Marquez V Alindog
Marquez V Alindog
Facts: Petitioner Anita Marquez extended a loan to Benjamin Gutierrez secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land located in Tagaytay. The mortgage was duly
annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. T-13443, which Sps. Marquez had verified as clean
prior to the mortgage.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the subject property. At the public auction sale, Anita emerged as the highest
bidder. Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property within the prescribed
period, title was consolidated under the name of Sps.Marquez, which, however, bore an
annotation of adverse claim dated March 2, 2000 in the names of respondents-spouses
Alindog. Said annotation was copied from an earlier annotation on TCT No. T-13443 made only
after the subject property’s mortgage to Sps. Marquez.
RTC: Subsequently, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for annulment of real estate mortgage and
certificate of sale against Sps. Marquez. Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC. RTC granted the same. Claiming that they
would suffer irreparable injury, Sps. Alindog sought the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. After further proceedings on the injunction
case, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking
possession of the subject property until after the controversy has been fully resolved on
the merits.
CA: Aggrieved, Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration, essentially pointing out that,as the
confirmed and registered owners of the subject property, they are entitled to its possession
as a matter of right. They argued that pursuant to Sections 728 and 829 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, the RTC was legally bound to place them in possession of the
subject property pending resolution of the annulment case. Further, it is their position that
the purpose for the issuance of the injunctive writ – i.e., to restrain the implementation of the writ
of possession –had already been rendered moot and academic by its actual enforcement in the
interim.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
possession of the winning bidder in a foreclosure sale after the lapse of the redemption
period.
The phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such
as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably,
the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor." The third person must therefore claim a right superior to that
of the original mortgagor.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps.Marquez,
who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely
ministerial in nature. The general rule as herein stated – and not the exception found under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules – should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over
the subject property on their purported purchase of the same from its previous owner,
i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be
seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-
interest who do not have a right superior to them.