Concorde Condominium Inc Vs PNB

G.R. No. 228354.November 26, 2018.*

CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM, INC.,
petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PNB-
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LIMITED, and NEW PPI
CORPORATION (formerly PULP AND PAPER, INC.),
respondents.

G.R. No. 228359. November 26, 2018.*

NEW PPI CORPORATION (formerly PULP AND PAPER,
INC.), petitioner, vs. CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM, INC.,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Once vested by

the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.—The nature of an
action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law governing at the
time the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 53

Concorde Condominium, Inc. vs. Philippine National Bank
action was commenced. Either is conferred only by law; not

by the parties’ consent or by their waiver in favor of a court that
would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
the nature of an action. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein.
Administrative Agencies; Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) to hear and decide cases is
determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter
or property involved and the parties. The case must involve a
subdivision project, subdivision lot, condominium project or
condominium unit.—By virtue of Executive Order No. 648, the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was created
to regulate zoning and land use and development and to assume
the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the NHA. The HSRC
was later renamed HLURB under Executive Order No. 90. It was
held that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases
is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject
matter or property involved and the parties. The case must
involve a subdivision project, subdivision lot, condominium project
or condominium unit. Contrary to the CA’s reasoning, the
complaint raising the issue of ownership and title will not
automatically characterize it as a real action as to confer
jurisdiction on the RTC. Clearly, the suit involves a claim against
a condominium owner or developer filed by the registered unit
owners to compel the performance of the former’s contractual and
statutory obligations. As we held in Peña v. Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), 502 SCRA 383 (2006): When an
administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter
pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within
the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split
jurisdiction is not favored. Therefore, the Complaint for Specific
Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages filed by
petitioner against respondent, though involving title to,
possession of, or interest in real estate, was well within the
jurisdiction of the HLURB for it involves a claim against the
subdivision developer, Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., as well as
respondent.

54
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Housing and Land

Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to regulate the real estate
business is broad enough to include jurisdiction over a complaint
for annulment of foreclosure sale and mortgage and the grant of
incidental reliefs such as a cease and desist order.—Undoubtedly,
the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate business
is broad enough to include jurisdiction over a complaint for
annulment of foreclosure sale and mortgage and the grant of
incidental reliefs such as a cease and desist order.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Well-settled is the
rule that a party who fails to appeal from a judgment can no
longer seek the modification or reversal thereof; To this general
rule, however, one (1) exception stands out: where both parties
have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be
the vicarious appeal of the other.—Well-settled is the rule that a
party who fails to appeal from a judgment can no longer seek the
modification or reversal thereof. Indeed, one party’s appeal from a
judgment will not inure to the benefit of a coparty. And as against
the latter, the judgment will continue to run its course until it
becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, one
exception stands out: where both parties have a commonality of
interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be the vicarious appeal of
the other.
Same; Same; Same; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In
general, the issue of whether a mortgagee is in good faith cannot be
entertained in a Rule 45 petition. This is because the
ascertainment of good faith or the lack thereof, and the
determination of negligence are factual matters which lie outside
the scope of a petition for review on certiorari.—In general, the
issue of whether a mortgagee is in good faith cannot be
entertained in a Rule 45 petition. This is because the
ascertainment of good faith or the lack thereof, and the
determination of negligence are factual matters which lie outside
the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. Good faith, or the
lack of it, is a question of intention. In ascertaining intention,
courts are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct
and outward facts by which alone the inward motive may safely
be determined. A recognized exception to the rule is when there
are conflicting findings of fact by the CA and the RTC. Given the
conflicting findings of the CA and that of the HLURB and the OP,
the Court shall address the factual issue on hand.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 55

Civil Law; Condominiums; Condominium Corporations; To
enable the orderly administration over these common areas which
are jointly owned by the various unit owners, the Condominium
Act permits the creation of a condominium corporation. Such is
specially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common
area, in which the holders of separate interests shall automatically
be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units.—
To enable the orderly administration over these common areas
which are jointly owned by the various unit owners, the
Condominium Act permits the creation of a condominium
corporation. Such is specially formed for the purpose of holding
title to the common area, in which the holders of separate
interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the
exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of
their respective units. Other management bodies are specifically
allowed to manage the common areas, namely: association of
condominium owners, a board of governors elected by
condominium owners or by the board named in the declaration.
Having expressly covenanted the organization of a condominium
corporation to hold title and manage the common areas and
limited common areas provided in the master deed, PPI’s refusal
to transfer title to CCI and subsequent acts, without the
knowledge or consent of the condominium buyers, are highly
prejudicial to the registered unit owners. Undeniably, each has an
undivided interest in the common areas of the condominium
project.
Administrative Agencies; Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board; Jurisdiction; The Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) is given wide latitude in characterizing or
categorizing acts which may constitute unsound business practice
or breach of contractual obligations in the real estate trade.—P.D.
No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent subdivision lot and
condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real estate practices.
The HLURB is given wide latitude in characterizing or
categorizing acts which may constitute unsound business practice
or breach of contractual obligations in the real estate trade. In
this case, we agree with the HLURB and the OP that PPI’s act of
mortgaging the uncovered parking area — by amending the
approved project plan and master deed without the affirmative
vote of two-thirds of the voting power of CCI (Sec. 13 of the
master deed) or a simple majority of the registered unit owners
(Sec. 4 of the Condominium Act) — constitutes unsound real

56
estate business practice. Clearly, PPI has reneged on its

contractual commitments to its buyers and CCI which was
empowered (Part II, Sec. 1 of the master deed) to “enforce the
provisions” of said instrument. Not even CCI’s silence or inaction
for several years after its incorporation — attributed to its lack of
knowledge of PPI’s acts affecting the common areas — may defeat
the unit owners’ contractual and statutory rights. CCI should not
be deemed to have waived any right as it has never acquiesced to
PPI’s maneuverings to deprive the unit owners of their undivided
interest in the common areas.
Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Certificate of Title; As a
general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and is no longer
required to look behind the certificate in order to determine the
actual owner. A banking institution is expected to exercise due
diligence before entering into a mortgage contract.—As a general
rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title and is no longer required
to look behind the certificate in order to determine the actual
owner. However, PNB-IFL is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a
mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private individuals, it is
expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings,
including those involving registered lands. A banking institution
is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of
a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard
and indispensable part of its operations.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cruz & Capule Law Offices for Concorde Condominium,
Inc.
Jubert Jay C. Andrion for Philippine National Bank
and PNB International Finance Limited.
Carmelita Rita R. Baculio for New PPI Corp.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 57

GESMUNDO, J.:

Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision,1 dated
March 21, 2016, and the Resolution,2 dated November 21,
2016, of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA’s decision
granted the petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 135651 but
dismissed the petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 135689. Both
petitions before the CA sought the reversal of the June 14,
2013 Decision3 of the Office of the President (O.P. Case No.
11-E-159) affirming the March 17, 2011 Decision4 of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board). The HLURB Board
upheld the December 14, 2005 Decision5 of the HLURB
Arbiter in the National Capital Region Field Office
(HLURB-NCRFO).

Antecedents

Pulp and Paper, Inc. (PPI) is the owner/developer of a
residential project known as the Concorde Condominium
(Concorde), a seven-storey building situated at Benavidez
corner Salcedo Streets, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On
November 4, 1974, PPI executed a Master Deed with
Declaration of Restrictions6 (master deed) for the said
project. It covered two parcels of land registered in its
name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
[351672] S-20277 with an area of 1,022 square meters and
TCT No. [420504] S-20278 consisting of
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 228354), pp. 31-55; penned by Associate Justice

Renato C. Francisco, and concurred in by Associate Justices Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr. and Danton Q. Bueser.
2 Id., at pp. 72-84.
3 Id., at pp. 275-284.
4 Id., at pp. 240-245.
5 Id., at pp. 225-239.
6 Id., at pp. 108-123.

58

1,209 square meters. The master deed was annotated on
these titles.7
The master deed provided for the common areas of the
Concorde, as follows:
Section 3. The Common Areas.—The common areas of the

project include:

a) The parcels of land described above, the
basement, the deck roof, the main lobby, the
stairways, the common entrances and exits, and
common hallways and other areas of common use;
b) The bearing walls, columns, floors, beams,
borders, roofs, foundations, and other structural
elements of the building;
c) The elevator equipment and shafts, the
compartments and installations of all other services
and utilities such as light, water, pumps, drainage,
sewerage, fire alarm systems and all pipes, ducts,
flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility lines
wherever located, except the telephone cable line
mentioned in Section 4(b) below, and the outlets of
such utilities and services when located within a unit,
and all other devices and installations existing for or
rationally of common use or necessary to the
existence, upkeep and safety of the building; and
d) All other areas, structural elements and central
services, facilities and utilities shown or indicated
as part of the common areas in the
condominium project plan hereto attached and
marked as Annex “A.”8 (Emphases supplied)
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 92-107.

8 Id., at pp. 110-111.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 59

The basement of the Concorde is used for parking

purposes. Directly at the rear portion of the building is an
uncovered parking area also used by the unit owners.
On January 6, 1975, pursuant to the provisions of the
master deed, the Concorde Condominium, Inc. (CCI) was
organized to own, hold title to, and manage the common
areas, along with the two parcels of land.9 However, despite
the completion of the project and incorporation of CCI, the
titles to the two parcels of land, where the condominium
building stands and all the common areas are located, have
not been transferred to CCI.
It turned out that PPI, without CCI’s knowledge and
consent, consolidated and later subdivided the two parcels
of land, thus, segregating the uncovered parking area from
the condominium building lot.
On November 7, 1995, PPI, through its president,
Robert G. Young (Young), requested the Register of Deeds
of Makati to issue two new certificates of title based on a
resurvey and a subdivision plan covering the two parcels of
land. The Register of Deeds of Makati denied the request
on the ground that Republic Act No. 4726 (Condominium
Act) does not allow separate titling for specific common
areas of the condominium project. PPI elevated the matter
to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) which issued a
resolution (Consulta No. 2439, dated June 10, 1996)
granting its request for the issuance of separate certificates
of title based on the resurvey plan. Thus, on July 10, 1996,
the following new titles were issued in the name of PPI:
TCT No. 206284 covering an area of 1,225 square meters
and TCT No. 206285 covering 1,006 square meters. The
master deed annotated on the original titles was carried
over to the new TCTs.10
On January 16, 1997, again without CCI’s knowledge
and consent, PPI, through Young, applied with the HLURB
for the
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 85-90.

10 Id., at pp. 125-140.

60

alteration of the Concorde Condominium Project’s

(Concorde project) approved plan. The plan excluded the
uncovered parking area (TCT No. 206285) from the list of
common areas of the condominium project and its master
deed. The HLURB granted the request on March 25, 1997,
giving PPI clearance for the amended master deed to be
recorded with the Register of Deeds of Makati. Thereafter,
upon the request of Young, the Register of Deeds of Makati
cancelled TCT No. 206285 and issued TCT No. 208874 in
the name of PPI without the annotation of the master
deed.11
With the new TCT No. 208874 over the uncovered
parking area, PPI executed on May 23, 1997, a real estate
mortgage over the said property in favor of Philippine
National Bank-International Finance Limited (PNB-
IFL) as security for a P26,300,000.00 loan extended to PPI
and two other corporations. The debtors-mortgagors
defaulted on its loan obligation, resulting in the foreclosure
of the mortgage. Consequently, the property was sold at a
public auction and a certificate of sale was issued to
Philippine National Bank (PNB) on September 1, 1999.12
On May 5, 2000, CCI filed a complaint against PPI,
PNB-IFL, and the Register of Deeds of Makati for
annulment of title, mortgage, and reconveyance (HLURB
Case No. REM-050500-10982).13
CCI alleged that PPI’s acts of retaining title over the two
parcels of land of the condominium project, including its
common areas as provided in the master deed, were done
without CCI’s knowledge and consent and in evident bad
faith, with fraud and misrepresentation to promote its self-
interest. Such caused the resurvey and amendment of the
project plan and master deed and the issuance of a
separate title for the uncovered parking area which
undisputedly forms
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 141-148.

12 Id., at pp. 149-157.
13 Id., at pp. 158-180.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 61

part of the common areas. By excluding the uncovered
parking area of the condominium project from the common
areas, PPI has deprived CCI of ownership over it. CCI
averred that not all unit owners were given prior or
appropriate notices of the proposal to amend the master
deed. There was no approval by majority of the registered
owners of the amendment, contrary to the Corporate
Secretary’s Certificate submitted by PPI. Neither did the
Makati Commercial Estate Association (MACEA) and the
City Engineer approve the amendment to the plan and
master deed.
As for PNB-IFL, CCI claimed that it is not an innocent
mortgagee for value, having failed to exercise the degree of
diligence required by law before accepting the mortgage,
relying solely on the representation of the borrower and
PPI. Had PNB-IFL conducted an ocular inspection of the
property offered as collateral, it would have been compelled
by the physical features to undertake further inquiry and
investigation on the property’s recent history. It would
have then discovered that the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 208874 formed part of the condominium project.
CCI cited the following physical evidence: 1) the lot is
situated directly behind the condominium building and is
still being used by CCI and its owners for parking; and 2)
there is no demarcation line or divider between the
building and the uncovered parking area to show that the
latter is not part of the condominium project. The
mortgage, constituted without the prior approval of the
HLURB, is not valid. The foreclosure sale to PNB is
likewise void, PNB-IFL being a mere alter ego or conduit of
PNB. PNB is, therefore, not an innocent purchaser for
value. CCI argued that PPI, PNB-IFL and PNB, being
mere trustees of the property, are duty bound to convey or
transfer the title in its favor. In the alternative, CCI prayed
that if, for whatever reason, the property covered by TCT
No. 208874 cannot be transferred in its name, PPI and/or
PNB/PNB-IFL should compensate CCI in the amount
equivalent to its current value. Further, it should cause the
annotation in the title the exclusive

62

and perpetual easement of use of the uncovered parking
area in CCI’s favor.
In its Answer,14 PPI contended that no specific provision
in the Condominium Act vests exclusive jurisdiction on the
HLURB over cases on annulment and cancellation of titles,
issuance of new titles, transfer of title, and possession.
Such actions are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC of Makati City. In fact, Section 23 of said law
provides that the courts have jurisdiction over actions for
partition of a condominium project or for the dissolution of
the condominium corporation.
PPI argued that the complaint essentially questions the
validity of the resolution (consulta) of the LRA granting
PPI’s request for the issuance of a separate certificate of
title over the segregated parking lots. It pointed out that
the HLURB approved the proposed amendment of the
master deed and issued its clearance after a review of all
documents submitted, particularly the proof of consent for
the condominium plan alteration. Indeed, the Corporate
Secretary’s Certificate attesting to the stockholders’
approval of the amendment to the condominium project
and the master deed, confirms this.
PPI stressed that the acts of the LRA, the Register of
Deeds of Makati, and the HLURB in acknowledging PPI’s
absolute ownership over the uncovered parking area by
cancelling TCT No. 206285 and issuing the new title TCT
No. 208874, evidence the presumption of regularity. It
posited that the non-annotation of the master deed in TCT
No. 208874 confirms that the subject lot is not part of the
common areas.
PNB and PNB-IFL filed their Answer,15 asserting that
PNB-IFL is a mortgagee in good faith and for value. Due to
the default of the debtors-mortgagors on their loan
obligation and their failure to settle their outstanding debt
despite demands,
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 196-206.

15 Id., at pp. 207-222.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 63

PNB-IFL foreclosed the property, pursuant to the
provisions of the promissory note and the mortgage
contract, after due notice and publication. PNB, the highest
bidder at the public auction, was issued a certificate of sale.
PNB-IFL alleged that before accepting the offered
collateral, it had conducted a thorough investigation,
inspection, and appraisal. On the strength of the conclusive
character of all matters in TCT No. 208874 issued solely in
the name of PPI, PNB-IFL approved the loan and executed
the loan documents, including the real estate mortgage
contract. It claimed to have granted the credit
accommodation and accepted the mortgage in good faith
only on the basis of TCT No. 208874 solely in PPI’s name,
satisfied that the title had no defect or infirmity.
Interposing a cross-claim against PPI, PNB-IFL stated that
it had extended the credit accommodation on PPI’s
representation as the absolute owner of the mortgaged
property free from all liens and encumbrances. Thus,
should the mortgage and the foreclosure be declared void,
PNB-IFL prayed that PPI be ordered to pay its outstanding
obligation or the fair market value of the property.

Ruling of the HLURB Arbiter

On June 5, 2003, Arbiter Dunstan T. San Vicente
rendered a decision16 upholding the HLURB’s jurisdiction
over the case. It reasoned that the HLURB is granted
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove the alteration
of condominium plans and to issue a title resulting from
such. It would thus be illogical that it would have no
authority to order the partition of the common areas, which
is but an incident of alteration. It cited PPI’s previous
invocation of the HLURB’s authority to give it clearance
and to approve its alteration of the Concorde Condominium
Project plan, only to deny such jurisdiction because of its
suit for the alleged illegal alteration.
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 182-195.

64

On the validity of the con-
solidation and subdivision
of the two parcels of land
of the Concorde Condomin-
ium project

Arbiter San Vicente found that the issuance of a new
title over the said portion without annotation of the master
deed showed that PPI failed to secure the required consent
of the majority of the unit owners for the amendment of the
master deed. PPI had submitted to the HLURB a mere
certificate of its corporate secretary and not a registrable
instrument, i.e., a resolution of the CCI Board attesting
that the majority of the registered owners approved the
proposed amendment. Nonetheless, the new titles issued
over the uncovered parking area, the mortgage in favor of
PNB-IFL, and the certificate of sale awarded to PNB were
not declared null and void. PNB is considered an innocent
assignee of the foreclosed property. PPI’s acts deprived CCI
of ownership over the parcels of land and disregarded CCI’s
rights as condominium unit buyers. Thus, it is held solely
liable to CCI for damages.
The fallo of the HLURB-NCRFO’s original decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, a

judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the respondent Pulp and Paper, Inc. to
compensate and reimburse complainant Concorde
Condominium, Inc. the amount of money equivalent
to the present market value of the land segregated
from the mass of the common areas of the
condominium project, which is covered by TCT No.
206285 and later TCT No. 208874;
2. Ordering the respondent Pulp and Paper, Inc. to
restore and provide to the Concorde Condominium
project parking lots or slots, whether on-site or off-
site, with the same area and use as the lot area,

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 65

which was removed or taken from it by reason of the
alteration of the project’s common area;
3. Ordering respondent Pulp and Paper, Inc. to pay
CCI damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
All other claims and counterclaims are denied.17

CCI elevated the case to the HLURB Board. During the
appeal, Landmart Philippines, Inc. (Landmart), a unit
owner and member of CCI, filed a motion to intervene,
which was initially denied by the HLURB. On motion for
reconsideration, Landmart’s intervention was granted. CCI
and PNB, PNB-IFL and PPI were ordered to comment on
its complaint-in-intervention. The Board ordered the
remand of the case to the HLURB-NCRFO for the
determination of the rights of the intervenor. Two more
unit owners and CCI members: Lasquite Foodstar, Inc. and
Majette Tan Torres, were also allowed to intervene.
On December 14, 2005, Arbiter San Vicente rendered a
new decision18 upholding the jurisdiction of the HLURB
over the case. This reversed its earlier ruling that PNB-IFL
was a mortgagee in good faith and PNB was an innocent
assignee of the foreclosed property. It held that, based on
the master deed, the two parcels of land had been set aside
and reserved by PPI from its own estate and declared as
part of the common areas of the Concorde. Thus, PPI
cannot unilaterally take away these properties from the
mass of the common areas without violating the law and its
contractual undertaking with the unit owners. Recall that
the CCI had been designated by PPI to hold and manage
the project, specifically, the common areas. For CCI to
discharge these responsibilities, PPI needs to turn over the
titles to the project, including those of the common areas.
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 194-195.

18 Id., at pp. 225-239.

66

On the approval of the al-
teration of the condomin-
ium project plan

Arbiter San Vicente reiterated his previous finding that
PPI committed an illegal act of presenting an inexistent
CCI Board resolution, in its request for approval of the
amendment of the master deed and ensuing alteration of
the project plan. PPI did not meet the strict requirement of
the law when it submitted a mere certificate of its
corporate secretary. He also maintained his earlier ruling
that all the acts of the government agencies concerned in
the approval of the resurvey and alteration of the project
plan, amendment of the master deed, and issuance of new
certificates of title, still in PPI’s name, were a nullity and
cannot enjoy the presumption of regularity under the law.
This time, however, Arbiter San Vicente opined that the
unjust consequences borne by the unit owners and buyers,
including the intervenors, deserve equitable and
commensurate reliefs, beyond compensation or
reimbursement to CCI of the present market value of the
land. Indeed, the remand of the case to the HLURB-
NCRFO re-opened the proceedings and authorized the
adjudication anew of the rights of the parties.
Arbiter San Vicente held that the presumed bona fide
members of CCI and complainants-intervenors enjoy the
equal right to maintain the present suit as well as to be
protected from the acts of PPI, PNB-IFL, and PNB that
impinged on their interest in the common areas. Since PPI
failed to meet the requirements of the law when it
segregated and separately titled the uncovered parking
area from the common areas, the original titles of the
Concorde remained valid and subsisting. Consequently, the
new titles and their derivatives, being a nullity, conferred
no right or title in favor of the mortgagee PNB-IFL and its
successor-in-interest, PNB. Clearly, PPI cannot freely
dispose of the ownership of the disputed parking area
which had been previously vested by law and by contract
on CCI. Further, even if PPI acquires a separate title
through

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 67

legal means or in good faith, still, it cannot mortgage the
segregated portion without the HLURB’s approval.
The dispositive portion of the December 14, 2005
decision of the HLURB-NCRFO states thus:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises

considered, a judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the issuance of TCT No. 206284 for
Lot 1 (Pcs-00-06989] and TCT No. 206285 for Lot 2
[Pcs-00-0066989] null and void and canceling the
same;
2. Declaring the issuance of TCT No. 208874 for
Lot 2 [Pcs-00-0066989], which replaced TCT No.
206285, as null and void and canceling the same;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City
to cancel TCT Nos. 206284, 206285 and 208874 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati and reinstate TCT No.
(351672) [S]-20277 and TCT No. (420504) [S]-20278;
4. Declaring as null and void the amendment of
the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions
effected by PPI without notice and without the
consent of the simple majority of all the registered
unit owners of Concorde Condominium Project and
without the written approval of the City Engineer of
Makati City and of this Board, including the
cancellation of the annotation of the said amendment
from TCT Nos. (351672) [S]-20277 and (420504)
[S]-20278 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal;
5. Declaring as void and inexistent the mortgage
of Lot 2 [covered previously by TCT No. 206285 and
later by TCT No. 208874] executed between PNB-IFL
and PPI over the parcel of land upon which the
uncovered parking area of Concorde Condominium is
located, including the sale by auction or otherwise of
the parcel of land upon which the uncovered parking
area of Concorde Condominium was constituted and
described in TCT No. 208874 to PNB. This shall [sic]
understood to be without prejudice to the right of
PNB to proceed against other as-

68

sets of Pulp & Paper Inc. to cover or guarantee the amount
of the loan and its interest;
6. Directing PPI to deliver TCT No. (351672) [S]-20277
[as replaced by TCT No. 206284] covering Lot No. 1 to the
complainant Concorde Condominium, Inc., in the same
manner that PNB is directed to release and deliver TCT No.
(420504) [S]-20278 [as replaced by TCT No. 208874]
covering Lot No. 2, also to the complainant Concorde
Condominium Inc. or to the Complainants-Intervenors,
being trustors and holders of rights of the two (2)
properties.
In the event of failure of PPI and PNB to make the
delivery of TCT No. 206284 and TCT No. 208874, the
Register of Deeds of Makati City is directed to cancel and
nullify said titles and issue another titles in the name of
Concorde Condominium, Inc. (CCI).
7. Ordering PPI to pay the complainant and
complainant-intervenors exemplary damages of
P500,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P300,000.00;
In the alternative, and if for any reason the parcels of
land upon which the mortgage of the Concorde
Condominium building and/or its uncovered parking lot are
constituted cannot be conveyed and/or transferred to CCI,
directing PPI and/or PNB-IFL and/or PNB to pay CCI an
amount of money equal to the value of the said parcel of
land and directing PPI and/or PNB-IFL and/or PNB to
cause the annotation at the back of TCT Nos. 351672 and
420504 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal an
exclusive and perpetual easement of use in favor of CCI
and/or the complainants-intervenors.
All other claims and counterclaims are denied.19

Both CCI and PNB-IFL, and PNB filed their respective
petitions for review with the HLURB Board.
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 238-239.

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Ruling of the HLURB Board of Commissioners

20
In a decision, dated March 17, 2011, the HLURB
Board dismissed CCI’s appeal for being moot and academic.
The issue of validity of the real estate mortgage and
auction sale of the property covered by TCT No. 208874
(TCT No. 206285) were already resolved by the regional
office. PNB-IFL and PNB’s appeal was likewise denied for
lack of merit. The regional office found that the appellants
failed to meet the requirements of the law for the alteration
of the condominium plan and amendment of the master
deed under the Condominium Act. Laquiste Food, Inc.
(LFI) also filed a motion to cite a board member of CCI for
indirect contempt.
The Board decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, CCI’s appeal

is DISMISSED for being moot and academic; respondents
PNB-IFL and PNB’s appeal, and LFI’s urgent motion to cite
Mr. Dela Paz for indirect contempt are hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21

PNB-IFL and PNB appealed the HLURB’s decision with
the Office of the President (OP), in accordance with Sec. 15
of Presidential Decree No. 957 (P.D. No. 957)22 and Sec. 2
of Presidential Decree No. 1344 (P.D. No. 1344),23 in
relation to Sec. 2, Rule XX of the 2009 HLURB Rules of
Procedure.
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 240-245.

21 Id., at p. 245.
22 Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums,
Providing Penalties for Violations thereof (1976).
23 Empowering the NHA to Issue the Writ of Execution in the
Enforcement of its Decision under P.D. No. 957 (1978).

70

Ruling of the Office of the President

In its June 14, 2013 decision,24 the OP dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the March 17, 2011 decision of the
HLURB Board. The OP upheld the jurisdiction of the
HLURB in line with existing jurisprudence. It likewise
sustained the HLURB in declaring as void the mortgage to
PNB-IFL. It explained that PPI had engaged in unsound
real estate business practice when it mortgaged a portion of
the common areas without the consent of the Concorde
owners. It further noted that contrary to the argument of
PNB-IFL and PNB that the complaint questions the
validity of the LRA’s resolution in consulta, it actually
reinforces it. The LRA’s resolution specifically provides
that the segregated lot is “reserved for the use of the unit
owners pursuant to the Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions.”25
The motion for reconsideration filed by PNB-IFL and
PNB was likewise denied in the OP’s resolution,26 dated
April 28, 2014.
In the same resolution, the OP denied the Motion to
Admit and Manifestation filed by PPI for failing to appeal
the December 14, 2005 decision of the HLURB Arbiter.
Hence, PPI is bound by the said ruling and could not
anymore seek affirmative relief on appeal.
PNB and New PPI Corporation (formerly PPI) filed
separate petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
135651 and CA-G.R. SP No. 135689, respectively. The two
cases were ordered consolidated. On September 26, 2014,
the CA’s Sixteenth Division issued a Resolution27 granting
PNB’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
thereby enjoining the
_______________
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 228354), pp. 275-283.

25 Id., at pp. 281-282.
26 Id., at pp. 285-292.
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 228359), pp. 268-273.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 71

HLURB from implementing the December 14, 2005
decision of Arbiter San Vicente, subject to payment of the
bond set by the appellate court.

Ruling of the CA

On March 21, 2016, the CA rendered its decision holding
that HLURB has no jurisdiction over the case. It noted that
CCI’s complaint reveals allegations of the nullity of TCT
No. 208874, the mortgage constituted thereon in favor of
PNB-IFL, and the certificate of sale in favor of PNB. The
complaint essentially prayed for the reconveyance of the
disputed property. Since the ultimate purpose involves title
to real property, a real action lies under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts and not with the HLURB.
The appellate court declared valid the real estate
mortgage over the uncovered parking area, finding no
evidence of possession by CCI. PNB-IFL, as a mortgagee in
good faith, had conducted an investigation, inspection, and
appraisal of the said property offered as collateral. PPI’s
failure to attach the board resolution to the Secretary’s
Certification, was held to be a mere irregularity in PPI’s
application for amendment of the master deed. Such
irregularity does not amount to an unsound real estate
business practice. Also, Sec. 18 of P.D. No. 957 prohibiting
the mortgage by condominium developers/owners of their
units does not cover applications for amendment of master
deeds or alteration of plans. The CA further pointed out
that the irregularity, i.e., cannot prejudice PNB-IFL and
PNB. It only arose from CCI’s complaint filed nearly eleven
(11) years from the HLURB’s approval of the amendment.
Thus, PNB-IFL as mortgagee could not be expected to
know of, much less anticipate, this finding of irregularity
by the HLURB Board that would otherwise constitute a
ground for nullification of the amendment.
The CA stressed that there is nothing in TCT No.
208874 and its physical condition which would have put
PNB on

72

guard on the existence of irregularity. It concluded that it

is contrary to fair play to declare PNB-IFL and PNB liable
with PPI for the latter’s failure to strictly comply with the
requirements in P.D. No. 9157 on the alteration of the
project plan and the amendment of the master deed.
Earlier, the OP and the HLURB Board had declared the
same. Moreover, CCI failed to present evidence to its claim
on the existence of alleged structures on the uncovered
parking lot. There were no signages, no security guards,
and no allocation of parking space to unit owners. Not one
car was seen in the vicinity to indicate that the lot covered
by TCT No. 208874 was part of Concorde.
The appellate court dismissed New PPI’s petition. It had
failed to appeal the June 14, 2005 decision of the HLURB
Arbiter, the March 17, 2011 decision of the HLURB Board,
and the June 14, 2013 decision of the OP. New PPI’s direct
recourse to the CA was held a violation of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The CA decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby

resolves to:
1. GRANT PNB-IFL’s and PNB’s Petition (C.A.-

G.R. S.P. No. 135651). The real estate mortgage
constituted on Lot 2 (TCT No. 208874) in favor
of PNB-IFL and the Certificate of Sale in favor
of PNB remain valid.
2. DISMISS New PPI’s Petition (C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
135689). New PPI’s liability to CCI stands.
Accordingly, New PPI is ordered to compensate
and reimburse CCI in the amount equivalent to
the present market value of Lot 2 (TCT No.
208874).
SO ORDERED.28
_______________
28 Id., at p. 71.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 73

CCI and New PPI filed their respective motions for

reconsideration. In its resolution,29 dated November 21,
2016, the CA denied both motions and reiterated its
findings and conclusions in its March 21, 2016 decision.
Issues

I.
WHETHER THE HLURB HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE;

II.
WHETHER THE DISMISSAL OF NEW PPI’S
PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE CA WAS
PROPER; AND

III.
WHETHER PNB-IFL IS A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD
FAITH, AND PNB AN INNOCENT ASSIGNEE/PUR-
CHASER IN GOOD FAITH.

Petitioners’ Arguments

In G.R. No. 228354, CCI contends the CA’s ruling that
the HLURB has no jurisdiction over its complaint is
contrary to existing jurisprudence that upholds the
HLURB’s authority over cases on annulment of mortgages
on condominium or subdivision units. While the ultimate
prayer is for reconveyance of the disputed property, the
Court has held that HLURB is vested with jurisdiction on
issues involving title to real property. CCI argues that,
without its knowledge and consent, the acts of PPI
(now New PPI) in refusing to turn over the title of the
project to CCI, and in segregating the uncovered parking
area from the project and its ensuing consequences, are
unsound real estate business practice. Such
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 76-88.

74

acts are well within the jurisdiction of the HLURB. On the
CA’s observation that PPI’s acts were done without any
protest from the condominium owners, CCI points out that
it could not have opposed such acts simply because it was
not made a party thereto. Nor was it notified by the
government agencies concerned.
As to the claimed status of a mortgagee in good faith,
CCI avers that no board resolution was presented by New
PPI authorizing predecessor-in-interest, PPI’s Vice
President for Finance and Operations, to enter into a real
estate mortgage agreement with PNB-IFL. Further, the
Inspection and Appraisal Report of PNB (PNB report)
contains the notation that at the time of the mortgage, TCT
No. 208874 had not yet issued. The HLURB Board and the
OP disregarded this PNB report, having been submitted
only on appeal. CCI maintains that no inspection was
actually conducted prior to execution of the mortgage
contract between PPI and PNB-IFL. The PNB report also
failed to disclose the physical features of the project to
show that the uncovered parking area was used by unit
owners as a common area. The foregoing circumstances
prove the PNB-IFL’s lack of due diligence. Since the
mortgage was made in violation of Section 18 of P.D. No.
957, said contract, as well as the certificate of sale issued to
PNB, should be considered null and void.
In G.R. No. 228359, New PPI asserts that the CA
decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. It clarifies
that the appellate court erred in holding that its liability to
CCI stands despite ruling that the HLURB has no
jurisdiction over CCI’s complaint. Citing Vda. De Herrera v.
Bernardo, et al.,30 New PPI argues that the decision of both
the OP and the HLURB Board affirming the HLURB-
NCRFO’s decision cannot bind it for lack of jurisdiction.
Without jurisdiction, any judgment by a quasi-judicial body
is void. It cannot be the
_______________
30 665 Phil. 234; 650 SCRA 87 (2011).

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 75

source of any right or create any obligation. All acts and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Further, New PPI faults the CA in ruling that it failed
to exhaust administrative remedies. It claims that the CA
overlooked the exception where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The CA, thus, should not have dismissed its
petition on mere technicalities. Regardless of the fact that
the HLURB has no jurisdiction over CCI’s complaint, New
PPI contends that the CA still erred in its decision
benefiting only PNB. Assuming that it had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, New PPI insists that a
decision in favor of PNB should inure to its benefit.
New PPI thus prays that this Court reverse and set
aside the assailed CA’s decision and resolution, as well as
the decisions of the HLURB Board and the OP which
affirmed the December 14, 2005 decision of the HLURB-
NCRFO. Further, it prays that the latter be declared as
null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.

Respondents’ Arguments

In G.R. No. 228354, PNB-IFL and PNB argue that the
CA was correct in ruling that the HLURB has no
jurisdiction over CCI’s complaint. While it appears that the
complaint called for the nullity and cancellation of TCT No.
208874, the validity of the title had not been questioned
directly. The issues raised in the complaint clearly involved
a determination of the ownership of a party of real
properties, over which the Regional Trial Courts have
exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, the complaint does not
concern the enforcement of contractual rights and statutory
obligations between a developer and its buyers. Rather, it
is the validity of the alteration of the condominium plan
which segregated Lot No. 2 from the common areas and
enabled PPI to obtain TCT No. 208874 from the Register of
Deeds of Makati City. The CA correctly pointed

76

out that Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 would not apply since,
at the time of the mortgage to PNB-IFL, Lot No. 2 no
longer formed part of the condominium project. Its
exclusion followed the amendment of the master deed,
which was duly approved by the HLURB.
Asserting their respective status as mortgagee and
purchaser in good faith, PNB-IFL and PNB contend that
even assuming that HLURB had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the mortgage, the CA nonetheless correctly
ruled that the mortgage to PNB-IFL and subsequent sale
to PNB remain valid. By virtue of the PNB report, PNB-
IFL, in the ordinary course of business, followed the
standard operating procedure in accepting the property as
security. It conducted a thorough investigation, appraisal,
and inspection of the property, including verification with
the government offices concerned, prior to the acceptance of
the collateral and the resulting approval of the credit
facility. PNB-IFL thus did not confine itself to the four
corners of TCT No. 208874.
Also, contrary to the findings of the HLURB and the OP,
PNB-IFL and PNB point out that the condominium
building stood right in front of the contested northern
portion covered by TCT No. 208874. Even if vehicles were
parked in it, nothing else should have made PNB-IFL
conclude that the lot in question actually belonged to the
common areas, absent any lien or encumbrance inscribed in
the title. It was noted that the condominium itself has
basement parking slots allotted to its registered unit
owners. They stress that nothing in the master deed or in
the amended master deed that specifically states that Lot
No. 2 was to be constituted as the uncovered parking lot of
the project. Besides, the issuance of TCT No. 208874
without the annotation of the master deed was
accomplished through the proper government agencies.
Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty stands. Being without fault, PNB-IFL and
PNB assert that they should not be unduly stripped of their
rights with-

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 77

out due process. PPI’s fault cannot be attributed to them

who are mortgagee and purchaser, respectively, in good
faith.
On its part, New PPI maintains that it has not
committed any unsound real estate business practice. As
recognized in the CA’s decision, New PPI followed the
procedure laid down by the proper government agencies to
secure the separation of Lot 2 from the common areas of
the project. The CA likewise correctly ruled that PNB-IFL
is a mortgagee in good faith; and that the real estate
mortgage in favor of PNB-IFL, as well as the certificate of
sale to PNB, are valid.
New PPI argues that whether PNB-IFL is a mortgagee
in good faith is a question of fact, outside the scope of a
Rule 45 petition. The petition in G.R. No. 228354 should
therefore be dismissed.
In G.R. No. 228359, CCI contends that New PPI failed to
show that it had availed of the proper administrative
remedies to question the findings of the HLURB-NCRFO.
New PPI’s position that HLURB lacks jurisdiction over
CCI’s complaint does not justify its bringing directly the
HLURB-NCRFO decision to the CA via a petition for
review under Rule 43. CCI further assails the argument of
New PPI that, while it failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, the CA decision should inure to its benefit owing
to its commonality of interests with PNB-IFL. Such
reasoning would contravene and abandon New PPI’s claim
that HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint in the
first place.
CCI reiterates that its complaint prayed for the
nullification of the mortgage agreement executed by then
PPI and PNB-IFL, among other things, in violation of
Section 18 of P.D. No. 957. Hence, it is the HLURB that
should have jurisdiction over the case.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition in G.R. No. 228354 and deny the
petition in G.R. No. 228359.

78

HLURB has jurisdiction

over CCJ’s complaint for
annulment of title and
mortgage.

The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal
are determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law governing at the time the action was
commenced. Either is conferred only by law; not by the
parties’ consent or by their waiver in favor of a court that
would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of an action.31 Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.32
P.D. No. 957,33 promulgated on July 12, 1976, conferred
exclusive jurisdiction upon the National Housing Authority
(NHA)34 to regulate the real estate trade and business. P.D.
No. 1344, dated April 2, 1978, expanded the quasi-judicial
powers of the NHA by providing:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the

real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
_______________
31 Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Ignacio, 613 Phil. 629, 636; 597
SCRA 266, 276 (2009), citing Laresma v. Abellana, 484 Phil. 766, 778; 442
SCRA 156, 169 (2004).
32 Geronimo v. Calderon, 749 Phil. 871, 880; 744 SCRA 564, 572
(2014), citing Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction,
Inc., 686 Phil. 1160, 1172; 671 SCRA 461, 472 (2012).
33 THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE (1976),
as amended by P.D. No. 1216 dated October 14, 1977.
34 Section 3. National Housing Authority.—The National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate
trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 79

National Housing Authority shall have exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 648,35 the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was created
to regulate zoning and land use and development and to
assume the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the
NHA. The HSRC was later renamed HLURB under
Executive Order No. 90.36
It was held that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear
and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause
of action, the subject matter or property involved and the
parties.37 The case must involve a subdivision project,
subdivision lot, condominium project or condominium
unit.38
Contrary to the CA’s reasoning, the complaint raising
the issue of ownership and title will not automatically
characterize it as a real action as to confer jurisdiction on
the RTC.
_______________
35 REORGANIZING THE HUMAN SETTLEMENTS REGULATORY

COMMISSION effective February 7, 1981.
36 IDENTIFYING THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL
SHELTER PROGRAM AND DEFINING THEIR MANDATES, CREATING THE HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL, RATIONALIZING FUNDING SOURCES

AND LENDING MECHANISMS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES effective December 17, 1986.
37 Delos Santos v. Sarmiento, 548 Phil. 1, 13; 519 SCRA 62, 73 (2007).
38 Id., at p. 14; p. 74.

80

Clearly, the suit involves a claim against a condominium

owner or developer filed by the registered unit owners to
compel the performance of the former’s contractual and
statutory obligations. As we held in Peña v. Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS):39
When an administrative agency or body is conferred

quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the
subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to
be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative
agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Therefore,
the Complaint for Specific Performance, Annulment of
Mortgage, and Damages filed by petitioner against
respondent, though involving title to, possession of, or
interest in real estate, was well within the jurisdiction of
the HLURB for it involves a claim against the subdivision
developer, Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., as well as
respondent.40

In Spouses Vargas v. Spouses Caminas, et al.,41 this
Court declared:
On spouses De Guzman’s claim that Section 18 of PD 957

does not grant the HLURB the authority to invalidate the
mortgage contract if the requisite authority from the NHA
is not obtained, this Court has previously ruled that the
HLURB has jurisdiction over cases involving the annulment
of a real estate mortgage constituted by the project owner
without the consent of the buyer and without the prior
written approval of the NHA.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. HLURB, the Court
held that a realty company’s act of mortgaging a
condominium project without the knowledge and consent of
the buyer of one of the condominium units, and without
obtaining the prior approval of the NHA, constitutes
_______________
39 533 Phil. 670; 502 SCRA 383 (2006).

40 Id., at p. 688; p. 402.
41 577 Phil. 185; 554 SCRA 305 (2008).

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 81

unsound real estate business practice. Accordingly, the
action for the annulment of such mortgage and mortgage
foreclosure sale falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB, thus:

Clearly, FRDC’s act of mortgaging the
condominium project to Bancom and FEBTC,
without the knowledge and consent of David as
buyer of a unit therein, and without the
approval of the NHA (now HLURB) as required
by P.D. No. 957, was not only an unsound real
estate business practice but also highly
prejudicial to the buyer. David, who has a cause of
action for annulment of the mortgage, the mortgage
foreclosure sale, and the condominium certificate of
title that was issued to the UBP and FEBTC as [the]
highest bidders at the sale. The case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB) as
provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of
1978. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterated this ruling in Home Bankers
Savings and Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals which involves a
mortgage entered into by the same Trans-American Sales
and Exposition that is a party in this case, thus:

The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the
Office of the President that HLURB has jurisdiction
to declare invalid the mortgage contract executed
between Garcia/TransAmerican and petitioner over
the subject lots insofar as private respondents are
concerned. It correctly relied on Union Bank of the
Philippines vs. HLURB, et al. where we squarely
ruled on the question of HLURB’s jurisdiction to hear
and decide a condominium buyers complaint for: (a)
annulment of a real estate mortgage constituted
by the project owner without the consent of the
buyer and without the prior written ap-

82

proval of the NHA; (b) annulment of the
foreclosure sale; and (c) annulment of the
condominium certificate of title that was issued to the
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, x x x.42
(Citations omitted)

Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate
the real estate business is broad enough to include
jurisdiction over a complaint for annulment of foreclosure
sale and mortgage and the grant of incidental reliefs such
as a cease and desist order.43
In Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, et al.,44 the
Court explained the rationale for upholding the expanded
jurisdiction of the HLURB:
The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to

encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and
condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for
an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which
all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions
and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to
said category of real estate may take recourse. The business
of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued
with public interest and welfare, any question arising from
the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the
HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter.
In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of
private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is
no longer a uniquely judicial func-
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 195-196; pp. 315-316.

43 Government Service Insurance System v. Board of Commissioners
(Second Division) HLURB, 634 Phil. 330, 338; 620 SCRA 249, 258 (2010),
citing Home Bankers Savings & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, 496 Phil.
637, 649-650; 457 SCRA 167, 180 (2005).
44 606 Phil. 670; 588 SCRA 663 (2009).

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 83

tion, exercisable only by the regular courts.45 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

The Court similarly underscored this rationale
in Sps. Chua v. Ang, et al.,46 when it pronounced that:
The law recognized, too, that subdivision and condominium

development involves public interest and welfare and
should be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has
technical expertise. In the exercise of its powers, the
HLURB, on the other hand, is empowered to interpret and
apply contracts, and determine the rights of private parties
under these contracts. This ancillary power, generally
judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to the
extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide.
Viewed from this perspective, the HLURB’s
jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations
of parties under subdivision and condominium
contracts comes out very clearly.47 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

The CA therefore erred in holding that the HLURB
lacks jurisdiction over the case filed by CCI.

New PPI is not entitled to
any relief due to its failure
to appeal the decision of
the HLURB-NCRFO.

The CA was correct in dismissing the petition for review
filed by New PPI. Having failed to appeal to the OP the
decision of Arbiter San Vicente, New PPI is deemed to have
ac-
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 681-682; pp. 672-673, citing Antipolo Realty Corp. v.
National Housing Authority, 237 Phil. 389, 397-398; 153 SCRA 399, 407
(1987).
46 614 Phil. 416; 598 SCRA 229 (2009).
47 Id., at p. 429; p. 242.

84

quiesced to the findings and conclusions therein with

respect to CCI’s rights over the common areas including
the uncovered parking lot.
Well-settled is the rule that a party who fails to appeal
from a judgment can no longer seek the modification or
reversal thereof.48 Indeed, one party’s appeal from a
judgment will not inure to the benefit of a coparty. And as
against the latter, the judgment will continue to run its
course until it becomes final and executory. To this general
rule, however, one exception stands out: where both parties
have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is
deemed to be the vicarious appeal of the other.49
We fail to see a commonality of interest of then PPI with
those of its corespondents PNB-IFL and PNB. CCI sought
to compel PPI to perform its contractual and statutory
obligations to all the registered unit buyers/owners of the
Concorde. The contractual and legal liabilities of PPI to the
said buyers are distinct and independent from its financial
obligations to its creditor-mortgagee PNB-IFL and to PNB,
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Thus, even if PPI was
adjudged to have violated its contractual undertaking to
transfer ownership of the subject parcels of land to CCI,
PNB-IFL and PNB can still obtain relief on appeal by
proving that they are mortgagee and purchaser in good
faith. The appellate court’s ruling in
_______________
48 Aquino v. Aguilar, 762 Phil. 52, 64; 760 SCRA 444, 456-457 (2015),
citing Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
736 Phil. 591, 600; 726 SCRA 637, 648 (2014); Raquel-Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 609 Phil. 630, 651; 592 SCRA 169, 190 (2009).
49 Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation, 568 Phil. 219, 228; 544 SCRA 241, 249 (2008), citing Portes,
Sr. v. Arcala, 505 Phil. 443, 450-451; 468 SCRA 343, 352 (2005); Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Auhtority v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 695,
707; 346 SCRA 126, 140 (2000); Republic v. Institute for Social Concern,
490 Phil. 379, 391; 449 SCRA 512, 524 (2005).

85
VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 85

favor of PNB-IFL and PNB will not inure to the benefit of

PPI who remains liable to the condominium unit buyers.
Even if the real estate mortgage is held valid under a final
judgment, PPI is deemed to have acquiesced to the HLURB
judgment with respect to its obligations to its buyers.

PNB-IFL is not a mort-
gagee in good faith; the
foreclosure sale in favor
of PNB is likewise void.

In general, the issue of whether a mortgagee is in good
faith cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition. This is
because the ascertainment of good faith or the lack thereof,
and the determination of negligence are factual matters
which lie outside the scope of a petition for review on
certiorari. Good faith, or the lack of it, is a question of
intention. In ascertaining intention, courts are necessarily
controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward
facts by which alone the inward motive may safely be
determined.50 A recognized exception to the rule is when
there are conflicting findings of fact by the CA and the
RTC.
Given the conflicting findings of the CA and that of the
HLURB and the OP, the Court shall address the factual
issue on hand.
As mentioned earlier the uncovered parking area formed
part of the condominium project under the approved plan.
This is evident from the provisions of the master deed
which referred to the uncovered parking spaces as among
those “limited common areas.” PPI expressly conferred
their owner-
_______________
50 Philippine National Bank v. Vila, 792 Phil. 86, 96; 799 SCRA 90, 98
(2016), citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belle Corporation, 768 Phil.
368, 385; 769 SCRA 46, 63 (2015); Philippine Banking Corporation v. Dy,
698 Phil. 750, 756-757; 685 SCRA 567, 573-574 (2012).

86

ship and management to the condominium corporation or

CCI that was formed and designated as the management
body for the limited common areas.
The pertinent provisions of the master deed state:
Section 4. The limited Common Areas.—Certain parts

of the common areas are to be set aside and reserved for the
exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall have
appurtenant thereto an exclusive easement for the use of
the limited common areas:
a) Exclusive use of the covered and uncovered

parking spaces within the project, as now
existing or as may hereafter exist subject to the
deed restrictions mentioned in Section 9 of Part
1 hereof, shall be allocated as equally as possible
among all the unit owners in the project. Of the
twenty-nine (29) covered and thirty-four (34)
uncovered parking spaces presently existing,
each unit owner shall be entitled to the exclusive
use of five (5) parking spaces for Unit A owners
and four (4) parking spaces for Unit B owners to
be allocated by the management body referred to
in Part II, Section 1 below in the following
manner, namely:

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 87

Of the additional parking spaces that may

hereafter be provided, the management body
shall reserve one parking space for the exclusive
use of the building administrator. Use of the
rest of the parking spaces (i.e., those not
exclusively reserved in accordance with the
foregoing) shall be at the discretion of the
management body which may allow use
thereof in accordance with the need of particular
unit owners for additional space, or on a first-
come, first-served basis, or on a rotation basis or
such other equitable basis as the management
body may determine and subject to such terms
and conditions as it may fix.
x x x x
Section 5. Appurtenant Interest of each Unit in
the Common Areas.—To each unit in the project shall
indirectly appertain an undivided interest in the
common areas equal to the percentage which the floor
area of the unit bears to the total floor area of all the
units in the project, exclusive of common areas. x x x
x x x x
Section 6. The Condominium Corporation.—The
Declarant shall, before conveying any unit in
the Project, form and organize a condominium
corporation pursuant to the provisions of the
Condominium Act and the Corporation Law, for
the purpose of holding title to all the common
areas in the project and of managing the entire
project. All owners of units in the project shall
automatically become members of the condominium
corporation, to the exclusion of others.
Section 7. Nature of Interest acquired by
purchasers of units.—The purchaser of a
condominium unit in the project shall acquire
ownership of such unit, subject to the terms and
conditions of the instrument conveying the unit from
the Declarant to such purchaser or to the terms and
conditions of any subsequent conveyance un-

88

der which the purchaser takes title to the unit. Each

condominium unit owners, as an appurtenance of
such ownership, shall automatically become a
member of the condominium corporation provided for
above. The proprietary interest acquired by each
member of the condominium corporation shall be
equal to the appurtenant interest of his unit in the
common areas as provided in Section 5 above. Each
condominium unit owner shall also acquire, as an
appurtenance of the Unit, an exclusive easements for
the use of the limited common areas as provided in
Section 4 above.
x x x x
Section 8. Options in case of involuntary
dissolution of condominium corporation.—In case of
involuntary dissolution of the condominium
corporation for any of the cause provided by law, the
members of the corporation shall have the option to
decide, by a majority vote of all the members in a
regular or special meeting called for the purpose,
whether to convert their interest or participation in
the corporation into an undivided co-ownership
interest in the common areas or to sell and dispose of
the entire project as a whole, including their separate
units therein, before dissolution and liquidation of the
corporation.
x x x x

Part II

x x x x
Section 1. Management Body.—The
condominium corporation formed and organized
pursuant to Section 6 of Part I above, shall constitute
the management body of the project. As such
management body, the powers of the corporation shall
be such as are provided by the Condominium Act, by
the Articles of Incorporation and the By-Laws of the
corporation, by this instrument and by the applicable
provisions of the Corporation Law as are not
inconsistent with the Condominium Act. Among such
powers but not by way of limitation, it shall have
the

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 89

power to enforce the provisions hereof in accordance

with the Bylaws of the Corporation. x x x51

The foregoing indisputably shows that PPI is
contractually bound to transfer to CCI the title to the
common areas and the “limited common areas.”
To enable the orderly administration over these common
areas which are jointly owned by the various unit owners,
the Condominium Act permits the creation of a
condominium corporation. Such is specially formed for the
purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the
holders of separate interests shall automatically be
members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective
units.52 Other management bodies are specifically allowed
to manage the common areas, namely: association of
condominium owners, a board of governors elected by
condominium owners or by the board named in the
declaration.53
Having expressly covenanted the organization of a
condominium corporation to hold title and manage the
common areas and limited common areas provided in the
master deed, PPI’s refusal to transfer title to CCI and
subsequent acts, without the knowledge or consent of the
condominium buyers, are highly prejudicial to the
registered unit owners. Undeniably, each has an undivided
interest in the common areas of the condominium project.
Under the Condominium Act, the enabling or master
deed may be amended or revoked upon registration of an
instrument executed by a simple majority of the registered
owners of the property. With prior notifications to all
registered owners, any such amendment or revocation
already decided by a
_______________
51 Rollo (G.R. No. 228354), pp. 111-115.

52 Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation, 510 Phil. 750,
772-773; 474 SCRA 258, 277-278 (2005).
53 See Republic Act No. 4726, Section 9.

90

simple majority of all registered owners shall be submitted
to the HLURB and the city or municipal engineer for
approval.54 In this case, the HLURB-NCRFO ruled that
PPI failed to comply with the requirements of the law
having submitted a mere Secretary’s Certificate.55 The
certificate stated that the proposed amendment was
approved by 84% of the controlling interest of CCI. It was
not a CCI board resolution. CCI denies having given such
consent, hence, the amendment was ineffectual.
Moreover, the law prohibits the mortgage of a portion of
the common areas of the condominium project without the
approval of the HLURB.
Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 provides:
Section 18. Mortgages.—No mortgage on any unit or lot

shall be made by the owner or developer without prior
written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not
be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the
mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the
condominium or subdivision project and effective measures
have been provided to ensure such utilization x x x.

PNB-IFL and PNB assert that Section 18 does not apply
in this case. They argue that, at the time of the mortgage,
the uncovered parking area (Lot 2) was no longer part of
the project after its segregation from the common areas
and the amendment of the master deed.
We disagree.
As found by the HLURB, the segregation of the
uncovered parking areas contravened the provisions of the
master deed. Its subsequent amendment failed to comply
with the required consent of the unit owners. Such acts,
having been declared
_______________
54 See Republic Act No. 4726, Section 4.

55 Rollo (G.R. No. 228359), p. 155.

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VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 91

without legal force and effect, cannot prejudice the rights of
the unit owners.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. HLURB, et al.,56 the
Court held that a realty company’s act of mortgaging a
condominium project without the knowledge and consent of
a condominium unit buyer, and without obtaining the prior
approval of the NHA, constitutes unsound real estate
business practice.57
P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent
subdivision lot and condominium unit buyers against
fraudulent real estate practices. The HLURB is given wide
latitude in characterizing or categorizing acts which may
constitute unsound business practice or breach of
contractual obligations in the real estate trade.58
In this case, we agree with the HLURB and the OP that
PPI’s act of mortgaging the uncovered parking area — by
amending the approved project plan and master deed
without the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting
power of CCI (Sec. 13 of the master deed) or a simple
majority of the registered unit owners (Sec. 4 of the
Condominium Act) — constitutes unsound real estate
business practice. Clearly, PPI has reneged on its
contractual commitments to its buyers and CCI which was
empowered (Part II, Sec. 1 of the master deed) to “enforce
the provisions” of said instrument.
Not even CCI’s silence or inaction for several years after
its incorporation — attributed to its lack of knowledge of
PPI’s acts affecting the common areas — may defeat the
unit owners’ contractual and statutory rights. CCI should
not be deemed to have waived any right as it has never
acquiesced to PPI’s maneuverings to deprive the unit
owners of their undi-
_______________
56 285 Phil. 1095; 210 SCRA 558 (1992).

57 Id., at pp. 1101-1102; p. 563; see also The Manila Banking
Corporation v. Rabina, 594 Phil. 422, 433; 574 SCRA 16, 23 (2008).
58 Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.,
supra note 32 at p. 1174; p. 473.

92

vided interest in the common areas. CCI’s position finds
support in Sec. 7 of the master deed, which provides:
Section 7. Waivers.—No limitations, restrictions,

covenant or conditions herein contained and no rule or
regulation in the Building Rules shall be deemed to have
been abrogated or waived by reason of any failure to enforce
the same, irrespective of the number of violations or
breaches thereof which may occur.59

As a general rule, every person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title and is no longer required to look behind the certificate
in order to determine the actual owner.60 However, PNB-
IFL is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank.
As such, unlike private individuals, it is expected to
exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings,
including those involving registered lands. A banking
institution is expected to exercise due diligence before
entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of
the status or condition of a property offered to it as security
for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its
operations.61
In Philippine National Bank v. Vila,62 the Court ruled:
Clearly, the PNB failed to observe the exacting standards

required of banking institutions which are be-
_______________
59 Rollo (G.R. No. 228354), p. 119.

60 Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429 Phil. 225, 237; 379 SCRA
490, 503 (2002), citing Heirs of Spouses Benito Gavino and Juana Euste v.
Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 686, 701; 291 SCRA 495, 509 (1998).
61 Id., at p. 239; p. 505, citing Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, 381
Phil. 355, 368-369; 324 SCRA 346, 362 (2000); Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 283, 302; 331 SCRA 267, 276
(2000); Sunshine Finance and Investment Corp. v. IAC, 280 Phil. 230, 236;
203 SCRA 210, 216 (1991).
62 Philippine National Bank v. Vila, supra note 50.

93
VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 93

hooved by statutes and jurisprudence to exercise greater
care and prudence before entering into a mortgage contract.
No credible proof on the records could substantiate the
claim of PNB that a physical inspection of the property was
conducted. x x x The failure of the mortgagee to take
precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and
would thereby preclude it from invoking that it is a
mortgagee in good faith.
Before approving a loan application, it is standard
operating procedure for banks and financial
institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the
property offered for mortgage and to determine the
real owner(s) thereof. The apparent purpose of an ocular
inspection is to protect the “true owner” of the property as
well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim
thereon from a usurper who may have acquired a
fraudulent certificate of title thereto.
x x x x
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belle
Corporation, the Court exhorted banks to exercise
the highest degree of diligence in its dealing with
properties offered as securities for the loan
obligation:

When the purchaser or the mortgagee is a bank,
the rule on innocent purchasers or mortgagees for
value is applied more strictly. Being in the business of
extending loans secured by real estate mortgage,
banks are presumed to be familiar with the rules on
land registration. Since the banking business is
impressed with public interest, they are
expected to be more cautious, to exercise a
higher degree of diligence, care and prudence,
than private individuals in their dealings, even
those involving registered lands. Banks may not
simply rely on the face of the certificate of title.
Hence, they cannot assume that, x x x the ti-

94

tle offered as security is on its face free of any
encumbrances or lien, they are relieved of the
responsibility of taking further steps to verify
the title and inspect the properties to be
mortgaged. As expected, the ascertainment of
the status or condition of a property offered to
it as security for a loan must be a standard and
indispensable part of the bank’s operations.
x x x.

We never fail to stress the remarkable significance of a
banking institution to commercial transactions, in
particular, and to the country’s economy in general. The
banking system is an indispensable institution in the
modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of
every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive entities for
the safekeeping and saving of money or as active
instruments of business and commerce, banks have become
an ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to
regard them with respect and even gratitude and, most of
all, confidence. Consequently, the highest degree of
diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity
and performance are even required, of it.63 (Emphases
supplied; citations omitted)

In this case, PNB-IFL clearly failed to exercise the
required degree of caution in readily accepting the
collateral offered by PPI, as per the loan documents
submitted by PNB-IFL and PNB, and in approving the
latter’s increased credit availments.64 PNB appears to be a
mere accommodation mortgagee with two other
corporations as borrower and co-borrower. While it
belatedly submitted an Inspection and Appraisal Report,
the date of inspection indicated therein, “November 23,
1998,” only raised serious doubt whether any inspection
was conducted at all considering that the real estate
mortgage was executed on May 23, 1997, more than a year
earlier.
_______________
63 Id., at pp. 97-99; pp. 99-102.

64 Rollo (G.R. No. 228354), pp. 403-416.

95
VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 95
There was also no description of the premises or its

physical condition. There was no statement that the lot was
directly at the back of the condominium building nor was it
being used for parking. Moreover, no inquiry on the recent
history or background of TCT No. 208874 was made. This
would have disclosed that it was originally part of the
condominium’s approved project plan — consistent with the
actual physical features of the lot — and the master deed
annotated on previous titles. In fact, under the entry
“Encumbrances,” it was stated that “TCT No. 208874 was
not available when verified on 11-24-98.” On the face of
TCT No. 208874, its date of issuance was April 1, 1997.65
The Court has ruled that the burden of proving the
status of a purchaser/mortgagee in good faith lies upon one
who asserts that status. This onus probandi cannot be
discharged by mere invocation of the legal presumption of
good faith.66 Indeed, the status of a buyer/mortgagee in
good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the
person invoking it.67 PNB-IFL and PNB failed to discharge
that burden of proof. Clearly, the CA erred in holding that
they are purchaser and mortgagee in good faith.
Nonetheless, the mortgage, although voided, still stands
as evidence of a contract of indebtedness. PNB-IFL may
demand payment from New PPI, subject to claims and
defenses they
_______________
65 Id., at pp. 143, 368, 417.

66 Sigaya v. Mayuga, 504 Phil. 600, 613; 467 SCRA 341, 354 (2005),
citing Potenciano v. Reynoso, 49 Phil. 396, 410; 401 SCRA 391, 401 (2003);
Uy v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 788, 801; 359 SCRA 262, 271 (2001).
67 Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr., 644 Phil. 26, 38; 629 SCRA 562, 575 (2010),
citing Bautista v. Silva, 533 Phil. 627, 638; 502 SCRA 334, 346 (2006);
Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 32, 45; 421 SCRA 310, 324 (2004).

96

have made against each other that have not been settled in
this Decision.68
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 228354
is GRANTED. The Decision, dated March 21, 2016, and
the Resolution, dated November 21, 2016, of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed
the petition of New PPI (C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 135689);
and REVERSED insofar as it granted the petition of PNB-
IFL and PNB in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 135651. The Decision,
dated December 14, 2005, of the HLURB Arbiter in the
National Capital Region Field Office (HLURB-NCRFO) in
HLURB Case No. REM-050500-10982, as affirmed by the
HLURB Board of Commissioners and the Office of the
President, is hereby REINSTATED.
The petition in G.R. No. 228359 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen,** J. Reyes, Jr. and Hernando, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., On Official Business.
Petition in G.R. No. 228354 granted, judgment affirmed

as it dismissed petition of New PPI and reversed insofar as
it granted petition of PNB-IFL and PNB. Petition in G.R.
No. 228359 denied.
Notes.—Republic Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for

Homeowners and Homeowners’ Associations, approved on
January 7, 2010 and became effective on July 10, 2010,
empowers the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) to hear and decide inter-association and/or intra-
_______________
68 See Philippine Bank of Communications v. Pridisons Realty

Corporation, 701 Phil. 178, 191; 688 SCRA 200, 214 (2013).
** Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2617 dated
November 23, 2018.

97
VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 97

association controversies or conflicts concerning

homeowners’ associations. However, we cannot apply the
same in the present case as it involves a controversy
between a condominium unit owner and a condominium
corporation. (Medical Plaza Makati Condominium
Corporation vs. Cullen, 709 SCRA 110 [2013])
The rights and obligations of the condominium unit
owners and the condominium corporation are set forth in
the Condominium Act. (Id.)

——o0o——

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G.R. No. 228354.November 26, 2018.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Once vested by

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 53

action was commenced. Either is conferred only by law; not

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Housing and Land

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 55

estate business practice. Clearly, PPI has reneged on its

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 57

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 228354), pp. 31-55; penned by Associate Justice

58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Section 3. The Common Areas.—The common areas of the

7 Id., at pp. 92-107.

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 59

The basement of the Concorde is used for parking

9 Id., at pp. 85-90.

60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

alteration of the Concorde Condominium Project’s

11 Id., at pp. 141-148.

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 61

62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

14 Id., at pp. 196-206.

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 63

16 Id., at pp. 182-195.

64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, a

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 65

17 Id., at pp. 194-195.

66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 67

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises

68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

19 Id., at pp. 238-239.

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 69

WHEREFORE, premises considered, CCI’s appeal

20 Id., at pp. 240-245.

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ruling of the Office of the President

24 Rollo (G.R. No. 228354), pp. 275-283.

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 71

72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

guard on the existence of irregularity. It concluded that it

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby

1. GRANT PNB-IFL’s and PNB’s Petition (C.A.-

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 73

CCI and New PPI filed their respective motions for

29 Id., at pp. 76-88.

74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

30 665 Phil. 234; 650 SCRA 87 (2011).

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 75

76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 77

out due process. PPI’s fault cannot be attributed to them

78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

HLURB has jurisdiction

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the

VOL. 887, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 79

National Housing Authority shall have exclusive