AIRCRAFT

Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

Takeoff Surveillance
& Monitoring
Functions
Airbus has continuously improved takeoff safety since the
“TO CONFIG TEST” pushbutton was first introduced on A300
and A310 aircraft, and with the development of the Takeoff
Surveillance (TOS1 & TOS2) and Takeoff Monitoring (TOM)
functions.
The TOS2 package that was initially developed for the A350
is now available for A320 family and A330 aircraft. This is an
opportunity to review the checks that are performed by each
function, from cockpit preparation to takeoff.
Safety first #29 October 2019 - 1/11
 This article supersedes “The Takeoff Securing function” article
published in the Safety first issue #8 (July 2009).

SECURING THE TAKEOFF

There have been several events during takeoff over this last decade. In certain
cases, the aircraft took off with incorrect trim or flaps settings, which increases the
risk of runway overrun or tail strike event. Erroneous parameters were sometimes
used for the performance calculation, leading to incorrect takeoff speeds or Flex
thrust computation. On other occasions takeoff data was not updated in the FMS
following a late runway change, leading to takeoff without the correct performance
data in the FMS. A number of aircraft started takeoff from a taxiway intersection
when the computed performance was for the entire length of runway. There were
also takeoffs starting on a taxiway or from the opposite QFU. Finally, few cases of
residual braking leading to an abnormal aircraft acceleration were reported during
takeoff roll.

Most of these events can be avoided by complying with the FCOM Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP). Indeed, several crosschecks enable the flight crew
to identify discrepancies. These examples however show that errors can still be
made, which typically occur when there are stressful situations, high crew workload,
last minute changes or demanding ATC requests.

Airbus developed Takeoff Surveillance and Monitoring functions to provide additional

safety-nets to support the flight crew during takeoff preparation and takeoff roll.

Evolution of the Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring

functions on Airbus aircraft

The “TO CONFIG TEST” pushbutton was first introduced on A300/A310 aircraft.
When pressed, it checks the correct aircraft configuration for takeoff. If the aircraft
configuration is not correct, the CONFIG light comes on the Master Warning Panel
(A300) or an ECAM alert triggers (A300-600/A310).

Airbus introduced the first step of the Takeoff Surveillance functions (TOS1) on A320
family aircraft in 2009 and then on A330/A340 aircraft in 2013. TOS1 improves the
checks performed on flaps and trim settings and adds a check of the performance
parameters entered in the FMS (aircraft weight and takeoff speeds).

The second step of the Takeoff Surveillance functions (TOS2) was introduced
on A350 aircraft in 2018 and is now available on A320 family and A330 aircraft.
TOS2 checks that the aircraft is positioned on the intended runway and that the
expected takeoff performance – based on data entered in the FMS by the crew – is
compatible with the runway distance available.

The Takeoff Monitoring function (TOM) was first developed on A380 in 2018 and is
now also available on A350. TOM monitors the acceleration of the aircraft during
the takeoff phase and warns the flight crew if a lower-than-expected acceleration
is detected.

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 2/11

AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

TOS CHECKS DURING

COCKPIT PREPARATION

ZFW and takeoff speeds check (TOS1)

During the cockpit preparation, TOS1 checks for gross errors on weight or
takeoff speeds inserted into the FMS. The MCDU/MFD can display the below
scratchpad messages (fig.1).

• ENTRY OUT OF RANGE: Inserted Zero Fuel Weight value is outside of the
correct range.
• TO SPEED TOO LOW (A320/A330) or T.O SPEED TOO LOW CHECK TOW
AND T.O DATA (A380/A350): Inserted takeoff speeds do not respect the
required margins with minimum control (VMCG, VMCA) or stall (VS1G) speeds.
• V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE: Inserted takeoff speeds do not respect the rule
V1 ≤ VR ≤ V2.
• CHECK TAKE OFF DATA: The flight crew changed the takeoff runway but
takeoff speeds that were entered are applicable for another runway. The takeoff
speeds are therefore invalidated and must be either re-entered or re-validated.

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

TOS2 computes the Lift Off Distance (LOD) expected with the performance dataset
entered by the crew (weight, thrust, Flaps, OAT and VR/V2) and compares it with
the available runway length of the takeoff runway selected in the FMS. The LOD
computation takes into account any takeoff shift entered in the MCDU/MFD. If
the available runway length is lower than the LOD, the MCDU/MFD scratchpad
displays a T.O RWY TOO SHORT message (fig.1).

FM 1 IND RDY FM 2

TAKE OFF R WY 09L

V1 FLP RETR
138 F=150
VR S LT R E T R TO S H I F T
141 S=192 [ M ] [ ]*
V2 CLEAN FLAPS/THS
143 O=216 2/UP0.6
T R A N S A LT D R T TO - F L X TO
5000 F50
T H R R E D / ACC E N G O U T ACC
2000/2000 1900
UPLINK NEXT
<TO DATA PHASE>
T.O RUNWAY TOO SHORT

TOS2

TOS1
FM 1 IND RDY FM 2 FM 1 IND RDY FM 2

INIT TAKE OFF R WY 09L

TA X I Z F W / Z F WCG V1 FLP RETR
0.4 . / . 100 F=137
TRIP /TIME B LO C K VR S LT R E T R TO S H I F T
---.-/---- . 102 S=166 [ M ] [ ]*
RT E RSV/ % V2 CLEAN FLAPS/THS
---.-/5.0 104 O=166 [ ]/[ ]
A LT N / T I M E TOW / LW T R A N S A LT D R T TO - F L X TO
---.-/---- ---.-/---.- 5000 [ ]
FINAL/TIME TRIP WIND T H R R E D / ACC E N G O U T ACC
---.-/---- HD000 2000/2000 1900
M I N D EST FO B EXTRA/TIME UPLINK NEXT
---.- ---.-/---- <TO DATA PHASE>
ENTRY OUT OF RANGE TO SPEED TOO LOW

FM 1 IND RDY FM 2 FM 1 IND RDY FM 2

TAKE OFF R WY 09L TAKE OFF R WY 09L

V1 FLP RETR V1 FLP RETR
138 F=150 142 F=137
VR S LT R E T R TO S H I F T VR S LT R E T R TO S H I F T
141 S=192 [ M ] [ ]* 146 S=166 [ M ] [ ]*
V2 CLEAN FLAPS/THS V2 CLEAN FLAPS/THS
143 O=216 2/UP0.6 144 O=166 [ ]/[ ]
T R A N S A LT D R T TO - F L X TO T R A N S A LT D R T TO - F L X TO
5000 [ ] 5000 [ ]
T H R R E D / ACC E N G O U T ACC T H R R E D / ACC E N G O U T ACC
2000/2000 1900 2000/2000 1900
(fig.1) UPLINK
<TO DATA
CO N F I R M
TO DATA *
UPLINK
<TO DATA
NEXT
PHASE>
V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE
TOS1 and TOS2 potential scratchpad CHECK TAKE OFF DATA

messages during cockpit preparation

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 3/11

TOS CHECKS AT ENGINE START

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

TOS2 re-performs a LOD check at engine start, using actual fuel quantity
data now available from the fuel system. If the available runway length is lower
than the LOD, the MCDU/MFD scratchpad displays a T.O RWY TOO SHORT
message (fig.2).

First engine
FM 1 IND RDY FM 2

start
TAKE OFF R WY 09L
V1 FLP RETR
138 F=150
VR S LT R E T R TO S H I F T
141 S=192 [ M ] [ ]*
V2 CLEAN FLAPS/THS
143 O=216 2/UP0.6
T R A N S A LT D R T TO - F L X TO
5000 F50
T H R R E D / ACC E N G O U T ACC
2000/2000 1900
UPLINK NEXT
<TO DATA PHASE>
T.O RUNWAY TOO SHORT

(fig.2)
TOS2 potential alert at first engine start

TOS CHECKS DURING

TAXI PHASE (T.O CONFIG
PUSHBUTTON PRESSED)

During taxi, the SOP request the flight crew to press the T.O CONFIG pushbutton.
TOS functions then perform the following checks:

Flaps check (TOS1)

TOS1 checks consistency between the Flaps setting inserted by the crew in
the Takeoff PERF page and the actual flaps setting. If there is an inconsistency,
this will trigger the F/CTL FLAP/MCDU DISAGREE (A320/A330/A340) (fig.3)
or F/CTL FLAP/FMS DISAGREE (A350/A380) ECAM message.

Trim Check (TOS1)

TOS1 also compares the trim setting entered by the crew into the Takeoff PERF
page with the actual Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) position and with the
trim computed by the FAC/FMGEC/FE based on the CG value provided by the
fuel management system. If an inconsistency is detected, this will trigger the
F/CTL PITCH TRIM/MCDU/CG DISAGREE (A320/A330/A340) (fig.3) or
F/CTL PITCH TRIM/FMS/CG DISAGREE (A350/A380) ECAM message.

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 4/11

AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

Takeoff speeds check (TOS1)

TOS1 performs an additional takeoff speeds check in the same way as it was
done during the cockpit preparation phase. If one of the checks fails, the Flight
Warning System triggers an ECAM alert and displays the associated MCDU/MFD
scratchpad message (fig.3):

• T.O SPEEDS TOO LOW

• T.O V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE
• T.O SPEEDS NOT INSERTED

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

TOS2 performs an additional LOD check. If the available runway length is lower than
LOD, the Flight Warning System triggers the ECAM alert T.O RWY TOO SHORT
(fig.3) and displays the associated scratchpad message.

T.O RWY TOO SHORT

T.O
CONFIG

TOS2
TOS1
F/CTL FLAP/MCDU DISAGREE

F/CTL PITCH TRIM/MCDU/CG DISAGREE

T.O SPEEDS TOO LOW

T.O V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE

T.O SPEEDS NOT INSERTED

(fig.3)
TOS1 and TOS2 potential alerts when the
T.O CONFIG pushbutton is pressed

TOS CHECKS AT TAKEOFF

THRUST APPLICATION

When the flight crew initiates the takeoff roll by setting the thrust levers to takeoff
thrust, TOS2 provides additional safety nets by checking that the aircraft is on the
intended runway and that the required liftoff distance is compatible with the available
runway distance, taking into account the real aircraft position on the runway.

Check of takeoff start position (TOS2)

When the crew applies takeoff thrust, TOS2 checks if the aircraft is positioned
within an area that contains the takeoff runway entered in the FMS (fig.4).

If the flight crew applies takeoff thrust when the aircraft is still on a taxiway and
outside the runway area, this will trigger the red ECAM warning NAV ON TAXIWAY.

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 5/11

The alert can also be an amber caution depending on the FWS standard.

If the flight crew applies takeoff thrust while the aircraft is positioned on a different
runway from the one entered into the FMS, this will trigger the ECAM caution
NAV NOT ON FMS RUNWAY.

Lift-off distance check (TOS2)

When the flight crew applies takeoff thrust, TOS2 performs a final LOD check
based on the real aircraft position. If the runway distance available in front of the
aircraft is lower than the computed LOD (e.g. an aircraft commencing takeoff
from a wrong runway intersection or from an incorrect runway with an insufficient
length), this will trigger the red ECAM warning T.O RWY TOO SHORT (fig.4).

FM 1 IND RDY FM 2

TAKE OFF R WY 09L

V1 FLP RETR
138 F=150
VR S LT R E T R TO S H I F T
141 S=192 [ M ] [ ]*
V2 CLEAN FLAPS/THS
143 O=216 2/UP0.6
T R A N S A LT D R T TO - F L X TO
NAV ON TAXIWAY
5000 [ ]
T H R R E D / ACC E N G O U T ACC
2000/2000 1900
UPLINK NEXT
<TO DATA PHASE>
T.O RUNWAY TOO SHORT

T.O RWY TOO SHORT

09
L

Takeoff runway detection area

NAV NOT ON FMS RUNWAY

09
R

(fig.4)
TOS2 potential alerts at takeoff
thrust application

De-activation of TOS 2 function

The T.O SURV pushbutton switch de-activates TOS2 function to avoid spurious alerts if the Navigation/Airport
database information for a particular airport is not up-to-date. This pushbutton switch is installed on A320/A330
aircraft equipped with the TOS2 and can be installed on A350 as an option.

(fig.5)
Example of the T.O SURV pushbutton switch
on A320 aircraft

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 6/11

AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

TAKEOFF MONITORING (TOM)

TOM provides an additional safety-net during the takeoff roll. From 30 kt, it
compares the expected acceleration with the real acceleration of the aircraft.
If the difference between the real aircraft acceleration and its expected
acceleration is more than 15 % when the aircraft reaches 90 kt, TOM will
trigger the red ECAM warning T.O ACCELERATION DEGRADED.

TOM can be de-activated on A350 aircraft using the T.O SURV pushbutton
switch (if installed).

T.O ACCELERATION DEGRADED

09
L

(fig.6)
TOM alert displayed if the difference Acceleration monitoring
between the aircraft’s actual acceleration
and its expected acceleration is more than 30 kt 90 kt
15 % when the aircraft reaches 90 kt

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

SOP ensure correct takeoff preparation

and request checks for error identification
Adherence to SOP ensures takeoff preparation is completed correctly regardless
of whether an aircraft is equipped with the Takeoff Surveillance and Monitoring
functions. Correct takeoff preparation by the crew is ensured by promoting the
following:

• A takeoff briefing should be relevant, concise and chronological

• The takeoff performance computation should be independently performed
by both flight crew members and crosschecked
• Ensure accurate aircraft positioning data by systematically inserting T.O SHIFT
during the departure phase when the takeoff will start from an intersection.

The Takeoff Surveillance and Monitoring functions must be considered

as a safety net and are not replacements for full application of SOP actions.

An up-to-date Navigation/Airport database is key

TOS2 function relies on the FMS Navigation Database (for A320/A330/A380)
and on the Airport database (for A350). Therefore the database must be up-to-
date to fully take advantage of the TOS2 function. An outdated database may
lead to spurious TOS2 ECAM alerts or non-triggering of an alert.

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 7/11

NOTAMs impacting the TOS2 function
NOTAMs that modify the runway length available may not always be incorporated
into the Navigation/Airport database. Airbus recommends that Operators
evaluate the impact on TOS2 of these NOTAMs and request that their flight
crew deactivates the function to avoid spurious alerts if necessary (fig.5).

Takeoff Surveillance alerts and RTO

Airbus recommends to reject the takeoff if TOS2 ECAM alerts are triggered at
takeoff thrust application – including:

- NAV ON TAXIWAY
- NAV NOT ON FMS RUNWAY
- T.O RWY TOO SHORT

Takeoff Monitoring alert and RTO

Many ECAM alerts are inhibited between 80 kt and 400 ft (takeoff inhibition
phase). Any warning received during this period must be considered as
significant. For this reason, Airbus recommends to reject the takeoff if the
T.O ACCELERATION DEGRADED warning is triggered. The TOM function is
designed so that if this warning appears when the aircraft reaches 90 kt, the
flight crew can safely perform a rejected takeoff before V1.

SUMMARY & AVAILABILITY OF

TOS AND TOM FUNCTIONS
Focusing on the types of event that were reported to Airbus in the last ten years (fig.7)
shows that the takeoff surveillance and monitoring functions would detect the Summary of the potential occurrences
majority of them and alert the flight crew. addressed by TOS and TOM functions

Design
Mitigation
T.O Configuration P/B TOS1 TOS2 TOM
Potential
Occurrences

Wrong CG/trim Yes (check of Trim vs

Yes (Trim inside green band)
setting FMS and computed CG)

Wrong flaps setting Yes (Flap not in CLEAN Yes (Actual Flaps vs
or FULL) FMS Flaps)
Erroneous FMS Yes
Takeoff Speeds
Runway too short Yes
for takeoff
Incorrect aircraft Yes
position at takeoff
Degraded
acceleration Yes
at takeoff

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 8/11

AIRCRAFT
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions

The table below summarizes the availability of the TOS and TOM functions on
the various aircraft types. The availability for retrofit depends on the exact aircraft
configuration (FMS, EIS, ADIRU, and FWS standards). For more details on the
system pre-requisites, operators are invited to contact Airbus customer support.

Aircraft Type T.O CONFIG P/B TOS1 TOS2 TOM

A300 Basic No No No

A310 Basic No No No

A300-600 Basic No No No

Under
FMS
A320 Basic Option feasibility
R1A*
study

Under
FMS
A330 Basic Option feasibility
R1A*
study

A340 Basic FMS

R1A* No No

A350 Basic Basic Basic Basic**

Under
A380 Basic Basic feasibility Basic
study

* TOS1 is basically activated on all aircraft fitted with FMS2 release

(fig.8)
1a and later standards (see below table for availability)
Availability of the Takeoff Surveillance
and Monitoring functions
**Available on A350-1000 in 2020

Aircraft HONEYWELL FMS THALES FMS

Types & Delivery Delivery
Engines MSN* MSN*
Date Date
A320 CFM56 4379 Aug-10 4030 Sep-09
A320 IAE 4066 Oct-09 4110 Dec-09
A320neo All aircraft
A330 GE 1458 Nov-13 1276 Jan-12
A330 PW/RR 1425 Jun-13 1627 May-15
A330neo All aircraft
(fig.9) A340 Retrofit only
Availability of the TOS1 (Release 1A * Manufacturer Serial Number: first aircraft with FMS release
FMS standard or later standards)
for A320/A330/A340 aircraft
1a or later standard installed in production line

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 9/11

 Airbus developed the Takeoff Surveillance TOS 1 & TOS 2 and Takeoff
CONTRIBUTORS:
Monitoring (TOM) functions to provide an additional safety-net against
Daniel LOPEZ FERNANDEZ the risks of runway overrun or tailstrike at takeoff that may occur due to:
Director Product Safety
Enhancement - Errors in takeoff performance computation, or errors when entering
Product Safety takeoff data
- Takeoff starting from an incorrect position
Marie PALARIC
TOS/TOM Product Leader - A degraded acceleration condition, where the aircraft’s actual
Engineering Aircraft acceleration is lower than the expected acceleration during the
Performance takeoff roll.

Annabelle BLUSSON The TOS2 was initially developed for the A350 aircraft and it is now
Flight Operations Support available for the A320 family and on A330 aircraft.

It is important to remember that these Takeoff Surveillance functions

are enhancements that act as an additional safety-net. They do not
replace the correct application of SOP by the flight crew.

Safety first #29 October 2019 - 10/11

Safety first, #29 October, 2019. Safety first is
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Safety first #29 October 2019 - 11/11