City Response To Whatley Lawsuit

Case 1:21-cv-01185-DCJ-JPM Document 5 Filed 06/21/21 Page 1 of 42 PageID #: 50
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
PATRICIA “KAY” WHATLEY CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-01185
VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH
JEROME HOPEWELL; STEVE MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

BOETA; HARRY ROBERTSON;
CHRIS PRUITT; ALEXANDRIA
CITY MARSHAL’S OFFICE;
DOES 1-10; and XYZ INSURANCE
COMPANY
______________________________________________________________________________
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come defendants JEROME
HOPEWELL (“Hopewell”), STEVE BOETA (“Boeta”), HARRY ROBERTSON (“Robertson”),
CHRIS PRUITT (“Pruitt”), and “ALEXANDRIA CITY MARSHAL’S OFFICE” (the “Marshal’s
Office”) (incorrectly named as an entity capable of being sued), and for their Answer and
Affirmative Defenses state that:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
The “Alexandria City Marshal’s Office” is not a juridical entity, and cannot be sued. See
Harvey v. City of Shreveport, No. 13-2970, 2014 WL 5856914 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2014)(dismissing
all claims against the non- juridical entity “City Marshal’s Office”). The Alexandria City Marshal
is an elected official whose duties place him within the structure of the City Court. (See La. R.S.
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13:1879). The City Court of Alexandria was “created and established by special legislative act,” and
was “recognized and continued in existence” pursuant to La. R.S.13:1952(2). As per La. R.S.
13:1881(A) the role of the Alexandria City Marshal is as the executive officer of the City Court.
(“The marshal is the executive officer of the court...”). Analogous cases hold “it is the sheriff, not
a sheriff’s office or sheriff’s department, that is the proper legal entity for suit.” Harvey, supra, at
*3, citing Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir.
2002). All claims against “Alexandria City Marshal’s Office” should be dismissed.
THIRD DEFENSE
Defendants Hopewell, Boeta, Robertson and Pruitt, in their individual capacities, did not
employ plaintiff; further, there is no individual liability for alleged violation of Title VII. Plaintiff
therefore has no Title VII claims against defendants Hopewell, Boeta, Robertson and Pruitt in their
individual capacities. See Kiper v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., No. 14-313, 2015 WL 2451998, at *2
(M.D. La May 21, 2015) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit has consistently held that there is no individual
liability for employees under Title VII”); See also, Coon v. Richland Parish Tax Commission, No.
18-1035, 2019 WL 2403000, *7, *8 (W.D. La. June 4, 2019), citing Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d
649, 635 (5th Cir. 1994)).
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff was not employed by any individual defendant, acting in an individual capacity;
further, plaintiff was not employed by defendants Boeta, Robertson or Pruitt while defendants were
acting in any “official capacity.” Plaintiff has no “official-capacity” claims against these defendants
under Title VII or the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). “The Fifth Circuit has rejected
official-capacity claims under Title VII and suggested that such claims are not cognizable under the
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ADA.” Coon, supra, 2019 WL 2403000, *8, citing Moss v. Harris Cty. Constable Precinct One,
851 F.3d 413, 420 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003); Ackal v. Nat’l Comm’ns. Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381 n.1 (5th Cir.
2003), citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448-449 (5th Cir. 2001).
FIFTH DEFENSE
Defendants Hopewell, Boeta, Robertson and Pruitt, in their individual capacities, were not
plaintiff’s employers, and they cannot be held liable for any alleged violation of the ADA. See
Traylor v. Southern Components, Inc., No. 18-0775. 2019 WL 3526358, * 3 (W.D. La. Aug. 8,
2019) (citing cases on “virtually universal view” that “employment discrimination provisions of the
ADA do not expose supervisors to individual liability”); see also Wilhelm v. City of Alexandria,
No. 18-1068167, *1 FN 3 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2020)(“Even if Wilhelm alleged ADA violations
against Officer Helminger and Voorhies in their individual capacities, this court has recognized there
is no individual liability under the ADA ...” [citations omitted]).
SIXTH DEFENSE
Regarding plaintiff’s individual and official capacity contract claims, defendants Hopewell,
Boeta, Robertson and Pruitt, in their individual capacities, were not plaintiff’s employers; these
defendants, individually, had no employment contract with plaintiff; these defendants owed no
individual contractual obligation to plaintiff. Accordingly, these defendants cannot be individually
liable for any alleged “breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” in relation to
plaintiff’s employment contract. See Ledet v. Campo, No. 12-1193 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/6/13), 128
So.3d 1034, 1040 (“ ... in order to find that Dr. Mathews breached a duty of good faith towards Ms.
Ledet, there must first be a finding that Dr. Mathews owed an obligation to Ms. Ledet. ... Ms. Ledet
presented no evidence indicating that Dr. Mathews owed her any obligation pursuant to her at-will
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employment with Dr. Campo. ... with regard to Ms. Ledet’s breach of contract claims ... Dr.
Mathews is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). Also, defendants Boeta, Robertson and Pruitt
did not employ plaintiff in their official capacities, and these defendants likewise cannot be liable
in their official capacities for any alleged “breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”
with regard to plaintiff’s employment.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Some or all of plaintiff’s claims (including but not limited to simple assault, simple battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and any and all other non-criminal claims based on La.
C.C. art. 2315) are barred by prescription, statutes of limitation and/or failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and/or failure to meet prerequisites. See Clark v. Auger Services, Inc., 244
F.Supp.3d 685, 711-713 (M.D. La. 2020).
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s La.R.S. 23:967 “whistleblower” retaliation claims are specifically prescribed. See
Clark v. Auger Services, Inc., 244 F.Supp.3d 685, 712 (M.D. La. 2020)(“However, ‘[a]bsent any
specification within La. R.S. 23:967, [the plaintiff’s] cause of action thereunder is subject to the
general one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions provided in La. Civ. Code art. 3492’ ...
Prescription for retaliation claims under La. R.S. 23:967 is not suspended during administrative
review of investigation.”(Citations omitted)); see also, Riley v. Novasad, No. 6:18-1123, 2020 WL
2858532, *4 (W.D. La. May 12, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s claims under ... La. Rev. Stat. 23:967 accrued
when she either resigned her employment with Cumulus or was constructively discharged ...”),
Report and Recommendations adopted, 2020 WL 2892187 (W.D. La. June 2, 2020).
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NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff cannot assert claims under La. R.S. 23:967 because plaintiff never advised the
Marshall’s Office or any superior of any violation of State law, and plaintiff never disclosed or
threatened to disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of State law.
TENTH DEFENSE
The allegations of plaintiff’s Complaint – and applicable facts – do not show the Louisiana
Code of Governmental Ethics provisions of La. R.S. 42:1169 [whistleblower retaliation
protection] are applicable to plaintiff’s claims; moreover, La. R.S. 42:1169 provides no private
right of action for plaintiff to sue in any court. Wilson v. Trege, 787 F.3d 322, 327-328 (5th Cir. 2015)
(“Section 42:1169 does not provide a private right of action for Wilson to sue in either state or
federal court. See Collins v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Natural Res., 2012-1031, p. 6-7 (La. App. 1 Cir.
5/30/13); 118 So.3d 43, 47-48. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim with
prejudice”).
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Some or all of plaintiff’s claims are barred because the Alexandria City Marshal exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct all acts alleged to be unlawful in the Complaint by
maintaining, disseminating and enforcing clear policies against discrimination and/or retaliation.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
Some or all of plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
Although defendants deny the occurrence of alleged, improper acts and/or comments
having a sexual component as alleged by plaintiff, various off-color comments were exchanged
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among individuals employed by the City Marshal. However, some or all of plaintiff’s claims are
barred because plaintiff herself actively engaged in the type of workplace behavior that she alleges
was improper, inappropriate, and having a sexual component. The United States Supreme Court
holds that “[t]he correct inquiry is whether [plaintiff] by her conduct indicated that the alleged
sexual advances were unwelcome.” Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 86, 106
S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), citing 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) [1985] (Emphasis added); see also
Holmes v. North Texas Health Care Laundry Cooperative Association, 304 F.Supp.3d 525, 543
(N.D. Tex. 2018) (quoting Meritor, supra). Plaintiff’s own conduct never indicated that any
alleged actions and/or comments made to her (and supposedly having a sexual component) were
unwelcome.
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
In the alternative, and only in the event any liability is found in this case (which is expressly
denied), some or all of the damages sought are barred or should be reduced due to plaintiff’s failure
to mitigate her damages.
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
In the alternative, and only to the extent any damages are found due, which is expressly
denied, an offset would be due for any earnings or other income received by plaintiff.
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
Some or all of plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims are barred because plaintiff
cannot bring claims or allege purported discriminatory or retaliatory acts not alleged in her EEOC
Charge of Discrimination.
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SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff will be unable to show any violation of the ADA or any other law or that any alleged
disability was a motivating factor in relation to any alleged improper employment action taken in
relation to plaintiff.
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE
Any requested accommodation allegedly not provided to plaintiff would have imposed an
undue hardship on plaintiff’s employer.
NINETEENTH DEFENSE
Some or all of plaintiff’s claims are barred because the Alexandria City Marshal prohibited
the conduct alleged by plaintiff.
TWENTIETH DEFENSE
Plaintiff cannot recover for completely unknown, unasserted unalleged “other causes of
action that may become known through a trial of this matter on its merits against any and all other
parties which are herein named ...” as asserted in Paragraph 240 of plaintiff’s Complaint. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), stating, “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ...”(Emphasis added).
TWENTY-FIRST DEFENSE
Some or all of plaintiff’s damage claims are barred by provisions of the Louisiana Workers’
Compensation Act.
TWENTY-SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiff cannot bring claims under Title VII or ADA, in that defendant Jerome Hopewell
did not and does not employ a sufficient number of persons to qualify as an “employer” under the
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cited statutes. “Both Title VII and the ADA define ‘employer’ as an entity with fifteen or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 112111(5)(A).” Coon, supra, 2019 WL 2403000, at *5. Further,
defendant Jerome Hopewell is an elected official; as such he is not an “employee.” (See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f), providing, in part, “the term ‘employee’ shall not include any person elected to
public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof ...”).
TWENTY THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff cannot bring claims under La. R.S. 23: 323 [Disability Discrimination] or La. R.S.
23:332 [Sex Discrimination], in that defendant Jerome Hopewell did not and does not employ a
sufficient number of persons required for applicability of the cited statutes. As provided by the
definition of “Employer” in La. R.S. 23:302(2), in part, “[t]he provisions of this Chapter shall apply
only to an employer who employs twenty or more employees within this state ...” (Emphasis added).
TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is frivolous and/or unreasonable and/or without foundation, and
accordingly, defendants are entitled to and seek herein:
(A) Attorney fees and all costs of defending against plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination and
retaliation claims, in accordance with § 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k);
(B) Attorney fees and costs for defending against plaintiff’s State law “whistleblower” claim
as provided by La. R.S. 23:967(D), upon a showing that plaintiff fails to meet the
requirements for her claim under the cited statute and/or upon a showing the employer’s
alleged acts or practices were not in violation of the law;
(C) Reasonable damages incurred as a result of plaintiff’s claims under La. R.S. 23:323 and
23:332, together with attorney fees and court costs as allowed by La. R.S. 23:303(B).
AND NOW, FOR ANSWER TO THE INDIVIDUAL ALLEGATIONS OF

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, DEFENDANTS STATE AS FOLLOWS:
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1.
The allegations of paragraph 1 are denied as written.
2.
The allegations of paragraph 2 are denied.
3.
For answer to paragraph 3, plaintiff’s knee injury allegations are denied for lack of
information sufficient to justify a belief therein. Defendants deny that any sexual harassment ever
occurred. Any remaining allegations of paragraph 3 are denied.
4.
The allegations of paragraph 4 are denied. Further responding, defendants deny the
occurrence of any sexual harassment.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The allegations of paragraph 8 are denied as written. Further responding, plaintiff received
a Written Warning because she was causing severe disruption through her actions at the office;
moreover, plaintiff’s EEOC filing was made after she received her Written Warning.
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9.
10.
11.
The allegations of paragraph 11 do not require a response; however, jurisdiction is not
contested.
12.
For answer to the allegations of paragraph 12, defendants deny the occurrence of the “events”
alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint. Further responding, venue is not contested.
13.
The first sentence of paragraph 13 is a conclusion of law for which a response is not required;
however, to the extent a response may be necessary, the allegations are denied. The second sentence
is admitted.
14.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 14, defendants deny the first sentence for lack
of information sufficient to justify a belief therein. Further responding, it is admitted plaintiff worked
at the City Marshal’s Office. All remaining allegations of paragraph 14 are denied.
15.
16.
The allegations of paragraph 16 are admitted. Further, Jerome Hopewell denies all liability.
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17.
The allegations of paragraph 17 are admitted. Further responding, Steve Boeta denies all
liability.
18.
The allegations of paragraph 18 are admitted. Further responding, Harry Robertson denies
all liability.
19.
The allegations of paragraph 19 are admitted. Further responding, Chris Pruitt denies all
liability.
20.
21.
occurrence of the actions alleged by plaintiffs.
22.
23.
The allegations of paragraph 23 are denied for lack of information sufficient to justify a belief
therein.
24.
25.
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therein.
26.
therein.
27.
28.
The allegations of paragraph 28 are admitted.
29.
The allegations of paragraph 29 are admitted.
30.
therein.
31.
therein.
32.
therein.
33.
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34.
35.
therein.
36.
The allegations of paragraph 36 are denied as written. Further responding, the employment
position which requires monitoring of the metal detector does not allow the responsible employee
“to sit in a chair approximately 95% of the time.”
37.
38.
39.
40.
The allegations of paragraph 40 are admitted. Further responding, however, plaintiff did not
perform the duties of a deputy in the field.
41.
42.
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The allegations of paragraph 42 are denied. Further responding, defendants deny any “sexual
harassment” ever occurred.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
14
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
therein.
61.
occurrence of any sexual harassment.
62.
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disclosure of any medical information regarding plaintiff.
63.
therein.
64.
65.
66.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 66, defendants deny the occurrence of any sexual
harassment at any time. Further responding, all allegations of paragraph 66 are denied.
67.
68.
occurrence of any events alleged in paragraph 68.
69.
70.
occurrence of any events alleged in paragraph 70.
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71.
72.
73.
74.
The allegations of paragraph 74 are denied. Further responding, defendants deny plaintiff
ever sought the alleged “accommodation” referenced in paragraph 74.
75.
76.
therein.
77.
The allegations of the first sentence of paragraph 77 are denied. The second sentence of
paragraph 77 is denied as written; further responding, defendants aver plaintiff never lost any pay
as a result of being on leave.
78.
The allegations of paragraph 78 are denied. Further responding, defendants aver Deputy
Butch Mackey resigned his position.
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79.
80.
For answer to the allegations of paragraph 80, it is denied that defendant Jerome Hopewell
ever told any employee to “get rid of” plaintiff; further answering, defendants deny the remaining
allegations of paragraph 80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
The allegations of paragraph 85 are denied as written. Further responding, defendants deny
there was ever any improper denial of an accommodation to plaintiff.
86.
87.
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88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 93, defendants deny there was ever any
harassment of plaintiff. Further answering, defendants aver that all City Marshal offices are “out of
public view.” Any and all remaining allegations of paragraph 93 are denied.
94.
The allegations of the first sentence of paragraph 94 are denied; and further responding,
defendant Harry Robinson never had any photographs of plaintiff. All remaining allegations of
paragraph 94 are denied for lack of information sufficient to justify a belief therein.
95.
96.
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therein.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
For answer to the allegations of paragraph 103, defendants deny the occurrence of any acts
alluded to by plaintiff, and which purported acts were supposedly “stopped” when another deputy
supposedly “entered the room.” Any and all remaining allegations of paragraph 103 are denied.
104.
105.
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106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 113, defendants deny plaintiff worked in a
hostile environment; defendants deny plaintiff was subjected to any sexual harassment. All
remaining allegations of paragraph 113 are denied.
114.
115.
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116.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 116, defendants deny the occurrence of
“harassment” relating to plaintiff’s alleged romantic relationship with any person. Further
responding, any remaining allegations of paragraph 116 are denied for lack of information sufficient
to justify a belief therein.
117.
The allegations of paragraph 117 are denied for lack of information sufficient to justify a
belief therein.
118.
The allegations of the first two sentences of paragraph 118 are denied for lack of information
sufficient to justify a belief therein. All remaining allegations of paragraph 118 are denied.
119.
occurrence of any sexual harassment; further responding, defendants deny there was ever any
“disclosure” of plaintiffs’ “private medical information.”
120.
121.
122.
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123.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 123, it is denied that no employees other than
plaintiff were required to account for the performance of their job responsibilities. All further
allegations of paragraph 123 are denied as written.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 128, defendants deny the occurrence of the
alleged statements referenced therein; further responding, defendants deny there were any actions
taken or statements made for which a “stop” thereof was needed. All remaining allegations of
paragraph 128 are denied.
129.
130.
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131.
132.
133.
134.
The allegations of paragraph 134 do not require an answer. Further responding, however,
defendants aver the referenced document is the best evidence of its content and filing information.
135.
The allegations of paragraph 135 are denied. Further responding, plaintiff was provided with
a “Written Warning” on January 13, 2020, prior to her filing of any EEOC Complaint, and there was
no “retaliation” relating to any matter whatsoever; further responding, the referenced “Written
Warning” is the best evidence of its content.
136.
Figure 1 Allegations.
The allegations of the “Figure 1” paragraph are denied. Further responding, plaintiff received
a “Written Warning” due to her disruptive office behavior; further responding, defendants Steve
Boeta, Harry Robertson and Chris Pruitt do not ever issue “Written Warnings” to any employees;
further responding, the document reproduced as “Figure 1” is the best evidence of its content.
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137.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 137, defendants deny the occurrence of any
“retaliation” of any nature whatsoever. Further responding, defendants aver that monitor cameras
with a 180 degree range (and not aimed at any person) were installed in several offices of the City
Marshal’s Office. All remaining allegations of paragraph 137 are denied.
138.
139.
The allegations of paragraph 139 do not reflect any purported conduct or statements of any
defendant, and do not require a response; however, to the extent a response may be necessary, the
allegations are denied as written.
140.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 140, defendants deny the existence of “hostility
of [plaintiff’s] work environment” and they further deny the causation of “stress” to plaintiff. The
remaining allegations of paragraph 140 are denied for lack of information to justify a belief therein
as to purported recommendations of plaintiff’s psychiatrist.
141.
142.
143.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 143, defendants deny the existence of any
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“harassment and retaliation” whatsoever. All remaining allegations of paragraph 143 are denied.
144.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 144, defendants admit plaintiff resigned her
employment on February 4, 2020. Further responding, defendants deny plaintiff was “subject to a
hostile work environment consisting of sexual harassment, discrimination and retaliation.” Further
responding, defendants deny any actions whatsoever were taken against plaintiff for “filing a
complaint with the EEOC.” Any further allegations of paragraph 144 are denied.
145.
The allegations of paragraph 145 do not require a response; however, to the extent a
response may be necessary, defendants do not contest the allegation that a Right to Sue letter was
issued.
146.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 146, defendants deny plaintiff experienced any
harassment at her job; defendants further deny any “harassers” of plaintiff were ever employed by
defendant Jerome Hopewell or “the Alexandria City Marshal’s Office.” Further responding, all
147.
alleged “discrimination and battery.” Further responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph 147
are denied.
148.
For response to paragraph 148, defendants incorporate herein by reference and reaver all
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previous answers to plaintiff’s allegations.
149.
The allegations of paragraphs 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, and 156 constitute
allegations and/or conclusions of law for which a response is not required. Further responding to the
cited paragraphs, however, defendants aver the facts and law will show plaintiff’s claims have no
merit, and that plaintiff is entitled to no relief whatsoever.
150.
151.
“harassment.” All remaining allegations of paragraph 158 are denied.
152.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 159, defendants deny the occurrence of
“harassment” and any other acts purported included in, or purportedly consisting of that which
plaintiff references as “this behavior.” Further responding, all allegations of paragraph 159 are
denied.
153.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 160, defendants deny the existence of a “hostile
work environment” and defendants further deny the existence of “harassment” directed to plaintiff.
All remaining allegations of paragraph 160 are denied.
154.
The allegations of paragraph 161 are not disputed.
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155.
The allegations of paragraph 162 constitute conclusions of law, for which a response is not
required; however, the allegations are nevertheless denied
156.
157.
158.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 165, defendants deny plaintiff was disciplined
for filing an EEOC Complaint; defendants further deny the existence of any “retaliation” relating to
plaintiff. All remaining allegations of paragraph 165 are denied.
159.
160.
The allegations of paragraph 167 constitute conclusions of law for which a response is not
required; however, to the extent a response is required, plaintiff fails to identify any “requirements
of federal law” of which Jerome Hopewell was supposedly aware, and the allegations are denied as
written. Further responding, defendants deny Jerome Hopewell “rejected” any requirements of
federal law “as not applying to the Alexandria City Marshal’s Office.”
161.
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162.
163.
The allegations of paragraph 170 do not require an answer. Further responding, however, the
referenced document is the best evidence of its content and filing information.
164.
For response to the allegations of Paragraph 171, defendants do not dispute plaintiff’s receipt
of a Right to Sue letter.
165.
For response to paragraph 172, defendants incorporate herein and reaver all previous answers
to plaintiff’s allegations.
166.
The allegations of paragraphs 173 and 174 constitute allegations and/or conclusions of law
for which a response is not required; however, to the extent a response may be necessary, the
allegations are denied to the extent they relate to any claims alleged by plaintiff.
167.
168.
purported improper “practices” referenced therein; further responding, defendants deny plaintiff ever
reported any purported improper “practices.” All remaining allegations of paragraph 176 are denied.
169.
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For response to the allegations of paragraph 177, defendants deny that no other employees
were required to account for the performance of their job responsibilities; the remaining allegations
are denied as written. Further responding, defendants aver monitor cameras with a 180 degree view
were installed in several offices in the Office of the City Marshal, and plaintiff was instructed not
to perform her job duties and refrain from wandering the halls.
170.
The allegations of paragraph 178 constitute allegations and/or conclusions of law for which
a response is not required; however, to the extent a response may be necessary, defendants deny
plaintiff was subjected to any “increased scrutiny” or any “retaliation.” Any remaining allegations
of paragraph 178 are denied.
171.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 179, defendants deny any camera was ever
“pointed directly at Ms. Whatley.” Any remaining allegations of paragraph 179 are denied.
172.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 180, defendants deny the existence of
“restrictions and requirements” on plaintiff’s employment as alleged by plaintiff; defendants further
deny the existence of any workplace “harassment.” Further responding, defendants deny plaintiff
reported any “harassment.” Any remaining allegations of paragraph 180 are denied.
173.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 181, defendants deny “fabricating reasons to
write-up” plaintiff; further responding, defendants deny they have any “legal liability” to plaintiff;
further responding, defendants deny attempting to “avoid legal liability” in any manner and as to any
30
matter as alleged by plaintiff; further responding, defendants Steve Boeta, Harry Robertson and Chris
Pruitt do not “write-up” employees. Any remaining allegations of paragraph 181 are denied.
174.
175.
a response is not required.
176.
177.
The first sentence of paragraph 185 is denied for lack of information sufficient to justify a
belief therein. The remaining allegations of paragraph 185 constitute allegations and/or conclusions
of law, for which a response is not required; however, to the extent an answer may be necessary, the
allegations as they purport to relate to claims by plaintiff are denied.
178.
The first sentence of paragraph 186 constitutes allegations and/or conclusions of law for
which a response is not required; however, to the extent the allegations purport to relate to plaintiff,
the allegations are denied. The remaining allegations of paragraph 186 are denied as written. Further
responding, defendants aver any purported document referenced by plaintiff in paragraph 186 is the
best evidence of its content.
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179.
The first sentence of paragraph 187 constitutes allegations and/or conclusions of law for
which a response is not required; however, to the extent a response may be necessary, the allegations
are denied as written. The remaining allegations of paragraph 187 are denied as written; further
responding, defendants aver the “front door position” does not entail “sitting for at least 95% of the
time.”
180.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 188, defendants deny for lack of information
sufficient to justify a belief therein plaintiff’s allegations regarding the purported denial of an
accommodation at the police academy and subsequent aggravation of a claimed knee injury;
defendants further deny plaintiff was refused a position “for which she was qualified under 42
U.S.C.12111(8).” Further responding, defendants deny the existence of any “sexual harassment.”
Any remaining allegations of paragraph 188 are denied.
181.
allegations are denied as they purport to relate to alleged claims by plaintiff.
182.
183.
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184.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 193, defendants deny plaintiff had a disability
as alleged by plaintiff; defendants further deny the violation of any purported “rights” whatsoever
of plaintiff “under the ADA.” Any remaining allegations of paragraph 193 are denied.
185.
186.
a response is not required; however, to the extent a response may be necessary, the allegations are
denied as they purport to relate to alleged claims by plaintiff.
187.
188.
“sexual harassment of” and “hostility toward” plaintiff at any time; further responding, defendants
deny the alleged sharing of plaintiff’s medical information; further responding, defendants deny the
existence of any “retaliation” relating to plaintiff; defendants further deny violating the Americans
With Disabilities Act in any manner whatsoever. Any remaining allegations of paragraph 197 are
denied.
189.
For response to paragraph 198, defendants incorporate and reaver all previous answers to
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plaintiff’s allegations.
190.
allegations are denied to the extent they purport to relate to alleged claims by plaintiff.
191.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 201, defendants deny all allegations relating to
“the conduct alleged herein” by plaintiff; further responding, defendants deny all allegations of
paragraph 201.
192.
a response is not required; however, to the extent a response may be necessary, the allegations of
193.
194.
allegations are denied to the extent they purport to relate to alleged claims by plaintiff
195.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 206, defendants deny the existence of “sexual
harassment” towards plaintiff; defendants deny the existence of “hostilities” towards plaintiff;
34
defendants deny disclosing plaintiff’s private medical information; defendants deny mocking
plaintiff’s alleged health conditions; defendants deny any alleged retaliation towards plaintiff.
Further responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph 206 are denied.
196.
197.
198.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 209, defendants deny “touching [plaintiff’s] hair,
shoulders, buttocks, breasts” and defendants further deny “electroshocking [plaintiff] with a
TASER” as alleged by plaintiff. Further responding, defendants aver plaintiff’s lack of consent
allegation is based on the false premise that the listed actions occurred – and defendants deny the
occurrence of the listed actions. Any remaining allegations of paragraph 209 are denied.
199.
200.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 211, defendants deny there was any “occasion”
of any purported wrongful conduct; further responding, defendants deny the existence of any alleged
offensive or harmful contact relating to plaintiff; further responding, defendants deny there was ever
any “present ability to cause” any “offensive or harmful contact with Ms. Whatley.” Any remaining
allegations of paragraph 211 are denied.
35
201.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 212, defendants deny defendant Chris Pruitt ever
committed any act of “electroshocking Ms. Whatley on the buttocks with a TASER.” Further
responding, defendants deny Chris Pruitt committed any “battery” on plaintiff at any time. Any
202.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 213, defendants deny all allegations of “battery”
as alleged in paragraph 213.
203.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 214, defendants deny allegations of “battery” as
alleged in paragraph 214. Further responding, defendant Steve Boeta specifically denies “groping
Ms. Whatley’s shoulders and forcibly holding her body against his” as alleged by plaintiff.
204.
“assaults and batteries” allegedly committed against plaintiff; further responding, defendants deny
plaintiff sustained any injury or that plaintiff “was injured” as alleged by plaintiff. Any remaining
allegations of paragraph 215 are denied.
205.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 216, defendants deny the alleged occurrence of
any “assault and battery of Ms. Whatley.” Further responding, defendants deny the existence of a
“hostile work environment” in the City Marshal’s Office; further responding, defendants deny the
existence of any “pervasive sexual harassment” at the City Marshal’s Office. Further responding, all
36
206.
207.
denied to the extent they purport to relate to any claims alleged by plaintiff.
208.
209.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 220, defendants deny “sexually harassing Ms.
Whatley.” Further responding, defendants deny “sharing [plaintiff’s] private medical information.”
Further responding, defendants deny any alleged desire to “inflict severe emotional distress” upon
plaintiff. Further responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph 220 are denied.
210.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 221, defendants deny they made “lewd and
slanderous” comments to plaintiff; further responding, defendants deny they made requests for
plaintiff to perform sexual acts; defendants deny they engaged in “solicitations” involving plaintiff;
defendants deny they made “physical advances” to plaintiff; defendants deny “electroshocking
[plaintiff] with a TASER.” Further responding, defendants deny all remaining allegations of
paragraph 221.
37
211.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 222, defendants deny engaging in any “behavior”
as alleged by plaintiff; defendants deny engaging in any behavior that caused any emotional distress
and/or any severe emotional distress to plaintiff. Further responding, all remaining allegations of
212.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 223, defendants deny plaintiff was the victim
of any “sexual harassment” by defendants; defendants deny plaintiff was the victim of any “sexual
battery” by defendants; defendants deny disclosing plaintiff’s medical information. Further
responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph 223 are denied.
213.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 224, defendants deny inflicting “emotional
distress” upon plaintiff. Further responding, defendants deny that any person was permitted or
encouraged to engage in any improper acts that would cause emotional distress to any person
employed in the City Marshal’s Office. Further responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph
224 are denied.
214.
allegations are denied to the extent they purport to relate to any claims alleged by plaintiff.
215.
38
216.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 228, defendants deny engaging in any “violations
of law.” Further responding, defendants deny plaintiff reported any violations of law. Further
responding, defendants deny the paragraph 228 allegation that plaintiff was subjected to “reprisals
and punishment.” Further responding, any remaining allegations of paragraph 228 are denied.
217.
218.
denied to the extent they purport to relate to any claims alleged by plaintiff.
219.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 231, defendants deny they forced plaintiff to
resign her employment position. Further responding, not one of the defendants, in his individual
capacity, had any employment contract with plaintiff; further responding, defendants Steve Boeta,
Harry Robertson and Chris Pruitt, in their official capacities, had no employment contract with
plaintiff. Further responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph 231 are denied.
220.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 232, defendants deny plaintiff experienced any
“constructive termination.” Further responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph 232 are
denied.
39
221.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 233, defendants deny plaintiff was terminated;
defendants deny the occurrence of “bad faith” in relation to plaintiff’s employment; further
responding, all remaining allegations of paragraph 233 are denied.
222.
223.
224.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 236, defendants deny engaging in any “illegal
and unconstitutional acts.” Further responding, defendants deny all alleged liability to plaintiff.
Further responding, defendants aver any alleged contract of insurance is the best evidence of its
content. Further responding, any remaining allegations of paragraph 236 are denied.
225.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 237, defendants deny engaging in any acts that
would create any liability to plaintiff. Further responding, the remaining allegations of paragraph
237 are directed to unidentified insurance companies and do not require a response from defendants.
226.
The allegations of paragraph 238 do not require a response from defendants.
227.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 239, defendants deny that plaintiff is entitled to
40
any Judgment against defendants; defendants further deny plaintiff is entitled to any relief as stated
in paragraph 227 subparts (a) through (f); further responding, defendants deny plaintiff is entitled
to any relief whatsoever. Any remaining allegations of paragraph 239 are denied.
228.
For response to the allegations of paragraph 240, defendants deny plaintiff is entitled to assert
new causes of action at the trial of this matter; further responding, defendants deny plaintiff is
entitled to any “damages or remedies” whatsoever. Further responding, any remaining allegations
of paragraph 240 are denied.
229.
The allegations of paragraph 241 do not require a response.
WHEREFORE, defendants JEROME HOPEWELL, STEVE BOETA, HARRY
ROBERTSON, CHRIS PRUITT and ALEXANDRIA CITY MARSHAL’S OFFICE (incorrectly
named as an entity capable of being sued) pray:
1) That their Answer and Affirmative Defenses be deemed good and sufficient, and that
plaintiff’s claims be denied and dismissed with prejudice, at plaintiff’s cost;
2) That defendants be awarded attorney fees and costs for defending against plaintiff’s
Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, in accordance with § 706(k) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k);
3) That defendants be awarded attorney fees and costs for defending against plaintiff’s
State law “whistleblower” claim as provided by La. R.S. 23:967(D);
4) That defendants be awarded reasonable damages incurred as a result of plaintiff’s

claims under La. R.S. 23:323 and La. R,.S. 23:332 and that defendants be awarded
attorney fees and court costs as allowed by La. R.S. 23:303(B).
41
Respectfully submitted,
GOLD, WEEMS, BRUSER, SUES & RUNDELL
By: s/Steven M. Oxenhandler

Steven M. Oxenhandler, T.A. (#28405)
Michael J. O’Shee (#10268)
Joshua J. Dara, Jr. (#35739)
Martha R. Crenshaw (#27420)
M. Allison Johnson (#35850)
P.O. Box 6118
2001 MacArthur Drive
Alexandria, LA 71307-6118
Telephone: (318) 445-6471
Facsimile: (318) 445-6476
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS JEROME
HOPEWELL, STEVE BOETA, HARRY
RO B E RT S O N C H R I S PRUI T T AND
ALEXANDRIA CITY MARSHAL’S OFFICE
42

City Response To Whatley Lawsuit

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Case 1:21-cv-01185-DCJ-JPM Document 5 Filed 06/21/21 Page 1 of 42 PageID #: 50

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

PATRICIA “KAY” WHATLEY CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-01185

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

JEROME HOPEWELL; STEVE MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come defendants JEROME

HOPEWELL (“Hopewell”), STEVE BOETA (“Boeta”), HARRY ROBERTSON (“Robertson”),

Affirmative Defenses state that:

649, 635 (5th Cir. 1994)).

is no individual liability under the ADA ...” [citations omitted]).

individual contractual obligation to plaintiff. Accordingly, these defendants cannot be individually

with regard to plaintiff’s employment.

F.Supp.3d 685, 711-713 (M.D. La. 2020).

threatened to disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of State law.

Code of Governmental Ethics provisions of La. R.S. 42:1169 [whistleblower retaliation

to mitigate her damages.

undue hardship on plaintiff’s employer.

the conduct alleged by plaintiff.

TWENTY THIRD DEFENSE

Plaintiff’s lawsuit is frivolous and/or unreasonable and/or without foundation, and

accordingly, defendants are entitled to and seek herein:

AND NOW, FOR ANSWER TO THE INDIVIDUAL ALLEGATIONS OF

The allegations of paragraph 1 are denied as written.

The allegations of paragraph 2 are denied.

occurred. Any remaining allegations of paragraph 3 are denied.

occurrence of any sexual harassment.

The allegations of paragraph 5 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 6 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 7 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 9 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 10 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 11 do not require a response; however, jurisdiction is not

alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint. Further responding, venue is not contested.

The allegations of paragraph 15 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 20 are denied.

occurrence of the actions alleged by plaintiffs.

The allegations of paragraph 22 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 24 are denied as written.

The allegations of paragraph 27 are denied as written.

The allegations of paragraph 28 are admitted.

The allegations of paragraph 29 are admitted.

The allegations of paragraph 33 are denied as written.

The allegations of paragraph 34 are denied as written.

“to sit in a chair approximately 95% of the time.”

The allegations of paragraph 37 are denied as written.

The allegations of paragraph 38 are denied as written.

The allegations of paragraph 39 are denied as written.

perform the duties of a deputy in the field.

The allegations of paragraph 41 are denied.

harassment” ever occurred.

The allegations of paragraph 43 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 44 are denied.

The allegations of paragraph 45 are denied.