174 SUPREME COURT that failure to notify the Solicitor General about the action is a

REPORTS jurisdictional defect. In fact, Rule 3, Section 22 gives the courts in

any action involving the “validity” of any ordinance, inter alia,
ANNOTATED “discretion” to notify the Solicitor General.
Lucena Grand Central Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Police
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, Power; As with the State, the local government may be considered
Inc. as having properly exercised its police power only if there is a
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005. *
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.—Respecting the
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., issue of
_______________
petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.
*
 EN BANC.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisdiction; Solicitor
General; Nowhere, however, is it stated in the above-quoted rules 175
that failure to notify the Solicitor General about the action is a
jurisdictional defect.—Petitioner argues that since the trial court VOL. 452, 175
failed to serve a copy of its assailed orders upon the Office of the FEBRUARY 23,
Solicitor General, it never acquired jurisdiction over the case, it 2005
citing Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules which provides: SEC. Lucena Grand Central
22. Notice to the Solicitor General.—In any action involving
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order,
presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court in its discretion, Inc.
may require the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be whether police power was properly exercised when the subject
heard in person or through representative duly designated by him. ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the local government
(Emphasis and italics supplied) Furthermore, petitioner may be considered as having properly exercised its police power
invokes Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 63 which respectively provide: only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General.—In any action which involves generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise
such question. SEC. 4. Local government ordinances.—In any action stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the method.
corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit Same; Same; Same; Traffic Congestion; That traffic
involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be
ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General gainsaid.—That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private,
shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and italics concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang v. Williams which involved
supplied) Nowhere, however, is it stated in the above-quoted rules a statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads,

1|Page
this Court held: In enacting said law, therefore, the National Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable. (Italics
and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of supplied)
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth—they
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem;
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more
(Emphasis supplied) The questioned ordinances having been enacted careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.—With the aim
with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single
Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and
the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing,
thus present. and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The
examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited.— common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
Respondent’s suggestion to have this Court look behind the explicit compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the
objective of the ordinances which, to it, was actually to benefit the facilities of petitioner. x x x As in De la Cruz and Lupangco, the
private interest of petitioner by coercing all bus operators to ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go
patronize its terminal does not lie. Lim v. Pacquing instructs: . . . beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
[T]his Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges,
operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the
motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. appellate court. What should have been done was to determine
217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, in the first exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The
place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC’s allegation of true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
place, as already averred, this framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
176 rights. (Italics supplied) A due deference to the rights of the
individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to
17 SUPREME societal problems.
6 COURT REPORTS Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nuisances; Bus
ANNOTATED Terminals; Bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede the
Lucena Grand Central flow of traffic; In the subject ordinances, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the
Inc. franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.—From the
memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that

2|Page
the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not
congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload
passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the
conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles
obstructing traffic on the does not extend to terminals.
177 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The operation
of bus terminals is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be
VOL. 452, 177 said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of
FEBRUARY 23, the community; Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may
2005 not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings.—
Lucena Grand Central Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their
operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the
Inc. community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to
city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are
help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a thing is nuisance per se,
the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, however, it
can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic 178
problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack
adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and 17 SUPREME
unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then 8 COURT REPORTS
reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, ANNOTATED
with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to
meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope
Lucena Grand Central
of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than Inc.
the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent any proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Whether an
public roads, they are not obstacles—the buses which ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is
indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. reasonably necessary.—As for petitioner’s claim that the challenged
—As for petitioner’s argument that the challenged ordinances were ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic
enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different
“[r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not
or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then
constructions in public places”: Absent any showing, nay allegation,

3|Page
even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be sailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction  against the
1

effective. City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Same; Same; Same; Same; The weight of popular opinion Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City,
must be balanced with that of an individual’s rights.—The Court is City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the
not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise
supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar
of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a
expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were
submitted to this Court by petitioner. The weight of popular opinion, violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
however, must be balanced with that of an individual’s rights. There The salient provisions of the ordinances are:
is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the Ordinance No. 1631 2

most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions,

will excuse the bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is no AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE,
Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-
rest of the nation who would deny him that right. JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
xxx
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and SECTION 1.—There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter referred
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
to as the “grantee,” a franchise to construct, finance, establish,
operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
City of Lucena.
     Castillo,  Laman,  Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose for SECTION 2.—This franchise shall continue for a period of
petitioner. twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and
     Manalo, Puno & Jocson Law Offices for respondent. renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of
twentyfive (25) years upon such expiration.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: xxx
SECTION 4.—Responsibilities and Obligations of the City
Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses Government of Lucena.—During the existence of the franchise, the
which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, as- City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities
179 and obligations:
VOL. 452, 179 xxx
FEBRUARY 23, 2005 (c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or
Lucena Grand Central concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.
xxx
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
Inc. _______________

1
 Records at pp. 1-10.

4|Page
  Rollo at pp. 118-120.
2
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
180
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses
180 SUPREME COURT coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall
REPORTS utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at
ANNOTATED Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other
Lucena Grand Central terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena;
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Inc.
Ordinance No. 1778 3 _______________

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY 3

 Id., at pp. 226-229.
OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF- 181
TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE,
VOL. 452, 181
AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND
ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995 FEBRUARY 23, 2005
xxx Lucena Grand Central
SECTION 1.—The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated Inc.
as follows: Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys from other municipalities and/or local government units shall avail of
shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby
to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City
of their passengers. of Lucena;
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby
hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this amended to read as follows:
ordinance. The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal
xxx as this is the entity which was given the exclusive franchise by the
SECTION 3.—a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of Sangguniang Panlungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and
1995, is hereby amended to read as follows: italics supplied)
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other
municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena City These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for
are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to
Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers. one entity for the construction and operation of one common
xxx bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located
outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards

5|Page
alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within hereby rendered, as follows:
the city, as the “Explanatory Note”—Whereas Clause adopting
Ordinance No. 1778 states: 1. 1.Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid,
“WHEREAS, in line with the worsening traffic condition of the City having been issued in the exercise of the police
of Lucena, and with the purpose of easing and regulating the flow of power of the City Government of Lucena insofar
the same, it is imperative that the Buses, Mini-Buses and out-of-town as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand
jeepneys be prohibited from maintaining terminals within the City, Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance,
but instead directing to proceed to the Lucena Grand Central establish, operate and maintain common bus-
Terminal for purposes of picking-up and/or dropping off their jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena;
passengers; 4 2. 2.But however, declaring the provision of Sec. 4(c)
of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect that the City
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, Government shall not grant any third party any
was one of those affected by the ordinances. privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-
Petitioner, Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., claiming bus and/or jeepney terminal, as illegal and ultra
legal interest as the grantee of the exclusive franchise for the vires because it contravenes the provisions of
_______________ Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as “The
Local Government Code”;
 Id., at p. 227.
4
3. 3.Declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null and
void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the
182
City Government of Lucena arising from an invalid,
182 SUPREME COURT oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police
REPORTS power, more specifically, declaring illegal [sections
ANNOTATED 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)];
Lucena Grand Central 4. 4.Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, and/or Injunction directing the respondents public
officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang
Inc. Panlungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from
operation of the common terminal,  was allowed to intervene in
5
implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said
the petition before the trial court. ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from
In the hearing conducted on November 25, 1998, all the maintaining and operating its own bus
parties agreed to dispense with the presentation of evidence and terminal subject to the conditions provided for in
to submit the case for resolution solely on the basis of the Ordinance No. 1557, Sec. 3, which authorizes the
pleadings filed. 6 construction
By Order of March 31, 1999,  Branch 54 of the Lucena RTC
7

_______________
rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

6|Page
 5
 Records at pp. 55-59. by the appellate court by Resolution dated June 5,
6
 Id., at pp. 339.
7
 Id., at pp. 328-360. 2001,  petitioner once again comes to this Court via petition for
15

review,  this time assailing the Decision and Resolution of the

16

183 Court of Appeals.

VOL. 452, 183 Decision on the petition hinges on two issues, to wit: (1)
FEBRUARY 23, 2005 whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case, it not
Lucena Grand Central _______________
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, 8
 Id., at pp. 358-360.
Inc. 9
 Id., at pp. 384-399.
10
 Id., at pp. 467-470.
1. of terminal outside the poblacion of Lucena City;
11
 CA Rollo at pp. 18-59.
12
 Id., at p. 327.
and likewise, insofar as said ordinance directs 13
 Id., at pp. 548-557.
and compels the petitioner to use the Lucena 14
 Id., at pp. 560-572.
Grand Central Terminal, Inc., and furthermore, 15
 Id., at pp. 622-623.
insofar as it declares that no other terminals shall 16
 Rollo at pp. 9-407 inclusive of Annexes “A”-“Y”.
be situated, constructed, maintained or
184
established inside or within the City of Lucena;
and furthermore; 184 SUPREME COURT
2. 5.The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Intervenor, REPORTS
Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., dated October ANNOTATED
19, 1998, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis and italics supplied) 8

Inc.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration  of the trial court’s
9
having furnished the Office of the Solicitor General copy of the
order having been denied by Order of August 6, 1999,  it 10
orders it issued therein, and (2) whether the City of Lucena
elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before this properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject
Court.  This Court, by Resolution of November 24,
11
ordinances.
1999,  referred the petition to the Court of Appeals with which
12
Petitioner argues that since the trial court failed to serve a
it has concurrent jurisdiction, no special and important reason copy of its assailed orders upon the Office of the Solicitor
having been cited for it to take cognizance thereof in the first General, it never acquired jurisdiction over the case, it
instance. citing Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules which provides:
By Decision of December 15, 2000,  the appellate court
13 SEC. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General.—In any action involving
dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order,
trial court. Its motion for reconsideration  having been denied
14 presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court in its discretion,

7|Page
may require the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be notify him, Sec. 3 of the same rule provides—it is the party
heard in person or through representative duly designated by him. which is assailing the local government’s ordinance.
(Emphasis and italics supplied) More importantly, however, this Court finds that no
Furthermore, petitioner invokes Sections 3 and 4 of procedural defect, fatal or otherwise, attended the disposition
Rule 63 which respectively provide: of the case. For respondent actually served a copy of its
SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General.—In any action which involves petition upon the Office of the Solicitor General on October 1,
the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other 1998, two days after it was filed. The Solicitor General has
governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by issued a Certification to that effect.  There was thus compliance
17

the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon with above-quoted rules.
such question. Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly
SEC. 4. Local government ordinances.—In any action involving exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with
the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding the State, the local government may be considered as having
prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit involved shall be properly exercised its police power only if the following
similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be
notified and entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
Nowhere, however, is it stated in the above-quoted rules that reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to
failure to notify the Solicitor General about the action is a be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
jurisdictional defect. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
In fact, Rule 3, Section 22 gives the courts in any action subject and lawful method. 18

involving the “validity” of any ordinance, inter alia, That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private,
“discretion” to notify the Solicitor General. concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang v. Williams   which 19

185 involved a statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to

VOL. 452, 185 promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic
FEBRUARY 23, 2005 on national roads, this Court held:
Lucena Grand Central In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, by considerations of public convenience and welfare.
Inc. _______________
Section 4 of Rule 63, which more specifically deals with cases 17
 CA Rollo at p. 498.
assailing the constitutionality, not just the validity, of a local 18
 Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, 180 SCRA
government ordinance, directs that the Solicitor General 533, 537 (1989).
“shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.” Who will 19
 70 Phil. 726 (1940).

186

8|Page
186 SUPREME COURT professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly
REPORTS oppressive upon individuals.
_______________
ANNOTATED
Lucena Grand Central 20
 Id., at p. 733.
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, 21
 Rollo at p. 539.
22
 240 SCRA 649 (1995).
Inc. 23
 Id., at pp. 677-678.
It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is,
to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies 187
at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to VOL. 452, 187
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with FEBRUARY 23, 2005
property, and with business and occupations.  (Emphasis supplied)
20

Lucena Grand Central

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, Inc.
they involve public interest warranting the interference of the With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in
State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power the city to a single location,  the subject ordinances prohibit the
24

is thus present. operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
Respondent’s suggestion to have this Court look behind the including those already existing, and allow the operation of
explicit objective of the ordinances which, to it, was actually to only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the
benefit the private interest of petitioner by coercing all bus franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common
operators to patronize its terminal does not lie.  Lim v. 21
carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
Pacquing   instructs:
22
compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the
. . . [T]his Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was facilities of petitioner.
enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to In De la Cruz v. Paras,  this Court declared unconstitutional
25

operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative an ordinance characterized by overbreadth. In that case, the
motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibited the operation of all
217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, in the first
night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction for
place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC’s allegation of
improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second
the protection of public morals. Held the Court:
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking
place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed
power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can
even laudable. (Italics supplied)
23

be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.

This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth.
employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by

9|Page
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: “The Judiciary should not guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.” It depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on
is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this those last three precious days when they should be refreshing
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and
the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the
and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be examination day itself—would be like uprooting the tree to get rid
earned by those therein employed. (Italics supplied) 26
of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is
to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If
In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,  this Court, in declaring
27
corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss,
unconstitutional the resolution subject thereof, advanced a then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict
similar consideration. That case involved a resolution issued guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if
_______________ violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or
revoked. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)28

 Rollo at p. 505.
24

 123 SCRA 569 (1983).

25
As in De la Cruz  and Lupangco,  the ordinances assailed
29 30

 Id., at p. 578.
26

 160 SCRA 848 (1988).

27
herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what
is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
188 Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated
188 SUPREME COURT by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and
REPORTS charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found
ANNOTATED by the appellate court.  What should have been done was to
31

Lucena Grand Central determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, right there.
_______________
Inc.
by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited 28
 Id., at p. 860.
examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout 29
 Supra.
materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of
30
 Supra.
31
 Rollo at p. 59.
examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the
licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being 189
unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the VOL. 452, 189
measure was found to be more sweeping than what was FEBRUARY 23, 2005
necessary, viz.: Lucena Grand Central

10 | P a g e
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
32
 Cruz, I., Constitutional Law 1 (1995).
33
 Rollo at pp. 496, 509-510.
Inc.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium 190
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the 190 SUPREME COURT
framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to REPORTS
rights. (Italics supplied)
32
ANNOTATED
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a Lucena Grand Central
more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
From the memorandum  filed before this Court by
33
Inc.
petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had But the grant of an exclusive franchise to petitioner has not
identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the been shown to be the only solution to the problem.
indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses While the Sangguniang Panlungsod, via Ordinance No.
on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the 1557,  previously directed bus owners and operators to put up
34

terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing their terminals “outside the poblacion of Lucena City,”
traffic on the city streets. petitioner informs that said ordinance only resulted in the
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help relocation of terminals to other well-populated barangays,
impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription thereby giving rise to traffic congestion in those
against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised areas.  Assuming that information to be true, the Sangguniang
35

to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to Panlungsod was not without remedy. It could have defined,
solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. among other considerations, in a more precise manner, the area
If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are of relocation to avoid such consequences.
compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead As for petitioner’s argument that the challenged ordinances
of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang
size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the Panlungsod to “[r]egulate traffic on all streets and
same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and,
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
that even entities which might be able to provide facilities places”:  Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals
36

better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The
all. buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on
Petitioner argues, however, that other solutions for the the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang
traffic problem have already been tried but proven ineffective. Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not
_______________ extend to terminals.

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 Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, (Italics supplied) 38

cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac   where
39

or comfort of the community. the appellant-municipality similarly argued that the terminal
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the
alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: “Suffice it
are nuisance per accidens, not per se. to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the
_______________
Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed.
 Id., at p. 109.
34 This appellant failed to do.”
 Memorandum of Petitioner, Id., at p. 510.
35
As for petitioner’s claim that the challenged ordinances
 Section 458(5)(vi), Local Government Code of 1991.
36
have actually been proven effective in easing traffic
191 congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue
VOL. 452, 191 different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is
FEBRUARY 23, 2005 its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its
Lucena Grand Central constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were
Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner, measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may
be justified whenever they happen to be effective.
Inc. _______________
Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be
abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was 37
 199 SCRA 595 (1991).
done in the case at bar.
38
 Id., at p. 601.
39
 3 SCRA 816 (1961).
In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals,  this 37

Court held: 192

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause 192 SUPREME COURT
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial REPORTS
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which ANNOTATED
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde Lucena Grand Central
v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be Inc.
said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various
the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the
private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by

12 | P a g e
petitioner. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be © Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
balanced with that of an individual’s rights. reserved.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or
the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is
no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed
under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
     Davide,
Jr.  (C.J.),  Puno,  Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, 
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Calle
jo, Sr.,  Azcuna,  Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Absent any undue damage or injury suffered by a
party by reason of the enactment and implementation of a
municipal resolution, the fourth element of the offense of
causing undue injury is wanting. (Bunye vs.
Sandiganbayan, 306 SCRA 663 [1999])
Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax
except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them
either by the basic law or by statute. (Manila Electric Company
vs. Province of Laguna, 306 SCRA 750 [1999])

——o0o——
_______________

40
 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376. (1989).

193

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