B o o k R ev iew s 603

PHILOSOPHY OF M IN D : A C O M PREH EN SIV E IN T R O D U C T IO N . By

William Jaworski. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Pp. x + 4 l 1. Paper $41.95, ISBN:
978-1-444-33368-8.

This book is comprehensive indeed, this response, though common among

offering substantive treatments of un­ eliminativists, is itself directed at a straw
justly neglected positions like idealism, man. Serious critics of eliminativism are
neutral monism, and hylomorphism, aware that the eliminativist can easily
alongside the usual varieties of dualism avoid uttering blatantly self-contradic­
and physicalism. It is also very well- tory statements like “I believe that there
written, well-organized, and handsomely are no beliefs.” The real issue is whether
illustrated with a battery of extremely the eliminativist can consistently avoid
useful diagrams. Newcomers to the all intentional notions, and those who
subject will learn an enormous amount, press the self-refutation objection claim
and experts will find much of interest that this cannot be done. For instance,
too. It is without a doubt among the best notions like error, illusion, and the like
currently available textbooks in the field. do an enormous am ount o f work in
Hylomorphism is Jaworski’s favored eliminativist argumentation. Yet these
approach, and his willingness vigorously are themselves intentional notions,
to defend a position so different from so that a consistent eliminativist will
those usually on offer in the philosophy have to eliminate them too. But how
of mind is a welcome development for can the eliminativist convey the thesis
which he deserves credit. Nevertheless, that his opponents’ views are somehow
there are several respects in which even philosophically or scientifically inferior
Jaworski fails adequately to identify to eliminativism w ithout characteriz­
and challenge various unexamined as­ ing those rival views in terms of such
sumptions that prevail in the field. W ith notions? The proponent says that any
respect for Jaworski’s fine work and in attempt to do so will inevitably either
the spirit of constructive criticism, I will smuggle the intentional notions back in
address two of these areas for improve­ or fail to convey the thesis that non-elim-
ment in the remainder of this review. inativist views are in any way inferior to
Though he rejects physicalism in eliminativist ones. Certainly no elimi­
favor of hylomorphism, Jaworski could nativist has shown how this dilemma
have more strongly conveyed the weak­ can be resolved, and merely avoiding
nesses in physicalist argumentation. For locutions like “I believe t h a t . . . ” hardly
example, he dismisses the self-refutation solves the problem.
objection against eliminative material­ Thom ists and other Aristotelians
ism as “misguided” and as exhibiting might also object to Jaworski’s presen­
the “obvious flaw . . . [of] assuming] tation of the hylomorphist position he
wrongly that eliminativists must believe shares with them. Jaworski says: “Hy­
their own theory” (187), when elimina­ lomorphism has two central concepts:
tivists would of course deny that either the concept of structure or organiza­
they or anyone else believe anything. But tion, and the concept of materials that

©201 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 3 pp. 603-606
doi: 10.5840/acpq20l488324
604 American C atholic Philosophical Q uarterly

get structured or organized” (280). But temperatures, will tend to erode a river
traditionally, of course, the fundamental bank it is rushing along, and so forth.
notions of hylomorphism are form and These properties and causal powers can­
matter, and the difference is by no means not be reduced to a mere aggregate of
merely verbal. the properties and causal powers of the
The foundation of hylomorphism is hydrogen and oxygen of which the water
the Aristotelian theory of actuality and is composed. To be water is, accordingly,
potentiality, first developed in response to have a certain kind of substantial
to Parmenides’s denial of the reality of form. A stone, a tree, a dog, and a hu­
change and later extended by Scholastic man being would be other things with
thinkers to answer also Parmenides’s substantial forms.
denial of multiplicity. The theory says An accidental form, by contrast,
that change is possible because there merely m odifies som ething already
is, between actuality on the one hand having a substantial form. It does not
and sheer nothingness on the other, an reflect any inherent or natural tendency,
intermediate sort of reality known as and the properties and causal powers
potency or potentiality. Change is not associated with it are reducible to those
(contra Parmenides) the transition from o f the parts o f the thing having the
nothingness to actuality (which, as Par­ form. For example, a pile of stones has
menides rightly held, is impossible), but no properties or causal powers that are
rather the transition from potentiality to not reducible to the aggregate of those
actuality. Now matter is the principle of of the stones making up the pile. The
potentiality in the things of our experi­ parts of a watch have no inherent or
ence, and form the principle of their natural tendency to function together as
actuality. A tree or a table is actually what a time-telling device but have that func­
it is because it has a certain form, but it tion imposed on them by the designers
is potentially another way because the and users of the watch. To be a pile of
matter of which it is made can take on stones or a watch is, accordingly, to have
a different form. Potentiality (and thus a merely accidental form.
matter) is also the principle of multiplic­ There is a corresponding distinc­
ity. A form like being a tree or being a tion drawn between prime matter and
table is of itself one. But it becomes many secondary matter. Secondary m atter
insofar as this bit of matter takes on the is matter already having a substantial
form of a tree, that dijferentbxr of matter form. The subject of accidental change,
takes on the form of a tree, and so on. which involves merely the acquisition or
Where form is concerned, a distinc­ loss of an accidental form, is secondary
tion is made between substantial form matter. Prime matter is matter having no
and accidentalform. A substantial form substantial form. It is the subject of sub­
is an intrinsic principle of a thing’s opera­ stantial change, which involves the loss
tion, that which underlies its natural ten­ of a substantial form and acquisition of
dencies. It manifests itself in irreducible a new one. Prime matter is the pure po­
properties and in causal powers directed tentiality for taking on form, and never
toward certain characteristic outcomes. exists on its own in mind-independent
Water, for example, is naturally liquid at reality, but always only together with
room temperature, will freeze at lower some substantial form or other.
 Book Reviews 605

Traditional hylom orphism more skill at that game might be integrated

rigorously characterized is the view that into a larger educational program, the
natural objects are composites of sub­ way this educational program might in
stantial form and prime matter. Various turn play a role in shaping the citizenry
further theses are associated with this of a country, and other “patterns of social
account. For instance, for Thom ists and environmental interaction” (280-1).
the parts of a natural object are in it For the traditional hylomorphist,
only virtually rather than actually. For only the first of these counts as a sub­
example, strictly speaking oxygen and stantial form, and even then only with
hydrogen are not actually present in qualification, at least from the Thomis-
water; rather, water has the potentiality tic point of view (which insists on the
to have oxygen and hydrogen drawn out unicity of substantial form). For strictly
of it. This has to be the case if a natural speaking it is in the Thomists view not
substance has (as the Thomist argues) cells or even chemical elements that the
only one substantial form. substantial form of a tree gives form
Now, for the traditional hylomor- to, but rather the tree’s prime matter.
phist, all of this complexity is necessary The cells and chemical elements are in
if we are to make sense of change, mul­ the tree virtually, not as “materials that
tiplicity, and other aspects of the world. get structured or organized.” (Similarly,
T he trouble many Aristotelians and when Jaworski speaks o f “a complex
Thomists will have with Jaworski’s pre­ hierarchy of structures and substruc­
sentation is that it not only ignores the tures” (282), he gives the impression
traditional commitments and motiva­ that hylomorphism regards a hierarchy
tions of hylomorphism, but even makes of forms as really rather than virtually
claims that seem inconsistent with those present in things. But that is not true
commitments. The way that Jaworksi of substantial forms, at least not for
characterizes what he calls the “materials hylomorphists who affirm the unicity
that get structured or organized” makes of substantial form.)
them sound like what the traditional Hence Jaworski’s characterization of
hylomorphist would regard as bits of sec­ hylomorphism as the view that there is
ondary matter already having substantial “structure and organization” on the one
forms. And the way he characterizes hand and “materials that get structured
the “structure or organization” of these or organized” on the other sometimes
materials at least often makes it sound seems to amount to what in traditional
like the having of an accidental form. hylomorphist language would be stated
To be sure, Jaworski does characterize as the thesis that there are bits of second­
structure as “irreducible” (296), which ary matter that have accidental forms.
makes it sound like substantial form. Yet For the traditional hylomorphist, this
Jaworski’s notion of “structure” or “orga­ would be a correct characterization of
nization” is so broad that it includes not paradigmatic artifacts (tables, chairs,
only the way chemical compounds are machines, etc.), and also o f random
combined in the cells of a tree, but also arrangements like a pile of stones that
the way the timbers and nails of a house forms at the bottom of a hill as a result
are arranged, the way game pieces are of erosion. But it would not be a correct
moved about in chess, the way a person’s description of natural substances (water,
6o6 A merican C atholic P hilosophical Q uarterly

plants, animals, etc.), since these have Jaworski also claims (e.g., at 272)
substantial rather than accidental forms. that for the hylomorphist, the difference
It would also fail to capture the deepest between human beings on the one hand
aspects o f nature, because secondary and other animals, plants, and inorganic
matter and accidental forms are less phenomena on the other is merely a
fundamental than prime m atter and difference in structure. This would be
substantial form. Indeed, the former are news to paradigmatic hylomorphists like
intelligible only by reference to the latter. Aristotle and Aquinas, who held that
That is not to say that Jaworski explic­ though the mental capacities of non­
itly talks of secondary matter, accidental human animals are entirely corporeal,
forms, etc. He does not. Indeed, he al­ the distinctively intellectual capacities
most entirely avoids using the traditional of human beings involve an incorporeal
terminology of hylomorphism at all, and faculty— indeed, one which, in Aquinas’s
largely refrains from citing well-known view, can survive the destruction of the
hylomorphists like Aristotle and Aqui­ body. Here as elsewhere it seems Jawor-
nas. Instead he uses terminology that ski’s commendable eagerness to make
contemporary analytic philosophers will hylomorphism palatable to contempo­
be familiar with, and cites contemporary rary readers has led him to characterize
emergentist and other non-reductive the view in a misleading way.
naturalist thinkers, rather than actual O f course, Jaworski is free to defend
hylomorphists, when illustrating how any view he likes, including a revisionist
hylomorphism would interpret various brand of hylomorphism. But he should
phenomena. His aim, no doubt, is to make it clear that that is what he is do­
make hylomorphism as accessible as pos­ ing, rather than presenting what is a
sible to contemporary readers to whom sometimes idiosyncratic formulation as
it will otherwise seem very foreign. That “the hylomorphic worldview,” full stop.
is a laudable goal, but the danger is that All the same, Jaworskis book is, as I
what is distinctive about hylomorphism say, a fine piece of work, and a welcome
will be obscured. Rather than clarifying and needed addition to the existing range
hylomorphism by comparison with other of textbooks on philosophy of mind.
views which superficially resemble it,
Jaworskis discussion sometimes makes EDWARD FESER
hylomorphism seem a mere riff on these Pasadena City College
merely approximate views.

SO U N D IN G /SIL E N C E: M A R T IN H EID EG G ER AT T H E LIM ITS OF

POETICS. By David Nowell Smith. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013.
Pp. xiv + 242. Hard Cover $55.00, ISBN: 978-0-823-25153-7.

T here is an apparent tension in from poetry to guide his Denkweg, most

Heidegger’s relation to poetry. On the notably, Holderlin, Trakl, and George,
one hand, Heidegger draws extensively On the other hand, he is unsparing in

©2014, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 3 pp. 606-610
doi: 10.5840/acpq20l488325
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