemental Project of Partition" may be deemed in law as tantamount to
the required ratification.
It is quite true that appellant-guardian Mrs. de Pua, did sign, assisted
by her lawyer, Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, the motion to approve said
"Supplemental Project of Partition" of July 29, 1960, and that said motion
was approved by the probate court on August 29, 1960. It is further true that
in the first "Supplemental Project of Partition" it was specifically stipulated in
paragraph 7(a) "that this Estate shall recognize and confirm the conveyance
of the rights over said Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cad. 102, with an area of 11
hectares, in favor of Justiniano San Agustin, for the stipulated price of
P8,250.00." But legally speaking, the approval by the probate court of such
project of partition (the stipulation just quoted was specifically reiterated in
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the amended project dated July 29, 1960), did not in any degree confer upon
Mrs. de Pua the power to dispose of the lots in question without prior
permission of the guardianship court. Indeed, the motion to approve referred
to was signed only by Flor A. Unson, the Judicial Administrator in the probate
court in Case No. 64-R. We hold that court had no jurisdiction to authorize
the sale of any property belonging to an heir who is under guardianship
without first requiring the guardian to secure the corresponding authority
from the guardianship court. Worse, much less could the probate court have
any power to effectively approve a sale of an heir-ward which had, as in this
case, been actually disapproved by the guardianship court. cdrep
In arriving at this conclusion, We are not overlooking the fact that the
same judge, the Honorable Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. who had issued the order
denying authority to sell Lots 632 and 633 was the very one who in his order
of November 12, 1966, here being assailed, approved the motion for
confirmation on the lame excuse, as We see it, that his previous order of
February 7, 1959 was "based on erroneous facts." What "erroneous facts "
he did not state, which circumstance readily places the order in question
subject to the omission to comply with the constitutional requirement that
final orders or decisions of courts of record should state the facts on which it
is based, which means, of course, that at least the main elemental facts
must be stated in a manner such as to enable the parties to comprehend
intelligently what they are. LexLib
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring: