MUPAS.

Ruling: Eminent domain is a fundamental state power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the power of a
sovereign state to appropriate private property within its territorial sovereignty to promote public welfare. The
exercise of this power is based on the State’s primary duty to serve the common need and advance the general
welfare. It is an inherent power and is not conferred by the Constitution. It is inalienable and no legislative act or
agreement can serve to abrogate the power of eminent domain when public necessity and convenience require its
exercise.
The decision to exercise the power of eminent domain rests with the legislature which has the exclusive power to
prescribe how and by whom the power of eminent domain is to be exercised. Thus, the Executive Department
cannot condemn properties for its own use without direct authority from the Congress.

MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA V. PATHFINDER (2016)

Respondent Pathfinder is the owner of several real properties in Cordova, Cebu.

• Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan of the Municiplity of Cordova enacted an ordinance expropriating some
parcels of land owned by Eric Ng Mendoza for the construction of road access from national highway to municipal
roll-on/roll-off RORO port. The Ordinance also authorized Mayor of Cordova to initiate and execute necessary
expropriation proceedings.

Respondents filed for an action to declare null and void the expropriation Ordinance before RTC. Respondents
claimed that no offer to buy addressed to them was shown or attached to expropriation complaint, thereby rendering
the Ordinance constitutionally infirm

ISSUE:
Whether the Municipality of Cordova may exercise the power of eminent domain?

HELD:
YES. Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to
promote public welfare. The 2 Constitutional requirements are: a) just compensation; and b) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The power of eminent domain is essentially
legislative in nature but may be validly delegated to local government units. Judicial review of the exercise of the
power of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the
necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking. The power of eminent domain is
essentially legislative in nature but may validly delegated to LGUs.

Here, the basis of Municipality of Cordova’s (as an LGU) exercise of eminent domain lies under Section 19 of RA
7160.
NOTE:
Here, the exercise of eminent domain is valid because there is indeed a necessity for the taking of the subject
properties as these would provide access towards the RORO port being constructed in the municipality. The
construction of the new road will highly benefit the public as it will enable shippers and passengers to gain access to
the port from the main public road or highway.

PNOR, SUPRA

Doctrine: In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public utilities, and other persons and entities,
the right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a delegated power. In fact, even as to municipal corporations, it
has been held that they can exercise the right of eminent domain only if some law exists conferring the power upon
them.

City of Manila vs. Prieto

Doctrine: LGU’s exercise of power of eminent domain must conform to the additional requisites laid down under
R.A. No. 7279, in addition to the basic requisites thereof.

City Council of Manila (CM) enacted Ordinance that authorized the City Mayor to acquire certain parcels of land
belonging to respondents to be used for the City of Manila's Land-For-The-Landless Program. Due to failure of
negotiation, CM filed a petition to exercise expropriation

Issue: Whether or not petitioner have validly exercised the power of eminent domain. NO

Requisites of Eminent Domain under Sec.19 of LGC:

(1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive; (2) the power of
eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; (3)
there is payment of just compensation; (4) a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Further, Sec. 19 states that exercise of such power should be pursuant to the Constitution and other pertinent laws.
R.A. No. 7279 is such pertinent law in this case as it governs the local expropriation of properties for purposes of
urban land reform and housing. Thus, Sec. 9 and 10 of RA7279 cannot be disregarded. Section 9 provides for an
order under which lands for socialized housing shall be acquired. Apparently, Privately-owned lands are placed in
the bottom, meaning all other options should be exhausted before resorting to private lands. Section 10 provides for
Modes of Land Acquisition. It states that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted.
In this case, nothing in the records indicating that petitioner complied with Section 19 of the LGC and Sections 9
and 10 of R.A. No. 7279. There was no showing that any attempt was made to first acquire the lands listed in
Section 9(a) to (e) before proceeding to expropriate respondents' private lands. There was also no evidence
presented to prove a study allegedly conducted showing comparisons and considerations to support petitioner's
conclusion that on-site development was its best choice. There was likewise no evidence presented to show that the
prospective beneficiaries of the expropriation are the "underprivileged and homeless" contemplated under Section 8.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition under Section 10 were first exhausted.

B. When exercise

Congress,

LGU (SECTION 19, ra 7160) LGU may appropriate private property for public use, or purpose, or
welfare. For the benefit of the poor and the landless.

Required by law is an ordinance.

c. Stages

a. First Stage- Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts of the case.

First Stage starts when the plaintiff files an expropriation suit and ends with the court deciding
whether the plaintiff has authority to exercise the expropriation or eminent domain.

-Respondent can appeal. Without awaiting the decision of the court for second stage.

-After of filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant

“plaintiff have the right to enter the property of the defendant upon depositing with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. (rule 67,
ROC) (WRIT OF POSSESSION BECOME MINISTERIAL TO THE COURT. )

-Scrictly construed against expropriator

-By filing the expropriation proceedings, the (condemnor) merely serves notice that it is taking
the property. (defendant asserting title or interest in the property)

Defendant - Not merely the owner. It can be the mortgagee, vendee, leases

B. Second Stage- the determination of the court of “just compensation”. Done with the assistance of
not more than 3 commissioners.

What constitutes Just compensation is a JUDICIAL prerogative. Congress determination can be

used a mare preliminary determination or a guideline.

Trial with commissioners is indispensable. –this is substantial of a defendant cannot be

dispensed with.

Paid with MONEY.

Compensation determined as of the date of filing of the complaint. If complaint was filed
after TAKING the property from the owner. The compensation is determined on the date of the
taking.

PNOC, SUPRA  
Complaint for Expropriation filed by respondent NGCP against petitioner PAFC. NGCP alleged that, in
order for it to construct and maintain the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission Line Project, it sought to
expropriate, upon payment of just compensation, a certain area of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Batangas II, Mariveles, Bataan and Barangay Lamao, Limay, Bataan. The subject property is part of the
Petrochemical Industrial Park. Administration, management, and ownership of the parcel of land of the
public domain located at Lamao, Limay, Bataan covered by P.P. No. 361, as amended by P.P. No. 630, to
the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). NGCP filed its Complaint seeking to expropriate the subject
property from petitioner PAFC.

Power of eminent domain lodged in congress.

BUT In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public utilities, and other persons and
entities, the right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a delegated power. Hence, with the right of
eminent domain not being an inherent power for private corporations, whose right to expropriate is
granted by mere legislative fiat, the delegate's exercise of the right of eminent domain is restrictively
limited to the confines of the delegating law.

Issue: Whether or not NGCP has the power to expropriate public property through its general
authority under RA 9511 – NO
Therefore, with respondent NGCP's power to expropriate being a mere delegated power from Congress
by virtue of R.A. No. 9511, respondent NGCP's exercise of the right of eminent domain over the subject
property must conform to the limits set under the said law. Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 is clear, plain, and
free from any ambiguity. Respondent NGCP is allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain only with
respect to private property.

Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate of

legislature acting under the general grant of authority.
RA 9511 states that it can only expropriate private property.

2. Whether or not NGCP can validly expropriate the property? YES.

The subject property, though owned by a State instrumentality, is considered patrimonial property that
assumes the nature of private property. First and foremost, it is admitted by all parties that the subject
property, sitting within the Petrochemical Industrial Park, is an industrial zone. In Republic v. East
Silverlane Realty Development Corp., the Court held that when the subject property therein was
classified by the government as an industrial zone, the subject property therein "had been
declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began to run."

that it was necessary for respondent NGCP to establish the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV
Transmission Line Project due to the increased demand for electricity in the provinces of
Bataan and Zambales, and that the technical teams of the parties already agreed on a
revised route that provided for a safe and viable route for the transmission lines, taking
into consideration the safety and security concerns of Orica.

Therefore, the Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent NGCP's act of

expropriating the subject property was reasonably necessary for the realization of the
purposes for which its franchise is granted.

Premises considered, the Court upholds the assailed Order of Expropriation issued by
the RTC, considering that respondent NGCP validly expropriated the subject property.

D. Requisites for Exercise of Eminent domain

A. Necessity

WHEN EXERCISED BY LEGISLATURE: POLITICAL QUESTION

WHEN DELEGATED: JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

Issue of Necessity: matter properly addressed in the RTC in the course of expropriation
proceedings

Genuine Necessity must be of public character

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC v. SPOUSES VICENTE ABECINA AND MARIA
CLEOFE ABECINA

1. the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management,
operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP) under
the National Telephone Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1).

Thereafter, the Municipality of Jose Panaganiban of Camarines Norte donated a 1,200 Square Meter parcel of land
to the DOTC for the establishment of the needed facilities of the said operation.

However, the conflict of this case has surfaced when the portion of the respondent’s property was inadvertedly
included to the said donated area. Which eventually prompted the spouses to demand the Digitel to vacate the
said area; however demand was unheeded. Thereafter, an Accion Publiciana case was instituted. In the RTC, Digitel
agreed to enter into compromise agreement to lease the subject property; however, DOTC assailed the doctrine of
immunity from suit on its answer from the complaint.

The RTC held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the respondent spouses enjoyed the right to
use and to possess them - rights that were violated by the DOTC's unauthorized entry, construction, and refusal to
vacate.

Issue:

RULING: The SC ruled that CA did not err in this case.

AS TO THE IMMUNITY OF THE DOTC FROM SUIT, THE SC STATED THAT:

 The DOTC encroached on the respondents' properties when it constructed the local telephone exchange
in Daet, Camarines Norte. The exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone
Program. We have no doubt that when the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and
subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign
function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC's contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall within
the cloak of state immunity.

the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.

Consequently, our laws require that the State's power of eminent domain shall be exercised through
expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary
implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity

AS TO THE NECESSITY OF THE TAKING (TOPIC UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN) vis-à-vis the contention of the DOTC
that the property should not be reconveyed to the respondent as it is vital to the government, the SC stated
that:

The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine necessity to take the property for public use and
the consequent payment of just compensation. The property is evidently being used for a public
purpose. However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly entered into a lease agreement
with Digitel for the use of the subject properties.

The exercise is not “genuine necessity” enough to expropriate the property of the spouses because there
was an agreement in DIGITEL as to the payment of the usage of the real property.

If in the future the factual circumstances shoul d change and the respondents refuse to continue the
lease, then the DOTC may initiate expropriation proceedings. But as matters now stand, the respondents
are clearly willing to lease the property. Therefore, we find no genuine necessity for the DOTC to actually
take the property at this point

B. Private Property

-private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate of

legislature acting under a general grant of authority.

-ALL PRIVATE PROPERTY ARE CAPABLE OF OWNERSHIP may be appropriated.

Except money and chose of action. (payment of debts and damages from third party)

-Even services can be expropriated.

Gatchalian vs. Flores

G.R. No. 225176, January 19, 2018
Topic: Private Property

Doctrine: The mere usage by the public of the road lot does not make it public property. To convert
the same to public property, it must be expropriated by the government or the registered owner must
donate or sell the same to the government. The road is not converted into public property by mere
tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's passage through it.

Facts: the lot of Segundo Mendoza encroached a portion of Road Lot 23 which the Gatchalian's
had tolerated. But after several years, the lot of Segundo Mendoza was sold and subdivided
among the new owners including herein respondents.

Gatchalian family were constrained to withdraw their tolerated possession, use and occupation
of the portion of Road Lot 23. Verbal and written demands to vacate were then served upon
them but remained unheeded. Their dispute reached the Lupong Tagapamayapa but all in vain.
Hence, the filing of the ejectment case against the respondents.

For their part, respondents denied that they usurped the property of petitioner. They insisted that
Road Lot 23 is a public road and is now known as "Don Juan Street Cat-Mendoza". In the
subdivision plan of the GAT Mendoza Housing area, Road Lot 23 is constituted as a right of way.
Respondents believed that petitioner has no cause of action against them and has no authority to file
the instant case because it is the City Government of Parañaque which has the right to do so

While respondents do not claim ownership of the subject lot, they argued that the road lot is now
public property because of Ordinance No. 88-04, series of 1988 constituting it as "Don Juan St. Gat-
Mendoza".

Issue: Whether or not the subject land is a public property?

Ruling:

No. it is not. It is still a private land.

Contrary to the position of petitioners,

the use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private
character. The road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner
of the public's passage through it. To repeat, "the local government should first acquire them
by donation, purchase or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road." 14

Since the local government of Paranaque has not purchased nor undertaken any expropriation
proceedings, neither did the petitioner and his siblings donate the subject property, the latter is
still a private property and Ordinance No. 88-04 did not convert the same to public property.
Republic vs. Sps.Llamas (Road Widening project)
G.R. No. 194190, January 25, 2017
Topic: Eminent Domain; Requisite for Exercise; Private Property

Doctrine: A "positive act" must first be made by the "owner-developer before the city or
municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As there is no such thing as an
automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be
effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to
the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation."

Facts: On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to
the Llamas Spouses of just compensation at ₱12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters;
for road widening project. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted
that these were subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which
"belonged to the community for whom they were made." The Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the DPWH to pay the
Llamas Spouses just compensation for the lots, inclusive of the portions excluded by the
Regional Trial Court.

The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not compensable
since they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of man."

Issue: Whether subdivision roads were automatically passed ownership to the government. NO.

Ruling: The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first be made by the
"owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision
roads."52 As there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road
lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets
belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of
just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road."

This Court's 2014 Decision in Republic v. Ortigas succinctly captures all that we have previously
stated:

Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use,
remain private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by donation or
through expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate his or her property
even if it has been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or
she may even choose to retain said properties.

The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road lots covered
by TCT No. 179165 have actually been donated to the government or that their transfer has
otherwise been consummated by respondents. It only theorizes that they have been
automatically transferred. Neither has expropriation ever been fully effected. Precisely, we are
resolving this expropriation controversy only now.

Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of Parafiaque to
acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character
(albeit all parties acknowledge them to be subject to an easement of right of way). Accordingly,
just compensation must be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots in the
course of a road widening project.

C. Taking

VALID TAKING

A. Expropriator must enter a PRIVATE PROPERTY

B. Entry must be for MORE THAN A MOMENTARY PERIOD
C. Entry must be under warrant of COLOR OF AUTHORITY
D. Property must be devoted for PUBLIC USE
E. Utilization must be in a way to OUST THE OWNER AND DEPRIVE HIM OF BENEFICIAL
ENJOYMENT OF THE PROPERTY

-imposition of easement

-prohibiting a building obstructing the view of plaza from the highway

D. Public Use

“meeting public need or public exigency”

Synonyms with “public interest” “public benefit” “public welfare” “public convenience”

Extends to even not available to public but redound to their indirect advantage or benefit

E. Just Compensation
Full and fair equivalent of the property taken.

True measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.

It is the FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.

Zonal Value- only one of the standards in valuing the property.