VOL.

129, MAY 29, 1984 495

Cuizon vs. Ramolete
No. L-51291. May 29, 1984. *

FRANCISCO CUIZON, ROSITA CUIZON, PURIFICATION C. GUIDO married to

TEODORO GUIDO, and JUAN ARCHE, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA
and SEGUNDO ZAMBO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Estate; Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties; Duty of
probate court as regards said disputed properties.—It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate court without authority to deprive third persons of possession

and ownership of property and covered by a transfer certificate of title in the name of such third par-
________________

*
 FIRST DIVISION.

496

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

96 ANNOTATED
Cuizon vs. Ramolete
ties; Application for relief with intestate court unnecessary, probate court clearly having no
jurisdiction.—Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third
parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parlies, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded
the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive
such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent court was clearly
without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus, it was unnecessary for the petitioners to
first apply for relief with the intestate court.

Same; Same; Same; Separate civil action: Issues, such as that sale of disputed property tainted
with fraud and that the rights of the owner as alleged half-sister and sole heir of the decedent remains
open to question, better threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the administrator and not in the
intestate proceedings in the court below.—Even assuming the truth of the private respondents’ allegations
that the sale of December 29, 1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud
and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these
issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the
petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Br. III.
Ramolete, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Eliseo C. Alinsug for petitioners.
     Loreto M. Pono for respondents Domingo Antigua and Segundo Zambo.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over
parcels of land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who
are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the inventory
of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.
497
VOL. 129, MAY 29, 1984 497
Cuizon vs. Ramolete
For a clearer understanding of the present case, the background facts may be appreciated. As far
back as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at
Opao, Mandaue City then covered by certificates of Tax Declaration in Land Registration Case
No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and Irene. Part
of the property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which eventually became the subject
of this controversy.
On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct
involving the said salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all
surnamed Cuizon. At that time, Francisco and Rosita were minors and assisted by their mother,
Rufina, only sister of Irene. However, the sale was not registered because the petitioners felt it
was unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene.
Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1962, the decree of
registration No. N-161246 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was
issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene
Cuizon. The latter died in 1978. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, her alleged half
sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the decedent including the
property in question. After the notice of the extrajudicial settlement was duly published in a
newspaper of general circulation, Rufina thereafter, executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale
wherein she confirmed and ratified the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 executed by the late
Irene and renounced and waived whatever rights, interest, and participation she may have in the
property in question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds and annotated at the back of TCT No. 10477. Subsequently, TCT No. 12665 was issued in
favor of the petitioners.
On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administration was filed before the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (Sp.
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Cuizon vs. Ramolete
Proc. No. 3864-R) by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of Irene
numbering seventeen (17) in all to act as administrator of the estate of the decedent. The petition
was granted.
 Respondent Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He included in
the inventory the property in question which was being administered by Juan Arche, one of the
petitioners. On June 27, 1979, respondent Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority to
sell the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to
the administrator. The motion was granted and respondent court issued the following order:
“The administrator, thru this motion, informs the Court that the estate owns some beds and fish pond
located in Opao, Mandaue City; that these salt beds are producing salt which are now in the warehouse in
Mandaue City, under the custody of Juan Arche; that the value of the salt in the warehouse is estimated to
be worth P5,000.00 are beginning to melt and, unless they are sold as soon as possible, they may
depreciate in value. It is likewise prayed in this motion that Juan Arche be ordered to deliver the salt in
question to the administrator such other products of the land now in his (Juan Arche) possession.
x x x      x x x      x x x
“Let this motion be, as it is hereby GRANTED. The administrator is hereby authorized to sell the salt
now in the custody of Juan Arche and the latter (Juan Arche) is hereby ordered to deliver the salt in
question to the administrator in order to effect the sale thereof and he is likewise directed to deliver such
other products of the land to the administrator.’

Subsequently, on three different occasions, respondent Segundo Zambo with the aid of several
men, sought to enforce the order of the respondent court, compelling the petitioners to come to
us on certiorari. On September 14, 1979, we issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents
from enforcing the above order of the respondent court and from further interfering with the
petitioners in their peaceful possession and cultivation of the property in question.
The thrust of the petitioners’ argument is that the respondent court, as a court handling only
the intestate proceedings,
499
VOL. 129, MAY 29, 1984 499
Cuizon vs. Ramolete
to divest them of their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the
same to the administrator. Petitioners further contend that the proper remedy of the respondent
administrator is to file a separate civil action to recover the same.
On the other hand, the respondent administrator banked on the failure of the petitioners to
first apply for relief in the court of origin before filing the present petition. According to him this
was a fatal defect. In addition, the administrator stated that the deed of sale of December 29,
1971 lost its efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree in favor of Irene
Cuizon.
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards
said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good;
but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. C.A., (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose
of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by
the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and
473; Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).
In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold
seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who
are not party to the proceedings. In Bolisay v.
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Cuizon vs. Ramolete
Alcid, (85 SCRA 213), this Court was confronted with a similar situation. The petitioners therein
sought to annul the order of the respondent court in a special proceeding which in effect ruled
that notwithstanding that the subject property was duly titled in the name of petitioners, the
administratrix of the intestate estate involved in said proceeding had the right to collect the
rentals of said property over the objection of the titled owners just because it was included in the
inventory of said estate and there was an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership
thereof and the estate was one of the parties therein. This Court viewed the petition as one
seeking for a prima facie determination and not a final resolution of the claim of ownership.
We held that:
“x x x Considering that as aforestated the said property is titled under the Torrens System in the names of
the petitioners, it does appear strange, in the light of the probate court’s own ruling that it has no
jurisdiction to pass on the issue of ownership, that the same court deemed the same as part of the estate
under administration just because the administratrix, alleges it is still owned by the estate and has in fact
listed it in the inventory submitted by her to the court.
“It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself,
which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In other words, in Our considered view, the mere
inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given
property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the property of such
inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would render
inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership recognized
in the above quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before it
provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It does not even matter that the
issue is raised after approval of the inventory because “apparently, it is not necessary that the inventory
and appraisal be approved by the

501
VOL. 129, MAY 29, 1984 501
Cuizon vs. Ramolete
Court.” (Francisco on the Rules of Court Vol. V-B, p. 99, citing Siy Chong Keng v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 60 Phil. 494)
“In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens
Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in
the title.”
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third
parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such
third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator
and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.
Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus, it
was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.
Even assuming the truth of the private respondents’ allegations that the sale of December 29,
1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of
Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these issues may
only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the
petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the respondent court’s order
dated June 27, 1979 is hereby set aside and declared void as issued in excess of its jurisdiction.
Our restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the June 27, 1979 order and the respondents
from further interfering, through the intestate proceedings, in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of the land in question by the petitioners is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
New Frontier Mines, Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission
     Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.—It is inappropriate for a probate court to determine conflicting claims of title to
property. (Recto vs. De la Rosa, 75 SCRA 226.)
Probate court may not proceed to take cognizance of question as to ownership of property
between estate and heir who claims adverse ownership thereof on basis of an alleged settlement
among all the heirs. (Recto vs. De la Rosa, 70 SCRA 88.)

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