Anatomy of Lone Wolf Terrorism Special E
Anatomy of Lone Wolf Terrorism Special E
Anatomy of Lone Wolf Terrorism Special E
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The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an autonomous think-tank dealing
with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and
sub-conventional conflicts and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook
and policy-oriented in approach.
Disclaimer: The contents of this paper are based on the analysis of materials accessed from open
sources and are the personal views of the author. The contents, therefore, may not be quoted or
cited as representing the views or policy of the Government of India, or Integrated Headquarters
of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (Army), or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.
KNOWLEDGE WORLD
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Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. Structural Analysis 12
3. Solutions 17
4. Conclusion 21
5. References 22
Anatomy of Lone Wolf Terrorism: 1
Special Emphasis on Countering Violent
Introduction
The running over of two on-duty soldiers in Canada, the massacre of 77
people in Norway, the mass shooting of 13 soldiers in Texas, a failed attempt
to blow up Times Square in New York City, the decapitation of a British
soldier in London and many such incidents are portents of an emerging,
though not novel, form of terrorism. This phenomenon, also known as ‘lone
wolf’ terrorism or ‘home grown’ terrorism, fuelled by the unhindered capacity
of the social media in terms of networking, anonymity and propaganda
dissemination, has left law enforcement agencies foxed and policy-makers
struggling to identify common linkages, pinpoint causal factors and, thereby,
come forth with a strategy to counter the threat.
What exactly is ‘lone wolf’ terrorism? What are the reasons for its
evolution? How are these supposed ‘lone wolves’ identified? Is lone wolf
terrorism really generated by itself, in isolation, as most analysts tend to
believe, or is there a need to relook at some of the core societal issues
to understand this phenomenon? What is the role of the social media in
the proliferation of ‘lone wolf’ attacks across the world? How is it that an
organisation like the Islamic State (IS) is able to indirectly influence foreigners
in their own homeland to conduct attacks on their brethren? With the help
of various case studies, the author will attempt an explanation to all the
abovementioned questions.
Terror, legally and technically, has numerous meanings and a context has
to be provided to bring out its situational relevance. However, for this article,
we may define terror as “the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property in order to coerce or intimidate a government or
the civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives.”1
This definition, to an extent, limits the cases that may be treated as terror
incidents. Since what we have laid out is a contextual definition, we may ask:
too, create fear though may be for the person affected and his near family,
and through the media, the local community. To classify any incident as
terrorism, the intent and perception are important, and the nature of the
act should be political. However, most critical is the narrative being spun,
that of a third person, an alien, an unknown out to destroy ‘us’, someone
who doesn’t like ‘us’, our ‘freedom’ or ‘way of life’. Seen in this frame
of reference, the events mentioned in this paragraph are considered to
be mere crimes, localised in nature, often with mal-intent but not an all-
encompassing objective of creating a fear psychosis in a broad chunk of the
population. The narrative remains local. Terrorism is externalisation in the
form of events creating big-bangs, causing huge damage to a multitude of
lives and, most importantly, undertaken by ‘them’, the terrorists. It becomes
relatively simple to blame ‘the others’ for striking fear, for foreign ideologies.
Personalities such as Osama bin Laden, Leila Khaled and organisations like
Hamas, Al Qaeda and today’s Islamic State (IS) become the figureheads of
terror. But what happens when the home nation itself is converted into
the new battlefield? The renewed threat of lone wolf terrorism has to be
understood in terms of the post 1979 scenario.
The term ‘lone wolf’ terrorism was popularised by white supremacists
Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis in the 1990s who believed it comprised
underground or small cell activities continuously targeting the government
in anonymous attacks.2 A formal definition of lone wolf terrorism is, “The
threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting
out of personal material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider
audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning,
preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act
is not directed by any group or other individuals (although possibly
inspired by others).”3 According to Professor Mark Hamm of Indiana State
University, an expert on lone wolf attacks, a lone wolf is “someone who
acts alone without the help or encouragement of a government or a
terrorist organisation, who acts without the direction or leadership of
a hierarchy, someone who designs the plan and the methods by himself
without any sort of outside support, and who acts totally alone without
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the support of any second individual or third individual.”4 Rafaello
Pantucci, in fact, goes further and categorises these attackers into four groups: 3
loner (acts alone, no connection with any extremist group), lone wolf (appears
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attacks11 to the recent spate of targeting of black teenagers/ young adults
by the police.12 This perception of undermining of own culture and forceful 5
assimilation has created disillusionment and anger in a few members of
York’s Times Square was in revenge for the drone killings of his people
in Pakistan.21 Arid Uka killed two US servicemen at Frankfurt airport
in Germany on March 2, 2011, to prevent more US soldiers going to
Afghanistan and raping Muslim women.22 Most of the attackers have
cited Western military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq as reasons for
their acts. In fact, when a Jordanian pilot, Moaz al-Kasabeh, was shot
down and captured by the IS, the militants connected the Jordanian
jet and, hence, the Jordanian regime, with mass casualties of the Syrian
Muslim population and proceeded to burn him alive. The IS has justified
its attacks on the citizens of Western nations, on the fact that these
civilians have voted their respective governments to power. Variants of
this belief can be found in the rhetoric of almost all the militant Islamist
groups. IS agitprop in the form of an apocalyptic final battle between
the armies of Islam and the armies of ‘Rome’ in the nondescript town of
Dabiq, Syria, has accentuated the perception of all these acts being done
in the fulfilment of this prophecy.23
yy Financial Distress and Criminal Background: Anders Breivik lost
two million kroner in the stock market when he was 18 years old.24
Michael Zihaf-Bibeau who attacked the Canadian Parliament building in
Ottawa on October 22, 2014, was a habitual offender with an extensive
criminal record, who lived in a homeless shelter.25 Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,
younger of the Boston Marathon bombing brother duo, was a cannabis
dealer.26 The Tsarnaev family survived on food stamps and government
welfare27. Amine el Khalifi, accused of attempted suicide bombing of
Capitol Hill in the US was indicted on charges of possession of marijuana,
and traffic violations.28 Faisal Shehzad, a financial analyst in the US, was
from a wealthy Pakistani family, his father being a retired Air Vice Marshal
in the Pakistan Air Force.29 However, a collapsing housing market and his
inability to pay his mortgage, led to growing desperation and a feeling of
loathing towards his adopted country. He began to look for reasons to
blame the US and homed on the drone strikes in his native country, to
vent his anger.30 Antonio Martinez aka Mohd Hussein was a construction
worker who was preemptively arrested by the Joint Terrorism Task
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Force (JTTF) for trying to blow up an Armed Forces Recruiting Station in
Catonsville, Maryland.31 Most of these young men had had brushes with 7
the law or were in financial distress or stuck in low paying jobs that led
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of the Tsarnaev brothers, Tamerlan travelled to Russia, spent time in
Chechnya (Dagestan) and may have been radicalised there, though this 9
fact remains uncorroborated.45 Taimur Abdelwahab al Abdaly, who blew
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Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had exploded on the scene. Online
behavioural change mechanics can be explained by the following 11
proselytisers. In order to attract women to its fold, the ISIS has also founded
the Zora Foundation which is a media wing for luring women, and currently
has around 32,000 followers.68 Apart from the social media onslaught, the
ISIS has five centralised propaganda units, which are:
yy Al Furqan Foundation: Delivers official statements and concentrates
on military warfare.
yy Al Itisan Foundation: Social and religious activities.
yy Al Hayat Media Centre.
yy Al Bayan Radio.
yy Amaq News Agency.69
Structural Analysis
All the above mentioned factors have been culled retrospectively from
studying the aftermath of the events. No amount of computer-based
modelling or academic intuiting has been able to pin-point the exact reasons
for these acts of lone-wolf terrorism or helped to prevent it. The onus for
securing soft targets in a country cannot be on the security forces/ agencies
only, as the sheer number of people and places to be protected is massive and
beyond the purview of the armed forces, which are generally responsible for
external security and are, therefore, extra-enemy focussed and area specific,
or of the local security agencies which are more information dependent
and rarely act preemptively. It is, therefore, necessary to go beyond what is
visible and look at structural factors to focus on, and target, the root causes
and not the persons responsible, as focussing on the latter is not possible,
and neglecting the former will ensure that the plague of lone wolf terrorism
will remain the bane of civilised societies. The following are the structural
factors responsible:
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yy Structural Violence: This term was used by Johann Galtung when he
referred to it as “some social or structura/ institution that may harm people by 13
preventing them from meeting their basic needs”. Structural violence differs
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countries, there is no alternative to a madrassa option. Poverty is
exploited to the hilt to promote extremism. The second is the process 15
of underdevelopment perpetrated by the core i.e. the developed
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Qaeda and the ISIS have tried to merge together existing states in their
dream of a global Caliphate. Divergence and convergence are occurring 17
simultaneously. In conjunction with the rhetoric about a global culture
Solutions
Short-term solutions to counter lone wolf terrorism is what anti-terror
agencies are currently following, which is a two-pronged approach. The
first prong involves targeting prospective and suspected lone wolf terrorists
by way of ‘profiling’ and masquerading as terrorists themselves to win the
trust of the would-be lone wolf, and enticing him to divulge information
regarding his plans. These actions have had limited yet effective success in
avoiding major attacks on important landmarks and cities, examples of which
have been discussed earlier. The second prong has been an effort by various
governments and heads of states to dissuade the youth from joining the ranks
(GEC).83 These efforts, however, have proved quite ineffective in dealing with
the torrent of propaganda dumped by the ISIS everyday on the internet and
lapped up by thousands, if not millions. With the ISIS’ real estate shrinking
every day, an increased focus on social media platforms is likely--one which
would focus on creating more lone wolf terrorists. In view of the various
causative and structural factors discussed, the following long-term solutions
can be particularised and adapted to local conditions in order to reduce the
probability of lone wolf terrorism.
yy Countering of Narrative: Surprisingly, against the tirades of figures
such as Anwar al Awlaki and Jihadi John, the voices of reason have been
generally silent, in the physical as well as the digital world. The ‘jihadi cool’
attitude fostered and tempered by the ISIS through its videos and stills,
as well as the victimisation narrative has to be countered effectively. This
can be done only by the local preachers and community leaders who,
by way of their standing in the community and consequent moral high
ground, can wean the youth away from proselytisers and extremist ideas.
Similarly, the online battle of the social media has to be fought using the
Twitter profiles and gravatars of local leaders and influential personalities
of a particular community whose links with the West or the supposedly
imperialist countries of the extremist propaganda, have to be shown as
being non-existent. The language and semantics of the narrative have
to be local. The resistance against the extremist, especially the ISIS,
propaganda, and the spinning of a counter-narrative has to delink itself
from any governmental or external, especially Western backed, effort,
in any form.
yy Inclusive and Integrative Policies: There is a need for governments
to have a relook at their economic and social policies. A conscious effort
has to be put in to ensure a more equitable, integrative and inclusive
development process. The idea of ‘separateness’ grows stronger when
distinguishing factors such as race, ethnicity, religion are supplemented
by unequal development, which can be exploited by a number of agencies
to promote numerous agendas. Directives, aimed at a perceived cultural
more of a particular community, need to be endorsed by the relevant
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community leaders publicly and not applied or declared unilaterally
in the name of secularism. The ban on the wearing of hijab in France, 19
though ostensibly to promote gender equality and inhibit an evil practice
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behaviour and not rewarded with ironic nominations in the world body
polity. 21
yy Shifting of Affiliations: As mentioned earlier, the two simultaneous
Conclusion
At the end, it would suffice to say that the phenomenon of lone wolf
terrorism is not a new one. Post Cold War, it can be said to have started
from the Oklahoma City bombing in 1993 and has continued with the recent
casualties. However, the post 9/11 lone wolf attacks cannot be said to have
occurred in a vacuum. The structural factors mentioned above have slowly
shaped the landscape where lone wolf attacks were a given. The recent
Bangladesh attacks90 and the truck related killings of 84 people in Nice on
Bastille Day in France91 just drive home the fact that the frequency of lone
wolf attacks has increased exponentially and will continue to do so unless
a long-term plan to counter them is evolved. These attacks increased in
frequency due to the surprising growth of the internet, especially the social
media. However, their counter has to simultaneously focus on a number of
fields, social media rebuttal being one of them. This has to be supplemented
by community leadership and mentoring, change in the foreign policies of the
Western countries, inclusive and equitable development by own governments
and, most importantly, a rehabilitation programme for anyone returning from
Iraq or Syria so as to ease his entry back into the normal world.
References
1. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “Antiterrorism,” US Department of Defense(DoD) dated November 24,
2010.
2. “Lone Wolf (Terrorism),” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lone_Wolf_(terrorism).htm.
3. Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, “Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor
Terrorists,” Countering Lone Actor Terrorism Series, No 5, Policy Paper 1, http://www.
terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/preventing-lone-wolf/html.
4. Prof Mark Hamm, http://nij.ncjrs.gov/multimedia/transcripts/video-hamm-transcript.htm.
5. “Rafaelo Pantucci,” http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_
ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.
6. Jason Bourke, The New Threat from Islamic Militancy (2015), pp. 164-165.
7. Ibid.
8. Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, “Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the
Homegrown Terrorist Threat”, Majority and Minority Staff Report by United States
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 08, 2008.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Report by Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802-01.htm.
12. “Targeting Blacks: Drug Law Enforcement and Race in the United States,” Human Rights
Watch Report, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/us0508/.
13. “Toulouse and Montauban Shootings,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toulouse_and_
Montauban_shootings.
14. Ibid.
15. Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “How did Mohammed Merah become a Jihadist?”, http://
edition.cnn.com/2012/03/26/world/europe/france-shooting-suspect/index.html?hpt=hp_
c1, March 26, 2012.
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16. Ibid.
17. “Rotten Heart of Europe”, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/23/the-rotten-heart-of- 23
europe-belgium-attacks-abdeslam-molenbeek/.
18. “Obituary: Toulouse Gunman Mohamed Merah”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
bombing#MIT_shooting_and_carjacking.htm.
51. n. 25.
52. “2015 San Bernandino Attack”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_San_Bernardino_attack.
53. n. 28.
54. “Sweden Suicide Bomber Taimur Abdulwahab al Abdaly was Living in Britain”, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8198043/Sweden-suicide-bomber-
Taimur-Abdulwahab-al-Abdaly-was-living-in-Britain.html.
55. “Jose Pimentel”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jose_Pimentel.
56. “Arid Uka”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arid_Uka.
57. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983), pp. 57-58.
58. Lieberman and Collins, n. 8, May 08, 2008.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Dr Christina Schori Lang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State
Propaganda”, GCSP Policy Paper 2015/2- February 2015, Geneva Centre for Security
Policy, www.gcsp.ch/download/2763/72138.pdf.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda
Strategy”, Quilliam Foundation, https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-
strategy.pdf.
67. Ibid.
68. Schori Lang, n. 61.
69. Ibid.
70. “Soviet-Afghan War,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet-Afghan_War.htm.
71. Jamie Tarabay, “How the Afghan Jihad Went Global”, Aljazeera America, america.aljazeera.
com/articles/2013/11/12/how-afghan-jihadwentglobal.html.
72. “Afghan Civil War (1989-92)”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_Civil_War_(1989-92).
htm.
73. Yousaf Butt, “How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism”,
Huffington Post, www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islam-
terrorism_b_6501916.html, January 20, 2015.
74. Allan Hall, “Saudi Offer to Build 200 Mosques in Germany for Syrian Migrants is Slammed
as ‘Cynical’ because the Kingdom has not Offered to Take Any Refugee Themselves”,
Mail Online, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3242354/Saudi-offer-build-200-mosques-
Germany-Syrian-migrants-slammed-cynical-Kingdom-not-offered-refugees-themselves.
htm, September 20, 2015.
75. Declan Walsh, “Wikileaks Cables Portray Saudi Arabia as a Cash Machine for Terrorists”,
The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-
terrorist-funding.htm, December 05, 2010.
76. Butt, n. 73.
77. Benjamin Teryima Ashaver, “Poverty, Inequality and Underdevelopment in Third World
Countries: Bad State Policies or Bad Global Rules?”, Department of Political Science Benue
State University, Makurdi-Nigeria, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Volume
15, Issue 6 (Sep - Oct 2013) pp 33-38.
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78. Daniel Greenfield, “French City with 40% Muslim Population is the Most Dangerous City
in Europe”, Frontpage Mag, www.frontpagemag.com/point/214086/french-city-40-muslim- 25
population-most-dangerous-daniel-greenfield.htm, January 04, 2014.
79. Anthea Butler, “Shooters of Color are Called ‘Terrorists’ and ‘Thugs’. Why are White