PROJECT 1: DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL

A project by

Anonymous
 GROUP PROJECT

(SEMESTER 1, SESSION 2010/2011)

CONTENTS

CONTENTS....................................................................................................................................................I
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................- 1 -
1.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................- 1 -
1.2 Objective.................................................................................................................................- 1 -
1.3 Ethical Concerns............................................................................................................................- 2 -
1.3.1 Universalizability (Reversibility)..............................................................................................- 2 -
1.3.2 Act Utilitarianism....................................................................................................................- 2 -
1.3.3 Rule Utilitarianism..................................................................................................................- 2 -
1.3.4 Cost Benefit Analysis..............................................................................................................- 2 -
1.3.5 Respect for Individuals...........................................................................................................- 2 -
1.3.6 Engineering Code of Ethics.....................................................................................................- 3 -
1.4 Possible Conflicts of Interest.........................................................................................................- 3 -
1.4.1 Public Interest.........................................................................................................................- 3 -
1.4.2 Self Interest............................................................................................................................- 4 -
CHAPTER 2: COST & TIME vs. SAFETY......................................................................................................- 6 -
2.1 Well Design....................................................................................................................................- 6 -
2.2 Centralizers....................................................................................................................................- 7 -
2.3 Cement Bond Log..........................................................................................................................- 7 -
2.4 Blowout Preventer (BOP)..............................................................................................................- 8 -
 2.4 Theory of Ethics.............................................................................................................................- 8 -
2.4.1 Reversibility............................................................................................................................- 8 -
2.4.2 Act Utilitarianism....................................................................................................................- 9 -
2.4.3 Cost Benefit Analysis..............................................................................................................- 9 -
2.4.4 Code of Ethics.........................................................................................................................- 9 -
CHAPTER 3: THE 3Cs - Communication and Company Culture..............................................................- 11 -
3.1 Whistle Blowing...........................................................................................................................- 11 -
3.1.1 Universalizability...................................................................................................................- 11 -
3.1.2 Act Utilitarianism..................................................................................................................- 11 -
3.1.3 Rule Utilitarianism................................................................................................................- 11 -
3.1.4 Respect-For-Individual..........................................................................................................- 12 -
3.1.5 Code of Ethics.......................................................................................................................- 12 -
3.2 Company Culture.........................................................................................................................- 12 -
3.2.1 Reversibility..........................................................................................................................- 13 -
3.2.2 Act Utilitarianism..................................................................................................................- 13 -
3.2.3 Rule Utilitarianism................................................................................................................- 13 -
3.2.4 Respect for Individual...........................................................................................................- 14 -
3.2.5 Code of Ethics.......................................................................................................................- 14 -
CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION MANIPULATION........................................................................................- 15 -
4.1 Background..................................................................................................................................- 15 -
4.2 Theory of Ethics...........................................................................................................................- 15 -
4.2.1 Reversibility..........................................................................................................................- 15 -
4.2.2 Utilitarianism........................................................................................................................- 16 -
4.2.3 Violation of Code of Ethics....................................................................................................- 16 -
CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY.......................................................................................................................- 19 -
5.1 Background..................................................................................................................................- 19 -
5.2 Comparison with BP case............................................................................................................- 19 -
5.2.1 Violation of BP’s own company polices and code of ethics..................................................- 19 -
5.2.2 Trade-off between safety for lower costs and shorter time.................................................- 20 -
5.2.3 “Silent” culture.....................................................................................................................- 20 -
5.2.4 Management and Employee’s Differing Views on safety......................................................- 20 -
5.3 BP fails to learn from past mistakes............................................................................................- 21 -
CHAPTER 6: SOLUTIONS........................................................................................................................- 22 -
6.1 Following Code of Ethics..............................................................................................................- 22 -
6.2 Finding the Best Compromise......................................................................................................- 22 -
6.3 External Whistle-Blowing Agencies.............................................................................................- 22 -
6.4 Respecting the Hierarchy of the Company..................................................................................- 22 -
6.5 Internal Task Force......................................................................................................................- 23 -
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................- 24 -
REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................................- 25 -
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
Ethical cases often go far beyond issues of public safety. Many involve bribery, environmental
damages, honesty, whistle-blowing and conflicts of interest. There are many rights and
responsibilities that engineers must exercise in their professional engineer careers. Often these
right and responsibilities overlap. When confronted by engineering ethical problems, how should
the engineers respond? Various ethical principles and codes of ethics are promulgated by
professional societies. These guidelines can help engineers in making decision about how to
conduct themselves and how to resolve the ethical issues.

This report will cover a recent incident, Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which is rather
controversial for its ethical problems, and a few related case studies. Nature of the accident and
decisions taken by parties involved will be analyzed and discussed according to the relevant
ethical principles.

1.1.1 Background

Deepwater Horizon oil spill is a catastrophic oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico which is the
largest of offshore spill in U.S. history. On the April 20th, 2010, a BP drilling oil-rig suffered an
explosion, spilling 42000 gallons of oil everyday straight to the ocean. Eleven platform workers
died and 17 others were injured in the disaster. Despite the mammoth clean-up operations, BP
still failed to stem the oil spill six days after the explosion. On July 15, BP said the leak had been
stopped by capping the gushing oil wellhead, though there is a new leak emerging on the sea
floor. The actions taken by BP and its engineers have raised questions and public outrage.
Lawmakers also raised the ethical concerns about how decisions are made by BP and the health
impact on those who live in the affected region, fishermen, marine lives and the environment.

1.2 Objective
The aim of the report is to investigate what actions and how decisions are taken by BP
management and engineers and Halliburton before and after the explosion of oil rig occurs.
Based on the Professional Code of Ethics, it is going to be discussed whether the actions taken
by all the parties involved are appropriate. The controversial actions that will be the focus of this

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report include compromise between safety and cost, communication problem regarding safety,
and information manipulation undertaken by BP. These discussions will be based on the relevant
Code of Ethics for both the engineer and management side. And, its influences on all parties
involved in this oil disaster will be further elaborated on. This report also aims to learn more
about the company, BP, itself and make comparisons with previous accidents that they had.
Lastly, this report seeks to discuss several recommendations which might be useful in future
cases.

1.3 Ethical Concerns

In this project, several theories of ethics will be used to discuss the ethical concerns involved.
Below are descriptions of the theories that will be used. In subsequent chapters, they will be
applied to the issue of concern.

1.3.1 Universalizability (Reversibility)

Universalisability is a general principal which demands consistency in human being’s moral
thinking. Reversibility is a special case of universalizability. Someone who holds the principle of
reversibility will weigh an action after considering what if he is at other party’s shoe.

1.3.2 Act Utilitarianism

Act utilitarianism attempts to determine which cause of action produces maximum happiness or
the greatest benefits as consequences. Rules must be broken, if necessary, to achieve this.

1.3.3 Rule Utilitarianism

Rule Utilitarianism asks the following two questions: “What general rule would one be
following?” and “Does it maximize benefits by following this rule?”

1.3.4 Cost Benefit Analysis

Cost Benefit Analysis is often used in engineering; especially in large projects. This method
reduces every factor and consequence of an action into its monetary value and whether the action
is acceptable or not is based on the cost/benefit ratio.

1.3.5 Respect for Individuals

This approach holds the rights of individuals of groups paramount to any overall benefits that
would be caused by an action. The highest right of an individual is his/her own life.

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1.3.6 Engineering Code of Ethics
In this case study, several codes of ethics that are frequently used in engineering field will be
used. Relevant clauses will be extracted and applied to the ethical evaluation. Below are the
codes of ethics which referred to later in the report:

 ASME Fundamental Canons

 BP’s own Code of Conduct
 IEEE Code of Ethics
 Instituto De Consejeros- Administradores (Spain), Code of Ethics for Companies
 NSPE Code of Ethics

1.4 Possible Conflicts of Interest

Conflict of interest is a conflict between one's obligation to the public good and one's self-
interest. The purpose of this section is to highlight the possible conflicts of interest between the
various parties involved, namely BP Engineers, BP management and Halliburton. Knowing these
conflicts of interest will give better understanding why and how the parties involved make
decisions. It also helps to examine whether the parties involved are biased and are neglecting
ethics at the expense of personal interest.

According to the American Society of Civil Engineers Code of Ethics Canon 1.d, 1.e,
“Engineers should seek opportunities to be of constructive service in civic affairs and work for
the advancement of the safety, health and well-being of their communities, and the protection of
the environment through the practice of sustainable development.” and “Engineers should be
committed to improving the environment by adherence to the principles of sustainable
development so as to enhance the quality of life of the general public.”

As mentioned in the aforementioned code of ethics, BP, as well as Halliburton, have obligation
to preserve the environment health and well-being of their community, which in this case refers
to people living nearby and those whose business are affected.

1.4.1 Public Interest

1.4.1.1 Environment Health

Oil spills present high risk for enormous harm to marine life and ecosystem. In the short-run,
toxic and smothering oil waste instigates mass mortality and contamination of fish and other

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food species. And, in the long-run, it triggers long-term ecological effects that may be even
detrimental to the environment, compared to its short-run effect. Oil waste poisons the sensitive
marine substrate, on which fish and sea creatures feed on. This will interrupt the food chain of
the marine ecosystem, and is harmful to the existence of certain species in the marine life.
Furthermore, other wildlife including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, and birds that live in or
near the ocean, will also be poisoned by oil waste and may lose their source of food.

1.4.1.2 Community Interest

Oil spills can also have devastating short-term and long-term effects on the local economy and
society. Oil waste invades and pollutes the coastal areas, which would drive tourists away from
these places. People who are depending on recreational attractions and related facilities that have
been developed for fishing, scuba diving, swimming, nature parks and preserves, beaches, and
other resident and tourist attractions, for source of income will lose their means of living. These
people will not only lose their source of income, but the property values for housing will tend to
decrease, regional business activity declines, inhibiting future investment around the area.

1.4.2 Self Interest

1.4.2.1 BP Engineers
The engineers have put forward their concern over the lack of safety design to the management.
However, they still go for the riskier safety option, as suggested by the managers, because of
self-interest in securing their jobs. As employees, they may fear of losing their job if they go
head-on with the company or higher level management. As such, they did not whistle-blow and
continued doing the improper safety measures. The engineers’ concern for protecting their job
has outweighed the public safety and environmental damage.

1.4.2.2 BP Management
As managers, they have responsibility to ensure the company is running at minimal cost and
maximum profit. They usually work under specific time constraints and budgeted expenses to
achieve their target performance. When they reach the target, they can get bonuses/incentives or
be promoted to higher level position. This self-interest may motivate managers to opt for the less
costly design at the expense of the safety.

1.4.2.3 Halliburton

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Halliburton tends to follow BP instructions for the oil well design to ensure the customer (BP) is
satisfied although Halliburton knew that the failure probability was very high. If Halliburton
insisted on BP to use the better oil well design, BP might disagree with Halliburton and find
another oil rig operator. Halliburton might then lose its valuable customer. Moreover, its
reputation on customer satisfactory would be damaged and Halliburton may lose possible future
contracts with other customers. Hence, Halliburton, for its self-interest, has foregone their
responsibility towards the public interest.

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 CHAPTER 2: COST & TIME vs. SAFETY

2.1 Well Design

Firstly, Halliburton proposed two primary options of well design to BP. One option involves two
steel tubes, the liner and tieback. The liner tube is hanging from the liner hanger at the bottom of
the casing already in. The tieback tube is inserted on top of the liner hanger. In this liner/tieback
option, not only are four barriers for annular flow provided, but liner hanger also acts as second
barrier for Hydro Carbon in annulus (BP, 2010). Furthermore, it has higher chance to succeed in
cement lift. It is easier to remedy the cement job even if it is required. However, liner/tieback
option has its drawbacks. It takes more time and cost to build as compared to the second option,
long string casing.

On the other hand, long string casing involves running only one string of steel tube from the
seafloor all the way to the bottom of the well. String option only provides two barriers for
annular flow (BP, 2010). Moreover, it is indicated by cement simulation that cement job will be
likely unsuccessful because of formation breakdown. In addition, it would violate MMS
regulations of 500 feet of cement above the top Hydro Carbon zone, and it is required bond log
to be verified. In spite of the aforementioned risks, long string casing installation is less time
consuming and less costly than liner/tieback which in turn influenced BP’s decision to use the
latter.

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For economic reason, BP decided to use the long string casing option despite its possible
drawbacks. Liner/tieback option was rejected even though it will be safer option as
recommended by Halliburton. On March 25, in his email for Allison Crane, Materials
Management Coordinator of BP, Morel mentioned that long casing string will save at least 3
days (Watson, 2010). In the following week, he emailed BP Completion Engineer and Drilling
Engineer that it is better not to choose the tieback as it saves a lot of money and time.

2.2 Centralizers
Secondly, BP used an insufficient number of centralizers, 6 centralizers that are attached around
the casings to keep the casing in the centre of the well. It is important to keep the casing in the
centre of the well because there is increased risk of gas flowing up the annular space around the
casing due to formation of channels in the cement. To achieve only a minor gas flow problem, 21
centralizers are required to install according to Mr. Gagliano modelling. Mr. Gagliano has
informed to BP engineer that modelling resulted in moderate gas flow problem with 10
centralizers (Watson, 2010). However, BP engineer, Mr Morel, emailed back that it is hoped that
the pipe stays at the centre due to gravity as it is a vertical hole, and “as far as changes are
concerned, it is too late to get any more product on the rig, our only option is to arrange
placement of these centralizers” (Watson, 2010).

Mr Waltz, BP’s Drilling Engineering Team Leader explained to Mr Guide, BP’s Well Team
Leader that he wanted to make sure the centralizers were working well unlike their previous
Atlantis job, and "I do not like or want to disrupt your operations … I know the planning has
been lagging behind the operations and I have to turn that around.” (Watson, 2010). Mr. Guide
responded that "it will take 10 hrs to install them. ... I do not like this and ... I am very concerned
about using them.” From these evidences, it can be gathered BP rather focus on getting the job
done faster rather than solving the problem despite being fully aware of the risks involved.

2.3 Cement Bond Log

Lastly, BP has skipped cement bond log test which determines whether the cement has bonded to
the casing and surrounding formation. By performing the test, even if there is any channel in the

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cement for the gas flow, repairing the cementing job can be done by injecting additional cement
to block any channel for the gas flow.

Mr. Roth, Halliburton Vice President of Cementing, said that the cement evaluation should be
performed as a part of comprehensive system integrity test if the cement is to be relied upon as
an effective barrier (Watson, 2010). Moreover, a cement bond log test was required if there is an
inadequate cementing job according to Minerals Management Service (MMS) regulations. Mr.
Gagliano’s simulation result showed that cementing job on Macondo well is inadequate cement
job.

On April 18, BP has contracted Schlumberger for the cement bond log test if BP has requested
those services (Watson, 2010). On April 20, the Schlumberger crew was told that cement bond
log test is not required to perform. The cement bond log test will cost over $128,000 to complete.
On the other hand, cancelling it will cost only $10,000. Furthermore, it would take additional 9
to 12 hours to perform the test. It would take more time if cement repairing job was required.

2.4 Blowout Preventer (BOP)

Blowout preventer is a device that automatically cuts the pipe and seals the well to prevent the
oil leaking from the well if any failure in system is occurred. Hence, it is very important to have
blowout preventer in a very risky operation like drilling of deep water oil well and to ensure the
integrity of blowout preventer. Although blowout preventer had been fitted to BP wellhead, there
was a failure in blowout preventer as the oil had leaked from the well and the reason for the
failure remains unknown (Russell, 2010). Moreover, it is indicated in documents discussed
during congressional hearings June 17, 2010 that there were modifications made to BOP for the
Macondo site which increased the risk of BOP failure.

2.4 Theory of Ethics

In this chapter, we will attempt to use several theories of ethics to discern whether or not the
company was doing the right thing ethically.

2.4.1 Reversibility
If BP engineers are required to operate on the oil rig platform, BP engineers would choose
line/tie back casing, more centralizers installation as it concerns for their lives according to

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reversibility. Moreover, cement bond log test is going to be performed to make sure it is safe to
operate.

2.4.2 Act Utilitarianism

By choosing long string casing, the operating cost and time will be reduced which could result in
reducing the price that the public are required to pay. If there were no explosion of oil rig,
choosing long string casing was good in act utilitarianism approach. However, there was
explosion and oil leakage affects the marine lives and public’s livelihood. Moreover, due to BP
negligence, they were fined. Hence, according to Act Utilitarianism, choosing the long string
casing, operation with just 6 centralizers and failure to perform cement bond log test should not
be done.

2.4.3 Cost Benefit Analysis

BP has chosen the cheaper and less time consuming option. Hence, BP has done the right things
in terms of cost benefit analysis. However, cost benefit analysis should not be used here because
it concerned lives of the workers on the oil rig platform and the marine lives.

However, due to explosion and oil leakage, BP has to pay out more than the amount they should
spend on well design, centralizers and cement bond log. Hence, they have under estimated the
amount of money needed to pay if there is any accident occurred.

2.4.4 Code of Ethics

According to IEEE’s code of ethic, “engineer shall accept responsibility in making decision
consistent with the safety health and welfare of the public”.

According to National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) code of ethics, “Engineer shall
hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.”

Engineers are encouraged to adhere to the principles of sustainable development in order to

protect the environment for future generations”

Hence, BP was unethical to choose the cheaper and less time consuming option according to the
above approaches. Moreover, BP has violated the codes of ethic because it has neglected the
safety of public and environment. If BP had chosen safer options rather than cheaper options,
this tragic accident could have been prevented.

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 CHAPTER 3: THE 3Cs - Communication and Company Culture

3.1 Whistle Blowing

When interviewed by CNN, a survivor from the BP’s Deepwater Horizon, Daniel Barron III,
mentioned that on the morning of the explosion, there was an argument regarding the decision to
replace the heavy mud, which is used to keep the well’s pressure down, with lighter seawater.
BP’s management decided to proceed with seawater to speed up the process. After the argument,
Baron mentioned that chief driller Dewey Revette expressed concern and opposition regarding
the decision made (Bloxham, 2010).

Similar to Dewey Revette, there are many other Deepwater Horizon rig personnels who had
concerns regarding the safety of the rig, which had they been heard and heeded, could have
averted the tragedy. However, sadly, these concerns had not been voiced out properly and
heeded. The workers have fulfilled their duty to whistle blow safety issues that might have led to
the accident.

3.1.1 Universalizability
Workers should have whistle blew. If everyone abandoned their responsibility to whistle blow,
no action would be taken by the company to rectify the problem.

3.1.2 Act Utilitarianism

Again, whistle blowing should have been done. Whistle blowing on safety issue promotes
greater good of the society. While running the oil rig in the manner it was run saved cost, the
benefit is not distributed equally and it may not even be comparable to the long term effects it
caused. Only few BP officials get most of the monetary benefit, while the cost is irreversible and
is spread among people across countries.

3.1.3 Rule Utilitarianism

As to follow what the BP Code of Conduct dictates, workers should have whistle blew against
the safety issue.

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3.1.4 Respect-For-Individual
Workers have to balance his respect for company and his respect for their colleagues’ lives and
public’s health and survival. Obviously, the latter outweigh the respect for the company. Thus
workers took the wrong decision under this rule.

3.1.5 Code of Ethics

According to BP’s own Code of Conduct, "If you are unsure of what to do in particular
circumstances or concerned that the code is being broken, you have a responsibility to speak up.
The code explains the mechanisms to do this . . . and the protections to ensure that retaliation
against those who do speak up will not be tolerated.....Always... Stop any work that becomes
unsafe."

Workers should have reported the safety issues and if necessary stopped all works on the site.

According to NPSE’s Code of Conduct, “Engineers shall be guided in all their relations by the
highest standards of honesty and integrity. Engineers shall advise their clients or employers
when they believe a project will not be successful. Engineers shall not promote their own interest
at the expense of the dignity and integrity of the profession.”

Workers should have persisted in advising BP management that if they continue their practice,
accident is bound to happen. They should not try to promote their own self-interest of keeping
their job at the expense of their colleagues’ lives, public lives, and marine lives.

3.2 Company Culture

It is true that some workers are partly to blame for not reporting what they know is wrong.
However, looking back at the very essence why they dare not to speak up, it would be due to
BP’s culture. In June 2010, a Deepwater Horizon’s rig survivor interviewed by CNN mentioned
that it was understood that the act of raising safety concerns that might delay drilling schedule
could cause them losing their job (Bloxham, 2010). Employees and ex-BP-employees described
how the management overlooked safety by neglecting aging equipment, pressured or harassed
employees not to report problems, and cut short or delayed inspections in order to reduce
production costs (Lustgarten, 2010). Beyond harassment, some workers were even fired. Sneed,
a former technician at Purdhoe Bay, one of BP oil field, was fired for attempting to stop work

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upon discovery of a crack in the steel skin of an oil transit line that may ignite stray gases
(Lustgarten, 2010).

Not only the workers, subcontractors have also faced similar problem of not being able to force
their concern regarding safety due to BP’s company culture that prioritizes speed and profits on
top of safety. Halliburton may fear that they face the same fate as BP’s subcontractor. For
instance, in 2008, Kenneth Abbott noticed that Atlantis was operating with incomplete and
inaccurate engineering documents. In his email, Abbott notified and/or warned a BP manager
about the incomplete design specifications given to platform operators which violated federal
laws and BP's own safety regulations. Abbot was then fired when he tried to reveal these
information regarding safety concerns to BP officials (Blizzard, 2010). Therefore, it is evident
that BP is not willing to comply with the safety standards as they have fired both the workers and
subcontractors.

3.2.1 Reversibility
The company would not have fired whistle blowers if they are ones of higher rank, such as
director or shareholders. Hence, the act of firing employees cannot be justified.

3.2.2 Act Utilitarianism

By firing these workers, BP eliminated threat of internal information leaking by setting these
cases as example. However, on the other hand, workers may be discouraged from speaking out
because they know the consequence of getting fired if they talked about the company’s
wrongdoings even if it involves human lives. Moreover, BP can enjoy longer period of large
profit and good reputation by hiding their safety inadequacies. However, the cost if this
information is finally uncovered will be larger than the benefit it reaped. Not only workers lost
their lives, enormous number of marine lives perished and billions of dollars are pumped into
cleaning up the oil spill and compensating affected civilians. Hence, BP’s action is not justified.

3.2.3 Rule Utilitarianism

BP has to follow their own rules to protect those who speak up in matters regarding safety - in
this case whistle blowing workers. Hence, their action of firing workers cannot be justified.

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3.2.4 Respect for Individual
The company has to balance between the respect for the workers and the respect for the whole
company. The company might have fired these workers to protect the company’s image and
respect the company. However, they have neglected respect for individual worker’s honesty and
dignity. Hence, they should not have fired these workers.

3.2.5 Code of Ethics

According to Instituto De Consejeros- Administradores (Spain), Code of Ethics for Companies,
“Carry out their activities in a professional, ethical and responsible manner.”

According to this code, BP managers should do things in an ethical and responsible way.

Although the management was being informed by workers about the possible harm of the
compromises on safety done on the rig, they did not take proper action to investigate and rectify
the problems. Furthermore, they fired these people for raising the issue. In this case, BP had not
been acting in accordance to the aforementioned code of ethics.

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 CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION MANIPULATION
BP has been accused of withholding vital information/manipulating information before releasing
them to public.

4.1 Background
On 19 May 2010, BP America president Lamar McKay reconfirmed that the damaged well’s
maximum release rate hovered around 5,000 barrels a day. However, Associate Professor
Wereley of Purdue University, an established professor in his field, estimated the damaged well's
oil-release rate at a much higher figure, 95,000 barrels a day (Raloff, 2010).

Moreover, Purdue’s Wereley mentions that if longer streams of video were made available,
scientists can further check the gas-to-oil ratio emanating from the well to produce more accurate
estimate. BP management has those numbers but has not shared them yet. And the oil giant also
has not been sharing much video. On 19 August 2010, Transocean, the company that owned the
oil rig, also alleged that BP was refusing to hand over information it needs about the explosion
(BP rejects claims, 2010).

Lastly, shortly after the oil rig exploded, BP purchased sponsored links at the top of internet
search engines, Google and Yahoo to keep people from the real news. This raises the question:
‘If BP was not trying to influence information on the Gulf oil spill, why would they buy
sponsored links?’ BP spokesman Toby Odone told ABC News, “We have bought search terms
on search engines to make it easier for people to find out more about our efforts in the Gulf and
make it easier for people to find key links to information on filing claims, reporting oil on the
beach and signing up to volunteer” (Torbin, 2010). Nevertheless, the opponents argue that BP
was manipulating search results on Google to keep their company image safe.

4.2 Theory of Ethics

4.2.1 Reversibility
If BP managers were public (i.e. fishermen and people who use or live by the coast), they may
want to know the actual oil spill amount so they can know how the oil spill will affect their
livelihood and health. The authority and environmentalists also need to know the actual data so

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they can take the appropriate measures to solve the oil spill. Thus, BP should not underestimate
the spill rate.

4.2.2 Utilitarianism
BP may think hiding the oil spill damage can help to mitigate the public panic, avoiding
unnecessary chaos. With less panic, BP can focus on their cleaning-up measures. Thus BP hid
information to bring maximum benefit to the public and themselves with the assumption that BP
quickly and diligently cleans up the oil spill.

However, it is most likely that BP hid the information for hidden agenda: to evade penalty that
they have to pay to affected countries’ government and take less clean up measures.
Consequently, public’s welfare will be compromised. Weighing both effects, BP should not have
underestimated the spill rate.

4.2.3 Violation of Code of Ethics

4.2.3.1 Underestimation of Spill Rate

According to IEEE Code of Ethics, “To be honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates
based on the available data.”

More than five independent engineers have pegged the spill rate at between 30,000 and 100,000
barrels a day (Raloff, 2010). This would suggest BP’s number is an outlier, said House
Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment chairman Ed Markey. Wereley further assured
that all of these estimates from outside the industry are considerably higher than BP’s. “I don’t
see any possibility – any scenario – under which their number is accurate,” he said. Thus, BP
was neither honest nor realistic in stating estimates.

According to ASME Fundamental Canons, “Engineers shall admit their own errors when
proven wrong and refrain from distorting or altering facts to justify their mistakes.”

Responding to the public outrage and accusation, BP management defended themselves and said
that estimates were hard to make since there was no way to attach a flow meter to the top of the
gashes in the damaged pipe. However, Rachel Maddow (2010) disagreed with BP. She
mentioned that if BP is found guilty of gross negligence due to reported failure to repair the
damaged blow out preventer on the Deepwater Horizon, the penalty may rise to $4,300 per

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barrel. At the estimated spill rate of 25,000 barrels a day beginning on April 20 until the
completion of relief wells in August, the fines from the EPA alone would be 10.7 billion dollars.
As EPA oil spill fines are well known throughout the industry, she commented that “BP had a
great deal of motivation to underestimate their original figures on the amount of oil being
spilled.” BP has breached the ASME Fundamental Canons, underestimating figures for their own
benefits. With Utilitarian Theory, BP does not bring the maximum benefit to the public as they
will pay fewer penalties for the environmental damage.

4.2.3.2 Withholding crucial information

According to NSPE Code of Ethics, “Engineers shall avoid the use of statements containing a
material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact.”

When subcommittee Markey formally requested BP to make live streaming video from its
wellhead available to the public, the video was compressed so that much of the fine detail was
missing (Raloff, 2010). He emphasized that original unadulterated footage is required for high-
quality flow analysis. Therefore, it is likely that BP has tried to omit relevant material facts from
the public.

Steven L. Roberts, lawyer for Transocean, writes that BP has continued to demonstrate its
unwillingness, if not outright refusal, to deliver even the most basic information to Transocean.
"This is troubling, both in light of BP's frequently stated public commitment to openness and a
fair investigation and because it appears that BP is withholding evidence in an attempt to prevent
any other entity other than BP from investigating," he wrote (BP rejects claims, 2010). This
substantiates that BP has not released even the basic information to the related companies and
authorities.

4.2.3.3 “Buying” online search engines and scientists

According to NSPE Code of Ethics, “Engineers shall not offer or give, either directly or
indirectly, any contribution or gift to influence pubic authority or to secure work.”

Critics have described BP's move as unethical. Maureen Mackey, a writer on the Fiscal Times,
an online news site, said: "What it effectively does is that it bumps down other legitimate news
and opinion pieces that are addressing the spill... and (BP are) paying big money for that." He
comments that BP is trying to salvage its battered image after the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

17
This shows that BP may “buy” the mass media to manipulate information to rescue the company
image.

In fact, BP’s unethical acts are also evident as BP has been offering signing bonuses and
lucrative pay to prominent scientists from public universities around the Gulf Coast to aid its
defence against spill lawsuit. BP attempted to hire the entire marine sciences department at
Alabama University, according to scientists involved in discussions with the company's lawyers
(Raines, 2010). The university declined the offer because of “confidentiality restrictions” that the
company sought on any research and “obligations to take orders” from their attorneys.

More than one scientist interviewed by the Press-Register described being offered $250 an hour
through BP lawyers. For eight working hours a week, this amounts to $104,000 a year. "It makes
me feel like they were more interested in making sure we couldn't testify against them than in
having us testify for them," said George Crozier, head of the Dauphin Island Sea Lab, who was
approached by BP ((Raines, 2010). This shows that BP has done unethical acts as they offer gifts
and bonuses to buy scientists’ voice.

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 CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY

5.1 Background
Judging from its past records, BP proves not to have a good track record in terms of oil spills.
They are no stranger to the world in several of the nation’s worst oil and gas related disasters.

In March 2005, a massive explosion ripped through a tower at BP’s refinery in Texas City,
Texas, bringing the death toll to 15 workers and injuries to 170. Then, about a year later, at
5000km away in Alaska, technicians discovered that about 4,800 barrels of oil (~200,000 gallons
of crude oil) had seeped into the Alaskan snow through a small hole in BP’s pipeline in Prudhoe
Bay. More spills were discovered in subsequent years, and finally it happened again in the
Deepwater Horizon accident. According to Public Citizen, BP has paid more than $550 million
in fines, but it certainly seems that the money is not too much of deterrence to them.

5.2 Comparison with BP case

In this section, we’ll draw some comparisons between several of BP’s previous oil and gas
related accidents.

5.2.1 Violation of BP’s own company polices and code of ethics

For the Texas City accident, the company actually ignored its own safety protocols on operating
the tower which was filled with gasoline, and disabled a warning system. BP pleaded guilty to
federal felony charges and was fined more than $50 million by the US EPA.

For the Alaska Oil Spill incident a year later, BP was actually warned in 2002 to check the
pipeline, but they decided to ignore the warning. BP had no choice but to temporarily shut down
its operations, causing large disruptions to US oil supplies. In addition, they were fined $12
million.

In addition, BP’s own internal studies have also revealed that employees who work more than 16
hours during a 24 hours period can lack the mental capacity to make sound and timely decisions.
Yet, BP violated its own policies and internal BP documents have shown that 16 plus hour shifts
were routine, with 75% representing 18 hour work shifts. To meet targets established for external
commitments and performance, BP is willing to risk allowing workers who are already tired to

19
work more in a potentially very dangerous environment dealing with flammable items and heavy
volume equipment, rather than spend more time and money to train and hire more people. This is
clearly a very unethical approach BP is taking.

This is similar to how in the current BP case; BP chooses to overlook its own code of ethics

5.2.2 Trade-off between safety for lower costs and shorter time
Similarly, an oil spill was discovered in BP’s Lisburne facility, where oil was pouring out from a
two foot long hole at the bottom of a 25-year-old pipeline. The bottom-line was, in an effort to
cut costs, BP left it to the operators to respond if anything happened to the pipeline, instead of
spending money to install freeze protection, which would have prevented the rupture of the
pipeline. In the same context in 2001, a similar incident happened, and BP told the State of
Alaska it would rectify the problem, but they never did.

This is exactly how our current stands – in an effort to cut costs and save time, BP chose to
ignore certain critical designs of the well which eventually contributed to the disaster.

5.2.3 “Silent” culture

Just last November (2009), another serious oil spill occurred, and BP employees made a long list
of safety issues that have not been addressed properly, making the Prudhoe Bay oilfield a
potential for another great disaster. An employee who has worked there for 30 decades mentions
that they still have “hundreds of miles of rotting pipe ready to break that needs to be replaced.” A
lot of employees share the same sentiment, but they’re afraid to speak out, risking their jobs. BP
Alaska is literally following an “operate to failure” attitude, avoiding spending money on
maintenance and letting equipments to operate until they break down and then replacing them.

In our current case, similarly, several employees had noticed that there were certain things that
were not right/not in place which might lead to serious safety percussions. However, for one
reason or another, they did not voice it out to their superiors.

5.2.4 Management and Employee’s Differing Views on safety

An act of whistle blowing was achieved by an employee who worked at the Lisburne Production
Centre, when he emailed Alaskan BP officials more than a dozen pieces of crucial production
equipment that he claims were not working or were out of service during the spill. He mentions
specifically that “the management of our maintenance simply is not working to maintain a safe

20
operation. This gap in maintenance management causes problems that increase the overall risk of
plant integrity and personnel safety.” This email is now in the hands of criminal investigators.

There isn’t a specific point in our current case that pinpoints that the management and employee
had differing views on safety, but from the way that the management took certain decisions on
the well design and that in Chapter 3.2, where we described that the company even fired a
worker who stopped work upon discovering a safety breach, it can be then perceived that the
management does really have a different standpoint from the employees regarding safety.

5.3 BP fails to learn from past mistakes

We have seen from the previous section that a comparison between our current case and previous
history of BP’s oil and gas related accidents has revealed the following similarities:

 Violating its own policies and code of ethics

 Creating a huge trade-off in safety for lower cost in terms of design, upgrading of
equipment, installation of safety equipments and training more workers instead of
overworking current ones.
 “Silent” company culture
 Management does not share the same safety view as their employees

What does this entail? It then becomes very clear that BP has not learnt its mistakes at all, and
with the findings from the study in the previous chapters, we discover the same reasons over and
over again as we compare them with previous accidents from BP. BP, apparently, does not take
the consequences of their actions and the disasters (e.g. loss of lives, damage to eco environment,
oceans, disruption to economy, heavy fines from government agencies etc.) seriously enough to
warrant them to do something significant to address the safety issues properly.

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 CHAPTER 6: SOLUTIONS

6.1 Following Code of Ethics

According to code of ethics, the liner/tieback option and 21 centralizers would be chosen in
operation. Cement bond log would also be performed. The first option would cost a lot of money
and time. However, it will provide very high safety option and it would sure prevent the tragedy.

6.2 Finding the Best Compromise

The full string casing option would reduce the cost and time compared to the liner/tieback
option. Although it would be less safe to operate, it would be a good option if the choice is done
properly. In this case, Liner/Tieback or Long String Casing, number of centralizers usage, and
cement bond log are to be chosen. Centralizers are very important for drilling oil wall in the sea.
Hence, it is important to have as many centralizers as possible. In this case, choosing 21
centralizers is essential. Moreover, cement bond log should be performed. By performing cement
bond log, it can be sure that the cementing is done properly or not. If there is any cementing
problem, remedial cementing can be done. However, it is thought that liner/tieback option is not
really essential to choose. Hence, this option is a compromise between safety and cost or time.

It is thought that Engineering is a compromise between cost and safety as no products can be
completely safe and affordable. Hence, choosing the second option is a compromise option
between cost and safety and a good middle way.

6.3 External Whistle-Blowing Agencies

Following trend that is undertaken by Singapore companies recently, BP could have engaged on
external auditing company to have a whistle-blowing hotline where employees can file
allegations against their own company anonymously. This would allow employees to be more
vocal about their concerns without having to worry about their employment. Moreover, since an
external auditing company is filtering the complaints, they could be more objective in viewing
the problem.

6.4 Respecting the Hierarchy of the Company

Employees could have averted risk of being fired by being more aware of the situation in the
company. Since he had known that he is risking his job by stopping his work, he should have

22
consulted his colleagues and supervisor regarding the problem, instead of stopping his work right
away.

Another possible solution would be to approach the management by sending anonymous email to
the company’s internal audit department with full detailed report of the problem faced.

6.5 Internal Task Force

As discussed earlier, it can be seen that the root of the accident is the poor safety culture in the
company. BP has failed to learn from their mistakes in many past accidents. Our group believes
that what can be done to rectify this problem is to improve the company’s safety culture.
However, attitude is not something that can be worked on easily since it is rather intangible.
Hence, a more feasible solution is to ensure critical equipments are always in good condition,
obsolete and old equipments to be eradicated or upgraded by stricter monitoring. One plausible
solution to carry this out is to improve enforcement of the Operation Integrity Review 1 document
that BP came up with in 2001, which identified safety and maintenance issues the company
needed to address to protect the welfare of its workers. To help in the implementation, BP
should consider setting up an internal task force, whose sole role is to take corrective actions in
improving BP’s safety culture. BP always had a structure of monitoring systems in place, and yet
they have time and time again ignored such alarms with excuses, such as “the delay [of the
improvements] is a conscious readjustment that we undertook as we learned more about the scale
and complexities [of the maintenance projects]”, and chose to make decisions that were
unethical, in their own interests. In this way, BP would no longer be able to give any other
excuses not to perform any improvement in the condition of its safety equipments.

1
Report prepared by Kovac and several other BP employees and management officials in 2001 to identify safety and
maintenance issues the company needed to address to protect the welfare of its workers.

23
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
In summary, while dealing with ethical cases, an engineer would find conflict between their
interest and public interest. It is generally agreed that human lives should never be compromised
even though sometimes that means sacrificing the engineer’s personal interest. As
aforementioned, BP management had failed to respect this principle by compromising condition
of the rig’s safety gadgets, while BP engineers and Halliburton had put their self-interest, job-
security, before public interest, resulting in the unfortunate disaster. BP and Halliburton may
argue that they did so believing that nothing major would have happened. Had they known that
such a consequence would occur, they surely would have done otherwise. However, they would
never know, not in the past, not now, not in the future as well. Hence, BP and Halliburton had
still neglected to follow the least that they should have done, to follow the rig maintenance safety
guideline.

The line between right and wrong in any ethical problem is usually rather ambiguous. A solution
that can be accepted by one party may be disadvantageous and disagreed by another party. A
convenient gauge would be to satisfy all or most of the code of universally agreed engineering
ethics. However, professional ethical codes cannot cover all the possible situations that an
employee might encounter; there is no substitute for good judgment. Hence, in each case, an
engineer should consider all possible solution and make decision based on the most universally
agreed approach. Whistle-blowing should be placed as the last resort in any case, however,
should still be considered when all other alternatives fail.

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Bloxham, E. (2010). What BP was missing on Deepwater Horizon: A Whistleblower. Retrieved

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Raloff, J. (2010, May 19). BP’s estimate of spill rate is way low, engineer suggests. Retrieved
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