US POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA DURING COLD WAR

BY – ANSHUL SINGH
18/UPOL/007
South Asia has been a region of great importance to the industrialized democracies -and
specifically the United States. The region has always been an arena where great power
competition has been played and managed. It is, of course, possible to argue that the primary
significance of the states of South Asia in cold war lies in their role in the competition between
the United States, the Soviet Union and China for global and regional influence. The region has
been recognized as a geographical area of major strategic significance through, with the routes
connecting Europe, Africa and Asia.
Moreover, the major actors of the region, India and Pakistan, were divided in terms of
polarisation between the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In this context, India has
functioned as an important ally of the Soviet Union and Pakistan has functioned as a broker for
the West in relation to moderate Muslim countries in the Middle East and the Gulf areas and in
relation to China.

The United States’ involvement in South Asia has fluctuated, depending upon its intensity and
style of competition with other great powers at the global level. The United States did not
become an imperialist nation in South Asia, but it replaced Britain as the principal Western
power of the region.

The principal determinant of US policy towards South Asia has been the US perception of the
region’s relevance to the pursuit of its global geopolitical and strategic goals. Moreover, the
US policy in South Asia has been shaped not so much with reference to the interests of the
states of this region but based on US interests vs. Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the major
American interest was to prevent the absorption of the area into the communist orbit. The early
thrust was against advancing communism in general; and later, the emphasis was confined to
Soviet expansionism after the Sino-US rapprochement.

After the World War II the communist threat seemed more menacing and it was utmost need
that the United States must lead the world. Europe, Asia and Africa all were economically and
militarily weak and politically unstable. Britain was no more capable of world leadership and
only the United States was powerful enough to challenge the emerging threats in the bipolar
international structure of the world. In the situation, the US abandoned its traditional policy of
“isolationism” and assumed the leadership of the “free world,” embarked upon a global strategy
of anti-communism. In fact, the US anti-communist strategy began in 1947 with the Truman
Doctrine of containment in which he committed to “support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”

After the introduction of containment policy, the US first turned its attention to Europe through
the Marshall Plan (1947) and later American strategists abruptly set out to extend the policy of
containment to Asia. one of the few Asian countries that reacted to the American search for allies
with avid interest was Pakistan which was eagerly searching for international friends in order to
counter Indian threat.
It was clear that a policy of containment of communism in Southeast and Southwest Asia
predominated in the US approach and they found Pakistan more comfortable for US strategic
interests as compared to India. Pakistan’s assets, such as its religious identity with the Muslim
countries of Middle East, its geographical proximity to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and to the
communist adversaries like the Soviet Union and China, and above all its potential and
willingness to act as a regional balancer to India were indeed tempting. There was also general
feeling by the American policy makers that by extending military assistance, Pakistan’s
friendship could be won and its opposition to the communist nations strengthened.

Pakistan became an ally of the West in May 1954, when the Mutual Defence Assistance
Agreement with the United States was signed. Later, Pakistan became a member of SEATO and
the Baghdad Pact in 1954-55 led to a close military relationship with the US and Washington
had a chance to establish military bases in order to protect the oil areas of the Middle East. In
1959, Pakistan also signed a bilateral “Agreement of Co-operation” with the United States and
Pakistan was associated with the US through not one, but four mutual security arrangements.

The US military aid to Pakistan alienated India and pushed it toward the Soviet Union.
Subsequently, India’s willingness to expand relations with the Communist countries enhanced
their international stature and made other Asian countries more receptive to Soviet overtures.
The Soviet Union backing of India vis-à-vis Pakistan strengthened New Delhi’s resolve to stand
firm on Kashmir rather than seek a compromise, just as the alliance with the United States
encouraged Pakistan to think it might succeed in pressuring India to be more accommodating.
Thus, within a decade of independence the two major nations of the region were caught up in
the Cold War and their involvement in great-power politics enabled them to extract material
benefits.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States almost withdrew from South Asian affairs.
The US adopted neutral stance between the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and 1971 and terminated
military aid to both countries, which hurt Pakistan more than India. The US strategy in South
Asia changed the regional scenario and upset the ‘balance of power’ and left India “unchecked”
to impose its will upon the other countries of the region.

Moreover, India’s importance in American global policy reached its climax when Sino-India
war of 1962 started and the US did not hesitate to supply military aid to India but this action was
interpreted by Pakistan as affecting adversely Pakistan’s fundamental objective of security vis-
à-vis India. The US also refused to put any pressure on India during the Sino-Indian border war
to come to a settlement on the Kashmir question with Pakistan. Thus, the events of the 1960s
convinced the Pakistanis that as far as their objectives of security were concerned, an alliance
with the US was worth little as India began to gain more and more importance in the global
strategy of the US and especially in American policies relating to the containment of China in
Southeast Asia, Pakistan’s chances of convincing the US to increase its responsiveness to
Pakistan’s demands relating to its security declined.

A civil war between East and West Pakistan in the early 1970s also involved India, the US, and
the USSR. Most Pakistanis were Muslim, but they did not share a language. West Pakistan forced
its language, Urdu, on Bangla speaking East Pakistanis. West Pakistan also controlled resources,
education, and the military. When East Pakistan sought to create its own nation, Cold War
powers took sides. The US supported West Pakistan, while India and the USSR supported East
Pakistan. Indian forces defeated West Pakistan in less than two weeks. With India's help, East
Pakistan gained its independence in 1971, becoming the new nation of Bangladesh.

In the late 1970s, when a group of communist sympathizers tried and failed to unify Afghanistan
with socialist ideas, the USSR invaded. Practically the US was not involved in South Asia until
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. the advent of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet
adventurism in Afghanistan fuelled the long-standing Western fear of Soviet expansionism and
gave an acute sense of urgency to the need to retaliate and stop the advancement of the
communists. US regional and global interests compelled it to re-establish relations with Pakistan,
which had become a “front-line state”. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had given new life
to the threat to choke off oil supplies to the industrial nations and the US was concerned to
maintain regional stability and preserve economic and commercial interests.

The Soviet’s primary purpose was to use South Asia as a jumping-off place for more direct
access to Southeast Asia and Persian Gulf area and as a staging area for outflanking China. Both
the military and the economic power of the world depend on oil. This basic fact made the Persian
Gulf the eye of the global storm in the closing days of the twentieth century. Thus, if the Soviet
Union had gained the power to turn off the oil spigots of the Middle East then it could easily
have blackmailed most of the industrialised nations. This is why America was worried and was
involving itself in all these matters. Fearing the spread of Soviet influence, the US funded Islamic
jihadists, who viewed the Soviets as foreign invaders and infidels. This conflict lasted nearly a
decade, bankrupting the USSR and contributing to its collapse in the early 1990s. While this US
strategy had short-term benefits of weakening the Soviet Union, it also helped bring to power
Islamic fundamentalists who ruled through threat of violence.

Conclusion
The US policy toward South Asia was basically confused, inconsistent and reactive rather than
calculated, long term, and innovative due, to internal American factors, including periodic
changes in administrations. The factors of oil and Zionist nationalism which involve the US in
the Middle East had no corollary in South Asia. In fact, the absence of material interest has
helped to limit American involvement in the region and it has been determined largely by
factors extraneous to the area. Moreover, the United States had been guided in its South Asian
policy by its global interests and has therefore tended to view regional conflicts largely from a
global perspective. Thus, it is also clear that most of the US actions and reactions were
congruent with global considerations; the periodic modification of US regional policy to suit
its global pursuits appeared to local states as a confused policy, lacking clarity and coherence
in its declaratory and operational dimensions.

Since 1945 the region of South Asia had no valuable importance for the United States but in
the absence of the US the Soviet Union had taken full advantage to expand its influence in the
region. For the US region was neither crucial to its economy nor vital for investment and trade
relations. It always had shown their interest in the region from global pursuits disregarding the
aspiration of regional actors. Thus, the US never introduced long-terms and well-calculated
policy for the region but it was more interested to prevent the flood of communism and
determined to contain the Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf region. the US always
misunderstood the “conflictual cobweb of South Asia” and pressurized Pakistan (the most loyal
ally in Asia) not to annoy India. In fact, they failed to accommodate Pakistan’s wishes at the
expense of India who always hurt the United States interests in the region. Although the US
major concern has been and still is to strengthen India against China but policy makers have
not been successful to achieve their objectives from India. Thus, during the Cold War the US
efforts for the stability and peace in South Asia were less impressive but the Soviet Union and
China played more active role to stabilize their influence and position in the region. In this
regard, the Soviet Union supported India and Afghanistan and China backed Pakistan to
counter Delhi-Moscow axis in the region.

However, the US and the Soviet Union engaged each other because of their respective regional
and global interests and penetration occurred due to simultaneous push from the superpowers
and pull from the local powers. Moreover, superpowers penetration and interest in the Indian
Ocean and Afghanistan crisis basically initiated in the result of global rivalry and not from a
convergence of interest of local states. Nonetheless, the Cold War provided an opportunity for
South Asian states to set their own house in order and to grope for internal solutions for regional
disputes, beginning with a restructuring of regional relationships on the basis of mutual
interests rather than as proxy actors. The Cold War also provided an opportunity of freedom of
action that could prove to be both a responsibility and a risk. The decade ahead will be a test
for South Asian ruling elites of their capacity to convert responsibilities into power and risks
into opportunities. Nevertheless, the Cold War lasted for over 50 years and ended with the fall
of the Soviet Union in 1989.