Chapter

 2      
 
failure  modes  and  failure  effects  of  each  subsystem  based  on  knowledge  of  the  
subsystem’s  required  functions,  or  from  experience  from  similar  equipment.    

The  top-­‐down  approach  tends  to  be  more  accurate  than  bottom-­‐up,  but  also  
demands  input  of  higher  quality,  and  thus  demands  more  resources.  This  might  
be  one  of  the  reasons  to  choose  a  bottom-­‐up  approach.    

2.1.2 RELIABILITY  BLOCK  DIAGRAM  

A  Reliability  Block  Diagram  (RBD)  illustrates  the  functioning  of  various  
functional  blocks  that  may  secure  success,  or  failure,  of  a  complex  system.  The  
structure  in  the  RBD  is  described  mathematically  by  structure  functions,  
considering  redundancy  and  the  like  in  the  system.    

RBD’s  can  be  utilized  to  calculate  risk  values  and  to  identify  where  the  most  
effective  modifications  should  be  included  for  mitigation  of  risk.    

Credible  reliability  data  may  not  be  obtainable  at  a  system  level.  In  that  case  the  
systems  or  modules  may  consist  of  general  components  such  as  connectors  and  
frame,  where  reliability  data  is  more  comprehensive.    

The  RBD  method  is  comparable  in  certain  respects  to  a  fault  tree  analysis  (FTA).  
The  main  difference  is  that  the  RBD  starts  out  from  the  system  functionality  
instead  of  a  potential  system  failure.    

2.2 RELIABILITY  DATA  

2.2.1 QUALIFICATION  AND  APPLICATION  OF  RELIABILITY  DATA  
The  principles  from  NORSOK  Z-­‐016  shall  be  applied  for  qualification  and  
application  of  reliability  data.  The  standard  underlines  the  following  principles:    

”The  establishment  of  correct  and  relevant  reliability  data  (i.e.  failure  and  
associated  repair/downtime  data)  requires  a  data  qualification  process  which  
involves  conscious  attention  to  original  source  of  data,  interpretation  of  any  
available  statistics  and  estimation  method  for  analysis  usage.  Selection  of  data  
shall  be  based  on  the  following  principles:  

• Data  should  originate  from  the  same  type  of  equipment.  

• Data  should  originate  from  equipment  using  similar  technology.  
• Data  should  if  possible  originate  from  identical  equipment  models.  
• Data   should   originate   from   periods   of   stable   operation,   although   1st   year  
start-­‐up  problems  should  be  given  due  consideration.  
• Data  should  if  possible  originate  from  equipment,  which  has  been  exposed,  
to  comparable  operating  and  maintenance  conditions.  
• The  basis  for  the  data  used  should  be  sufficiently  extensive.  

  6  
     Theory,  Method  and  Literature  Review  

• The   amount   of   inventories   and   failure   events   used   to   estimate   or   predict  

reliability   parameters   should   be   sufficiently   large   to   avoid   bias   resulting  
from  ’outliers’.    
• The  repair  and  downtime  data  should  reflect  site-­‐specific  conditions.  
• The  equipment  boundary  for  originating  data  source  and  analysis  element  
should   match   as   far   as   possible.   Study   assumptions   should   otherwise   be  
given.    
• Population   data   (e.g.   operating   time,   observation   period)   should   be  
indicated   to   reflect   statistical   significance   (uncertainty   related   to  
estimate/predictions)  and  ”technology  window”.  
• Data  sources  shall  be  quoted.  

Data  from  event  databases,  e.g.  OREDA  database,  provide  relevant  basis  for  
meeting  the  requirements  above.  In  case  of  scarce  data,  proper  engineering  
judgement  is  needed  and  sensitivity  analysis  of  input  data  shall  be  done.”  (NORSOK  
Z-­‐016)  

2.2.2 FAILURE  RATE  

According  to  NORSOK  Z-­‐016  a  failure  is  “termination  of  an  ability  an  item  have  to  
perform  a  required  function”.    The  failure  rate  function  express  the  likelihood  that  
an  item  that  has  survived  up  to  time  t,  will  fail  during  the  next  period  of  time.  If  
the  item  is  deteriorating,  this  likelihood  will  increase  with  age  t.    

The  failure  rate  function,  expressed  by  z(t),  has  different  shapes  during  the  
lifetime  of  an  item.  The  failure  rate  is  often  high  in  the  initial  phase.  This  can  be  
explained  by  the  fact  that  an  item  may  have  undiscovered  defects  not  detected  
before  the  item  is  activated  (called  burn-­‐in  phase  or  infant  mortality  period).  
When  an  item  has  survived  the  burn-­‐in  phase,  the  failure  rate  often  stabilizes  at  a  
level  where  it  remains  until  it  starts  to  increase  as  the  item  start  to  wear-­‐out  
(Rausand  &  Høyland,  2004).  This  is  expressed  by  the  well-­‐known  bathtub  curve,  
illustrated  in  figure  1  below.  

 
F IGURE   1   T HE   B ATHTUB   ( L IFE )   C URVE   ( R AUSAND   &   H ØYLAND ,   2 004)  

  7  
Chapter  2      
 
For  a  technical  item  for  subsea  purposes,  it  is  generally  recognized  that  the  
comprehensive  quality  testing  before  installation  eliminates  most  of  the  infant  
mortalities.  Also,  strict  maintenance  or  replacement  policies  ensure  the  
components  to  not  reach  the  wear-­‐out  period.  From  these  assumptions,  it  is  
reasonable  to  assume  the  failure  rate  function  is  constant  and  independent  of  
time,  in  which  case  the  z(t)  =  λ  for  subsea  technical  items  (SINTEF,  2009).  The  
failure  rate  λ  is  exponentially  distributed.    

An  important  implication  of  the  constant  failure  rate  is  that  an  item  is  considered  
“as  good  as  new”  as  long  as  it  is  functioning.    

Based  on  the  assumption  of  constant  failure  rate,  the  Mean  Time  To  Failure  
(MTTF),  may  be  calculated  as:  

1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =  
𝜆
With  failure  data  from  identical  items  that  have  been  operating  under  the  same  
operational  and  environmental  conditions,  the  failure  rate  λ  is  calculated  by  
dividing  the  total  number  of  failures  by  the  total  time  in  service:  

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑛

𝜆= =  
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑖𝑛  𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝜏

For  further  details,  see  (Rausand  &  Høyland,  2004).  

2.2.3 OREDA  OFFSHORE  RELIABILITY  DATA  HANDBOOK  

The  main  data  source  for  this  thesis  is  the  OREDA  database,  which  is  the  most  
comprehensive  database  commercially  available.  It  is  a  project  sponsored  by  
several  companies  in  the  oil  and  gas  industry  operating  multinational.  The  main  
purpose  of  the  project  is  to  exchange  and  collect  reliability  data  from  the  
participants  and  act  as  a  forum  to  co-­‐ordinate  the  reliability  data  collection  
within  the  oil  and  gas  industry.  

The  database  is  a  generic  component  reliability  database  where  the  participating  
parties  can  see  the  manufacturers  and  makes  of  the  components  represented,  
otherwise  the  data  available  are  components  classified  under  groups  such  as  
connectors,  valves,  chokes  and  the  like.  The  equipment  is  primarily  divided  into  
topside  and  subsea  equipment,  but  some  onshore  equipment  is  also  included.      

Each  equipment  class,  such  as  XT  or  manifold,  is  defined  with  a  boundary  
drawing  that  encompasses  all  subunits  and  components  belonging  to  that  
equipment  class.    Each  failure  is  linked  to  the  component  that  failed,  reflecting  
failure  modes  for  the  equipment.  The  failure  modes  identified  are  further  
classified,  standard  equipment  level,  sub-­‐unit  and  component  level,  as  critical,  
degraded,  or  incipient:  

  8  
      

• “Critical  failure:  A  failure  which  causes  immediate  and  complete  loss  of  an  
equipment/sub-­‐item  or  components  unit’s  capability  of  providing  its  output.  
• Degraded   failure:   A   failure   which   is   not   critical,   but   it   prevents   the  
equipment   unit/sub-­‐item   or   component   from   providing   its   output   within  
specifications.  Such  a  failure  would  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  be  gradual  
or  partial,  and  may  develop  into  a  critical  failure  in  time.    
• Incipient   failure:   A   failure   which   does   not   immediately   cause   loss   of   an  
equipment  unit/sub-­‐item  or  components  capability  of  providing  its  output,  
but  which,  if  not  attended  to,  could  result  in  a  critical  or  degraded  failure  in  
the  near  future.”  (SINTEF,  2009)  

Failure   modes   of   the   components   are   not   registered   before   3   months   of  

operation   in   the   purpose   to   eliminate   infant   mortalities,   since   the   data   is  
exponentially  distributed.    

With  the  failure  data  mainly  collected  from  maintenance  records,  both  
component  specific  failures  and  common  cause  failures  are  included.  This  also  
implies  that  failures  such  as  spurious  trips  are  not  included,  because  such  false  
alarms  should  not  require  any  maintenance.    

  9  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   

3 OVERVIEW  OF  SUBSEA  XMAS  TREE  SYSTEMS  AND  

STATISTICAL  REVIEW  
3.1 INDUSTRY  REQUIREMENTS  
When  a  manufacturer  is  involved  in  a  new  project,  the  first  step  is  to  define  the  
requirements  and  specifications  relevant  for  that  particular  project.  The  
requirements  are  specified  in  the  laws  and  regulations  of  the  countries  involved,  
the  standards  are  stipulated  in  the  customer  requirements  and  in  internal  
standards  and  requirements  within  the  organization  involved.    
 
Subsea  production  system  poses  a  hazard.  It  is  therefor  vital  to  have  standards  
that  give  guidance  to  maintain  secure  operations  and  prevent  major  accidents.  

Applicable  standards  for  the  XT  requirements  include:  

1. API  6A:  Specification  for  Wellhead  and  Christmas  Tree  Equipment;  

2. API   17D:   Design   and   Operation   of   Subsea   Production   Systems-­‐Subsea  
Wellhead  and  Tree  Equipment;  
3. ISO  13628-­‐4:  Petroleum   and   natural   gas   industries   –   Design   and   operation  
of  subsea  production  systems.  Part  4:  Subsea  wellhead  and  tree  equipment;  
4. ISO  10423:2009:  Petroleum  and  natural  gas  industries  -­‐  Drilling  and  
production  equipment  -­‐  Wellhead  and  christmas  tree  equipment.  

Additionally,  three  standards  have  been  considered  for  the  use  of  reliability  data  
and  for  well  integrity:  

5. ISO   14224:   Petroleum,   petrochemical   and   natural   gas   industries   -­‐  

Collection  and  exchange  of  reliability  and  maintenance  data  for  equipment;  
6. NORSOK  Z-­‐016:  Regularity  management  &  reliability  technology;  
7. NORSOK  D-­‐010:  Well  integrity  in  drilling  and  well  operations.  

The   standards   stippled   has   been   reviewed   and   actively   used   throughout   the  
thesis   to   understand   and   to   get   knowledge   about   the   XTs   and   the   associated  
functions  and  requirements.  

   

  11  
Chapter  3      
 

3.2 ACCIDENT  AND  STATISTICAL  REVIEW  

3.2.1 ACCIDENT  REVIEW  
History  shows  that  uncontrolled  release  of  hydrocarbons  has  caused  several  
major  accidents.  Experience  from  major  accidents  is  an  important  source  of  
information  to  prevent  similar  accidents  in  the  future.  Incidents  that  potentially  
could  have  led  to  a  major  accident  are  also  important  in  the  preventive  work.  
Unfortunately,  incidents  with  the  potential  of  a  major  accident  are  often  
unreported  and  well  hidden  by  operators.    

A  damaged  WH  or  XT  is  a  serious  incident,  which  potentially  can  evolve  into  an  
uncontrolled  release  of  hydrocarbons.  An  XT  may  be  damaged  by  external  
impact,  such  as  dropped  objects,  trawling  activities  and  anchors  or  by  wear  over  
time  or  immediately,  such  as  corrosion,  internal  overpressure,  erosion  and  so  on.  
With  subsea  WH  and  XTs  being  located  without  immediate  well  access  from  a  
host  topside  facility,  a  leakage  may  cause  environmental  and  commercial  impact,  
but  usually  no  safety  impact.    

In-­‐field  experiences  contain  information  regarding  failures  that  have  occurred  

and  the  potential  consequences.  There  is  a  big  amount  of  learning  potential  in  
accidents  or  other  unwanted  events  to  improve  safety  and  reliability  of  a  system.  
As  an  example,  this  was  demonstrated  for  the  major  Macondo  blowout  in  2010  
for  the  BOP  system.  Worldwide,  the  XT  alone  have  not  had  any  failures  during  
production  that  have  led  to  major  accidents.  This  does  not  mean  that  major  
accidents  cannot  happen  due  to  XT  failures  –  even  more  so,  with  no  major  
accident  to  learn  from  or  even  remember,  operators  may  become  inattentive  and  
incidents  may  occur  leading  to  a  major  accident  due  to  lack  of  awareness.    

   

  12  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   
Einar  Molnes,  in  ExproSoft  AS,  listed  these  XT  and  downhole  failures  that  led  to  
accidents  in-­‐between  1980  and  2007:  

T ABLE   1   B LOWOUT   D URING   P RODUCTION   ( 1980   -­‐   2 007)   ( M OLNES ,   2 012)  

Blowout   Flow  
Country   Remark  
year   medium  
DHSV  and  two  MV's  could  not  be  
US/  GOM   Oil,  gas  
1980   closed  and  gas  was  leaking  
OCS   (deep)  
through  a  needle  valve  
US/  GOM   Oil,  gas   DHSV  and  bonnet  of  the  bottom  
1980  
OCS   (deep)   master  valve  failed  
Poor  cement,  shallow  gas  blowout  
US/  GOM   Shallow  gas,  
1987   between  13  3/8"  csg  and  the  20"  
OCS   water  
conductor  
Tubing  to  annulus  communication  
US/  GOM   Oil,  gas  
1987   for  some  time,  One  casing  failed,  
OCS   (deep)  
then  underground  blowout,  crater  
Tubing  to  annulus  communication  
1989   UK   Gas  (deep)   for  some  time.  Leakage  through  
the  3/3  test  port  for  TH  
Experienced  an  uncontrolled  flow  
from  a  3/8"  sample  fitting  in  the  
US/  GOM  
1989   Gas  (deep)   horizontal  run  from  the  wellhead,  
OCS  
DHSV  failed,  used  36  h  to  close  the  
MV.    
Tubing  to  annulus  communication,  
US/  GOM   Oil,  gas  
1992   then  casing  leak,  underground  
OCS   (deep)  
flow  only  
US/  GOM   Condensate,   Erosion  in  SCSSV  body,  then  
1998  
OCS   gas  (deep)   erosion  in  casing  
Ignored  annulus  pressure  for  
US/  GOM  
2007   Gas  (deep)   seven  months,  inner  casing  failed,  
OCS  
fracture  at  casing  shoe  
*Downhole  Safety  Valve  (DHSV)  **  Master  Valve  (MV)  ***Tubing  Hanger  (TH)  ****  Surface-­‐
Controlled  Subsurface  Safety  Valve  (SCSSV)  

The  main  causes  for  the  blowouts  were  disregard  for  pressure  build-­‐up  in  the  
annulus  and  failure  of  the  Downhole  Safety  Valve  (DHSV)  and  check  valve.  It  
shall  be  noted  that  none  of  the  events  had  severe  consequences.  The  releases  of  
gas/oil/condensate  were  small  and  there  were  no  ignition  of  the  releases.    

   

  13  
Chapter  3      
 
3.2.2 STATISTICAL  REVIEW  
The  suppliers  of  equipment  reflect  upon  the  accuracy  of  the  databases  
established,  such  as  OREDA.    

There  is  a  gap  in-­‐between  contractors  and  third  party  verification  when  
calculating  reliability  on  XT  equipment  and  the  like.  If  reliability  is  calculated  
purely  based  on  the  OREDA  handbook,  one  typically  finds  a  MTTF  for  XT  
retrieval  between  15  to  25  years.  If  one  calculates  the  reliability  by  meeting  the  
databases  with  field  experience  and  professional  engineering  judgement,  one  
applies  a  more  detailed  information  set  and  unsurprisingly  get  another  result,  
tending  to  give  a  more  realistic  reliability  picture.  Out  of  a  population  of  XTs,  the  
MTTF  may  be  in-­‐between  100-­‐150  years  when  looking  at  a  population  of  XTs  
spanning  more  or  less  15  years  in  operation.  Of  the  failure  occurring  on  XTs,  GE  
Oil  &  Gas,  which  has  initiated  this  theme  for  a  thesis,  has  indicated  that  a  Pareto-­‐
type  rule  seems  to  apply  to  partition.  This  mean  that  the  majority  (80  %)  of  the  
failures  can  be  restored  by  light  intervention  means  such  as  Remotely  Operated  
Vehicle  (ROV)  override,  while  only  the  minority  (20  %)  of  the  failures  would  
require  XT  retrieval  and  thus  represents  the  more  costly  failures.    

There  is  an  understanding  among  engineers  with  massive  experience  on  XTs  that  
maximum  1/3  of  the  XTs  that  returns  to  yard/factory  for  refurbishment  are  
actually  caused  by  XT  equipment  failures.  It  is  believed  that  downhole  workover  
operations,  sidetrack  drilling  and  the  like  would  cause  the  majority  of  XT  
retrievals.  The  source  for  this  information  is  a  written,  but  informal,  mail  
correspondence  within  chief  engineers  in  GE  Oil  &  Gas  based  on  their  experience  
on  trees  globally.  Although  this  is  not  information  new  calculations  can  be  based  
directly  on,  but  it  is  natural  to  raise  the  question  whether  some  equipment  
failures  that  is  included  in  reliability  data  collecting  tools  such  as  OREDA  is  a  
result  of  failures  not  yet  occurred?    

Once  the  XT  is  retrieved  to  the  surface  due  to  downhole  workover  operations,  
the  operators  install  a  spare  XT  instead  of  re-­‐installing  the  originally  operating  
XT.  Further,  the  XT  that  was  operating  and  functioning  is  sent  to  the  yard/factory  
for  refurbishment  and  repaired  upon  failures  not  yet  occurred.  These  incidents  
may  have  been  recorded  as  XT  equipment  critical  failures  in  reliability  databases  
such  as  OREDA,  but  is  not  likely  to  be  a  significant  error  source.  However,  that  is  
misleading  information,  originating  in  a  lack  of  interference  between  contractor,  
operator  and  service  centers.  This  is  more  likely  related  to  inaccurate  
information  on  criticality/effect  of  failure  and  the  resulting  activities  required  to  
resolve  the  problem.    

There  are  few  (none)  public  available  reports  found  on  this  subject.  This  is  not  a  
surprising  finding  due  to  confidentiality  practices  on  such  issues.  A  review  of  
Xmas  Tree  experience  provided  by  GE  Oil  &  Gas  is  elaborated  on  in  the  two  

  14  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   
followed  sections.  These  experience  data  is  used  for  top-­‐down  calculations  for  
XT  retrieval  for  comparison  of  the  results  on  the  bottom-­‐up  approach  conducted  
on  the  case  study.    

3.2.3 REVIEW  OF  XT  FIELD  DATA  PERFORMED  IN  1999  

A  study  conducted  by  Endre  Willmann  in  ABB  (now  GE  Oil  &  Gas)  in  1999  
reviewed  three  different  studies  evaluating  in-­‐field  XT  experiences,  which  is  
elaborated  underneath:  

UKCS  Well  Intervention  Experience  –  BP  study  

BP  conducted  an  analysis  of  the  subsea  operational  experiences  of  UKCS  
Operators.    The  survey  that  was  carried  out  included  experiences  from  22  subsea  
fields  from  1975  to  1990,  from  eight  operators  in  the  UK  Sector  of  the  North  Sea.  
The  study  was  initiated  due  to  doubtful  accuracy  regarding  operating  cost  
estimates  for  new  subsea  fields.  The  survey  aimed  at  providing  source  operating  
data  in  order  to  improve  accuracy  of  operating  cost  forecasts  for  subsea  fields.    

The  study  concluded  that  the  average  intervention  frequency  per  well  year  is  0.2,  
corresponding  to  a  MTBF  of  5  years  per  well.    

Out  of  the  subsea  fields  investigated,  the  main  reasons  for  the  well  interventions  
are:  

1. 55%   Voluntary   interventions   for   reservoir   reasons   such   as   logging,   re-­‐

perforation,  gas  lift  repositioning  and  water  shutoff.    
2. 23%   Downhole   failure,   generally   SCSSV   replacement   (85%),   including  
replacement  by  wireline  set  valve.  
3. 15%  Seafloor  failure,  normally  Xmas  tree  (50%),  Subsea  Control  Module  
(SCM)  (30%)  and  pipelines  and  umbilicals  (20%).    
4. 7%  Consequential  failure  where  workover  must  be  repeated.  

By  relating  the  numbers  above  to  the  average  intervention  frequency  per  well  
(0.2),  indicative  MTBF  estimates  are:  

• Downhole  failure:  MTBF  =  22  years  

• SCSSV  failure:  MTBF  =  26  years  
• Xmas  tree  replacement:  MTBF  =  67  years  

The  tree  replacement  is  calculated  based  on  that  all  of  the  tree  failures  resulted  
in   tree   retrieval,   because   the   information   was   not   obtained   otherwise.   It   is   a  
conservative  approach  to  assume  that  all  tree  failures  resulted  in  tree  retrieval.    

Over  a  period  of  646  well  years,  spanning  15  years  of  operation,  the  average  
frequency  of  subsea  interventions  per  well  year  stayed  surprisingly  constant.  No  
distinct  wear-­‐out  was  identified.    

  15  
Chapter  3      
 
In  general,  the  interventions  were  carried  out  in  order  to  improve/restore  
production  of  a  failing  well.  Hence,  for  the  subsea  equipment,  intervention  was  
only  registered  if  the  failure  that  occurred  affected  production.    

Xmas  Tree  Experience  –  Tordis  and  Vigdis  

As  a  part  of  a  Technology  Agreement  between  Sage  Petroleum  and  ABB,  a  study  
on  Reliability,  Availability  and  Maintainability  (RAM)  optimization  of  subsea  
production  systems  has  been  established.  The  objective  was  to  analyze  the  
collected  reliability  data  from  Tordis  and  Vigdis  (now  operated  by  Statoil)  and  
recommend  improvements  with  respect  to  design,  testing,  organization  and  
supplier/customer  interaction.    

For  the  subsea  equipment  at  Tordis  and  Vigdis,  a  total  of  31  well  years  are  
reviewed  with  38  failures  recorded,  whereof  none  critical  (i.e.  no  XT  retrieval  
recorded).  The  data  is  collected  for  failures  both  prior  to  and  during  production.    

When  the  study  was  conducted,  Tordis  and  Vigdis  were  rather  new  installations,  
meaning  that  the  bulk  of  data  collected  relates  to  early-­‐life  history.    

The  study  concludes  that  for  the  steady-­‐state  operation  period  for  the  XTs,  an  
MTBF  of  46  years  can  be  recommended.  The  estimate  is  a  50/50  estimate  based  
on  no  critical  failures  experienced  from  the  31  well  years  registered.    

Xmas  Tree  Experience  –  Snorre  Evaluation  

The  XT  experience  on  Snorre  was  evaluated  by  looking  at  data  registered  for  the  
field  in  the  OREDA  IV  and  III  database.    

According  to  the  OREDA  IV  database,  the  total  failure  rate  for  the  XT  system  is  
31.3  failure  per  million  hours  (fpmh),  where  10%  (3  out  of  31  failures)  of  the  
failures  are  classified  as  critical.    

For  the  OREDA  III  database,  the  corresponding  number  is  14.26  fpmh,  where  13  
%  (2  out  of  16  failures)  failures  were  classified  as  critical.    

By  combining  the  OREDA  III  and  IV  data,  weighting  the  experienced  data  to  both  
sets  with  50%,  yields  a  critical  failure  rate  of  2.43  fpmh  for  the  XT  system.  This  
corresponds  to  a  MTBF  of  47  years.    

The  estimate  corresponds  to  five  critical  XT  failures  for  the  total  of  241  well  
years  registered.  However,  none  of  these  failures  required  XT  retrieval  in  order  
to  maintain  production.  The  least  significant  downtime  related  to  these  five  
failures  was  on  an  incident  related  to  spurious  operation  of  the  Production  Wing  
Valve  (PWV),  resulting  in  a  one-­‐hour  downtime.    

   

  16  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   
 

ABB  summarize  the  OREDA  data  registered  in  the  database  by:    

• “Failure   rate   contribution   classified   by   sub   system:   52   %   valves,   3   %   subsea  

wellhead  and  45  %  other  XT  components  
• Failure   rate   contribution   classified   by   criticality   at   equipment   unit   level:   10  
%  critical,  45  %  degraded  and  45  %  incipient.    
• Spurious   closure   of   a   WV   due   to   an   actuator   failure   has   been   registered,  
yielding   a   MTBF   of   156   years.   However,   due   to   scarce   experience,   this   value  
may  well  be  under/over  estimated.    
• Typical  actual  repair  time  for  XT  failures  is  in  the  order  of  80-­‐100  hours.    
• The   total   problem   rate   for   a   XT   (incl.   uncritical   failures)   is   31   fpmh   (3.6  
years  MTBF).”  

Xmas  Tree  Experience  –  Snorre  and  BP  Study  

By  combining  the  OREDA  III/IV  data  and  the  BP-­‐study  data  (conservatively  
assuming  all  nine  critical  XT  failures  did  result  in  XT  retrieval)  weighting  the  
experienced  data  to  both  sets  equally  with  50  %,  yields  nine  XT  retrievals  within  
the  total  of  887  well  years.  This  corresponds  to  1.16  fpmh  and  a  MTBF  of  98.6  
years.    

3.2.4 REVIEW  OF  XT  FIELD  DATA  PERFORMED  IN  2014  

The  source  for  this  information  is  a  written,  but  informal,  mail  correspondence  
within  chief  engineers  in  GE  Oil  &  Gas,  the  XT  statistics  were  treated  for  GE  Oil  &  
Gas  projects  offshore  in  Angola  and  four  reference  fields  in  the  North  Sea.  This  is  
not  information  that  can  be  based  directly  on,  but  it  is  natural  to  raise  the  
question  of  the  amount  of  XT  failures  that  result  in  XT  retrieval  when  reviewing  
the  estimated  MTTF’s.    

Xmas  Tree  Experience  –  Offshore  in  Angola  

The  three  reference  fields  offshore  in  Angola  are  posting  strong  figures  for  the  
XT  retrieval  rate.    

For  the  CVXTs  in  Angola  these  are  the  XTs  accounted  for:  

• Ref.  Project  1     ≈  30  XTs          Average  start-­‐up  2002        ≈  360  years  total  
• Ref.  Project  2     ≈  20  XTs          Average  start-­‐up  2006    ≈  160  years  total  
• Ref.  Project  3     ≈  10  XTs          Average  start-­‐up  2008        ≈  60  years  total  
• Total       ≈  60  XTs          ≈  580  years  total  

   

  17  
Chapter  3      
 
For  the  last  12  years,  approximately  10  XTs  has  been  recovered  from  these  fields  
in  Angola.  Whereas;  

• Five  recovered  due  to  side-­‐track  drilling  

• One  recovered  due  to  leak  between  the  master  valve  block  and  the  
production  wing  block  
• One  recovered  after  installation  as  the  ROV  sheared  the  S.I.V  extension  
rod  
• Three  recovered  as  well  was  being  re-­‐spudded  

This  is  groundbreaking  good  numbers  that  indicate  a  MTBF  of  580  years.  Only  10  
%  (one  out  of  ten  retrievals)  of  the  failures  that  occurred  were  due  to  critical  XT  
failures.  10  %  of  the  other  failures  were  due  to  downhole  failure,  whilst  80  %  of  
the  retrievals  were  due  to  voluntary  interventions  for  reservoir  reasons.    

Xmas  Tree  Experience  –  North  Sea  

For  the  four  North  Sea  reference  projects,  all  operated  by  Statoil,  it  is  installed  
approximately  75  XTs.  During  the  last  four  years,  23  XTs  have  been  overhauled  
for  these  fields.    

More  specifically,  the  overhauls  for  these  three  fields  the  last  4  years  are:  

• 2010:  5  XTs  
• 2011:  5  XTs  
• 2012:  5  XTs  
• 2013:  8  XTs  

Also  included  in  these  numbers  are  unutilized  XTs  that  have  been  overhauled  
due  to  they  have  been  stored  since  2000  to  2002.      

   

  18  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   

3.3 XMAS  TREE  FUNCTIONAL  REQUIREMENTS  

The  subsea  Xmas  Tree  (XT)  is  located  on  the  top  of  the  wellhead,  providing  an  
interface  between  the  completion  string  and  the  piping  towards  the  process  
system.  At  its  simplest,  an  XT  can  be  defined  as  an  assembly  of  valves  and  fittings  
used  for  production  or  injection  to  control  the  flow  of  product,  chemicals,  water  
or  gas  from  a  well.  The  injection  system,  production  control  system,  downhole  
control  system  and  monitoring  and  flow  control  system  are  all  systems  
controlled  through  the  XT  assembly.  

Typical  functional  requirements  include:  

• Control   of   flow   by   directing   hydrocarbons   from   the   well   to   the   flowline  

(called  production  tree)  or  by  canalizing  water  or  gas  into  the  reservoir  to  
maintain  reservoir  pressure  (called  injection  tree);  
• Regulate  the  fluid  flow  through  a  choke;  
• Monitor   well   parameters,   such   as   temperature,   annulus   pressure,   well  
pressure  and  flow  composition;  
• Act  as  a  barrier  between  the  reservoir  and  the  environment;  
• Safely  open  and  shut  down  the  fluid  flow  through  the  assembly  of  valves;  
• Inject   protection   fluids,   such   as   inhibitors   for   corrosion   and   hydrate  
prevention,  to  protect  the  subsea  equipment  and  to  assist  the  flow;  

Each  XT  is  designed  for  the  individual  reservoir  conditions  and  for  the  possible  
facility  solutions  available,  which  means  that  the  configuration,  size,  weight  and  
cost  for  a  XT  will  differ  from  one  offshore  field  to  another  due  to  the  specific  
design  requirements.  The  optimum  XT  will  be  driven  by  reservoir  requirements  
and  therefor  never  completely  standardized.  However,  there  is  a  strong  trend  
towards  smaller,  more  compact  XTs  in  the  industry.    

3.4 TYPES  AND  CONFIGURATIONS  OF  XMAS  TREES  

XTs  may  be  segmented  into  two  main  types:  Vertical  Xmas  Tree  (VXT)  and  
Horizontal  Xmas  Tree  (HXT).  The  Subsea  Engineering  Handbook,  written  by  
Yong  Bai  and  Qjang  Bai  in  2012,  is  the  main  source  for  the  background  
information  about  the  trees  in  the  following  sections.  

3.4.1 VERTICAL  XMAS  TREE  

The  conventional  XT,  which  is  the  VXT,  is  the  earliest  and  most  extensively  used  
XT.  A  VXT  are  installed  either  on  a  wellhead  or  on  a  tubing  head,  after  the  subsea  
tubing-­‐hanger  has  been  installed  through  the  drilling  BOP  stack  and  landed  and  
locked  into  the  wellhead  or  in  the  tubing  head.  The  production  flow  path  is  
through  the  valves  mounted  in  the  vertical  bore(s)  and  out  of  the  top  of  the  tree  
during  workover  and  testing  or  during  production  (injection)  via  the  production  
outlet  that  branches  off  the  vertical  bore  (ISO  13628-­‐4,  2010).    

  19  
Chapter  3      
 
The  VXT  is  identified  by  the  location  of  the  production  and  annulus  bore,  that  is  
placed  vertically  through  the  tree  body  with  the  primary  valves  placed  in  a  
vertical  configuration.  The  tree  can  have  a  concentric  bore  or  multiple  bores.  
Annulus  access  may  be  through  the  bore  or  a  side  outlet  in  the  tubing  head,  
depending  on  the  XT  design.    Since  the  tubing  hanger  system  lands  in  the  
wellhead  or  the  tubing  head,  the  VXT  can  be  retrieved  without  having  to  recover  
the  downhole  completion.  A  typical  tree  of  this  type  is  illustrated  in  figure  2  and  
3.    

F IGURE   2   G ENERAL   V XT   C ONFIGURATION   ( (ENI),   E T   A L .,   2 012)  

3.4.2 HORIZONTAL  XMAS  TREE  

The  other  main  type  of  XT  is  the  HXT  design,  also  commonly  known  as  the  spool  
tree.  The  HXTs  are  distinguished  from  the  conventional  design  by  the  production  
and  annulus  valves  being  routed  around  the  tubing  hanger  in  a  horizontal  
configuration.    

One  of  the  key  functional  features  is  that  the  HXT  may  be  installed  after  drilling  
and  installation  of  the  complete  wellhead  system,  but  prior  to  installation  of  the  
tubing  completion  and  tubing  hanger.  This  is  due  to  the  tubing  completion  being  
performed  through  the  HXT.  This  feature  opens  for  easier  access  for  well  
intervention  and  tubing  recovery  since  the  XT  does  not  have  to  be  retrieved  to  
allow  removal  of  the  tubing  hanger  for  well  intervention  and  well  work-­‐over  
operations.  Hence,  the  HXTs  are  especially  beneficial  for  wells  that  are  expected  

  20  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   
to  have  a  higher  probability  of  failure  in  the  completion  than  a  failure  in  the  XT  
itself,  or  high  frequency  of  well  workovers  for  reservoir  management  reasons.  

Since  the  XT  is  installed  prior  to  the  tubing  completion,  the  Blow  Out  Preventer  
(BOP)  stack  is  landed  on  top  of  the  HXT  and  the  tubing  hanger  and  tubing  
completion  is  run  through  the  BOP  and  landed  off  on  a  landing  shoulder  in  the  
bore  of  the  HXT.  The  production  flow  path  exits  horizontally  through  a  branch  
bore  in  the  tubing  hanger  between  seals  and  connect  to  the  aligned  production  
outlet.    

An  alternative  arrangement  is  that  the  tubing  hanger  and  internal  tree  cap  are  
combined  into  a  single  extended  tubing  hanger  system  suspended  in  the  HXT.  
This  doubles  up  on  the  number  of  isolation  plugs  and  annular  seals  for  barrier  
protection  and  features  a  debris  cap  that  can  also  serve  as  a  back-­‐up  locking  
mechanism  for  the  tubing  hanger  (ISO  13628-­‐4,  2010).    

A  third  configuration,  the  drill-­‐thru  configuration,  allow  installation  of  the  tree  
immediately  after  the  wellhead  housing  is  landed,  meaning  that  drilling  and  
installation  of  the  casing  strings  is  performed  through  the  tree,  minimizing  the  
number  of  times  it  is  necessary  to  run  and  retrieve  the  BOP  stack.    

                                     
F IGURE   3   G ENERAL   H XT   C ONFIGURATION   ( (ENI),   E T   A L .,   2 012)  

  21  
Chapter  3      
 
3.4.3 COMPARISON  OF  HORIZONTAL  AND  VERTICAL  XMAS  TREES  
An  ongoing  debate  within  the  XT  industry  is  comparing  the  relative  merits  of  
VXT  and  HXT  systems.  For  the  last  20  years  the  HXT  has  been  the  preferred  
design  for  deepwater  fields,  while  in  recent  years  the  focus  in  the  industry  is  
returning  to  the  conventional  VXT  system.    

A  key  requirement  when  designing  a  XT  is  that  access  to  the  annulus  is  enabled  
between  the  production  bore  and  the  casing.    This  is  an  important  feature  for  a  
number  of  reasons,  such  as  pressure  monitoring  and  gas  lift  means.  As  an  
example,  any  pressure  build-­‐up  in  the  annulus  may  be  bled  into  the  production  
bore  via  a  crossover  loop.    

The  original  design  of  the  VXT  and  the  Tubing  Hanger  (TH)  were  a  dual-­‐bore  
configuration.  Prior  to  removal  of  the  BOP  it  was  then  necessary  to  set  plugs  in  
both  the  production  bore  and  the  annulus  bore.  Access  to  the  bores  is  handled  
with  a  dual-­‐bore  riser  or  a  landing  string.  The  handling  and  operation  with  dual-­‐
bore  systems  compared  to  monobore  systems  are  more  complex  and  time-­‐
consuming,  and  then  again  more  costly.    

In  an  HXT  configuration  access  to  the  annulus  is  incorporated  in  the  tree  design  
and  controlled  by  valves  rather  than  plugs.  This  enables  operation  with  
monobore  systems,  which  means  less  complex  riser  or  landing  string.  Easier  
access  to  the  annulus  enables  operations  that  can  deliver  significant  advantages,  
particularly  in  deepwater  (White,  2013).  

Regarding  installation  and  intervention,  both  VXT  and  HXT  systems  use  a  landing  
string  to  run  the  completion  through  the  BOP.  In  the  HXT  configuration,  the  tree  
is  normally  run  on  a  subsea  test  tree  within  the  marine  riser  to  carry  out  a  
number  of  critical  functions.  Once  the  hanger  is  landed  inside  the  landing  
shoulders  in  the  tree,  it  is  critical  to  ensure  communication  of  electric  and  
hydraulic  downhole  functions.  The  TH  is  landed  passively  inside  the  tree  without  
relying  on  external  input  using  an  orientation  sleeve.    

Before  production,  after  a  well  is  completed,  it  is  common  practice  to  flow  the  
well  fluid  to  the  drilling  rig  to  clean  up  the  well  or  to  carry  out  a  well  test.  For  the  
HXT  systems  this  is  carried  out  through  the  subsea  test  tree  and  a  marine  riser.  
The  primary  function  of  the  test  tree  ensures  that,  if  necessary  to  disconnect  the  
rig  from  the  BOP  during  testing  or  cleanup,  the  test  tree  will  close  the  valves  and  
an  emergency  disconnect  will  be  performed  safely.    

In  the  case  of  the  VXT  system,  the  completion  is  run  on  a  landing  string  
incorporating  a  tool  that  run,  lock  and  orientate  the  TH.  This  orientation  requires  
a  tool  to  interface  with  a  pin  installed  inside  the  BOP.  Once  the  TH  is  oriented  
and  installed  inside  the  wellhead,  with  the  understanding  that  when  the  tree  is  
oriented  and  landed  on  the  wellhead,  the  communication  of  all  electric  and  

  22  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   
hydraulic  downhole  functions  will  function.  Well  cleanup  and  testing  is  then  
carried  out  after  a  dedicated  test  package  and  an  open-­‐water  riser  replace  the  
BOP.  This  test  package  comprises  a  Lower  Riser  Package  (LRP)  and  an  
Emergency  Disconnect  Package  (EDP),  enabling  the  rig  or  vessel  to  disconnect  
safely  in  the  case  of  an  emergency  in  the  same  way  as  a  test  tree.    

It  is  worth  mentioning  that  such  test  packages  and  open-­‐water  riser  systems  
represent  considerable  capital  investments,  typically  in  order  tens  of  million  
dollars  (White,  2013).  Test  trees  can  be  rented  on  the  open  marked  on  a  per-­‐day  
or  per-­‐well  basis,  resulting  in  a  much  lower  capital  investment.  

Currently,  most  tree  systems  are  being  installed  on  cable  (tree  on  wire)  and  do  
not  require  either  open  water  riser  or  marine  riser  and  subsea  BOP.  This  is  
dependent  on  the  completion  method  (Statoil  ASA,  2013)  

These  logics  led  to  the  introduction  of  Tubing  Head  Spools  (THS)  for  use  with  a  
conventional  tree,  thereby  giving  many  of  the  advantages  earlier  only  available  
with  the  HXTs.    

A  special  configuration  is  called  a  Deepwater  Vertical  Xmas  Tree  (DVXT)  and  is  
the  XT  used  in  further  analysis  in  this  thesis.  The  DVXT  is  elaborated  on  in  
chapter  4:  Case  Study.    

3.4.4 SELECTION  CRITERIA  

When  selecting  between  a  HXT  or  a  VXT  for  a  given  project,  several  
considerations  have  to  be  made.    

If  the  well  is  completed  before  the  XT  configuration  is  selected,  the  design  need  
to  be  VXT,  since  the  TH  already  will  be  installed  in  the  wellhead.  If  a  HXT  is  
preferred,  the  well  cannot  be  completed  before  installation  of  the  XT.    

Complex  wells  that  will  require  frequent  workovers  that  require  retrieval  of  the  
TH,  the  HXT  configuration  is  beneficial.  This  means  that  the  HXT  is  preferred  if  
the  well  will  have  a  lower  reliability  then  the  XT.  Conversely,  the  VXT  is  
preferred  for  simple  reservoirs  where  the  risk  of  tubing  retrieval  is  low  over  the  
life  span  of  the  well.  Gas  reservoirs  are  an  example  where  well  interventions  are  
rarely  needed  and  the  VXT  should  be  the  preferred  design.    

It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  VXT  is  larger  and  heavier  then  the  HXT,  whilst  
the  HXT  is  more  expensive.  The  size  and  weight  of  the  XT  is  an  important  factor  
since  the  vessel  used  for  installation  and  intervention  might  have  a  limited  
moonpool  and/or  crane.  

   

  23  
Chapter  3      
 

3.5 MAIN  COMPONENTS  OF  A  XMAS  TREE  SYSTEM  

3.5.1 GENERAL  COMPONENTS  OF  A  XT  SYSTEM  
Typical  main  components  in  an  XT  assembly  required  to  perform  its  functions  
include:    

• Tubing  Hanger  
• Tubing  Head  Spool  (Not  mandatory  unless  the  configuration  is  a  DVXT)  
• Tree  piping  
• Flowline  connector  
• Wellhead  connector  
• Valves  and  fittings  
• Choke  
• Tree  cap  
• Tree  frame  

The  components  are  further  described  in  chapter  4:  Case  Study:  Deepwater  
Vertical  Xmas  T.  

The  tubing  hanger,  wellhead  connector  and  the  valves  are  described  underneath  
for  an  introduction  to  different  variations  of  these  components  that  is  not  a  part  
of  the  case  study.    

3.5.2 TUBING  HANGER  

The  Tubing  Hanger  (TH)  system  is  designed  to  suspend  and  seal  the  downhole  
tubing.  The  TH  shall  be  possible  to  be  installed  through  a  BOP  stack  and  locked  
into  the  internal  landing  profile  of  either  the  casing  hanger  in  the  wellhead,  the  
tree  bore  or  in  the  THS.    

The  TH  shall  provide  the  means  of  communication  between  the  XT  and  the  
downhole  hydraulic  and  electric  functionalities.  Wet  mate  couplers/connectors  
are  located  on  the  top  and  bottom  of  the  hanger  and  engage  with  the  XT  and  the  
downhole  equipment.    

   

  24  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   
Tubing  Hanger  Configurations  
The  TH  can  be  segmented  into  two  types  of  configurations:  monobore  and  
dualbore  TH.    

 
F IGURE   4   M ONOBORE   A ND   D UAL   B ORE   T UBING   H ANGER   ( B AI   &   B AI ,   2 012)  

The  monobore  TH  only  have  a  production  bore,  with  the  annulus  routed  around  
the  bore.  The  dual  bore  TH  is  designed  with  a  main  production  bore  and  an  
annulus  bore.  

                                                                                           
F IGURE   5  MONOBORE  TUBING  H ANGER  S ECTION  VIEW   ( COURTESY  O F   GE   O IL  &   G AS )  
  25  
Chapter  3      
 
 

The  TH  assembly  consists  of  the  hanger  body,  lockdown  sleeves,  locking  dogs,  
gallery  seals,  pump  down  seal,  electrical  penetrator  receptacle,  dry  and  wet  mate  
connector  and  pup  joint.  These  components  ensure  that  the  TH  is  locked  down  
and  communicate  with  the  systems  around.    

A  conventional  VXT  require  a  conventional  dualbore  TH,  where  the  TH  is  hung  
off  in  the  wellhead.  A  dualbore  configuration  includes  a  main  production  bore  
and  an  annulus  bore.    

However,  in  an  HXT  the  TH  is  a  monobore  TH  integrated  into  the  XT  body.  The  
monobore  TH  has  a  side  outlet  through  which  the  production  flow  will  pass  into  
the  PWV.  With  the  TH  located  inside  the  HXT  it  is  necessary  with  crown  plugs  
over  the  tubing  hanger  to  fulfill  the  requirements  for  double  barriers.  The  
alternative,  with  one  crown  plug  requires  an  additionally  internal  tree  cap.  

In  the  case  of  the  DVXT  system,  the  TH  may  be  either  a  monobore  or  a  dualbore  
TH,  hung  off  in  the  internal  profile  in  the  dedicated  THS.    

3.5.3 WELLHEAD  CONNECTORS  

The  wellhead  connectors  are  the  mechanism  to  lock  and  seal  a  XT  to  the  WH,  XT  
to  the  THS  and  the  THS  to  the  WH.  The  connectors  may  be  both  mechanical  and  
pressure  connections.  If  remote  operated,  it  may  be  hydraulically  actuated.  
Where  possible,  divers  can  actuate  the  screws  in  the  mechanical  connections.  

It  exists  two  types  of  tree  connectors:  

• H4  connector  
• Collet  connector  

The  H4  connector  is  the  most  commonly  used  connector.  It  is  a  hydraulically  
actuated  connector  applicable  for  H4  type  of  wellhead  profiles.    

  26  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   

                                                                   
F IGURE   6   H 4-­‐ CONNECTOR   ( B AI   &   B AI ,   2 012)  

The  connector  is  used  to  land  and  lock  a  XT  to  a  subsea  wellhead.  The  tree  
connectors  can  be  both  mechanical  and  pressure  connections  together  with  
orientation  between  the  XT  assembly  and  the  wellhead.    

3.5.4 VALVES  
Tree  valves  are  designed  in  the  XT  assembly  to  control  and  safely  stop  the  fluid  
flow.  The  various  valves  are  used  for  servicing,  testing  and  regulating  oil,  gas,  
water  or  chemicals.    

The  most  common  type  of  valves  in  a  XT  is  a  gate  valve.  Gate  valves  are  operated  
either  hydraulically,  mechanically  and/or  by  Remotely  Operated  Vehicles  
(ROVs).  XT  valves  should  be  designed,  fabricated  and  tested  in  accordance  with  
API  17D,  API  6A  and  API  6D.    

All  main  valves  are  power-­‐operated  fail-­‐safe  closed  valves,  which  means  that  the  
valves  will  automatically  close  if  either  the  signal  or  the  hydraulic  control  
pressure  is  lost.  Swab  and  control  valves  are  fail  “as  is”  due  to  production  
regulations.  

All  XTs  are  configured  to  provide  ROV  access  to  the  principal  main  XT  valves  and  
isolation  needle  valves  from  the  ROV  panel.  ROV  interfaces  shall  be  configured  
per  ISO  13628-­‐8.  

Typical  valve  sizes  include:  

  27  
Chapter  3      
 
• Production  and  Injection  valves  (typ.  5-­‐7”  gate  valves)  for  controlling  the  
process  medium  
• Annulus  or  Injection  Valves  (typ.  2”  gate  valves)  for  annulus  access  
• Service  valves  (typ.  3/8”  to  1”)  for  chemical  injection  
• Isolation  valves  (typ.  3/8  “to  1”)  for  pressure  test  and  downhole  lines  
• Check  valves  (typ.  ½-­‐1”)  for  preventing  back-­‐flow  of  well  fluid  to  service  
lines.  

3.5.5 FLOW  CONTROL  MODULE  

A  Flow  Control  Module  (FCM)  is  often  included  in  an  XT  assembly.  A  FCM  on  the  
XT  enables  partly  standardization  by  integrating  the  custom  and  field  specific  
components  into  the  retrievable  module.    This  gives  the  advantage  of  packing  
less  reliable  components  into  the  FCM  for  easy  retrieval,  such  as  the  choke,  
sensors  and  the  Wet  Gas  Flow  Meter  (WGFM)  (alternatively  the  Multiphase  Flow  
Meter  (MPFM)).    

By  integrating  the  flow  meter  upstream  of  the  choke  in  the  FCM  rather  than  the  
alternative,  which  is  on  a  jumper,  is  an  essential  feature  due  to  the  complex  
operation  required  to  retrieve  the  WGFM  from  the  jumper  in  deepwater.    

With  the  field  specific  components  into  the  retrievable  FCM,  the  XT  can  easily  be  
converted  from  a  production  XT  into  an  injection  XT  by  switching  out  the  FCM.  

3.5.6 MAIN  COMPONENTS  THAT  VARY  BETWEEN  HXTS  AND  VXTS  

The  main  difference  between  a  VXT  and  a  HXT  are  the  positions  of  the  valves,  the  
tubing  hanger  system,  the  tree  body,  the  tree  cap  and  the  crown  plugs  (only  
utilized  in  HXTs).  This  is  shown  in  the  figure  below.    

F IGURE   7 :   D IFFERENCE   B ETWEEN   H XT   A ND   V XT   ( R ED   D OTS   I LLUSTRATE   T HE   L OCATION   O F   V ALVES )  

(B AI   &   B AI ,   2 012)  

  28  
      Overview  of  Subsea  Xmas  Tree  Systems  and  Statistical  Review  
   
3.5.7 XMAS  TREE-­‐MOUNTED  CONTROLS  
The  Subsea  Control  Module  (SCM)  is  a  part  of  the  production  control  system  and  
controls  all  hydraulically  actuated  valves  and  monitoring  equipment  located  on  
the  XT  and  downhole  in  the  well.  In  addition,  the  SCM  collects  signals  from  
manifold  and  topside/onshore  (FMC  Technologies,  2013).    

The  SCM  contains  all  control  valves,  hydraulic  pressure  monitoring  transducers  
and  electronics.  The  SCM  is  located  on  XT  and/or  manifold,  depending  the  field  
design.  The  SCM  is  landed  and  locked  onto  the  SCM  Mounted  Base  (SCMMB),  
located  on  the  XT  or  the  manifold  body.  

ISO  14224:2006  stipulates  that  the  SCM  and  other  control  system  parts  can  be  
considered  outside  the  scope  of  the  XT  system  or  as  subunits  or  maintainable  
units  of  the  XT  system.    

3.6 XMAS  TREE  INSTALLATION  AND  SERVICE  CONDITIONS  

3.6.1 XMAS  TREE  INSTALLATION  
An  XT  can  be  installed  either  by  a  drill-­‐pipe  or  by  a  crane  through  a  moon  pool  at  
a  rig  or  a  vessel,  depending  on  the  size  of  the  XT.  The  vessel  may  be  a  jack-­‐up,  
semisubmersible  or  a  drillship.  Both  VXT  and  HXT  systems  use  a  landing  string  
through  the  BOP  stack  to  run  the  completion.  

Typical  procedures  for  installing  the  VXT  and  the  HXT  system  are  as  follows  (Bai  
&  Bai,  2012):    

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VXT:   HXT:  

• Perform  pre-­‐installation  tree   • Complete  drilling  

tests.   • Retrieve  the  drilling  riser  and  
• Skid  tree  to  moon  pool.   BOP  stack;  move  the  rig  off  
• Push  guide  wired  into  tree   • Retrieve  drilling  guide  base  
guide  arms.   • Run  the  Production  Guide  
• Install  lower  riser  package   Base  (PGB)  and  latch  onto  the  
and  emergency  disconnect   wellhead  
package  (EDP)  on  tree  at   • Run  the  subsea  HXT  
moon  pool  area.     • Land  tree,  lock  connector,  
• Connect  the  installation  and   test  seal  function  valves  with  
workover  control  system   an  ROV,  release  tree  running  
(IWOCS)   tool.  
• Lower  the  tree  to  the  guide   • Run  the  BOP  stack  onto  the  
base  with  tubing  risers   HXT;  lock  the  connector  
• Lock  the  tree  onto  the  guide   • Run  the  tubing  hanger;  
base.  Test  the  seal  gasket.   perform  subsea  well  
• Perform  tree  valve  functions   completion;  unlatch  the  
with  the  Installation  and   Tubing  Hanger  Running  Tool  
Workover  Control  System   (THRT).  
(IWOCS).   • Run  the  internal  tree  cap  by  
• Retrieve  the  tree  running   wireline  through  the  riser  
tool.   and  BOP;  retrieve  THRT.  
• Rune  the  tree  cap  on  the  drill   • Retrieve  BOP  stack.  
pipe  with  the  utility  running   • Install  debris  cap.  
tool  system.   • Prepare  to  start  the  well.  
• Lower  the  tree  cap  to  the  
subsea  tree.    
• Land  and  lock  the  tree  cap    
onto  the  tree  mandrel.  
• Lower  the  corrosion  cap  onto    
the  tree  cap  with  a  drill  pipe  
 
(or  lifting  wires).  Some  
suppliers  have  developed  
ROV-­‐installed  corrosion  caps.    
 

   

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