G.R. No. 192571. April 22, 2014.

* mistaken notion: it is not the probationary employee’s job description but the
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE, adequate performance of his duties and responsibilities which constitutes the
EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUTMISA, TERESITA C. inherent and implied standard for regularization. To echo the fundamental point
BERNARDO, and ALLAN G. ALMAZAR, petitioners, vs. PEARLIE ANN F. of the Decision, if the probationary employee had been fully apprised by his
ALCARAZ, respondent. employer of these duties and responsibilities, then basic knowledge and common
sense dictate that he must adequately perform the same, else he fails to pass the
Labor Law; Probationary Employees; Termination of Employment; As the probationary trial and may therefore be subject to termination. The determination
Supreme Court observed, an employee’s failure to perform the duties and of “adequate performance” is not, in all cases, measurable by quantitative
responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him constitutes a specification, such as that of a sales quota in Alcaraz’s example. It is also hinged
justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s non-regularization.—A careful on the qualitative assessment of the employee’s work; by its nature, this largely
perusal of the questioned Decision will reveal that the Court actually resolved the rests on the reasonable exercise of the employer’s management prerogative.
controversy under the above-stated framework of analysis. Essentially, the Court While in
found the CA to have committed an error in holding that no grave abuse of 27some instances the standards used in measuring the quality of work may
discretion can be ascribed to the NLRC since the latter arbitrarily disregarded the be conveyed — such as workers who construct tangible products which follow
legal implication of the attendant circumstances in this case which should have particular metrics, not all standards of quality measurement may be reducible to
simply resulted in the finding that Alcaraz was apprised of the performance hard figures or are readily articulable in specific pre-engagement descriptions. A
standards for her regularization and hence, was properly a probationary good example would be the case of probationary employees whose tasks involve
employee. As the Court observed, an employee’s failure to perform the duties the application of discretion and intellect, such as — to name a few — lawyers,
and responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him artists, and journalists. In these kinds of occupation, the best that the employer
_______________ can do at the time of engagement is to inform the probationary employee of his
* EN BANC. duties and responsibilities and to orient him on how to properly proceed with the
26constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s non- same. The employer cannot bear out in exacting detail at the beginning of the
regularization. engagement what he deems as “quality work” especially since the probationary
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on employee has yet to submit the required output. In the ultimate analysis, the
Certiorari; The Supreme Court’s analysis of the National Labor Relations communication of performance standards should be perceived within the context
Commission (NLRC’s) interpretation of the environmental principles and of the nature of the probationary employee’s duties and responsibilities.
concepts of labor law is not completely prohibited in —as it is complementary to Same; Same; Same; Managerial Employees; Given that a managerial role
— a Rule 45 review of labor cases.—At this juncture, it bears exposition that essentially connotes an exercise of discretion, the quality of effective
while NLRC decisions are, by their nature, final and executory and, hence, not management can only be determined through subsequent assessment.—It is
subject to appellate review, the Court is not precluded from considering other hardly possible for the employer, at the time of the employee’s engagement, to
questions of law aside from the CA’s finding on the NLRC’s grave abuse of map into technical indicators, or convey in precise detail the quality standards by
discretion. While the focal point of analysis revolves on this issue, the Court may which the latter should effectively manage the department. Factors which gauge
deal with ancillary issues — such as, in this case, the question of how a the ability of the managerial employee to either deal with his subordinates (e.g.,
probationary employee is deemed to have been informed of the standards of his how to spur their performance, or command respect and obedience from them),
regularization — if only to determine if the concepts and principles of labor law or to organize office policies, are hardly conveyable at the outset of the
were correctly applied or misapplied by the NLRC in its decision. In other engagement since the employee has yet to be immersed into the work itself.
words, the Court’s analysis of the NLRC’s interpretation of the environmental Given that a managerial role essentially connotes an exercise of discretion, the
principles and concepts of labor law is not completely prohibited in — as it is quality of effective management can only be determined through subsequent
complementary to — a Rule 45 review of labor cases. assessment. While at the time of engagement, reason dictates that the employer
Labor Law; Probationary Employees; Termination of Employment; If the can only inform the probationary managerial employee of his duties and
probationary employee had been fully apprised by his employer of these duties responsibilities as such and provide the allowable parameters for the same.
and responsibilities, then basic knowledge and common sense dictate that he Verily, as stated in the Decision, the adequate performance of such duties and
must adequately perform the same, else he fails to pass the probationary trial responsibilities is, by and of itself, an implied standard of regularization.
and may therefore be subject to termination.—The Court must correct Alcaraz’s
 Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The Supreme Court takes judicial its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
notice of the fact that not all employers, such as simple busi- jurisdiction.
28nesses or small-scale enterprises, have a sophisticated form of human Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
resource management, so much so that the adoption of technical indicators as Certiorari; View that Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, 597 SCRA 334
utilized through “comment cards” or “appraisal” tools should not be treated as (2009), instructs us that in a Rule 45 review (of the Court of Appeals [CA]
a prerequisite for every case of probationary engagement.—It bears mentioning decision rendered under Rule 65), the question of law that confronts the Court is
that the performance standard contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be the legal correctness of the CA decision — i.e., whether the CA correctly
contained in a specialized system of feedbacks or evaluation. The Court takes determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the National
judicial notice of the fact that not all employers, such as simple businesses or Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decision before it, and not on the basis of
small-scale enterprises, have a sophisticated form of human resource whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct.—Montoya v.
management, so much so that the adoption of technical indicators as utilized Transmed Manila Corporation, 597 SCRA 334 (2009), instructs us that in a Rule
through “comment cards” or “appraisal” tools should not be treated as a 45 review (of the CA decision rendered under Rule 65), the question of law that
prerequisite for every case of probationary engagement. In fact, even if a system confronts the Court is the legal correctness of the CA decision — i.e., whether
of such kind is employed and the procedures for its implementation are not the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
followed, once an employer determines that the probationary employee fails to in the NLRC decision before it, and not on the basis of whether the NLRC
meet the standards required for his regularization, the former is not precluded decision on the merits of the case was correct. As applied in the present
from dismissing the latter. The rule is that when a valid cause for termination case, the Court should simply determine the legal correctness of the CA’s
exists, the procedural infirmity attending the termination only warrants the finding that the NLRC ruling had basis in fact and law, not the question of
payment of nominal damages. This was the principle laid down in the landmark whether it was or was not correct.
cases of Agabon v. NLRC, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), (Agabon) and Jaka Food Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that certiorari is different
Processing Corporation v. Pacot,  454 SCRA 119 (2005), (Jaka). In the assailed from appeal.—Certiorari is different from appeal. In an appellate proceeding,
Decision, the Court actually extended the application of the Agabon and Jaka the original suit is continued on appeal. In a certiorari proceeding, the certiorari
rulings to breaches of company procedure, notwithstanding the employer’s petition is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that
compliance with the statutory requirements under the Labor Code. Hence, had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. “[T]he
although Abbott did not comply with its own termination procedure, its non- higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control
compliance thereof would not detract from the finding that there subsists a valid and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.”
cause to terminate Alcaraz’s employment. Abbott, however, was penalized for its 30
contractual breach and thereby ordered to pay nominal damages. Same; Same; Same; View that error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction. This
Brion, J., Dissenting Opinion: is the province of the writ of certiorari.—Error of jurisdiction is one where the
Labor Law; Judgments; Final Judgments; Certiorari; View that when a act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction.
labor case reaches the judicial system, courts must proceed based on two basic This is the province of the writ of certiorari. The writ of certiorari will not be
premises: first, the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued to cure errors in the appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its
is declared by law to be a final ruling that is no longer appealable; and second, conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. If the
the only remedy left to set aside or modify this ruling is through a Rule 65 review CA finds that the NLRC committed no error of jurisdiction, the Court’s task is to
by the Court of Appeals (CA) that is narrowly grounded on jurisdictional errors only determine the legal correctness of this CA finding — and not to supplant
— i.e., whether the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, the NLRC and the CA’s conclusion with what the Court thinks should be the
29or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of correct interpretation of the law, in utter disregard of the different levels of
jurisdiction.—When a labor case reaches the judicial system, courts must review the case underwent. If the Court will undertake a review of the “ancillary
proceed based on two basic premises: first, the ruling of the National Labor issues” suggested by the ponencia, the Court will in effect create a right of
Relations Commission (NLRC) is declared by law to be a final ruling that is no appeal from the NLRC ruling when the law confers none.
longer appealable; and second, the only remedy left to set aside or modify this Same; Same; Same; View that a Rule 65 petition requires the presence of
ruling is through a Rule 65 review by the CA that is narrowly grounded grave abuse of discretion — and not mere abuse of discretion — before courts
on jurisdictional errors — i.e., whether the NLRC acted without or in excess of may issue the corrective writ of certiorari in labor cases not only because the
ruling under review is already final; but, more importantly, because the probationary basis; 2. The employer must convey to the probationary employee
appreciation of the evidence and its legal effects carries with it discretion within the reasonable standards to qualify for regularization; 3. The probationary status
the bounds of the law.—Too, a Rule 65 petition requires the presence of grave of the newly-hired employee must be communicated to him prior to the
abuse of discretion — and not mere abuse of discretion — before courts may commencement of his employment; 4. The employer must convey these
issue the corrective writ of certiorari in labor cases not only because the ruling reasonable standards at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement; 5.
under review is already final; but, more importantly, because the appreciation of The employer must evaluate the performance of the probationary employee vis
the evidence and its legal effects carries with it discretion within the bounds of the duly communicated reasonable standards; and 6.
the law. The discretion granted to the NLRC to affirm or reverse the LA, on one 32The employee fails to comply with these reasonable standards before
hand, and the discretion granted to the CA to determine whether grave abuse of the completion of the probationary period.
discretion attended the NLRC’s ruling, on the other hand, are discretions within Same; Same; Security of Tenure; View that Article 281 of the Labor Code
legal bounds that the Court cannot supplant at will, much less via mere merely proceeded from the premise that security of tenure is not merely a
assumption. statutory but a constitutionally guaranteed right; The law employed a qualitative
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Security of Tenure; View that an and quantitative measurement of one’s performance by requiring a probationary
employer cannot terminate his employee’s employment (whether actual or employee’s performance to be measured on the basis of reasonable standards.—
constructive) or otherwise suspend him without any just or authorized cause and In employing its present terms, Article 281 of the Labor Code merely proceeded
without complying with the due process requirements mandated by law.—The from the premise that security of tenure is not merely a statutory but a
Constitution decrees constitutionally guaranteed right. To consider an employee’s regularization on
31that all workers are entitled to security of tenure. This means that an the overly broad basis of “adequacy of performance” alone would practically
employer cannot terminate his employee’s employment (whether actual or negate the constitutional guarantee. Rather, the law employed a qualitative and
constructive) or otherwise suspend him without any just or authorized cause and quantitative measurement of one’s performance by requiring a probationary
without complying with the due process requirements mandated by law. This employee’s performance to be measured on the basis of reasonable standards.
constitutional and statutory guarantee seeks, in the ultimate, to prevent the These standards or measurement of performance serve as a statutory limitation to
capricious exercise by the employer of his power to dismiss. Aside from the just the employer’s prerogative to dismiss an employee, consistent with the
and authorized causes provided by law, the law also allows the employer to constitutional right to security of tenure.
dismiss a probationary employee if he “fails to qualify as a regular employee in Same; Same; View that the probationary period of employment is not
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the exclusively for the benefit of the employer but of both the employer and the
employee at the time of his engagement.” The inclusion of this phrase in Article employee.—The reason for requiring the existence of reasonable standards that
281 of the Labor Code and the manner by which it is phrased indicate that: first, are duly communicated to the employee is not hard to discern. The
a probationary employment is not a default mode of an employment contract; probationary period of employment is not exclusively for the benefit of the
and second, inadequate performance of one’s duties and failure to comply with employer but of both the employer and the employee: on one hand, the
reasonable standards cannot actually mean the same thing. employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationary
Same; Probationary Employees; View that regardless of the kind of employee to ascertain whether she is qualified for permanent employment; the
employment arrangement between the parties, an employer has the right to put a probationary employee, on the other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that
newly-hired employee under a probationary period or it may choose not to do she has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards duly communicated
so, as part and parcel of its power to hire.—Regardless of the kind of by the employer for permanent employment. In the same manner that the
employment arrangement between the parties, an employer has the right to put a probationary period of employment (or trial period) is meant to serve the
newly-hired employee under a probationary period or it may choose not to do so, interests of both the employer and the employee, the requirement of reasonable
as part and parcel of its power to hire. If the employer opts for the latter, standards seeks to protect the rights of both the employer (to his management
however, he may not easily sever the relationship without proving the existence prerogative) and the employee (since his employment is in a sense a property
of a just or authorized cause and without complying with procedural due process. right).
If the employer opts to hire an employee on a probationary basis, valid severance 33
of the employer-employee relationship — outside of the just and authorized Same; Same; View that based on Article 281 of the Labor Code and
causes — presupposes that the employer had accomplished the following things: Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, a
1. The employer must communicate to the employee that he is being hired on a valid probationary employment presupposes the concurrence of two
requirements; Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a this manner, compliance with the twin requirements of a valid probationary
probationary employee, should be considered a regular employee.—Based on employment may require the employer to lay down a quantitative or qualitative
Article 281 of the Labor Code and Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of standard (or both) in measuring the performance of a probationary employee.
Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, a valid probationary employment Same; Same; Regular Employees; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages;
presupposes the concurrence of two requirements: First, the employer shall View that since Abbott failed to comply with the requisites for valid probationary
make known to the employee the reasonable standard (performance standard) employment, then Alcaraz should be deemed a regular employee who can be
that the probationary employee must comply with to qualify as a regular removed only with just or authorized causes; The abrupt and oppressive manner
employee. Second, the employer shall inform the employee of the applicable by which the petitioners dismissed Alcaraz from her employment justified the
performance standard at the time of his/her engagement. Failing in one or both, award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.—Since Abbott
the employee, even if initially hired as a probationary employee, should be failed to comply with the requisites for valid probationary employment, then
considered a regular employee. Alcaraz should be deemed a regular employee who can be removed only with
Same; Same; Performance Standards; View that performance standards just or authorized causes. In the present case, the petitioners failed to show that
are the specific expectations of the employer on how the probationary employee Alcaraz’s dismissal was for a valid cause. The petitioners also failed to comply
should perform.—For emphasis, performance standards are the specific with the two-written notice requirement under Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of
expectations of the employer on how the probationary employee should perform. the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, in violation of Alcaraz’s
These specific expectations cannot be equated with the duties and responsibilities procedural due process rights under the law. In addition, the abrupt and
attached to the position. While the “specific expectations” inhere in an employer oppressive manner by which the petitioners dismissed Alcaraz from her
and, accordingly, vary from one employer to another, the duties and employment justified the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
responsibilities inhere in the peculiarities of the particular job itself. Due to the fees.
difference between the two, proof of the existence of one does not necessarily
prove the existence of the other and vice versa. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Same; View that the communication of a performance 35
standard is a requirement imposed by law — on top of the practical requirement The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
of describing the job and communicating, expressly or impliedly, this description   Laguesma, Magsalin, Consulta and Gastardo for petitioners.
to the employee — unless the nature of the job falls within the exceptions.—   Dionela, Jimenez, Baroque, So & Salazar for respondent. 
While all jobs, regardless of their nature, would necessitate a description of what RESOLUTION
they entail, not all jobs would legally require the employers to set and PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
communicate a performance standard applicable to them, as enunciated under the For resolution is respondent Pearlie Ann Alcaraz’s (Alcaraz) Motion for
exceptions. The legal requirement for the employer to lay down and Reconsideration dated August 23, 2013 of the Court’s Decision dated July 23,
communicate the performance standards to the employee at the time of his 2013 (Decision).1
engagement arises from the nature of the probationary employment as a trial At the outset, there appears to be no substantial argument in the said motion
period. A trial period presupposes the existence of a standard against which the sufficient for the Court to depart from the pronouncements made in the initial
probationary em- ruling. But if only to address Alcaraz’s novel assertions, and to so placate any
34ployee’s performance would be tried and measured. Accordingly, the doubt or misconception in the resolution of this case, the Court proceeds to shed
communication of a performance standard is a requirement imposed by law — light on the matters indicated below.
on top of the practical requirement of describing the job and communicating, A. Manner of review.
expressly or impliedly, this description to the employee — unless the nature of Alcaraz contends that the Court should not have conducted a re-weighing of
the job falls within the exceptions. evidence since a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Same; Same; Same; View that the more complex the job is (like that of Court (Rules) is limited to the review of questions of law. She submits that since
managerial employee) the more it becomes necessary to specify what the what was under review was a ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered via a
employer’s specific expectations are vis-à-vis the duties and responsibilities that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court should only
the job entails.—The more complex the job is (like that of managerial employee) determine whether or not the CA properly determined that the National Labor
the more it becomes necessary to specify what the employer’s specific Relations Commission (NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion.
expectations are vis-à-vis the duties and responsibilities that the job entails. In The assertion does not justify the reconsideration of the assailed Decision.
_______________ Considering the foregoing incidents which were readily observable from the
1 Abbot Laboratories, Philippines v. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, July 23, records, the Court reached the conclusion that the NLRC committed grave abuse
2013, 701 SCRA 682. of discretion, viz.:
[I]n holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed due to her status as a regular
36 and not a probationary employee, the Court finds that the NLRC committed a
A careful perusal of the questioned Decision will reveal that the Court grave abuse of discretion.
actually resolved the controversy under the abovestated framework of analysis. To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision on the premise
Essentially, the Court found the CA to have committed an error in holding that that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description and Abbott’s Code of Conduct and
no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the NLRC since the latter Performance Modules was not equivalent to being actually informed of the
arbitrarily disregarded the legal implication of the attendant circumstances in this performance standards upon which she should have been evaluated on. It,
case which should have simply resulted in the finding that Alcaraz was apprised however, overlooked the legal implication of the other attendant circumstances
of the performance standards for her regularization and hence, was properly a as detailed herein which should have warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz
probationary employee. As the Court observed, an employee’s failure to perform was indeed a probationary and not a regular employee — more particularly the
the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him fact that she was well-aware of her duties and responsibilities and that her failure
constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s non-regularization. to adequately perform the
As detailed in the Decision, Alcaraz was well-apprised of her duties and _______________
responsibilities as well as the probationary status of her employment: 2 Id., at pp. 708-709.
(a) On June 27, 2004, [Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott)] caused
the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory 38same would lead to her non-regularization and eventually, her termination. 3
Affairs Manager, indicating therein the job description for as well as the duties
and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position; this prompted Alcaraz to Consequently, since the CA found that the NLRC did not commit grave
submit her application to Abbott on October 4, 2004; abuse of discretion and denied the certiorari petition before it, the reversal of its
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz ruling was thus in order.
was to be employed on a probationary status; At this juncture, it bears exposition that while NLRC decisions are, by their
(c)  On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which nature, final and executory4 and, hence, not subject to appellate review, 5 the
specifically stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period Court is not precluded from considering other questions of law aside from the
of six (6) months beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005; CA’s finding on the NLRC’s grave abuse of discretion. While the focal point of
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer, Bernardo sent analysis revolves on this issue, the Court may deal with ancillary issues — such
her copies of Abbott’s organizational structure and her job description through e- as, in this case, the question of how a probationary employee is deemed to have
mail; been informed of the standards of his regularization — if only to determine if the
(e)  Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment orientation where concepts and principles of labor law were correctly applied or misapplied by the
[Allan G. Almazar] informed her that she had to implement Abbott’s Code of NLRC in its decision. In other words, the Court’s analysis of the NLRC’s
37Conduct and office policies on human resources and finance and that she interpretation of the environmental principles and concepts of labor law is not
would be reporting directly to [Kelly Walsh]; completely prohibited in — as it is complementary to — a Rule 45 review of
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as part of her labor cases.
orientation; Finally, if only to put to rest Alcaraz’s misgivings on the manner in which
(g)  Alcaraz received copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance this case was reviewed, it bears pointing out that no “factual appellate review”
Modules from [Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa] who explained to her the procedure was conducted by the Court in the Decision. Rather, the Court proceeded to
for evaluating the performance of probationary employees; she was further interpret the relevant rules on probationary employment as applied to settled
notified that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees; and factual findings. Besides, even on the assumption that a scrutiny of facts was
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another pharmaceutical undertaken, the Court is not altogether barred from conducting the same. This
company and had admitted to have an “extensive training and background” to was explained in the case of Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v.
acquire the necessary skills for her job.2 Serna,6 wherein the Court held as follows:
_______________
3 Id., at p. 710.
 4 See Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended. management prerogative. While in some instances the standards used in
5 See St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 811; 295 SCRA 494 measuring the quality of work may be conveyed — such as workers who
(1998). construct tangible products which follow particular metrics, not all standards of
6 G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 676. quality measurement may be reducible to hard figures or are readily ar-
_______________
39 8 Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the provides that “[i]f the termination is brought about by the x x x failure of an
credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary
administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field. Nor do we employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee,
substitute our “own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.” To this end, the
weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.” The factual findings of the Court in the assailed Decision pronounced that:
NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court. Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate
Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the exercise of our performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied
discretionary appellate jurisdiction may be urged to look into factual issues standard for a probationary employee to be regularized; such is a
raised in a Rule 45 petition. For instance, when the regularization standard which need not be literally spelled out or mapped
petitioner persuasively alleges that there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence into technical indicators in every case. In this regard, it must be observed
on record to support the factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo, as Section that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the nature of a
5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states in express terms that in cases filed before management prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as Abbott
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established only if did in this case — should be respected. This is especially true of a
supported by substantial evidence.7 (Emphasis supplied) managerial employee like Alcaraz who was tasked with the vital
B. Standards for regularization; responsibility of handling the personnel and important matters of her
      conceptual under pinnings. department. (Abbot Laboratories, Philippines v. Alcaraz, supra note 1 at
Alcaraz posits that, contrary to the Court’s Decision, one’s job description pp. 709-710.)
cannot by and of itself be treated as a standard for regularization as a standard 41ticulable in specific pre-engagement descriptions. A good example would be
denotes a measure of quantity or quality. By way of example, Alcaraz cites the the case of probationary employees whose tasks involve the application of
case of a probationary salesperson and asks how does such employee achieve discretion and intellect, such as — to name a few — lawyers, artists, and
regular status if he does not know how much he needs to sell to reach the same. journalists. In these kinds of occupation, the best that the employer can do at the
The argument is untenable. time of engagement is to inform the probationary employee of his duties and
First off, the Court must correct Alcaraz’s mistaken notion: it is not the responsibilities and to orient him on how to properly proceed with the same. The
probationary employee’s job description but the adequate performance of his employer cannot bear out in exacting detail at the beginning of the engagement
duties and responsibilities which constitutes the inherent and implied standard what he deems as “quality work” especially since the probationary employee has
for regulariza- yet to submit the required output. In the ultimate analysis, the communication of
_______________ performance standards should be perceived within the context of the nature of
7 Id., at pp. 684-685. the probationary employee’s duties and responsibilities.
40tion. To echo the fundamental point of the Decision, if the probationary The same logic applies to a probationary managerial employee who is tasked
employee had been fully apprised by his employer of these duties and to supervise a particular department, as Alcaraz in this case. It is hardly possible
responsibilities, then basic knowledge and common sense dictate that he must for the employer, at the time of the employee’s engagement, to map into
adequately perform the same, else he fails to pass the probationary trial and may technical indicators, or convey in precise detail the quality standards by which
therefore be subject to termination.8 the latter should effectively manage the department. Factors which gauge the
The determination of “adequate performance” is not, in all cases, measurable ability of the managerial employee to either deal with his subordinates (e.g., how
by quantitative specification, such as that of a sales quota in Alcaraz’s example. to spur their performance, or command respect and obedience from them), or to
It is also hinged on the qualitative assessment of the employee’s work; by its organize office policies, are hardly conveyable at the outset of the engagement
nature, this largely rests on the reasonable exercise of the employer’s since the employee has yet to be immersed into the work itself. Given that a
managerial role essentially connotes an exercise of discretion, the quality of terminate Alcaraz’s employment. Abbott, however, was penalized for its
effective management can only be determined through subsequent assessment. contractual breach and thereby ordered to pay nominal damages.
While at the time of engagement, reason dictates that the employer can only As a final point, Alcaraz cannot take refuge in Aliling v. Feliciano12 (Aliling)
inform the probationary managerial employee of his duties and responsibilities as since the same is not squarely applicable to the case at bar. The employee
such and provide the allowable parameters for the same. Verily, as stated in the in Aliling, a sales executive, was belatedly informed of his quota requirement.
Decision, the adequate performance of such duties and responsibilities is, by and Thus, considering the nature of his position, the fact that he was not informed of
of itself, an implied standard of regularization. his sales quota at the time of his engagement changed the complexion of his
42 employment. Contrarily, the nature of Alcaraz’s duties and responsibilities as
In this relation, it bears mentioning that the performance standard Regulatory Affairs Manager negates the application of the foregoing. Records
contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be contained in a specialized show that Alcaraz was terminated because she (a) did not manage her time
system of feedbacks or evaluation. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective
not all employers, such as simple businesses or small-scale enterprises, have a rapport with them; (c) failed to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to
sophisticated form of human resource management, so much so that the adoption obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case processing
of technical indicators as utilized through “comment cards” or “appraisal” tools and article review which were necessary for the proper performance of her
should not be treated as a prerequisite for every case of probationary duties.13 Due to the nature and variety of these managerial functions, the best that
engagement. In fact, even if a system of such kind is employed and the Abbott could have done, at the time of Alcaraz’s engagement, was to inform her
procedures for its implementation are not followed, once an employer determines of her duties and responsibilities, the adequate performance of which, to repeat,
that the probationary employee fails to meet the standards required for his is an inherent and implied standard for regularization; this is unlike the
regularization, the former is not precluded from dismissing the latter. The rule is circumstance in Aliling where a quantitative regularization standard, in the term
that when a valid cause for termination exists, the procedural infirmity attending of a sales quota, was readily articulable to the employee at the outset. Hence,
the termination only warrants the payment of nominal damages. This was the since the reasonableness of Alcaraz’s assessment clearly appears from the
principle laid down in the landmark cases of Agabon v. NLRC9 (Agabon) records, her termination was justified. Bear in mind that the quantum of proof
and Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot 10 (Jaka). In the assailed which the employer must discharge is only substantial evidence
Decision, the Court actually extended the application of the Agabon and Jaka _______________
rulings to breaches of company procedure, notwithstanding the employer’s  with Article 2221 of the Civil Code.” (Abbot Laboratories, Philippines v.
compliance with the statutory requirements under the Labor Code. 11 Hence, Alcaraz, supra note 1 at pp. 715-716.)
although Abbott 12 G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186.
_______________ 13 Rollo, pp. 19-21, 78 and 80-81.
9 G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573.
10 G.R. No. 151378, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 119. 44which, as defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a
11 “Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon and Jaka proceed from reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
the necessity to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. 14 To the Court’s
process rights of employees. In similar regard, the Court deems it proper to apply mind, this threshold of evidence Abbott amply overcame in this case.
the same principle to the case at bar for the reason that an employer’s contractual All told, the Court hereby denies the instant motion for reconsideration and
breach of its own company procedure — albeit not statutory in source — has the thereby upholds the Decision in the main case.
parallel effect of violating the laborer’s rights. Suffice it to state, the contract is WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated August 23, 2013 of the
the law between the parties and thus, breaches of the same impel recompense to Court’s Decision dated July 23, 2013 in this case is hereby DENIED.
vindicate a right that has been violated. Consequently, while the Court is wont to SO ORDERED.
uphold the dismissal of Alcaraz because a valid cause exists, the payment of Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,
nominal damages on account of Abbott’s contractual breach is warranted in Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Reyes, JJ.,
accordance concur.
Brion, J., See: My Dissent.
43did not comply with its own termination procedure, its non-compliance Leonen, J., I join the Dissent of J. Brion.
thereof would not detract from the finding that there subsists a valid cause to
 DISSENTING OPINION 3 Id., at p. 9.

BRION, J.: 46job performance as shown by the high-handed manner Abbott used in

implementing her dismissal.
Before the Court are respondent Pearlie Ann Alcaraz’s motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s July 23, 2013 Decision, and petitioners Abbott The Comment
Laboratories, Phils. (Abbott), Cecille Terrible, Edwin Feist, Maria Olivia Yabut-
Misa, Teresita Bernardo, and Allan Almazar’s comment thereon. I submit this In their Comment, the petitioners maintained the correctness of the Court’s
Dissenting Opinion to grant the present motion for reconsideration and to ruling on both procedural and substantive grounds.
maintain my view that the petitioners’ earlier petition for review lacked merit Abbott argues that the Court correctly proceeded as it did in evaluating the
and should have been denied by the Court. facts and evidence in deciding the case. While the Court does not normally
_______________ embark on the re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, it may do
14 Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 160368, so when, among others: (i) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
March 30, 2005, 454 SCRA 792, 803. surmises or conjectures; (ii) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(iii) the findings of fact are conflicting; (iv) when the findings are contrary to the
45 trial court; and (v) the Court of Appeals (CA) manifestly overlooked certain
The Motion for Reconsideration relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would
In her motion for reconsideration, Alcaraz alleges that the Court engaged in justify a different conclusion. In the present case, all these instances are present.
judicial legislation when it equated Alcaraz’s job description and, in the process, The probationary nature of Alcaraz’s employment is clear from the evidence
enumerated the circumstances showing when and how the petitioners conveyed and should be respected. In fact, in her reply-letter to Abbott, Alcaraz even asked
Alcaraz’s duties and responsibilities to her to the reasonable standards for that the probationary period of six months be reduced to three months since
regularization required by the Labor Code. She argues that “one’s job “Abbott can already determine if [she] is fit for the position.” 4 Her statement
description cannot by itself be considered the standard for does not only show her knowledge of the nature of her employment but proves
regularization”1 because a “standard denotes a measure of quantity or her acknowledgment that there were standards to be met and that the company
quality.”2 In so doing, the Court acted contrary to the principles of social justice will evaluate her compliance with these standards.
and protection to labor The petitioners posit that this same statement belies Alcaraz’s claim that she
Alcaraz further claims that the Court erred in considering her dismissal on was not informed of these standards. 5 In fact, Alcaraz herself admitted that
the third month of her probationary employment to be a mere due process “Abbott has only one evaluation system for all types of employees in the
violation that only warrants an award of nominal damages. In support, Alcaraz organiza-
cites Abbott’s own rules under which Abbott must evaluate Alcaraz’s _______________
performance on the third and fifth months of the probationary period; if Abbott 4 Comment, p. 3.
finds Alcaraz to be underperforming on the third month, Abbott should come up 5 Id., at p. 4.
with a performance improvement plan (PEP). Only upon her failure to meet this
PEP that Abbott may end her probationary employment. 47tion.”6 She knew that she had to undergo the Probationary Performance
Alcaraz also points out that Abbott failed to abide by its own rules and Standards Evaluation (PPSE) (based on the duties and responsibilities of her
immediately dismissed Alcaraz, without any just cause under Article 281 of the position, i.e., her job description) to document her performance during the
Labor Code to support its action. Without a just cause, the dismissal is illegal and probationary period and to serve as basis in recommending her regularization or
entitles her to reinstatement and backwages. termination.
Lastly, even assuming that Abbott can terminate Alcaraz at any time for The petitioners also note that in signing her appointment paper, Alcaraz
failure to qualify for regularization, it is clear that Abbott “merely feigned its agreed “to abide by all existing policies, rules and regulations of the company, as
dissatisfaction”3 of Alcaraz’s well as those, which may hereinafter be promulgated.” 7 All these taken together
_______________ comply with the legal requirement that the probationary employee be informed
1 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4. of the reasonable standards at the time of her engagement.
2 Id. Citing Alcira v. NLRC,8 the petitioners claim that they “substantially
complied” with the notification requirement since they informed Alcaraz of the
PPSE; it is only natural that the evaluation should be made vis-à-vis the (Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escaño, Jr., G.R. No.
performance standards for the job. 190994, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 306, 314).
Discussion 10 G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334.
A. Procedural Objection
I shall first address the petitioners’ claim that the Court can normally 49legal correctness of the CA decision — i.e., whether the CA correctly
undertake a review of the facts and evidence under a Rule 45 petition, citing the determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC
numerous exceptions to what is otherwise claimed as the general rule. In doing decision before it, and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the
so, I reiterate my position in my earlier Dissent, with added arguments to merits of the case was correct. As applied in the present case, the Court
specifically address the petitioners’ claim and the ponencia’s present should simply determine the legal correctness of the CA’s finding that the
explanation. NLRC ruling had basis in fact and law, not the question of whether it was or
_______________ was not correct. I clearly stated these in my Dissenting Opinion, as follows:
6 Id., at p. 5. Specifically, in reviewing a CA labor ruling under Rule 45 of the Rules of
7 Id., at p. 8. Court, the Court’s review is limited to:
8 G.R. No. 149859, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 508. (1) Ascertaining the correctness of the CA’s decision in finding the
presence or absence of a grave abuse of discretion. This is done by examining,
48 on the basis of the parties’ presentations, whether the CA correctly determined
A1. The Rule 65 petition and that at the NLRC level, all the adduced pieces of evidence were considered; no
Montoya v. Transmed evidence which should not have been considered was considered; and the
When a labor case reaches the judicial system, courts must proceed based on evidence presented supports the NLRC findings; and
two basic premises: first, the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (2) Deciding any other jurisdictional error that attended the CA’s
(NLRC) is declared by law to be a final ruling that is no longer appealable; interpretation or application of the law.25
and second, the only remedy left to set aside or modify this ruling is through
a Rule 65 review by the CA that is narrowly grounded on jurisdictional errors  
— i.e., whether the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with While these two questions should sufficiently delimit the narrow scope of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. review under Rule 65, nonetheless, the petitioners submit that factual review is
Once the CA decision reaches the Court under a Rule 45 petition for review appropriate under the numerous exceptions cited in a case where the decisions of
on certiorari, from what prism does the Court examine the CA decision? Note the trial court and the appellate court were brought on appeal to the Supreme
that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the scope of the petition to “pure Court. Notably, jurisprudence has even extended the application of these
questions of law.”9 This review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial numerous exceptions to the decisions rendered by the labor tribunals and the CA.
discretion. Obviously, the sound judicial discretion requirement is meant to limit _______________
what could otherwise be an unlimited exercise of discretion by the Highest Court 11 Abbott Laboratories, Philippines, et al. v. Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz, G.R.
to lay open and review the whole case, both as to fact and law. No. 192571, July 23, 2013, 701 SCRA 682; emphases supplied.
Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,10 instructs us that in a Rule 45 50
review (of the CA decision rendered under Rule 65), the question of law that In other words, based on these exceptions, the existence of a conflict in the
confronts the Court is the factual findings and/or conclusions at any stage of the case, from the labor arbiter
_______________ (LA) to the CA, renders it open for the Court to conduct a factual review that is
9  A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a deemed necessary in deciding the case.
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to This approach obviously considers the Rule 65 petition route to the CA
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same (instead of this Court) only in light of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented disregards the final and unappealable character of the NLRC decision. If a
by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on court’s certiorari jurisdiction has a limited scope and breadth, the Court, under a
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the Rule 45 petition for review (of the CA decision), could not have a more
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact expanded jurisdiction than what Rule 45 expressly provides, i.e., that the issue is
limited to pure questions of law.
 Too, this approach has resulted in turning the rule (that factual findings of how a probationary employee is deemed to have been informed of the standards
labor tribunals are binding on the Court) into an exception — the Court of regularization.” To the ponencia, this considera-
effectively becomes a trier of facts — and vice versa. Notably, when one traces _______________
in jurisprudence the justification for the exception, it will invariably point to 13 Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp., 479 Phil. 768,
cases where the Supreme Court departed from the rule — that the jurisdiction of 780; 436 SCRA 123, 134-135 (2004); citation omitted.
the Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to the review of errors of
law, as the factual findings of the lower courts are deemed conclusive — when, 52tion is necessary “if only to determine if the concepts and principles of labor
among others, the findings of facts by the trial court and the appellate court are law were correctly applied or misapplied by the NLRC in its decision.”
conflicting.12 I strongly disagree with the ponencia’s reasoning for two reasons:
The indiscriminate adoption of this remedial law principle into labor cases First, the ponencia unmistakably validates the very objection I raised in my
stands on shaky legal grounds. To begin with, certiorari is different from earlier Dissenting Opinion that there were in fact no communication standards
appeal. In an appellate proceeding, the original suit is continued on appeal. In expressly communicated to Alcaraz; the Court, through the Decision under
a certiorari proceeding, the certiorari petition is an original and independent review, simply attempted to supply this fatal omission via an assumption and
action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the disjointed implication. I reiterate the following points in my earlier Dissent:
judgment or order complained The ponencia’s reasoning, however, is badly flawed.
_______________ 1st. The law and the rules require that these performance standards be
12 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 171, 180; 258 SCRA 651, 659 communicated at the time of engagement to the probationary employee. The
(1996). performance standards to be met are the employer’s specific expectations of how
the probationary employee should perform. The ponencia impliedly admits that
51of. “[T]he higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its no performance standards were expressly given but argues that because [Alcaraz]
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.” 13 had been informed of her duties and responsibilities (a fact that was and is not
Put more bluntly, when the Court undertakes a review of the factual disputed), she should be deemed to know what was expected of her for purposes
findings made by the lower courts, it does so on the premise that the of regularization. This is a major flaw that the ponencia satisfies only via an
recourse to the CA is part of the appellate process authorized by law. Hence, assumption. The ponencia apparently forgets that knowledge of duties and
when the trier of facts at the trial and appellate level reach divergent factual responsibilities is different from the measure of how these duties and
findings, even if the same pieces of evidence are before them, the Court, in the responsibilities should be delivered. They are separate elements and the latter
exercise of its sound discretion, sets aside the rule that only questions of law may element is missing in the present case.
be raised under a Rule 45 petition in order to arrive at a correct and just x x x x
decision. The same situation does not apply in labor cases because statutory 4th.  The ponencia also forgets that these “performance standards” or
law does not provide for an appellate process beyond the NLRC, and thus, measures cannot simply be assumed because they are critically important in this
the mere existence of a conflict in the factual findings at any stage of the case, or for that matter, in any case involving jobs whose duties and
proceedings does not by itself  warrant the Court to undertake an responsibilities are not simple or self-descriptive. If [Alcaraz] had been evaluated
independent review. or assessed
  53in the manner that the company’s internal rules require, these standards would
A2. The question of how a proba- have been the basis for her performance or lack of it. Last but not the least,
tionary employee “is deemed to [Alcaraz’s] services were terminated on the basis of the performance standards
have been informed of the stan- that, by law, the employer set or prescribed at the time of the employee’s
dards of his regularization” may engagement. If none had been prescribed in the first place, under what basis
be a question of law, but not from could the employee then be assessed for purposes of termination or
the prism of a decision rendered regularization?
under Rule 65
According to the ponencia, the Court may consider “other questions of law Second, in considering the “ancillary issue” as a proper subject of a Rule 45
aside from the CA’s finding on the NLRC’s grave abuse of discretion.” In the petition for review on certiorari of a ruling rendered under a Rule 65 petition,
present case, this other question of law or “ancillary issue” is the “question of the ponencia apparently fails to distinguish the difference between errors of law
and errors of jurisdiction in an attempt to justify its decision that is based solely completion of training and poor time management skills) [was] not supported
on assumptions. by evidence.
Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the 55
court without or in excess of jurisdiction. This is the province of the writ 7.        There is also no evidence to show that Abbott conveyed to or
of certiorari. The writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in the confronted Alcaraz with her alleged inefficiencies or incompetence at any time
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on during her tenure with Abbott.
the said findings and its conclusions of law. If the CA finds that the NLRC 8. While Abbott has a standard operating procedure in evaluating
committed no error of jurisdiction, the Court’s task is to only determine the legal probationary employees, there is no evidence that Alcaraz underwent this
correctness of this CA finding — and not to supplant the NLRC and the CA’s procedure.
conclusion with what the Court thinks should be the correct interpretation of the 9. What makes [Alcaraz’s] dismissal for alleged dismal performance even
law, in utter disregard of the different levels of review the case underwent. If the more highly suspicious is that she was even complimented by no less than Ms.
Court will undertake a review of the “ancillary issues” suggested by Kelly Walsh in her electronic mail dated 25 April 2005.14
the ponencia, the Court will in effect create a right of appeal from the
NLRC ruling when the law confers none.  
Too, a Rule 65 petition requires the presence of grave abuse of discretion — Based on these findings, the CA correctly determined that the NLRC did not
and not mere abuse of discretion — before courts may issue the corrective writ commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the LA’s ruling. Consider the
of certiorari in labor cases not only because the ruling under review is already following: first, the LA’s ruling that Alcaraz was apprised of the reasonable
final; but, more importantly, because the appreciation of the evidence and its standards (to qualify as regular employee) was merely based on Alcaraz’s factual
legal effects carries with it discretion within the narrations in her position paper — narrations that by themselves do not at all
54bounds of the law. The discretion granted to the NLRC to affirm or reverse speak of any reasonable performance standards. This is not even disputed by
the LA, on one hand, and the discretion granted to the CA to determine whether the ponencia; second, Alcaraz received the documents that purportedly contain
grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRC’s ruling, on the other hand, are the performance standards only on March 3, 2005 or a month after her
discretions within legal bounds that the Court cannot supplant at will, much engagement — contrary to what the law requires on when the reasonable
less via mere assumption. standards must be communicated; and third, the LA himself is not convinced
In sum, these are what the NLRC and the CA found as matters of fact and that these documents would suffice to prove the existence of performance
law: standards that he had to rely on a baseless assumption that a top level
1. Abbott failed to specify the reasonable standards by which Alcaraz’s pharmaceutical corporation would not be remiss in leaving its standards of
alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that such standards continued employment undisclosed to its employees. In reversing the CA’s
were made known to her at the time of her recruitment. ruling that no grave abuse of discretion existed, the Court itself might have
2. The employment contract does not show that Alcaraz had been apprised crossed into prohibited territory through its own grave abuse of discretion.
of the requirements to become a regular employee. _______________
3. The Labor Arbiter’s reasoning that a top level pharmaceutical 14 CA Decision, pp. 3, 13-14; NLRC Decision, pp. 12-16.
corporation would not be remiss in leaving its standards of continued 56
employment undisclosed to its employees is simply non sequitur. B. Substantive Objections
4. Alcaraz’s receipt of Abbott’s Code of Good Corporate Conduct, I. The constitutional guarantee
Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation and Performance of security of tenure
Excellence Orientation Modules for the Hospira ALSU Staff cannot be equated The Constitution decrees that all workers are entitled to security of tenure.
with being actually informed of the performance standards. Notably, what This means that an employer cannot terminate his employee’s employment
Alcaraz received was the Probationary Performance Standards for the (whether actual or constructive) or otherwise suspend him without any just or
Hospira ALSU Staff. authorized cause and without complying with the due process requirements
5.        Alcaraz received these various documents not at the time of her mandated by law. This constitutional and statutory guarantee seeks, in the
engagement but only on March 3, 2005 or a month after her engagement. ultimate, to prevent the capricious exercise by the employer of his power to
6.        Abbott’s claim on Alcaraz’s poor performance (on account of her dismiss.15
tardiness, poor time management, failure to build effective rapport, non-
 Aside from the just and authorized causes provided by law, the law also a regular employee under the Labor Code. Since a probationary employment is
allows the employer to dismiss a probationary employee if he “fails to qualify as not an “employment at will” situation
a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by 58as that phrase is understood in American jurisprudence, the only way by
the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.” The inclusion of which the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure may be enforced is to
this phrase in Article 281 of the Labor Code and the manner by which it is ensure that the employer sufficiently discharges its burden of proving
phrased indicate that: first, a probationary employment is not a default mode of compliance with these requirements in the same manner that it is burdened to
an employment contract; and second, inadequate performance of one’s prove the existence of a valid cause in dismissing an employee.16
duties and failure to comply with reasonable standards cannot actually mean the 2.        “Inadequate performance of
same thing. one’s duties” and “failure to
  comply with reasonable stan-
1.        Probationary employment dards” cannot actually mean
is not a default mode of the same thing
employment contract The ponencia reiterates that adequate performance of one’s duties and
Regardless of the kind of employment arrangement between the parties, an responsibilities constitutes the inherent and implied standard for regularization.
employer has the right to put a newly- In short, “if the probationary employee had been fully apprised by his employer
_______________ of these duties and responsibilities, then basic knowledge and common sense
15 Alert Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. v. Pasawilan, G.R. No. dictate that he must adequately perform the same.” 17 Otherwise, he may be
182397, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 655, 665, citing De Guzman, Jr. v. terminated on the ground that his performance during the probationary period is
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 188, 197- “inadequate.”
198. If this is the case, then the law could have simply stated that a probationary
employee can be dismissed “if he fails to adequately perform his duties and
57hired employee under a probationary period or it may choose not to do so, as responsibilities” if it actually meant the “adequate performance of one’s duties”
part and parcel of its power to hire. If the employer opts for the latter, and “reasonable standards” to mean the same thing.
however, he may not easily sever the relationship without proving the In employing its present terms, Article 281 of the Labor Code merely
existence of a just or authorized cause and without complying with proceeded from the premise that security of tenure is not merely a statutory but
procedural due process. If the employer opts to hire an employee on a a constitutionally guaranteed right. To consider an employee’s regularization
probationary basis, valid severance of the employer-employee relationship — _______________
outside of the just and authorized causes — presupposes that the employer 16 Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., 495 Phil. 706, 712; 456 SCRA 32, 37
had accomplished the following things: (2005).
1.    The employer must communicate to the employee that he is being hired on a 17 Draft Resolution, pp. 4-5.
probationary basis;
2.   The employer must convey to the probationary employee the reasonable 59on the overly broad basis of “adequacy of performance” alone would
standards to qualify for regularization; practically negate the constitutional guarantee. Rather, the law employed a
3. The probationary status of the newly-hired employee must be communicated qualitative and quantitative measurement of one’s performance by requiring a
to him prior to the commencement of his employment; probationary employee’s performance to be measured on the basis of reasonable
4.  The employer must convey these reasonable standards at the time of the standards. These standards or measurement of performance serve as a statutory
probationary employee’s engagement; limitation to the employer’s prerogative to dismiss an employee, consistent with
5.   The employer must evaluate the performance of the probationary employee the constitutional right to security of tenure.
vis the duly communicated reasonable standards; and The reason for requiring the existence of reasonable standards that are duly
6.  The employee fails to comply with these reasonable standards before the communicated to the employee is not hard to discern. The probationary period
completion of the probationary period. of employment is not exclusively for the benefit of the employer but of both
These cumulative requirements are demanded from the employer itself and the employer and the employee: on one hand, the employer observes the
cannot be supplied for him by law. These requirements, too, should serve to fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationary employee to ascertain whether
dispel the wrong notion that a probationary employee enjoys lesser rights than she is qualified for permanent employment; the probationary employee, on the
other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that she has the qualifications to meet 18 Supra note 16 at p. 712; p. 38.
the reasonable standards duly communicated by the employer for permanent
employment. 61sense, in regard to which there is no need to spell out a policy or standard
In the same manner that the probationary period of employment (or trial to be met,”19 then his termination on this ground will be upheld by the Court.
period) is meant to serve the interests of both the employer and the employee, the In Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation v. Ranchez,20 the
requirement of reasonable standards seeks to protect the rights of both the Court stated that a probationary employee shall be deemed a regular employee
employer (to his management prerogative) and the employee (since his where no standards are made known to him at the time of his engagement
employment is in a sense a property right). “unless the job is self-descriptive, like maid, cook, driver, or messenger.”
In the context of the present case, an employer who duly communicates to a Under these two instances, the very nature of the duty or duties to be
probationary employee these reasonable standards for regularization can performed by the employee or of what he failed to perform (showing lack of
reasonably expect that his exercise of management prerogative (whether to hire basic knowledge and common sense) is necessarily equated with the
or fire) will be respected by the State (through its labor tribunals and eventually performance standard or specific expectations of the employer as required by
the courts). Similarly, a probationary employee who has been duly informed law. Notably, what these cases instruct finds its logic in the law itself: failure to
cannot be heard to cry foul later should she fail in these performance standards of meet a performance standard that is rooted on “basic knowledge and common
which she has notice. sense” can be a valid ground to terminate a probationary employee without the
60 need of an express prior communication of the performance standard to the
II. Elements of valid proba- probationary employee. Basic knowledge and common sense should be
tionary employment possessed by anyone desiring to find a regular employment.
Based on Article 281 of the Labor Code and Section 6(d) of the Additionally, if the very nature of the job no longer permits the employer
Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, a valid probationary from specifying his expectations that would constitute performance standards
employment presupposes the concurrence of two requirements: First, the beyond what the job itself entails, the law likewise cannot demand something
employer shall make known to the employee the reasonable more from the employer. The law, however, does not bar the employer from
standard (performance standard) that the probationary employee must comply expressly laying down his terms, even with the simplicity of the job, before a
with to qualify as a regular employee. Second, the employer shall inform the probationary employee can qualify for regularization.
employee of the applicable performance standard at the time of his/her While all jobs, regardless of their nature, would necessitate a description of
engagement. Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a what they entail, not all jobs would legally require the employers to set and
probationary employee, should be considered a regular employee. communicate a performance standard applicable to them, as enunciated under the
Both these elements are sorely wanting in this case. excep-
61 _______________
1.  The rule and the exception 19 Id., at pp. 716-717; p. 43.
in jurisprudence 20 G.R. No. 177937, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 135, 145.
For emphasis, performance standards are the specific expectations of the 62tions. The legal requirement for the employer to lay down and communicate
employer on how the probationary employee should perform. These specific the performance standards to the employee at the time of his engagement arises
expectations cannot be equated with the duties and responsibilities attached to from the nature of the probationary employment as a trial period. A trial period
the position. While the “specific expectations” inhere in an employer and, presupposes the existence of a standard against which the probationary
accordingly, vary from one employer to another, the duties and responsibilities employee’s performance would be tried and measured. Accordingly, the
inhere in the peculiarities of the particular job itself. Due to the difference communication of a performance standard is a requirement imposed by law —
between the two, proof of the existence of one does not necessarily prove the on top of the practical requirement of describing the job and communicating,
existence of the other and vice versa. expressly or impliedly, this description to the employee — unless the nature of
In Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr.,18 the Court made a qualification to the the job falls within the exceptions.
rule that failure to comply with the two requirements for valid probationary In the present case, while the ponencia did not — and could not — expressly
employment would make the employment a regular employment. Where the claim that the petitioners’ case falls within the exceptions it oddly leaned on the
employee acted “in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common exceptions to stretch its reading of the general rule. This legal maneuvering is
_______________ most unwarranted for going against the basic principle in dismissal-of-employees
cases, i.e., the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner Cecille Terrible
is for a just cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal (Terrible), Abbott’s former HR Di-
is not justified.21 64rector, to discuss certain issues regarding staff performance standards. In
These observations lead to the conclusion that the law’s demand for the course x x x thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a printed copy of an e-mail
compliance with the two requirements (for a valid probationary sent by Walsh to some staff members which essentially contained queries
employment to exist) becomes greater as the complexity of the job regarding the former’s job performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action was
increases since the same complex nature of the job results in varying needs and the normal process of evaluation. Terrible said that it was not.22 (emphasis
specific expectations from different employers that are engaged in the same line ours)
of industry. Hence, it is highly inappropriate to cite Alcaraz’s “extensive training
and background” to effectively make up for Abbott’s own failure to comply with  
the requirements of the law. This is a uniform, undisputed finding of fact of the LA, the NLRC and the
In other words, the more complex the job is (like that of managerial CA. Given the difference in treatment by Abbott in Alcaraz’s case, Abbott
employee) the more it becomes necessary to specify what the employer’s cannot avoid the conclusion that it may only legally be allowed to divert from the
specific expectations are vis-à-vis the usual procedure on the ground that Alcaraz is actually bound by a different set of
_______________ specific expectations by her employer because of the nature of the duties and
21 Harborview Restaurant v. Labro, G.R. No. 168273, April 30, 2009, 587 responsibilities that a managerial employee like her has to discharge. If she is
SCRA 277, 281. bound by a different set of expectations, then Abbott must prove what these
expectations are in order to comply with the required performance standards.
63duties and responsibilities that the job entails. In this manner, compliance As the NLRC and the CA found however, there is no evidence on record to
with the twin requirements of a valid probationary employment may require the show what these standards really were and that they were duly communicated.
employer to lay down a quantitative or qualitative standard (or both) in Much less was there evidence that Alcaraz was actually evaluated on the basis of
measuring the performance of a probationary employee. the required duly communicated standards.
In the present case, none of the petitioners’ evidence shows what these Abbott’s own admission that it had only one evaluation system for all of its
quantitative and/or qualitative standards are. employees actually backfires against it for being inconsistent with its own
2.        Abbott’s pre-employment ori- conduct (when it subjected Alcaraz to a different evaluation process) and
entation and other documen- omission (when it failed to communicate to Alcaraz the performance standards
tary evidence cannot amount that are actually applicable to her). By itself, its admission proves the utter lack
to performance standards of evidence to show Abbott’s compliance with the first (and, much less the
The pre-employment orientation the petitioners conducted for Alcaraz and second) requirement of a valid probationary employee. If Abbott would insist on
the office policies communicated to her cannot be equated with the performance the uniformity of its performance standard, one can be tempted to ask whether
standards required by law. The pre-employment orientation pertains to Abbott can assess its Regulatory
Alcaraz’s duty to implement Abbott’s Code of Conduct and office policies as _______________
they relate to the staff she has to manage and supervise. The other pieces of 22 Ponencia, p. 39.
documentary evidence Abbott presented — Code of Conduct, PPSE and
Performance Excellence Orientation Modules — were likewise in line with its 65Affairs Manager, like Alcaraz, who has an initial salary of P110,000.00 on
purpose of acquainting and assisting Alcaraz in her duty in supervising and the same standard Abbott applies to its office receptionist or clerk and
evaluating the employees assigned to her department. objectively consider the application compliant with the law.
Interestingly, even if these documents were not given to Alcaraz for the To be sure, Abbott cannot answer this question affirmatively without, at the
purpose of communicating the performance standards that apply to her, Abbott same time, suggesting the superfluity of the two requirements in Article 281 of
claims that since it has only one evaluation system for all its employees, Alcaraz Labor Code for a valid probationary employment to exist. The law precisely
very well knew that the contents of these documents would be the same  measure required the performance standards to be “reasonable” since the performance
in evaluating Alcaraz’s performance. However, the facts, as found by standard applicable to only one type of employee (e.g., managerial) cannot
the ponencia itself, tell otherwise, i.e., that Alcaraz was actually subjected to reasonably be applied to a different type of employee (e.g., clerical).
a different work performance evaluation: Abbott likewise cannot answer in the negative without contradicting its own
admission on record and without emphasizing what the NLRC and the CA have
found all along — the absence of an applicable performance standard duly _______________
communicated to Alcaraz. 25 Id., at p. 201.
Since the validity of Alcaraz’s dismissal hinges on whether Abbott complied 26 Ibid.
with the twin requirements under Article 281 of the Labor Code, then proof of its
compliance with these requirements must be substantiated by the evidence — 67qualitative assessment of probationary employees now advanced by the
and not merely assumed from or impelled by something that, in the first place, ponencia.
the NLRC and the CA did not find existing. a.        The quantitative and qualitative
3. The case of Aliling v. Feliciano assessment of probationary employees
On this point, I submit that Alcira v. NLRC,23 far from advancing Abbott’s In Aliling, the letter-offer to the probationary employee states that the
position, in fact, supports this Dissent in the same manner that the case regularization standards or the performance norms to be used are still to be
of Armando Aliling v. Jose B. Feliciano, et al.,24 cited by Alcaraz, does. agreed upon by the probationary employee and his supervisor — i.e., the two
_______________ would “jointly define [their] objectives compared with the job requirements of
23 Supra note 8. In this case, the probationary employee, in fact, underwent the position”27 — without the employer proving that an agreement has, in fact,
company evaluation in accordance with the parties’ agreement. been reached. While there was evidence that the supervisor reminded the
24 G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 186. probationary employee of the sales quota he must reach for continued
employment, this standard was communicated belatedly or one month after the
66 employee’s engagement.
In Aliling, there were three grounds cited, each of which can independently While the specific expectations of an employer may cut across the details of
support the Court’s ruling, in finding that the probationary employee was one’s job description, the Court must not confuse one with the other. In the case
actually a regular employee, for failure to comply with the requirements of the of a salesperson (account executive), specific expectations may translate into the
law on probationary employment. minimum quota that a probationary employee must reach to be entitled to
First, the labor tribunals and the CA uniformly found the lack of regularization. In the present case, there is absolutely nothing in the petitioner’s
performance standards duly communicated to the employee. In the present case, evidence that would have given the NLRC and the CA — and this Court — a
the fact that the LA arrived at a conclusion different from those reached by the hint as to what the petitioners’ expectations would translate into. The ponencia’s
NLRC and the CA does not authorize the Court to simply brush aside the factual reasoning that it is the adequacy of the performance of these duties and
findings at these two levels of review because the Court’s jurisdiction under a responsibilities, which constitutes as the “implied and inherent” reasonable
Rule 45 petition is limited. More importantly, the LA’s ruling itself was legally standards for regularization, begs the question. On what basis is the “adequacy”
and factually baseless, thus warranting its reversal on appeal. legally gauged? To this argument, the ponencia offers an explanation.
At the risk of being repetitive, what the CA reviews under a Rule 65 petition The determination of “adequate performance” is not, in all case, measurable
is a ruling that under the law is already final. To warrant the issuance of the writ by quantitative specification,
of certiorari, the CA should find the existence of grave abuse of discretion. _______________
Should it find none, as in the present case, the Court, under a Rule 45 petition, is 27 Id., at p. 204.
confined to the determination of the legal correctness  of the CA’s finding that
the NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law (i.e., was not 68such as that of a sales quota… It also hinged on the qualitative assessment of
attended by grave abuse of discretion). the employee’s work; by its nature, this largely rests on the reasonable exercise
Second, the probationary employee was “assigned to GX trucking sales, an of the employer’s management prerogative. While in some instances the
activity entirely different from the Seafreight Sales he was originally hired and standards used in measuring the quality of work may be conveyed x x x not all
trained for.”25 The difference in assignment led the Court to conclude that “at the standards of quality measurement may be reducible to hard figures or are
time of his engagement, the standards relative to his assignment with GX sales readily articulable in specific pre-engagement descriptions. A good example
could not have plausibly been communicated to him as he was under Seafreight would be the case of probationary employees whose tasks involve the application
Sales.”26 of discretion and intellect, such as x x x lawyers, artists and journalist. In these
This circumstance is admittedly absent in the present case. Nonetheless, the kinds of jobs, the best that the employer can do at the time of engagement is to
third ground cited by the Court requires an extended discussion since it touches inform the probationary employee of his duties and responsibilities and to orient
on the quantitative and him on how to properly proceed with the same. The employer cannot bear out in
exacting detail at the beginning of the engagement what he deems as “quality
work” especially since the employee has yet to submit the required output. In the 31 Draft Resolution, p. 3.
ultimate analysis, the communication of performance standards should be 32 Ibid.
perceived within the context of the nature of probationary employee’s duties and
responsibilities.28 70
Abbott’s failure to comply with its own prescribed manner of determining
The fundamental flaw in the ponencia’s explanation is that it contradicts the a probationary employee’s performance goes into and against the very nature of
evidence on record. Applying the ponencia’s reasoning, Abbott itself may have the employer’s legal obligation to evaluate the probationary employee’s
recognized that the standards for measuring the quality (instead of quantity) of performance and to determine that she actually failed to comply with the
Alcaraz’s work are not “reducible to hard figures.” 29 To be able to comply with reasonable standards required by the law itself. In the ponencia’s words, this
the law, Abbott devised its own system of evaluation to measure the “adequacy reasonable standard is the adequacy of performance of her duties and
of Alcaraz’s performance.” Since the “adequacy of performance” cannot entirely responsibilities. Abbott’s failure to comply with its own procedure in evaluating
be left to the whims and caprices of Abbott, the Court can rightfully consider Alcaraz’s performance — and in actually deviating therefrom — is itself a
Abbott’s PPSE as its legal compliance with Article 281 of the Labor Code on the palpable proof that there were no duly communicated performance standards in
twin requirements of probationary employment. Abbott’s PPSE requires: the present case to begin with, both in point of fact and law.
_______________ On this point and contrary to the ponencia’s view, Abbott’s non-compliance
28 Draft Resolution, p. 5. with the terms of the PPSE cannot be regarded as a mere matter of procedural
29 Ibid. lapse. In reality, one cannot divorce the requirement of reasonable standards and
of duly communicating it to the probationary employee, on one hand, and the
69 requirement that the employee, in fact, failed to comply with these standards in
a.        Performance standards must be discussed in detail with the employee the manner that the employer himself had contractually determined if only to
within the first two weeks on the job. This means the leader should have already give life to the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure to all workers, on
identified the Core Job Responsibilities, goals, and competency expectations the other hand. For this reason, the ponencia cannot insist that the non-
prior to discussion with the probationary employee. compliance with the PPSE is only a formal defect and yet claim that adequacy of
b.        A signed copy of the Probationary Performance Standards and performance is not reducible to figures. Abbott cannot have its cake and eat it
Evaluations (PPSE) must be submitted to HRD within employee’s 1st two weeks too.
on the job. Notably, prior to or at the time of Alcaraz’s engagement, Abbott’s
c.        The completed PPSE will serve as documentation of the employee’s communications to Alcaraz comprised only of: (i) her job description; (ii) the
performance during his/her probationary period, and will serve as basis for duties and responsibilities attached to the position; (iii) the conditions of her
recommending confirmation or termination of employment with Abbott. To be employment, i.e., the position title, the assigned department, the status of
submitted to HRD on the probationary employee’s 5th month on the job.30 employment, and the period of employment; (iv) Abbott’s organizational
In short, based on Abbott’s own manner of legal compliance with the law’s structure; and (v) what she had to implement, i.e., Abbott’s Code of Conduct,
requirement on performance standards, Abbott prescribes the procedure for office policies on human resources and finance, and to whom she would be
making the evaluation and it is only through compliance with this procedure reporting to.
that Abbott’s determination of the adequacy of performance can be shown. 71
Since not all probationary standards of quality measurement are “reducible to Even if we go by the ponencia’s reasoning, these communications by
hard figures or are readily articulable in specific pre-engagement themselves do not establish the legal gauge of “adequacy” of performance by
descriptions,”31 Abbott’s PPSE is its own solution, as far as practicable, to be which Alcaraz’s probationary performance would be measured. To emphasize,
able to “map into technical indicators or convey in precise detail the quality Abbott’s PPSE serves as a legal gauge to measure the adequacy of Alcaraz’s
standards”32 by which Alcaraz’s probationary employment would be performance. Unfortunately, the silence of the ponencia and the dearth of
assessed. The truism that the substance of the law can be found in the evidence on why this legal gauge was not applied to Alcaraz would keep this
interstices of the procedure cannot be more applicable than in the present aspect of the case in mystery. To make matters worse, the PPSE (together with
case. the Performance Excellence Orientation Modules) was given to Alcaraz almost a
_______________ month after her engagement.
30 CA Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 1043.
 In other words, even the “totality of circumstances” approach by Second, the ponencia makes the qualitative assessment (in contrast with a
the ponencia is fractured from the very start. The 2nd requirement for a valid quantitative assessment) of a probationary employee far more esoteric in
probationary employment under the Labor Code is, in fact, an offshoot of the business application than it actually is. As may be implied from my earlier
first requirement of a reasonable standard: a standard is reasonable not only discussion, had Abbott discussed the PPSE with Alcaraz vis-à-vis her duties and
because it lays down the employer’s specific expectations applicable to a responsibilities, Abbott could have easily communicated to Alcaraz, at least
particular type of employee vis the attendant duties and responsibilities but also substantially, the specific expectations
because it is duly communicated to the employee. A belated communication of _______________
what the reasonable standard is deprives the standard of the character of 34  Id., at p. 6; emphasis supplied.
reasonableness.
Still, Abbott attempts to show the inadequacy of Alcaraz’s performance — 73that translate into the reasonable standards required of it by law. Not only did
although deviating from the prescribed procedure — by presenting its May 19, Abbott fail in this regard, Abbott, in fact, belatedly gave the PPSE to Alcaraz, in
2005 letter addressed to Alcaraz, noting her “NA (Not Achieved) ratings in the patent violation of Article 281 of the Labor Code.
area of Core Job Competencies.”33 The ponencia unqualifiedly bought this claim Third, the ponencia wrote too early in claiming that it did not undertake a
in this manner — “factual appellate review” of the case. Yet, it weighed in on the supposed
The employee in Aliling, a sales executive, was belatedly informed of his quota “reasonableness of [the petitioners’] assessment” of Alcaraz’s performance
requirement. Thus, considering the nature of his position, the fact the he was not because it “clearly appears on the record.” 35 As the NLRC and the CA found
informed of his sales quota at the time of his engagement changed the however, the factual accuracy of Abbott’s assessment of Alcaraz is not
complexion of his employment. Contrarily the nature of respondent’s duties and supported by evidence.
responsibilities as Regulatory b.        Rubbing it in: extension of the Agabon
_______________ and Jaka rulings does not cure a fatal
33 Abbott’s Position Paper, Rollo, p. 87. flaw
In an apparent attempt to belittle Abbott’s noncompliance with its internal
72Affairs Manager negates the application of the foregoing. Records show that procedure, the Court — for the first time — extends the application of its rulings
respondent was terminated because she x x x. Due to the nature of these tasks, in Agabon v. NLRC36 and Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot37 to the
the performance standards for measuring the same were hardly articulable present case. In these cases, the Court ruled that when a valid cause for
at the time of her engagement unlike those in Aliling which were already termination exists, the employer’s noncompliance with the procedural
conveyable. Hence, since the reasonableness of respondent’s assessment clearly requirements warrants the payment of nominal damages.
appears from the records, her termination was justified.34 In these cases, however, the procedural requirements do not have a bearing
on the validity of the dismissal since the existence of a just or authorized cause
  can be proved by independent and objective evidence. In the present case, what
 The ponencia’s statements require some serious reflection from the Court. the ponencia  advances as ground for termination of a probationary employee is
First, are we, in effect, saying that the reasonable standards required by the law the inadequacy of her probationary performance. At the risk of raising a
may be communicated at a point beyond the time of the employee’s rhetorical question, what is the legal gauge of this basis of adequacy that is
engagement? To put it bluntly, is the Court not engaging in clear judicial consistent with
legislation? Article 281 of the Labor Code is pointedly clear. _______________
Art. 281. Probationary employment.—Probationary employment shall not 35 Id., at p. 7.
exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is 36 485 Phil. 248; 442 SCRA 573 (2004).
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services 37 494 Phil. 114; 454 SCRA 119 (2005).
of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in 74the constitutionally guaranteed right of security of tenure? In other words,
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the where the validity of the cause of dismissal — adequacy of performance —
employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work cannot be resolved without undergoing the very process prescribed by the
after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. [italics employer for measuring the adequacy, there is no reason to extend the Agabon
supplied; emphasis and underscore ours] and Jaka rulings in the present case.
 On this score, it is highly inapt to equate Abbott’s internal procedure of 38 Draft Resolution, p. 6.
evaluating a probationary employee with the notice requirements under the law 39 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Arturo Brion in Abbott Laboratories,
even as a consoling gesture on the part of the Court. The inextricable Philippines, et al. v. Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz, supra note 11.
link between the procedure devised by Abbott for evaluating Alcaraz (as a 3rd. The ponencia badly contradicts itself in claiming that actual
means to qualitatively specify Abbotts’ specific expectations vis-à-vis the duties communication of specific standards might not be necessary “when the job is
and responsibilities of Alcaraz’ position and to evidence its qualitative self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or
assessment of Alcaraz), on one hand, and the end that this procedure seeks to messengers.” The respondent, in the first place, was never a maid, cook, driver or
achieve, on the other hand, suffices to distinguish Abbott’s internal procedure a messenger and cannot be placed under this classification; she was hired and
and the statutory procedural requirements. employed as a human resources manager[.] [italics supplied]
c.        Evidence of performance
standards 76thorized causes. In the present case, the petitioners failed to show that
As stated in my earlier Dissent, the performance standard contemplated in Alcaraz’s dismissal was for a valid cause. The petitioners also failed to comply
law may be proven by evidence of how the employee’s performance was with the two-written notice requirement under Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of
intended to be or was, in fact, measured by the employer. The performance the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, in violation of Alcaraz’s
standard may be in the form of a clear set of the employer’s expectations, or by a procedural due process rights under the law.
system of feedbacks (e.g., comment cards) and document evaluation or In addition, the abrupt and oppressive manner by which the petitioners
performance evaluation and appraisals conducted by the employer. dismissed Alcaraz from her employment justified the award of moral and
To this, again the ponencia offers an explanation: exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. To reiterate my earlier Dissent:
[T]he performance standard contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be The narration of facts of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA shows,
contained in a specialized system of feedbacks or evaluation. The Court takes among others, that: (1) the individual petitioners did not follow the petitioner’s
judicial notice of the fact that not all employers, such as simple businesses or prescribed procedure performance evaluation as, in fact, the respondent’s work
small-scale enterprises, have a sophisticated was not evaluated; (2) the individual petitioners, through their concerted actions,
75form of human resource management, so much so that the adoption of ganged up on the respondent in forcing her to resign from employment; (3) the
technical indicators as utilized through “comment cards” or “appraisal” tools individual petitioners pressured the respondent to resign by announcing her
should not be treated as a prerequisite for every case of probationary resignation to the office staff, thereby subjecting her to unwarranted humiliation;
engagement.38 and (4) they blackmailed the respondent by withholding her personal possessions
until she resigned from employment.
The problem with the ponencia’s explanation is that it veers away from the Bad faith can also be inferred from the lack of fairness and underhandedness
problem at hand — in the same manner that it did when it claimed that actual employed by the individual petitioners on how they informed the respondent of
communication of specific standards might not be necessary “when the job is the termination of her employment. The records disclose that the respondent was
self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or lured into a meeting on the pretext that her work performance was to be
messengers” even if Alcaraz was, in the first place, never a maid, cook, driver or evaluated; she was caught off-guard when she was informed that her
a messenger. Abbott is not engaged in a simple business nor is it a small-scale employment had been terminated. Aside from the abrupt notification, bad faith
enterprise. Abbott is a multinational corporation, with branches and can also be deduced from the fact that the termination was made immediately
different facilities located all over the world. As such, it is most unfortunate that effective; the respondent was immediately banned from the petitioner’s premises
the specialized system it actually has in place — as a legal gauge to measure the after she was informed that her employment had been terminated.
“adequacy of performance” of Alcaraz, i.e., the PPSE — was never observed,
not to mention, not duly communicated.39 77In these lights, I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
III.        Consequence of non-compliance Motion for Reconsideration denied.
with Article 281 of the Labor Code Notes.—As a matter of due process, teachers on probationary employment,
Since Abbott failed to comply with the requisites for valid probationary just like all probationary employees, have the right to know whether they have
employment, then Alcaraz should be deemed a regular employee who can be met the standards against which their performance was evaluated. (Colegio del
removed only with just or au- Santisimo Rosario vs. Rojo, 705 SCRA 63 [2013])
_______________
 Probationary employment refers to the trial stage or period during which the ——o0o——
employer examines the competency and qualifications of job applicants, and
determines whether they are qualified to be extended permanent employment
status. (Herrera-Manaois vs. St. Scholastica’s College, 712 SCRA 418 [2013]) © Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.