SEPTEMBER 2020

Eyes Everywhere:
Amazon's Surveillance Infrastructure
and Revitalizing Worker Power
Daniel A. Hanley & Sally Hubbard

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Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................................. 2

I. Introduction ......................................................................................... 5

II. Amazon's Worker Surveillance Infrastructure ........................................ 8

III. How Surveillance Harms and Controls Workers .................................. 10

A. Endangering Workers' Mental and Physical Health ...................... 10

B. Intensifying Worker Precarity.......................................................... 12

C. Interfering With Worker Organizing .............................................. 12

D. Increasing Risk of the Spread and Normalization of Surveillance.. 13

IV. Solutions ................................................................................................ 14

A. Prohibit Dangerous, Invasive, and Oppressive Forms of

Worker Surveillance ................................................................... 14

B. Revitalize American Unionization ................................................... 17

C. Rein in Corporate Power ................................................................ 19

V. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 22

Authors & Acknowlegments ...................................................................... 23

Endnotes ..................................................................................................... 24
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Executive Summary

In the age of Big Data, our lives are under constant surveillance. Tech giants,
termed “surveillance capitalists” by author and Harvard Business School
professor Shoshana Zuboff,1 track our every move: our physical locations, which
websites we visit, what we purchase, our social connections, what we read, our
health stats—the list is endless. We are tracked as consumers, as companies use
surveillance to hypertarget us with ads; we are tracked as businesspeople, as
dominant companies use their control of infrastructure to peek inside businesses
and gather competitively advantageous data; and we are tracked as citizens,
as police departments and government agencies monitor Americans under the
guise of protection. But a form of surveillance that has received less attention—
and that remains deeply opaque—is the way we are tracked as workers, as
employers leverage new technologies to increase their power and control over
their employees.

Employer surveillance of workers is nothing new. Even requiring workers to

punch a timecard is a form of surveillance. But employers are increasingly
finding new ways to watch over their workers, aided by developments in
technology. And the methods that corporations are using are growing more and
more invasive, often denying the basic humanity of employees. COVID-19 has
accelerated the surveillance of workers, as it caused a shift to remote working
for a large number of employees and a desire to track workers wherever they
may be. But when the pandemic finally passes, the technologies that surveil
workers will likely be here to stay.

Today, workers of all kinds endure the adverse effects of pervasive and constant 2
employer surveillance that monitors and controls their working day. Employees
often must accept how their employer chooses to surveil them and typically do
not have any input to limit how their employer uses these technologies.2

Significant advances in technology have greatly expanded the capability,

severity, methodology, frequency, and precision of employer surveillance.3
Employers have even become interested in the most mundane behaviors of
their workers, such as the length of their smoking and food breaks, to evaluate
their overall productivity.4

Sophisticated surveillance technologies have only exacerbated the power gap

between employer and employee. In conjunction with the steep decline in

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unionization in the United States since the 1950s,5 employees have even less
bargaining power to protect their interests. Workers lack bargaining power to
sufficiently fight invasive forms of surveillance, and surveillance is even being
used to deter and prevent unionization.

Leading the troubling trend of worker surveillance is one of the world’s most
powerful companies: Amazon. Amazon is the dominant online retailer in the
United States, accounting for almost one out of every two dollars spent online.6
Beyond e-commerce, Amazon also maintains a commanding presence in many
other markets spanning voice assistants, digital books, smart doorbells, and
cloud computing.7

But make no mistake about it—Amazon is first and foremost a surveillance

company. Data collection is the core of its business model, no matter what
the business line. Amazon surveils consumers, competitors, citizens, and
immigrants, and it invasively and ubiquitously surveils its employees.

Amazon employed approximately 840,000 people as of April 2020,8 so its

practices have widespread impact. And the tech platform's surveillance
operations now serve as a model for other corporations, which seek to adopt
similar technologies to try to stave off Amazon or to emulate its continual
expansion of market shares.

Reports indicate that Amazon’s relationship with many of its employees

consists of control, humiliation, and unabating anxiety.9 Employees have
described Amazon as creating a “‘Lord Of The Flies’-esque environment where
the perceived weakest links are culled every year.”10 Other employees have
described that Amazon treats its workers like “zombies” and “robots,” ordered
to work at a relentless pace and in the specific manner that Amazon requires its
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tasks to be completed.11

In this paper, we discuss the various methods and tactics that Amazon
implements to surveil its workers and how these surveillance operations
harm them. We also detail how surveillance is tied to employer power over
workers and how surveillance exacerbates the inherently unequal dynamics
among corporations and their employees. Furthermore, we propose several
solutions to reduce surveillance practices and their consequences, as well as
reduce the market power that facilitates surveillance and limits employees’ job
opportunities and bargaining power.

Worker surveillance is almost wholly unregulated and opaque, and thus requires
further study to refine the potential solution set. But regulating surveillance,

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increasing worker power, and reducing overall corporate power is a starting
point. We propose:

• Invasive forms of worker surveillance should be prohibited outright, with

employers bearing the burden of obtaining approval from state and
federal agencies for noninvasive tracking measures that do not harm
worker welfare.

• The NLRB should promulgate a rule prohibiting forms of surveillance

that presumptively interfere with unionization efforts.

• Congress should permit independent contractors to unionize.

• Congress should legalize secondary boycotts and other

solidarity actions.

• The FTC and DOJ should amend the merger guidelines to enact bright-
line enforcement rules.

• The FTC should ban noncompete agreements and class

action waivers.

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I. Introduction

This report examines Amazon’s surveillance operations as a troubling example

of the broader conduct taking place in the American economy, conduct
that is the byproduct of years of consolidation of corporate power and
the simultaneous decline of worker power. Gaps in our laws have allowed
employers to implement a vast range of surveillance technologies with few legal
repercussions. Shoshana Zuboff has stated that the workplace is “where invasive
technologies are normalized among captive populations of employees.”12
Studying and understanding the degree of power exerted over workers has
direct implications for how these technologies can be used by corporations or
even the government over the population at large.13

To be sure, employers may have legitimate purposes for keeping track of

their employees, such as measuring performance to reward with bonuses or
raises those who excel.14 But surveillance significantly affects how employees
engage with their work and behave in the workplace; the phenomenon is
so well documented that it has a name: the Hawthorne Effect.15 Among
the psychological effects is the distrust often created between workers and
employers because of the implied condition that employers are surveilling
employees because employers suspect that employees might be engaged
in nefarious behavior.16 Workers may not be able or even desire to build
relationships with each other, out of fear that they are not performing in the
most efficient and productive way.17 Due to increased stress and anxiety,
surveillance can also reduce worker productivity and increase their probability
of injuring themselves, as workers will skip needed breaks when they know their
employer is monitoring them.18 5

Beyond the psychological effects, this growing trend among American

corporations causes several other severe harms to workers, their safety, and
their ability to advocate for better working conditions. Such invasive techniques
risk being used by employers to limit worker freedom, ensure full compliance
with employer-demanded standards, squeeze every ounce of efficiency out of a
worker, as well as deter, interfere with, and ultimately chill collective
worker action.19

Henry Ford hired Harry Bennett to run the Ford Service Department to deter
and mitigate—in many cases with physical force—any efforts to unionize.20
However, now that the modern workplace substantially relies on email,
computers, internet access, and the use of other electronic devices,

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the ability of employers to surveil their employees has never been easier, more
imperceptible, or more invasive. And workers endure the adverse effects of
surveillance, with little recourse.21

Critics note that opting out of surveillance today is as difficult as opting out
of “electricity, or cooked foods,”22 and the workplace has turned into a digital
panopticon.23 Between 2015 and 2018, 50% of 239 companies surveyed used
some form of employee surveillance, according to a 2019 survey by Gartner.24
This number was expected to increase to 80% in 2020.25 Corporate practices
have gotten so invasive that one of America’s leading security experts, Bruce
Schneier, stated that employers are “the most dangerous power that has us
under surveillance.”26

No employee is immune to expanding corporate surveillance. A range of

software products captures an employee’s screen and keystrokes, which are
used by employers to determine the worker's overall “intensity score.”27
Sales for this type of software have surged since the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic.28 Two prominent software companies saw their surveillance software
sales spike 500% and 600% between March and June of this year.29

Although most employees understand that their employers are tracking them,
they often lack insight into how invasive these applications are and how their
employers use the collected information. Surveillance company CEOs are clear
about which aspects of an employee’s day are monitored by their software.
Sam Naficy, the CEO of Prodoscore, which produces surveillance software
installed on employees’ computers, simply stated, “All of it is recorded.”30
Other surveillance programs can be used by employers to judge a worker’s
performance. For example, software by Microsoft allows employers to know
how much time an employee spends emailing or in meetings.31 All calls can be
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digitally recorded and reviewed to judge for a worker's quality, tone,
and engagement.32

The employer-employee relationship inherently favors the employer.33

Employees are typically dependent on their labor to produce their income.
Employers, on the other hand, can leverage their customer base as well as
the financial size and geographic scale of their operations to mitigate the
risk that any one employee can pose to the company and its operations.
Furthermore, employers can impose, as a condition of employment, other
restrictive practices that impede labor mobility, increase employer control, and
weaken an employee’s workplace rights. For example, noncompete agreements
and mandatory arbitration clauses restrict employees’ ability to seek other,
potentially better employment, and prevent employees from using a public
judicial forum to redress their grievances.34

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A troubling trend has emerged during the past decade, as employers have
extended their surveillance beyond what any employer could reasonably
justify—and Amazon is the quintessential offender.35 Amazon has adopted
worker surveillance technologies in nearly every aspect of its operations,
creating exceptionally oppressive conditions for its workers.

Giving homage to Brad Stone’s famed description of Amazon as “The

Everything Store,”36 OneZero journalist William Oremus has said that, thanks to
its relentless surveillance, Amazon should be called “The Everywhere Store.”37
Amazon’s recent surveillance efforts indicate that the corporation is eager to live
up to this title. In June 2019, Amazon patented its “surveillance as a service”
system, which will use its fleet of delivery drones to monitor the homes of its
users to check for break-ins and package theft.38

“It makes me afraid, mentally and physically exhausted,” Hibaq Mohamed,

who works as a stower at an Amazon warehouse in Minneapolis,39 told us of
the constant monitoring on the job. Mohamed, who is a worker-leader with
the Awood Center, shared with us her experiences with the Amazon surveillance
tactics detailed in this report.

In this paper, we discuss the methods and tactics that Amazon uses to surveil its
workers, and how these surveillance operations harm them. We also explain how
surveillance exacerbates the inherently unequal dynamic among employers and
workers. Among many adverse effects, surveillance enhances corporate power
by endangering worker health and well-being, intensifies precarity, provides
corporations with the ability to block unionization, and is at risk of even more
widespread adoption and normalization. Finally, we propose measures to begin
to rebalance power away from dominant employers and back to employees,
with the goal of ultimately reducing surveillance practices and
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their consequences.

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II. Amazon’s Worker
Surveillance Infrastructure

Employer surveillance is not a new phenomenon,40 but, due to the increasing

sophistication of technology, the desire for increased control over workers, and
declining costs, worker surveillance has begun to intensify. Among other things,
surveillance can be used by employers to standardize tasks, automate jobs, and
make rigid an employee’s work.41 Although not all worker surveillance adversely
affects workers or degrades their working conditions,42 employers have
consistently incorporated ever more invasive means to track their employees, to
obtain unprecedented insight into employee behavior.

Amazon uses its surveillance infrastructure to control and monitor the output
and behavior of its employees. Upon entering the warehouse, Amazon requires
workers to dispose of all of their personal belongings except a water bottle and
a clear plastic bag of cash.43 During the workday, Amazon surveils warehouse
employees with an extensive network of security cameras that tracks and
monitors a worker’s every move.

Amazon installs numerous surveillance cameras in its warehouses in part to

prevent and deter theft. However, Amazon uses the recorded footage to
display—on large television sets visible to many employees in the warehouse—
former employees who were caught stealing and whom Amazon subsequently
terminated or arrested.44 Veterans of the security industry are even astonished
by the extent of Amazon’s practices. One retail security veteran stated he had
“never heard of anything” quite like Amazon’s practices.45
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Amazon has also recently integrated its security cameras with sophisticated
artificial intelligence to monitor and track employee movements. These
cameras, called Distance Assistants, are to ensure that employees are complying
with social distancing requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic.46

At the end of their workday, warehouse employees are thoroughly screened to

ensure that they did not steal any items from Amazon’s warehouses. For many
workers, the time spent in these mandatory screenings is not compensated and
requires waiting times that can range from 25 minutes to an hour.47

Amazon has also set up vast surveillance operations to ensure that every aspect
of a worker’s tasks is optimized, so the corporation can extract as much labor
from workers as possible.

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Using item scanners,48 Amazon sends out orders to its workers to complete
a task, such as retrieving an item to be packaged and sent to a customer.
However, Amazon’s item scanners also count the number of seconds between
each task assigned to the worker. When employees fall behind Amazon’s chosen
productivity rate (e.g., packages processed per hour), software in the scanners
reprimands the employees who spend too much “time off task” (TOT)—
including issuing warnings and even terminating the employee.

Amazon’s surveillance of its workers extends outside its warehouses, as well.

Navigation software, called the Rabbit or Dora,49 is used to recommend
and monitor routes for delivery drivers (even though in many cases they are
independent contractors).50 The software tracks a worker’s location, to ensure
that the driver always takes the route chosen by Amazon. Amazon programs
the software to minimize worker freedom and individual decision-making. For
example, the software only factors in 30 minutes for lunch and two separate
15-minute breaks during the day.51 Amazon further demands that employees
deliver 999 out of every 1,000 packages on time or face termination.52 Amazon’s
surveillance thus drives not only which tasks are completed by workers, but the
manner and rate in which they are completed.

Amazon has vast ambitions to expand its surveillance and control over its
workers. Amazon patented a wristband that “can precisely track where
warehouse employees are placing their hands and use vibrations to nudge
them in a different direction.”53 The patent states that “ultrasonic tracking of a
worker’s hands may be used to monitor performance of assigned tasks.”54

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III. How Surveillance Harms
and Controls Workers

Amazon’s surveillance infrastructure has a wide range of adverse effects on its

workers. Amazon’s surveillance practices endanger workers’ mental and physical
health, increase precarity, deter unionization efforts—and yet might well be
normalized and adopted widely.

A. ENDANGERING WORKERS’ MENTAL

AND PHYSICAL HEALTH

Amazon’s relationship with its employees consists of control, humiliation, and

unabating anxiety, according to reports.55 Employees have described Amazon as
creating a “‘Lord Of The Flies’-esque environment where the perceived weakest
links are culled every year.”56

Amazon’s workers are under constant stress to make their quotas for collecting
and organizing hundreds of packages per hour.57 Amazon monitors an
employee’s time off task, or TOT (i.e., the time spent not completing the task
assigned by the worker’s item scanner), and will automatically terminate the
employee for making merely a few missteps.

For employees, the TOT scanners create the psychological effect of a constant
“low-grade panic” to work.58 In this sense, workers are dehumanizingly treated
by Amazon as if they are robots—persistently asked to accomplish task after
task at an unforgiving rate.59 Put another way, workers say that this degree of 10
control turns them into “zombies” when they enter the Amazon facility and start
their shifts.60

Mohamed explained to us that she and her colleagues are routinely evaluated
for performance on the basis of hitting their “rate” of packing, stowing, or
picking, based on their particular role. But, she said, “We don’t know what the
rate is—they change it behind the scenes. You’ll know when you get a warning.
They don’t tell you what rate you have to hit at the beginning.”

The resulting pressure and anxiety do not cease when the workday ends. Hibaq
explained: “I feel—and a lot of workers, they feel, even when they’re sleeping—
that they’re docking to try and hit their rate. Because they’re worried about next
week what’s going to happen; you don’t know what’s going to happen. I don’t

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know what I finished this week. Next week if I hit the rate, if the rate will change.
And managers are watching you and coming to you all the time. You feel like
someone is watching you while you are sleeping.”

Amazon employees feel forced to work through the pain and injuries they
incur on the job, as Amazon routinely fires employees who fall behind their
quotas, without taking such injuries into account.61 An investigation of Amazon’s
workplace injuries by the Center for Investigative Reporting found that Amazon’s
rate of severe injuries in its warehouses is, in some cases, more than five times
the industry average.62 Amazon’s surveillance capabilities allow the corporation
to extract every ounce of productivity from their workers, increasing the
probability of worker injuries. A former safety manager, who works at a third-
party service to deliver medical services at Amazon’s warehouses, said that “If
[workers] had an injury … there was no leniency; you were expected to keep
that rate.”63

One employee remarked that she “wasn’t prepared for how exhausting working
at Amazon would be.”64 In describing the pain she experienced trying to meet
Amazon’s demanding work pace, the employee said, “It took my body two
weeks to adjust to the agony of walking 15 miles a day and doing hundreds of
squats. But as the physical stress got more manageable, the mental stress of
being held to the productivity standards of a robot became an even
bigger problem.”65

Mental health problems are pervasive among workers. Among 46 warehouses

in 17 states, 189 calls for emergency services were made between 2013 and
2018 for a variety of mental health incidents, including suicide attempts, suicidal
thoughts, and other mental health episodes.66

The rate of workplace injuries is so egregious in Amazon’s warehouses that the 11

National Council for Occupational Safety and Health in 2018 listed Amazon as
one of the “dirty dozen” on its list of the most dangerous places to work in the
United States.67 

Amazon’s technological surveillance enables and reinforces the relentless

physical surveillance by managers. “Managers are always hovering around,” said
Hibaq. “They feel comfortable physically harassing people; that’s a regular thing
… The workers who speak up, they feel threatened physically and mentally.”

Physical monitoring by managers can infantilize workers. Recounting her

communications with managers, Hibaq said, “I was telling them, ‘I’m not a baby,
you’re not babysitting me,’ many times. ‘Why are you surrounding me? Why are
you surrounding me? I’m a grown person, I know what to do.’ And the managers
don’t even introduce themselves, they just keep watching and surrounding.”

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Amazon’s surveillance is also used to enforce the corporation’s rigorous
employee performance standards outside the physical premises of its
warehouses. Delivery drivers often speed to meet Amazon’s rigorous delivery
demands, harming both drivers and bystanders.68 Investigations conducted by
ProPublica and BuzzFeed discovered that Amazon delivery drivers had been
involved in more than 60 crashes that led to serious injuries, including at least
13 deaths, between 2015 and 2019.69

B. INTENSIFYING WORKER PRECARITY

Amazon routinely uses its surveillance infrastructure to determine whether

employees are falling below its rigorous work demands. Often employee
terminations are delivered electronically, dehumanizing the process.70 Amazon’s
electronic system analyzes an employee's electronic record and, after falling
below productivity measures, “automatically generates any warnings or
terminations regarding quality or productivity without input from supervisors.”71

Amazon’s practices exacerbate the inequality between employees and

management by keeping employees in a constant state of precariousness, with
the threat of being fired for even the slightest deviation, which ensures full
compliance with employer-demanded standards and limits worker freedom.

C. INTERFERING WITH WORKER ORGANIZING

Amazon’s surveillance infrastructure also plays a vital role in the corporation’s

union-busting activities to prevent workers from collective organization to
advocate for safer working conditions, as well as for increased pay and benefits.

Amazon has a long history of union busting,72 and its surveillance infrastructure
has enhanced its ability to prevent worker organizing. For example, Amazon 12
analyzes more than two dozen internal and external variables from data
collected from a variety of sources, including the percentage of families below
the poverty line, a “diversity index,” and team member sentiment, to determine
which Whole Foods stores are at a higher risk of unionizing. Amazon used its
collected data to create a heat map, indicating to management the stores that
were at a higher risk of unionizing.73 Amazon has fiercely fought against unions
and has provided an anti-union training video to members of its
management team.74

Surveillance also provides Amazon a means to proactively prevent workers

from organizing, because the corporation is always tracking where its workers
are located. Mohamed told us: “When they want to know something, the
management, they use that camera. When we're organizing, when there was

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a slowdown of work before the pandemic in my area or my department, then we
[workers] would come together and talk. But [the camera] is how they can come
so quickly and spread workers out.”

Mohamed said that the corporation uses its surveillance infrastructure to move
around employees whom management suspect of collectively organizing. “They
spread the workers out,” said Mohamed, adding that “you cannot talk to your
colleagues … The managers come to you and say they’ll send you to a
different station.”

COVID-19 has given Amazon another means to suppress labor organizing: social
distancing, Mohamed said. “They created a new policy of keeping six feet apart,
and you get a warning if you don’t do it. But managers, they are not getting
it, they are not doing it. The only people that they're giving warnings to are
organizing leaders … They are taking this as an opportunity to fire workers.” She
added, “They punish workers for not social distancing, [but] the managers are
coming close all the time.”

“There’s retaliation for only the organizers,” said Mohamed.

D. INCREASING RISK OF THE SPREAD AND

NORMALIZATION OF SURVEILLANCE

Amazon’s practices have been widely adopted, particularly by Walmart, the

corporation’s primary—and only significant—rival.

Walmart has purchased facial recognition software to identify workers and

customers in its stores and monitor their productivity, location, and purchases.75
Like Amazon, Walmart has also sought to patent new surveillance technology:
a microphone system to eavesdrop on its workers and shoppers, for example.76 13
While not yet implemented to our knowledge, the patent application states,
“A need exists for ways to capture the sounds resulting from people in the
shopping facility and determine performance of employees based on those
sounds.”77 The system would be embedded near the cashier, to listen to every
beep, noise, and conversation to extract and analyze various performance
measures from the employee and the customer.78 Walmart has also started
offering one-day free shipping on many of its products, to compete with
Amazon.79 Such practices will almost certainly lead to the same harmful effects
that plague Amazon workers.

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IV. Solutions

We propose a series of solutions that can begin to give workers the power to
help determine their working conditions and ensure their unfettered right to
privacy and the right to organize. We also believe these solutions can establish
a fair marketplace in which no firm or small set of firms are dominant.

A. PROHIBIT DANGEROUS, INVASIVE, AND

OPPRESSIVE FORMS OF WORKER SURVEILLANCE

i. Employers’ Invasive Surveillance Practices Should

Be Prohibited

As we show in our report, dominant employers such as Amazon continue to

implement ever more invasive means to surveil their employees. Employers
should face a heavy regulatory burden to implement worker surveillance.
Unless substantial evidence proves otherwise, the presumption should be
that surveillance interferes with a worker’s right to privacy, right to mental and
physical health, and right to organize.

Congress and state legislatures should enact legislation that requires employers
to disclose, in plain and ordinary language, the surveillance practices they either
use or intend to use to surveil their employees. The legislation should also
require corporations to disclose and justify each of their surveillance practices to
state and federal agencies. State and federal agencies should then be required
to approve the surveillance practices that an employer seeks to implement.
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An employer’s disclosures should include: which information is being collected

by the corporation’s surveillance practices; how long the employer retains the
information; the reasons for each surveillance practice; any adverse mental
and physical health effects the surveillance practice has on workers; how the
information collected is used by the employer or potential third parties; whether
the employer shares the information with any third parties; and, if the employer
is sharing the information, which third parties have access to the
collected information.80

Requiring employers to disclose their surveillance practices to state and federal

agencies provides several key benefits. First, disclosures to state and federal
agencies inhibit employers from unilaterally subjecting their employees to

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invasive surveillance practices without public oversight. Second, disclosures
provide workers with notice about the surveillance practices they will be
subjected to. Disclosures thus allow individuals to determine whether they want
to be subject to the types of surveillance that a potential employer uses. Third,
public disclosure requirements can deter employers from implementing certain
surveillance practices. Fourth, disclosure requirements of surveillance practices
can provide information for state and federal agencies to study the practice
and determine whether it should be prohibited. For example, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act requires all employers to provide employees a workplace
that is “free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm.”81 Mandatory disclosures to agencies can aid the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to launch investigations into the
adverse health effects of particular workplace surveillance practices, which could
lead the agency to limit the practices.82 Lastly, disclosures ensure that, despite
employer efforts to use ever more imaginative means to surveil workers, the
public and governmental agencies are aware of these practices and will properly
regulate or prohibit the practices as quickly as possible.

Mandatory disclosures can thus help resolve the current disconnect among what
the general public and state and federal agencies know about the employers’
surveillance practices, how much these practices deter worker organization
efforts, and how much physical and psychological harm these practices cause.

Currently, only Connecticut and Delaware require employers to disclose their

surveillance practices to their employees.83 However, these statutes lack any
provision about how the employer uses the information collected by the
surveillance. Additionally, these statutes lack any process for employers to
disclose their surveillance practices to state or federal agencies.

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ii. The NLRB Should Determine That Specific Employer
Surveillance Practices Should Be Prohibited or Presumptively
Interfere With Unionization Efforts

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) should use its broad, substantive
rule-making authority and adjudicative capabilities to prohibit intrusive
surveillance practices in the workplace that have an appreciable risk of
interfering or deterring collective worker action.84 The NLRB should use its rule-
making capabilities to prohibit any practices that have been shown to deter
worker unionization.

After insufficiently protecting workers’ right to strike and collectively organize,85

Congress passed the Wagner Act and established the NLRB in 1935.86 The

15
Wagner Act was enacted by Congress to provide affirmative organizing
and collective bargaining rights to workers.87 The act specifically states that
employees “shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”88 Importantly, the
Wagner Act prohibited employer practices that “interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees” in their efforts to organize and act collectively.89

As we describe, surveillance not only deters workers from organizing, but

dominant employers such as Amazon have used their surveillance infrastructure
precisely to interfere with and deter collective worker action.90 The NLRB has
broad, substantive rule-making authority regarding unfair labor practices that
deter unionization.91 While the NLRB has typically depended on adjudication to
implement specific policies,92 the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that
the NLRB has the rule-making authority to rebalance worker power.93

The agency also has adjudicative authority in the sense that labor relations
issues are litigated through the agency’s administrative law judges and, if
appealed, by the NLRB. The NLRB has primarily chosen to enact its policy
agenda through adjudication.

One example of the NLRB using its litigation authority to limit worker
surveillance was in Purple Communications.94 Purple Communications
concerned an employer’s communications practices that prohibited the use
of email relating to “activities on behalf of organizations or persons with no
professional or business affiliation with the company.”95 The complaint alleged
that the employer’s practice unlawfully interfered with and restricted employees’
rights to unionize.96
16

Although the decision was a narrow one,97 the NLRB in its 2014 Purple
Communications decision did acknowledge the growing need for unionization
efforts to use workplace technology such as email to organize and discuss
workplace grievances.98 The NLRB stated that the previous legal analysis of
balancing employers’ interests in monitoring communications over the needs
and desires of workers to collectively organize was too imbalanced in favor of
employers.99 The NLRB then established a presumption that required employers
to show a “special circumstance” such that monitoring of email communications
was necessary to “maintain production or discipline.”100

The NLRB in 2019 overturned its Purple Communications decision.101 Because

the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the ability of agencies to interpret

16
and reinterpret the meaning of agency regulations and holdings, a future NLRB
could reinstate a stronger Purple Communications standard.102

A new presidential administration could appoint NLRB members that are

more favorable to labor organizing. The new board members could institute
strong rules that protect workers from invasive employer surveillance
practices. Additionally, new NLRB members can rule, as the board did in
Purple Communications, that employer surveillance practices, such as email
surveillance or pervasive camera surveillance, presumptively interfere with an
employee’s right to organize and outweigh an employer’s need to surveil
its employees.103

B. REVITALIZE AMERICAN UNIONIZATION

The employee-employer work paradigm involves employers being able to

terminate employees at will for almost any reason. As long as employers
can fire workers for practically any reason—or no reason at all—the power
disparity between labor and employers will always favor employers. Fostering
unionization is critical to rebalancing power toward workers and to ensuring that
workers receive essential benefits such as fair wages, a safe work environment,
and equal decision-making over operations and strategy.

Unions also provide a broad range of benefits to workers, including protections

against at-will employment. Substantial research has shown that unions reduce
income inequality, increase wages, provide better benefits to workers, and
rebalance power away from dominant employers to workers.104 The proliferation
of other restrictive practices such as class action waivers, noncompete
agreements, and mandatory arbitration agreements would have likely not
occurred if a more substantial union presence existed in the United States.105
17

Scholars and lawmakers have known and recognized the benefits of unions
for almost a century. Chief Justice William Howard Taft remarked in 1921 that
unions were “essential” to give laborers an opportunity to deal on equal terms
with their employers.106

Unions can prohibit practices that are detrimental to a worker’s safety and
interfere with a worker’s right to privacy. In some cases, unions have been able
to obtain restrictions on employer surveillance practices.107

To rebalance power toward workers, we propose four solutions that can

revitalize unionization in the United States and ultimately restrict and prohibit
worker surveillance.

17
i. Congress Should Permit Independent Contractors to Unionize
Under current law, independent contractors (such as Amazon Flex delivery
drivers or warehouse workers) cannot unionize.108 The rise of the “gig economy”
has increased in tandem with the usage of independent contractors by
dominant firms, the latter increasing by 20% on average in the United States
between 2001 and 2016, as compared to less than 10% for the increase in
all employees.109 Dominant firms such as Amazon now routinely depend on
independent contractors.

By enacting the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress limited the National Labor
Relations Act’s protections only to employees. As a result of this decision,
Congress pushed corporations to relegate workers to independent contractor
status, avoiding the protections that unions provide to employees.110 Employers
who decide to use independent contractors instead of traditional workers
effectively sidestep federal labor law.

Allowing independent contractors to unionize would prohibit firms from

circumventing labor protections and would give a significant percentage of
workers the benefits and protections offered by unions.

ii. Congress Should Legalize Secondary Boycotts and Other

Solidarity Actions
One of the signature weaknesses in American labor law is the prohibition
against secondary boycotts and other solidarity labor actions.111 Secondary
boycotts allow unions to engage in a strike or other labor action that supports
workers in a separate organization. Without secondary boycotts and other
solidarity actions, labor protections are limited to only the relationship between
an employer and its employees.
18
While the Wagner Act was a statute meant to pursue “utopian aspirations for
a radical restructuring of the workplace,”112 the Taft-Hartley Act specifically
sought to restrict labor practices to narrow how unions can advocate for their
workers and how workers can organize or put pressure on their employers to
demand better working conditions. The Taft-Hartley Act specifically prohibited
secondary and solidarity boycotts. As a result of the act, American unionization
rates plummeted.113

Prohibiting secondary and solidarity boycotts limits which actions a union can
take to pressure employers to treat workers fairly, even across entire economic
sectors. Legalizing secondary boycotts and other solidarity actions would allow
workers across the economy to organize collectively to win fair treatment,
adequate wages, a safe working environment—and protections from
excessive surveillance.

18
C. REIN IN CORPORATE POWER

Sheer power explains much of why dominant firms such as Amazon have been
able to implement intrusive surveillance practices. Market power allows firms
not only to control markets, but also to exploit their workers, with surveillance
just one method to exert dominance.

A substantial body of evidence shows that U.S. markets are significantly more
concentrated than in the past.114 Researchers have found that 75% of all U.S.
industries have increased in concentration since the 1990s, with an average
increase in concentration of 90%.115 Moreover, researchers have found that many
U.S. markets now suffer from exceedingly high levels of concentration.116

Recent scholarly literature has shown a clear connection between market

concentration and harm to workers. For example, José Azar, Ioana Marinescu,
and Marshall Steinbaum examined more than 8,000 local labor markets and
concluded that the average labor market in the U.S. is “highly concentrated.”
The researchers said that highly concentrated markets resulted in workers
frequently earning less income: In a market that goes from the 25th percentile
to the 75th percentile in concentration, wages decline by 17%.117 Similar studies
have found that as market concentration increases in a supply chain, workers’
wages in upstream markets stagnate.118

Decreasing the market power of dominant firms is critical to strengthening

unions and ensuring their long-term stability. Additionally, more vigorous
antitrust enforcement would increase competition for workers, enhancing their
overall mobility and demand for their labor.119 Increased enforcement would also
substantially lessen the market power and monopsony power of dominant firms
and decrease the ability of employers to impose coercive surveillance practices
on their employees.
19

We propose two recommendations for how antitrust enforcement can be

reinvigorated to benefit workers.

i. The FTC and DOJ Should Amend the Merger Guidelines to

Enact Bright-Line Enforcement Rules

Dominant firms routinely acquire and entrench market power by taking

advantage of permissive merger enforcement.120 Substantial research has shown
the adverse effects of mergers on competition, innovation, workers,
and prices.121

The Clayton Act, the primary anti-merger law in the United States, features
robust and broad language. Section 7 of the act prohibits mergers

19
that may “substantially … lessen competition, or … tend to create a
monopoly.”122 Congress amended the law in 1950 to increase both its reach and
enforcement. The 1950 amendments aimed to create a more robust merger
enforcement regime to promote local ownership to stem the “rising tide of
economic concentration in the American economy.”123 Soon thereafter, the
Supreme Court and antitrust enforcers enacted strong presumptions against
mergers that unduly increased concentration.124 In United States v. Von’s Grocery
Co.,125 the Supreme Court held in 1966 that a merger between two grocery
store chains with a local market share of almost 8% violated the Clayton Act.126
Soon thereafter, in 1967, the Supreme Court prohibited Procter & Gamble’s
acquisition of Clorox.127 The court reasoned that the acquisition would entrench
Clorox’s dominance in household bleach and deprive consumers of the benefit
of a competitive market.

The Clayton Act and the subsequent 1950 amendments were a clear and direct
policy choice to favor corporate expansion by means other than acquisition,
and to establish a vigorous merger enforcement regime.128 Despite the clear
congressional intent, federal agencies have withdrawn from enforcing even
the most clearly harmful mergers, such as the recent 4-to-3 merger of T-Mobile
and Sprint. The agencies have also chosen not to block other mergers that
appear illegal under the statute.129 Moreover, the agencies have chosen to
challenge only a small handful of the more than 700 acquisitions that Google,
Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft have made since 1987.130 Amazon, in
particular, has made 83 acquisitions between 1998 and 2019—none of which
were challenged by federal agencies. Many of Amazon’s mergers have simply
bought a significant market share for the corporation.131

This lackluster enforcement stems from unclear merger enforcement rules that
provide the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC with too much discretion
on when to enforce the Clayton Act. Additionally, the current enforcement 20
regime forces federal agencies and the courts to make speculative decisions
concerning how competitive a market will be in the future.

We propose that the FTC and DOJ amend their merger guidelines to
incorporate bright-line rules similar to the 1968 Merger Guidelines, so that if
a firm controls 20% of a relevant labor market or product market, any merger
involving the company would be illegal.

Before being watered down by the DOJ, the 1968 Merger Guidelines had a
similar construction and sought to enact the strong congressional command
against mergers from the 1950 Clayton Act amendments.132

Bright-line rules, such as the ones we propose and that were implemented in
the 1968 Merger Guidelines, encourage firms to grow organically instead of

20
through acquisition. When the Clayton Act was vigorously enforced, between
1948 and 1952, corporations chose to invest in building out their operations
rather than in acquiring competitors.133 During this time, companies spent less
than 3% of their total investment dollars on acquisitions.134 Historical examples
have shown that when acquisitions are not pursued, firms invest in innovation.
For example, the telecommunications giant AT&T was prohibited from acquiring
T-Mobile in 2011. Instead of T-Mobile faltering as a competitor, T-Mobile
radically altered the industry’s entire business model by slashing prices and
ending long-term consumer contracts.

Establishing bright-line rules also prohibits agencies from engaging in what is

called cross-market balancing. Cross-market balancing is when the harm caused
by an antitrust violator to one set of economic actors can be offset by the
alleged beneficial effects the conduct has in another market with another set of
economic actors. The Supreme Court has repeatedly prohibited this practice.135
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court stated that
“a merger the effect of which ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ is not
saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and
credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”136

Despite this clear ruling, courts still engage in this cost-benefit analysis, and
these institutions still try to promote anti-competitive and other exclusionary
conduct, based on court opinions that such conduct is healthy for a competitive
market. In addition to promoting a vigorous anti-merger enforcement regime
in line with congressional intent, bright-line rules would reinforce the agency’s
commitment to follow Supreme Court precedent and prohibit
cross-market balancing.

ii. The FTC Should Ban Noncompete Agreements and Class

21
Action Waivers

The FTC has broad powers granted by its enabling statute, the Federal Trade
Commission Act.137 Section 5 of the act allows the FTC to prohibit unfair or
deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition.138 The FTC also
has broad rule-making powers to define the meaning of these terms. The FTC
can use its rule-making authority to establish bright-line rules to prohibit some
of the most egregious business practices that dominant firms routinely employ
to disenfranchise workers, limit their employment opportunities, and prevent
them from engaging in collective litigation.139 Specifically, the FTC should ban
noncompete clauses and class action waivers in employee contracts. These
coercive contracts suppress wages, limit the formation of new firms, and limit
worker mobility by disincentivizing workers from leaving abusive or unsafe
work environments.

21
 Employers currently bind millions of workers to these restrictive agreements.
Scholars have determined that noncompetes bind roughly 20% of the labor
force, and at least 40% have agreed to one in the past.140 A study by the
Economic Policy Institute found that corporations have bound 60 million
workers to mandatory arbitration agreements.141 In the past, Amazon imposed
agreements that prohibited warehouse workers from accepting employment
with any product or service competitor to Amazon for an astonishing
18 months.142 Although Amazon stopped this practice for its warehouse workers
under public pressure, the corporation still uses noncompetes with its executives
and technical professionals.143

V. Conclusion

Amazon is one of the most dominant corporations in history. A fundamental

aspect of its power is the corporation’s ability to surveil every aspect of its
workers’ behavior and use the surveillance to create a harsh and dehumanizing
working environment that produces a constant state of fear, as well as physical
and mental anguish. The corporation’s extensive and pervasive surveillance
practices deter workers from collectively organizing and harm their physical and
mental health.

Amazon’s vast surveillance infrastructure constantly makes workers aware that

every single movement they make is tracked and scrutinized. When workers
make the slightest mistake, Amazon can use its surveillance infrastructure to
terminate them. 22

Amazon’s conduct has provided a roadmap for other dominant corporations,

such as Walmart, to implement similar surveillance practices. Amazon’s tactics
ultimately seek to weaken the power of its workers and entrench its control
over them.

Federal and state agencies, as well as legislatures, can enact several policies
to prevent the implementation of invasive surveillance practices, restrain
the market power of dominant corporations like Amazon, and invigorate
unionization in the United States.Our solutions can create a new working
environment in this country, an environment where workers have representation
and bargaining power to determine their working conditions and protect their
right to privacy and their right to collectively organize.

22
Authors & Acknowledgments

Daniel A. Hanley is a policy analyst at the Open Markets Institute.

Sally Hubbard is director of enforcement strategy at the Open Markets
Institute. Udit Thakur, who contributed to this report, is a research
associate at the Open Markets Institute.

The authors would like to thank Hibaq Mohamed, the Awood Center,
and its executive director, Abdirahman Muse; Marc Rotenberg, president
and executive director of Electronic Privacy Information Center and
professor at Georgetown Law; Bennett Cyphers, staff technologist at the
Electronic Frontier Foundation; Matthew Crain, assistant professor of
media & culture at Miami University; and Shaoul Sussman, legal fellow
at the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, for their invaluable and thorough
feedback on this report.

23

23
Endnotes
1
Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier
of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019)

2
“2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey,” AMA/ePolicy Institute Research, accessed August
11, 2020,http://www.plattgroupllc.com/jun08/2007ElectronicMonitoringSurveillanceSurvey.pdf.

3
Ifeoma Ajunwa et. al., “Limitless Worker Surveillance,” California Law Review 105, no.3 (2017): 743,
https://mronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/3Ajunwa-Schultz-Crawford-36.pdf.

4
Kaveh Waddell, “Automating Humans with AI,” Axios, October 12, 2019, https://www.axios.com/ai-
employee-surveillance-automating-humans-092f8c36-24bc-4efd-8d38-78f1c8a61e1f.html.

5
“Informing the Dialogue,” Economic Policy Institute Newsletter, accessed August 11, 2020, https://www.
epi.org/news/union-membership-declines-inequality-rises/.

6
Ingrid Lunden, “Amazon's Share of the US e-Commerce Market Is Now 49%, or 5% of All Retail Spend,”
TechCrunch, July 13, 2018, https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/13/amazons-share-of-the-us-e-commerce-
market-is-now-49-or-5-of-all-retail-spend/.

7
Daniel A. Hanley, “Zoom, Netflix, Slack: Amazon Is Behind All the Services We Use to Work From Home
(and That's a Problem),” Pro Market, May 4, 2020, https://promarket.org/2020/04/09/zoom-netflix-slack-
amazon-is-behind-all-the-services-we-use-to-work-from-home-and-thats-a-problem/.;
Amrita Khalid, “The Future of Live-Streaming, for Better or Worse, Depends on Twitch,” Quartz (Quartz,
November 14, 2019), https://qz.com/1747158/twitch-grows-as-non-gamer-live-streaming-expands-on-
the-platform/.;
Greg Sterling, “Alexa Devices Maintain 70% Market Share in U.S. According to Survey,” Marketing Land,
August 9, 2019, https://marketingland.com/alexa-devices-maintain-70-market-share-in-u-s-according-to-
survey-265180.;
Andria Cheng, “Why Walmart Is Pushing Into E-Books, A Business On The Decline,” Forbes Magazine,
August 23, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/andriacheng/2018/08/22/walmart-introduces-ebooks-in-
its-latest-loud-display-of-intense-fight-against-amazon/.;
“Ebook Industry News Feed”, About eBooks, accessed August 12, 2020, https://about.ebooks.com/
ebook-industry-news-feed/.;
Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, “Amazon Already Disrupted the Sale of Print Titles. Up Next: Audiobooks,” The 24
Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company, February 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/readers-
listen-up-amazon-wants-to-extend-its-dominance-in-audiobooks-1517832000.;
“Cloud Service Spending Still Growing Almost 40% per Year; Half of It Won by Amazon & Microsoft,”
Synergy Research Group, accessed August 11, 2020, https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/cloud-
service-spending-still-growing-almost-40-year-half-it-won-amazon-microsoft.

8
Andria Chang, “Amazon’s Coronavirus Plan to Test All 84,000 Employees May Pressure
Other Companies to Follow Suit, Forbes, April 16, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
andriacheng/2020/04/16/amazons-plan-to-test-all-employees-on-coronavirus-may-up-the-ante-for-other-
companies/#5dc5079836cb.

9
“Amazon Delivery Drivers Are Being Exploited, Claims a BBC Inside Out Investigation - Media Centre,”
BBC (Media Centre, November 11, 2016), https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2016/amazon-
inside-out.;
Chavie Lieber, “Muslim Amazon Workers Say They Don't Have Enough Time to Pray. Now
They're Fighting for Their Rights.,” Vox, December 14, 2018, https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2018/12/14/18141291/amazon-fulfillment-center-east-africa-workers-minneapolis.

24
10
Annie Zaleski, “We Are All ‘Amabots’ Now: Jeff Bezos Just Perfected the ‘Burn and Churn’ Philosophy
That's Sucking American Workers Dry,” Salon, The Associated Press, August 18, 2015, https://www.
salon.com/2015/08/18/we_are_all_ambots_now_jeff_bezos_just_perfected_the_burn_and_churn_
philosophy_thats_sucking_american_workers_dry/.

11
Emily Guendelsberger, “I Worked at an Amazon Fulfillment Center; They Treat Workers Like Robots,”
Time, July 18, 2019, https://time.com/5629233/amazon-warehouse-employee-treatment-robots/.;
Lorraine Kelly, “Amazombies,” PressReader, December 4, 2016, https://www.pressreader.com/ireland/
the-irish-mail-on-sunday/20161204/282230895310580

12
Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.

13
Matthew Guariglia, “Analysis | Too Much Surveillance Makes Us Less Free. It Also Makes Us Less Safe.,”
The Washington Post (WP Company, July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-
history/wp/2017/07/18/too-much-surveillance-makes-us-less-free-it-also-makes-us-less-safe/.

14
Corey A. Ciocchetti, “The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee
Monitoring,” American Business Law Journal 48, no. 2 (May 19, 2011): pp. 285-369, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.2011.01116.x.

15
“Hawthorne Effect,” Wikipedia (Wikimedia Foundation, August 4, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Hawthorne_effect.

16
“The Negative Effects of CCTV Workplace Surveillance,” Le Mauricien, August 17, 2016, http://www.
lemauricien.com/le-mauricien/negative-effects-cctv-workplace-surveillance/36188/.

17
Dr. Vidushi Jaswal, “Psychological Effects of Workplace”.;
Johnny Lupsha, “Employee Surveillance Rises Alongside Work-from-Home Rates,” The Great Courses
Daily, May 19, 2020, https://www.thegreatcoursesdaily.com/employee-surveillance-rises-alongside-work-
from-home-rates/.

18
Dr. Vidushi Jaswal, “Psychological Effects of Workplace”, 63.

19
Charlotte Garden, Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance, 63 St. Louis U. L.J. 55 (2018), https://
digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/814.;
Hayley Peterson, “Amazon-Owned Whole Foods Is Quietly Tracking Its Employees with a Heat Map
Tool That Ranks Which Stores Are Most at Risk of Unionizing,” Business Insider (Business Insider, April
20, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/whole-foods-tracks-unionization-risk-with-heat-map-2020-
25
1?fbclid=IwAR2ci-941CBZ2mygOiyzbg4NKQmqw5H06cKa4r50jmGUGuLe0IMBPwcKBC0.

20
Beth Tompkins. Bates, The Making of Black Detroit in the Age of Henry Ford (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 2012), 74.

21
“2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey”.

22
Wolfie Christl, “Corporate Surveillance In Everyday Life,” Cracked Labs, June 2017, https://crackedlabs.
org/dl/CrackedLabs_Christl_CorporateSurveillance.pdf.

23
“The Panopticon,” Bentham Project, April 9, 2019, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-project/who-was-
jeremy-bentham/panopticon.

24
Brian Kropp, “The Future of Employee Monitoring,” Smarter With Gartner, May 3, 2019, https://www.
gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/the-future-of-employee-monitoring/.

25
Ibid.

25
25
26
Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath the Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (New
York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2016), 82.

27
Olivia Solon, “Big Brother Isn't Just Watching: Workplace Surveillance Can Track Your Every Move,” The
Guardian (Guardian News and Media, November 6, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
nov/06/workplace-surveillance-big-brother-technology.

28
Sara Morrison, “Just Because You're Working from Home Doesn't Mean Your Boss Isn't Watching You,”
Vox (Vox, April 2, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/2/21195584/coronavirus-remote-work-
from-home-employee-monitoring.

29
Adam Isaak, “Employee Tracking Is Increasingly Widespread, and It Could Be Doing More Harm than
Good,” CNBC (CNBC, June 17, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/employee-surveillance-
software-is-seeing-a-spike-as-workers-stay-home.html.

30
Ibid.

31
Ellen Sheng, “Employee Privacy in the US Is at Stake as Corporate Surveillance Technology Monitors
Workers' Every Move,” CNBC (CNBC, July 22, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/15/employee-
privacy-is-at-stake-as-surveillance-tech-monitors-workers.html.

32
Emine Saner, “Employers Are Monitoring Computers, Toilet Breaks – Even Emotions. Is Your Boss
Watching You?,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, May 14, 2018), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2018/may/14/is-your-boss-secretly-or-not-so-secretly-watching-you.

33
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2020)

34
Open Markets, “Open Markets, AFL-CIO, SEIU, and Over 60 Signatories Demand the FTC Ban Worker
Non-Compete Clauses,” Open Markets Institute, March 20, 2019, https://www.openmarketsinstitute.
org/publications/open-markets-afl-cio-seiu-60-signatories-demand-ftc-ban-worker-non-compete-clauses.

35
Ibid.

36
Brad Stone, The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon (New York, NY: Back Bay Books/
Little, Brown and Company, 2018).

37
Will Oremus, “Amazon Just Became the Everywhere Store,” Medium (OneZero, September 25, 2019),
https://onezero.medium.com/amazon-just-became-the-everywhere-store-dce9353decd3.
26
38
James Cook, “Amazon Drones Could Be Used to Film Your Home and Spot Intruders, Patent
Reveals,” The Telegraph (Telegraph Media Group, June 19, 2019), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/2019/06/19/amazon-drones-could-used-spy-home-spot-intruders-patent-reveals/.

39
Nelson Lichtenstein, “Making History at Amazon,” Dissent Magazine (February 12, 2020), https://www.
dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/making-history-at-amazon.

40
Ifeoma Ajunwa et. al., “Limitless Worker Surveillance”.

Roland E. Kidwell & Nathan Bennett, Electronic Surveillance as Employee Control: A Procedural Justice
41

Interpretation, The Journal of High Technology Management Research, Volume 5, Number 1, pages
39-57.

42
Chandra Steele, “The Quantified Employee: How Companies Use Tech to Track Workers,” The 21st
Century, May 14, 2020, https://www.21cir.com/2020/05/the-quantified-employee-how-companies-use-
tech-to-track-workers/.

43
Lorraine Kelly, “Amazombies.”

26
26
44
Victor Luckerson, “Amazon Uses Surveillance Footage to Deter Warehouse Thieves,” Time, March 8,
2016, https://time.com/4251122/amazon-surveillance-footage-thieves/.

45
Eidelson and Spencer Soper, “How Amazon Shames Warehouse Workers for Alleged Theft,” Bloomberg,
March 7, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-07/amazon-s-story-time-is-kind-of-a-
bummer?sref=ZvMMMOkz.

46
Annie Palmer, “Amazon Is Tracking Warehouse Workers and Says It Could Fire Them for Violating Social
Distancing Rules,” CNBC, April 7, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/06/amazon-says-workers-could-
be-fired-for-violating-social-distancing-rules.html.;
James Vincent, “Amazon Deploys AI 'Distance Assistants' to Notify Warehouse Workers If They Get Too
Close,” The Verge, June 16, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/16/21292669/social-distancing-
amazon-ai-assistant-warehouses-covid-19.

47
Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, (9th Cir. 2014)

48
Emily Guendelsberger, “I Worked at an Amazon Fulfillment Center.”

49
“Amazon delivery drivers are being exploited.”

50
Joelle Gamble, “The Inequalities of Workplace Surveillance,” The Nation, June 6, 2019, https://www.
thenation.com/article/archive/worker-surveillance-big-data/.;
Hayley Peterson, “'Amazon Has All the Power': How Amazon Controls Legions of Delivery Drivers
without Paying Their Wages and Benefits,” Business Insider, October 4, 2018, https://www.
businessinsider.com/amazon-controls-delivery-drivers-without-paying-wages-2018-9.

51
Hayley Peterson, “'We Sped like Crazy': Amazon Delivery Drivers Say They Feel Pressure to Drive
Dangerously, Urinate in Bottles, and Sprint on the Job,” Business Insider, September 12, 2018, https://
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-delivery-drivers-say-they-speed-urinate-in-bottles-2018-9.

52
Patricia Callahan, “THE DEADLY RACE How Amazon Hooked America on Fast Delivery While Avoiding
Responsibility for Crashes,” ProPublica, September 5, 2019, https://features.propublica.org/amazon-
delivery-crashes/how-amazon-hooked-america-on-fast-delivery-while-avoiding-responsibility-for-
crashes/.

53
Alan Boyle, “Amazon Wins a Pair of Patents for Wireless Wristbands That Track Warehouse Workers,”
GeekWire, February 5, 2018, https://www.geekwire.com/2018/amazon-wins-patents-wireless-wristbands- 27
track-warehouse-workers/.

54
Jonathan Evan Cohn. Ultrasonic bracelet and receiver for detecting position in 2d plane. US Patent
20170278051A1, filed March 28, 2016, and issues January 30, 2018.

55
“Amazon Delivery Drivers Are Being Exploited”.
Chavie Lieber, “Muslim Amazon Workers Say They Don't Have Enough Time to Pray. Now They're
Fighting for Their Rights”.

56
Annie Zaleski, “We Are All ‘Amabots”.

57
Will Evans, “Ruthless Quotas at Amazon Are Maiming Employees,” The Atlantic (Atlantic Media
Company, December 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/11/amazon-
warehouse-reports-show-worker-injuries/602530/.

58
Ibid.

59
Ibid.

27
60
Lorraine Kelly, “Amazombies.”

61
Ibid;
Michael Sainato, “Accidents at Amazon: Workers Left to Suffer after Warehouse Injuries,” The Guardian
(Guardian News and Media, July 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/30/
accidents-at-amazon-workers-left-to-suffer-after-warehouse-injuries.

62
Reveal Staff, “Find out What Injuries Are like at the Amazon Warehouse That Handled Your Packages,”
Reveal News, November 25, 2019, https://www.revealnews.org/article/find-out-what-injuries-are-like-at-
the-amazon-warehouse-that-handled-your-packages/.

63
Tonya Riley, “She Injured Herself Working at Amazon. But Then the Real Nightmare Began.,” Mother
Jones, March 19, 2019, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/amazon-workers-compensation-
amcare-clinic-warehouse/.

64
Emily Guendelsberger, “I Worked at an Amazon Fulfillment Center.”;

65
Ibid.

66
Sharif Paget and Max Zahn, “'Colony of Hell': 911 Calls From Inside Amazon Warehouses,” The Daily
Beast, March 11, 2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/amazon-the-shocking-911-calls-from-inside-its-
warehouses.

67
“The Dirty Dozen,” National Council of Occupational Health and Saftey, 2018, https://coshnetwork.org/
sites/default/files/Dirty%20Dozen%202018,%204-25-18+FINAL(1).pdf.

68
James Bandler and Patricia Callahan, “Inside Documents Show How Amazon Chose Speed Over Safety
in Building Its Delivery Network,” ProPublica, December 11, 2019, https://www.propublica.org/article/
inside-documents-show-how-amazon-chose-speed-over-safety-in-building-its-delivery-network.;
Patricia Callahan, “THE DEADLY RACE.”;
Caroline O' Donovan and Ken Bensinger, “The Cost of Next-Day Delivery: How Amazon Escapes The
Blame For Its Deadly Last Mile,” BuzzFeed News, September 6, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolineodonovan/amazon-next-day-delivery-deaths.;
Ken Bensinger et al., “The Fast Mile: Amazon's Race To Build A Fast Delivery Network: ‘The Human Cost
Of This Is Too Much.",” BuzzFeed News, December 24, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
kenbensinger/amazons-race-to-build-a-fast-delivery-network-the-human.

69
Ibid. 28
70
Skunk Ohm, “Amazon Uses AI To Fire Unproductive Employees,” Intelligent Living, September 9, 2019,
https://www.intelligentliving.co/amazon-ai-fire-unproductive-employees/.

71
Colin Lecher, “How Amazon Automatically Tracks and Fires Warehouse Workers for 'Productivity',” The
Verge, April 25, 2019, https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/25/18516004/amazon-warehouse-fulfillment-
centers-productivity-firing-terminations.

72
Charles Duhigg, “Is Amazon Unstoppable?.”
In 2000, when the Communication Workers of America sought to unionize several hundred Amazon call
center workers, Amazon closed the call center.
In 2014, after Amazon technicians sought to unionize and even petitioned the National Labor Relations
Board, Amazon held meetings explaining how bad forming a union could be.
Caroline O'Donovan, “Amazon Fired an Employee Involved In Workplace Organizing In
Minnesota, Sources Say,” BuzzFeed News, April 14, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
carolineodonovan/amazon-fired-employee-involved-in-workplace-organizing-in.

28
73
Hayley Peterson, “Amazon-Owned Whole Foods Is Quietly Tracking Its Employees.”

74
Whole Foods, “Amazon's Union-Busting Training Video (LONG VERSION), YouTube Video, 29:02, June
22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRpwVwFxyk4.

75
Esperanza Fonseca, “Worker Surveillance Is on the Rise, and Has Its Roots in Centuries of Racism,”
Truthout, June 8, 2020, https://truthout.org/articles/worker-surveillance-is-on-the-rise-and-has-its-roots-
in-centuries-of-racism/.

76
Jena McGregor, “What Walmart's Patent for Audio Surveillance Could Mean for Its Workers,” The
Washington Post (WP Company, July 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/07/12/
what-walmarts-patent-audio-surveillance-could-mean-its-workers/.

77
Ibid.

78
Caroline O'Donovan, “Walmart's Newly Patented Technology For Eavesdropping On Workers
Presents Privacy Concerns,” BuzzFeed News, July 11, 2018, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
carolineodonovan/walmart-just-patented-audio-surveillance-technology-for.

79
Jon Porter, “Walmart Offers Free One-Day Delivery in Attempt to Catch up with Amazon,” The Verge,
May 14, 2019, https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18622786/walmart-free-one-day-delivery-35-
dollars-phoenix-las-vegas-75-percent-us-amazon-prime.

80
Ariana R. Levinson, “Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed”, Cornell Law Journal 18,
no.18. (2009): 609, 629.

81
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).

82
29 U.S.C. §§ 662(a), 657(f)(1), 666(f). 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6.

83
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-48d(b)(1); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 705

84
Charles J. Morris, “The NLRB in the Dog House—Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?”, San Diego Law
Review 24, no. 9 (1987): 29-42;
American Hospitals Association v. National Labor Relations Board, 499 U.S. 606, (U.S. Supreme Court
1991);
Charlotte Garden, “Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance” Seattle University School of Law 63,
no. 55 (2018): 68.
Labor Board v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, (U.S Supreme Court 1946). 29
85
Joseph H. McFarlane, “Poster Wars: The NLRB and the Controversy over an 11-by-17-Inch Piece of
Paper”, Journal of Corporation Law 38, no. 2 (2013): 421, 423-24.

86
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).

87
Milton Handler, William C. Zifchak, “Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of
the Labor Exemption”, Columbia Law Review 81, no. 3 (1981): 459, 471.

88
29 U.S.C. § 157(2020).

89
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2020).

90
Id.

91
29 U.S.C. §§ 156, 159(b), 159(c), 160(a); 499 U.S. 606, 606 (2020).

92
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, “The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB”, American University Washington
College of Law 5, no. 2 (2010): 411,412.

29
93
National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Company, 416 U.S. 267, (U.S. Supreme Court 1974).

94
Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 NLRB 1050 (2014).
95
Ibid. at 1051.

96
Ibid.

97
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, “Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age”, University of North Carolina Legal
Studies 117, (2015): 921, 950.

98
Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 NLRB 1050 (2014).

99
Ibid. at 1053.

100
Ibid. at 1055.

101
Caesars Entm't, 368 NLRB 143 (Dec. 16, 2019).

Kisor v. Wilkie, 18-15, 588 U.S., (U.S. Supreme Court 2019).;

102

Ray Jay Davis, “The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative Decisions”, West Virginia Law
Review 59, no. 2 (1957): 111, 128.;
“NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness”, Yale Law Journal 89, (1980): 982, 991.
National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Company, 416 U.S. 267, (U.S Supreme Court 1974).

103
Charlotte Garden, “Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance”.Republic Aviation Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 793 (U.S. Supreme Court 1945).

104
Ryan Nunn, Jimmy O’ Donnell, and Jay Shambaugh, “The Shift in Private Sector Union Participation:
Explanation and Effects”, The Hamilton Project, August 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2019/08/UnionsEA_Web_8.19.pdf.;
Matthew Walters and Lawrence Mishel, “How Unions Help All Workers,” Economic Policy Institute,
August 26, 2003, https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/.;
David Card, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell, “UNIONIZATION AND WAGE INEQUALITY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE U.S., THE U.K., AND CANADA”, National Bureau of Economic
Research, January 2003, http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/wunionization.pdf.;
Eunice Han Richard Freeman,  David Madland, and Brendan Duke “Bargaining for the American Dream,”
Center for American Progress, September 9, 2015, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/
reports/2015/09/09/120558/bargaining-for-the-american-dream/.
30
105
Ryan Nunn, Jimmy O’ Donnell, and Jay Shambaugh, “The Shift in Private Sector Union Participation, 12.

106
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (U.S. Supreme Court
1921).

107
Esperanza Fonseca, “Worker Surveillance Is on the Rise, and Has Its Roots in Centuries of Racism,”
Truthout, June 8, 2020, https://truthout.org/articles/worker-surveillance-is-on-the-rise-and-has-its-roots-
in-centuries-of-racism/.

108
Robert J. Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 556,
557 (1951).

109
Katherine Lim, Alicia Miller, Max Risch, Eleanor Wilking, “Independent Contractors in the U.S.: New
Trends from 15 years of Administrative Tax Data”, Internal Revenue Service, July 2019, https://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpindcontractorinus.pdf, 37.

110
Marshall Steinbaum, “Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power”, Law
and Contemporary Problems 82, no. 45 (2019): 45-47.

30
111
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (2020).

112
Theodore J. St. Antoine, "How the Wagner Act Came to Be: A Prospectus", Mich. L. Rev. 96, no. 8
(1998): 2201-11;
Karl E. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941” Minnesota Law Review 62, no. 265 (1978).

Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).; Steven E. Abraham, How the Taft-
113

Hartley Act Hindered Unions, 12 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 1, 13 (1994);

Michael Hiltzik, “Column: The Key to Union Resurgence Is Repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act,” Los Angeles
Times, October 29, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-10-29/repeal-the-taft-hartley-
act.

114
Too Much of a Good Thing,” The Economist Newspaper, March 26, 2016, https://www.economist.com/
briefing/2016/03/26/too-much-of-a-good-thing.;
David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen, “Concentrating on
the Fall of Labor Share”, American Economy Review 107, no.5 (2017):180-85.;
Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, and Roni Michaely, “Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?”,
Swiss Finance Institute 23, no. 19 (2019): 697-743.

115
Ibid.

116
Adil Abdela and Marshall Steinbaum, “The United Stated Has A Market Concentration Problem”,
Roosevelt Institute, September 2018, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
comments/2018/09/ftc-2018-0074-d-0042-155544.pdf.

117
José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall I. Steinbaum, “Labor Market Concentration”, National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.24147 (2017), http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/
early/2020/05/04/jhr.monopsony.1218-9914R1.full.pdf.

Nathan Wilmers, “Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How Buyer-Supplier Relations Affect U.S.
118

Workers’ Wages”, American Sociological Association 83, no.2 (2018).

Henry S. Farber and Bruce Western, Round Up the Usual Suspects: The Decline of Unions in the Private
119

Sector, Round Up the Usual Suspects: The Decline of Unions in the Private Sector, 1973-1998”, Princeton
University Working Paper 437, (2000).

120
Diana L. Moss, “The Record of Weak U.S. Merger Enforcement in Big Tech”, American Antitrust
31
Institute, July 8, 2019, https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Merger-
Enforcement_Big-Tech_7.8.19.pdf.

121
John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of U.S.. Policy
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018);
Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, and Roni Michaely, “Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?”.
Ibid. at 700 (“We also find that increased profits are driven primarily by wider operating margins rather
than by higher operational efficiency, in line with the increased market-power explanation.”);
Bruce A. Blonigen and Justin R. Pierce, “Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and
Efficiency”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 22750 (2016);
Melissa A. Schilling, “Potential Sources of Value from Mergers and Their Indicators”, 63 The Antitrust
Bulletin 63, no.2 (2018): 183.

122
15 U.S.C. § 18

123
Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315, (U.S. Supreme Court 1962).

Ibid.
124

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (U.S. Supreme Court 1963);

31
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (U.S. Supreme Court 1966);

125
Ibid.

126
Ibid.

127
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (U.S. Supreme Court 1967).

128
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (U.S. Supreme Court 1963).

129
“Trends in Merger Investigations and Enforcement at the U.S. Antitrust Agencies”, Cornerstone
Research, September 16, 2019.
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Trends-in-Merger-Investigations-and-
Enforcement-2009-2018.pdf, 3,6;
“U.S. Antitrust and Competition Policy amid the New Merger Wave,” Equitable Growth, July 27, 2017,
https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/u-s-merger-policy-amid-the-new-merger-wave/, 11.

130
Diana L. Moss, “The Record of Weak U.S. Merger Enforcement in Big Tech”, 4-5.

Amrita Khalid, “The Future of Live-Streaming”.;

131

Lina Khan, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox”, Yale Law Journal 126, no. 3 (2017): 768.

132
“1968 Merger Guidelines,” The United States Department of Justice, August 4, 2015, https://www.
justice.gov/archives/atr/1968-merger-guidelines.

John F. Winslow, Conglomerates Unlimited: the Failure of Regulation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
133

University Press, 1975), 4.

134
Ibid.

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (U.S. Supreme Court 1963).
135

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (U.S. Supreme Court 1972).

136
This tactic was most recently observed in the antitrust litigation against the NCAA, where the court
justified the organization’s policy to prevent payments to college athletes on the grounds that the
viewers of college sports obtain value from the fact that the college athletes are amateurs and are not
paid by their respective college for their performance. In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).
32
137
15 U.S.C. § 45.

138
Ibid.

139
Sandeep Vanheesan, “Resurrecting ‘A Comprehensive Charter of Economic Liberty’: The Latent
Power of the Federal Trade Commission”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 645, (2018), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jbl/vol19/iss3/4/.;
Royce Zeisler, “Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why the FTC Should Use Chevron to Improve
Antitrust Enforcement”, Columbia Business Law Review 2014, no. 1, (2014).

Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara, “Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force”, University of
140

Michigan Law, Research Paper No. 18-013, (2020),

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625714.

Alexander J.S. Colvin, “The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration”, Economic Policy Institute, April. 6,
141

2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-
now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/.

142
Josh Lowensohn, “Amazon Does an about-Face on Controversial Warehouse Worker Non-

32
 Compete Contracts,” The Verge, March 27, 2015, https://www.theverge.com/2015/3/27/8303229/
amazon-reverses-noncompete-contract-rules.

Jordan Novet, “Amazon Is Suing a Cloud Employee Who Left for Google, Rekindling the Debate over
143

Non-Compete Agreements,” CNBC, June 11, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/11/aws-case-

against-worker-who-joined-google-reignites-non-compete-debate.html;
The Associated Press, “Non-Compete Limits, Modified by Amazon, Signed into Law,”; The Seattle
Times, May 9, 2019, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/non-compete-limits-modified-by-
amazon-signed-into-law/.

33

33