Labor-Case Digests-Marquez-P10-12

LABOR 1 | JMM | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – TOPICS 10-12
10. OTHER SPECIAL BENEFITS
1. Reyes v. NLRC, G.R. NO 160233, Aug. 8, 2007 (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Rogelio Reyes RESPONDENT: NLRC, Universal Robina Corporation

Grocery Division
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641, otherwise known as The New
Retirement Law, 22 provides:
Art. 287. Retirement. — Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty five
(65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years
in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen
(15) days plus one twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5)
days of service incentive leaves.
● Section 5 of Rule II of the Rules Implementing the New Retirement Law
FACTS:
● Petitioner was employed as a salesman at private respondent's Grocery Division in Davao City. He was
eventually appointed as unit manager of Sales Department-South Mindanao District, a position he held until
his retirement on November 30, 1997. He received a letter regarding the computation of his separation pay.
● Insisting that his retirement benefits and 13th month pay must be based on the average monthly salary of
P42,766.19, which consists of P10,919.22 basic salary and P31,846.97 average monthly commission,
petitioner refused to accept the check issued by private respondent in the amount of P200,322.21. Instead,
he filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the NLRC for retirement benefits, 13th month pay, tax
refund, earned sick and vacation leaves, financial assistance, service incentive leave pay, damages and
attorney's fees.
● Labor Arbiter Miriam A. Libron-Barroso rendered a decision holding that sales commission is part of the
basic salary of a unit manager.
● On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by excluding the overriding commission in
the computation of the retirement benefits and 13th month pay and deleted the award of attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT: Petitioner COUNTER-ARGUMENT: Respondent

The commissions form part of the basic petitioner knew that the overriding commission is not
salary, citing the case of Philippine included in the basic salary because it had not been
Duplicators, Inc. v. National Labor Relations considered as such for a long time in the computation of the
Commission, wherein the Court held that 13th month pay, leave commissions, absences and tardiness
commissions earned by salesmen form part
of their basic salary.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the overriding commission is included in the computation of the retirement benefits and 13th month
pay? (NO)
RULING:
1. The Court thus clarified that in Philippine Duplicators, the salesmen's commissions, comprising a pre-
determined percentage of the selling price of the goods sold by each salesman, were properly included in
the term basic salary for purposes of computing the 13th month pay. The salesmen's commission are not
overtime payments, nor profit-sharing payments nor any other fringe benefit, but a portion of the salary
Page 1 of 53
structure which represents an automatic increment to the monetary value initially assigned to each unit of
work rendered by a salesman.
2. Contrarily, in Boie-Takeda, the so-called commissions paid to or received by medical representatives of
Boie-Takeda Chemicals or by the rank and file employees of Philippine Fuji Xerox Co., were excluded from
the term basic salary because these were paid to the medical representatives and rank-and-file employees
as productivity bonuses, which are generally tied to the productivity, or capacity for revenue production, of
a corporation and such bonuses closely resemble profit-sharing payments and have no clear direct or
necessary relation to the amount of work actually done by each individual employee. Further, commissions
paid by the Boie-Takeda Company to its medical representatives could not have been sales commissions
in the same sense that Philippine Duplicators paid the salesmen their sales commissions. Medical
representatives are not salesmen; they do not effect any sale of any article at all.
3. Petitioner filed for optional retirement upon reaching the age of 60. However, the basis in computing his
retirement benefits is his latest salary rate of P10,919.22 as the commissions he received are in the form
of profit-sharing payments specifically excluded by the foregoing rules.
Aside from the fact that as unit manager petitioner did not enter into actual sale transactions, but merely
supervised the salesmen under his control, the disputed commissions were not regularly received by him.
Only when the salesmen were able to collect from the sale transactions can petitioner receive the
commissions. Conversely, if no collections were made by the salesmen, then petitioner would receive no
commissions at all. In fine, the commissions which petitioner received were not part of his salary
structure but were profit-sharing payments and had no clear, direct or necessary relation to the
amount of work he actually performed. The collection made by the salesmen from the sale
transactions was the profit of private respondent from which petitioner had a share in the form of a
commission.
NOTES:
The Supreme Court held that the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently "the basic salary" for this is what the
employee receives for a standard work period, and that commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in
consummating sales or other transactions.
Also, in Soriano v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court clarified that overriding commission is not
properly includible in the basic salary as it must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to the
claimant. Thus, as a unit manager who supervised the salesmen under his control and did not enter into actual sale
transactions, petitioner's overriding commissions must not be considered in the computation of the retirement
benefits and 13th month pay.
2. Arco Metal Products Co. Inc v. Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Arco Metal-NAFLU, G.R. NO 170734,
May 14, 2008 (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Arco Metal Products Co.Inc., Mrs. RESPONDENT: Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa
Salavadro Uy sa Arco Metal-NAFLU (SAMARM-NAFLU)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated
by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the Constitutional mandate to "protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare," and "to afford labor full protection." Said mandate in turn is the basis of
Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor." Jurisprudence is replete with
cases which recognize the right of employees to benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer and which
ripened into company practice.
In cases involving money claims of employees, the employer has the burden of proving that the employees did
receive the wages and benefits and that the same were paid in accordance with law.
FACTS:
● Petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of metal products, whereas respondent is the labor
union of petitioner's rank and file employees.
● Sometime in December 2003, petitioner paid the 13th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment of three
union members in amounts proportional to the service they actually rendered in a year, which is less than
a full twelve (12) months.
Page 2 of 53
● Respondent protested the prorated scheme, claiming that on several occasions petitioner did not prorate
the payment of the same benefits to seven (7) employees who had not served for the full 12 months.
● According to respondent, the prorated payment violates the rule against diminution of benefits under Article
100 of the Labor Code. Thus, they filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). The parties submitted the case for voluntary arbitration.
● The voluntary arbitrator, Apron M. Mangabat, ruled in favor of petitioner and found that the giving of the
contested benefits in full, irrespective of the actual service rendered within one year has not ripened into a
practice. He noted the affidavit of Joselito Baingan, manufacturing group head of petitioner, which states
that the giving in full of the benefit was a mere error. He also interpreted the phrase "for each year of
service" found in the pertinent CBA provisions to mean that an employee must have rendered one year of
service in order to be entitled to the full benefits provided in the CBA.
● Respondent filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals, imputing serious error
to Mangabat's conclusion.
● The Court of Appeals ruled that the CBA did not intend to foreclose the application of prorated payments
of leave benefits to covered employees. The appellate court found that petitioner, however, had an existing
voluntary practice of paying the aforesaid benefits in full to its employees, thereby rejecting the claim that
petitioner erred in paying full benefits to its seven employees.
ARGUMENT: Petitioner COUNTER-ARGUMENT: Respondent

claims that its full payment of benefits regardless of the length the prorated payment violates the rule against
of service to the company does not constitute voluntary diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor
employer practice Code
ISSUES: Whether or not the grant of 13th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment in full regardless of
actual service rendered constitutes voluntary employer practice (YES)
whether or not the prorated payment of the said benefits constitute diminution of benefits under Article 100
of the Labor Code (YES)
RULING: Petition is Denied.
● Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished,
discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded
on the Constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," and "to
afford labor full protection." Said mandate in turn is the basis of Article 4 of the Labor Code which states
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor." Jurisprudence is replete with cases which recognize the
right of employees to benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer and which ripened into company
practice.
● Thus in Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, et al. where an employer had freely and
continuously included in the computation of the 13th month pay those items that were expressly excluded
by the law, we held that the act which was favorable to the employees though not conforming to law had
thus ripened into a practice and could not be withdrawn, reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated.
In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana, we ruled that the employer's act of including non-basic benefits in
the computation of the 13th month pay was a voluntary act and had ripened into a company practice which
cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. Meanwhile in Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,
19 the Court ordered the payment of the cash equivalent of the unenjoyed sick leave benefits to its
intermittent workers after finding that said workers had received these benefits for almost four years until
the grant was stopped due to a different interpretation of the CBA provisions. We held that the employer
cannot unilaterally withdraw the existing privilege of commutation or conversion to cash given to said
workers, and as also noted that the employer had in fact granted and paid said cash equivalent of the
unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefits to some intermittent workers.
● Petitioner had adopted a policy of freely, voluntarily and consistently granting full benefits to its employees
regardless of the length of service rendered. True, there were only a total of seven employees who
benefited from such a practice, but it was an established practice nonetheless.
● Jurisprudence has not laid down any rule specifying a minimum number of years within which a company
practice must be exercised in order to constitute voluntary company practice. 20 Thus, it can be six (6)
years, 21 three (3) years, or even as short as two (2) years. Petitioner cannot shirk away from its
responsibility by merely claiming that it was a mistake or an error, supported only by an affidavit of its
manufacturing group head portions.
Page 3 of 53
● In cases involving money claims of employees, the employer has the burden of proving that the employees
did receive the wages and benefits and that the same were paid in accordance with law.
NOTES: (NA)
3. URSUMCO V. AGRIPINO, G.R. No. 188154 October 13, 2010, ANDRIN
PETITIONER: Universal Robina Sugar Milling RESPONDENT: Agripino Caballeda (Agripino) worked
Corporation (URSUMCO) is a domestic corporation as welder for URSUMCO from March 1989 until June 23,
engaged in the sugar milling business and petitioner 1997 with a salary of P124.00 per day, while respondent
Renato Cabati is URSUMCO's manager. Alejandro Cadalin (Alejandro) worked for URSUMCO as
crane operator from 1976 up to June 15, 1997 with a
salary of P209.30 per day.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

• Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and
the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with
the former. The age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement between the employer
and the employees. However, in the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law.
Under Art. 287 of the Labor Code as amended, the legally mandated age for compulsory retirement is 65
years, while the set minimum age for optional retirement is 60 years.
• Art. 287 of the Labor Code which provides for two types of retirement: (a) compulsory and (b) optional.
The first takes place at age 65, while the second is primarily determined by the collective bargaining
agreement or other employment contract or employer's retirement plan. In the absence of any provision on
optional retirement in a collective bargaining agreement, other employment contract, or employer's
retirement plan, an employee may optionally retire upon reaching the age of 60 years or more, but not
beyond 65 years, provided he has served at least five years in the establishment concerned. That
prerogative is exclusively lodged in the employee.
FACTS:
• April 24, 1991 - John Gokongwei, Jr., President of URSUMCO, issued a Memorandum establishing the
company policy on “Compulsory Retirement” (Memorandum) of its employees.
o The memorandum provides that all employees corporate-wide who attain 60 years of age on or
before April 30, 1991 shall be considered retired on May 31, 1991.
• April 29, 1993, URSUMCO and the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor organization and
the recognized sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly and daily paid employees of
URSUMCO, of which Alejandro was a member, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
o Article XV of the said CBA particularly provided that the retirement benefits of the members of the
collective bargaining unit shall be in accordance with law.
• Agripino and Alejandro (respondents), having reached the age of 60, were allegedly forced to retire by
URSUMCO.
o Agripino averred that URSUMCO illegally dismissed him from employment on June 24, 1997 when
he was forced to retire upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years old. Upon the termination of his
employment, he accepted his separation pay and applied for retirement benefits with the Social
Security System (SSS).
o On the other hand, Alejandro turned 60 years old. On May 28, 1997, he filed his application for
retirement with URSUMCO, attaching his birth and baptismal certificates. On July 23, 1997, he
accepted his retirement benefits and executed a quitclaim in favor of URSUMCO.
• August 6, 1997 - Agripino filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and attorney’s fees before the
Labor Arbiter (LA) of Dumaguete City. Alejandro likewise filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of retirement benefits, damages and attorney’s fees before the LA
o AGRIPINO - alleged that his compulsory retirement was in violation of the provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) 7641 and, was in effect, a form of illegal dismissal.
o ALEJANDRO – alleged that he was given only 15 days per year of service by way of retirement
benefits and further assails that his compulsory retirement was discriminatory considering
Page 4 of 53
that there were other workers over sixty (60) years of age who were allowed to continuously report
for work.
ARGUMENT COUNTER-ARGUMENT
Petitioners postulate that respondents voluntarily retired Respondents claim otherwise, contending that they
particularly when Alejandro filed his application for were merely forced to comply as they were no longer
retirement, submitted all the documentary requirements, given any work assignment and considering that the
accepted the retirement benefits and executed a quitclaim severance of their employment with URSUMCO is a
in favor of URSUMCO. condition precedent for them to receive their retirement
benefits.
ISSUES: Whether respondents were illegally terminated on account of compulsory retirement or the same voluntarily
retired.
RULING:
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the
employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former.
The age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement between the employer and the employees.
However, in the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under Art. 287 of the Labor
Code as amended, the legally mandated age for compulsory retirement is 65 years, while the set minimum age for
optional retirement is 60 years.
In this case, it may be stressed that the CBA does not per se specifically provide for the compulsory retirement
age nor does it provide for an optional retirement plan. It merely provides that the retirement benefits
accorded to an employee shall be in accordance with law. Thus, we must apply Art. 287 of the Labor Code
which provides for two types of retirement: (a) compulsory and (b) optional. The first takes place at age 65, while the
second is primarily determined by the collective bargaining agreement or other employment contract or employer's
retirement plan. In the absence of any provision on optional retirement in a collective bargaining agreement, other
employment contract, or employer's retirement plan, an employee may optionally retire upon reaching the age of 60
years or more, but not beyond 65 years, provided he has served at least five years in the establishment concerned.
That prerogative is exclusively lodged in the employee.
Indubitably, the voluntariness of the respondents' retirement is the meat of the instant controversy. Generally, the
law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees who have been inveigled or pressured into signing
them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees.
They are frowned upon as contrary to public policy. A quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure
of a worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppels.
To be precise, only Alejandro was able to claim a partial amount of his retirement benefit. Thus, it is clear from
the decisions of the LA, NLRC and CA that petitioners are still liable to pay Alejandro the differential on his
retirement benefits. On the other hand, Agripino was actually and totally deprived of his retirement benefit.
Moreover, the petitioners, not the respondents, have the burden of proving that the quitclaim was voluntarily entered
into. In previous cases, we have considered, among others, the educational attainment of the employees concerned
in upholding the validity of the quitclaims which they have executed in favor of their employers.
NOTES: (NA)
4. CERCADO V. UNIPROM
PETITIONER: Lourdes cerdaco was an employee of RESPONDENT: UNIPROM INC.

UNIPROM Inc. for 22 years since December 15, 1978 as
a ticket seller assigned at Fiesta Carnival, Araneta
Center, Quezon City. Later on, she was promoted as
cashier and then as clerk typist.
Page 5 of 53
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the
former.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7641, 13cra1aw pegs the age for compulsory retirement at
65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. An employer is, however, free to impose
a retirement age earlier than the foregoing mandates. This has been upheld in numerous cases 14cra1aw as a valid
exercise of management prerogative.
FACTS:
• UNIPROM came up with a retirement plan, sometime in 1980 and then amended in 2001, which provides
that any employee with a minimum of 20 years of service, regardless of age, may be retired at the option
of the employer.
• December 2000 - UNIPROM implemented a company-wide retirement program, including herein petitioner.
She was offered an early retirement package amounting to P171, 982.90 but Cercado rejected the offer.
• UNIPROM exercised its option under the retirement plan and decided to retire petitioner effective February
15, 2001 so she was no longer given any work assignment after the said date.
• RULINGS:
o LA & NLRC – Favor Cercado. Illegally dismissed.
o CA set aside the decisions of the LA and the NLRC.
UNIPROM did not have a bona fide retirement plan, and Cercado was automatically covered by the retirement
even if there was, she didn‘t consent thereto plan when she agreed to the company‘s rules and
regulations, and that her retirement was an exercise of
management prerogative.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not UNIPROM has a bona fide retirement plan;
2. Whether or not petitioner was validly retired pursuant thereto
RULING:
employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former.
1. Yes, UNIPROM had a bona fide retirement plan. Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A 7641,
pegs the age for compulsory retirement at 65 years old, while the minimum age for optional retirement is
set at 60 years. However, an employer is free to impose a retirement age earlier than the foregoing
mandates. This has been upheld in numerous cases as a valid exercise of management prerogative. In this
case, petitioner was retired by UNIPROM at the age of 47, after having served the company for 22 years,
pursuant to the company‘s retirement plan, which provides that employees who have rendered at least 20
years of service can be retired at the option of the company. Respondent‘s retirement plan can be
expediently stamped with validity and justified under the all-encompassing phrase ―management
prerogative‖.
2. No, petitioner was not validly retired. Jurisprudence has upheld that it is axiomatic that a retirement plan
giving the employer the option to retire its employees below the ages provided by law must be assented to
and accepted by the latter, otherwise its adhesive imposition will amount to a deprivation of property without
due process. In decided cases, the retirement plans were either embodied in the CBA, or established after
consultations and negotiations with the employees’ bargaining representative. The consent of the
employees to be retired even before the statutory retirement age of 65 years was thus clear and
unequivocal. Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age must be explicit, voluntary, free and
uncompelled.
NOTES:
• In Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court upheld the retirement of private respondent pursuant
to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) allowing Pantranco to compulsorily retire employees upon
Page 6 of 53
completing 25 years of service to the company. Interpreting Article 287, the Court ruled that the Labor Code
permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age lower than 60 years of age. The
Court also held that there was no illegal dismissal involved, since it was the CBA itself that incorporated
the agreement between the employer and the bargaining agent with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment. Hence, when the private respondent ratified the CBA, he concurrently agreed to conform to
and abide by its provisions. Thus, the Court stressed, "[p]roviding in a CBA for compulsory retirement of
employees after twenty-five (25) years of service is legal and enforceable so long as the parties agree to
be governed by such CBA."
• Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) v. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (APAP),17cra1aw the retirement
plan contained in the CBA between PAL and APAP was declared valid. The Court explained that by their
acceptance of the CBA, APAP and its members are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations
they had agreed to cede to management.
• Catholic School v. Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (CCSEU), aw wherein the compulsory
retirement of two teachers was upheld as valid and consistent with the CBA provision allowing an employee
to be retired by the school even before reaching the age of 60, provided that he/she had rendered 20 years
of service.
• In Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, although the retirement plan was not embodied in a
CBA, its provisions were made known to the employees union. The validity of the retirement plan was
sustained on the basis of the finding of the Director of the Bureau of Working Conditions of the Department
of Labor and Employment that it was expressly made known to the employees and accepted by them.
It is axiomatic that a retirement plan giving the employer the option to retire its employees below the ages provided
by law must be assented to and accepted by the latter, otherwise, its adhesive imposition will amount to a deprivation
of property without due process of law.
In the above-discussed cases, the retirement plans in issue were the result of negotiations and eventual agreement
between the employer and the employees. The plan was either embodied in a CBA, or established after consultations
and negotiations with the employees bargaining representative. The consent of the employees to be retired even
before the statutory retirement age of 65 years was thus clear and unequivocal.
5. Radio Mindanao Network Inc, et al., vs. Ybarola, Jr. et al., G.R. No. 198662, September 12, 2012 (Artillero)
PETITIONER: RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC. RESPONDENT: DOMINGO Z. YBAROLA, JR. and
(RMN) and ERIC S. CANOY, ALFONSO E. RIVERA, JR
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
That the salary structure of the respondents was such that they only received a minimal amount as guaranteed
wage; a greater part of their income was derived from the commissions they get from soliciting advertisements; these
advertisements are the "products" they sell. As the CA aptly noted, this kind of salary structure does not detract
from the character of the commissions being part of the salary or wage paid to the employees for services
rendered to the company.
FACTS:
Respondents Domingo Z. Ybarola, Jr. and Alfonso E. Rivera, Jr. were hired by RMN.They eventually
became account managers, soliciting advertisements and servicing various clients of RMN.
The respondents' services were terminated as a result of RMN's reorganization/restructuring; they were
given their separation pay — P631,250.00 for Ybarola, and P481,250.00 for Rivera. Sometime in December
2002, they executed release/quitclaim affidavits.
Dissatisfied with their separation pay, the respondents filed separate complaints (which were later
consolidated) against RMN and its President, Eric S. Canoy, for illegal dismissal with several money claims,
Page 7 of 53
including attorney's fees. They indicated that their monthly salary rates were P60,000.00 for Ybarola and
P40,000.00 for Rivera.
The respondents argued that the release/quitclaim they executed should not be a bar to the recovery of the
full benefits due them; while they admitted that they signed release documents, they did so due to dire
necessity.
The labor arbiter adjusted the separation pay award based on the respondents’ Certificates of
Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld.
On appeal by the petitioners to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), it ruled that the
withholding tax certificate cannot be the basis of the computation of the respondents’ separation pay as the
tax document included the respondents’ cost-of-living allowance and commissions; as a general rule,
commissions cannot be included in the base figure for the computation of the separation pay because they
have to be earned by actual market transactions attributable to the respondents as held in Soriano vs.
NLRC and San Miguel Jeepney Service vs. NLRC.
From the NLRC, the respondents sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. In its decision of February 17, 2011, the CA granted the petition and reinstated the
labor arbiter’s separation pay award. Hence, this petition for motion for reconsideration.
ARGUMENT (Respondent) COUNTER-ARGUMENT (Petitioner)
Through their Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for

Reconsideration), 13 the respondents pray that the motion
be denied for lack of merit. They argue that the motion is In their reply (to the respondents'
based on arguments already raised in the petition for Comment/Opposition), the petitioners ask that their
review which had already been denied by this Court.The petition be reinstated to allow the full ventilation of the
respondents submit that the issue of Canoy's personal issues presented for consideration. They contend that
liability has become final and conclusive on the parties as the respondents merely reiterated the CA
the petitioners failed to raise the issue on time. They pronouncements and have not confronted the issues
maintain that as the records show, the petitioners failed to raised and the jurisprudence they cited.On the question
raise the issue in their appeal to the NLRC and neither did of Canoy's personal liability, the petitioners take
they bring it up in their motion for reconsideration of the exception to the respondents' submission that the
CA's decision reinstating the labor arbiter's award. matter had been resolved with finality and has become
conclusive on them. They assert that they did not raise
the issue with the CA because there was no reason for
them to do so as the ruling then being reviewed was
one which held that they were not liable to the
respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in :

(1) failing to declare that Canoy is not personally liable in the present case;
(2) disregarding the rule laid down in Talam v. National Labor Relations Commission on the proper appreciation
of quitclaims; and
(3) disregarding prevailing jurisprudence which places on the respondents the burden of proving that their
commissions were earned through actual market transactions attributable to them.
RULING:
The motion for reconsideration is unmeritorious. The motion raises substantially the same arguments presented
in the petition. The petitioner’s contention that respondent’s commissions are profit-sharing payments which do not
form part of their salaries is untenable. That the salary structure of the respondents was such that they only received
a minimal amount as guaranteed wage; a greater part of their income was derived from the commissions they get
from soliciting advertisements; these advertisements are the "products" they sell. As the CA aptly noted, this kind of
Page 8 of 53
salary structure does not detract from the character of the commissions being part of the salary or wage paid to the
employees for services rendered to the company.
The petitioners’ reliance on our ruling in Talam v. National Labor Relations Commission, regarding the
"proper appreciation of quitclaims," as they put it, is misplaced. In this case, as the CA noted, the separation pay the
respondents each received was deficient by at least P 400,000.00; thus, they were given only half of the amount
they were legally entitled to. To be sure, a settlement under these terms is not and cannot be a reasonable one,
given especially the respondents’ length of service – 25 years for Ybarola and 19 years for Rivera.
Lastly, the petitioners are estopped from raising the issue of Canoy's personal liability. They did not raise it
before the NLRC in their appeal from the labor arbiter's decision, nor with the CA in their motion for reconsideration
of the appellate court's judgment.
6. Padillo vs. Rural bank of Nabunturan Inc. G.r. No. 199338, Jan. 21, 2013 (Artillero)
PETITIONER: ELEAZAR S. PADILLO RESPONDENT: RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC., and MARK S.
OROPEZA
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Article 297 of the Labor Code clearly presupposes that it is the employer who terminates the services of the employee
found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his
health as well as to the health of his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation where it is the employee who
severs his or her employment ties.
FACTS:
Petitioner, the late Eleazar Padillo (Padillo), was an employee of respondent Rural Bank of Nabunturan, Inc. (Bank)
as its SA Bookkeeper. Due to liquidity problems in 2003, the Bank took out retirement/insurance plans with Philippine
American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life) for all its employees in anticipation of its possible
closure and the concomitant severance of its personnel. Respondent Mark Oropeza is the president and major
stockholder of the bank.
Padillo suffered a mild stroke due to hypertension which consequently impaired his ability to effectively pursue his
work. He wrote a letter addressed to Oropeza expressing his intention to avail of an early retirement package.
Despite several follow-ups, his request remained unheeded. Not having received his claimed retirement benefits,
Padillo filed with the NLRC a complaint for the recovery of unpaid retirement benefits.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Padillos complaint on the ground that the latter did not qualify to receive any benefits
under Article 300 of the Labor Code as he was only fifty-five (55) years old when he resigned, while the law
specifically provides for an optional retirement age of sixty (60) and compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65).
Padillo elevated the matter to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling. Aggrieved, Oropeza and the
Bank filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA reversed the NLRCs ruling but with modification. It directed
the respondents to pay Padillo the amount of P50,000.00 as financial assistance exclusive of the P100,000.00
Philam Life Plan benefit.
Displeased with the CAs ruling, Padillo (now substituted by his legal heirs due to his death) filed the instant petition
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Is Padillo entitled to claim for separation and retirement benefits under the Labor Code?
RULING:
At the outset, it must be maintained that the Labor Code provision on termination on the ground of disease under
Article 297 does not apply in this case, considering that it was Padillo and not the Bank who severed the employment
Page 9 of 53
relations. A plain reading of the Article 297 of the Labor Code clearly presupposes that it is the employer who
terminates the services of the employee found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment
is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees. It does not contemplate
a situation where it is the employee who severs his or her employment ties.
Thus, given the inapplicability of Art. 297 of the Labor Code to the case at bar, it necessarily follows that petitioners’
claim for separation pay anchored on such provision must be denied. What remains, applicable, however, is the
Labor Code provision on retirement Article 300. Simply stated, in the absence of any applicable agreement, an
employee must (1) retire when he is at least 60 years of age and (2) serve at least (5) years in the company to entitle
him/her to a retirement benefit of at least one-half month salary for every year or service, with a fraction of at least
six months being considered as one whole year. Notably, these age and tenure requirements are cumulative and
non-compliance with one negates the employee’s entitlement to the retirement benefits under the Labor Code.
7. Grace Christian High School v Lavandera, G.R. No. 177845, Aug 20, 2014
PETITIONER: Grace Christian High RESPONDENT: Filipinas Lavandera- Win

Schoool; Dr. James Tan (principal)- A former Grace Christian High School teacher who sued the said school
Lost after being terminated the school’s retirement plan.
Lavandera’s former employer who
terminated her through its retirement
plan.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Art. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have
earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided,
however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements
shall not be less than those provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five
(65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years
in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen
(15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5)
days of service incentive leaves.
Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than (10) employees or
workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.
Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions provided under
Article 288 of this Code.
● The term “one-half (1/2) month salary” means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-
twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for SIL
● RA 7641 provision, which amended Art. 287 of the Labor Code, is applicable only where:
(a) there is no CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees,
or
(b) there is a CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the
requirement set by law
FACTS:
● Filipinas Lavandera is a Grace Christian High School teacher since 1979.
● Grace Christian High School decided to terminate Lavandera effective May 11, 2001 pursuant to GCHS'
retirement plan which gives the school the option to retire a teacher who has rendered at least 20 years of
service, regardless of age, with a retirement pay of one-half (1/2) month for every year of service.
● Lavendera who was only 58 yrs. Old at that time pleaded GCHS but was terminated so she filed a complaint
for illegal (constructive) dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave (SIL) pay, separation pay,
service allowance, damages, and attorney's fees against GCHS and/or its principal, Dr. James Tan.
Page 10 of 53
● Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit and ruled that Lavandera was not
terminated but retired. LA also found the retirement benefits payable under GCHS retirement plan to be
deficient vis-à-vis those provided under RA 7641 so it awarded her the retirement pay differentials (Php
143,717).
● NLRC set aside LA’s award and ruled that Filipinas' retirement pay should be computed based on her
monthly salary at the time of her retirement on May 31, 1997 (Php 27,057.20 consisting of one-twelfth (1/12)
of the 13th month pay and SIL pay based on her salary at the time of her retirement on May 31, 1997, or
P13,621.00 multiplied by 20 years).
● CA affirmed NLRC’s decision but with modifications on the retirement benefit differentials (Php 68,150)
imposed legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the award reckoned from the date of
the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint until actual payment.
● Case is elevated to the SC.
● Filipinas was retired and not ● A former Grace Christian High School teacher who sued the said
dismissed. school after being terminated the school’s retirement plan.
● 5 days of Service incentive ● Filipinas was only 58 years old and still physically fit to work.
leaves should be pro-rated to ● She pleaded with GCHS to allow her to continue teaching but her
their ½ equivalent. services were terminated, contrary to the provisions of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7641, otherwise known as the "Retirement Pay Law.
ISSUES: Whether or not the multiplier "22.5. Days" should be used in computing the retirement pay
differentials
RULING:
The SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision with modifications (legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum on the amount of Php 68,150.00 representing the retirement pay differentials payable is
reckoned from the promulgation of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on March 26, 2002 until full payment).
On the applicability of provisions of RA 7641, which amended Art. 287 of the Labor Code (rules on retirement
pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment):
● RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, provides for
the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement
plan in the establishment.
● The said law states that "an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining
[agreement (CBA)] and other agreements shall not be less than those provided" under the same —
that is, at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months
being considered as one whole year — and that "unless the parties provide for broader inclusions,
the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th
month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
● The said provision is applicable only where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable agreement
providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other applicable agreement
providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by law.
On the meaning of “½ month salary”:

● The Court cited its previous ruling in Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., where it affirmed that "one-half
(1/2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the
13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for SIL.
● Section 5.2, Rule II 38 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, as amended, promulgated
to implement RA 7641, further clarifies what comprises the "1/2 month salary" due a retiring employee, to
wit:
RULE II
Retirement Benefits
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 5. Retirement Benefits. —
xxx xxx xxx
5.2 Components of One-half (1/2) Month Salary. — For the purpose of determining the minimum retirement
pay due an employee under this Rule, the term "one-half month salary" shall include all the following:
(a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary rate. As used herein, the
term "salary" includes all remunerations paid by an employer to his employees for services
rendered during normal working days and hours, whether such payments are fixed or ascertained
Page 11 of 53
on a time, task, piece or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, and includes
the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, of food,
lodging or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to his employees. The term does
not include cost of living allowance, profit-sharing payments and other monetary benefits which
are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the employees.
(b) The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leave;
(c) One-twelfth of the 13th month pay due the employee.
(d) All other benefits that the employer and employee may agree upon that should be included in
the computation of the employee's retirement pay.
● The whole 5 days of SIL are included in the computation of a retiring employees' pay.
NOTES:
● The Court finds that the award of legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of Php 68,150
representing the retirement pay differentials due Filipinas should be reckoned from the rendition of the LA's
Decision on March 26, 2002 and not from the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint as ordered by the CA,
in accordance with the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA (Eastern Shipping).
○ When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except
when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification
of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
8. Goodyear Phils. Inc. v Angus , G.R. No. 185449, Nov. 12, 2014
PETITIONER: Goodyear Phils. Inc.; RESPONDENT: Marinal Angus

Remegio Ramos Former Manager of Quality and Technology Secretary in Goodyear
Former employer of Angus who insists that the who sued the company after being forced to avail early retirement
respondent is only entitled to only one benefit and contested for the inclusion of the premium of additional 3 days
as per the CBA. for every year of service in her retirement benefits.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● An employee is entitled to recover both separation pay and retirement benefits in the absence of a
specific prohibition in the Retirement Plan or CBA.
● An employee's right to receive separation pay in addition to retirement benefits depends upon the
provisions of the company's Retirement Plan and/or CBA.
● Retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive.
● Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer and are
earned under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and company policies. Separation pay is that
amount which an employee receives at the time of his severance from employment, designed to provide
the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment and is
recoverable only in instances enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code or in illegal
dismissal cases when reinstatement is not feasible.
FACTS:
● Marina Angus was the secretary of Manager of Quality and Technology in Goodyear Phils. Inc. since 1966
● Goodyear Phils. Inc., in order maintain the viability of its operations in the midst of economic reversals and
eliminate redundancy, decided to terminate Angus’ employment and have her avail its early retirement
program.
● Angus agreed to avail the early retirement package but requested that she be given a premium of additional
3 days for every year of service which is only 6.3% or a total of 50 days.
● Remegios Ramos rejected her request and insisted that she can only avail one kind of separation pay.
Page 12 of 53
● Angus demanded that she be given a copy of the Notice of Redundancy filed with the DOLE and a copy of
the specific provisions in the Retirement Plan, CBA and Employment Contract which could justify the
prohibition against the grant of both to a separated employee but Goodyear ignored her demand.
● Angus decided to accept Goodyear’s check (Php 1,958,927.89 purportedly inclusive of all termination
benefits computed at 47 days' pay per year of service) and executed a Release and Quitclaimin favor of
Goodyear. However, Angus still filed a complaint before the LA.
● Labor Arbiter dismissed Angus’ petition and upheld the validity of Angus' termination from employment. It
likewise declared that the amount she received from the company was actually payment of separation pay
due to redundancy, only that it was computed under the CBA's retirement plan since the same was more
advantageous to her.
● NLRC affirmed LA’s decision.
● CA partially granted the petition and modified NLRC’s decision. CA ruled that Angus is entitled to the
payment of both retirement benefit and separation pay in view of the absence of any provision in the CBA
prohibiting the payment of both. Goodyear’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied (CA
ordered Goodyear to pay Angus separation pay, attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the separation pay,
and moral damages).
● Case is elevated to the SC.
● Angus is not entitled to retirement ● 2001-2004 CBA does not contain any restriction on the
pay because she does not meet the availment of benefits under the company's Retirement
requirements enumerated in the Plan and of separation pay.
Retirement Plan provision of the
CBA.
ISSUES: Whether or not Angus is entitled to only one kind of pay as the recovery of both retirement benefits
and separation pay is proscribed by the company's CBA
RULING:
SC denied the petition and affirmed CA’s decision.
On being entitled to both separation pay and early retirement benefit due to the absence of a specific
provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of both:
● Court held that an employee is entitled to recover both separation pay and retirement benefits in the
absence of a specific prohibition in the Retirement Plan or CBA. Concomitantly, the Court ruled that
an employee's right to receive separation pay in addition to retirement benefits depends upon the
provisions of the company's Retirement Plan and/or CBA.
● The Court agreed with the CA that the amount Angus received from petitioners represented only her
retirement pay and not separation pay.|||
● A cursory reading of petitioners' September 18, 2001 letter notifying Angus of her termination from
employment shows that they granted her early retirement benefits pegged at 47 days' pay per year of
service. This rate was arrived at after petitioners considered respondent's length of service with the
company, as well as her age which qualified her for early retirement. In fact, petitioners were even explicit
in stating in the said letter that the amount she was to receive would come from the company's Pension
Fund, which, as correctly asserted by Angus, was created to cover retirement benefit payment of
employees. In addition, the document showing a detailed account of Angus' termination benefits speaks for
itself as the same is entitled "Summary of Retirement Pay and other Company Benefits.
Retirement benefits and separation pay distinguished:

● Retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive.
● Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer and
are earned under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and company policies. Separation
pay is that amount which an employee receives at the time of his severance from employment,
designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for
another employment and is recoverable only in instances enumerated under Articles 283 and 284
of the Labor Code or in illegal dismissal cases when reinstatement is not feasible. In the case at bar,
Article 283 clearly entitles Angus to separation pay apart from the retirement benefits she received from
petitioners.
Release and Quickclaim signed by Angus is invalid:

● A quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled.
Page 13 of 53
● The terms of the quitclaim authorizes Angus to receive less than what she is legally entitled to.
● It was held to be "ineffective in barring claims for the full measure of the worker's rights and the acceptance
of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel."
NOTES:
On moral damages and attorney’s fees:
● Goodyear's false contention over what has been paid to Angus suggests an attempt to feign compliance
with their legal obligation to grant their employee all the benefits provided for by agreement and law. Their
bad faith is evident in the intent to circumvent this legal mandate. And as Angus was then forced to litigate
her just claims when petitioners refused to heed her demands for the payment of separation pay, the award
of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount of separation pay is also in order.
9. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., Petitioner, v. GUILLERMO C. SAGAYSAY, Respondent. G.R. No.
214961, September 16, 2015
PETITIONER: BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. RESPONDENT: GUILLERMO C. SAGAYSAY
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Art. 287. Retirement. xxx
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment,
an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby
declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire
and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
FACTS:
● On May 16, 2006, respondent Guillermo Sagaysay was hired by petitioner Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc.,
(BDO) as Senior Accounting Assistant 5 in its San Jose, Nueva Ecija, branch as a result of a merger with
United Overseas Bank (UOB), with BDO as the surviving bank. Sagaysay was previously employed in UOB
from 2004 to 2006 or for two (2) years. Prior thereto, he worked for Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank) from 1976 to 2004 for a period of 28 years.
● On January 8, 2010 BDO informed Sagaysay that, pursuant to the retirement policy of the bank which
mandated its retirement age to be sixty (60), he would be formally retired effective September 1, 2010, a
few days after his 60th birthday. Sagaysay sent several requests to extend his employment but these
requests were denied. Sagaysay then signed Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, dated October 22, 2010, for
and in consideration of P98,376.14.
● On January 10, 2011, Sagaysay filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and
payment of backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fee against BDO before the
Labor Arbiter (LA). He claimed that despite his appeal, BDO compulsory retired him on September 1, 2010.
As a result, he and his family suffered damages in the amount of P2,225,403.00 which he would have
received if he was made to retire at the age of sixty-five.
● The Labor Arbiter ruled that Sagaysay was illegally dismissed because he was forced to avail of an optional
retirement at the age of sixty (60) which was contrary to the provisions of Article 287 of the Labor Code.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA and concluded that when Sagaysay accepted his
employment with BDO, he assented to the provisions of the retirement plan. The CA rendered the assailed
decision which reversed the NLRC ruling. It opined that Sagaysay was forced to participate in the retirement
plan. Equally, the quitclaim he executed was not given credence because his subsequent filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal manifested that he had no intention to relinquish his employment.
BDO principally argues that the retirement plan Sagaysay countered that he was retired by BDO
has been valid and effective since June 1, 1994; against his will; that there was no provision in any CBA
that having been in place for such a long period, that employees who reached sixty (60) years of age
the retirement plan is deemed to have been could be compulsorily retired; that there was no
written into Sagaysay's employment contract, agreement either between Sagaysay and BDO that he
executed on May 16, 2006; that he even asked for would be retired upon reaching sixty (60); and that the
an extension to become eligible to avail of the quitclaim was invalid because BDO took undue
Page 14 of 53
benefits under the same retirement plan; and that advantage of his situation and dire financial problems
the 2005-2010 CBA stated, "[t]the Bank shall to obtain his signature therein.
continue to grant retirement pay," showing that
the CBA likewise recognized the existing
retirement plan.
BDO also contends that the CA erred in citing

Cercado because in that case, the retirement plan
was executed only after the employment of
petitioner therein. Moreover, Sagaysay, as a
veteran banker, fully knew the effects of the
release, waiver and quitclaim when he signed it.
BDO reiterated that the retirement plan was not

forced upon Sagaysay; and that at the time he
was employed by BDO in 2006, he had every
opportunity to refuse employment if he disagreed
with the retirement policy of the bank.
ISSUES:
Whether the retirement plan is valid and effective and the mandatory retirement age of 60 is also binding.
RULING:
The petition essentially centers on whether the June 1, 1994 retirement plan is valid and effective against Sagaysay.
To resolve this issue, a review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence regarding the compulsory retirement age is
warranted.
Article 287 of the Labor Code is the primary provision which governs the age of retirement. Doubtless, under this
provision, the retirement age is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract. Only in the
absence of such an agreement shall the retirement age be fixed. Retirement plans allowing employers to retire
employees who have not yet reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per se repugnant to the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. By its express language, the Labor Code permits employers and
employees to fix the applicable retirement age at 60 years or below, provided that the employees' retirement benefits
under any CBA and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.
After a judicious study of records, the Court is convinced that Sagaysay was undeniably informed and had consented
to the retirement plan of BDO before his compulsory retirement.
For four years, from the time he was employed until his retirement and having actual knowledge of the BDO
retirement plan, Sagaysay had every opportunity to question the same, if indeed he knew it would not be beneficial
to him. Yet, he did not express his dissent. In fact, he recognized in one of his emails that "the time has come that
BDO Retirement Program will be implemented to those reaching the age of sixty (60).
The NLRC ruling is reinstated.
NOTES:
10. MAUREEN P. PEREZ, Petitioner, v. COMPARTS INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 197557,
October 05, 2016
PETITIONER: MAUREEN P. PEREZ RESPONDENT: COMPARTS INDUSTRIES, INC.
Page 15 of 53
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Optional Retirement Plan: IIt will be the exclusive prerogative and sole option of this company to retire any
covered employee who shall have rendered at least fifteen (15) years of credited service for land-based
employees and 3,650 days actually on board vessels for shipboard personnel. x x x
● The age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract. In the
absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under the aforecited law, the
mandated compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is
set at 60 years.
FACTS:
● Perez (petitioner) started her employment with CII (respondent) on 16 July 1988 and became a regular
employee thereof on 01 September 1988. After years of working and after several promotions, she was
eventually appointed as Marketing Manager. She held this position from 1998 up to 10 January 2009, the
date when she resigned from her work.
● CII has a retirement program for its managerial employees or officers covered by "Comparts Industries, Inc.
Employees Retirement Plan" (Retirement Plan) that took effect on 01 June 1999 and was amended on 25
January 2001. Included therein are provisions relating to optional or early retirement and optional retirement
benefits.
● Prior to her resignation, Perez manifested to CII sometime in November 2007 her intention to avail of the
optional retirement program since she was already qualified to retire under it. Her application was denied.
In January 2008, while vacationing in the United States of America (USA), she again filed an application
for optional retirement to take advantage of a job offered to her in the said country. Still, her application was
denied. CII justified its denial of Perez's application saying that, under the Retirement Plan, it has the option
to grant or deny her application for optional retirement and considering that it is experiencing financial crisis,
it has no choice but to disallow her intention.
● Perez maintains that she is entitled to separation pay: (1) primarily through the optional retirement program
under the Retirement Plan having rendered more than twenty (20) years of service to CII, (2) through a
similar optional retirement program under the CBA which has been likewise extended to other
managerial/middle management employees in several instances, or (3) a retrenchment program
undertaken by CII because of the global financial crisis.
It is not enough that an employee of [Perez] contends that as she had already completed the minimum
[CII] who wants to optionally retire number of years to avail of the optional retirement, she has
meets the conditions for optional acquired a vested right to her optional retirement benefits.
retirement. [CII] has to give its consent
for the optional retirement to operate.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an optional retirement program.
RULING:
First and foremost, the Court emphasized that termination of employment by the employee, as in this instance, does
not entitle the employee to separation pay. Separation pay is that amount which an employee receives at the time
of his severance from employment, designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he
is looking for another employment and is recoverable only in instances enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of
the Labor Code or in illegal dismissal cases when reinstatement is not feasible.
Second, in the matter of Perez's entitlement to optional retirement benefits, the Court agrees with the NLRC and the
appellate court that as a managerial employee, she is covered by the Retirement Plan for CII Officers which took
effect in 1999 and was amended in 2001.
A Retirement Plan in a company partakes the nature of a contract, with the employer and the employee as the
contracting parties. It creates a contractual obligation in which the promise to pay retirement benefits is made in
consideration of the continued faithful service of, the employee for the requisite period. Being a contract, the
employer and employee may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient.
Page 16 of 53
Observably, as stipulated in the Retirement Plan, it is not enough that an employee of CII who wants to optionally
retire meets the conditions for optional retirement. CII has to give its consent for the optional retirement to operate.
In this case, Perez's application for optional retirement was denied several times as CII still needs her services.
Perez's unilateral act of retiring without the consent of CII does not bind the latter with the provisions of the Retirement
Plan. Therefore, CII is not liable to give Perez the optional retirement benefits provided therein.
Clearly, the age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract. In the
absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under the law, the mandated compulsory
retirement age is set at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years.
NOTES:
11. De La Salle Araneta University v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 190809, February 13, 2017 (GOPUCO)
PETITIONER: : De La Salle Araneta University RESPONDENT: Juanito C. Bernardo
It is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly A part-time professional lecturer at the Graduate School
organized under Philippine laws. of De La Salle Araneta University teaching Recent
Advances in Animal Nutrition.
Dr. Bautista was its Executive Vice-President.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Article 302 - Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract.
RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law shall apply to all employees in the private sector, regardless of their position,
designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid. They shall include part-time
employees, employees of service and other job contractors and domestic helpers or persons in the personal service
of another.
Article 291- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code
shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall forever be barred.
FACTS:
● Bernardo then took a leave of absence because he was assigned by the Philippine Government to work in
Papua New Guinea.
● 1977 – He resumed teaching at DLS-AU until 2003.
● His contract was renewed every start of the semester and summer.
● November 2003 – DLS-AU informed Bernardo (already 75 years old) that he could no longer teach at the
school anymore by reason of implementing the retirement age limit for their faculty members.
● Bernardo had no other choice but to retire but prior to his retirement he was being paid at an hourly rate of
P246.50.
● He sought advice from DOLE for his entitlement of retirement benefits and the latter opined that respondent
was entitled to receive benefits under RA 7641 or the “New Retirement Law”, and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations.
● Dr. Bautista, in a letter, stated that Bernardo was not entitled to receive any kind of separation pay or
benefits.
● Respondent and Dr. Bautista’s reasons:
○ DLSU-AU’s CBA states that only full-time permanent faculty for at least five (5) years immediately
preceding termination could avail of the post-employment benefits.
○ Bernardo was only a part-time faculty member and the contract was for a fixed term.
○ Bernardo then filed a complaint for non-payment of retirement benefits and damages against DLS-
AU and Dr. Bautista.
● Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the complaint and ruled that the claim for retirement benefits/pay is already barred
by prescription because he should have sought the payment of such benefits/pay within three (3) years
from such time but instead, he belatedly sought the payment of his retirement benefits/pay when he filed
Page 17 of 53
the complaint only ten (10) years after his cause of action accrued. For failure to do so, his claim for the
retirement benefits should be forfeited.
● NLRC: Reversed the Labor Arbiter's ruling and stated that Bernardo filed his complaint for retirement
benefits on time since DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista knew that Bernardo already reached the compulsory age
of retirement of 65 years old, they still extended Bernardo's employment. Thus, Bernardo's cause of action
for payment of his retirement benefits accrued only on November 8, 2003, when he was informed by DLS-
AU that his contract would no longer be renewed and he was deemed separated from employment.
The principle of estoppel was also applicable against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista who could not validly claim
prescription when they were the ones who permitted Bernardo to work beyond retirement age. As to
Bernardo's entitlement to retirement benefits, the NLRC held untenable the contention that Bernardo is not
entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 7641 since he is just a part time employee. The
retirement law does not exclude a part time employee from enjoying the retirement benefit as the Republic
Act explicitly states “all employees in the private sector, regardless of their position, designation, or status,
and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid” with the only exceptions are employees
covered by the Civil Service Law; domestic helpers and persons in the personal service of another; and
employees in retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations regularly employing not more
than ten employees. Clearly, Bernardo does not fall under any of the exceptions. NLRC also commented
that the retirement law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee, and all doubts as to the intent
of the laws should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purpose.
● DLS-AU then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. However, the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and reaffirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ARGUMENT (Petitioner) COUNTER-ARGUMENT (Respondent)

● He should be entitled to retirement benefits ● DLSU-AU’s CBA states that only full-time
under RA 7641. permanent faculty for at least five (5) years
● The prescriptive period has not yet expired when immediately preceding termination could avail
he turned 65 years old but only upon termination of the post-employment benefits.
of his contract (when he was already 75 years ● Bernardo was only a part-time faculty member
old). and the contract was for a fixed term.
● Bernardo then filed a complaint for non-
payment of retirement benefits and damages
against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista.
ISSUES:
1. WON part-time employees are excluded from the coverage of those entitled to retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 7541.
2. WON a claim for retirement benefits filed beyond the period provided for under Art. 291 of the Labor Code
has prescribed.
RULING:
1. No, Art. 302 (287) of the Labor Code as amended by RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law provides that
“Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract.” The only exceptions are those working in the retail,
service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or
workers are exempted from the coverage. As a part-time employee with fixed-term employment, Bernardo
is entitled to retirement benefits.
2. No. Bernardo filed his complaint with the NLRC on February 26, 2004, and was deemed filed within the
three-year prescriptive period. The court ruled that Bernardo's cause of action for his retirement benefits
has not yet been prescribed and it only accrued upon his termination because of his extended employment
with DLS-AU beyond the compulsory retirement age. Bernardo's cause of action for his retirement benefits
only accrued after DLS-AU refused to pay him such benefits as clearly expressed in Dr. Bautista's letter
dated February 12, 2004. Thus, Bernardo's complaint with the NLRC on February 26, 2004, was deemed
filed within the three-year prescriptive period.
NOTES:
His initial hourly rate: P20.00
Hourly rate before retirement: P246.50
Page 18 of 53
12. Catotocan v. Lourdes School of Quezon City, Inc., G.R. No. 213486, April 26, 2017 (GOPUCO)
PETITIONER: Editha M. Catotocan RESPONDENT: Lourdes School of Quezon City, Inc.
Music teacher that had already served for thirty-five It is a private, Catholic educational institution owned and
(35) years. She was rehired as a Grade School founded by the Capuchins in Quezon City, Philippines, beside
Guidance Counselor. the National Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Article 287 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides:
FACTS:
● LSQC had a retirement plan with an age of retirement at 60 years old or separation pay.
● They added to the retirement policy, an addendum.
● Petitioner and 7 other co-employees appealed to defer the addendum.
● Petitioner conducted a survey with other schools as proof.
● She was offered her retirement pay when she was fifty-six (56) years old.
● LSQC said she may continue serving the school if she hands in a letter of intent.
● She was then appointed as a grade school guidance counselor.
● Petitioner and other “retirees” were rehired.
● She was hired again the following year and the years following that until 2009.
● 2009- LSQC no longer considered her application.
● Labor Arbiter’s decision: Dismissed petitioner’s petition
Her subsequent actions, such as opening her own individual savings account where the retirement benefits
were deposited and credited thereto, her subsequent withdrawals therefrom, her application for contractual
employment after her retirement, constituted implied consent to the assailed addendum in LSQC's
retirement policy and, in effect, abandoned her objection.
● NLRC decision: Catotocan performed all the acts that a retired employee would do after retirement under
the new school policy. These were voluntary acts and she cannot be considered to have been forced to
retire or to have been illegally dismissed.
ARGUMENT (Petitioner) COUNTER-ARGUMENT (Respondent)
● Take out the “after 30 years of service” ● This is what is used in other schools
and instead use the 60 years of age basis ● Petitioner will have to retire because she had served
● They shouldn’t be forced to retire when for 30 years
they reach 60 if they are still capable ● Full retirement benefits were given to petitioner
● Illegal dismissal and demanded her (before she was rehired)
monetary claims
ISSUE:
WON the receipt of Catotocan of her retirement benefits will not stop her from pursuing an illegal dismissal complaint
against LSQC.
RULING:
LSQC’s retirement plan is not per se repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. By its express
language, the Labor Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age at 60 years or
below, provided that the employees' retirement benefits under any CBA and other agreements shall not be less than
those provided therein.
Page 19 of 53
Catotocan's subsequent actions after her "retirement" are actually tantamount to her consent to LSQC's retirement
policy of retiring her from service upon serving the school for at least thirty (30) continuous years.
1. After being notified that she was being retired from service by LSQC, she opened a savings account with
BDO, the trustee bank;
2. She accepted all the proceeds of her retirement package: the lump sum and all the monthly payments
credited to her account until June 2009; and
3. Upon acceptance of the retirement benefits, there was no notation that she is accepting the retirement
benefits under protest or without prejudice to the filing of an illegal dismissal case.
Moreover, the petitioner's correspondence with the respondent following her "retirement” shows her voluntary assent
to the latter’s retirement policy. Said letter stipulates that “re-hiring was exclusive only for those employees who have
availed of the retirement benefits or who have been retired by the school but who have not yet reached 65 years of
age.
Thus, since petitioner has availed of this contractual employment which is exclusively offered only to LSQC's
qualified retirees for three (3) consecutive years following her retirement, she can no longer dispute that she has
indeed legitimately retired from employment, and was not illegally dismissed.
Furthermore, petitioner’s availment of the re-hiring program of LSQC for qualified retirees for 3 consecutive years is
a supervening event that would reveal that she has already voluntarily and freely signified her consent to the
retirement policy despite her initial opposition to it.
NOTES:
Monthly Salary as a Music Teacher: P30,081
Retirement Pay: P1,052,835
13. TITLE, G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 & G.R. Nos. 186984-85. October 17, 2013, (SURNAME)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

An employee in the private sector who did not expressly agree to the terms of an early retirement plan cannot be
separated from the service before he reaches the age of 65 years. The employer who retires the employee
prematurely is guilty of illegal dismissal, and is liable to pay his back wages and to reinstate him without loss of
seniority and other benefits, unless the employee has meanwhile reached the mandatory retirement age under the
Labor Code, in which case he is entitled to separation pay pursuant to the terms of the plan, with legal interest on
the backwages and separation pay reckoned from the finality of the decision.
FACTS:
● Laya was hired by Philippine Veterans Bank as its Chief Legal Counsel with a rank of Vice President. The
term and conditions of his appointment as a Senior Officer of the Bank, among others, are 1) Membership
in the Provident Fund Program/Retirement Program and 2) Entitlement to any and all other basic and fringe
benefits enjoyed by the officers; core of the Bank relative to Insurance covers, Healthcare Insurance,
vacation and sick leaves, among others.
● On the other hand, PVB has its Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations which provides that attainment of
age 60, a member may, with the approval of Board of Directors, retire early on the first day of any month
coincident with or following his attainment of age 50 anr completion of at least 10 years. A member may,
with the approval of the Board of Directors, extend his service beyond his normal retirement date but not
beyond 65. Such deferred retirement shall be on a case and yearly extension basis.
● Petitioner was informed thru letter by the respondent of his retirement. Petitioner wrote to the CHairman of
the bank, requesting for an extension of his tenure for 2 years pursuant to the Bank’s Retirement Plan.
● Respondents issued a memo directing the petitioner to continue to discharge his official duties and functions
as chief legal councel pending his request. However, petitioner was inforemed thru its president, that his
request for an extention was denied.
Page 20 of 53
● Petitioner filed his complaint for illegal dismissal against PVB and its president. The LA dismissed the
conplaint for lack of merit with 200k indemnidty.
ISSUES:
● W/N the court could accept the petitioner’s 2nd MR (YES)
● Whether PVB is a private entity or a public instrument
● Whether the petitioner was validly retured by PVB at age 60 (NO)
RULING:
● The court may entertain second and subsequent motions for reconsideration when the assailed secision is
legally erroneous, patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury
or damage to the parties. Under these circumstance, even final and executory judgments may be set aside
because of the existence of compelling reasons.
● As the bank is not owned or contolled by the Government although it does have an original charter, it clearly
does not fall under the Civil Service and should be regarded as an ordinary commercial corpration. The
consequence is that the relations of the Bank with its employees should be governed by the labor laws,
under which in fact they have already been paid some other claims.
● To stress, company retirement plans must not only comply with the standards set by the prevailing labor
laws but must also be accepted by the employees as commensurate to their faithful services to the
employer within the requisite period. Although the employer could be free to impose a retirement age lower
than 65 years for as long as its employees consented, the retirement of the employee whose intent to retire
was not clearly established, or whose retirement was involuntary is to be treated as a discharge.
NOTES:
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. The Philippine Veterans Bank
Coming now to the ownership of the Bank, we find it is not a government bank, as claimed by the petitioners.1âwphi1
The fact is that under Section 3(b) of its charter, while 51 % of the capital stock of the Bank was initially fully
subscribed by the Republic of the Philippines for and in behalf of the veterans, their widows, orphans or compulsory
heirs, the corresponding shares of stock were to be turned over within 5 years from the organization by the Bank to
the said beneficiaries who would thereafter have the right to vote such common shares. The balance of about 49%
was to be divided into preferred shares which would be opened for subscription by any recognized veteran, widow,
orphans or compulsory heirs of said veteran at the rate of one preferred share per veteran, on the condition that in
case of failure of any particular veteran to subscribe for any preferred share of stock so offered to him within thirty
(30) days from the date of receipt of notice, said share of stock shall be available for subscription to other veterans
in accordance with such rules or regulations as may be promulgated by the Board of Directors. Moreover, under
Sec. 6(a), the affairs of the Bank are managed by a board of directors composed of eleven members, three of whom
are ex officio members, with the other eight being elected annually by the stockholders in the manner prescribed by
the Corporation Law. Significantly, Sec. 28 also provides as follows:
Sec. 28. Articles of incorporation. - This Act, upon its approval, shall be deemed and accepted to all
legal intents and purposes as the statutory articles of incorporation or Charter of the Philippine
Veterans' Bank; and that, notwithstanding the provisions of any existing law to the contrary, said Bank
shall be deemed registered and duly authorized to do business and operate as a commercial bank
as of the date of approval of this Act.
St. Martin Funeral Home[s] v. NLRC
The special civil action of certiorari is the mode of judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC either by this
Court and the Court of Appeals, although the latter court is the appropriate forum for seeking the relief desired
"in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts" and that, in the exercise of its power, the
Court of Appeals can review the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the NLRC. The contrary rule in
Jamer was thus overruled.
Cercado v. Uniprom, Inc.
Page 21 of 53
Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free, and
uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally permissible ages
under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement
plan. In other words, only the implementation and execution of the option may be unilateral, but not the
adoption and institution of the retirement plan containing such option. For the option to be valid, the retirement
plan containing it must be voluntarily assented to by the employees or at least by a majority of them through
a bargaining representative.
14. PAL vs. HASSARAM, G.R. NO. 217730, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: Philippine Airlines RESPONDENT: ARJAN HASSARAM
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective
bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned
under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an
employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those
provided therein.
and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1 /2) month salary for every year of service, a
FACTS:
● Hassaram filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of retirement benefits, damages, and
attorney’s fees. he had applied for retirement from PAL after rendering 24 years of service as a pilot, but
that his application was denied. Instead, PAL informed him that he had lost his employment in the company
in view of his failure to comply with the Return to Work Order issued by the Secretary of Labor against
members of the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines on 7 June 1998.
● Hassaram argued that he was not covered by the Secretary's Return to Work Order; hence, PAL had no
valid ground for his dismissal. He asserted that on 9 June 1998, he was already on his way to Taipei to
report for work at Eva Air, pursuant to a four-year contract approved by PAL itself. Petitioner further claimed
that his arrangement with PAL allowed him to go on leave without pay while working for Eva Air, with the
right to accrue seniority and retire from PAL during the period of his leave.
● The LA awarded Hassaram with retirement benefits and attorney’s fees. Art. 287 of LC should be applied
in computation of benefits as it provides better benefits than PAL-ALPAP CBA.
● He was not covered by the PAL contended that (a) the LA had no jurisdiction over the case,
Secretary's Return to Work Order; which was a mere off-shoot of ALPAP's strike, a matter over which
hence, PAL had no valid ground for the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction; (b) the
his dismissal. Complaint should be considered barred by res judicata, forum
● His arrangement with PAL allowed shopping, and prescription; (c) the case should be suspended while
him to go on leave without pay PAL was under receivership; and (d) if at all, Hassaram was entitled
while working for Eva Air, with the only to retirement benefits of ₱5,000 for every year of service
right to accrue seniority and retire
Page 22 of 53
from PAL during the period of his pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL
leave. and ALPAP.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the amount received by Hassaram under the Plan should be deemed part of his retirement pay
2. Whether Hassaram is entitled to receive retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code
RULING:
The amount received by Hassaram under the Plan must be considered part of his retirement pay. Combined with
the retirement benefits under the CBA between PAL and ALP AP, this scheme would allow Hassaram to receive
superior retirement benefits, thereby rendering Article 287 of the Labor Code inapplicable. It is clear from the
provisions of the Plan that it is the company that contributes to a "retirement fund" for the account of the pilots. These
contributions comprise the benefits received by the latter upon retirement, separation from service, or disability.
The Court utilized these provisions to explain the nature of the Plan in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots
Association of the Phils. and Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
Hassaram's retirement pay should be computed on the basis of the retirement plans provided by PAL.
It is clear from the records that Hassaram is a member of ALP AP and as such, is entitled to benefits from both the
retirement plans under the 1967 PAL-ALPAP CBA and the Plan. The declaration of the CA that the agreement had
already expired two years before Hassaram's claim. This declaration appears to be inaccurate, as the RTC and the
CA themselves declared that the CBA expired only on 31 December 2000, while Hassaram had applied for
retirement earlier, on 31 August 2000. The provisions of the CBA are therefore applicable as they would allow
Hassaram to claim the following benefits under two separate plans provided under the CBA: (a) the amount of
₱5,000 for every year of service under the PAL-ALP AP Retirement Plan; and (b) an equity equivalent to 240% of
his gross monthly salary for every year of employment pursuant to the Plan.
In contrast, Article 287 would entitle a retiring pilot to the equivalent of only 22.5 days of his monthly salary for every
year of service.
Comparing the benefits under the 2 retirement schemes, it can readily be perceived that the 22.5 days’ worth of
salary for every year of service provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code cannot match the 240% of salary or
almost two and a half worth of monthly salary per year of service provided under the PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit
Plan, which will be further added to the ₱125,000.00 to which the petitioner is entitled under the PAL-ALP AP
Retirement Plan. Clearly then, it is to the petitioner's advantage that P AL's retirement plans were applied in the
computation of his retirement benefits.
In view of the undisputed fact that Hassaram has received his benefits under the Plan, he is now entitled to claim
only his remaining benefits under the CBA, i.e. the amount of ₱l20,000 (24 years x ₱5,000) for his 24 years of service
to the company.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The CA Decision and Resolution dated 25
September 2014 and 23 March 2015, respectively, are SET ASIDE. Petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc., is hereby
ORDERED to PAY respondent Arjan T. Hassaram the amount of ₱120,000 representing the balance of his
retirement pay, computed based on the 1967 PAL-ALP AP Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit
Plan.
NOTES:
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.:
Page 23 of 53
Consistent with the purpose of the law, the CA correctly ruled for the computation of the petitioner's retirement
benefits based on the 2 PAL retirement plans because it is under the same that he will reap the most benefits. Under
the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, the petitioner, who qualified for late retirement after rendering more than 20 years
of service as a pilot, is entitled to a lump sum payment of ₱125,000.00 for his 25 years of service to PAL.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Phils.
The PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit Plan is a retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from [PALI of
amounts equivalent to 20% of each pilot's gross monthly pay. Upon retirement, each pilot stands to receive the full
amount of the contribution. In sum, therefore, the pilot gets an amount equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly
income for every year of service he rendered to petitioner. This is in addition to the amount of not less than
₱100,000.00 that he shall receive under the 1967 Retirement Plan.
15. MARIA DE LEON TRANSPORTATION, INC., represented by MA. VICTORIA D. RONQUILLO vs.
DANIEL M. MACURAY
LAW & PRINCIPLES: (see notes) employee is entitled to retirement benefits if he was not dismissed from work,
either for cause or by resignation or abandonment
FACTS:
● Daniel M. Macuray filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner Maria De Leon
Transportation, Inc. before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1 of San Fernando City, La Union.
● Respondent claimed that, in April, 1991, he was employed as a bus driver of petitioner, a company engaged
in paid public transportation; that he plied the Laoag-Manila-Laoag route. He received a monthly
pay/commission of P20, 000.00.
● In November 2009, petitioner's dispatcher did not assign a bus to him, for no apparent reason; that for a
period of one month, he continually returned to follow up if a bus had already been assigned to him; that
finally, when he returned to the company premises, the bus dispatcher informed him that he was already
considered AWOL (absent without leave), without giving any reason therefor. He went back to follow up
his status for about six months in 2010, but nobody attended to him. Other than that, he was not given any
notice or explanation regarding his employment status which made him feel betrayed by the petitioner, after
having served the latter for 18 years. Consequently, he considered himself illegally dismissed; that during
this time, he was already 62 years old, but he received no benefits for his service. Finally, he was being
charged for the cost of gasoline for the bus he would drive; and that petitioner owed him three months'
salary for the year 2009.
● Thus, he prayed that he be awarded back wages, separation pay, retirement pay, 13th month pay,
damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
● In its Position Paper and other pleadings, petitioner claimed that respondent was hired on commission
basis, on a "no work, no pay" and "per travel, per trip" basis; that respondent was paid an average of
P10,000.00 commission per month without salary; that, contrary to his claim of illegal dismissal, respondent
permanently abandoned his employment effective March 31, 2009, after he failed to report for work; that it
received information later on that respondent was already engaged in driving his family truck and was seen
doing so at public roads and highways; that respondent's claim of illegal dismissal was not true, as there
was no dismissal or termination of his services, and no instructions to do so were given; that the bus
dispatcher from whom respondent inquired about his status had no power to terminate or declare him
AWOL; that respondent had not actually approached management to inquire about his employment status;
that based on respondent's Complaint, he claimed to have been illegally dismissed in January, 2009, which
was contrary to the documentary evidence which showed that he continued to work until March, 2009, after
which he completely abandoned his employment; that per Joint Affidavit of petitioner's bus dispatchers, it
is not true that respondent ever made inquiries and follow-ups about his employment until mid-2010; that
there was no illegal dismissal, and thus respondent was not entitled to his monetary claims; that respondent
never refuted the claim that he abandoned his employment with petitioner because he took on a new job
as driver for his family's trucking business and was seen doing so in public roads and highways; that it was
Page 24 of 53
common practice for bus drivers of the petitioner to simply stop reporting for work for short periods of time,
or even years, after which they would return and ask to be allowed to drive petitioner's buses once more,
which management allowed after the absentee drivers gave satisfactory and reasonable explanations for
their absences; that this practice was impliedly sanctioned in order to give the drivers the opportunity to
take time off from the stress and boredom of driving on long trips; that respondent's allegations were not
true, particularly his claim that he was told by a bus dispatcher that he was considered AWOL, since he
refused to divulge the identity of the bus dispatcher who gave such information to him; and that there was
no truth to respondent's allegations that the cost of gasoline for every bus trip was charged to him, as it
was shouldered by the petitioner. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the case.
● LABOR ARBITER: Dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Rationing that “Complainant cannot state with
certainty the date and time of his dismissal if it was January 2009, middle of 2009 or November 2009.”
● Respondent filed a Memorandum of Appeal 12 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
● NLRC: issued a Resolution modifying the Labor Arbiter's judgment by awarding in favor of respondent the
amount of P50,000.00 as financial assistance
● Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, questioning the NLRC dispositions and praying for
the relief he originally sought in his labor complaint.
● CA: rendered the assailed decision meritorious and held that in an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi
rests on the employer company to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. There is
no such proof of a valid cause in the instant case. On the contrary, the facts bear the marks of constructive
dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. w/n the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion in concluding that private respondent was constructively
or illegally dismissed by petitioner
2. w/n the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the private respondent is entitled to
separation pay, back wages, retirement pay, service incentive leave pay, moral damages, exemplary
damages, nominal damages and attorney's fees.
RULING:
1. Yes. There is no truth to the allegation that the respondent was dismissed, actually or
constructively.
● The Court is inclined to believe the petitioner's allegations: respondent left his work as bus driver to work
for his family's trucking business. This was not denied by the respondent.
● The fact that the respondent made no sincere effort to meet with the management of the bus company
gives credence to the petitioner's allegation that he was never fired from work. However, it cannot be said
that respondent abandoned his employment because petitioner itself admitted that it sanctioned the
practice of allowing its drivers to take breaks from work in order to afford them the opportunity to recover
from the stresses of driving.
● Respondent here availed only of petitioner's company practice and unwritten policy — of allowing its bus
drivers to take needed breaks or sabbaticals to enable them to recover from the monotony of driving the
same route for long periods — and obtained work elsewhere.
● Thus, since respondent was not dismissed from work, petitioner may not be held liable for his (respondent's)
monetary claims, except those that were actually owing to him by way of unpaid salary/commission, and
retirement benefits, which are due to him for the reason that he reached the age of retirement while under
petitioner's employ.
2. No. Respondent is entitled to retirement benefits considering that he was never dismissed from work,
either for cause or by resignation or abandonment. But, this Court finds insufficient CA's pronouncement
of one-half month's salary per year of service.
● As far as petitioner is concerned, he merely went on a company-sanctioned sabbatical. It just so happened
that during this sabbatical, he reached the retirement age of 60; by this time, he is already 67 years old. By
filing the labor case, he may have pre-empted the payment of his retirement benefits; but it is a clear
demand for retirement benefits nonetheless. Understandably, respondent may have already expected that
he would not be paid retirement benefits since he stopped reporting for work in 2009, when he took his
sabbatical; for him, such move might have been construed as a resignation or abandonment by his
employer, the petitioner, and rightly so — for this is precisely petitioner's defense in this case.
Page 25 of 53
● In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement in Maria De Leon Transportation, Inc., the Court hereby
declares that respondent is entitled to one month's salary for every year of service(P10, 000.00x18 yrs.=
P180, 000.00)
● Retirement compensation equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service is more equitable and
just than the CA's pronouncement of one-half month's salary per year of service, which the Court finds
insufficient. This is considering that petitioner has been paying its drivers commission equivalent to less
than the minimum wage for the latter's work, and in respondent's case, it has delayed payment of the latter's
compensation for three months. On the other hand, petitioner's lax policies regarding the coming and going
of its drivers, as well as the fact that respondent's layovers are considerable — it appears that throughout
his employment, respondent spends a good number of days each month not driving for petitioner, which
thus allows him to accept other work outside — makes up for deficiencies in the parties' compensation
arrangement.
● As for attorney's fees, the respondent is entitled thereto. Under paragraphs 7 and 11, respectively, of Article
2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, may be
recovered "in actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers" and "in
any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered."
● The CA award of P20,000.00 is thus reasonable and just under the circumstances.
NOTES: Under Article 287 of the Labor Code,

Art. 287. Retirement. — Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective
bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned
under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, that an
employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those
provided herein.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days
plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leaves.
Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than (10) employees or workers
are exempted from the coverage of this provision. Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject
to the penal provisions provided under Article 288 of this Code.
11. JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER
12. 2011 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE, AMENDED
1. LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC.vs . UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 185918. April 18, 2012]
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, 22 as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, 23 it is
the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or
owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the implementation of
Page 26 of 53
Republic Act No. 6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal
by petition for certiorari to this Court.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for security
services with respondent University of the Philippines (UP).
● In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for
payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays, hol-iday
pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of
deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and
attorneys fees.
● The LA held Lockheed and UP as solidarily liable to complainants. As the parties did not appeal the NLRC
decision, the same became final and executory. A writ of execution was then issued but later quashed by
the Labor Arbiter upon motion of UP due to disputes regarding the amount of the award. Lat-er, however,
said order quashing the writ was reversed by the NLRC.
● UP moved to reconsider the NLRC resolution. The NLRC upheld its resolution but with modification that
the satisfaction of the judgment award in favor of Lockheed will be only against the funds of UP which are
not identified as public funds.
● The NLRC order and resolution having become final, Lockheed filed a motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution which was subsequently granted. A Notice of Garnishment was issued to Philip-pine
National Bank (PNB) UP Diliman Branch for the satisfaction of the award.
● UP filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Garnishment. UP contended that the funds being subjected to
garnishment at PNB are government/public funds. The Labor Arbiter, however, dismissed the urgent mo-
tion for lack of merit. UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA held that although the subject
funds do not constitute public funds, in light of the ruling in the case of National Electrification Ad-
ministration v. Morales mandates that all money claims against the government must first be filed with the
Commission on Audit (COA). Hence, petitioner filed this petition before the SC.
ISSUES: a. W/N the NEA Case applies and the funds be garnished directly bypassing the COA.
b. W/N the previous garnishment and withdrawal of funds was fait accompli (a completed act)
RULING:
1. This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA case. UP is a juridical personality sepa-rate and
distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued.
● We cannot subscribe to Lockheed's argument that NEA is not similarly situated with UP because the COA's
jurisdiction over the latter is only on post-audit basis. A reading of the pertinent Commonwealth Act
provision clearly shows that it does not make any distinction as to which of the government subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries whose debts should be filed before the COA.
2. No. Hence, UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds plus interest.

● As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed, contrary to its claim that there is nothing that can be done
since the funds of UP had already been garnished, since the garnishment was erroneously carried out and
did not go through the proper procedure (the filing of a claim with the COA), UP is entitled to reimbursement
of the garnished funds plus interest of 6% per annum, to be computed from the time of judicial demand to
be reckoned from the time UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which occurred right after the
withdrawal of the garnished funds from PNB.
● Before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has
primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
● Thus, failure of petitioners to comply with the proper rules of procedure in carrying out the garnish-ment
resulted in a decision adverse in their favor.
Page 27 of 53
NOTES:
2. MARIETTA N. PORTILLO , petitioner, vs . RUDOLF LIETZ, INC., RUDOLF LIETZ and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 196539 October 10, 2012, (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Article 217, paragraph 4 does not automatically cover all disputes between an employer and its employee(s). If the
cause of action was within the realm of Civil Law, thus, jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts.
At bottom, we considered that the stipulation referred to post-employment relations of the parties
FACTS:
● Respondent Rudolf Lietz (Rudolf) and by Portillo signed in a letter agreement dated 3 May 1991 that latter
was hired by the former under the following terms and condition:
1. Portillo will not engage in any other gainful employment by herself or with any other company either
directly or indirectly without written consent of [Lietz Inc.], and they hereby accept and henceforth consider
your Petitioner’s proposal an undertaking on her part. A breach of which will render petitioner liable to [Lietz
Inc.] for liquidated damages
● On her tenth (10th) year with Lietz Inc., specifically on 1 February 2002, Portillo was promoted to Sales
Representative and received a corresponding increase in basic monthly salary and sales quota. In this
regard, Portillo signed another letter agreement containing a "Goodwill Clause:"
“that, on the termination of your employment by act of either you or [Lietz Inc.], and for a period of three (3)
years thereafter, you shall not engage directly or indirectly as employee, manager, proprietor, or solicitor
for yourself or others in a similar or competitive business or the same character of work which you were
employed by [Lietz Inc.] to do and perform. Should you breach this good will clause of this Contract, you
shall pay [Lietz Inc.] as liquidated damages the amount of 100% of your gross compensation over the last
12 months, it being agreed that this sum is reasonable and just.”
● Three (3) years thereafter, on 6 June 2005, Portillo resigned from Lietz Inc. During her exit interview, Portillo
declared that she intended to engage in business—a rice dealership, selling rice in wholesale.
● In a subsequent letter dated 21 June 2005, Lietz Inc. wrote Portillo and supposed that the exchange of
correspondence between them regarding the "Goodwill Clause" in the employment contract was a moot
exercise since Portillo’s articulated intention to go into business, selling rice, will not compete with Lietz
Inc.’s products.
● Lietz Inc. learned that Portillo had been hired by Ed Keller Philippines, Limited to head its Pharma Raw
Material Department. Ed Keller Limited is purportedly a direct competitor of Lietz Inc.
● Meanwhile, Portillo's demands from Lietz, Inc. for the payment of her remaining salaries and commissions
went unheeded. Lietz, Inc. gave Portillo the run around, on the pretext that her salaries and commissions
were still being computed. On 14 September 2005, Portillo filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for non-payment of 1 1/2 months' salary, two (2) months' commission, 13th
month pay, plus moral, exemplary and actual damages and attorney's fees..
● Labor Arbiter Daniel J. Cajilig granted Portillo's complaint:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Rudolf Lietz, Inc. to pay complainant
Marietta N. Portillo the amount of Php110,662.16, representing her salary and commissions, including 13th
month pay. On appeal by respondents, the NLRC, through its Second Division, affirmed the ruling of Labor
Arbiter Daniel J. Cajilig. On motion for reconsideration, the NLRC stood pat on its ruling.
Page 28 of 53
● Expectedly, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of
discretion in the labor tribunals' rulings.
● As earlier adverted to, the appellate court initially affirmed the labor tribunals. The Court of Appeals, on
motion for reconsideration, modified its previous decision.
●
● It anchors its modified ruling on the ostensible causal connection between Portillo's money claims and Lietz,
Inc.'s claim for liquidated damages, both claims apparently arising from the same employment relations.
Thus, did it say: [T]his Court will have to take cognizance of and consider the "Goodwill Clause" contained
[in] the employment contract signed by and between [respondents and Portillo].
●
● There is no gainsaying the fact that such "Goodwill Clause" is part and parcel of the employment contract
extended to [Portillo], and such clause is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. There is thus a
causal connection between [Portillo's] monetary claims against [respondents] and the latter's claim
for liquidated damages against the former. Consequently, we should allow legal compensation or set-
off to take place. [Respondents and Portillo] are both bound principally and, at the same time, are creditors
of each other. [Portillo] is a creditor of [respondents] in the sum of P110,662.16 in connection with her
monetary claims against the latter. At the same time, [respondents] are creditors of [Portillo] insofar as their
claims for liquidated damages in the sum of P980,295.25 16 against the latter is concerned.
● Portillo’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether Portillo's money claims for unpaid salaries may be offset against respondents' claim for
liquidated damages.
RULING: YES. It can be offset.
It is clear, therefore, that while Portillo’s claim for unpaid salaries is a money claim that arises out of or in connection
with an employer-employee relationship, Lietz Inc.’s claim against Portillo for violation of the goodwill clause is a
money claim based on an act done after the cessation of the employment relationship. And, while the jurisdiction
over Portillo’s claim is vested in the labor arbiter, the jurisdiction over Lietz Inc.’s claim rests on the regular courts.
There is no dispute as to the cessation of Portillo's employment with Lietz, Inc. She simply claims her unpaid salaries
and commissions, which Lietz, Inc. does not contest. At that juncture, Portillo was no longer an employee of Lietz,
Inc. The "Goodwill Clause" or the "Non-Compete Clause" is a contractual undertaking effective after the cessation
of the employment relationship between the parties. In accordance with jurisprudence, breach of the undertaking is
a civil law dispute, not a labor law case.
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code. It merely seeks to recover damages based on the parties'
contract of employment as redress for respondent's breach thereof. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil
Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so must this be in the present case,
what with the reality that the stipulation refers to the post employment relations of the parties.
In the case at bar, the difference in the nature of the credits that one has against the other, conversely, the nature
of the debt one owes another, which difference in turn results in the difference of the forum where the different credits
can be enforced, prevents the application of compensation. Simply, the labor tribunal in an employee’s claim for
unpaid wages is without authority to allow the compensation of such claims against the post employment claim of
the former employer for breach of a post employment condition. The labor tribunal does not have jurisdiction over
the civil case of breach of contract. There is no causal connection between the petitioner employees’ claim for unpaid
wages and the respondent employers’ claim for damages for the alleged "Goodwill Clause" violation. Portillo’s claim
for unpaid salaries did not have anything to do with her alleged violation of the employment contract as, in fact, her
separation from employment is not "rooted" in the alleged contractual violation. She resigned from her employment.
She was not dismissed. Portillo’s entitlement to the unpaid salaries is not even contested. Indeed, Lietz Inc.’s
argument about legal compensation necessarily admits that it owes the money claimed by Portillo. When, as here,
the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal connection with any of the
claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts.
Page 29 of 53
For sure, a plain and cursory reading of the complaint will readily reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for
damages arising from a breach of contract, which is within the ambit of the regular court’s jurisdiction.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter
resolved only after and as a result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a court be made to depend upon the defenses
made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely upon the defendant.
NOTES:
3. BUILDING CARE CORPORATION/LEOPARD SECURITY &VINVESTIGATION AGENCY and/or

RUPERTO PROTACIO , petitioners, vs . MYRNA MACARAEG, respondent. (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
● Petitioners are in the business of providing security services to their clients. They hired respondent as a
security guard beginning August 25, 1996, assigning her at Genato Building in Caloocan City. However, on
March 9, 2008, respondent was relieved of her post. She was re-assigned to Bayview Park Hotel from
March 9-13, 2008, but after said period, she was allegedly no longer given any assignment. Thus, on
September 9, 2008, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
salaries, non-payment of separation pay and refund of cash bond. Conciliation and mediation proceedings
failed, so the parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers.
● Respondent claimed that petitioners failed to give her an assignment for more than nine months, amounting
to constructive dismissal, and this compelled her to file the complaint for illegal dismissal.
● On the other hand, petitioners alleged in their position paper that respondent was relieved from her post as
requested by the client because of her habitual tardiness, persistent borrowing of money from employees
and tenants of the client, and sleeping on the job. Petitioners allegedly directed respondent to explain why
she committed such infractions, but respondent failed to heed such order. Respondent was nevertheless
temporarily assigned to Bayview Park Hotel from March 9-13, 2008, but she also failed to meet said client’s
standards and her posting thereat was not extended.
● Respondent then filed an administrative complaint for illegal dismissal with the PNP-Security Agencies and
Guard Supervision Division on June 18, 2008, but she did not attend the conference hearings for said case.
Petitioners brought to the conference hearings a new assignment order detailing respondent at the Ateneo
de Manila University but, due to her absence, petitioners failed to personally serve respondent said
assignment order. Petitioners then sent respondent a letter ordering her to report to headquarters for work
assignment, but respondent did not comply with said order. Instead, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.
● The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision on May 13, 2009, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
● WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made dismissing the charge of illegal dismissal as wanting in merit but,
as explained above, ordering the Respondents Leopard Security and Investigation Agency and Rupert
Protacio to pay complainant a financial assistance in the amount of P5,00.00.
● Respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but in a
Decision dated October 23, 2009, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. Thereby
declaring that the Labor Arbiter’s Decision had become final and executor on June 16, 2009.
● Respondent elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, and on March 24, 2011, the CA
promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
● WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 23, 2009 and
Resolution dated March 2, 2010 rendered by public respondent bin NLRC LAC No. 07-001892-09 (NLRC
Page 30 of 53
Case No. NCR-09-12628-08) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof, a new judgment is
ENTERED declaring petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and DIRECTING private respondents to
reinstate petitioner without loss of seniority rights, benefits and privileges; and to pay her backwages and
other monetary benefits during the period of her illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.
●
ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA erred in liberally applying the rules of procedure and ruling
that respondent's appeal should be allowed and resolved on the merits despite having
been filed out of time.
2. Whether or not, the NLRC decision of the Labor Arbiter is final and executory.
RULING: 1. Court cannot sustain the CA's Decision. In this case, the justiFIcations given by the CA for its
liberality by choosing to overlook the belated filing of the appeal are, the importance of the issue raised, i.e.,
whether respondent was illegally dismissed; and the belief that respondent should be "afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities,"
considering that the belated filing of respondent's appeal before the NLRC was the fault of respondent's
former counsel. Note, however, that neither respondent nor her former counsel gave any explanation or
reason citing extraordinary circumstances for her lawyer's failure to abide by the rules for filing an appeal.
Respondent merely insisted that she had not been remiss in following up her case with said lawyer.
It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A departure
from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or
negligence to support the client's case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.
The only exception would be, where the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of
depriving his client of the due process of law. In this case, there was no such deprivation of due process.
Respondent was able to fully present and argue her case before the Labor Arbiter. She was accorded the
opportunity to be heard. Her failure to appeal the Labor Arbiter's Decision cannot, therefore, be deemed as
a deprivation of her right to due process.
2. Yes. The Court re-emphasizes the doctrine of finality of judgment. In Alcantara v. Ponce, the Court, citing
its much earlier ruling in Arnedo v. Llorente stressed the importance of said doctrine, to wit:
The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions
submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. With the full knowledge that
courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at
some time or other to have final judgment on which they can rely as a final disposition of the issue
submitted, and to know that there is an end to the litigation.
When the Labor Arbiter’s Decision became final, petitioners attained a vested right to said judgment. They
had the right to fully rely on the immutability of said Decision.
In sum, the Court cannot countenance relaxation of the rules absent the showing of extraordinary
circumstances to justify the same. In this case, no compelling reasons can be found to convince this Court
that the CA acted correctly by according respondent such liberality.
The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-LAC No.07-001892-09 (NLRC Case No.
NCR-09-12628-08), ruling that the Decision of the Labor Arbiter has become final and executor, is
REINSTATED.
NOTES:
Page 31 of 53
4. McBurnie v. Ganzon, G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 & G.R. Nos. 186984-85, October 17, 2013, (AMIO)
Andrew James McBurnie Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E.

Ganzon, Inc.
- an Australian national who claimed that he signed a five-
year employment agreement with the EGI Manager Inc. - the private respondent, and the
as an executive vice-president who shall oversee the companies, respectively, whom
management of the company's hotels and resorts in the McBurnie filed an illegal dismissal
Philippines. complaint against.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Application of Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
● The filing of a motion to reduce bond, coupled with compliance with the two conditions – a
meritorious ground and posting of a bond in a reasonable amount – (as emphasized in Garcia v. KJ
Commercial) for the grant of such motion, shall suffice to suspend the running of the period to
perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC.
● For purposes of compliance with the 2nd condition of posting a bond in a reasonable amount, a
motion to reduce bond shall be accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash or surety bond
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages
and attorney's fees.
● To require the full amount of the bond within the 10-day reglementary period would only render
nugatory the legal provisions which allow an appellant to seek a reduction of the bond.
FACTS:
● Petitioner claimed that in May 1999, he signed a 5-year employment agreement with the company EGI as
an executive vice-president tasked to oversee the management of the company’s hotels and resorts in the
Philippines.
● Petitioner claimed that he performed work for the company until he figured in an accident in November
1999.
● The accident forced the petitioner to go back to Australia to recuperate. While in Australia, he was informed
by respondent Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because their intended project would no
longer push through.
● This development prompted petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims
against the respondents.
● In turn, the respondents opposed the complaint, contending that their agreement with McBurnie was only
to jointly invest in and establish a company for the management of hotels. They added that they did not
intend to create an employer-employee relationship.
● According to the respondents, the execution of the employment contract that was invoked by McBurnie was
solely for the purpose of allowing petitioner to obtain an alien work permit in the Philippines. However, when
McBurnie left for Australia for his medical treatment, he has yet to obtain a work permit.
● In a Decision dated September 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter declared McBurnie as having been illegally
dismissed from employment and ordered the respondents to pay him US$985,162 as salary and benefits
for the unexpired term of the employment contract, P2,000,000 as moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
● Aggrieved, the respondents appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC, by filing their Memorandum
of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond. Respondents then posted an appeal bond in the amount of
P100,000.
● In their Motion to Reduce Bond, the respondents contended that the monetary awards of the Labor Arbiter
were null and excessive, allegedly with the intention of rendering them incapable of posting the necessary
appeal bond.
● The NLRC denied the Motion to Reduce Bond.
Page 32 of 53
● Respondents elevated the matter to the CA, which directed the respondent to post bond in the amount of
P10,000,000.
● Eventually, McBurnie then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari regarding the
matter.
● The Supreme Court 3rd Division then rendered a decision in favor of McBurnie, explaining that the
respondents' failure to post a bond equivalent in amount to the LA's monetary award was fatal to their
appeal.
● On the basis of the Supreme Court's Decision, McBurnie filed with the NLRC a motion for reconsideration
with motion to recall and expunge from the records the NLRC decision that reversed and set aside the LA
ruling which at the same time declared McBurnie to have never been an employee of any of the
respondents, but only a potential investor in a project that never materialized due to lack of funds. The
NLRC granted petitioners’ motion.
● On the other hand, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the Supreme Court, which was
denied for lack of merit.
● Undaunted, the respondents filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for Leave to Submit Attached Second
Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion for Reconsideration, which motion for leave was granted.
● McBurnie was allowed to submit his comment on the second motion, and the respondents, their reply to
the comment.
● The Supreme Court denied the second motion for lack of merit, considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. This decision became final and executory and thus, entry of
judgment was made in due course.
● Yet, the respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Third Motion for Reconsideration, with an
attached Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Refer These Cases to the Honorable Supreme Court
En Banc.
● The Supreme Court en banc accepted the case from the SC Third Division. It also issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of the LA's decision. This prompted
● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking the fact that the SC decision had become final and
executory, with an entry of judgment already made.
Petitioner argued that in cases involving monetary award, an Respondents contend that the monetary
employer seeking to appeal the decision of the LA to the NLRC is awards of the LA were null and excessive, to
required by Article 223 of the Labor Code to post bond in the such effect of rendering them incapable of
amount equivalent to the monetary award prescribed by the LA. posting the appeal bond.
They added that they lacked the capacity to pay

the bond of almost P60 million because of their
business losses that may be attributed to an
economic crisis.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the acceptance of the third motion for reconsideration is valid
2. Whether or not an appeal bond to the NLRC may be reduced
RULING:
1. Yes. The acceptance of the third motion for reconsideration is valid; it is an exception to the general rule.
At the outset, the Supreme Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are,
as a general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that “[n]o second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.” The rule rests on
the basic tenet of immutability of judgments. “At some point, a decision becomes final and executory and,
consequently, all litigations must come to an end.
Page 33 of 53
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled
exceptions. For one, the present Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, particularly Section 3, Rule 15 thereof,
provides:
“Sec. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. — The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the
Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration “in the
higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently
unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A
second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's
declaration.”
The instant case qualifies as an exception to, first, the proscription against second and subsequent motions
for reconsideration, and second, the rule on immutability of judgments. The reconsideration of the decisions
rendered and resolutions issued by the SC Third Division is justified by the higher interest of substantial
justice.
In League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. Commission on Elections, it was held that when a motion for
leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Supreme Court, the latter
therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for
reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. Similarly, in this case, there was then no reason for the
Supreme Court to still consider the respondents' second motion for reconsideration as a prohibited
pleading, and deny it plainly on such ground.
2. Yes. An appeal bond to the NLRC may be reduced.
On the matter of the filing and acceptance of motions to reduce appeal bond, as provided in Section 6, Rule
VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the following guidelines shall be observed:
(a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to the following
conditions:
1) there is meritorious ground; and

2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted;
(b) For purposes of compliance with condition No. 2, a motion shall be accompanied by the posting of a
provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal,
exclusive of damages and attorney's fees;
(c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 10-day
reglementary period to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision to the NLRC;
(d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and determine the final
amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of “meritorious
grounds" and "reasonable amount"; and
(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that exceeds the amount
of the provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (10) days from notice of the NLRC
order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
APPLICATION IN THE CASE

A serious error of the NLRC was its outright denial of the motion to reduce the bond, without even
considering the respondent’s arguments and totally unmindful of the rules and jurisprudence that allow the
bond’s reduction. Instead of resolving the motion to reduce the bond on its merits, the NLRC insisted on an
amount that was equivalent to the monetary award. The NLRC should have considered the respondents’
arguments. By such haste, it effectively denied the respondents of their opportunity to seek a reduction of
the bond even when the same is allowed under the rules and settled jurisprudence.
Page 34 of 53
The Court finds the reduction of the appeal bond is justified by the substantial amount of the LA’s monetary
award. To require an appeal bond in such amount could only deprive them of the right to appeal, even force
them out of business and affect the livelihood of their employees.
The CA’s rendition of its decision which allowed a reduced appeal bond, the respondents have posted a
bond in the amount of P10,000,000. In determining the reasonable amount of appeal bonds, the Court
primarily considers the merits of the motions and appeal.
CONCLUSION
Thus, given the circumstances and merits in this case, the respondents had posted a bond in reasonable
amount, and complied with the requirements for the perfection of an appeal from the LA’s decision.
NOTES:
*The second issue in this case is relevant to the study of Topic 12.
*In resolving the illegal dismissal complaint, the SC ruled that McBurnie was not an employee of the respondents.
He was merely a potential investor. Since it was McBurnie who alleges that he is an employee of the respondents,
he also has the burden to prove that in court. But he failed to do so. In deciding this issue, the Court considered the
absence of McBurnie’s work permit since aliens cannot work or be employed in the country without such permit. The
work permit being lacking, McBurnie could never be an employee in the Philippines.
5. IndoPhil Textile Mills v. Adviento, G.R. No. 171212. August 4, 2014 (AMIO)
Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic Respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento was hired by the
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing petitioner company as its civil engineer who shall
thread for weaving. maintain the company’s facilities in Lambakin, Marilao,
Bulacan.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
● Not all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by labor courts, specifically when the
law provides otherwise. For this reason, the Supreme Court has formulated the “reasonable causal
connection rule,” wherein if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted
and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts;
and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. Such distinction is apt
since it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection
with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general
jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken
away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis.
(IndoPhil Textile Mills v. Adviento)
● It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs
is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being
the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders
under review are based on a wrong premise. (Medina v. Hon. Castro-Bartolome)
● Not all disputes between an employer and his employees fall within the jurisdiction of the labor
tribunals such that when the claim for damages is grounded on the “wanton failure and refusal”
without just cause of an employee to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of
the disapproval of his application for leave of absence, the same falls within the purview of Civil
Law. (Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc.)
● [I]n essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the “wanton failure and refusal” without
just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him
Page 35 of 53
of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further
averment that Cruz “maliciously and with bad faith” violated the terms and conditions of the
conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy
from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law. Clearly, the
complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his job —
as the latter was not required in the complaint to report back to work — but on the manner and
consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which
petitioner had to suffer… (Singapore Airlines Limited v. Paño)
FACTS:
● Sometime in August 2002, the respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness.
● Respondent was then diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis and moderate, severe and persistent Allergic
Rhinitis.
● Respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and textile dust as it will transmute
into health problems.
● Distressed, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), San Fernando, Pampanga, for alleged illegal dismissal and for the payment of backwages,
separation pay, actual damages and attorney’s fees.
● The said case, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-05-5834-03, was still pending resolution with the NLRC
at the time the instant petition was filed.
● Subsequently, respondent filed another Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan,
alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of petitioner to
provide him with a safe, healthy and workable environment.
● In reply, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint because the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter (LA) under Article 217(a) (4) of the Labor Code, and that there is another action pending with the
Regional Arbitration Branch III of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga, involving the same parties
for the same cause.
● In December 2003, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, thereby sustaining its jurisdiction over
the instant case.
● The case was elevated to the CA.
● After the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda, the CA rendered a decision in favor of
respondent.
● Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, assailing
the CA ruling.
In an attempt to overturn the CA ruling, petitioner argues In his complaint, respondent alleged that he contracted
that respondent's claim for damages is anchored on the such occupational disease by reason of the gross
alleged gross negligence of petitioner as an employer to negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe,
provide its employees, including herein respondent, with a healthy and workable environment.
safe, healthy and workable environment; hence, it arose
from an employer-employee relationship. The CA held that petitioner's alleged failure to provide
its employees with a safe, healthy and workable
The fact of respondent's employment with petitioner as a environment is an act of negligence, a case of quasi-
civil engineer is a necessary element of his cause of action delict. As such, it is not within the jurisdiction of the LA
because without the same, respondent cannot claim to under Article 217 of the Labor Code.
have a right to a safe, healthy and workable environment.
On the matter of dismissal based on lis pendencia, the
Thus, exclusive jurisdiction over the same should be RTC ruled that the complaint before the NLRC has a
vested in the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC pursuant to different cause of action which is for illegal dismissal
Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code of the Philippines and prayer for backwages, actual damages, attorney's
(Labor Code), as amended fees and separation pay due to illegal dismissal while in
the present case, the cause of action is for quasi-delict.
Page 36 of 53
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's complaint
RULING:
Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the respondent's complaint.
While the SC has upheld the trend to refer worker-employer controversies to labor courts, it has also
recognized that not all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by labor courts, specifically when
the law provides otherwise.
For this reason, the SC has formulated the “reasonable causal connection rule,” wherein if there is a
reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the
case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that
have jurisdiction.
Such distinction is apt since it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of
or in connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the
general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken
away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis.
Thus, claims for damages under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code, to be cognizable by the LA, must have
a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a
connection with the other claims can a claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee
relations.
In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for damages
arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction. Article 2176 of the Civil
Code which governs quasi-delict provides that: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict.
NOTES:
6. MANILA MINING CORPORATION vs. LOWITO AMOR, ET AL., G.R. No. 182800, April 20, 2015
(Odchigue)
PETITIONER: MANILA MINING CORPORATION RESPONDENT: LOWITO AMOR, ET AL.,

(regular employees of Manila Mining Corp)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that,

"(d)ecisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the [NLRC]
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of such decisions, awards or orders."
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, the same provision mandates that, "an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from."
Alongside the requirement that "the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party,"
the foregoing requisites for the perfection of an appeal are reiterated under Sections 1, 4 and 6, Rule VI of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure.
Page 37 of 53
Art. 286. When employment not deemed terminated. The bona-fide suspension of the operation of a business or
undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty
shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position
without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the
resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the LAW
& PRINCIPLES:
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that,

"(d)ecisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the [NLRC]
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of such decisions, awards or orders."
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, the same provision mandates that, "an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from."
Alongside the requirement that "the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party,"
the foregoing requisites for the perfection of an appeal are reiterated under Sections 1, 4 and 6, Rule VI of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure.
Art. 286. When employment not deemed terminated. The bona-fide suspension of the operation of a business or
undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty
shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position
without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the
resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment
or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at
least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
FACTS:
● Petitioner operated a mining claim in Placer, Surigao del Norte, in pursuit of its business of large-scale
open-pit mining for gold and copper ore.
● In compliance with existing environment laws, petitioner maintained a Tailing Pond No. 7 - a tailings
containment facility required for the storage of waste materials generated by its mining operations
● December 2000 - petitioner temporarily shut down its mining operations pending approval of its application
to increase said facility's capacity by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environment
Management Bureau (DENR-EMB), Butuan City when the mine tailings being pumped to the facility
reached its maximum.
● DENR-EMB permitted petitioner to operate for another 6 months and to increase its capacity but petitioner
failed to secure an extension permit when the said temporary authority eventually lapsed.
● 27 July 2001 – petitioner served a notice to emplyees and to DOLE XII of its the temporary suspension of
its operations for six months and the temporary lay-off of two-thirds of its employees.
● 11 December 2001 – petitioner notified DOLE XII that the temporary shutdown of its operations be
extended for another 6 months.
● Adversely affected by petitioner's continued failure to resume its operations, respondents led the complaint
for constructive dismissal and monetary claims.
Page 38 of 53
LA RULING (October 25, 2004):
● petitioner liable for constructive dismissal in view of the suspension of its operations beyond the six-month
period allowed under Article 286 7 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
● Finding that the cause of suspension of petitioner's business was not beyond its control, the Labor Arbiter
applied Article 283 of the same Code.
○ Declaring the respondents to have been constructively dismissed from their employment;
○ Petitioners to pay their separation pay equivalent to one month pay or to at least one-half month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of atleast six (6) months shall be
considered as one whole year, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
LA RULING after appeal:
● Reversed appealed decision and dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
● The continued suspension of petitioner's operations was due to circumstances beyond its control.
● Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, respondents were not even entitled to separation pay considering the
eventual closure of their employer's business due to serious business losses or financial reverses
CA RULING (29 November 2007):
● Grants respondent’s petition and reinstating the LA ruling on October 25,2004.

● Petitioner did not comply with the statutory requirements.
Contention on LA ruling:
● moved for the reduction of the appeal bond to ● the appeal bond tendered by petitioner
P100,000.00, on the ground that its financial losses in was so grossly disproportionate to
the preceding years had rendered it unable to put up monetary award for the same to be
one in cash and/or surety equivalent to the monetary considered substantial compliance with
award the requirements for the perfection of an
● Insisting that the cessation of its operations was due to appeal from a Labor Arbiter's decision.
causes beyond its control, petitioner argued that the ● Pointed out by respondents that said
subsequent closure of its business due to business check funds (for the appeal bond) was
losses exempted it from paying separation pay. subsequently dishonored upon
presentment for payment for
Contention on CA ruling: insufficiency of funds.
it "only learned belatedly that the same check was dishonored"
as there appeared to be "an inadvertent mix-up as other checks
issued for [its] other obligations were negotiated ahead [thereof],
leaving an insufficient balance in its account." As a
consequence, petitioner claimed that "the deficiency in deposit
has been promptly and immediately replenished as soon as the
check's dishonor was reported" and may already re-deposited
ISSUES:
W/N petitioner complied with the statutory requirements. (NO)

W/N petitioner justified in not paying for separation pay. (NO)
RULING:
A right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege. A party who
seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right
to appeal is invariably lost.
Page 39 of 53
● CA erred in ruling that under the circumstances, petitioner could not have filed its appeal earlier
than 7 February 2005.
File an appeal with 10 calendar days from receipt of LA decision.
● LA Decision receipt: November 24, 2004

● Deadline for appeal (10 calendar days): December 4, 2004 (Saturday) – December 6, 2004 (next working
day)
● Date on the memo: December 3, 2004
● Actual date notarized: December 6, 2004
Without proof as to the actual date of filing of said pleading being presented by both parties, the CA discounted the
timeliness of its filing in light of the established fact that the copy thereof intended for respondents was only served
by registered mail on 7 February 2005. Since proof of service of the memorandum on appeal is required for the
perfection of an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the CA ruled that "respondents filed its appeal not
earlier than 07 February 200[5], which is way beyond the ten-day reglementary period to appeal."
By and of itself, the fact that the copy of memorandum of appeal intended for respondents was served upon them
by registered mail only on 7 February 2005 does not necessarily mean that petitioner's appeal from the Labor
Arbiter's decision was filed out of time. On the principle that justice should not be sacrificed for technicality, it
has been ruled that the failure of a party to serve a copy of the memorandum to the opposing party is not a
jurisdictional defect and does not bar the NLRC from entertaining the appeal.
● Petitioner with no proof to substantiate its claim on the reduction of appeal bond.
On the appeal bond
In McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., it has been ruled that employer should comply with the following conditions:
(1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and
(2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the ling
of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Petitioner moved for a reduction of the appeal bond on the preferred basis of serious losses and reverses it
supposedly sustained in the years prior to the rendition of the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Although the NLRC chose not to address the issue of the perfection of the appeal as well as the reduction of the
bond in its Resolution dated 25 April 2005, the record shows that petitioner only manifested its deposit of the
funds for the check 24 days before the resolution of its appeal or 116 days after its right to appeal the Labor
Arbiter's decision had expired.
Having filed its motion and memorandum on the very last day of the reglementary period for appeal, moreover,
petitioner had no one but itself to blame for failing to post the full amount pending the NLRC's action on its motion
for reduction of the appeal bond.
Since it is the posting of a cash or surety bond which confers jurisdiction upon the NLRC, the rule is settled
that non-compliance is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.
● Article 286 of the Labor Code
Without necessarily resulting to a termination of employment, an employer may at any rate, bona fide suspend the
operation of its business for a period of not exceeding six months. While the employer is, on the one hand, duty
bound to reinstate his employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights if the operation of the
business is resumed within six months, employment is deemed terminated where the suspension exceeds said
period.
Page 40 of 53
● Article 283 of the Labor Code
Petitioner cannot expediently plead exemption from said liabilities due to the supposed financial reverses which led
to the eventual closure of its business. It is essentially required that the alleged losses in business operations
must be proven for, otherwise, said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming
employers who might be merely feigning business losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to
ease out employees.
The condition of business losses justifying retrenchment is normally shown by audited financial documents like yearly
balance sheets and profit and loss statements as well as annual income tax returns which were not presented in this
case.
NOTES:
SECTION 1. PERIODS OF APPEAL. —

Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, resolutions
or orders of the Labor Arbiter . . . . If the 10th . . . day . . . falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last
day to perfect the appeal shall be the next working day.
SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. —

(a) The Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be
verified by appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of
this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal in three (3) legibly typewritten copies which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order and a
certificate of non-forum shopping with proof of service on the other party of such appeal. A mere notice of
appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for
perfecting an appeal. (Italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. BOND. —
In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either be in cash
or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
The McBurnie ruling pronounced:
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, on the matter of the filing and acceptance of motions to reduce appeal bond, as provided in Section 6,
Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines
shall be observed:
(a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the
NLRC subject to the following conditions:
(1) there is meritorious ground; and
(2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted;
(b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion shall be accompanied by the posting of a
provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10), of the monetary award subject of the appeal,
exclusive of damages and attorney's fees;
Page 41 of 53
(c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 10-day
reglementary period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC;
(d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and determine the final
amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of meritorious
grounds and reasonable amount; and
(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that exceeds the
amount of the provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (10) days from notice of
the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
7. TOYOTA ALABANG, INC. vs. EDWIN GAMES, G.R. No. 206612. August 17, 2015 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: TOYOTA ALABANG, INC. RESPONDENT:

EDWIN GAMES
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Art. 223 of the Labor Code
In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or
surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which demands that an appeal bond must be
accompanied by a "proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond."
FACTS:
● Respondent Games, worked as a foreman for petitioner, allegedly stole its vehicle lubricants. Subsequently,
it charged him with qualified theft before the trial court.
● 24 August 2007 – (after 2 years), Games filed a Complainant for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of benefits,
and damages against petitioner.
● The latter, through counsel, failed to file its Position Paper on the date set on 15 November 2007.
LA RULING (5 February 2008):
● LA ruled against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay Games P535,553.07 for his separation pay, back
wages, service incentive leave pay and attorney's fees resulting from his illegal dismissal.
● Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the LA's ruling became final and
executory.
● The LA issued a Writ of Execution, which petitioner sought to quash and was denied.
NLRC RULING:
● Denied petitioner’s appeal.

● Petitioners had failed to show proof of its security deposit for the appeal.
● According to the NLRC, the bonding company's mere declaration in the Certification of Security Deposit
that the bond was fully secured was not tantamount to a faithful compliance with the rule, because there
must first be an accompanying assignment of the employer's bank deposit.
● On the merits, the NLRC dismissed the case on the basis of the rule that no appeal maybe taken from
an order of execution of a final judgment.
● For the NLRC, petitioner's failure to appeal the LA Decision already made the ruling final and executory.
CA RULING:
Page 42 of 53
● Firstly, the CA ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the appeal, given that
petitioner had failed to comply faithfully with the bond requirement.
ARGUMENT COUNTER-
ARGUMENT
● Prayed to quash LA’s Writ of Execution.
● It prayed that the proceedings be reopened, explaining that it had failed to
present evidence because of its counsel's negligence in filing the appropriate
pleadings.
● Appealed to SC - it disputed the finding that it did not show proof of its security
deposit for the appeal bond. It also insisted that its counsel's gross negligence
justified the reopening of the proceedings.
ISSUES:
W/N the CA committed a reversible error in refusing to reopen the proceedings. (NO)
RULING:
This Court maintains that the CA correctly refused to reopen the proceedings below. The reopening of a case is
an extraordinary remedy, which, if abused, can make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that
has long become final and executory. Hence, there must be good cause on the movant's part before it can be
granted.
Petitioner itself was negligent in advancing its case. - cannot now be allowed to claim denial of due process
when it was petitioner who was less than vigilant of its rights.
● petitioner not only reneged on the submission of its Position Paper, but even failed to move for the filing of
the pleading at any point before the LA resolved the case on 5 February 2008.
● did not attend the hearing on 11 January 2008, or any of the proceedings thereafter, despite its
manifestation that it no longer had any legal representative – failed to exhibit diligence.
Dissecting the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
1. NLRC gravely abused its discretion in requiring petitioner to post an appeal bond, because this requirement
does not cover an appeal from a decision of the LA denying a motion to quash a writ of execution.
No basis.
Art. 223 of the Labor Code, do not limit the appeal bond requirement only to certain kinds of rulings
of the LA. Rather, these rules generally state that in case the ruling of the LA involves a monetary award,
an employer's appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond. Therefore, absent any qualifying
terms, so long as the decision of the LA involves a monetary award, as in this case, that ruling can only be
appealed after the employer posts a bond.
2. NLRC erred in requiring petitioner to accompany the appeal bond with proof of a security deposit or
collateral securing the bond.
Fails to justify the grant of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
According to the NLRC and the CA, the bonding company's mere declaration in the Certification of Security
Deposit that the bond is fully secured is not tantamount to a faithful compliance with the rule, because there
must first be an accompanying assignment of the employer's bank deposit.
Page 43 of 53
Notwithstanding this issue, the NLRC has given a well-founded reason for refusing to entertain petitioner's
appeal, namely, no appeal may be taken from an order of execution of a final and executory
judgment.
An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege – those who seeks it must comply with
the requirements.
3. There may be merit in the Rule 45 petition filed by petitioner.
No longer be properly considered.
To adjudicate on the merits of the instant appeal would require the reopening of the whole case, a step that
all the tribunals below — the LA, the NLRC, and the CA — have already refused to take.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the reopening of a case is, by default, not allowed merely on the ground that
the counsel has been negligent in taking the required steps to protect the interest of the client, such
as timely filing a pleading, appearing during hearings, and perfecting appeals. An exception arises only
when there is good cause and excusable negligence on the client's part
We have consistently held that the requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their
claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary. Here, petitioner, despite being
given several chances to pass its position paper, did not at all comply. Worse, petitioner also had other instances of
negligence. Consequently, this Court cannot redo the whole proceedings of the Labor Arbiter who had already
afforded due process to the former.
NOTES:
Before discussing these points, it is apropos to elucidate that this Court must be faithful to the framework of resolving
labor cases on appellate review before this Court.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Acibo aptly explains:

This Court's power of review in a Rule 45 petition is limited to resolving matters pertaining to any perceived
legal errors, which the CA may have committed in issuing the assailed decision. In reviewing the legal
correctness of the CA's Rule 65 decision in a labor case, we examine the CA decision in the context
that it determined, i.e. , the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision
before it and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct.
In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal,
of the NLRC decision challenged before it. (Emphasis supplied)
8. SSS v. Ubaña, G.R. No. 200114. August 24, 2015 (Cuarteros)
PETITIONER: Social Security System RESPONDENT: Debbie Ubaña (WON)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
● Debbie applied for employment with the petitioner. However, after passing the examinations and
accomplishing all the requirements for employment, she was instead referred to DBP Service Corporation
Page 44 of 53
for "transitory employment." She took the pre-employment examination given by DBP Service Corporation
and passed the same.
● Debbie was told to report for training to SSS, Naga City branch, for immediate deployment to SSS Daet
branch. She was made to sign a six-month Service Contract Agreement by DBP Service Corporation,
appointing her as clerk for assignment with SSS Daet branch with a daily wage of only P171.00. She was
assigned as "Frontliner" of the SSS Members Assistance Section.
● From December 16, 1999 to May 15, 2001, she was assigned to the Membership Section as Data Encoder.
On December 16, 2001, she was transferred to the SSS Retirees Association as Processor at the
Membership Section until her resignation on August 26, 2002. As Processor, she was paid only P229.00
daily or P5,038.00 monthly, while a regular SSS Processor receives a monthly salary of P18,622.00 or
P846.45 daily wage. Her Service Contract Agreement with DBP Service Corporation was never renewed,
but she was required to work for SSS continuously under different assignments with a maximum daily salary
of only P229.00; at the same time, she was constantly assured of being absorbed into the SSS plantilla
● Respondent claimed she was qualified for her position as Processor, having completed required training
and passed the SSS qualifying examination for Computer Operations Course given by the National
Computer Institute, U.P. Diliman from May 16 to June 10, 2001, yet she was not given the proper salary.
● Respondent prayed for an award of P572,682.67 actual damages representing the difference between the
legal and proper salary she should have received and the actual salary she received during her six-year
stint with petitioner; P300,000.00 moral damages; exemplary damages at the discretion of the court;
P20,000.00 attorney's fees and P1,000.00 appearance fees; and other just and equitable relief.
● RTC: initially favor of petitioner, affirming that they have no jurisdiction over the complaint; but upon MR by
respondent, it reversed its decision stating that the case is one for damages which the regular courts have
jurisdiction
● NLRC: in favor of Respondent; Ubaña's claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article
217, other labor statutes, or CBAs. It is ineluctable that it is the regular courts that has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case
Petitioner contends that respondent's other claims are Respondent maintains that her case is predicated not on
intimately intertwined with her claim of actual damages labor laws but on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code for
which are cognizable by the NLRC. Moreover, petitioner petitioner's act of exploiting her and enriching itself at her
alleges that its existing manpower services agreements expense by not paying her the correct salary
with DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees commensurate to the position she held within SSS. Also,
Association are legitimate; and that some of since there is no employer-employee relationship
respondent's claims may not be entertained since these between her and petitioner, as the latter itself admits, then
pertain to benefits enjoyed by government employees, her case is not cognizable by the Civil Service
not by employees contracted via legitimate manpower Commission (CSC) either; that since the NLRC and the
service providers. Finally, petitioner avers that the CSC have no jurisdiction over her case, then it is only the
nature and character of the reliefs prayed for by the regular courts which can have jurisdiction over her claims.
respondent are directly within the jurisdiction not of the She argues that the CA is correct in ruling that her case is
courts, but of the labor tribunals. rooted in the principle of abuse of rights under the Civil
Code; and that the Petition did not properly raise issues
of law.
ISSUES: WN the nature and character of the reliefs prayed for by the respondent are directly within the jurisdiction
not of the courts, but of the labor tribunals.
RULING: NO.
For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in order for the Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over a dispute,
there must be an employer-employee relation between the parties thereto.
Since there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties herein, then there is no labor dispute
cognizable by the Labor Arbiters or the NLRC. There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or
direct contract between respondent and petitioner, the latter being responsible to the former only for the proper
payment of wages, respondent is thus justified in filing a case against petitioner, based on Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, to recover the proper salary due her as SSS Processor.
At first glance, it is indeed unfair and unjust that as Processor who has worked with petitioner for six long years, she
was paid only P5,038.00 monthly, or P229.00 daily, while a regular SSS employee with the same designation and
Page 45 of 53
who performs identical functions is paid a monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. Petitioner may not
hide under its service contracts to deprive respondent of what is justly due her. As a vital government entity charged
with ensuring social security, it should lead in setting the example by treating everyone with justice and fairness. If it
cannot guarantee the security of those who work for it, it is doubtful that it can even discharge its directive to promote
the social security of its members in line with the fundamental mandate to promote social justice and to insure the
well-being and economic security of the Filipino people.
NOTES:
9. Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa Nestle Phils. Chapter v. Nestle Phils., G.R. 198675, Sept. 23, 2015
(CUARTEROS)
PETITIONER: Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa Nestle RESPONDENT: Nestle Phils. (WON)

Phils. Chapter
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
● Petitioner union staged a strike against respondent company's Ice Cream and Chilled Products Division,
citing, as grounds, respondent's alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), dismissal
of union officers and members, discrimination and other unfair labor practice (ULP) acts.
● Respondent filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal. Subsequently, then DOLE Acting Secretary, issued an
Order assuming jurisdiction over the strike and certifying the same to the NLRC.
● Petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, questioning the above order of the Acting DOLE
Secretary.
● However, after a series of conciliation meetings and discussions between the parties, they agreed to resolve
their differences and came up with a compromise which was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA). NLRC issued its Decision approving the parties' compromise agreement and granting their Joint
Motion to Dismiss.
● After a lapse of more than eleven (11) years from the time of execution of the subject MOA, petitioners filed
with the NLRC a Motion for Writ of Execution contending that they have not been paid the amounts they
are entitled to in accordance with the MOA.
Petitioners' basic contention is that respondent Respondent filed its Opposition to the Motion for Writ of
cannot invoke the defense of prescription because it Execution contending that petitioners' remedy is already
is guilty of deliberately causing delay in paying barred by prescription because, under the 2005 Revised
petitioners' claims and that petitioners, on the other Rules of the NLRC, a decision or order may be executed on
hand, are entitled to protection under the law motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and
because they had been vigilant in exercising their executory and that the same decision or order may only be
right as provided for under the subject MOA enforced by independent action within a period of ten (10)
years from the date of its finality.
ISSUES: WN petitioners' claim is already barred by prescription.
RULING: YES.
The most relevant rule in the instant case is Section 8, Rule XI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which
states that: A decision or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such period, the judgment shall become dormant, and may only be enforced by an
independent action within a period of ten (10) years from date of its finality.
In the present case, the five-and ten-year periods provided by law and the rules are more than sufficient to enable
petitioners to enforce their right under the subject MOA. In this case, it is clear that the judgment of the NLRC, having
been based on a compromise embodied in a written contract, was immediately executory upon its issuance on
Page 46 of 53
October 12, 1998. Thus, it could have been executed by motion within five (5) years. It was not. Nonetheless, it could
have been enforced by an independent action within the next five (5) years, or within ten (10) years from the time
the NLRC Decision was promulgated. It was not. Therefore, petitioners' right to have the NLRC judgment executed
by mere motion as well as their right of action to enforce the same judgment had prescribed by the time they filed
their Motion for Writ of Execution on January 25, 2010.
It is true that there are instances in which this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years
upon meritorious grounds. However, in instances when this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse
of five years, there is, invariably, only one recognized exception, i.e., when the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. In the present case, there is no
indication that the delay in the execution of the MOA, as claimed by petitioners, was caused by respondent nor was
it incurred at its instance or for its benefit or advantage.
NOTES:
10. Quantum Foods, Inc. vs. Esloyo, GR. No. 213696, December 9, 2015, citing 2015 Mcburnie
(FUENTES)
QUANTUM FOODS, INC., MARCELINO ESLOYO and GLEN MAGSILA
Domestic corporation engaged ● Esloyo as Major Accounts Representative on December 14, 1998, whose
in the distribution and selling of consistent good performance led to successive promotions, until his
food products nationwide, with promotion to the position of Regional Sales Manager for Visayas and
principal office located in Mindanao in 2004.
Brgy. Merville, Parañaque ● Magsila as Key Accounts Representative for the Panay Area on March 1,
City. 2005 on a probationary status and gave him a "permanent" status on
August 31, 2005.
FACTS:
● In 2006, QFI decided to reorganize its sales force nationwide following a drastic drop in net income in 2005,
and Magsila was among those retrenched. The corresponding Establishment Termination Report of the
retrenched employees was likewise submitted to DOLE. However, Magsila's final pay and other benefits
were not released due to alleged discovery of unauthorized/undocumented deductions, which he
purportedly failed to explain.
● Meanwhile, in response to several anonymous complaints against Esloyo for alleged misbehavior and
violations of various company rules and regulations, such as sexual harassment, misappropriation of
company funds/property, falsification/padding of reports and serious misconduct, QFI's auditor, Vilma A.
Almendrala, conducted an audit/investigation in Iloilo City, and submitted an Audit Report dated March 23,
2006 detailing her findings. Esloyo submitted his written explanation denying the charges, which QFI found
to be unsatisfactory. Consequently, Esloyo was informed of his termination from work effective April 3, 2006
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence due to his numerous violations of the company rules and
regulations.
● Aggrieved, Esloyo and Magsila (respondents) filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal with money
claims against QFI before the NLRC.
LA ruling
● LA found respondents to have been illegally dismissed

● Esloyo's dismissal was tainted with malice and bad faith, finding that: (a) he was not given the opportunity
to refute the charges leveled against him, as instead of conducting an administrative investigation, QFI
ordered his re-assignment and thereafter placed him on "floating status"; and (b) the audit report submitted
was based on unverifed statements. The LA likewise found no substantial evidence to support the charges
against Esloyo, and thus, ruled that the claim of loss of trust and confidence was without basis
Page 47 of 53
● LA declared Magsila's dismissal to be illegal, holding that there could be no valid retrenchment since a
replacement was hired even before the effectivity of the latter's dismissal, noting too, that the dismissal was
effected only after he had acted as witness for Esloyo in the sexual harassment charge
● Dissatisfied, QFI filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC on February 8,
2008, accompanied by: (a) a Motion to Reduce Bond averring that it was encountering difficulty raising the
amount of the bond and finding an insurance company that can cover said amount during the short period
of time allotted for an appeal; and (b) a cash bond in the amount of P400,000.00 (partial bond).
NLRC ruling
● NLRC held that respondents were not illegally dismissed. It gave credence to the audit report which showed
the various infractions committed by Esloyo in violation of the company rules and regulations, and in breach
of the confidence reposed on him, warranting his dismissal. It also found substantial evidence to support
the losses suffered by QFI, and thus, declared Magsila's dismissal to prevent losses as a valid exercise of
the management's prerogative.
● NLRC denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to QFI's appeal, holding that: (a) the
lack of verification was a formal defect that could be cured by requiring an oath; (b) the belated filing of the
certificate of non-forum shopping may be allowed under exceptional circumstances as technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice; and (c) there was substantial compliance with
the bond requirement, and merit in QFI's appeal that would justify a liberal application of the requirement
on the timely filing of the appeal bond.
CA ruling
● CA reversed and set aside the NLRC's ruling and reinstated the LA's Decision. It ruled that QFI's failure to
post the required bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary judgment impeded the perfection of its
appeal, and rendered the LA's Decision final and executory. Thus, the NLRC was bereft of jurisdiction and
abused its discretion in entertaining the appeal.
● It also held that the posting of the partial bond together with the Motion to Reduce Bond did not stop the
running of the period to perfect the appeal, considering that: (a) the grounds relied upon by QFI are not
meritorious; and (b) the partial bond posted was not reasonable in relation to the monetary judgment
QFI maintained that Esloyo asserted that his dismissal was illegal, claiming that: (a) the charges were
respondents' dismissals were all fabricated; (b) no formal investigation was conducted; and (c) he was not given
valid, hence, it is not liable for the opportunity to confront his accusers; adding too that prior to the March 24, 2006
their money claims. Show Cause Memorandum, he received an e-mail memorandum directing him to
report to the head office for re-assignment but was, instead, placed on floating
status. Magsila, on the other hand, averred that there was no valid retrenchment
as the losses claimed by QFI were unsubstantiated and that he was merely
replaced
ISSUES: W/N CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on part of NLRC in giving due course to QFI’s
appeal
RULING:
Petition is granted
In labor cases, the law governing appeals from the LA's ruling to the NLRC is Article 229 of the Labor Code (see
below). In this relation, Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC enumerates the
requisites for the perfection of appeal .
Notably, while QFI timely filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal, it was only accompanied by a partial
bond with a Motion to Reduce Bond, and not a bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary judgment.
Page 48 of 53
While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in
cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA, in several cases, the Court has relaxed this stringent
requirement whenever justi􀀾ed. Thus, the Rules — specifically Section 6, Rule VI — thereof, allow the reduction of
the appeal bond upon a showing of: (a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting
of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award
It bears stressing that the reduction of the bond provided thereunder is not a matter of right on the part of the movant
and its grant still lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds and the
reasonableness of the bond tendered under the circumstances. The requirement on the existence of a "meritorious
ground" delves on the worth of the parties' arguments, taking into account their respective rights and the
circumstances that attend the case.
Case law has held that for purposes of justifying the reduction of the appeal bond, the merit referred to may pertain
to (a) an appellant's lack of financial capability to pay the full amount of the bond, or (b) the merits of the main appeal
such as when there is a valid claim that there was no illegal dismissal to justify the award, the absence of an
employer-employee relationship, prescription of claims, and other similarly valid issues that are raised in the appeal
As to what constitutes "a reasonable amount of bond" that must accompany the motion to reduce bond in order to
suspend the period to perfect an appeal, the Court, in McBurnie v. Ganzon, pronounced:
“To ensure that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that give parties the
chance to seek a reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out, without however defeating the
benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions to reduce bond that are to be
filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to 10%
of the monetary award that is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the
reasonable amount of the bond in the meantime that an appellant's motion is pending resolution by
the Commission. In conformity with the NLRC Rules, the monetary award, for the purpose of computing
the necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages and attorney's fees. Only after the posting of a bond in
the required percentage shall an appellant's period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC Rules be deemed
suspended”
Hence, the posting of a P400,000.00 cash bond equivalent to more than 20% of the monetary judgment, together
with the Motion to Reduce Bond within the reglementary period was sufficient to suspend the period to perfect
the appeal. The posting of the said partial bond coupled with the subsequent posting of a surety bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary judgment also signified QFI's good faith and willingness to recognize the final outcome
of its appeal
NOTES:
● ART. 229. Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
● Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. —
a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified
by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the
form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
Page 49 of 53
thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision,
resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of
payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this
Rule; iii) a certi􀀾cate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties.
b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop
the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
● SEC. 6. Bond. — In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be
in the form of sh deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages
and attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds, and only upon the posting
of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the preceding
paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal
11. Dela Rosa Liner Inc et vs. Borela et GR No. 207286, July 29, 2016 (FUENTES)
DELA ROSA LINER, INC. CALIXTO B. BORELA AND ESTELO A. AMARILLE
AND/OR ROSAURO DELA Borela (bus driver) and Amarille (conductor) filed separate complaints for
ROSA, SR. AND NORA DELA underpayment/non-payment of salaries, holiday pay, overtime pay, service
ROSA, incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, sick leave and vacation leave, night shift
Public transport company differential, illegal deductions, and violation of Wage Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and
16.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

In labor law, respondents' claim for 13th-month pay, overtime pay, and statutory wages (under Wages Orders 13,
14, 15 and 16), among others, cannot simply be generally waived as they are granted for workers' protection and
welfare; it takes more than a general waiver to give up workers' rights to these legal entitlements.
FACTS:
● On Sept. 23, 2011, respondents filed separate complaints for underpayment/non-payment of salaries,
holiday pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, sick leave and vacation leave, night
shift differential, illegal deductions, and violation of Wage Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16. On Oct. 26, 2011,
petitioners asked LA to dismiss case for forum shopping alleging that the CA 13 th Division disposed of a
similar case between the parties (CA-GR SP No. 118038) after they already entered into a compromise
agreement which covered all claims and causes of action they had against each other in relation to
respondents’ employment. Respondents opposed the motion contending causes of action are different
from causes of action settled in case petitioners cited.
Ruling on Compulsory Arbitration

● Labor Arbiter (LA) upheld petitioners’ position and dismissed complaint on grounds of forum shopping. On
appeal, NLRC reversed LA’s order and reinstated the complaint.
● NLRC held that the respondents could not have committed forum shopping as there was no identity of
causes of action between the two cases. The first complaint, charged the petitioners with illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice; while the second complaint was based on the petitioners' alleged
nonpayment/underpayment of their salaries and monetary benefits, and violation of several wage orders.
CA decision
● CA denied petition.
Page 50 of 53
● It explained that the first case involved the issues of whether respondents had been illegally dismissed and
whether petitioners should be liable for unfair labor practice. The labor arbiter dismissed the first complaint
for lack of merit in his decision of November 6, 2008
● On the respondents' appeal against the LA ruling in this first case, the NLRC 6th Division rendered a
decision on March 25, 2010, reversing the dismissal of the complaint. It awarded respondents back wages
(P442,550.00 for Borela and P215,775.00 for Amarille), damages (P10,000.00 each in moral and
exemplary damages for Borela), and moral and exemplary damages (P25,000.00 each for Amarille), plus
10% attorney's fees for each of them.
● On the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling in the first complaint, however, the NLRC
vacated its decision, and in its resolution of September 30, 2010, issued a new ruling that followed the LA's
ruling, with modification. It awarded the respondents financial assistance of P10,000.00 each, in
consideration of their long years of service to the company.
● The respondents sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038).
Thereafter, the parties settled the case (involving the first complaint) amicably through the compromise
agreement adverted to earlier. Based on this agreement, Borela and Amarille received from respondents
P350,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively, and executed a quitclaim. Consequently, the CA 13th Division
rendered judgment in accordance with the compromise agreement and ordered an entry of judgment which
was issued on September 28, 2011. In this manner, the parties resolved the first case
ISSUES: W/N CA erred in upholding NLRC ruling that there was no forum shopping nor res judicata that
would bar 2nd complaint
RULING:
Petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit
No identity of causes of action in both complaints
Contrary to the petitioners' submission, respondents' second complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 128188), a money claim,
is not a "similar case" to the first complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038). Thus, the filing of the second complaint did
not constitute forum shopping and the judgment in the first case is not a res judicata ruling that bars the second
complaint.
Under the circumstances of the case, sufficient basis exists for the NLRC's and CA's conclusions that there is no
identity of causes of action between the respondents' two complaints against the petitioners. The first complaint
involved illegal dismissal/suspension, unfair labor practice with prayer for damages and attorney's fees; while the
second complaint (the subject of the present appeal) involves claims for labor standards benefits — the petitioners'
alleged violation of Wage Orders Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16; nonpayment of respondents' sick and vacation leave pays,
13th-month pay, service incentive leave benefit, overtime pay, and night shift differential.
Compromise agreement
The compromise agreement had been concluded to terminate the illegal dismissal and unfair labor case then
pending before the CA. While the parties agreed that no further action shall be brought by the parties against each
other, they pointedly stated that they referred to actions on the same grounds. The phrase same grounds can
only refer to the grounds raised in the first complaint and not to any other grounds.
We likewise cannot accept the compromise agreement's application "to all claims and damages or losses either
party may have against each other whether those damages or losses are known or unknown, foreseen or
unforeseen." This coverage is too sweeping and effectively excludes any claims bythe respondents against the
petitioners, including those that by law and jurisprudence cannot be waived without appropriate consideration such
as nonpayment or underpayment of overtime pay and wages.
NOTES:
In Pampanga Sugar Development, Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., the Court reminded the parties
that while rights may be waived, the waiver must not be contrary to law, public policy, morals, or good customs; or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. In labor law, respondents' claim for 13th-month pay,
overtime pay, and statutory wages (under Wages Orders 13, 14, 15 and 16), among others, cannot simply be
Page 51 of 53
generally waived as they are granted for workers' protection and welfare; it takes more than a general waiver to
give up workers' rights to these legal entitlements.
12. Fontana Development Corp., vs. Vukasinovic, GR No. 222424, September 21, 2016 (FUENTES)
FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORP., DENNIS PAK as General SASCHA VUKASINOVIC
Manager, PASTOR ISAAC as Director of Human Resources, CHRIS Hired by petitioner Fontana Development
CHENG as Corporation (FDC) as its Director for
Deputy Group Financial Controller, JESUS CHUA, Representative Business Development for one year
MICHAEL FELICIANO, ALMA EREDIANO, LEILANI VALIENTE,
MANCHOI as Group Financial Controller, and JAIME VILLAREAL as
Chief Engineer
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court. Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the
courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets.
FACTS:
● In July 2009, respondent Sascha Vukasinovic was hired by petitioner Fontana Development Corporation
(FDC) as its Director for Business Development for one year. His employment was renewed for another
year at the end of his first contract
● Sometime in May 2010, he allegedly received a text message from one Jenny Mallari (Mallari) informing
him that Nestor Dischoso (Dischoso) and Chief Hotel Engineer Jaime Villareal (Engr. Villareal), both officers
of petitioner FDC, were receiving commissions from company transactions. Thereafter, respondent met
with Mallari and offered her money in exchange for evidence that will support her allegations. Mallari handed
over to respondent a photocopy of a check issued to Engr. Villareal, as proof of receiving commission.
Again, respondent discovered discrepancies. Consequently, in his Inter-Office Memorandum dated June
7, 2010, respondent recommended to Dennis Pak, petitioner FDC's General Manager, to conduct further
investigations on the alleged corruptions of Engr. Villareal.
● On October 2, 2010, respondent received a Show Cause/Preventive Suspension Order from petitioner
FDC's Human Resources Department, informing him of the complaint filed by Engr. Villareal and directing
him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating the provisions of the
Company Code of Conduct on Dishonesty. Respondent did not deny the allegations against him and,
instead, admitted that he gave money to Mallari because "it is a common practice in Fontana to give money
to informants for vital information”
● Thus, petitioner FDC approved the recommendation of the Investigating Panel and terminated respondent's
employment after finding him guilty of acts of dishonesty in the form of "bribery in any form or manner"
under Rule 1, Section 4 of petitioner FDC's Code of Conduct, which carries the maximum penalty of
dismissal. The Decision and the Notice of Termination were served on November 2, 2010. Respondent,
however, refused to acknowledge its receipt and, instead, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, regularization, non-payment of salaries, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, actual, moral
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and demands for his reinstatement with full backwages against
petitioner FDC and its officers
LA ruling
● LA dismissed the complaint for lack of factual or legal basis, and ruled that respondent cannot be
regularized as he is an employee with a legal and valid fixed-term employment and that his dismissal was
for a just cause.
NLRC ruling
Page 52 of 53
● NLRC rendered a Resolution dated March 15, 2012, dismissing the appeal and affirming the Decision of
Labor Arbiter Bactin
● NLRC noted that respondent had previously filed another complaint before the same branch of the NLRC
in San Fernando, Pampanga, involving the same facts, issues, and prayer. This previous case has been
dismissed by Labor Arbiter Reynaldo Abdon on the ground of forum shopping. The dismissal was
eventually sustained by both the NLRC and the CA
CA ruling
● CA agreed with the NLRC when it ruled that herein respondent's employment had not ripened into regular
employment and that he was validly dismissed.
● Respondent, being a managerial employee, can be terminated on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. However, contrary to NLRC’s decision, the CA ordered the award of unpaid salaries to
respondent. The CA held that petitioner FDC failed to present evidence to show payment of the salaries of
respondent for the period claimed.
ISSUES: W/N respondent is guilty of forum shopping
RULING:
Petition is granted. Respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in another or whether the following elements of litis pendentia are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis
pendens
In the instant case, there is no doubt that all the elements of litis pendentia have already been established, as this
was already settled with finality in CA-G.R. SP No. 126225. Yet, in his Comment, respondent repeatedly claimed
that there was no forum shopping and petitioners are misleading this Court, making it appear that forum shopping
exists when there is none at all.
Indeed, the existence of forum shopping has been duly proved in this case. As a result, petitioners hinge this present
appeal on the error committed by the CA in not dismissing outright the appeal filed by respondent. When there is
forum shopping, all pending claims on the same claim must be dismissed
It is well-settled that once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the
petition pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court. This is so because twin
dismissal is the punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of justice.
Consequently, the CA should have dismissed the case outright without rendering a decision on the merits of the
case. Respondent should be penalized for willfully and deliberately trifling with court processes. The purpose of the
law will be defeated if respondent will be granted the relief prayed for despite his act of deliberately committing forum
shopping
Page 53 of 53

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LABOR 1 | JMM | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – TOPICS 10-12

10. OTHER SPECIAL BENEFITS

1. Reyes v. NLRC, G.R. NO 160233, Aug. 8, 2007 (CABASAG)

PETITIONER: Rogelio Reyes RESPONDENT: NLRC, Universal Robina Corporation

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Section 5 of Rule II of the Rules Implementing the New Retirement Law

ARGUMENT: Petitioner COUNTER-ARGUMENT: Respondent

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ARGUMENT: Petitioner COUNTER-ARGUMENT: Respondent

RULING: Petition is Denied.

3. URSUMCO V. AGRIPINO, G.R. No. 188154 October 13, 2010, ANDRIN

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: Lourdes cerdaco was an employee of RESPONDENT: UNIPROM INC.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ARGUMENT (Respondent) COUNTER-ARGUMENT (Petitioner)

Through their Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in :

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: Grace Christian High RESPONDENT: Filipinas Lavandera- Win

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

On the meaning of “½ month salary”:

PETITIONER: Goodyear Phils. Inc.; RESPONDENT: Marinal Angus

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Retirement benefits and separation pay distinguished:

Release and Quickclaim signed by Angus is invalid:

PETITIONER: BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. RESPONDENT: GUILLERMO C. SAGAYSAY

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Art. 287. Retirement. xxx

BDO also contends that the CA erred in citing

BDO reiterated that the retirement plan was not

The NLRC ruling is reinstated.

PETITIONER: MAUREEN P. PEREZ RESPONDENT: COMPARTS INDUSTRIES, INC.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an optional retirement program.

PETITIONER: : De La Salle Araneta University RESPONDENT: Juanito C. Bernardo

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ARGUMENT (Petitioner) COUNTER-ARGUMENT (Respondent)

PETITIONER: Editha M. Catotocan RESPONDENT: Lourdes School of Quezon City, Inc.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Labor Arbiter’s decision: Dismissed petitioner’s petition

ARGUMENT (Petitioner) COUNTER-ARGUMENT (Respondent)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

St. Martin Funeral Home[s] v. NLRC

Cercado v. Uniprom, Inc.

14. PAL vs. HASSARAM, G.R. NO. 217730, (RUBENECIA)

PETITIONER: Philippine Airlines RESPONDENT: ARJAN HASSARAM

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.:

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Phils.

NOTES: Under Article 287 of the Labor Code,

11. JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER

12. 2011 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE, AMENDED

1. LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC.vs . UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. No. Hence, UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds plus interest.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

RULING: YES. It can be offset.

3. BUILDING CARE CORPORATION/LEOPARD SECURITY &VINVESTIGATION AGENCY and/or

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Andrew James McBurnie Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E.