Gsfc-std-7000b Signature Cycle 04-28-2021 Fixed Links

GODDARD TECHNICAL GSFC-STD-7000B
STANDARD
Goddard Space Flight Center Approved: 04-28-2021
Greenbelt, MD 20771 Revalidation Date: 04-28-2026
Superseding GSFC-STD-7000A
General Environmental Verification Standard (GEVS)

for GSFC Flight Programs and Projects
THIS STANDARD HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR EXPORT CONTROL RESTRICTIONS;

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
FOREWORD
This standard is published by the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to provide uniform
engineering and technical requirements for processes, procedures, practices, and methods that
have been endorsed as standard for NASA programs and projects, including requirements for
selection, application, and design criteria of an item.
This standard provides guidelines for environmental verification programs for Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) payloads, subsystems and components and describes methods for
implementing the environmental verifications described.
Requests for information, corrections, or additions to this standard should be submitted via
“Contact Us” on the GSFC Technical Standards website at http://standards.gsfc.nasa.gov.
Original signed by:
Michael Viens
Technical Standard Coordinator
Goddard Space Flight Center
Check the GSFC Technical Standards Program website at http://standards.gsfc.nasa.gov or contact the Executive Secretary for
the GSFC Technical Standards Program to verify that this is the correct version prior to use.
GSFC-STD-7000B
04/28/2021
Supersedes
GSFC-STD-7000A
General Environmental Verification Standard (GEVS)

For GSFC Flight Programs and Projects
Approved By:
Original signed by: Original signed by:
Tristram T. Hyde David F. Mitchell

Chief Engineer Director of Engineering and
Goddard Space Flight Center Technology
Original signed by Original signed by:
Thomas V. McCarthy Eric K. Isaac

Director of Flight Projects Director of Safety and
Goddard Space Flight Center Mission Assurance
NASA GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER

Greenbelt, Maryland 20771
ii
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
DOCUMENT HISTORY LOG

General Environmental Verification Standard
Change No. Date Nature of Change
Baseline April 2005

Major update - STS references removed; Reference to Office of
Mission Success removed; Added definition of anomaly;
Significant updates to the following sections: 1.13; 2.2.5; 2.4.1.2;
A 4/22/2013
2.4.1.4.1; 2.4.2.2; 2.4.2.6; 2.4.4.1; 2.4.4.2; 2.6.2.4;
Section 1.14 added; Section 2.5 rewritten; Section 2.7 rewritten
CCR Number CCR-D-0071
B 4/28/2021 Major Revision
iii
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
SECTION 1 – GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................ 1-1

1.2 APPLICABILITY AND LIMITATIONS ........................................................................ 1-1
1.3 THE GSFC VERIFICATION APPROACH ................................................................. 1-1
1.4 OTHER ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................................................. 1-2
1.5 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTRATION ............................................................. 1-2
1.6 GEVS CONFIGURATION CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION .................................... 1-2
1.7 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .................................................................................... 1-2
1.7.1 RF Compatibility Testing ....................................................................................... 1-3
1.7.2 Deep Space Network (DSN) Simulation ................................................................ 1-3
1.7.3 NASA Standards ................................................................................................... 1-3
1.7.4 Military Standards for EMI Testing ......................................................................... 1-3
1.7.5 Military Standards for Non-Destructive Evaluation ................................................ 1-3
1.8 DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................... 1-4
1.9 CRITERIA FOR UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE ........................................... 1-8
1.9.1 Failure Occurrence ................................................................................................ 1-8
1.9.2 Failures with Retroactive Effects ........................................................................... 1-8
1.9.3 Failure Reporting ................................................................................................... 1-8
1.9.4 Wear Out ............................................................................................................... 1-8
1.10 TEST SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................ 1-9
1.10.1 Operations Hazard Analysis, Responsibilities For ................................................. 1-9
1.10.2 Treatment of Hazards ............................................................................................ 1-9
1.10.3 Facility Safety ........................................................................................................ 1-9
1.10.4 Safety Responsibilities During Tests ................................................................... 1-10
1.11 TESTING OF SPARE HARDWARE ........................................................................ 1-10
1.12 TEST FACILITIES, CALIBRATION ......................................................................... 1-10
1.13 TEST CONDITION TOLERANCES ......................................................................... 1-11
1.14 TEST MEASUREMENT CONSIDERATIONS ......................................................... 1-13
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
Section 2 - VERIFICATION PROGRAM
SECTION 2.1 - SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION

2.1 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION .......................................................... 2.1-1
2.1.1 Documentation Requirements ............................................................................ 2.1-1
2.1.1.1 System Performance Verification Plan ............................................................ 2.1-1
2.1.1.2 System Performance Verification Matrix ......................................................... 2.1-2
2.1.1.3 Environmental Verification Specification ......................................................... 2.1-3
2.1.1.4 Performance Verification Procedures .............................................................. 2.1-3
2.1.1.5 Verification Reports......................................................................................... 2.1-3
2.1.1.6 System Performance Verification Report ........................................................ 2.1-3
2.1.1.7 Instrument Verification Documentation............................................................ 2.1-4
SECTION 2.2 - ENVIRONMENTAL VERIFICATION
2.2 APPLICABILITY ..................................................................................................... 2.2-1

2.2.1 Test Sequence and Level of Assembly ............................................................... 2.2-1
2.2.2 Verification Program Tailoring ............................................................................ 2.2-1
2.2.3 Qualification of Hardware by Similarity ............................................................... 2.2-3
2.2.4 Test Factors/Durations ....................................................................................... 2.2-4
2.2.5 Structural Analysis/Design Factors of Safety ...................................................... 2.2-4
SECTION 2.3 - ELECTRICAL FUNCTION & PERFORMANCE
2.3 ELECTRICAL FUNCTION TEST REQUIREMENTS .............................................. 2.3-1

2.3.1 Electrical Interface Tests .................................................................................... 2.3-1
2.3.2 Comprehensive Performance Tests ................................................................... 2.3-1
2.3.3 Limited Performance Tests ................................................................................. 2.3-1
2.3.4 Performance Operating Time and Failure-Free Performance Testing ................. 2.3-2
2.3.5 Limited-Life Electrical Elements.......................................................................... 2.3-2
SECTION 2.4 - STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL
2.4 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ............... 2.4-1

2.4.1 Structural Loads Qualification ............................................................................. 2.4-1
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2.4.1.1 Coupled load analysis ..................................................................................... 2.4-4

2.4.1.2 Modal Survey .................................................................................................. 2.4-6
2.4.1.3 Design Strength Qualification.......................................................................... 2.4-7
2.4.1.4 Structural Reliability (Residual Strength Verification) ...................................... 2.4-9
2.4.1.5 Acceptance Requirements ............................................................................ 2.4-11
2.4.2 Vibroacoustic Qualification ............................................................................... 2.4-12
2.4.2.1 Fatigue Life Considerations .......................................................................... 2.4-14
2.4.2.2 Payload Acoustic Test .................................................................................. 2.4-14
2.4.2.3 Payload Random Vibration Tests .................................................................. 2.4-15
2.4.2.4 Subsystem/Instrument Vibroacoustic Tests .................................................. 2.4-16
2.4.2.5 Component/Unit Vibroacoustic Tests ............................................................ 2.4-16
2.4.2.7 Retest of Reflight Hardware .......................................................................... 2.4-21
2.4.2.8 Retest of Reworked Hardware ...................................................................... 2.4-21
2.4.3 Sinusoidal Sweep Vibration Qualification.......................................................... 2.4-21
2.4.3.1 ELV Payload Sine Sweep Vibration Tests..................................................... 2.4-22
2.4.3.2 ELV Payload Subsystem and Component Sine Sweep Vibration Tests ........ 2.4-23
2.4.4 Mechanical Shock Qualification ........................................................................ 2.4-25
2.4.4.1 Subsystem Mechanical Shock Tests ............................................................. 2.4-25
2.4.4.2 Payload (Spacecraft) Mechanical Shock Tests ............................................. 2.4-27
2.4.5 Mechanical Function Verification ...................................................................... 2.4-28
2.4.5.1 Life Testing ................................................................................................... 2.4-28
2.4.5.2 Demonstration .............................................................................................. 2.4-31
2.4.5.3 Torque/Force Margin .................................................................................... 2.4-35
2.4.6 Pressure Profile Qualification ........................................................................... 2.4-37
2.4.6.1 Demonstration .............................................................................................. 2.4-37
2.4.7 Mass Properties Verification ............................................................................. 2.4-37
2.4.7.1 Demonstration .............................................................................................. 2.4-38
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
SECTION 2.5 - EMC
2.5 ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) REQUIREMENTS ....................... 2.5-1

2.5.1. General Requirements ....................................................................................... 2.5-1
2.5.1.1 Documentation................................................................................................ 2.5-2
2.5.1.2 Requirements Overview .................................................................................. 2.5-4
2.5.1.3 Testing at Lower Levels of Assembly .............................................................. 2.5-6
2.5.1.4 Safety and Controls ........................................................................................ 2.5-6
2.5.1.5 Test Facility and Procedure Requirements ..................................................... 2.5-6
2.5.1.6 Documentation Guidelines ............................................................................ 2.5-12
2.5.2. Detailed Requirements ..................................................................................... 2.5-19
2.5.2.1 Conducted Emissions Requirements ............................................................ 2.5-19
2.5.2.2 Conducted Susceptibility Requirements ........................................................ 2.5-30
2.5.2.3 Radiated Emissions Requirements ............................................................... 2.5-44
2.5.2.4 Radiated Susceptibility Requirements ........................................................... 2.5-46
2.5.2.5 System Level Requirements ......................................................................... 2.5-49
2.5.3. Application Guide ............................................................................................. 2.5-55
2.5.3.1 A Brief History of MIL-STD-461 ..................................................................... 2.5-56
2.5.3.2 Test Facility and Procedure Requirements ................................................... 2.5-61
2.5.3.3 Detailed Requirements ................................................................................. 2.5-69
2.5.3.4 Abbreviations, Acronyms, Constants, and Relations ................................... 2.5-149
SECTION 2.6 - THERMAL
2.6 THERMAL VERIFICATION TESTING – GENERAL ............................................... 2.6-2

2.6.1 Definitions .......................................................................................................... 2.6-2
2.6.2 General Requirements ....................................................................................... 2.6-5
2.6.2.1 Applicability ..................................................................................................... 2.6-5
2.6.2.2 Level of Testing; Test Setup /Configuration .................................................... 2.6-7
2.6.2.3 Special Considerations ................................................................................... 2.6-9
2.6.2.4 Environment Simulation (General) ................................................................ 2.6-11
2.6.2.5 Tailoring ........................................................................................................ 2.6-14
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GSFC-STD-7000A
2.6.3 THERMAL VACUUM VERIFICATION .............................................................. 2.6-14

2.6.3.1 Requirements ............................................................................................... 2.6-14
2.6.3.2 Test Parameters ........................................................................................... 2.6-15
2.6.3.3 Demonstration .............................................................................................. 2.6-20
2.6.3.4 Special Tests ................................................................................................ 2.6-23
2.6.3.5 Environment Simulation (TV) ........................................................................ 2.6-23
2.6.4 THERMAL BALANCE VERIFICATION ............................................................. 2.6-24
2.6.4.1 Guidelines ................................................................................................. ….2.6-24
2.6.4.2 Test Parameters ........................................................................................... 2.6-25
2.6.4.3 Demonstration .............................................................................................. 2.6-28
2.6.4.4 Special Tests ................................................................................................ 2.6-28
2.6.5 CONTAMINATION VERIFICATION.................................................................. 2.6-29
2.6.5.1 Temperature-Humidity Verification ................................................................ 2.6-31
2.6.6 LEAKAGE (INTEGRITY) VERIFICATION....................................................... 2.6-332
2.6.6.1 Levels of Assembly ....................................................................................... 2.6-31
2.6.6.2 Demonstration ............................................................................................. 2.6.332
2.6.6.3 Acceptance Requirements .......................................................................... 2.6-332
SECTION 2.7 - CRYOGENICS
2.7 Cryogenic Philosophy ............................................................................................ 2.7-1

2.7.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS VACUUM AND THERMAL VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................................ 2.7-1
2.7.2 Summary of Requirements ................................................................................. 2.7-1
2.7.3 Cryo-Thermal-Vacuum Qualification ................................................................... 2.7-2
2.7.3.1 Applicability ..................................................................................................... 2.7-3
2.7.3.2 Special Considerations ................................................................................... 2.7-4
2.7.3.3 Level of Testing .............................................................................................. 2.7-5
2.7.3.4 Test Parameters ............................................................................................. 2.7-5
2.7.3.5 Test Setup ...................................................................................................... 2.7-8
2.7.3.6 Demonstration ................................................................................................ 2.7-8
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GSFC-STD-7000A
2.7.3.7 Special Tests ................................................................................................ 2.7-10

2.7.3.8 Failure-Free-Performance ............................................................................. 2.7-10
2.7.4 Thermal Balance Qualification .......................................................................... 2.7-10
2.7.4.1 Alternative Methods ...................................................................................... 2.7-11
2.7.4.2 Use of a Thermal Analytical Model ................................................................ 2.7-11
2.7.4.3 Method of Cryo-Thermal Simulation .............................................................. 2.7-12
2.7.4.4 Internal Power............................................................................................... 2.7-14
2.7.4.5 Special Considerations ................................................................................. 2.7-14
2.7.4.6 Demonstration .............................................................................................. 2.7-14
2.7.5 Temperature-Humidity-Oxygen Deficiency Verification ..................................... 2.7-15
2.7.5.1 Temperature-Humidity: Transportation and Storage ..................................... 2.7-15
2.7.6 Leakage (Integrity Verification) ......................................................................... 2.7-16
2.7.6.1 Levels of Assembly ....................................................................................... 2.7-16
2.7.6.2 Demonstration .............................................................................................. 2.7-16
SECTION 2.8 - CONTAMINATION CONTROL
2.8 Contamination and Coatings Engineering and Planetary Protection ...................... 2.8-1
2.8.1 Contamination .................................................................................................... 2.8-1
2.8.1.1 Summary of Contamination Verification Process ............................................ 2.8-1
2.8.1.2 Contamination Engineering Approach ............................................................. 2.8-2
2.8.1.3 Contamination Sensitivities ............................................................................. 2.8-5
2.8.1.4 Contamination Requirements.......................................................................... 2.8-5
2.8.1.5 Contamination Budget .................................................................................... 2.8-5
2.8.1.6 Contamination Control Plan (CCP) ................................................................. 2.8-6
2.8.1.7 Contamination Engineering During Design ..................................................... 2.8-7
2.8.1.8 Contamination Engineering Analyses ............................................................. 2.8-8
2.8.1.9 Contamination Engineering During Integration and Test ............................... 2.8-10
2.8.1.10 Thermal Vacuum Bakeouts ........................................................................... 2.8-11
2.8.1.11 Spacecraft Transportation and Storage Phases ............................................ 2.8-11
2.8.1.12 Launch Site Contamination Control............................................................... 2.8-11
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
2.8.1.13 Launch Vehicle and Companion Payload Considerations ............................. 2.8-11

2.8.1.14 Launch and Orbit Insertion Mission Phases .................................................. 2.8-12
2.8.1.15 On-Orbit Through End-of-Life Mission Phases .............................................. 2.8-12
2.8.1.16 Spacecraft Post-Mission and Follow-on Program Phases ............................. 2.8-14
2.8.2 Coatings Engineering ....................................................................................... 2.8-15
2.8.2.1 Key Verification Milestones for Coatings Selections and Testing .................. 2.8-16
2.8.3 Planetary Protection ......................................................................................... 2.8-16
2.8.3.1 Classification of Missions .............................................................................. 2.8-17
2.8.3.2 Planetary Protection Categorization of Missions ........................................... 2.8-17
2.8.3.3 Planetary Protection Plan Development (Categories II-V) ............................ 2.8-18
2.8.3.4 Measurements and Verification ..................................................................... 2.8-19
2.8.3.5 Documentation for Planetary Protection Requirements and Verification........ 2.8-19
SECTION 2.9 - END-TO-END TESTING
2.9 END-TO-END COMPATIBILITY TESTS AND SIMULATIONS ............................... 2.9-1

2.9.1 Compatibility Tests ............................................................................................. 2.9-1
2.9.2 Mission Simulations ............................................................................................ 2.9-1
Appendix A – General Information ...................................................................................... A-1
Appendix B - Environmental Verification for CubeSats Companion to GSFC-STD-7000
(General Environmental Verification Standard) .................................................................. B-1
GSFC-STD-7000B
04/28/2021
Supersedes
GSFC-STD-7000A
Tables
Table
2.2-1 Flight System Hardware Levels of Assembly ..................................................................... 2.2-3
2.2-2 Test Factors/Durations ....................................................................................................... 2.2-5
2.2-3 Flight Hardware Design/Analysis Factors of Safety Applied to Limit Loads ..................... .2.2-6
2.4-1 Structural and Mechanical Verification Test Requirements ............................................... 2.4-2
2.4-2 Minimum Probability-Level Requirements for Flight Limit (maximum expected) Level ..... 2.4-3
2.4-3 Generalized Random Vibration Test Levels, Components. ............................................. 2.4-19
2.4-4 Component Minimum Workmanship Random Vibration Test Levels .............................. 2.4-20
2.5-1 Susceptibility Scanning (Replacement for MIL-STD-461F Table III) ................................. 2.5-9
2.5-2 EMI Requirements Summary ........................................................................................... 2.5-18
2.6-1 Thermal Vacuum Verification Summary (non-cryogenic) ................................................ 2.6-17
2.7-1 Cryogenic Vacuum, Thermal, Electrical and Mechanical Requirements ........................... 2.7-2
2.7-2 Margins As A Function Of Phase in Project Life-Cycle ...................................................... 2.7-6
A-1 Acoustic Fill-Factor, 3 meter Payload Fairing .......................................................................A-2
FIGURES
Figure
2.1-1 Environmental Test Matrix ................................................................................................. 2.1-5
2.1-2a Verification Test Report ...................................................................................................... 2.1-6
2.1-2b Verification Test Report (continued) ................................................................................... 2.1-7
2.4-1 Shock Response Level (SRS) – for Assessing Component Test Requirements............. 2.4-27
2.5-1 Capacitor Network Simulating Battery Dominated Bus Impedance ................................... 2.5-8
2.5-2 General Test Setup Diagram ........................................................................................... 2.5-11
2.5-3 General Test Setup For Free Standing EUT in Shielded Enclosure ................................ 2.5-12
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
2.5-4 Conducted Emissions Test Set-Up (Schematic) Differential Mode ................................. 2.5-20
2.5-5 Conducted Emissions Test Set-Up (Physical Layout) Differential Mode ......................... 2.5-20
2.5-6 Conducted Emissions Differential Mode Limits ................................................................ 2.5-21
2.5-7 Common Mode Conducted Emissions Default Limit ........................................................ 2.5-22
2.5-8 CMCE Test Setup, Modified CE101/CE03 Test Methods, Power Leads ........................ 2.5-24
2.5-9 CMCE Test Setup, Modified CE101/CE03 Test Methods, Signal Cables ....................... 2.5-22
2.5-10 CMCE Test Setup, Absorbing Clamp Method ................................................................. 2.5-25
2.5-11 Inrush Current Transient Default Limit ............................................................................. 2.5-27
2.5-12 Inrush Current Emissions Test Setup (Current Probe) .................................................... 2.5-29
2.5-13 Inrush Current Emissions Alternate Test Setup (Series Resistor) ................................... 2.5-29
2.5-14 Conducted Susceptibility Voltage Limit (30 Hz to 150 kHz) ............................................. 2.5-31
2.5-15 Conducted Susceptibility Power Limit (30 Hz to 150 kHz) ............................................... 2.5-31
2.5-16 General CS101 Test Setup .............................................................................................. 2.5-32
2.5-17 Alternate CS101 Test Method With Direct Current Monitoring ........................................ 2.5-32
2.5-18 Conducted Susceptibility Transient Waveform ................................................................ 2.5-34
2.5-19 Conducted Transient Susceptibility Test Setup ............................................................... 2.5-34
2.5-20 Conducted Transient Susceptibility Test Setup – Parallel Injection ................................. 2.5-35
2.5-21 Common Mode Conducted Susceptibility Current Limits................................................. 2.5-37
2.5-22 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, 150 kHz to 50 MHz Voltage Limit .................... 2.5-39
2.5-23 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, 150 kHz to 50 MHz Current Limits .................. 2.5-39
2.5-24 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads Test Setup ........................................................ 2.5-40
2.5-25 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads Test Setup, Alternate Method ........................... 2.5-41
2.5-26 CS115 Default Limit ......................................................................................................... 2.5-42
2.5-27 Radiated Emissions Electric Field Limit with Suggested Notches ................................... 2.5-45
2.5-28 Recommended Test Setup, Instrument/Payload Level Power Quality Measurements ... 2.5-50
2.5-29 Recommended Test Setup, Spacecraft/Observatory Level Power Quality Measure ...... 2.5-50
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
2.5-30 Impacts of Uncontrolled EGSE Common Mode Currents ................................................ 2.5-61
2.5-31 Proper EGSE Shielding and Grounding Configuration .................................................... 2.5-61
2.5-32 EGSE Cable Shield Termination – Connector Break (Preferred Method) ..................... .2.5-63
2.5-33 EGSE Cable Shield Termination – Stuffing Tube (Alternate Method) ............................. 2.5-63
2.5-34 Common Source Impedance and Harness Impedance ................................................... 2.5-65
2.5-35 Power Distribution Wiring, Large Military Platforms (Worst Case) .................................. 2.5-66
2.5-36 Power Distribution Wiring, GSFC Platforms (Typical) ...................................................... 2.5-66
2.5-37 Capacitor Network Simulating Battery Dominated Bus .................................................... 2.5-67
2.5-38 Conducted Emissions Set-Up Single-Ended ................................................................... 2.5-70
2.5-39 Basic Common Mode Conducted Emissions Calibration Setup ...................................... 2.5-73
2.5-40 Nominal Transfer Impedance of CISPR 16 Absorbing Clamp ......................................... 2.5-73
2.5-41 Elemental Electric Dipole Model ...................................................................................... 2.5-76
2.5-42 Simplified Inductive Crosstalk Model ............................................................................... 2.5-77
2.5-43 General Transmission Line Model ................................................................................... 2.5-78
2.5-44 Current Amplitude vs Position, DC to I = λ/4 .................................................................... 2.5-79
2.5-45 Current Amplitude vs. Position, l = λ/4 to l = λ/2 .............................................................. 2.5-79
2.5-46 Current Amplitude vs. Position, l = λ/2 to l = 3λ/4 ............................................................ 2.5-80
2.5-47 Current Amplitude vs. Position, l = 3λ/4 to l = λ ............................................................... 2.5-80
2.5-48 Source End Current vs. l/λ for Mismatched Transmission Line ....................................... 2.5-81
2.5-49 Currents at Various Locations on Mismatched Transmission Line .................................. 2.5-82
2.5-50 Effect of Damping Impedance on Null at l = λ/4 ............................................................... 2.5-84
2.5-51 Effect of Damping Impedance on Peak at l = λ/2 ............................................................. 2.5-84
2.5-52 “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Field Cancellation ....................................................... 2.5-86
2.5-53 “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Coupling ...................................................................... 2.5-86
2.5-54 Damping at “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Field Cancellation .................................... 2.5-87
2.5-55 Damping at “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Coupling .................................................. 2.5-87
GSFC-STD-7000B
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GSFC-STD-7000A
2.5-56 Current Measurement Fixture .......................................................................................... 2.5-90
2.5-57 Measured Current with Standard Current Probe ............................................................. 2.5-92
2.5-58 Example Measured Currents With and Without Absorbing Clamp .................................. 2.5-92
2.5-59 Solid State Switch Example Design ................................................................................. 2.5-94
2.5-60 Measurement System Check (Current Probe) ................................................................. 2.5-95
2.6-61 Measurement System Check (Series Resistor) ............................................................... 2.5-95
2.5-62 Inrush Current Calibration Waveform ............................................................................... 2.5-96
2.5-63 Input Power Voltage Sag Measurement Setup ................................................................ 2.5-96
2.5-64 CS01/CS101 Pre-Calibration Setup ............................................................................... 2.5-102
2.5-65 CS101 Pre-Calibration Equivalent Circuit, Transformer Included .................................. 2.5-103
2.5-66 CS101 Pre-Calibration Equivalent Circuit, Referred to Transformer Secondary ........... 2.5-103
2.5-67 Conducted Susceptibility Alternate Test Setup (Differential Mode, 30 Hz to 150 kHz) . 2.5-105
2.5-68 CS101 Alternate Voltage Limit ....................................................................................... 2.5-106
2.5-69 CS101 Alternate Power Limit ......................................................................................... 2.5-106
2.5-70 Plane Electromagnetic Wave Impinging On Wire-Above-Ground ................................. 2.5-110
2.5-71 V/E for Wire Above Ground, h = 5 cm ............................................................................ 2.5-111
2.5-72 IC/E0 into 100 Ω CS114 Calibration Fixture .................................................................... 2.5-112
2.5-73 I/E0 with Precalibrated Levels Applied to Shorted 50 Ω Line ......................................... 2.5-114
2.5-74 (I/E0)MAX per MIL-STD-461F and MIL-STD-461G .......................................................... 2.5-114
2.5-75 Simplified CS114 Calibration Diagram ........................................................................... 2.5-115
2.5-76 CS114 Pre-Calibration Equivalent Circuit ...................................................................... 2.5-116
2.5-77 Thévenin Equivalent Circuit for CUT Injection ............................................................... 2.5-118
2.5-78 Representative ZS for N = 1 and N = 2........................................................................... 2.5-118
2.5-79 Representative (Vemf)OC for N = 1 and N = 2 .................................................................. 2.5-119
2.5-80 Representative ISC for N = 1 and N = 2 .......................................................................... 2.5-120
2.5-81 Representative (Vemf)OC for N = 1 and N = 2 .................................................................. 2.5-122
GSFC-STD-7000B
04/28/2021
Supersedes
GSFC-STD-7000A
2.5-82 Representative ISC for N = 1 and N = 2 .......................................................................... 2.5-122
2.5-83 RE “Spot Size” Calculation ............................................................................................. 2.5-127
2.5-84 Side and Back Lobe Antenna Factor ............................................................................. 2.5-129
2.5-85 Theoretical Noise Floor Limits Considering Average Thermal Power ........................... 2.5-130
2.5-86 Typical Antenna Factors for Measurement Antennas .................................................... 2.5-132
2.5-87 Theoretical Floor Limits for Measurement System Using Peak Thermal Power ........... 2.5-133
2.5-88 Measurement Bandwidth and Clock Jitter...................................................................... 2.5-134
2.5-89 Probability Density of Thermal Voltage Noise ................................................................ 2.5-136
2.5-90 MIL-STD-461G CS114 Calibration Limits ...................................................................... 2.5-145
2.5-91 Inductance Per Unit Length, Wire Above Ground .......................................................... 2.5-147
2.5-92 Capacitance Per Unit Length, Wire Above Ground ....................................................... 2.5-147
2.5-93 Characteristic Impedance, Wire Above Ground ............................................................. 2.5-148
2.6-1 Thermal-Vac Test Temperature Margins (Passive Thermal Control) .............................. 2.6-16
2.6-2 Notional TV Test Temperature Profiles ............................................................................ 2.6-23
2.6-3 Temperature-Humidity Profile for Descent and Landing Demonstration ......................... 2.6-32
2.8-1 Contamination Engineering Approach ............................................................................... 2.8-4
A-1 Cylindrical Payload in Fairing Acoustic Fill-Factor ................................................................A-1
A-2 Acoustic Fill-Factor for Various Size Payloads in a 3 Meter Diameter Payload Fairing .......A-3
A-3 Determination of Qualification and Acceptance Random Vibration Test Levels ..................A-4
A-4 Shock Environment Produced by Linear Pyrotechnic Devices .............................................A-7
A-5 Shock Environment Produced by Separation Nuts and Explosive Bolts ..............................A-8
A-6 Shock Environment Produced by Pin-Pullers and Pin-Pushers ...........................................A-9
A-7 Shock Environment Produced by Bolt-Cutters, Pin-Cutters, and Cable-Cutters ................A-10
A-8 Attenuation of Constant Velocity Line .................................................................................A-11
A-9 Peak Pyrotechnic Shock Response vs. Distance ...............................................................A-12
A-10 Shock Attenuation Example ................................................................................................A-13
GSFC-STD-7000B
04/28/2021
Supersedes
GSFC-STD-7000A
A-11 Reduction of Pyrotechnic Shock Response due to Intervening Structure ..........................A-14
SECTION l
GENERAL INFORMATION
GENERAL INFORMATION ________________________________________ GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1 PURPOSE
This standard provides guidelines for environmental verification programs for Goddard
Space Flight Center (GSFC) payloads, subsystems and components and describes methods
for implementing the environmental verifications described. It contains a baseline for
demonstrating, by test and/or analysis, the satisfactory performance of hardware in the
expected mission environments, and that minimum workmanship standards have been met.
It elaborates on those guidelines, gives guideline test levels, provides guidance in the choice
of test options, and describes acceptable test and analytical methods for implementing the
requirements. It is expected that projects will use this handbook in the development of their
environmental requirements. Any guidelines that are intended as “institutional” requirements
will be captured in GSFC-Std-1000 Rules for the Design, Development, and Operation of
Flight Systems (also known as the GOLD Rules).
These guidelines are intended for use by GSFC projects and contractors and can be tailored
to create a project specific verification plan and verification specification as discussed in
section 2.1. GSFC projects should select from the options to fulfill the specific payload
(spacecraft) requirements in accordance with the launch vehicle to be used, or to cover other
mission-specific considerations.
1.2 APPLICABILITY AND LIMITATIONS
These guidelines apply to GSFC hardware and associated software that is to be launched on
an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV). Hardware launched by balloons, sounding rockets or
aircraft is not included. The guidelines apply to the following:
a. All space flight hardware, including interface hardware, that is developed as part of a
payload managed by GSFC, whether developed by (1) GSFC or any of its contractors,
(2) another National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) center, or (3) an
independent agency; and
b. All space flight hardware, including interface hardware that is developed by GSFC or
any of its contractors and that is provided to another NASA installation or independent
agency as part of a payload that is not managed by GSFC.
The provisions herein are generally limited to the verification of ELV payloads and to those
activities (with emphasis on the environmental verification program) that are closely
associated with such verification, such as workmanship and functional testing.
GEVS is written in accordance with the current GSFC practice of using a single protoflight
payload for both qualification testing and space flight (see definition of hardware, 1.8). The
protoflight verification program, therefore, is given as the nominal test program.
1.3 THE GSFC VERIFICATION APPROACH
Goddard Space Flight Center endorses the full systems verification approach in which the
entire payload is tested or verified under conditions that simulate the flight operations and flight
environment as realistically as possible. GEVS is written in accordance with that view.
However, it is recognized that there may be unavoidable exceptions, or conditions which make
it preferable to perform the verification activities at lower levels of assembly. For example,
testing at lower levels of assembly may be necessary to produce sufficient environmentally
induced stresses to uncover design and workmanship flaws. These test requirements should
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be tailored for each specific space program and waivers to GSFC-STD-1000 should be
submitted where tailoring results in test activity that doesn’t meet the requirements in GSFC-
STD-1000.
Since testing at the component (or unit) level, or lower level of assembly for large components,
often becomes a primary part of the verification program, all components should be operating
and monitored during all environmental tests if practicable.
Environmental verification of hardware is only a portion of the total assurance effort at GSFC
that establishes confidence that a payload will function correctly and fly a successful mission.
The environmental test program provides confidence that the design will perform when
subjected to mission environments since the test environments are more severe than
expected during the mission. The environmental test program also provides environmental
stress screening to uncover workmanship defects.
The total verification process also includes the development of models representing the
hardware, tests to validate or correlate the models, analyses, alignments, calibrations,
functional/performance tests to verify proper operation, and finally end-to-end tests and
simulations to show that the total system will perform as specified.
Other tests not included herein may be performed as required by the project. The level,
procedure, and decision criteria for performing any such additional tests should be included in
the system verification plan and system verification specification (section 2.1).
1.4 OTHER ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
In addition to the verification program, the assurance effort includes parts and materials
selection and control, reliability assessments, quality assurance, software assurance, design
reviews, and system safety.
1.5 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTRATION
The responsibility and authority for decisions in applying the guidelines of this standard rest with the
project manager. The general/environmental guidelines are intended for use by the flight project
managers, assisted by the systems assurance managers, and systems engineering in developing project-
unique performance verification requirements, plans, and specifications that are consistent with current
NASA program/project planning.
1.6 GEVS CONFIGURATION CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION
This document is controlled and maintained by the GSFC Technical Standards Program and
is available through the Goddard Document Management System (GDMS).
1.7 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The following documents may be needed in formulating the environmental test program. The
user must ensure that the latest versions are procured and that the most recent changes and
additions are included.
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1.7.1 RF Compatibility Testing
450-PROC-CTP/SN/NEN; Radio Frequency (RF) Compatibility Test Procedures between

Spacecraft and the Space Network (SN) and/or Near Earth Network (NEN), Revision 2;
Effective Date: April 7, 2016
1.7.2 Deep Space Network (DSN) Simulation
The Deep Space Network/Flight Project Interface Design Handbook, 8l0-5, Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Vol. I, Module TSS-10, describes existing
payload (spacecraft) telemetry and command simulation capability. Vol. II describes proposed
DSN capability
1.7.3 NASA Standards
The following standards provide supporting information:
a. NASA-STD 7002, Payload Test Requirements
b. NASA-STD-7001, Payload Vibroacoustic Test Criteria
c. NASA-STD-7003, Pyroshock Test Criteria
d. NASA-HDBK-7004, Force Limited Vibration Testing
e. NASA-HDBK-7005, Dynamic Environmental Criteria
f. NASA-STD-5001, Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for Space Flight
Hardware
g. NASA-STD-5002, Load Analyses of Spacecraft and Payloads
h. NASA-STD-5009, Nondestructive Evaluation Requirements for Fracture Critical

Metallic Components
i. NASA-STD-5019, Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware
j. GSFC-STD-1000, Rules for Design, Development and Operation of Flight

Systems
1.7.4 Military Standards for EMI Testing
Pertinent sections of the following standards are needed to conduct the EMI tests:
a. MIL-STD-461, Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference

Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment, December 2015
Additional documentation is specified in Section 2.5.
1.7.5 Military Standards for Non-Destructive Evaluation
a. MIL-HDBK-6870, Inspection Program Requirements, Non-Destructive Testing for

Aircraft and Missile Materials and Parts.
1-3
b. NAS-410, Certification and Qualification of Nondestructive Test Personnel.
c. MSFC-STD-1249, Standard NDE Guidelines and Requirements for Fracture Control

Programs.
d. MIL-HDBK-728, Nondestructive Testing.
1.8 DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply within the context of this specification:
Acceptance Tests: The verification process that demonstrates that hardware is acceptable
for flight. It also serves as a quality control screen to detect deficiencies and, normally, to
provide the basis for delivery of an item under terms of a contract.
Anomaly: An unexpected event that is outside of design/performance specification limits or is

inconsistent with proper system behavior. NOTE: Design limits are those identified in approved
design-level documents.
Assembly: See Level of Assembly.
Component: See Level of Assembly.
Configuration: The functional and physical characteristics of the payload and all its integral
parts, assemblies and systems that are capable of fulfilling the fit, form and functional
requirements defined by performance specifications and engineering drawings.
Contamination: The presence of materials of molecular or particulate nature which degrade

the performance of hardware.
Design Qualification Tests: Tests intended to demonstrate that the test item will function within
performance specifications under simulated conditions more severe than those expected from
ground handling, launch, and mission operations. Their purpose is to uncover deficiencies in
design and method of manufacture. They are not intended to exceed design safety margins
or to introduce unrealistic modes of failure. The design qualification tests may be to either
“prototype” or “protoflight” test levels.
Design Specification: Generic designation for a specification that describes functional and
physical requirements for an article, usually at the component level or higher levels of
assembly. In its initial form, the design specification is a statement of functional requirements
with only general coverage of physical and test requirements. The design specification
evolves through the project life cycle to reflect progressive refinements in performance,
design, configuration, and test requirements. In many projects the end-item specifications
serve all the purposes of design specifications for the contract end-items. Design
specifications provide the basis for technical and engineering management control.
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC): The condition that prevails when various electronic
devices are performing their functions according to design in a common electromagnetic
environment.
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI): Electromagnetic energy which interrupts, obstructs, or

otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electrical equipment.
1-4
Electromagnetic Susceptibility: Undesired response by a component, subsystem, or system

to conducted or radiated electromagnetic emissions.
End-to-End Tests: Tests performed on the integrated ground and flight system, including all
elements of the payload, its control, stimulation, communications, and data processing to
demonstrate that the entire system is operating in a manner to fulfill all mission requirements
and objectives.
Failure: A departure from specification that is discovered in the functioning or operation of the
hardware or software. See nonconformance.
Flight Acceptance: See Acceptance Tests.
Fracture Control Program: A systematic project activity to ensure that a payload intended for
flight has sufficient structural integrity as to present no critical or catastrophic hazard as well
as to ensure quality of performance in the structural area for any payload (spacecraft) project.
Central to the program is fracture control analysis, which includes the concepts of fail-safe and
safe-life, defined as follows:
a. Fail-safe: Ensures that a structural element, because of structural redundancy, will not
cause collapse of the remaining structure or have any detrimental effects on mission
performance.
b. Safe-life: Ensures that the largest flaw that could remain undetected after non-
destructive examination would not grow to failure during the mission.
Functional Tests: The operation of a unit in accordance with a defined operational procedure
to determine whether performance is within the specified requirements.
Hardware: As used in this document, there are two major categories of hardware as follows:
a. Prototype Hardware: Hardware of a new design; it is subject to a design qualification

test program; it is not intended for flight.
b. Flight Hardware: Hardware to be used operationally in space. It includes the following

subsets:
(1) Protoflight Hardware: Flight hardware of a new design; it is subject to a

qualification test program that combines elements of prototype and flight
acceptance verification; that is, the application of design qualification test levels
and flight acceptance test durations.
(2) Follow-On Hardware: Flight hardware built in accordance with a design that has
been qualified either as prototype or as protoflight hardware; follow-on hardware
is subject to a flight acceptance test program.
(3) Spare Hardware: Hardware the design of which has been proven in a design
qualification test program; it is subject to a flight acceptance test program and is
used to replace flight hardware that is no longer acceptable for flight.
(4) Reflight Hardware: Flight hardware that has been used operationally in space
and is to be reused in the same way; the verification program to which it is subject
depends on its past performance, current status, and the upcoming mission.
1-5
Level of Assembly: The environmental test guidelines of GEVS generally start at the
component or unit level assembly and continue through the system level (referred to in GEVS
as the payload or spacecraft level). The assurance program includes the part level.
Verification testing may also include testing at the assembly and subassembly levels of
assembly; for test record keeping, these levels are combined into a "subassembly" level. The
verification program continues through launch, and on-orbit performance. The following levels
of assembly are used for describing test and analysis configurations:
Assembly: A functional subdivision of a component consisting of parts or

subassemblies that perform functions necessary for the operation of the component
as a whole. Examples are a power amplifier and gyroscope.
Component: A functional subdivision of a subsystem and generally a self-contained

combination of items performing a function necessary for the subsystem's operation.
Examples are electronic box, transmitter, gyro package, actuator, motor, battery. For
the purposes of this document, "component" and "unit" are used interchangeably.
Instrument: A spacecraft subsystem consisting of sensors and associated hardware

for making measurements or observations in space. For the purposes of this document,
an instrument is considered a subsystem (of the spacecraft).
Module: A major subdivision of the payload that is viewed as a physical and functional
entity for the purposes of analysis, manufacturing, testing, and recordkeeping.
Examples include spacecraft bus, science payload, and upper stage vehicle.
Part: A hardware element that is not normally subject to further subdivision or

disassembly without destruction of design use. Examples include resistor, integrated
circuit, relay, connector, bolt, and gaskets.
Payload: An integrated assemblage of modules, subsystems, etc., designed to perform

a specified mission in space. For the purposes of this document, "payload" and
"spacecraft" are used interchangeably. Other terms used to designate this level of
assembly are Laboratory, Observatory, Satellite and System Segment.
Spacecraft: See Payload. Other terms used to designate this level of assembly are
Laboratory, Observatory, and Satellite.
Section: A structurally integrated set of components and integrating hardware that form
a subdivision of a subsystem, module, etc. A section forms a testable level of assembly,
such as components/units mounted into a structural mounting tray or panel-like
assembly, or components that are stacked.
Subassembly: A subdivision of an assembly. Examples are wire harness and loaded

printed circuit boards.
Subsystem: A functional subdivision of a payload consisting of two or more

components. Examples are structural, attitude control, electrical power, and
communication subsystems. The science instruments or experiments are also included
as subsystems of the payload.
Unit: A functional subdivision of a subsystem, or instrument, and generally a self-

contained combination of items performing a function necessary for the subsystem's
operation. Examples are electronic box, transmitter, gyro package, actuator, motor,
1-6
battery. For the purposes of this document, "component" and "unit" are used
interchangeably.
Limit Level: The maximum expected flight level (consistent with the minimum probability levels
of Table 2.4-2).
Margin: The amount by which hardware capability exceeds requirements.
Module: See Level of Assembly.
Nonconformance: A condition of any hardware, software, material, or service in which one or

more characteristics do not conform to specified requirements.
Offgassing: The emanation of volatile matter of any kind from materials into a crewed
pressurized volume.
Outgassing: The emanation of volatile materials under vacuum conditions resulting in a mass
loss and/or material condensation on nearby surfaces.
Part: See Level of Assembly.
Payload: See Level of Assembly.
Performance Verification: Determination by test, analysis, or a combination of the two that the
payload element can operate as intended in a particular mission; this includes being satisfied
that the design of the payload or element has been qualified and that the particular item has
been accepted as true to the design and ready for flight operations.
Protoflight Testing: See Hardware.
Prototype Testing: See Hardware.
Qualification: See Design Qualification Tests.
Redundancy (of design): The use of more than one independent means of accomplishing a
given function.
Section: See Level of Assembly.
Spacecraft: See Level of Assembly.
Subassembly: See Level of Assembly.
Subsystem: See Level of Assembly.
Temperature Cycle: A transition from some initial temperature condition to temperature

stabilization at one extreme and then to temperature stabilization at the opposite extreme and
returning to the initial temperature condition.
Temperature Stabilization: The condition that exists when the rate of change of temperatures
has decreased to the point where the test item may be expected to remain within the specified
test tolerance for the necessary duration or where further change is considered acceptable.
1-7
Thermal Balance Test: A test conducted to verify the adequacy of the thermal model, the
adequacy of the thermal design, and the capability of the thermal control system to maintain
thermal conditions within established mission limits.
Thermal-Vacuum Test: A test conducted to demonstrate the capability of the test item to
operate satisfactorily in vacuum at temperatures based on those expected for the mission.
The test, including the gradient shifts induced by cycling between temperature extremes, can
also uncover latent defects in design, parts, and workmanship.
Unit: See Level of Assembly.
Vibroacoustics: An environment induced by high-intensity acoustic noise associated with

various segments of the flight profile; it manifests itself throughout the payload in the form of
directly transmitted acoustic excitation and as structure-borne random vibration.
Workmanship Tests: Tests performed during the environmental verification program to verify
adequate workmanship in the construction of a test item. It is often necessary to impose
stresses beyond those predicted for the mission in order to uncover defects. Thus random
vibration tests are conducted specifically to detect bad solder joints, loose or missing
fasteners, improperly mounted parts, etc. Cycling between temperature extremes during
thermal-vacuum testing and the presence of electromagnetic interference during EMC testing
can also reveal the lack of proper construction and adequate workmanship.
1.9 CRITERIA FOR UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE
Deterioration or any change in performance of any test item that does or could in any manner
prevent the item from meeting its functional, operational, or design requirements throughout
its mission should be reason to consider the test item as having failed. Other factors
concerning failure are considered in the following paragraphs.
1.9.1 Failure Occurrence
When a failure (non-conformance or trend indicating that an out of spec condition will result)
occurs, a determination should be made as to the feasibility and value of continuing the test
to its specified conclusion. If corrective action is taken, the test should be repeated to the
extent necessary to demonstrate that the test item's performance is satisfactory.
1.9.2 Failures with Retroactive Effects
If corrective action taken as a result of failure, e.g. redesign of a component, affects the validity
of previously completed tests, prior tests should be repeated to the extent necessary to
demonstrate satisfactory performance.
1.9.3 Failure Reporting
Every failure should be recorded and reported in accordance with the failure reporting
provisions of the project.
1.9.4 Wear Out
If during a test sequence a test item is operated in excess of design life and wears out or
becomes unsuitable for further testing from causes other than deficiencies, a spare may be
substituted. If, however, the substitution affects the significance of test results, the test during
1-8
which the item was replaced and any previously completed tests that are affected should be
repeated to the extent necessary to demonstrate satisfactory performance.
1.10 TEST SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES
The following paragraphs define the responsibilities shared by the space project and facility management for
planning and enforcing industrial safety measures taken during testing for the protection of personnel, the payload,
and the test facility.
1.10.1 Operations Hazard Analysis, Responsibilities For
It will the joint responsibility of the test facility manager and the project manager to ensure that
environmental tests and associated operations do not present unacceptable hazard(s) to the
test item, facilities, or personnel. A test operations hazard analysis (OHA) will be performed
by the facility and project personnel to consider and evaluate all hazards presented by the
interaction of the payload and the facility for each environmental test. All hazards discovered
in the OHA will be tracked to an agreed-upon resolution. The safety measures to be taken as
a result of the OHA, as well as the safety measures between tests, will be specified as
requirements in the verification plan and verification specification. (sec. 2.1.1)
1.10.2 Treatment of Hazards
As hazards are discovered, they will be mitigated using the hierarchy of hazard controls:
elimination, substitution, engineering, administrative and personal protective equipment.
Elimination is when the hazard is physically removed and no longer present. Substitution is
replacing something that produces a hazard with something that does not produce a hazard.
An example is replacing a hazardous chemical with a nonhazardous chemical. Engineering
controls do not eliminate hazards, but rather isolate people from the hazards. Examples
include: installation of a fume hood to remove airborne contaminants, construction of a
platform to address work at heights hazards. Administrative controls are changes to the way
people work to limit or prevent personnel exposure to hazards. Examples include procedure
changes, employee training, and installation of signs and warning labels. Personal protective
equipment (PPE) should be used as a last resort and only with training that stresses the
importance of the proper use of the equipment. Examples of PPE include safety shoes, fall
protection harnesses, safety glasses, etc. In practice, a combination of all five methods may
be the best solution to the hazards posed by a complex system. Before any test begins, the
project manager and test facility management will agree on the hazard control method(s) that
are to be used.
1.10.3 Facility Safety
The test facility manager will verify that the test facility and normal operations present no
unacceptable hazard to the test item, test and support equipment, or personnel. He/she will
ensure that facility personnel abide by all applicable regulations, observe all appropriate
industrial safety measures, and follow all requirements for protective equipment. He/she will
ensure that all facility personnel are trained and qualified for their positions. Training should
include the handling of emergencies by the simulation of emergency conditions. Analyses,
tests, and inspections will be performed to verify that the safety requirements are satisfied.
The approach outlined in 1.10.2 will be used to mitigate hazards.
1-9
1.10.4 Safety Responsibilities During Tests
The test facility manager will appoint a safety officer to work closely with a safety officer
designated by the space project. The facility designee will ensure that the facility meets
applicable Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA) and other requirements that appropriate
industrial safety measures are observed, and that applicable personal protective equipment is
provided for all personnel involved. The facility designee will ensure that facility personnel use
the equipment provided and that the test operation does not present a hazard to the facility.
The project designee will ensure that project personnel use the equipment provided and that
the test operation does not present a hazard to the space hardware, equipment, or personnel.
1.11 TESTING OF SPARE HARDWARE
A supply of selected spares is often maintained in case of the failure of flight hardware. As a
minimum, spares must undergo a verification program equal to that required for follow-on
hardware. Therefore, special consideration must be given to spares as follows:
a. Extent of Testing - The extent and type of testing should be determined as part of the
flight hardware test program. A spare unit may be used for qualification of the hardware
by subjecting it to protoflight testing, and testing the flight hardware to acceptance
levels.
b. Spares From Failed Elements - If a flight element is replaced for reasons of failure and
is then repaired and re-designated as a spare, appropriate retesting should be
conducted.
c. Caution on the Use of Spares - When the need for a spare arises, immediate analysis
and review of the failed hardware must be made. If failure occurs in a hardware item
of which there are others of identical design, the fault may be generic and may affect
all hardware of that design.
d. "One-Shot" Items - Some items may be degraded or expended during the integration
and test period and replaced by spares. The spare that is re-designated for flight should
meet the required flight quality control standards or auxiliary tests and should be of
qualified design. Examples are pyrotechnic devices, yo-yo despin weights, and
elements that absorb impact energy by plastic yielding. When the replacement entails
procedures that could jeopardize mission success, the replacement procedure should
be successfully demonstrated with the hardware in the same configuration that it will be
in when final replacement is to be accomplished.
1.12 TEST FACILITIES, CALIBRATION
The facilities and fixtures used in conducting tests must be capable of producing and
maintaining the test conditions prescribed with the test specimen installed and operating or
not operating, as required. In any major test, facility performance should be verified prior to
the test either by a review of its performance during a test that occurred a short time earlier or
by conducting a test with a substitute test item. All measurements that require a specified
level of accuracy should be taken using equipment that has been properly calibrated, with
documentation available, using one of the standards: ANSI/NCSL z540.1, ANSI/NCSL z540.3,
or ISO 17025, IAW GPR 8730.1.
1-10
1.13 TEST CONDITION TOLERANCES
In the absence of a rationale for other test condition tolerances, the following should be used;
the values include measurement uncertainties:
Acoustics Overall Level: ≤ 1 dB
l/3 Octave Band Tolerance: Frequency (Hz) Tolerance (dB)

f ≤ 40 +3, -6
40 < F < 3150 ±3
f ≥ 3150 +3, -6
Duration +10%, -0%
Antenna Pattern Determination ± 2 dB

Electromagnetic Compatibility
Voltage Magnitude: ± 5% of the peak value
Current Magnitude: ± 5% of the peak value
RF Amplitudes: ± 2 dB
Frequency: ±2%
Distance: ± 5% of specified distance or

± 5 cm, whichever is greater
Humidity ± 5% RH
Loads Steady-State (Acceleration): ± 5%
Sine Burst Amplitude: ± 5%
Static: ± 5%
1-11
Magnetic Properties
Mapping Distance Measurement: ± 1 cm
Displacement of assembly center of gravity (cg)

from rotation axis: ± 5 cm
Vertical displacement of single probe centerline

from cg of assembly: ± 5 cm
Mapping turntable angular displacement: ± 3 degrees
Magnetic Field Strength: ± 1 nT
Repeatability of magnetic measurements (short term): ± 5% or ± 2 nT,

whichever is greater
Demagnetizing and Magnetizing Field Level: ±5% of nominal
Mass Properties Weight: ± 0.2%
Center of Gravity: ± 0.15 cm (± 0.06 in.)
Moments of Inertia: ± 1.5%
Mechanical Shock Response Spectrum: Frequency (Hz) Tolerance (dB)

Simulated Fn ≤ 3 kHz ±6
Fn ≥ 3kHz +9/-6
Shaker Fn ≤ 3 kHz ±3
Overall Spectrum > 50% of SRS magnitude above

nominal test level
Time History: ± 10%
Pressure Greater than 1.3 X 104 Pa

(Greater than 100 mm Hg): ± 5%
1.3 X l04 to 1.3 X l02 Pa

(l00 mm Hg to 1 mm Hg): ± 10%
1.3 X l02 to 1.3 X 101 Pa

(1 mm Hg to 1 micron): ± 25%
Less than 1.3 X 101 Pa

(less than 1 micron): ± 80%
1-12
Temperature ± 2°C
Vibration Sinusoidal: Amplitude ± 10%

Frequency ± 2%
Random: RMS level ± 10%

Accel. Spectral Density ± 3 dB
Duration +10%/-0%
1.14 TEST MEASUREMENT CONSIDERATIONS
From the moment a test article is excited or illuminated by an environmental source until the
article is returned to an ambient condition, measurements should be collected over time at
sufficient temporal resolution to capture any relevant frequency- or time-dependent effects
and to eliminate, in the cases of an anomaly or test failure, the possibility that the incident was
caused by overtest due to an error in process or in the test equipment itself.
1-13
SECTION 2
VERIFICATION PROGRAM
SECTION 2.1
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE___________________________________SYSTEM PERORMANCE
2.1 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION
This section applies to all payloads (spacecraft), subsystems (including instruments),

and components. The basic provisions apply to all flight hardware, and associated
software, that will be launched by expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).
The GEVS, as its name implies, provides basic guidelines for an environmental
verification program. This represents only a portion of the overall system verification
and must be integrated into the total system program which verifies that the system
will meet the mission requirements. A system performance verification program
documenting the overall verification plan, implementation, and results is required
which will provide traceability from mission specification requirements to launch and
initial on-orbit capability. This will also provide the baseline for tracking on-orbit
performance versus pre-launch capability.
2.1.1 Documentation Requirements
The following documents should be generated and approved in accordance with the
Project Development Schedule.
2.1.1.1 System Performance Verification Plan
A system performance verification plan should be prepared defining the tasks and
methods required to determine the ability of the system (or instrument) to meet each
program-level performance requirement (structural, thermal, optical, electrical,
guidance/control, RF/telemetry, science, mission operational, etc.) and to measure
specification compliance. Limitations in the ability to verify any performance
requirement should be addressed, including the addition of supplemental tests and/or
analyses that will be performed and a risk assessment of the inability to verify the
requirement.
The plan should address how compliance with each specification requirement will be
verified. If verification relies on the results of measurements and/or analyses
performed at lower (or other) levels of assembly, this dependence should be
described.
For each analysis activity, the plan should include objectives, a description of the
mathematical model, assumptions on which the models will be based, required output,
criteria for assessing the acceptability of the results, the interaction with related test
activity, if any, and requirements for reports. Analysis results must take into account
tolerance build-ups in the parameters being used.
2.1.1.1.1 Environmental Verification Plan
An environmental verification plan should be prepared, either as part of the System

Verification Plan or as a separate document, that prescribes the tests and analyses
that will collectively demonstrate that the hardware and software comply with the
environmental verification requirements
The environmental verification plan provides the overall approach to accomplishing

the environmental verification program. For each test, the verification plan should
include the level of assembly, the configuration of the item, objectives, facilities,
instrumentation, safety considerations, test article limitations and constraints,
Check the GSFC Technical Standards Program website at http://standards.gsfc.nasa.gov or contact the Executive
Secretary for the GSFC Technical Standards Program to verify that this is the correct version prior to use.
2.1 - 1
contamination control, test phases and profiles, necessary functional operations,

personnel responsibilities, and requirement for procedures and reports. It should also
define a rationale for retest determination that does not invalidate previous verification
activities. When appropriate, the interaction of the test and analysis activity should be
described.
Limitations in the environmental verification program which preclude the verification

by test of any system requirement should be documented and if any of these
limitations lead to deviations from the GOLD Rules, waivers as appropriate should be
submitted. Examples of limitations in the ability to demonstrate requirements include:
 Inability to deploy hardware in a 1-g environment.
 Facility limitations which do not allow testing at system level of assembly.
 Inability to perform certain tests because of contamination control

requirements.
 Inability to perform powered-on testing because of voltage breakdown

concerns.
Alternative tests and analyses should be evaluated and implemented as appropriate,

and an assessment of program risk should be included in the System Performance
Verification Plan.
2.1.1.2 System Performance Verification Matrix
A System Performance Verification Matrix should be prepared, and maintained, to

show each specification requirement, the reference source (to the specific paragraph
or line item), the method of compliance, applicable procedure references, results,
report reference numbers, etc. This matrix should be included in the system review
data packages showing the current verification status as applicable
2.1.1.2.1 Environmental Test Matrix
As an adjunct to the environmental verification plan, an environmental test matrix

should be prepared that summarizes all tests that will be performed on each
component, each subsystem, and the payload. The purpose is to provide a ready
reference to the contents of the test program in order to prevent the deletion of a
portion thereof without an alternative means of accomplishing the objectives; it has
the additional purpose of ensuring that all flight hardware has been subjected to
environmental exposures that are sufficient to demonstrate acceptable workmanship.
In addition, the matrix General Environmental Verification Standard provide
traceability of the qualification heritage of hardware. All flight hardware, spares, and
prototypes (when appropriate) should be included in the matrix. Details of each test
should be provided (e.g., number of thermal cycles, temperature extremes, vibration
levels). It should also relate the design environments to the test environments and to
the anticipated mission environments. The matrix should be prepared in conjunction
with the initial environmental verification plan and should be updated as changes
occur.
A sample test matrix is given in Figure 2.1-1. The electrical performance tests that are
required to be performed before, during, and following the environmental verification
test program are not shown in this sample matrix. Other performance tests,
2.1 - 2
measurements, demonstrations, alignments, etc. (electrical, mechanical, optical,

etc.), that must be performed to verify hardware/software requirements are also not
included in this Environmental Test Matrix. However they should be included in the
System Performance Verification Plan.
The test matrix does not have to conform to this format; any format that clearly
displays the pertinent information is acceptable.
A complementary matrix should be kept showing the tests that have been performed
on each component, subsystem, or payload (or applicable level of assembly). This
should include tests performed on prototypes or engineering units used in the
qualification program, and should indicate test results (pass/fail or malfunctions).
2.1.1.3 Environmental Verification Specification
An environmental verification specification should be prepared that defines the

specific environmental parameters that each hardware element is subjected to either
by test or analysis in order to demonstrate its ability to meet the mission performance
requirements. Such things as payload peculiarities and interaction with the launch
vehicle should be taken into account.
2.1.1.4 Performance Verification Procedures
For each verification test activity conducted at the component, subsystem, and
payload levels (or other appropriate levels) of assembly, a verification procedure
should be prepared that describes the configuration of the test article, how each test
activity contained in the verification plan and specification will be implemented.
Test procedures should contain details such as instrumentation monitoring, facility

control sequences, test article functions, test parameters, pass/fail criteria, quality
control checkpoints, data collection and reporting requirements. The procedures also
should address safety and contamination control provisions.
2.1.1.5 Verification Reports
After each component, subsystem, payload, etc., verification activity has been
completed; a report should be submitted. For each environmental test activity, the
report should contain, as a minimum, the information in the sample test report
contained in Figure 2.1-2a and 2.1-2b. For each analysis activity, the report should
describe the degree to which the objectives were accomplished, how well the
mathematical model was validated by related test data, and other such significant
results. In addition, as-run verification procedures and all test and analysis data
should be retained for review.
2.1.1.6 System Performance Verification Report
At the conclusion of the verification program, a final System Performance Verification

Report should be delivered comparing the hardware/software specifications with the
final verified values (whether measured or computed). It is recommended that this
report be subdivided by subsystem/instrument.
The System Performance Verification Report should be maintained "real-time"

throughout the program summarizing the successful completion of verification
2.1 - 3
activities, and showing that the applicable system performance specifications have
been acceptably complied with prior to integration of hardware/software into the next
higher level of assembly.
The initial report should be provided for the PDR. Current versions should then be
provided for review at subsequent major systems reviews.
The final pre-launch System Verification Report should be available for approval for
the FRR (Flight Readiness Review).
Following initial on-orbit checkout, the System Verification Report should be

completed, and delivered in accordance with the contract schedule.
2.1.1.7 Instrument Verification Documentation
The documentation requirements of sections 2.1.1.1 through 2.1.1.6 also apply to

instruments. Following integration of the instruments onto the spacecraft, the
spacecraft System Verification Report will include the instrument information.
2.1 - 4
2.1 - 5
Figure 2.1-2a - Verification Test Report
2.1 - 6
VERIFICATION TEST REPORT (Continued) Page_____of_____
Date (add time Note beginning and end of actual activity, Malfunction Report
for thermal and deviations from the planned procedure, and Number and Date
temperature tests) discrepancies in test times or performance. (if applicable)
(State if there were no deviations or discrepancies.)
(use additional paper as required)

The activities covered by these reports include tests and measurements performed for the purpose
of verifying the flightworthiness of hardware at the component, subsystem, and payload levels of
assembly. These reports should also be provided for such other activities as the project may
designate.
These reports should be completed and transmitted to the GSFC Technical Officer or Contracting
Officer (as appropriate) within 30 days after completion of an activity. Legible, reproducible,
handwritten completed forms are acceptable.
Material felt necessary to clarify this report may be attached. However, in general, test logs and
data should be retained by those responsible for the test item unless they are specifically
requested.
The forms should be signed by the quality assurance representative and the person responsible
for the test or his designated representative; the signatures represent concurrence that the data is
as accurate as possible given the constraints of time imposed by quick-response reporting.
This report does not replace the need for maintaining complete logs, records, etc.; it is intended to
document the implementation of the verification program and to provide a minimum amount of
information as to the performance of the test item.
Figure 2.1-2b - Verification Test Report (cont.)
2.1 - 7
SECTION 2.2
ENVIRONMENTAL VERIFICATION
ENVIRONMENTAL VERIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL VERIFICATION
2.2 APPLICABILITY
Sections 2.3 through 2.9 give the basic environmental verification program for verifying
payloads, subsystems, and components as follows:
2.3 Electrical Function & Performance

2.4 Structural and Mechanical
2.5 EMC
2.6 Thermal
2.7 Cryogenics and Fluids
2.8 Contamination Control
2.9 End-to-End Testing (payloads/spacecraft)
Appendix B GEVS Companion Guide For CubeSats
The verification program applies to payloads and spacecraft that will be launched by
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). For the purposes of this document, a spacecraft is
considered a payload, and an instrument is considered to be a subsystem when determining
the environmental verification requirements.
The basic provisions are written assuming protoflight hardware. They are, in general, also
applicable to prototype hardware. Acceptance requirements are also given for the flight
acceptance of previously qualified hardware. This applies to follow-on hardware (multiple
copies of the same item) developed for the program, or hardware (from another program)
qualified by similarity.
2.2.1 Test Sequence and Level of Assembly
The verification activities herein are grouped by discipline; they are not in a recommended
sequence of performance. No specific environmental test sequence is required, but the test
program should be arranged in a way to best disclose problems and failures associated with
the characteristics of the hardware and the mission objectives.
In cases where the magnetic properties of the hardware need to be controlled, the dc
magnetics testing should be performed after vibration testing. This provides an opportunity to
correct for any magnetization of the flight hardware caused by fields associated with the
vibration test equipment.
Table 2.2-1 provides a hierarchy of levels of assembly for the flight hardware, with examples.
These level designators are based on those used in the Space Systems Engineering
Database developed by The Aerospace Corporation for the Air Force, and agreed to by NASA
Headquarters, GSFC, and JPL. The GEVS environmental test requirements generally start
at the “unit” level and end at the “system segment” level. However, screening and life-tests
often occur at lower levels, and overall system verification continues beyond the “system
segment” level.
2.2.2 Verification Program Tailoring
The environmental test requirements are written assuming a low-risk program. The
environmental program should be tailored to reflect the hardware classification, mission
objectives, hardware characteristics such as physical size and complexity, and the level of risk
accepted by the project. For example, the "failure-free-performance" requirement may be
varied, with GSFC approval, from the baseline to reflect mission duration and risk acceptance.
2.2 - 1
This document also assumes that the payload/spacecraft is of modular design and can be
tested at the unit/component, subsystem/instrument, and system/spacecraft levels of
assembly. Often this is not the case. The project must develop a verification program that
satisfies the intent of the required verification program while taking into consideration the
specific characteristics of the mission and the hardware. For example:
 A spacecraft subsystem, or instrument, may be a functional subdivision of the

spacecraft, but it may be distributed throughout the spacecraft rather than being a
physical entity. In this case, the environmental tests, and associated functional tests,
must be performed at physical levels of assembly (component, section, module, system
or instrument [refer to Appendix A - hardware level of assembly]) that are appropriate
for the specific hardware. Performance tests and calibrations may still be performed on
the functional subsystem or instrument.
 The physical size of the system may necessitate testing at other levels of assembly.
Facility limitations may not allow certain environmental tests to be performed at the
system level. In this case, testing should be performed at the highest practicable level.
Also, for very large systems or subsystems/instruments, tests at additional levels of
assembly may be added in order to adequately verify the hardware design,
workmanship and/or performance.
 For small payloads, the subsystem level environmental tests may be skipped in favor
of testing at the component and system/spacecraft levels. Similarly, for very small
instruments the GSFC project may elect to not test all components in favor of testing at
the instrument level. These decisions must be made carefully, especially regarding
bypassing lower level testing for instruments, because of the increased risk to the
program (schedule, cost, etc.) of finding problems late in the planned schedule.
 In some cases, because of the hardware configuration it may be reasonable to test

more than one component at a time. The components may be stacked in their flight
configuration, and may therefore be tested as a "section". Part of the decision process
must consider the physical size and mass of the hardware. The test configuration must
allow for adequate dynamic or thermal stress inputs to the hardware to uncover design
errors and workmanship flaws.
 Some test requirements stated as subsystem/instrument requirements may be satisfied

at a higher level of assembly if approved by the GSFC project. For example, externally
induced mechanical shock test requirements may be satisfied at the system level by
firing the environment-producing pyro. A simulation of this environment is difficult,
especially for large subsystems or instruments.
 Aspects of the design and/or mission may negate certain test conditions to be imposed.
For example, if the on-orbit temperature variations are small, less than 5°C, then
consideration should be given to waiving the thermal-vacuum cycling at the system, or
instrument, level of assembly in favor of increasing the hot and cold dwell times.
The same process must be applied when developing the test plan for an instrument. While
testing is required at the instrument component and all-up instrument levels of assembly,
additional test levels may be called for because of hardware complexity or physical size.
2.2 - 2
Table 2.2-1
Flight System Hardware
Levels of Assembly
2.2.3 Qualification of Hardware by Similarity
There are cases in which hardware qualified for one flight program is to be built and used on
another program. Hardware that has been previously qualified may be considered qualified
for use on a new program by showing that the hardware is sufficiently similar to the original
hardware and that the previous qualification program has adequately enveloped the new
mission environments. The details for performing this comparison should be defined by the
project but as a minimum the following areas should be reviewed and documented:
(1) Design and test requirements must be shown to envelope the original requirements.
This should include a review of the test configuration and of all waivers and deviations
that may have occurred during testing of the original hardware.
(2) Manufacturing information should be reviewed to determine if changes have been made
that would invalidate the previous hardware qualification. This review should cover
2.2 - 3
parts, materials, packaging techniques as well as changes to the assembly process or

procedures.
(3) Test experience with the previous flight build should be reviewed to verify that no
significant modifications were made to the hardware during testing to successfully
complete the test program. Any significant change to the heritage hardware should be
identified and shown to be implemented on the current flight hardware.
If the review of the above criteria shows that the hardware is of sufficiently similar design as
the first build and that the previous test requirements envelope any new environmental
requirements, then the hardware can be treated as qualified and need only to be subjected to
acceptance level test requirements. The review of the hardware for similarity must be
documented and included as part of the verification package.
2.2.4 Test Factors/Durations
Test factors for prototype, protoflight, and acceptance are given in Table 2.2-2. While the
acceptance test margin is provided, the test may or may not be required for a specific mission.
2.2.5 Structural Analysis/Design Factors of Safety
Structural and mechanical verification testing should be supported by structural analysis to

provide confidence that the hardware will not experience failure or detrimental permanent
deformation under test or launch conditions. The factors of safety applied to limit loads in order
to calculate structural margins are shown in Table 2.2-3. These factors of safety have been
selected to be consistent with the test factors shown in Table 2.2-2. The yield factor of safety
ensures that a prototype or protoflight test can be conducted with low risk of the hardware
experiencing detrimental yielding. The ultimate factor of safety provides adequate separation
between yield and ultimate failure modes and ensures that the hardware will not experience
an ultimate failure under expected loading conditions.
In the case of thermally induced loads or stresses, the factors of safety shown in Table 2.2-3
for the static loading condition are to be used for calculating strength margins. If the absolute
value of the temperature differential between the stressed and un-stressed condition for the
hardware using flight acceptance temperatures is ≥ 20° C, then the static factors of safety
from Table 2.2-3 should be applied to the loads/stresses induced by acceptance
temperatures. Flight acceptance temperatures are defined as the maximum predicted flight
temperature plus acceptance margin which is typically 5° for thermal vacuum or 20° for
thermal cycling at ambient pressure as defined in Table 2.2-2. Survival temperatures are
treated as flight acceptance temperatures for assessing strength margins as they do not
include qualification margin. If the absolute value of the temperature differential between the
stressed and un-stressed condition using flight acceptance temperatures is < 20°C, then the
static factors of safety from Table 2.2-3 can be applied to the loads/stresses induced by
qualification temperatures for the hardware. Both hot and cold conditions should be evaluated
and the factors of safety should be applied to the appropriate test temperature (acceptance or
qualification). Thermally induced loads should be combined with mechanical loading due to
launch loads, gravity, or external loads due to enforced deflection if these mechanical loads
occur at the same time.
2.2 - 4
Table 2.2-2
Test Factors/Durations
Test Prototype Protoflight Acceptance

Qualification Qualification
Structural Loads1
Level 1.25 x Limit Load 1.25 x Limit Load 1.0 x Limit Load
Duration
Centrifuge/Static Load4 1 minute 30 seconds 30 seconds
Sine Burst 5 cycles @ full level 5 cycles @ full level 5 cycles @ full level
per axis per axis per axis
Acoustics
Level2 Limit Level + 3dB Limit Level + 3dB Limit Level
Duration 2 minutes 1 minute 1 minute
Random Vibration
Level2 Limit Level + 3dB Limit Level + 3dB Limit Level
Duration 2 minutes/axis 1 minute/axis 1 minute/axis
Sine Vibration3
Level 1.25 x Limit Level 1.25 x Limit Level Limit Level
Sweep Rate 2 oct/min 4 oct/min 4 oct/min
Mechanical Shock
Actual Device 2 actuations 2 actuations 1 actuations
Simulated 1.4 x Limit Level 1.4 x Limit Level Limit Level
2 x Each Axis 1 x Each Axis 1 x Each Axis
Thermal-Vacuum Max./min. predict. Max./min. predict. Max./min. predict.

 10C  10C  5C
EMC & Magnetics As Specified for Same Same
Mission
1- If qualified by analysis only, positive margins must be shown for factors of safety of 2.0 on yield and
2.6 on ultimate. Beryllium and composite materials cannot be qualified by analysis alone.
Note: Test levels for weldments, beryllium, bonded and composite structure, including metal matrix,
are 1.25 x Limit Level for both qualification and acceptance testing.
2- As a minimum, the test level shall be equal to or greater than the workmanship level.
3- The sweep direction should be evaluated and chosen to minimize the risk of damage to the hardware.
If a sine sweep is used to satisfy the loads or other requirements, rather than to simulate an oscillatory
mission environment, a faster sweep rate may be considered, e.g., 6-8 oct/min to reduce the potential
for over stress.
4- Shorter durations may be used in static testing if necessary to protect the hardware from damage
due to facility limitations. If a shorter duration is used then the dwell time at load shall be sufficient
to demonstrate that the target loading condition has been achieved within the specified tolerances,
all test measurements have been recorded, and the structure is stable under the applied loading
condition.
2.2 - 5
Table 2.2-3
Flight Hardware Design/Analysis Factors of Safety Applied to Limit Loads 1,2
Type Static Sine Random/Acoustic4,5
Metallic Yield 1.253 1.25 1.6
Metallic Ultimate 1.43 1.4 1.8
Stability Ultimate 1.4 1.4 1.8
Beryllium Yield 1.4 1.4 1.8
Beryllium Ultimate 1.6 1.6 2.0
Composite Ultimate 1.5 1.5 1.9
Bonded Inserts/Joints Ultimate 1.5 1.5 1.9
1 – Factors of safety for pressurized systems to be compliant with AFSPCMAN 91-710 (Range Safety).
2 – Factors of safety for glass and structural glass bonds specified in NASA-STD-5001
3 – If qualified by analysis only, positive margin must be shown for factors of safety of 2.0 on yield and 2.6
on ultimate. See section 2.4.1.1.1
4 – Factors shown should be applied to statistically derived peak response based on RMS level. As a
minimum, the peak response shall be calculated as a 3-sigma value.
5 – Factors shown assume that qualification/protoflight testing is performed at acceptance level plus 3dB.
If difference between acceptance and qualification levels is less than 3dB, then above factors may be
applied to qualification level minus 3dB instead of analyzing to acceptance level.
2.2 - 6
SECTION 2.3
ELECTRICAL FUNCTION & PERFORMANCE
ELECTRICAL FUNCTION ELECTRICAL FUNCTION
2.3 Electrical Function Test Guidelines
The following paragraphs describe the required electrical functional and performance tests
that verify the payload's operation before, during, and after environmental testing. These
tests along with all other calibrations, functional/performance tests, measurements/
demonstrations, alignments (and alignment verifications), end-to-end tests, simulations, etc.,
that are part of the overall verification program should be described in the System
Performance Verification Plan.
2.3.1 Electrical Interface Tests
Before the integration of an assembly, component, or subsystem into the next higher hardware
assembly, electrical interface tests should be performed to verify that all interface signals are
within acceptable limits of applicable performance specifications.
Prior to mating with other hardware, electrical harnessing should be tested to verify proper
characteristics; such as, routing of electrical signals, impedance, isolation, and overall
workmanship.
2.3.2 Comprehensive Performance Tests
A comprehensive performance test (CPT) should be conducted on each hardware element

after each stage of assembly: component, subsystem and payload. When environmental
testing is performed at a given level of assembly, additional comprehensive performance tests
should be conducted during the hot and cold extremes of the temperature or thermal-vacuum
test for both maximum and minimum input voltage, and at the conclusion of the environmental
test sequence, as well as at other times prescribed in the verification plan, specification, and
procedures.
The comprehensive performance test should be a detailed demonstration that the hardware
and software meet their performance requirements within allowable tolerances. The test
should demonstrate operation of all redundant circuitry and satisfactory performance in all
operational modes within practical limits of cost, schedule, and environmental simulation
capabilities. The initial CPT serves as a technical baseline against which the results of all later
CPTs can be readily compared.
At the payload level, the comprehensive performance test demonstrates that, with the
application of known stimuli, the payload will produce the expected responses. At lower levels
of assembly, the test demonstrates that, when provided with appropriate inputs, internal
performance is satisfactory and outputs are within acceptable limits.
2.3.3 Limited Performance Tests
Limited performance tests (LPT) should be performed before, during, and after environmental
tests, as appropriate, in order to demonstrate that functional capability has not been degraded
by the tests. The limited tests are also used in cases where comprehensive performance
testing is not warranted or not practicable. LPTs should be sufficient to demonstrate that the
performance of selected hardware and software functions is within acceptable limits. Specific
times when LPTs will be performed should be documented in the verification specification.
2.3 - 1
ELECTRICAL FUNCTION ELECTRICAL FUNCTION
2.3.4 Performance Operating Time and Failure-Free Performance Testing
One-thousand (1000) hours of operating/power-on time should be accumulated on all flight

electronic hardware, and spares prior to launch. For electronics consisting of a prime and
redundant, i.e. A and B sides, 1000 hours should be accumulated on each side.
In addition, at the conclusion of the performance verification program, payloads should have
demonstrated failure-free performance testing for at least the last 350 hours of operation. The
demonstration may be conducted at the subsystem level of assembly when payload
integration is accomplished at the launch site and the 350-hour demonstration cannot
practicably be accomplished on the integrated payload. Failure-free operation during the
thermal-vacuum test exposure is included as part of the demonstration with 100 hours of the
trouble-free operation being logged at the hot-dwell temperatures and 100 hours being logged
at the cold-dwell temperature. The 350-hour demonstration should include at least 200 hours
in vacuum. Major hardware changes during or after the verification program invalidate
previous demonstration.
The general intent of the above requirements is to accumulate 1000 hours of operating time
on all flight hardware, and to demonstrate trouble-free performance at high-, low-, and nominal
temperature. However, it is understood that under certain conditions this goal may not be met.
For example hardware change-out just prior to launch may not provide sufficient time to
demonstrate these requirements. Also, the retest requirements following component failure
during system level thermal vacuum, or other tests, must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis taking into account the criticality of the hardware element and the risk impact on
achieving mission goals.
The guideline time requirements should be tailored up or down to reflect hardware

classification, and mission duration.
These requirements also apply to instruments and other spacecraft subsystem hardware prior
to delivery for integration into the spacecraft. The Failure-free durations should be set
dependent on the mission risk level, hardware complexity, and hardware criticality to the
mission.
2.3.5 Limited-Life Electrical Elements
A life test program should be considered for electrical elements that have limited lifetimes.
The verification plan should address the life test program, identifying the electrical elements
that require such testing, describing the test hardware that will be used, and the test methods
that will be employed.
2.3 - 2
SECTION 2.4
STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL
STRUCTURAL MECHANICAL STRUCTURAL LOADS
2.4 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
A series of tests and analyses should be conducted to demonstrate that the flight hardware is
qualified for the expected mission environments and that the design of the hardware complies
with the specified verification requirements such as factors of safety, interface compatibility,
structural reliability, workmanship, and associated elements of system safety.
Table 2.4-1 specifies the structural and mechanical verification activities. When the tests and
analyses are planned, consideration must be given to the expected environments of structural
loads, vibroacoustics, sine vibration, mechanical shock, and pressure profiles induced during
all phases of the mission; for example, during launch, insertion into final orbit, preparation for
orbital operations, and entry, descent, and landing. Verification must also be accomplished to
ensure that the transportation and handling environments are enveloped by the expected
mission environments. Mass properties and proper mechanical functioning should also be
verified.
Of equal importance with qualifying the hardware for expected mission environments are the
testing for workmanship and structural reliability, which are intended to provide a high
probability of proper operation during the mission. In some cases, the expected mission
environment is rather benign and produces test levels insufficient to expose workmanship
defects. The verification test must envelope the expected mission levels, with appropriate
margins added for qualification, and impose sufficient stress to detect workmanship faults.
Flight load and dynamic environment levels are probabilistic quantities. Selection of
probability levels for flight limit level loads/environments to be used for payload design and
testing is the responsibility of the payload project manager, but in no event shall the probability
levels be less than the minimum levels in Table 2.4-2. Specific structural reliability
requirements regarding fracture control for ELV payloads, beryllium structure, composite
structure, bonded structural joints, and glass structural elements are given in 2.4.1.4.
The program outlined in Table 2.4-1 assumes that the payload is sufficiently modularized to
permit realistic environmental exposures at the subsystem level. When that is not possible,
or at the project's discretion, compliance with the subsystem requirements must be
accomplished at a higher or lower level of assembly. For example, structural load tests of
some components may be necessary if they cannot be properly applied during testing at
higher levels of assembly.
Ground handling, transportation and test fixtures needs to be analyzed and tested for proper
strength as required by safety, and should be verified for stability for applicable configurations
as appropriate.
Projects should consider metrology verification before and after environmental testing and
over temperature for all critical alignments.
2.4.1 Structural Loads Qualification
Qualification of the payload for the structural loads environment requires a combination of
test and analysis. A test-verified finite element model of the payload must be developed and
a coupled loads analysis of the payload/launch vehicle performed.
The analytical results define the limit loads for the payload (subsystems and components)
and show compatibility with the launch vehicle for all critical phases of the mission.
2.4 - 1
STRUCTURAL LOADS VIBROACOUSTICS
TABLE 2.4-1
Structural and Mechanical Verification Test Requirements
Requirement Payload/ Subsystem/ Unit (Component)
Spacecraft Instrument Including Instrument
Units (Components)
Structural Loads
Modal Survey * T2 *
Design Qualification * A,T/A
1
*
Structural Reliability
Primary & Secondary * (A,T)
1
*
Structure
Vibroacoustics
Acoustics T T
2
T
2
Random Vibration T
2
T
2
T
Sine Vibration 3
T ,T
4
T
3
T
3
Mechanical Shock T T5 T5
Mechanical Function A,T A,T -
Pressure Profile - A,T

2
A
Mass Properties A/T A,T

2
*
* = May be performed at payload or component level of assembly if appropriate.

A = Analysis required.
T = Test required.
A/T = Analysis and/or test.
A, T/A1 = Analysis and Test or analysis only if no-test factors of safety given in 2.4.1.1.1 are used.
(A, T)1 = Combination of fracture analysis and proof tests on selected elements, with special attention
given to beryllium, composites, bonded joints and weldments.
T2 = Test must be performed unless assessment justifies deletion.
T3 = Test performed to simulate low frequency transient vibration and any sustained periodic
mission environment, or to satisfy other requirement such as strength qualification.
T4 = Test must be performed for ELV payloads, if practicable, to simulate transient and any
sustained periodic vibration mission environment.
T5 = Test required for self-induced shocks, but may be performed at payload level of assembly for
externally induced shocks.
2.4 - 2
TABLE 2.4-2
Minimum Probability-Level Requirements
for Flight Limit (maximum expected) Level
Requirement Minimum Probability Level
ELV Payloads
Structural Loads 97.72/50 (1),(2)
Vibroacoustics 95/50
Acoustics
Random Vibration
Sine Vibration 97.72/50 (1)
Mechanical Shock 95/50
Notes:
(1) When parametric statistical methods are used to determine

the limit level, the data should be tested to show a
satisfactory fit to the assumed underlying distribution.
(2) 97.72% probability of not exceeding level, estimated with

50% confidence. Equal to the mean plus two-sigma level
for normal distributions.
A modal survey shall be performed for each payload (at the subsystem/instrument or other
appropriate level of assembly) to verify that the analytical model adequately represents the
dynamic behavior of the hardware. The test-verified model shall then be used to predict the
maximum expected load for each critical loading condition, including handling and
transportation, vibroacoustic effects during lift-off, insertion into final orbit, orbital operations,
thermal effects during landing, etc., as appropriate for the particular mission. If the payload
configuration is different for various phases of the mission, the structural loads qualification
program, including the modal survey, must consider the different configurations. The
maximum loads resulting from the analysis define the limit loads.
The launch loads environment is made up of a combination of steady-state, low-frequency

transient, and higher-frequency vibroacoustic loads. To determine the combined loads for any
phase of the launch, the root-sum-square (RSS) of the low- and high-frequency dynamic
components are superimposed upon the steady-state component if appropriate.
Ni = Si ± [(L i)2 + (Ri)2]1/2
2.4 - 3
Where Ni, Si, Li, and Ri are the combined load factor, steady-state load factor, low-frequency
dynamic load factor, and high-frequency random vibration load factor, respectively, for the i'th
axis. In some cases, the steady-state and low-frequency dynamic load factors are combined
into a low-frequency transient load factor Ai. In this case, the steady-state value must be
separated out before the RSS operation.
When determining the limit loads for ELV launches, consideration must be given to the timing
of the loading events; the maximum steady state and dynamic events occur at different times
in the launch and may provide too conservative an estimate if combined. Also, the frequency
band of the vibroacoustic energy to be combined must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Flight events which must be considered for inclusion in the coupled loads analysis for various
ELV's are listed in Table 2.4-3. If the verification cycle analysis or payload test-verified model
is not available, the latest analytical data should be used in conjunction with a suitable
uncertainty factor.
Each subsystem/instrument shall then be qualified by loads testing to 1.25 times the limit loads
defined above. The loads test shall be accompanied by stress analysis showing positive
margins of safety using the appropriate factors of safety defined in Table 2.2-3. In some cases,
qualification by analysis may be allowed (see 2.4.1.3). Special design and test factors of
safety are required for beryllium structure (see 2.4.1.3.1).
2.4.1.1 Coupled load analysis
A coupled load analysis, combining the launch vehicle and payload, shall be performed to
support the verification of positive stress margins and sufficient clearances during the
launch.
2.4.1.1.1 Analysis - Strength Verification
A finite element model shall be developed (and verified by test) that analytically simulates
the payload's mass and stiffness characteristics, for the purpose of performing a coupled
loads analysis. The model shall be of sufficient detail to make possible an analysis that
defines the payload's modal frequencies and displacements below a specified frequency
that is dependent on the fidelity of the launch vehicle finite element model. For ELV all
significant modes below 70 Hz are sufficient unless higher-frequency modes are required by
the launch vehicle manufacturer.
The model is then coupled with the model of the ELV and any upper-stage propulsion
system. The combined coupled model is used to conduct a coupled loads analysis that
evaluates all potentially critical loading conditions. Forcing functions used in the coupled
loads analysis shall be defined at the flight limit level consistent with the minimum probability
levels of Table 2.4-2. The results of the coupled loads analysis shall be reviewed to
determine the worst-case loads. These constitute the set of limit loads that are used to
evaluate member loads and stresses.
For ELV payloads, the coupled loads analysis shall consider all flight events required by the
ELV provider. None of the flight events shall be deleted from the coupled loads analysis
unless it is shown by base drive analysis of the cantilevered spacecraft and adapter that
there are no significant spacecraft vibration modes in frequency bands of significant launch
vehicle forcing functions and coupled-mode responses. For example, it should be confirmed
that there are no spacecraft structural components or subsystems (upper platforms, antenna
supports, scientific instruments, etc.) which can experience high dynamic responses during
flight events such as lift-off or sustained, pogo-like oscillations before deleting these events.
For the evaluation of flight events to include in the coupled loads analysis, an appropriate
2.4 - 4
tolerance should be applied to all potentially significant spacecraft modal frequencies unless
verified by modal survey testing.
Normally, the design and verification of payloads should not be burdened by transportation
and handling environments that exceed stresses expected during launch, orbit, or return.
Rather, shipping containers should be designed to prevent the imposition of such stresses.
To verify this, a documented analysis shall be prepared on shipping and handling equipment
to define the loads transmitted to flight hardware. When transportation and handling loads
are not enveloped by the maximum expected flight loads, the transportation and handling
loads should be included in the set of limit loads.
For those hardware items that will later be subjected to a strength qualification test, a stress
analysis shall be performed to provide confidence that the risk of failing the strength test is
small and to demonstrate compliance with the launch vehicle interface verification and
safety requirements. The analysis shall show positive margins using the appropriate factors
of safety defined in Table 2.2-3.
For payloads, or payload elements, whose strength is qualified by analysis, the objective of
the stress analysis is to demonstrate with a high degree of confidence that there is
essentially no chance of failure during flight. For all elements that are to be qualified by
analysis, positive strength margins on yield shall be shown to exist at stresses equal to 2.0
times those induced by the limit loads, and positive margins on ultimate shall be shown to
exist at stresses equal to 2.6 times those induced by the limit loads. For additional
qualification by analysis requirements, see 2.4.1.3. When qualification by analysis is used,
the upper frequency of the modal survey may have to be increased. Locations with small
margins should be verified by metrology.
2.4.1.1.2 Analysis - Clearance Verification
Analysis shall be conducted for all ELV payloads to verify adequate dynamic clearances
between the payload and launch vehicle and between members within the payload for all
significant ground test and flight conditions.
a. During Powered Flight - The coupled loads analysis shall be used to verify adequate
clearances during flight within ELV payload fairing. One part of the coupled loads
analysis output transformation matrices shall contain displacement data that will allow
calculation of loss of clearance between critical extremities of the payload and adjacent
surfaces of ELV. For ELV payloads, the analysis should consider clearances between
the payload and ELV payload fairing (and its acoustic blankets if used, including blanket
expansion due to venting) and between the payload and ELV attach fitting, as
applicable. For the clearance calculations the following factors should be considered:
1. Worst-case payload and vehicle manufacturing and assembly tolerances as

derived from as-built engineering drawings.
2. Worst-case payload/vehicle integration "stacking" tolerances related to interface

mating surface parallelism, perpendicularity and concentricity, plus bolt positional
tolerances, ELV payload fairing ovality, etc.
3. Quasi-static and dynamic flight loads, including coupled steady-state and

transient sinusoidal vibration, vibroacoustics and venting loads, as applicable.
Typically, either liftoff or the transonic buffet and maximum airloads cause the
greatest relative deflections between the vehicle and payload.
2.4 - 5
b. During ELV Payload Fairing Separation - A fairing separation analysis based on ground
separation test of the fairing, shall be used to verify adequate clearances between the
separating fairing sections and payload extremities. Effects of fairing section shell-
mode oscillations, fairing rocking, vehicle residual rates, transient coupled-mode
oscillations, thrust accelerations, and vehicle control-jet firings shall be considered, as
applicable.
c. During Payload Separation - A payload separation analysis shall be used to verify

adequate clearances between the payload and the ELV during separation. The
analysis shall include effects of factors such as vehicle residual rates, forces and
impulses imparted by the separation system (including lateral impulses due to
separation clampbands) and vehicle retro-rocket plumes impinging on the payload, as
applicable. The same analysis should be utilized to verify acceptable payload
separation velocity and tip-off rates if required
Analysis should also be performed to verify adequate critical dynamic clearances between
members within the payload during ground vibration and acoustic testing, and flight.
Additionally, a deployment analysis shall be used to verify adequate clearances during
payload appendage deployment. Refer to 2.4.5.2 regarding mechanical function clearances.
For all of the above clearance analyses and conditions, adequate clearances shall be verified
assuming worst-case static clearances due to manufacturing, assembly and vehicle
integration tolerances (unless measured on the launch stand), and quasi-static and dynamic
deflections due to 1.4 times the applicable flight limit loads or flight-level ground test levels.
Depending on the available static clearance, the clearance analysis requirements may be
satisfied in many cases by simple worst-case estimates and/or similarity. Locations with small
margins should be verified with metrology.
2.4.1.2 Modal Survey
A modal survey test will be required for payloads and subsystems, including instruments,
that have modes with significant modal mass within the frequency range of the launch
vehicle coupled loads analysis. The frequency range covered by coupled loads analysis is
dependent on the specific launch vehicle. The determination that a modal test is required
will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be specified in the design and test
requirements. Modal analysis of the hardware with appropriate boundary conditions may be
used to determine the need for performing a modal survey. If the determination is made that
a modal survey test is not required because the hardware does not have significant modes
in the coupled loads range, then the fundamental frequency of the hardware shall be verified
during vibration testing. A low-level sine survey is generally an appropriate method for
determining fundamental frequency.
Modal tests are generally performed at the subsystem/instrument level of assembly, but may
be required at other levels of assembly such as the payload or component level depending on
project requirements.
In general, the support of the hardware during the test should duplicate the boundary
conditions expected during launch. When that is not feasible, other boundary conditions are
employed and the frequency limits of the test are adjusted accordingly. The effects of interface
flexibilities should be considered when other than normal boundary conditions are used.
The results of the modal survey are required to identify any inaccuracies in the mathematical
model used in the payload analysis program so that modifications can be made if needed.
Such an experimental verification is required because a degree of uncertainty exists in
2.4 - 6
unverified models owing to assumptions inherent in the modeling process. These lead to
uncertainties in the results of the flight dynamic loads analysis, thereby reducing confidence
in the accuracy of the set of limit loads derived therefrom.
If a modal survey test is required, all significant modes up to the required frequency must be
determined both in terms of frequency and mode shape. A mode is considered significant if it
has modal effect mass that is equal to or greater than 5% of the total mass of the hardware at
the level of assembly for which the modal survey is being considered. Modes that drive high
responses of critical components from a coupled loads analysis should also be considered as
target modes for a modal survey. Cross-orthogonality checks of the test and analytical mode
shapes, with respect to the analytical mass matrix, shall be performed with the goal of
obtaining at least 0.9 on the diagonal and no greater than 0.1 off-diagonal. Frequencies
between the corresponding test and analytical modes shall match within 5%. Any test method
that is capable of meeting the test objectives with the necessary accuracy may be used to
perform the modal survey.
When a satisfactory modal survey has been conducted on a representative structural model,
a modal survey of the protoflight unit may be unnecessary. A representative structural model
is defined as one that duplicates the structure as to materials, configuration, fabrication, and
assembly methods and that satisfactorily simulates other items that mount on the structure as
to location, method of attachment, weight, mass properties, and dynamic characteristics.
2.4.1.3 Design Strength Qualification
The preferred method of verifying adequate strength is to apply a set of loads that will
generate forces in the hardware that are equal to 1.25 times limit loads. The strength
qualification test must be shown to produce forces equal to 1.25 times limit at structural
interfaces as well as in structural elements which have been shown to have the lowest
margins for all identified failure modes of the hardware. As many test conditions as
necessary should be applied to achieve the appropriate loads for qualification. Structural
qualification testing should be performed at the lowest level of assembly as possible to
reduce overtest and to limit the risk of damage to other components/subsystems should
structural failure occur. After structural testing, the hardware must be capable of meeting its
performance criteria (see 2.4.1.3.1 for special requirements for beryllium structure). No
detrimental permanent deformation shall be allowed to occur as a result of applying the
loads, and all applicable alignment requirements must be met following the test.
The requirement to achieve a test factor of 1.25 times limit load for qualification only applies
to mechanically induced loading from launch and on-orbit operations. It is usually not
possible to achieve a test factor of 1.25 on thermal loads by exposing the hardware to
qualification temperatures. In the case of thermally induced loads, qualification or proof
testing shall be performed to qualification temperatures only, without the need for additional
test margin. In the case where the qualification or proof test is intended to represent a
combined loading condition of thermal and mechanical loading, only the mechanical portion
of the load shall be increased by a 1.25 test factor. Analysis for thermally induced loads
shall demonstrate positive margins using the standard factors of safety as defined in Table
2.2-3.
The strength qualification test must be accompanied by a stress analysis that demonstrates
positive margins using the appropriate factors of safety defined in Table 2.2-3. See 2.4.1.3.1
for special requirements for beryllium structure.
In addition, the analysis shall show that at stresses equal to the limit load, the maximum
allowable loads at the launch vehicle interface points are not exceeded and that no excessive
deformations occur that might constitute a hazard to the mission. This analysis should be
2.4 - 7
performed prior to the start of the strength qualification tests to provide minimal risk of damage
to hardware. When satisfactory qualification tests have been conducted on a representative
structural model, the strength qualification testing of the protoflight unit may not be necessary.
a. Selection of Test Method - The qualification load conditions may be applied by

acceleration testing, static load testing, or vibration testing (either transient, fixed
frequency or swept sinusoidal excitation). Random vibration is generally not acceptable
for loads testing.
The following questions should be considered when the method to be employed for
verification tests is selected:
(1) Which method most closely approximates the flight-imposed load distribution?
(2) Which can be applied with the greatest accuracy?
(3) Which best provides information for design verification and for predicting design
capability for future payload or launch vehicle modifications?
(4) Which poses the least risk to the hardware in terms of handling and test
equipment?
(5) Which best stays within cost, time, and facility limitations?
b. Test Setup - The subsystem/instrument shall be attached to the test equipment by a

fixture whose mechanical interface simulates the mounting of the subsystem/instrument
into the payload with particular attention paid to duplicating the actual mounting contact
area. In mating the subsystem to the fixture, a flight-type mounting (including vibration
isolators or kinematic mounts if part of the design) and fasteners shall be used.
Components that are normally sealed shall be pressurized during the test to their
prelaunch pressure. In cases when significant changes in strength, stiffness, or applied
load result from variations in internal and external pressure during the launch phase, a
special test shall be considered to cover those effects.
When acceleration testing is performed, the centrifuge shall be large enough so that the
applied load at the extreme ends of the test item does not differ by more than 10 percent
from that applied to the center of gravity. In addition, when the proper orientation for
the applied acceleration vector is computed, ambient gravity effects shall be
considered.
c. Performance - Before and after the strength qualification test, the subsystem/
instrument shall be examined and functionally tested to verify compliance with all
performance criteria. During the tests, performance shall be monitored in accordance
with the verification specification and procedures.
If appropriate development tests are performed to verify accuracy of the stress model,
stringent quality control procedures are invoked to ensure conformance of the structure
(materials, fasteners, processes, etc.) to the design, and the structure has well-defined load
paths, then strength qualification may (with payload project concurrence) be accomplished by
a stress analysis that demonstrates that the hardware has positive margins on yield at loads
equal to 2.0 times the limit load, and positive margin on ultimate at loads equal to 2.6 times
the limit load. Factors of safety lower than 2.0 on yield and 2.6 on ultimate will be considered
when they can be shown to be warranted. Justification for the lower factors of safety must be
2.4 - 8
based on the merits of a particular combination of test and analysis and a correlation of the
two. Such alternative approaches shall be reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, at stresses equal to the limit load, the analysis shall show that the maximum
allowable loads at the launch vehicle interface points are not exceeded and that no excessive
deformations occur.
Structural elements fabricated from composite materials, beryllium or structures that have
bonded or welded joints shall not be qualified by analysis alone.
2.4.1.3.1 Strength Qualification - Beryllium
All beryllium primary and secondary structural elements shall undergo a strength test to 1.25
times limit load. No detrimental permanent deformation shall be allowed to occur as a result
of applying the loads, and applicable alignment requirements must be met following the test.
In addition:
a. When using cross-rolled sheet, the design shall preclude out-of-plane loads and
displacements during assembly, testing, or service life.
b. In order to account for uncertainties in material properties and local stress levels, a
design factor of safety of 1.4 on yield and 1.6 on ultimate material strength shall be
used.
c. Stress analysis shall properly account for the lack of ductility of the material by rigorous
treatment of applied loads, boundary conditions, assembly stresses, stress
concentrations, thermal cycling, and possible material anisotropy. The stress analysis
shall take into account worst-case tolerance conditions.
d. All machined and/or mechanically disturbed surfaces shall be chemically milled to

ensure removal of surface damage and residual stresses.
e. All parts shall undergo penetrant inspection for surface cracks and crack-like flaws per
NASA-STD-5009.
2.4.1.4 Structural Reliability (Residual Strength Verification)
Structural reliability requirements are intended to provide a high probability of the structural
integrity of all flight hardware. They are generally covered by the selection of materials,
process controls, selected analyses (stress, and fracture mechanics/crack growth), and
loads/proof tests.
All structural materials contain defects such as inclusions, porosity, and cracks. To ensure
that adequate residual strength (strength remaining after the flaws are accounted for) is
present for structural reliability at launch, a fracture control program, or a combination of
fracture control and specific loads tests shall be performed on all flight hardware as specified
below.
The use of materials that are susceptible to brittle fracture or stress-corrosion cracking require
development of, and strict adherence to, special procedures to prevent problems. If materials
are used for structural applications that are not listed in Table 1 of MSFC-SPEC-3029, a
Materials Usage Agreement (MUA) must be negotiated with the project office. Refer to project
Materials and Processes Control Requirements for applicable requirements.
2.4 - 9
2.4.1.4.1 Primary and Secondary Structure:
ELV Payloads - The following requirements regarding beryllium, nonmetallic-composite, and

metallic-honeycomb structural elements (both primary and secondary), and bonded
structural joints apply to ELV payloads:
a. Beryllium Primary and Secondary Structure: The requirements of section

2.4.1.3.1, Strength Verification-Beryllium, apply for structural reliability.
b. Nonmetallic Composite Structural Elements (including metal matrix): It is

preferred that all flight structural elements shall be proof tested to 1.25 times limit
load (even if previously qualified on valid prototype hardware). However, if this
is not feasible then it is acceptable to proof test a representative set of structural
elements to 1.25 times the highest limit load for that type of structure. The
remainder of the structural elements may then be considered qualified by
similarity. In order to use this approach, the allowables used to assess structural
margins must be developed based on coupon testing and standard statistical
techniques. As a minimum, B-basis allowables shall be used. In addition:
(1) A process control plan shall be developed and implemented to ensure

uniformity of processing among test coupons, test articles, and flight
hardware as required by the project Materials and Processes Control
Requirements.
(2) A damage control plan shall be implemented to establish procedures and

controls to prevent and/or identify nonvisible impact damage which may
cause premature failure of composite elements.
c. Metallic Honeycomb (both facesheets and core) Structural Elements:
(1) Appropriate process controls and coupon testing shall be implemented to

demonstrate that the honeycomb structure is acceptable for use as
payload flight structure as required by the project Materials and Processes
Control Requirements.
(2) Metallic honeycomb is not considered to be a composite material.
d. Bonded Structural Joints (either metal-metal or metal-nonmetal):
(1) It is preferred that every bonded structural joint in a flight article shall be
proof tested (by static loads test) to 1.25 times limit load. For example,
proof loads testing shall be performed to demonstrate that inserts will not
tear out from honeycomb under protoflight loads. However, in cases
where this approach is not feasible, it is acceptable to test a representative
sample of the bonded structural joints in the flight article. As a minimum,
at least one of each type of bonded joint in the flight article shall be tested
to 1.25 times the maximum predicted limit load for that joint type. The
remainder of the bonded joints may then be considered to be qualified by
similarity. The use of this approach requires that bonded joint allowables
be developed based on coupon testing or testing of sample joints and
standard statistical techniques. As a minimum, B-basis allowables shall
be used.
2.4 - 10
(2) A process control plan shall be developed and implemented as required

by applicable project Materials and Processes Control Requirements to
ensure uniformity of processing among test coupons, test articles, and
flight hardware.
(3) Composite or metallic honeycomb panels with bonded structural joints

(fittings, inserts, doublers, and splices) in composite and metallic
honeycomb shall be thermally cycled to the worst case temperature
extremes prior to being subjected to structural proof testing. Primary and
secondary structure with bonded joints whose strength margins are driven
by thermal loading should also be thermally cycled prior to proof testing.
e. Weldments:
(1) All flight structure with critical welds shall be proof tested to 1.25 times limit
loads. A critical weld is defined as a weld in which a single failure will
result in loss of load carrying capability under the applied loading
condition.
(2) Appropriate NDE inspection shall be performed shall be performed on
critical welds before and after proof testing.
f. Fracture Control Requirements: If the payload is to be placed in orbit by an ELV,

fracture control requirements (per NASA-STD-5019) shall apply to the following
elements only:
(1) Pressure vessels, dewars, lines, and fittings (per NHB-8071.1),

(2) Castings (unless hot isostatically pressed and the flight article is proof
tested to 1.25 times limit load),
(3) Weldments,
(4) Parts made of materials on Tables II or III of MSFC-SPEC-3029 if under
sustained tensile stress. (Note: All structural applications of these
materials require that a Materials Usage Agreement (MUA) must be
negotiated with the project office; refer to project Materials and Processes
Control Requirements,
(5) Parts made of materials susceptible to cracking during quenching,
(6) Nonredundant, mission-critical preloaded springs loaded to greater than
25 percent of ultimate strength.
All glass elements that are stressed above 10% of their ultimate tensile strength shall
also be shown by fracture analysis to satisfy "Safe-life" or "Fail-safe" conditions or be
subjected to a proof loads test at 1.0 times limit level.
2.4.1.5 Acceptance Requirements
All of the structural reliability requirements of 2.4.1.4 (as specified for ELV payloads) apply
for the acceptance of all flight hardware.
Generally, structural design loads testing is not required for flight structure that has been
previously qualified for the current mission as part of a valid prototype or protoflight test.
However, the following acceptance/proof loads tests are required unless equivalent load-level
testing was performed on the actual flight hardware as part of a protoflight test program:
2.4 - 11
a. For ELV Payloads
(1) Beryllium structure (primary and secondary) shall be proof tested to 1.25 times
limit load.
(2) Nonmetallic composites (including metal matrix) structural elements shall be

proof tested to 1.25 times limit load.
(3) Bonded structural joints shall be proof tested (by static loads test) to 1.25 times
limit load.
(4) Critical welds in flight structure shall be proof tested to 1.25 times limit load (See
Section 2.4.2.4.1e for the definition of critical welds).
If a follow-on spacecraft receives structural modifications or a new complement of instruments,
it must be requalified for the loads environment if analysis so indicates.
2.4.2 Vibroacoustic Qualification
Qualification for the vibroacoustics environment generally requires an acoustics test at the
payload level of assembly and random vibration tests on all components, instruments, and on
the payload, when appropriate, to better simulate the structure borne inputs. In addition,
random vibration tests shall be performed on all subsystems unless an assessment of the
expected environment indicates that the subsystem will not be exposed to any significant
vibration input. Similarly, an acoustic test shall be performed on subsystems/instruments and
components unless an assessment of the hardware indicates that they are not susceptible to
the expected acoustic environment or that testing at higher levels of assembly provides
sufficient exposure at an acceptable level of risk to the program. Irrespective of the above
stated conditions, these additional tests may be required to satisfy delivery requirements.
It is understood that for some payload projects, the vibroacoustic qualification program may
have to be modified. For example, for very large payloads it may be impracticable because
of test facility limitations to perform testing at the required level of assembly. In that case,
testing at the highest practicable level of assembly should be performed, and additional tests
and/or analyses added to the verification program if appropriate. Also, the risk to the program
associated with the modified test program shall be assessed and documented in the System
Verification Plan.
Similarly, for very large components, the random vibration tests may have to be supplemented
or replaced by an acoustic test. If the component level tests are not capable of inducing
sufficient excitation to internal electric, electronic, and electromechanical devices to provide
adequate workmanship verification, it is recommended that an environmental stress screening
test program be conducted at lower levels of assembly (subassembly or board level).
For the vibroacoustic environment, limit levels shall be used which are consistent with the
minimum probability levels of Table 2.4-2. The protoflight qualification level is defined as the
flight limit level plus 3 dB. When random vibration levels are determined, responses to the
acoustic inputs plus the effects of vibration transmitted through the structure should be
considered.
The random vibration test levels to be used for hardware containing delicate optics,
sensors/detectors, etc., may be notched in frequency bands known to be destructive to the
hardware with project concurrence. A force-limiting control strategy is recommended. This
requires a dual control system which will automatically notch the input so as not to exceed
design/expected forces in the area of rigid, shaker mounted resonances while maintaining
2.4 - 12
acceleration control over the remainder of the frequency band. The control methodology must
be approved by the GSFC project. More information on implementing the force-limiting control
strategy can be found in Force Limited Vibration Testing NASA Technical Handbook, NASA-
HDBK-7004.
2.4 - 13
VIBROACOUSTICS VIBROACOUSTICS
As a minimum, the vibroacoustic test levels shall be sufficient to demonstrate acceptable

workmanship.
During test, the test item should be in an operational configuration, both electrically and
mechanically, representative of its configuration at lift-off.
The vibroacoustic (acoustics plus random vibration) environmental test program should be
included in the environmental verification plan and environmental verification specification.
2.4.2.1 Fatigue Life Considerations
The nature of the protoflight test program prevents a demonstration of hardware lifetime
because the same hardware is both tested and flown. When hardware reliability
considerations demand the demonstration of a specific hardware lifetime, a prototype
verification program must be employed, and the test durations must be modified accordingly.
Specifically, the duration of the vibroacoustic exposures shall be extended to account for the
life that the flight hardware will experience during its mission. In order to account for the scatter
factor associated with the demonstration of fatigue life, the duration of prototype exposures
shall be at least four times the intended life of the flight hardware. For ELV payloads, the
duration of the exposure shall be based on both the vibroacoustic and sine vibration
environments.
If there is the possibility of thermally induced structural fatigue (examples include solar arrays,
antennas, etc.), thermal cycle testing shall be performed on prototype hardware. For large
solar arrays, a representative smaller qualification panel may be used for test provided that it
contains all of the full scale design details (including at least 100 solar cells) susceptible to
thermal fatigue. The life test should normally be performed at the worst case (limit level)
predicted temperature extremes for a number of thermal cycles corresponding to the required
mission life. However, if required by schedule considerations, the test program may be
accelerated by increasing the temperature cycle range (and possibly the temperature
transition rate) provided that stress analysis shows no unrealistic failure modes are produced
by the accelerated testing.
2.4.2.2 Payload Acoustic Test
At the payload level of assembly, protoflight hardware shall be subjected to an acoustic test
in a sound pressure field to verify its ability to survive the lift-off acoustic environment and to
provide a final workmanship acoustic test. The test specification is dependent on the
payload-launch vehicle configuration and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The
minimum overall test level should be at least 138 dB. If the test specification derived from
the launch vehicle expected environment, including fill-factor, is less than 138 dB, the test
profile should be raised to provide a 138 dB test level. The planned test and specification
levels shall be confirmed by the launch vehicle program office.
a. Facilities and Test Control - The acoustic test shall be conducted in an area large
enough to maintain a uniform sound field at all points surrounding the test item. The
sound pressure level is controlled at one-third octave band resolution. The preferred
method of control is to average four or more microphones with a real-time device that
effectively averages the sound pressure level in each filter band. When real-time
averaging is not practicable, a survey of the chamber shall be performed to determine
the single point that is most suitable for control of the acoustic test.
2.4 - 14
Regardless of the control method employed, a minimum of four microphones shall be

positioned around the test chamber at sufficient distance from all surfaces to avoid
absorption or re-radiation effects. One of the microphones should be located above the
test item for a free-field test. A distance from any surface of at least l/4 the wavelength
of the lowest frequency of interest is recommended. It is recognized that this cannot be
achieved in some facilities, particularly when noise levels are specified to frequencies
as low as 25 Hz. In such cases, the microphones shall be located in positions so as to
be affected as little as possible by surface effects.
The preferred method of preparing for an acoustic test is to preshape the spectrum of
the acoustic field with a dummy test item. If no such item is readily available, it is
possible to preshape the spectrum in an empty test area. In that case, however, a low-
level test should be performed after the test item has been placed in the test area to
permit final adjustments to the shape of the acoustic spectrum.
Acoustic testing may be performed in a reverberant chamber or may be performed as

a direct-acoustic field (DAF) test in which the acoustic pressure field is generated by
banks of speakers. The preferred method for performing acoustic testing on flight
hardware is with a reverberant chamber test. Comparison of data from test articles
subjected to both reverberant and current state-of-the art DAF testing showed that the
pressure field and measured responses from DAF testing can differ significantly from a
reverberant field test even if the control microphones are kept within the test tolerances
specified in Section 1.13. Because of the non-uniformity that may exist in the acoustic
field generated by DAF testing, care must be taken when performing this type of test to
have sufficient instrumentation on the test article to prevent exceeding hardware
capability as the test level is increased and have an adequate number of microphones
in place during the test to monitor the pressure field generated near critical items. It
should also be noted that variability in the acoustic field generated by a DAF test may
result in under-testing as well as over-testing in specific frequency bands and all efforts
should be made to map the acoustic field relative to acoustically sensitive hardware to
ensure that an adequate test can be achieved.
b. Test Setup - The boundary conditions under which the hardware is supported during
test shall duplicate those expected during flight. When that is not feasible, the test item
shall be mounted in the test chamber in such a manner as to be isolated from all energy
inputs on a soft suspension system (natural frequency less than 20 Hz) and a sufficient
distance from chamber surfaces to minimize surface effects. During test, the test item
should be in an operational configuration, both electrically and mechanically,
representative of its configuration at lift-off.
c. Performance - Before and after the acoustic exposure, the payload shall be examined
and functionally tested. During the test, performance shall be monitored in accordance
with the verification specification.
2.4.2.3 Payload Random Vibration Tests
At the payload level of assembly, protoflight hardware shall, when practicable, be subjected
to a random vibration test to verify its ability to survive the lift-off environment and also to
provide a final workmanship vibration test. For small payloads (<454 kg or 1000 lb), the test
is required; for larger payloads the need to perform a random vibration test shall be
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional qualification tests may be required if
expected environments are not enveloped by this test. The acoustic environment at lift-off is
usually the primary source of random vibration; however, other sources of random vibration
must be considered. The sources include transonic aerodynamic fluctuating pressures and
the firing of retro/apogee motors.
2.4 - 15
a. Lift-Off Random Vibration - Protoflight hardware shall be subjected to a random

vibration test to verify flightworthiness and workmanship. The test level shall represent
the qualification level (flight limit level plus 3 dB).
The test is intended for payloads (spacecraft) of low to moderate weight and size. For
small payloads, such as Pegasus-launched spacecraft, the test should cover the full
20-2000 Hz frequency range. In such cases, the project should assess and recommend
a random vibration test, acoustic test, or both, depending on the payload. For larger
ELV payloads, the test is not required unless there is a close-coupled, direct structural
load path to the launch vehicle external skin. In that case, both lift-off and transonic
random vibration must be considered.
The payload in its launch configuration shall be attached to a vibration fixture by use of
a flight-type launch-vehicle adapter and attachment hardware. Vibration shall be
applied at the base of the adapter in each of three orthogonal axes, one of which is
parallel to the thrust axis. The excitation spectrum as measured by the control
accelerometer(s) shall be equalized such that the acceleration spectral density is
maintained within ±3 dB of the specified level at all frequencies within the test range
and the overall RMS level is within ±10% of the specified level.
Prior to the payload test, a survey of the test fixture/exciter combination shall be
performed to evaluate the fixture dynamics, the proposed choice of control
accelerometer locations, and the control strategy. If a mechanical test model of the
payload is available it should be included in the survey to evaluate the need for limiting.
If a random vibration test is not performed at the payload level of assembly, the
feasibility of doing the test at the next lower level of assembly shall be assessed.
b. Performance - Before and after each vibration test, the payload shall be examined and
functionally tested. During the tests, performance shall be monitored in accordance
with the verification specification.
2.4.2.4 Subsystem/Instrument Vibroacoustic Tests
If subsystems are expected to be significantly excited by structure-borne random vibration, a

random vibration test shall be performed. Specific test levels are determined on a case-by-
case basis. The levels shall be equal to the qualification level as predicted at the location
where the input will be controlled. Subsystem acoustic tests may also be required if the
subsystem is judged to be sensitive to this environment or if it is necessary to meet delivery
specifications. A random vibration test is generally required for instruments.
2.4.2.5 Component/Unit Vibroacoustic Tests
As a screen for design and workmanship defects, components/units shall be subjected to a

random vibration test along each of three mutually perpendicular axes. In addition, when
components are particularly sensitive to the acoustic environment, an acoustic test shall be
considered.
a. Random Vibration - The test item is subjected to random vibration along each of three
mutually perpendicular axes for one minute each. When possible, the component
random vibration spectrum should be based on levels measured at the component
mounting locations during previous subsystem or payload testing. When such
measurements are not available, the levels should be based on statistically estimated
responses of similar components on similar structures or on analysis of the payload.
2.4 - 16
Actual measurements should then be used if and when they become available. In the
absence of any knowledge of the expected level, the generalized vibration test
specification of Table 2.4-3 may be used.
As a minimum, all components shall be subjected to the levels of Table 2.4-4, which
represent a workmanship screening test. The minimum workmanship test levels are
primarily intended for use on electrical, electronic, and electromechanical hardware.
The test item shall be attached to the test equipment by a rigid fixture. The mounting
shall simulate, insofar as practicable, the actual mounting of the item in the payload with
particular attention given to duplicating the mounting contact area. In mating the test
item to the fixture, a flight-type mounting (including vibration isolators or kinematic
mounts, if part of the design) and fasteners should be used. Normally sealed items
should be pressurized during test to their prelaunch pressure.
For components mounted on isolators, flexures, or other highly compliant mounting

structure, adequate workmanship testing may not be achieved in the flight configuration.
In this case, it may be necessary to test the component hard-mounted to the shaker to
achieve sufficient input levels to verify workmanship. The hard-mounted test would be
run in addition to testing the component with flight-like mounting hardware. The
component must be assessed for the hard-mounted test configuration to ensure that
the hardware can survive the test without damage.
In cases where significant changes in strength, stiffness, or applied load result from
variations in internal and external pressure during the launch phase, a special test
should be considered to cover those effects.
Prior to the test, a survey of the test fixture/exciter combination should be performed to
evaluate the fixture dynamics, the proposed choice of control accelerometer locations,
and the control strategy. The evaluation should include consideration of cross-axis
responses. If a mechanical test or engineering model of the test article is available it
should be included in the survey.
For very large components the random vibration tests may have to be supplemented or
replaced by an acoustic test if the vibration test levels are insufficient to excite internal
hardware. If neither the acoustic nor vibration excitation is sufficient to provide an
adequate workmanship test, a screening program should be initiated at lower levels of
assembly; down to the board level, if necessary. The need for the screening program
must be evaluated by the project. The evaluation is based on mission reliability
requirements and hardware criticality, as well as budgetary and schedule constraints.
If testing is performed below the component level of assembly, the workmanship test
levels of Table 2.4-4 can be used as a starting point for test tailoring. The intent of
testing at this level of assembly is to uncover design and workmanship flaws. The test
input levels do not represent expected environments, but are intended to induce failure
in weak parts and to expose workmanship errors. The susceptibility of the test item to
vibration must be evaluated and the test level tailored so as not to induce unnecessary
failures.
If the test levels create conditions that exceed appropriate design safety margins or
cause unrealistic modes of failure, the input spectrum can be notched below the
minimum workmanship level. This can be accomplished when flight or test responses
at the higher level of assembly are known or when appropriate force limits have been
calculated.
2.4 - 17
b. Acoustic Test - If a component-level acoustic test is required, the test set-up and control
should be in accordance with the requirements for payload testing.
c. Performance - Before and after test exposure, the test item shall be examined and
functionally tested. During the test, performance shall be monitored in accordance with
the verification specification.
Vibroacoustic testing for the acceptance of previously qualified hardware shall be conducted
at flight limit levels using the same duration as recommended for protoflight hardware. As a
minimum, the acoustic test level shall be 138 dB, and the random vibration levels shall
represent the workmanship test levels.
The payload is subjected to an acoustic test and/or a random vibration test in three axes.
Components shall be subjected to random vibration tests in the three axes. Additional
vibroacoustic tests at subsystem/instrument and component levels of assembly are performed
in accordance with the environmental verification plan or as required for delivery.
Hardware that has beryllium, composite (including metal matrix), ceramic, or bonded joints in
the structural load path and whose strength margins are driven by vibro-acoustic loading shall
be tested to protoflight levels for random and/or acoustic testing even if the design has been
previously qualified on a valid prototype or protoflight unit. Protoflight vibro-acoustic testing
ensures that structure whose strength is workmanship or fabrication dependent is adequately
screened to preclude failure at higher levels of assembly. Protoflight testing should be
performed at the lowest level of assembly practical for the hardware.
During the test, performance shall be monitored in accordance with the verification
specification.
2.4 - 18
Table 2.4-3
Generalized Random Vibration Test Levels
Components (ELV)
22.7-kg (50-lb) or less
Frequency ASD Level (g2/Hz)

(Hz) Qualification Acceptance
20 0.026 0.013
20-50 +6 dB/oct +6 dB/oct
50-800 0.16 0.08
800-2000 -6 dB/oct -6 dB/oct
2000 0.026 0.013
Overall 14.1 Grms 10.0 Grms
The acceleration spectral density level may be reduced for components

weighing more than 22.7-kg (50 lb) according to:
Weight in kg Weight in lb
dB reduction = 10 log(W/22.7) 10 log(W/50)
ASD(50-800 Hz) = 0.16•(22.7/W) 0.16•(50/W) for protoflight
ASD(50-800 Hz) = 0.08•(22.7/W) 0.08•(50/W) for acceptance
Where W = component weight.
The slopes shall be maintained at + and - 6dB/oct for components weighing

up to 59-kg (130-lb). Above that weight, the slopes shall be adjusted to
maintain an ASD level of 0.01 g2/Hz at 20 and 2000 Hz.
For components weighing over 182-kg (400-lb), the test specification will be
maintained at the level for 182-kg (400 pounds).
2.4 - 19
Table 2.4-4
Component Minimum Workmanship
Random Vibration Test Levels
45.4-kg (100-lb) or less
Frequency ASD Level (g2/Hz)

(Hz)
20 0.01
20-80 +3 dB/oct
80-500 0.04
500-2000 -3 dB/oct
2000 0.01
Overall 6.8 grms
The plateau acceleration spectral density level (ASD) may be reduced for components
weighing between 45.4 and 182 kg, or 100 and 400 pounds according to the component
weight (W) up to a maximum of 6 dB as follows:
Weight in kg Weight in lb
dB reduction = 10 log(W/45.4) 10 log(W/100)
ASD(plateau) level = 0.04•(45.4/W) 0.04•(100/W)
The sloped portions of the spectrum shall be maintained at plus and minus
3 dB/oct. Therefore, the lower and upper break points, or frequencies at the ends of the
plateau become:
FL = 80 (45.4/W) [kg] FL = frequency break point low end of plateau

= 80 (100/W) [lb]
FH = 500 (W/45.4) [kg] FH = frequency break point high end of plateau

= 500 (W/100) [lb]
The test spectrum shall not go below 0.01 g2/Hz. For components whose weight is
greater than 182-kg or 400 pounds, the workmanship test spectrum is
0.01 g2/Hz from 20 to 2000 Hz with an overall level of 4.4 grms.
2.4 - 20
MECHANICAL SHOCK MECHANICAL FUNCTION
2.4.2.7 Retest of Reflight Hardware
For reflight hardware, the amount of retest that is needed is determined by considering the
amount of rework done after flight and by comparing the stresses of the upcoming flight with
those of the previous flight. The principal objective is to verify the workmanship. If no
disassembly and rework was done, the test may not be necessary. The effects of storage,
elapsed time since last exposure, etc. should be considered in determining the need for
retest. Subsystems that have been taken apart and reassembled should, as a minimum, be
subjected to an acoustic test (levels shall be equal to the limit levels) and a random vibration
test in at least one axis. More comprehensive exposures shall be considered if the rework
has been extensive.
2.4.2.8 Retest of Reworked Hardware
In many cases it is necessary to make modifications to hardware after a unit has been
through a complete mechanical verification program. For example, replacing a capacitor on
a circuit board in an electronics box that has already been through protoflight vibration
testing. For this type of reworked hardware, the amount of additional mechanical testing
required depends on the amount of rework done and the amount of disassembly performed
as part of the rework. The primary objective of post-rework testing is to ensure proper
workmanship has been achieved in performing the rework and in reassembling the
component. As a minimum, the reworked component shall be subjected to a single axis
workmanship random vibration test to the levels specified in Table 2.4-4. The determination
of axis shall be made based on the direction necessary to provide the highest excitation of
the reworked area. Testing may be required in more than one axis if a single axis test
cannot be shown to adequately test all of the reworked area. If the amount of rework or
disassembly required is significant, then 3-axis testing to acceptance levels may be
necessary if they are higher than workmanship levels.
2.4.3 Sinusoidal Sweep Vibration Qualification
Sine sweep vibration tests are performed to qualify prototype/protoflight hardware for the low-
frequency transient or sustained sine environments when they are present in flight, and to
provide a workmanship test for all payload hardware which is exposed to such environments
and normally does not respond significantly to the vibroacoustic environment, such as wiring
harnesses and stowed appendages.
For a payload level test, the payload shall be in a configuration representative of the time the
stress occurs during flight, with appropriate flight type hardware used for attachment. For
example, if the test is intended to simulate the vibration environment produced by the firing of
retro/apogee motors, the vibration source shall be attached at the retro/apogee motor adapter,
and the payload shall be in a configuration representative of the retro/apogee motor burning
mode of operation.
In addition, all ELV payloads shall be subjected to swept sine vibration testing to simulate low-
frequency sine transient vibration and sustained, pogo-like sine vibration (if expected) induced
by the launch vehicle. Qualification for these environments requires swept sine vibration tests
at the payload, instrument, and component levels of assembly.
It is understood that, for some payload projects, the sinusoidal sweep vibration qualification
program may have to be modified. For example, for very large ELV payloads (with very large
masses, extreme lengths, or large c.g. offsets) it may be impracticable because of test facility
limitations to perform a swept sine vibration test at the payload level of assembly. In that case,
testing at the highest level of assembly practicable is required.
2.4 - 21
For the sinusoidal vibration environment, limit levels shall be used which are consistent with
the minimum probability level given in Table 2.4-2. The qualification level is then defined as
the limit level times 1.25. The test input frequency range shall start be limited to the frequency
range in which coupled loads results are applicable and may be used for notching test
responses. The typical frequency range of the sine test is 5 to 50 Hz but the range of the test
may be extended depending on the specific launch vehicle and the frequency content of the
coupled loads analysis. The fatigue life considerations of 2.4.2.1 apply where hardware
reliability goals demand the demonstration of a specific hardware lifetime. The sine sweep
environmental test program shall be included in the environmental verification plan and
environmental verification specification.
2.4.3.1 ELV Payload Sine Sweep Vibration Tests
At the payload level of assembly, ELV prototype/protoflight hardware shall, when practicable,
be subjected to a sine sweep vibration design qualification test to verify its ability to survive
the low-frequency launch environment. The test also provides a workmanship vibration test
for payload hardware which normally does not respond significantly to the vibroacoustic
environment, but can experience significant responses from the ELV low-frequency sine
transient vibration and any sustained, pogo-like sine vibration. Guidelines for developing
mission-specific test levels are given in 2.4.3.1.b.
a. Vibration Test Requirements - Protoflight hardware shall be subjected to a sine sweep

vibration test to verify flightworthiness and workmanship. The test shall represent the
qualification level (flight limit level times 1.25).
The test is intended for all ELV payloads (spacecraft) except those with very large
masses, extreme lengths and/or large c.g. offsets, where it is impracticable because of
test facility limitations.
If the sine sweep vibration test is not performed at the payload level of assembly, it
should be performed at the next lowest practicable level of assembly.
The payload in its launch configuration should be attached to a vibration fixture by use
of a flight-type launch-vehicle attach fitting (adapter) and attachment (separation
system) hardware. Sine sweep vibration should be applied at the base of the adapter
in each of three orthogonal axes, one of which is parallel to the thrust axis. The test
sweep rate shall be 4 octaves per minute to simulate the flight sine transient vibration;
lower sweep rates shall be used in the appropriate frequency bands as required to
match the duration and rate of change of frequency of any flight sustained, pogo-like
vibration. The frequency range of the sine test should be consistent with the frequency
content of the launch vehicle coupled loads analysis. Mission-specific sine sweep test
levels should be developed for each ELV payload. Guidelines for developing the test
levels are given in 2.4.3.1.b.
Prior to the payload test, a survey of the test fixture/exciter combination should be
performed to evaluate the fixture dynamics, the proposed choice of control
accelerometer locations, and the control strategy. The evaluation should include
consideration of cross-axis responses. If a mechanical test model of the payload is
available it should be included in the survey to evaluate the need for limiting (or
notching).
During the protoflight hardware sine sweep vibration test to the specified test levels,
loads induced in the payload and/or adapter structure while sweeping through
resonance shall not exceed 1.25 times flight limit loads. If required, test levels should
2.4 - 22
be reduced ("notched") at critical frequencies. Acceleration responses of specific

critical items may also be limited to 1.25 times flight limit levels if required to preclude
unrealistic levels, provided that the spacecraft model used for the coupled loads
analysis has sufficient detail and that the specific responses are recovered (using the
acceleration transformation matrix) from the coupled loads analysis results.
A low-level sine sweep shall be performed prior to the protoflight-level sine sweep test
in each test axis. Data from the low-level sweeps measured at locations identified by a
notching analysis shall be examined to determine if there are any significant test
response deviations from analytical predictions. The data utilized shall include
cross-axis response levels. Based on the results of the low-level tests, the
predetermined notch levels shall be verified prior to the protoflight-level test. The flight
limit loads used for notching analysis shall be based on the final verification cycle
coupled loads analysis (including a test-verified payload model).
b. Mission-Specific Test Level Development - Sinusoidal vibration test levels required to

simulate the flight environment for ELV spacecraft vary with the payload attach fitting
(adapter) and spacecraft configuration, including overall weight and length, mass and
stiffness distributions, and axial-to-lateral coupling. It therefore is impracticable to
specify generalized sine sweep vibration test levels applicable to all spacecraft, and
mission-specific test levels must be developed for each ELV spacecraft based on the
coupled loads analysis.
Coupled loads analysis results should be utilized to develop mission specific sinusoidal
vibration test levels based on acceleration-response time histories or processed shock
response spectra (SRS) data at the interface of the test article for all significant flight
event loading conditions. Equivalent sine sweep vibration test input levels can be
developed by processing the interface time history data using SRS techniques and then
dividing the resulting SRS by the assumed Q (where Q=Cc/2C). It should be noted
that, in developing equivalent test input levels by dividing the SRS by Q, the assumption
of a lower Q is more conservative. In the absence of test data, typical assumed values
of Q are from 10 to 20. For pogo-like flight events, the use of SRS techniques is not
generally required.
Prior to the availability of coupled loads analysis results, preliminary sine test levels may
be estimated by using the ELV "user manual" sine vibration levels for spacecraft base
drive analysis, with notching levels based on net loads equivalent to the user manual
c.g. load factor loads. The base-drive analysis shall be truncated to a frequency range
consistent with the launch vehicle coupled loads analysis. Alternatively, spacecraft
interface dynamic response data from flight measurements or coupled loads analysis
for similar spacecraft may be used for the base drive input in conjunction with a suitable
uncertainty factor.
c. Performance - Before and after each vibration test, the payload shall be examined and
functionally tested. During the tests, performance shall be monitored in accordance with
2.4.3.2 ELV Payload Subsystem and Component Sine Sweep Vibration Tests
As a screen for design and workmanship defects, these items (per Table 2.4-1) shall be
subjected to a sine sweep vibration test along each of three mutually perpendicular axes.
For the sinusoidal vibration environment, limit levels shall be defined to be consistent with
the minimum probability level of Table 2.4-2. The protoflight qualification level is then defined
as the limit level times 1.25. The test input frequency range shall be consistent with the
2.4 - 23
launch vehicle coupled loads analysis and shall be the same as the frequency range defined
for payload testing. The fatigue life considerations of 2.4.2.1 apply where hardware reliability
goals demand the demonstration of a specific hardware lifetime.
a. Vibration Test Requirements - The test item in its launch configuration shall be attached
to the test equipment by a rigid fixture. The mounting shall simulate, insofar as
practicable, the actual mounting of the item in the payload, with particular attention
given to duplicating the mounting interface. All connections to the item (connectors and
harnesses, plumbing, etc.) should be simulated with lengths at least to the first tie-down
point. In mating the test item to the fixture, a flight-type mounting (including vibration
isolators or kinematic mounts, if part of the design) and fasteners, including torque
levels and locking features, shall be used. Normally-sealed items shall be pressurized
during test to their prelaunch pressure.
In cases where significant changes in strength, stiffness, or applied load result from
variations in internal and external pressure during the launch phase, a special test shall
be considered to cover those effects.
Sine sweep vibration shall be applied at the base of the test item in each of three
mutually perpendicular axes. The test sweep rate shall be consistent with the
payload-level sweep rate, i.e., 4 octaves per minute to simulate the flight sine transient
vibration, and (if required) lower sweep rates in the appropriate frequency bands to
match the duration and rate of change of frequency of any flight sustained, pogo-like
vibration. The test shall be performed by sweeping the applied vibration once through
the specified frequency range in each test axis.
Spacecraft subsystem, including instrument, and component levels depend on the type
of structure to which the item is attached, the local attachment stiffness, the distance
from the spacecraft separation plane, and the item's mass, size, and stiffness. It
therefore is impracticable to specify generalized sine sweep vibration test levels
applicable to all subsystems/instruments, and components, and mission-specific test
levels shall be developed for each payload. Guidelines for developing the specific test
levels are given in 2.4.3.2.b.
Prior to the test, a survey of the test fixture/exciter combination should be performed to
evaluate the fixture dynamics, the proposed choice of control accelerometer locations,
and the control strategy. The evaluation should include consideration of cross-axis
responses. If a mechanical test or engineering model of the test article is available it
should be included in the survey.
A low-level sine sweep shall be performed prior to the protoflight level sine sweep test
in each test axis (with particular emphasis on cross-axis responses) to verify the control
strategy and check test fixture dynamics.
b. Mission Specific Test Level Development - The mission-specific sine sweep test levels
for spacecraft subsystems/components should be based on test data from structural
model spacecraft sine sweep tests if available. If not available, the test levels should
be based on an envelope of two sets of responses:
(1) Coupled loads analysis dynamic responses should be utilized if

acceleration-response time histories or processed shock response spectra
(SRS) data are available at the test article location for all significant flight event
loading conditions. Equivalent sine sweep vibration test input levels should be
2.4 - 24
developed using (SRS) techniques for transient flight events using the methods
defined in 2.4.3.1.b.
(2) Subsystem/component responses from a base drive analysis of the spacecraft

and adapter, using the spacecraft sine sweep test levels as input (in three axes),
should be included in the test level envelope. The base drive responses of the
test article should be corrected for effects of the spacecraft test sweep rates if
the sweep rates are not included in the base drive analysis input.
Subsystem/component test sweep rates should match spacecraft test sweep
rates.
Since most shakers can only apply translational (but not rotational) accelerations,
for test articles with predicted large rotational responses it may be necessary to
increase the test levels based on analysis to assure adequate response levels.
Also, for certain cases such as large items mounted on kinematic mount flexures,
which experience both significant rotations and translations, it may be necessary
to use the test article c.g. rotational and translational acceleration response levels
as not-to-exceed test levels in conjunction with appropriate notching or limiting.
c. Performance - Before and after test exposure, the test item shall be examined and
functionally tested. During the test, performance shall be monitored in accordance with
Sine sweep vibration testing for the acceptance of previously qualified hardware shall be
conducted at the flight limit levels using the same sweep rates as used for protoflight
hardware.
2.4.4 Mechanical Shock Qualification
Both self-induced and externally induced shocks should be considered in defining the
mechanical shock environment.
2.4.4.1 Subsystem Mechanical Shock Tests
All subsystems, including instruments, shall be qualified for the mechanical shock
environment.
a. Self-Induced Shock - The subsystem should be exposed to self-induced shocks by

actuation of all shock-producing devices. Self-induced shocks occur principally when
pyrotechnic and pneumatic devices are actuated to release booms, solar arrays,
protective covers, etc. Also the impact on deployable devices as they reach their
operational position at the "end of travel" is a likely source of significant shock. When
hardware contains such devices, it shall be exposed to each shock source twice to
account for the scatter associated with the actuation of the same device. The internal
spacecraft flight firing circuits should be used to trigger the event rather than external
test firing circuits. At the project's discretion, this testing may be deferred to the payload
level of assembly.
b. Externally Induced Shock - Mechanical shocks originating from other subsystems,

payloads, or launch vehicle operations must be assessed. When the most severe
shock is externally induced, a suitable simulation of that shock shall be applied at the
2.4 - 25
subsystem interface. When it is feasible to apply this shock with a controllable shock-
generating device, the qualification level shall be 1.4 times the maximum expected
value at the subsystem interface, applied once in each of the three axes. A pulse or
complex transient with a duration comparable to the actual shock pulse shall be applied
at the test item interface along each of the three axes. The shock spectrum of the
generated waveform (positive and negative) shall match the desired spectrum within
the tolerances specified for mechanical shock in Section 1.13. Equalization of the shock
spectrum is performed at a maximum resolution of one-sixth octave. The fraction of
critical damping (c/cc) used in the shock spectral analysis of the test pulse should equal
the fraction of critical damping used in the analysis of the data from which the test
specification was derived. In the absence of a strong rationale for some other value, a
fraction of critical damping equivalent to a Q of 10 shall be used for shock spectrum
analysis.
If the project so chooses or if it is not feasible to apply the shock with a controllable
shock-generating device (e.g. the subsystem is too large for the device), the test may
be conducted at the payload level by actuating the devices in the payload that produce
the shocks external to the subsystem to be tested. The shock-producing device(s) must
be actuated a minimum of two times for this test.
The decision to perform component shock testing to is typically based on an

assessment of the shock susceptibility of the component and the expected shock levels.
If the component is not considered shock sensitive and if there is low potential for
damage due to the shock environment, then the project may choose to defer shock
testing to the payload level of assembly. The potential for damage due to shock can be
quantified based on Figure 2.4-1. Two curves are shown in the figure; one for standard
aerospace electronics and one for all other hardware. If the flight shock environment
as shown on an SRS plot (Q=10) is enveloped by the appropriate curve shown in Figure
2.4-1, then the shock environment can be considered benign and there is low risk in
deferring the shock test. For the case in which the shock levels are above the curve,
then component level shock testing should be considered as the shock level may be
high enough to cause damage. The curve provided in Figure 2.4-1 is intended as a
guideline for determining whether component level shock testing should be performed.
Each component should be evaluated individually to determine its susceptibility for
damage due to the predicted shock environment.
It will not be necessary to conduct a test for externally induced shocks if it can be
demonstrated that the shock spectrum of the self-induced environment is greater at all
frequencies than the envelope of the spectra created by the external events at all
locations within the subsystem.
c. Test Setup - During test, the test item should be in the electrical and mechanical
operational modes appropriate to the phase of mission operations when the shock will
occur.
d. Performance - Before and after the mechanical shock test, the test item shall be
examined and functionally tested. During the tests, performance shall be monitored in
accordance with the verification specification.
2.4 - 26
10000
50 in/sec
Constant Velocity Line
SRS Acceleration (g's)
1000
500 g
Constant Acceleration Line
100
Q = 10 Standard Electronics
Other Hardware
10
100 1000 10000
Frequency (Hz)
Figure 2.4-1 Shock Response Spectrum (SRS) for assessing Component Test Requirements
2.4.4.2 Payload (Spacecraft) Mechanical Shock Tests
The payload must be qualified for the shock induced during payload separation (when
applicable) and for any other externally induced shocks whose levels are not enveloped at
the payload interface by the separation shock level. The payload separation shock is usually
higher than other launch vehicle-induced shocks; however that is not always the case. For
instance, the shocks induced at the payload interface during inertial upper stage (IUS)
actuation can be greater. In addition, mechanical shock testing may be performed at the
payload level of assembly to satisfy the subsystem mechanical shock requirements of
2.4.4.1.
a. Other Payload (Spacecraft) Shocks - If launch vehicle induced shocks or shocks from
other sources are not enveloped by the separation test, the spacecraft must be
subjected to a test designed to simulate the greater environment. If a controllable
source is used, the qualification level shall be 1.4 x the maximum expected level at the
payload interface applied in each of the three axes. The simulated shock spectrum
(positive and negative) shall match the desired test spectrum within the tolerances for
mechanical shock specified in Section 1.13. The analysis should be performed with a
fraction of critical damping corresponding to a Q of 10 or, if other than 10, with the Q for
which the shock being simulated was analyzed.
The subsystem mechanical shock requirements may be satisfied by testing at the

payload level of assembly as described above.
2.4 - 27
b. Performance - Before and after the mechanical shock test, the test item shall be
examined and functionally tested. During the tests, performance should be monitored
in accordance with the verification test plan and specification.
The need to perform mechanical shock tests for the acceptance of previously qualified
hardware should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Testing should be given careful
consideration evaluating mission reliability goals, shock severity, hardware susceptibility,
design changes from the previous qualification configuration including proximity to the shock
source, and previous history.
2.4.5 Mechanical Function Verification
A kinematic analysis of all payload mechanical operations is required (a) to ensure that each
mechanism can perform satisfactorily and has adequate margins under worst-case conditions,
(b) to ensure that satisfactory clearances exist for both the stowed and operational
configurations as well as during any mechanical operation, and (c) to ensure that all
mechanical elements are capable of withstanding the worst-case loads that may be
encountered. Payload qualification tests are required to demonstrate that the installation of
each mechanical device is correct and that no problems exist that will prevent proper operation
of the mechanism during mission life.
Subsystem qualification tests are required for each mechanical operation at nominal-, low-,
and high-energy levels. To establish that functioning is proper for normal operations, the
nominal test shall be conducted under the most probable conditions expected during normal
flight. A high-energy test and a low-energy test shall also be conducted to prove positive
margins of strength and function. The levels of these tests shall demonstrate margins beyond
the nominal conditions by considering adverse interaction of potential extremes of parameters
such as temperature, friction, spring forces, stiffness of electrical cabling or thermal insulation,
and, when applicable, spin rate. Parameters to be varied during the high- and low-energy
tests shall include, to the maximum extent practicable, all those that could substantively affect
the operation of the mechanism as determined by the results of analytic predictions or
development tests. As a minimum, successful operation at temperature extremes 10°C
beyond the range of expected flight temperatures shall be demonstrated.
Lubricants susceptible to adverse effects from humidity, such as MoS2 shall be given
protection. Testing in a humid environment shall, where practicable, either be avoided or
minimized.
2.4.5.1 Life Testing
A life test program shall be implemented for mechanical elements that move repetitively as
part of their normal function and whose useful life must be determined in order to verify their
adequacy for the mission. The verification plan and the verification specification shall address
the life test program, identifying the mechanical elements that require such testing, describing
the test hardware that will be used, and the test methods that will be employed.
2.4 - 28
MECHANICAL FUNCTION MECHANICAL FUNCTION
Life test planning should be initiated as early as possible in the development phase, and
presented at each program system/peer review to allow enough time to complete the life test
and thoroughly disassemble and inspect the mechanism, while retaining enough time to react
to any anomalous findings. Once the plan is finalized, an independent peer review of the
procedure and criteria should be held.
The life test mechanism should be fabricated and assembled such that it is as nearly identical
as possible to the actual flight mechanism, with special attention to the development and
implementation of detailed assembly procedures and certification logs. In fact, it is preferable
that the life test mechanism actually be a flight spare or Qualification Unit. Careful attention
should be given to properly simulating the flight interfaces, especially the perhaps less obvious
details, such as the method of mounting of the mechanism, the preloading and/or clamping of
bearings or other tribological interfaces, the routing of harnesses, the attachment of thermal
blankets, and any other items that could have an influence on the performance of the
mechanism.
Prior to the start of life testing, mechanisms should be subjected to the same ground testing
environments, both structural and thermal, that are anticipated for the flight units (protoflight
or acceptance levels, as appropriate). These environments may have a significant influence
on the life test performance of the mechanism.
Consideration should be given to the geometry of the test set-up and the effects of gravity on
the performance of the life test mechanism, including the effects on lubrication and external
loads. For example, gravity may cause lubrication to puddle at the bottom of a bearing race or
run out of the bearing. In some cases, the effects of gravity may cause abnormally high loads
on the mechanism.
The thermal environment of the mechanism during the life test should be representative of the
on-orbit environment. If expected bulk temperature changes are significant, then the life test
should include a number of transitions from the hot on-orbit predictions to the cold on-orbit
predictions, and vice versa. Depending on the thermal design, significant temperature
gradients may be developed which could have a profound influence on the life of the
mechanism and, therefore, should be factored into the thermal profile for the life test.
Consideration should be given to including in the life test the effects of vacuum on the
performance of the mechanism with particular attention to its effects on the thermal
environment (i.e., no convective heat transfer) and potentially adverse effects on lubrication
and materials. Life testing in a gaseous nitrogen environment as an inexpensive alternative
to a long duration vacuum test, for example, may have a completely unexpected or
unanticipated effect on lubricant tribology.
Life testing of electrically powered devices should be conducted with nominal supply voltage.
The selection of the proper instrumentation for the life test is very important. Physical
parameters that are an indication of the health of the mechanism should be closely monitored
and trended during the life test. These parameters may include in-rush and steady-state
currents, electrical opens or shorts, threshold voltages, temperatures (both steady-state and
rate of change), torques, angular or linear positions, vibration, times of actuation and
open/closed loop system responses.
The life test should be designed to "fail safe" in the event of any failure of the test setup, ground
support equipment, or test article. There may be a severe impact to the life test results if it is
necessary to stop a life test to replace or repair ground support equipment. Uninterruptible
power supplies should be considered when required for autonomous shutdown without
2.4 - 29
damage to the test article or loss of test data. Redundant sensors should be provided for all
critical test data. If used, the vacuum pumping station should be designed to maintain the
integrity of the vacuum in the event of a sudden loss of power. Any autonomous data capture
should include a time stamp to help diagnose the conditions present prior to a test shutdown.
The test spectrum for the life test should represent the required mission life for the flight
mechanism, including both ground and on-orbit mechanism operations. In order to reduce test
time and cost, the test spectrum should be simplified as much as possible while retaining an
appropriate balance between realism and conservatism. It should include, if applicable, a
representative range of velocities, number of direction reversals, and number of dead times
or stop/start sequences between movements. Direction reversals and stop/start operations
could have a significant effect on lubrication life, internal stresses, and, ultimately, the long
term performance of the mechanism and therefore should be given priority in the development
of the life test plan. Similarly, system dynamics effects due to inertial loads should be
considered in development of the plan and implemented where appropriate, such as in
applications where normal operation includes multiple start / stop or acceleration / deceleration
maneuvers.
The minimum requirement for demonstrated life test operation without failure shall be 2.0 times
the mission life. However, due to the uncertainties and simplifications inherent in the test, a
marginally successful test requires post-test inspections and characterizations to extrapolate
the remaining useful life. Because this can be difficult and uncertain, even higher margins
should be considered if time permits in order to establish greater confidence due to the limited
number of life test units that are typically available. Pre- and post-life test baseline
performance tests should be conducted with clear requirements established for determining
minimum acceptable performance at end-of-life.
When it is necessary to accelerate the life test in order to achieve the required life
demonstration in the time available, caution must be exercised in increasing the speed or duty
cycle of the mechanism. Mechanisms may survive a life test at a certain speed or duty cycle,
but fail if the speed is increased or decreased, or if the duty cycle is increased significantly.
There are three lubrication regimes to consider when considering whether to accelerate a life
test, "boundary lubrication", "mixed lubrication", and "full elastohydrodynamic (EHD)
lubrication".
For boundary and mixed lubrication regimes, the most likely failure mechanisms will be wear
and lubricant breakdown, not fatigue. Unfortunately failure by wear is not an exact science;
therefore, life test acceleration by increasing speed should be considered with caution. A
mechanism that normally operates in these two regimes should never be accelerated in a life
test to a level where the lubrication system moves into the EHD regime for the test.
Acceleration of a life test for systems in boundary or mixed lubrication regimes may be
considered if it can be shown by analysis or test that the mechanism rotor oscillations for the
accelerated operation are similar to that during normal operation. For example, in a step
motor, it should be shown that the rotor oscillations damp out to less than 10% of the peak
overshoot amplitude prior to initiating the next accelerated step. Rationale for acceleration
should be presented in the initial test plan.
In the EHD regime, no appreciable wear should occur and the failure mechanism should be
material fatigue rather than wear. Therefore, while life test acceleration by increasing speed
may be considered, other speed limiting factors must also be considered. For example, at the
speed at which EHD lubrication is attained, one must be concerned with bearing retainer
imbalances which may produce excessive wear of the retainer, which would in turn produce
contaminants which could degrade the performance of the bearings. Additionally, thermal
issues may arise related to increased power dissipation for higher speed operation, like
increased bearing gradients, which should be thoroughly evaluated.
2.4 - 30
If there are significant downtimes associated with the operation of an intermittent mechanism,
the life test can be accelerated by reducing this downtime, as long as this does not adversely
affect temperatures and leaves enough "settle time" for the lubricant film to "squish out" of the
contact area to simulate a full stop condition.
For all these reasons, the life test should be run as nearly as possible using the on-orbit speeds
and duty cycles. In some cases it may not be possible to accelerate the test at all.
Upon completion of the life test, it is imperative that careful disassembly procedures are
followed and that the proper levels of inspection are conducted. Successful tests will not have
any anomalous conditions such as abnormal wear, significant lubrication breakdown, or
excessive debris generation. These or other anomalous conditions may be cause for declaring
the life test a failure despite completion of the required test spectrum. A thorough investigation
of all moving components and wear surfaces should be conducted. This may include physical
dimensional inspection of components, high magnification photography, lubricant analysis,
Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) analysis, etc. Photographic documentation of the life
test article should be made from incoming component inspection/acceptance through full
assembly to act as a baseline for comparison.
For those items determined not to require life testing, the rationale for eliminating the test must
be provided along with a description of the analyses that will be done to verify the validity of
the rationale. Caution should be exercised when citing heritage as a reason for not conducting
a life test. Many factors such as assembly personnel, environments, changes to previously
used processes, or "improvements" to the design may lead to subtle differences in the
mechanism that in turn could affect the outcome of a life test. For example, environmental
testing of the heritage mechanism may not actually have enveloped the predicted flight
environment of the mechanism under consideration.
2.4.5.2 Demonstration
Compliance with the mechanical function qualification requirements is demonstrated by a

combination of analysis and testing. The functional qualification aspects of the
demonstration are discussed below. The life test demonstrations are peculiar to the design
and cannot be described here. Rather, they must be described in detail in an approved
verification plan and verification specification.
a. Analysis - An analysis of the payload should be conducted to ensure that satisfactory

clearances exist for both the stowed and operational configurations. Therefore, in
conjunction with the flight-loads analysis, an assessment of the relative displacements
of the various payload elements with respect to other payloads and various elements
of ELV payload fairing should be made for potentially critical events. During analysis,
the following effects should be considered: an adverse build-up of tolerances, thermal
distortions, and mechanical misalignments, as well as the effects of static and dynamic
displacements induced by particular mission events.
In addition, a kinematic analysis of all deployment and retraction sequences should be

conducted to ensure that each mechanism has adequate torque margin under worst-
case friction conditions and is capable of withstanding the worst-case loads that may
be encountered during unlatching, deployment, retraction, relatching, or ejection
sequences. In addition, the analysis should verify that sufficient clearance exists during
the motion of the mechanisms to avoid any interference.
2.4 - 31
The selection of lubricant for use in critical moving mechanical assemblies should be
based upon development tests of the lubricant that demonstrate its ability to provide
adequate lubrication under all specified operating conditions over the design lifetime.
Since life testing cannot typically provide proof of lubricant availability based on
evaporation over the required life of the mechanism, an analysis should be performed
to show that there is an adequate amount of lubricant in the system (not including
degradation) for the duration of the mechanism life with a margin greater than 10.
Lubricant availability analyses based on degradation rates should be proven through
life testing (see section 2.4.5.1).
The design of each ball bearing installation must be substantiated by analysis and either
development tests or previous usage. The materials, stresses, stiffness, fatigue life,
preload, and possible binding under normal, as well as the most severe combined
loading conditions, and other expected environmental conditions should be considered.
Alignments, fits, tolerances, thermal and load induced distortions, and other conditions
should be considered in determining preload variations. Bearing fatigue life calculations
shall be based on a survival probability of 99.95 percent when subjected to maximum
time varying loads. For noncritical applications or deployables, if nonquiet running is
acceptable, and the bearing material is 52100 Carbon Steel or 440C Stainless Steel,
the mean Hertzian contact stress shall not exceed 2760 megapascals (400,000 psi)
when subjected to the yield load. During operation, the mean Hertzian contact stress
shall not exceed 2310 megapascals (335,000 psi). For materials other than these, a
hertzian contact stress allowable shall be determined based on manufacturer
recommendations with appropriate reduction factors for aerospace applications and
approved by the responsible engineer.
In addition to the requirements stated above, bearing applications requiring quiet

operation or low torque ripple should be designed so that the bearing race and ball
stress levels are below the levels that would cause unacceptable permanent
deformation during application of ascent loads. Where bearing deformation is required
to carry a portion or all of the vehicle ascent loads, and where smoothness of operation
is required on orbit, the mean Hertzian stress levels of the bearing steel (52100 and
440C) shall not exceed 2310 megapascals (335,000 psi) when subjected to the yield
load. The upper and lower extremes of the contact ellipses shall be contained by the
raceways. The stress and shoulder height requirements of the races shall be analyzed
for both nominal and off-nominal bearing tolerances. During operation, the mean
Hertzian contact stress should not exceed 830 megapascals (120,000 psi) over the
worst case environment. For materials other than 52100 carbon steel and 440C
stainless steel, a Hertzian contact stress allowable shall be determined based on
manufacturer recommendations with appropriate reduction factors for aerospace
applications and approved by the responsible engineer.
b. Payload Testing - A series of mechanical function tests shall be performed on the

payload to demonstrate "freedom-of-motion" of all appendages and other mechanical
devices whose operation may be affected by the process of integrating them with the
payload. The tests should demonstrate proper release, motion, and lock-in of each
device, as appropriate, in order to ensure that no tolerance buildup, assembly error, or
other problem will prevent proper operation of the mechanism during mission life.
Unless the design of the device dictates otherwise, mechanical testing may be
conducted in ambient laboratory conditions. The testing should be performed at an
appropriate time in the payload environmental test sequence and, if any device is
subsequently removed from the payload, the testing should be repeated after final
reinstallation of the device.
2.4 - 32
c. Subsystem Testing - Each subsystem, and instrument, that performs a mechanical

operation must undergo functional qualification testing. At the project's discretion,
however, such testing may be performed at the payload level of assembly. The test is
conducted after any other testing that may affect mechanical operation. The purpose
is to confirm proper performance and to ensure that no degradation has occurred during
the previous tests.
During the test, the electrical and mechanical components of the subsystem should be
in the appropriate operational mode. The subsystem is also exposed to pertinent
environmental effects that may occur before and during mechanical operation. The
verification specification should stipulate the tests to be conducted, the necessary
environmental conditioning, and the range of required operations.
It is desirable that preliminary mechanical function tests and exploratory design

development tests shall have been performed with a structural model prior to
qualification testing of the subsystem. Such tests uncover weaknesses, detect failure
modes, and allow time before protoflight testing to develop and institute quality control
procedures and corrective redesign.
(1) Information Requirements - The following information is necessary to define the

series of functional qualification tests:
o A description of mission requirements, how the mechanism is intended to

operate, and when operation occurs during the mission;
o The required range of acceptable operation and criteria for acceptable

performance;
o The anticipated variation of all pertinent flight conditions or other

parameters that may affect performance.
(2) Test Levels and Margins - For each mechanical operation, such as appendage
deployment, tests at nominal-, low-, and high-energy levels shall be performed.
One test shall be conducted at the most probable level that will occur during a
normal mission (the nominal level). The test will establish that functioning is
proper for nominal operating conditions and baseline measurements will be
obtained for subsequent tests.
Other tests shall be conducted to prove positive margins of strength and function,
including torque or force ratio, a high-energy test and a low-energy test. The
levels of these tests shall demonstrate margins beyond the nominal operational
limits over the full range of motion at the worst case environments and the
operating parameters of the system (rate, acceleration, etc.). The margins shall
not be selected arbitrarily, but shall take into account all the uncertainties of
operation, strength, and test. If a margin test cannot be conducted at the
subsystem level due to its size and complexity these verification tests shall be
performed at the highest level of assembly possible and the results combined to
provide subsystem performance.
While in an appropriate functional configuration the hardware should be

subjected to events such as separation, appendage deployment, retromotor
ejection, or other mechanical operations, such as spin-up or despin that are
associated with the particular mission.
2.4 - 33
Gravity compensation should be provided to the extent necessary to achieve the

test objectives. As a guide, the uncompensated gravity effects should be less
than 10 percent of the operational loads. Uncompensated gravity of 0.l g is
usually achievable and acceptable for separation tests and for comparative
measurements of appendage positioning if the direction is correct, i.e., the net
shear and moment imposed during measurements acts in the same direction as
it would in flight, thereby causing any mechanism with backlash to assume the
correct extreme positions. For testing of certain mechanical functions, however,
more stringent uncompensated gravity constraints may be required. When
appropriate, the subsystem should be preconditioned before test or conditioned
during test to pertinent environmental levels. This can include vibration, high-
and low-temperature cycling, pressure-time profiles, transportation and handling.
(3) Performance - Before and after test, the subsystem should be examined and
electrically tested. During the test, the subsystem performance should be
monitored in accordance with the verification specification.
(4) Component Characterization and Testing – For applications where motor

performance is critical to mission success, the design shall be based on a
complete motor characterization at the minimum and maximum voltages from the
spacecraft bus and motor driver and shall include as a minimum: rotor inertia,
friction and damping parameters, back-EMF constant or torque constant, time
constant, torque characteristics, speed versus torque curves, thermal
dissipation, temperature effects, and where applicable, analysis to demonstrate
adequate margin against back driving.
For applications where the motor is integrated into a higher assembly, the motor
characterization shall be performed at the motor level prior to integration.
After initial functional testing, a run-in test should be performed on each moving
mechanical assembly before it is subjected to further acceptance testing, unless
it can be shown that this procedure would be detrimental to performance and
would result in reduced reliability. The primary purpose of the run-in test is to
detect material and workmanship defects that occur early in the component life.
Another purpose is to wear-in parts of the moving mechanical assembly so that
they perform in a consistent and controlled manner. Satisfactory wear-in may be
manifested by a reduction in running friction to a consistent low level. The run-in
test should be conducted for a minimum of 50 hours except for items where the
number of cycles of operation, rather than hours of operation, is a more
appropriate measure of the capability to perform in a consistent and controlled
manner. For these units, the run-in test should be for at least 15 cycles or 5% of
the total expected life cycles, whichever is greater. The run-in test conditions
should be representative of the operational loads, speed, and environment;
however, operation of the assembly at ambient conditions may be conducted if
the test objectives can be met and the ambient environment will not degrade
reliability or cause unacceptable changes to occur within the equipment such as
generation of excessive debris. During the run-in test, sufficient periodic
measurements should be made to indicate what conditions may be changing with
time and what wear rate characteristics exist. Test procedures, test time, and
criteria for performance adequacy should be in accordance with an approved test
plan. All gear trains using solid or liquid lubricants should, where practicable, be
inspected and cleaned following the run-in test.
2.4 - 34
2.4.5.3 Torque/Force Margin
The torque or force margin shall be demonstrated by test to be sufficiently large to guarantee
system-performance under worst-case conditions throughout its life by fully accommodating
the uncertainty in the resisting forces or torques and in the source of energy.
The Torque Margin (TM) is a measure of the degree to which the torque available to
accomplish a mechanical function exceeds the torque required. The torque margin is generally
the ratio of the driving or available torques times an appropriate Factor of Safety (FS) minus
one. The torque margin requirement defined below applies to all mechanical functions, those
driven by motors as well as springs, etc. at beginning of life (BOL) only; end of life (EOL)
mechanism performance is determined by life testing as discussed in paragraph 2.4.5.1,
and/or by analysis; however, all torque increases due to life test results should be included in
the final TM calculation and verification. Positive margin (>0) using the TM equation and FS
stated herein must be shown for worst case EOL predicted conditions and at the extreme
operating parameters of the system (rate, acceleration, etc.). For linear devices, the term
"force" should replace "torque" throughout the section.
For final design verification, the torque margin shall be verified by testing the qualification (or
protoflight) unit both before and after exposure to qualification level environmental testing.
The torque margin on all flight units should also be verified by testing when possible (without
breaking the flight hardware configuration), both before and after exposure to acceptance level
environmental testing. All torque margin testing should be performed at the highest possible
level of assembly, throughout the mechanism’s range of travel, under worst-case predicted
EOL environmental conditions, representing the worst-case combination of maximum and/or
minimum predicted (not qualification) temperatures, gradients, positions, acceleration/
deceleration of load, rate, voltage, vacuum, etc. As the deviation from these worst case
conditions increases, a higher Factor of Safety than that stated below should be used.
Along with system level test, available torque (T avail) and resistive torque (Tr) under worst case
conditions should be determined, whenever possible, through component, system and
subsystem level tests. Torque ratios for gear driven systems should be verified, using
subsystem level results, on both sides of the geartrain. The minimum available torque for
these types of systems should never be less than 1 in-oz at the motor. Kick-off springs that
do not operate over the entire range of the mechanical function can be neglected when
computing available torque over the full range. However, the use of kick-off spring forces in
the Torque Margin calculation at the beginning of travel or initial separation is acceptable. A
Factor of Safety of at least 1.5 over inertial driven or known quantifiable resistive torques (that
do not change over the operating life of the unit) shall be used in the final computing of torque
margin as indicated in the table below. FS requirements for parasitic forces dominated by a
combination of variable items should be determined based on the program phase as indicated
in the table below. The final test verified Torque Margin shall be greater than zero (>0) based
on the FS listed for the Acceptance / Qualification Test phase.
Program Phase Known Torque Variable Torque

Factor of Safety Factor of Safety
(FSk) (FSv)
Preliminary Design Review 2.00 4.0
Critical Design Review 1.50 3.0
Acceptance / Qualification Test 1.50 2.0
2.4 - 35
For those cases where high confidence does not exist in determination of worst case load or
driving capability, a Safety Factor higher than that stated above may be appropriate. Factors
of Safety should be based on a confidence level determined from the quantity and fidelity of
heritage and program test data. At the program PDR, a detailed plan to determine torque
margin shall be presented. By CDR, it shall be demonstrated (see GEVS section 2.4.5.2) that
the detail design complies with the program requirements as outlined in this section.
The required Factors of Safety should be appropriately higher than given above if:
a. The designs involve an unusually large degree of uncertainty in the characterization of
resistive torques.
b. The torque margin testing is not performed in the required environmental conditions or is
not repeatable and has a large tolerance band.
c. The torque margin testing is performed only at the component level.
It is important to note that this torque margin requirement relates to the verification phase of
the hardware in question. Conservative decisions should be made during the design phase to
ensure adequate margins will be realized. However, it is recognized that under some unique
circumstances these specified Factors of Safety might be detrimental (excessive) to the design
of a system. For these specific cases which require approval of a waiver, appropriate Factors
of Safety shall be determined based on the design complexity, engineering test data,
confidence level, and other pertinent information.
The minimum available driving torque for the mechanism shall be determined based on the
FS listed above. The Torque Margin (TM) shall be greater than zero and shall be calculated
using the following formula:
TM = {Tavail / (FSk Tknown + FSv Tvariable)} - 1
Where:
Driving Torques:
Tavail = Minimum Available Torque or Force generated by the mechanism at worst case
environmental conditions at any time in its life. If motors are used in the system,
Tavail shall be determined at the output of the motor, not including gear heads or
gear trains at its output based on minimum supplied motor voltage. T avail similarly
applies to other actuators such as springs, pyrotechnics, solenoids, heat actuated
devices, etc.
Resistive Torques:
Tknown = Sum of the fixed torques or forces that are known and quantifiable such as
accelerated inertias (T=I) and not influenced by friction, temperature, life, etc. A
constant Safety Factor is applied to the calculated torque.
Tvariable = Sum of the torques or forces that may vary over environmental conditions and life
such as static or dynamic friction, alignment effects, latching forces, wire harness
loads, damper drag, variations in lubricant effectiveness, including degradation or
depletion of lubricant over life, etc.
For the acceptance testing of previously qualified hardware, the payload and subsystem
tests described in 2.4.5.2.b and 2.4.5.2.c shall be performed, except that the subsystem
tests need be performed only at the nominal energy level. Adequate torque ratio (margin)
shall be demonstrated for all flight mechanisms.
2.4 - 36
MASS PROPERTIES MASS PROPERTIES
2.4.6 Pressure Profile Qualification
The need for a pressure profile test should be assessed for all subsystems. A qualification
test will be required if analysis does not indicate a positive margin at loads equal to twice those
induced by the maximum expected pressure differential during launch. If a test is required,
the limit pressure profile is determined by the predicted pressure-time profile for the nominal
trajectory of the particular mission.
Because pressure-induced loads vary with the square of the rate of change, the qualification
pressure profile is determined by multiplying the predicted pressure rate of change by a factor
of 1.12 (the square root of 1.25, the required qualification factor on load).
The hardware is qualified for the pressure profile environment by analysis and/or test. An
analysis shall be performed to estimate the pressure differential induced by the nominal
launch trajectories, as appropriate, across elements susceptible to such loading (e.g.
thermal blankets, contamination enclosures, and housings of components). If analysis does
not indicate a positive margin at loads equal to twice those induced by the maximum
expected pressure differential, testing is required. Although testing at the subsystem level is
usually appropriate, the project may elect to test at the payload level of assembly.
a. Test Profile - The flight pressure profile shall be determined by the analytically predicted
pressure-time history inside the cargo bay (or payload fairing) for the nominal launch
trajectory for the mission (including reentry if appropriate). Because pressure-induced
loads vary as the square of the pressure rate, the pressure profile for qualification is
determined by increasing the predicted flight rate by a factor of 1.12 (square root of
1.25, the required test factor for loads). The pressure profile shall be applied once.
b. Facility Considerations - Loads induced by the changing pressure environment are

affected both by the pressure change rate and the venting area. Because the exact
times of occurrence of the maximum pressure differential is not always coincident with
the maximum rate of change, the pumping capacity of the facility must be capable of
matching the desired pressure profile within ±5% at all times.
c. Test Setup - During the test, the subsystem shall be in the electrical and mechanical
operational modes that are appropriate for the event being simulated.
d. Performance - Before and after the pressure profile test, the subsystem shall be
examined and functionally tested. During the tests, performance shall be monitored in
accordance with the verification specification.
Pressure profile test requirements do not apply for the acceptance testing of previously
qualified hardware.
2.4.7 Mass Properties Verification
Hardware mass property requirements are mission-dependent and, therefore, are

determined on a case-by-case basis. The mass properties program should include an
analytic assessment of the payload's ability to comply with the mission requirements,
supplemented as necessary by measurement.
2.4- 37
The mass properties of the payload are verified by analysis and/or measurement.
When mass properties are to be derived by analysis, it may be necessary to make some direct
measurements of subsystems and components in order to attain the accuracy required for the
mission and to ensure that analytical determination of payload mass properties is feasible.
Determination of the various subsystem properties should be sufficiently accurate that, when
combined analytically to derive the mass properties of the payload, the uncertainties will be
small enough to ensure compliance with payload mass property requirements. If analytic
determination of payload mass properties is not feasible, then direct measurement is required.
The following mass properties must be determined:
a. Weight, Center of Gravity, and Moment of Inertia - Weight, center of gravity, and
moment of inertia are used in predicting payload performance during launch, insertion
into orbit, and orbital operations. The parameters are determined for all configurations
to evaluate flight performance in accordance with mission requirements.
b. Balance - Hardware is balanced in accordance with mission requirements. Balance

may be achieved analytically, if necessary, with the aid of direct measurements.
(1) Procedure for Direct Measurement - The usual procedure for direct measurement
is to perform an initial balance before beginning the environmental verification
program and a final balance after completing the program. One purpose of the
initial balance is to ensure the feasibility of attaining the stipulated final balance.
A residual unbalance of not more than four times the final balance requirement
is the recommended objective of initial balance. Another reason for doing the
initial balance prior to environmental exposures is to evaluate the method of
attaching the balance weights and the effect of the weights on the operation of
the hardware during the environmental exposures. Final balance is done after
completion of all environmental testing in order to properly adjust for all changes
to weight distribution made during the verification program such as hardware
replacement or redesign.
(2) Maintaining Balance - It is recommended that changes to the hardware that may
affect weight distribution be minimized after completion of final balance. The
effects of such changes (including any disassembly, hardware substitution, etc.)
on the residual unbalance of the hardware should be assessed. That involves
sufficient dimensional measurement and mass properties determination to permit
a judgment as to whether the configuration changes have caused the residual
unbalance to exceed requirements. If so, additional balance operations may be
necessary.
(3) Correcting Unbalance - To correct unbalance, weights may be attached,

removed, or relocated. The amount of residual unbalance for all appropriate
configurations is determined and recorded for comparison with the balance
requirements of the verification specification. Balance operations include
interface, fit, and alignment checks as necessary to ensure that alignment of
geometric axes is comparable with requirements.
Balancing operations include measurement and tabulation of weights and mass

center locations (referenced to hardware coordinates) of appendages, motors,
and other elements that may not be assembled for balancing.
2.4- 38
The data is analyzed to determine unbalance contributed by such elements to

each appropriate configuration.
The facilities and procedures for balancing should be fully defined at the time of
initial balance, and sufficient exploratory balancing operations should be
performed to provide confidence that the final balance can be accomplished
satisfactorily and expeditiously.
The mass property requirements cited above apply to all flight hardware.
2.4- 39
SECTION 2.5
EMC
2.5-0
EMC____________________________________________________________________________EMI
2.5 ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) REQUIREMENTS
This section establishes interface and associated verification requirements for the control of
electromagnetic interference (EMI) emission and susceptibility characteristics of electronic,
electrical, and electromechanical equipment and subsystems designed or procured for use on
GSFC Spacecraft.
This section is intended to provide guidance to each project for creating its own dedicated
EMC Control Plan (EMCCP) or equivalent document that defines its electromagnetic
environment and its requirements that have been tailored to that environment. The project
EMCCP should be updated and maintained throughout the program.
Additional EMC documentation is provided on the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site,
maintained by Code 565, Electrical Systems Branch, GSFC:
https://spaces.gsfc.nasa.gov/display/EMCWG/Home
The GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES page includes all of the reference documents listed
in Section 2.5.1.1 as well as documentation of lessons learned from previous programs.
Organizations outside of GSFC should contact their GSFC EMC representative in order to
obtain the information available on this SPACES site.
This section of the document is organized as follows:
 Section 2.5.1 defines the general requirements, including test facility and
procedure requirements;
 Section 2.5.2 defines the detailed requirements;
 Section 2.5.3 provides an Application Guide, which includes a discussion and

rationale of the general and detailed requirements
2.5.1. General Requirements
The general requirements for EMC are as follows:
a. The payload (spacecraft) and its elements must not generate EMI that could adversely
affect its own subsystems and components, other payloads, or the safety and operation
of the launch vehicle and launch site.
b. The payload (spacecraft) and its subsystems and components should not be
susceptible to emissions that could adversely affect their safety and performance. This
applies whether the emissions are self-generated or emanate from other sources, or
whether they are intentional or unintentional.
2.5-1
EMC____________________________________________________________________________EMI
2.5.1.1 Documentation
All of the reference documents listed in this section are available on the “Documents” page
of the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
https://spaces.gsfc.nasa.gov/display/EMCWG/Home.
The EMI test requirements in this document are based primarily on the requirements and test
methods of the following document:
MIL-STD-461G Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference

Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment, 11 December
2015
As needed, this document also references requirements, test methods, and tailoring
guidelines provided in the following documents:
MIL-STD-461C Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility Requirements for

the Control of Electromagnetic Interference, 4 August 1986
MIL-STD-462, Notice 2 Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Measurement

of, 1 May 1970
MIL-STD-464C Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for

Systems, 1 December 2010
SL-E-0002, Book 3 Space Shuttle Specification, Electromagnetic Interference

Characteristics, Requirements for Equipment, 10 August 2001
AIAA S-121A-2017 Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements for Space

Equipment and Systems
(no document number) The Design, Construction and Test of Magnetically Clean
Spacecraft - A Practical Guide (Mario H. Acuña)
NASA-STD-8739.12 NASA Technical Standard for Metrology and Calibration
GPR-87390.1M Goddard Procedural Requirement - Metrology: Control of

Measuring and Test Equipment
Guidelines for grounding, bonding, and shielding are provided in the following documents:
NASA-HDBK-4001 Electrical Grounding Architecture for Unmanned Spacecraft
NASA-STD-4003 Electrical Bonding for NASA Launch Vehicles, Spacecraft,

Payloads, and Flight Equipment
MIL-HDBK-419A Grounding, Bonding, and Shielding for Electronic Equipments

and Facilities (Volumes 1 & 2, 29 December 1987)
MIL-HDBK-1857 Grounding, Bonding and Shielding Design Practices
2.5-2
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Guidelines for addressing Space Charging effects are provided in the following document:
NASA-HDBK-4002 Mitigating In-Space Charging Effects - A Guideline
Guidelines for assessing Launch Vehicle & Launch Site Electromagnetic Environments are
provided in the following document:
ELVL-2010-0042300 Electromagnetic Environments – A Guideline for Spacecraft

Launching from Eastern, Western and Pacific Ranges
Guidelines for assessing on-orbit RF environments are provided in the following document:
JSC-CR-06-070 Space Vehicle RF Environments
International Space Station (ISS) Payloads must comply with the EMI/EMC requirements
defined in the following ISS documents:
SSP 57000 Pressurized Payloads Interface Requirements Document
SSP 57003 External Payload Interface Requirements Document
SSP 30237 Space Station Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility

Requirements
SSP 30238 Space Station Electromagnetic Techniques
SSP 30240 Space Station Grounding Requirements
SSP 30242 Space Station Cable/Wire Design and Control Requirements

for Electromagnetic Compatibility
SSP 30245 Space Station Electrical Bonding Requirements
The latest versions of these documents are available on the ISS Electronic Document
Management System (EDMS):
https://iss-www.jsc.nasa.gov/nwo/apps/edms/web/EDMS-RequestAccount.shtml
2.5-3
EMC____________________________________________________________________________EMI
2.5.1.2 Requirements Overview
Requirements and tests are prescribed at the component, subsystem, and payload levels of
assembly. Not all requirements apply to all levels of assembly or to all types of payloads. The
project must select the requirements that fit the characteristics of the mission and hardware.
For example, a transmitter would require a different group of EMI tests than a receiver.
It is recommended that all flight hardware be tested at the component or subsystem level.
Tests at this level are designed to assess the risk of interference at higher levels of assembly;
as such, they are called EMI tests. The EMI test program is meant to uncover design flaws,
workmanship defects, and unit-to-unit variations. These component/subsystem level EMI
tests are the primary focus of this document.
The EMI tests are intended to verify that the design and workmanship of each component will
be compatible with its intended/predicted electromagnetic environments. All tests must
simulate the flight configuration to the extent feasible. The tests are performed to fixed levels
which are intended to envelope those that may be expected during a typical mission and allow
for some degradation of the hardware during the mission.
The levels should be tailored by the project EMC engineer(s) to accommodate mission-specific
requirements, as explicitly recommended in MIL-STD-461G Section 1.2.2:
“Application-specific environmental criteria may be derived from operational and

engineering analyses on equipment or subsystems being procured for use in specific
systems or platforms. When analyses reveal that the requirements in this standard are
not appropriate for that procurement, the requirements may be tailored and
incorporated into the request-for-proposal, specification, contract, order, and so forth,
prior to the start of the test program. The test procedures contained in this document
should be adapted by the testing activity for each application.”
Such requirements, as defined in the appropriate mission-specific documentation, may

include:
 platform-specific environments
 launch vehicle and launch site environments
 protection of sensitive detectors or instruments in the payload
 environments encountered during ground testing that may differ from expected on-
orbit environments
Thus tailored, the requirements envelope the worst-case environments encountered during all
phases of the program. However, because some payloads may have sensors and devices
that are particularly sensitive to the low-level EMI ground environment, special workaround
procedures may have to be developed in order to meet individual payload needs. Testing at
the payload, spacecraft, and observatory levels are designed to assess compatibility at these
higher levels of assembly; as such, they are called EMC tests.
2.5-4
EMC____________________________________________________________________________EMI
Historically, GEVS has addressed GSFC platforms that tend to use “one of a kind” flight
hardware developed specifically for a given mission. In such cases, it is recommended that
each “one of a kind” component be thoroughly tested at component level.
By contrast, MIL-STD-461, which GEVS uses as its point of departure, largely addresses
equipment developed for military platforms. In many cases, a vendor may be mass-producing
a component that is intended to be used on as many platforms as possible. In these cases,
testing each individual unit is impractical and cost prohibitive. One or more representative units
are selected for testing, and the remaining units are “build to print” copies that are qualified by
similarity.
Some recent GSFC programs have used multiple copies of components and/or used build-to-
print copies of components used on previous missions. On such programs, a hybrid approach
is recommended. Full testing should be performed on a representative unit, and the remaining
units should be subjected, at minimum, to the following tests:
 Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, Differential Mode (section 2.5.2.1.1)

 Conducted Emissions, Common Mode, Power and Signal Lines (section 2.5.2.1.2)*
 Conducted Susceptibility, Primary Power Leads, 30 Hz to 150 kHz (section
2.5.2.2.1)
 Conducted Susceptibility, Primary Power Leads, 150 kHz to 50 MHz (Section
2.5.2.2.4.2)
 Conducted Susceptibility, Power and Signal Cables, Common Mode, 10 kHz to 200
MHz (section 2.5.2.2.4.1)*
* For the Common Mode tests, where multiple signal cables of the same type and interface circuitry (e.g.
SpaceWire, redundant signal, etc.) exist on a particular box, only one of each representative type need be
tested.
A significant advantage is that the above tests may be performed in the component’s
development laboratory; they need not be performed in an EMI chamber.
Guidelines for defining system level EMC testing are provided in MIL-STD-464C,
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems. Such EMC testing may
include, but is not necessarily limited to, the following tests:
 Power quality
 Aggregate radiated emissions, electric field
 Aggregate radiated susceptibility, electric field
 System self-compatibility
Further details for system level EMC tests are provided in section 2.5.2.5.
Test programs at these higher levels of assembly must be developed on a case-by-case basis
according to the needs of each platform. Additional guidelines are provided on the GSFC
EMC Working Group SPACES site:
https://spaces.gsfc.nasa.gov/display/EMCWG/Home
2.5-5
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2.5.1.3 Testing at Lower Levels of Assembly
EMI testing must be performed at the component and subsystem levels of assembly, followed
by EMC testing at the payload, spacecraft, and/or observatory levels as determined by the
specific needs of the platform. In addition, it is recommended that diagnostic testing be
performed at the circuit board level to the extent feasible. If possible, such testing should be
performed at the breadboard level in order to identify and correct problems as early as possible
before finalizing the flight design.
Testing at lower levels of assembly has many advantages, including:
 Detection of problems early in the program when they are less costly to correct, less
disruptive to the program schedule, and more easily diagnosed and addressed than at
higher levels of assembly;
 Providing a baseline and troubleshooting aid that can be used to alert the project to
potential problems at higher levels of assembly
2.5.1.4 Safety and Controls
During prelaunch and prerelease checkout, sensitive detectors and hardware may require
special procedures to protect them from the damage of high-level radiated emissions. If such
procedures are needed, they should also be applied during EMI testing. Operational control
procedures should also be instituted for EMI testing during prerelease checkout to minimize
interference with other equipment as appropriate.
The requirements documented within the EMCCP and/or levied in component/sub-system

specifications represent the environment in which the equipment must function and meet its
performance requirements. All requirements will be satisfied. Spurious emissions or
susceptibilities determined non-compliant with requirements will be eliminated or reduced to
sufficient levels to satisfy original requirements with adequate margin. All data/analysis
presented for component/sub-system qualification will be subject to technical board review by
GSFC EMC engineers and evaluated for compatibility within the intended payload system.
GSFC EMC Engineering reserves the right to make final determination of qualification. Any
EUT judged non-compliant by this review board is required either to make corrective actions
or to follow the waiver process described in section 2.5.1.6.4.
2.5.1.5 Test Facility and Procedure Requirements
The test facility and procedure requirements defined in MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3 will apply
with modifications to the following requirements as discussed in the following subsections:
 Ambient electromagnetic level (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.4)
 Power source impedance (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.6)
 Construction and arrangement of EUT cables (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.8.6)
 Susceptibility testing (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.10.4)
 General test setup (MIL-STD-461G Figure 2)
2.5-6
EMC____________________________________________________________________________EMI
MIL-STD-461G also provides guidance on the following topics that do not appear in earlier
versions:
 Use of Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) receivers for emissions testing: FFT receivers
have been demonstrated to perform emissions testing significantly more quickly and
efficiently than traditional frequency swept techniques. MIL-STD-461G provides
requirements for performing FFT measurements correctly and consistently with
existing measurement techniques.
 Calibration of measuring equipment: Per MIL-STD-461G section 4.3.11, primary
measurement devices and accessories required for measurement must be calibrated
in accordance with an approved calibration program traceable to the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST). After the initial calibration passive devices such
as measurement antennas, current probes, and LISNs, require no further formal
calibration unless the device is repaired. The measurement system integrity check in
the procedures is sufficient to determine acceptability of passive devices. Further
guidance on adhering to calibration requirements is given in NASA-STD-8739.12 and
GPR 8730.1M.
Additional discussions of these requirements are provided in Section 2.5.3.2.
Any deviations from these requirements must be approved by the project EMC engineer(s)
and documented in the project EMCCP.
2.5.1.5.1 Ambient Electromagnetic Level
The ambient electromagnetic level must be measured with the EUT de-energized and all
Electrical Ground Support Equipment (EGSE) powered on. If necessary, ambient conducted
levels on power leads will be measured with the leads disconnected from the EUT and
connected to a resistive load which draws the same rated current as the EUT. The ambient
level must be verified to be at least 6 dB below the specified limits and recorded in the EMI
Test Report (EMITR) prior to performing any emissions measurements on the EUT.
These requirements override the following statement from MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.4:
“When tests are performed in a shielded enclosure and the EUT is in compliance with required
limits, the ambient profile need not be recorded in the EMITR.”
Guidelines for complying with the ambient electromagnetic level are provided in Section
2.5.3.2.1.
2.5.1.5.2 Power Source Impedance
The impedance of power sources providing input power to the EUT should be controlled by
the capacitor network shown in Figure 2.5-1 for all measurement procedures of this document
unless a given GSFC program identifies a need to use a LISN, or it is otherwise stated in a
particular test procedure. This capacitor network simulates a battery dominated power bus
typical of GSFC platforms.
For all MIL-STD-461G based test methods specified in this document, the Line Impedance
Stabilization Networks (LISNs) will be replaced by this capacitor network.
Additional discussions of power source impedance and LISNs are provided in Section
2.5.3.2.2.
2.5-7
EMC____________________________________________________________________________EMI
Figure 2.5-1. Capacitor Network Simulating Battery Dominated Bus Impedance
2.5.1.5.3 Construction and Arrangement of EUT Cables
The signal cables connecting to the EUT should comply with the requirements defined in MIL-
STD-461G Section 4.3.8.6. In particular:
 Electrical cable assemblies must simulate actual installation and usage.
 Cables should be checked against installation requirements to verify proper

construction techniques such as use of twisted pairs, shielding, and shield terminations.
 Individual leads should be grouped into cables in the same manner as in the actual
installation.
Additional discussion of construction and arrangement of EUT cables is provided in Section

2.5.3.2.3.
2.5-8
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2.5.1.5.4 Susceptibility Testing
Susceptibility testing in MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.10.4 addresses the following topics:
 Frequency scanning (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.10.4.1)
 Modulation of susceptibility signals (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.10.4.2)
 Thresholds of susceptibility (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.10.4.3)
Each of these topics will be discussed in turn below.
2.5.1.5.4.1 Frequency Scanning (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.10.4.1)
For swept frequency susceptibility testing, frequency scan rates and frequency step sizes of
signal sources should not exceed the values listed in Table 2.5-1. This table replaces MIL-
STD-461G Table III. All of the updates are in the last row as noted below.
The upper frequency for susceptibility scans is limited to 18 GHz instead of 40 GHz. The scan
from 18 – 40 GHz requires considerably more test time with little added benefit in most cases.
Scanning from 18 to 40 GHz is only required if specified in the procurement specification, and
it should be specified only if there are specific transmitters operating in that frequency range
that pose a concern.
In the 1 GHz to 18 GHz frequency range, the maximum scan rate and maximum step size are
increased by a factor of 4 over the values in MIL-STD-461G Table III. Scans in this frequency
range take a significant amount of test time; the values in Table 2.5-1 will decrease test time
while still providing sufficient frequency resolution to address susceptibility concerns in this
frequency range.
Table 2.5-1. Susceptibility Scanning (Replacement for MIL-STD-461G Table III)
Analog Scans Stepped Scans

Frequency Range
Maximum Scan Rates Maximum Step Size
30 Hz - 1 MHz 0.0333 fo/sec 0.05 fo
1 MHz – 30 MHz 0.00667 fo/sec 0.01 fo
30 MHz - 1 GHz 0.00333 fo/sec 0.005 fo
1 GHz - 18 GHz 0.00667 fo/sec 0.01 fo
2.5-9
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2.5.1.5.4.2 Thresholds of Susceptibility (MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.10.4.3)
Should an EUT fail to meet its susceptibility requirements at the full test level, the threshold(s)
of susceptibility should be determined in accordance with MIL-STD-461G procedures.
Should the supplier propose to deliver the EUT as prototype flight equipment without further
modification and re-test, sufficient test data must be gathered to support the processing of a
waiver using the program's established process. Unless deemed different by the procuring
agency (see MIL-STD-461G, Section 4.3.9.3), the following information must be provided:
 Onset of susceptibility, defined as degradation in one or more EUT performance

parameters beyond product specification limits or levels.
 EUT transition from soft upset (EUT returns to normal operation upon removal of the
immunity stimulus) to hard upset (operator intervention required to reset to normal
operation after removal of immunity stimulus), should it occur at or below the full
required susceptibility test level.
 Description of degradation of performance with full test level applied.
MIL-STD-461G specifies thresholds of susceptibility in terms of signal amplitude. It may also

be desirable to determine the threshold of susceptibility to signal modulation as follows:
 When a susceptibility condition is detected, reduce the modulation duty cycle until the
EUT recovers.
 Reduce the modulation duty cycle by an additional 10% or by half, whichever is less.
 Gradually increase the modulation duty cycle until the susceptibility condition
reoccurs. The resulting level is the threshold of susceptibility.
 Record this modulation duty cycle, frequency range of occurrence, frequency and
level of greatest susceptibility, and other test parameters, as applicable.
If there is susceptibility found at a frequency where a known modulation is used by a specific

transmitter, the threshold(s) of susceptibility should also be determined as described above
using that modulation scheme at those frequencies of interest. If the EUT is not designed to
detect phase modulation, phase modulation may be simulated using a continuous wave (CW)
signal, i.e. no modulation.
2.5-10
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2.5.1.5.5 General Test Setup
The general setup for the EMI tests in this document is shown in Figure 2.5-2. Note that the
figure is a modified version of MIL-STD-461G Figure 2, showing the LISNs replaced by the
capacitor network specified in Section 2.5.1.5.2.
The general setup for a free standing EUT in a shielded enclosure is shown in Figure 2.5-3.
Note that the figure is a modified version of MIL-STD-461G Figure 4 showing the LISNS
replaced by the capacitor network specified in Section 2.5.1.5.2.
In both cases, the signal cables should be maintained at a height of 5 cm for their entire run
to the access panel, and the power leads should be maintained at a height of 5 cm between
the EUT and the capacitor network. The power leads between the capacitor network and the
access panel should be routed immediately over the ground plane with no standoffs.
Further discussion is provided in section 2.5.3.2.3.
Figure 2.5-2. General Test Setup Diagram (Modified MIL-STD-461G Figure 2)
2.5-11
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Figure 2.5-3. General test setup for free standing EUT in shielded enclosure
(Modified MIL-STD-461G Figure 4)
2.5.1.6 Documentation Guidelines
It is strongly recommended that each project create a dedicated EMCCP, either as a stand-
alone document or as part of another project document. In addition, an EMITP and EMI
EMITR must be created for each EUT. The contents of each of these documents will be
defined in the following subsections.
2.5.1.6.1 EMC Control Plan (EMCCP)
The EMCCP should provide the following:
1) Requirements with appropriate tailoring and documentation references (e.g. GEVS,

MIL-STD-461G, etc.)
2) Management areas, including:
a. Specific organizational responsibilities, lines of authority and control, and
program planning, including milestones and schedules.
b. Role in program of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and subcontractor
items.
c. Description of the equipment or subsystem, its function, characteristics, and
intended installation.
d. Plans and procedures for identifying and resolving potential EMI problems,
implementing solutions, and verifying solutions through analysis and testing.
e. Point of contact for EMI technical issues.
2.5-12
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3) Design techniques, including:

a. Spectrum management techniques (antenna locations, patterns, operating
frequency ranges, sensitivity levels for receivers, power levels for transmitters,
etc.)
b. EMI mechanical design, including the following:
i. Type of metals, casting, finishes, and hardware employed in the design.
ii. Construction techniques, such as isolated compartments; filter mounting,
isolation of other parts; treatment of openings (ventilation ports, access
hatches, windows, metal faces and control shafts), and attenuation
characteristics of Radio Frequency (RF) gaskets used on mating surfaces.
iii. Shielding provisions and techniques used for determining shielding
effectiveness.
iv. Corrosion control procedures.
v. Methods of bonding mating surfaces, such as surface preparation and
gaskets.
4) Electrical wiring design, including cable types or characteristics, cable routing, cable
separation, grounding philosophy, and cable shielding types, transmission lines, and
termination methods.
5) Electrical and electronic circuit design, including the following:
a. Filtering techniques, technical reasons for selecting types of filters, and
associated filter characteristics, including attenuation and line-to-ground
capacitance values of AC and DC power line filters.
b. Part location and separation for reducing EMI.
c. Location, shielding, and isolation of critical circuits.
6) Analysis. The EMCCP will provide analysis results demonstrating how each applicable
requirement is going to be met.
7) Developmental testing. The EMCCP will include a discussion of testing to be performed
during development (such as evaluations of breadboards, prototypes, and engineering
models).
2.5-13
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2.5.1.6.2 EMI Test Procedure (EMITP)
The EMITP describes the measurement procedures that will be used to demonstrate that the
EUT complies with its contractual EMI requirements defined in the project EMCCP (based on
this document), including how the general test procedures will be applied to the specific
equipment or subsystem.
The EMITP should be provided for review by the project EMC engineer(s) and the EMI test
facility at least 2 weeks prior to the start of EMI tests in order to verify adequate specification
of test requirements and procedures; ensure that all required test equipment is available and
to give the test facility adequate time to prepare.
The project should provide the following information to be included in the EMITP (may be in
the form of a test plan provided to the EMI test facility at least 6 weeks prior to the scheduled
start date of the tests):
1) Documentation references (e.g. project EMCCP, GEVS, MIL-STD-461G, etc.).

2) A table describing all the tests to be performed, the applicable section within the EMITP
(or test plan), the corresponding test procedure from this document or MIL-STD-461G,
and any associated tailoring of the limits and/or test methods.
3) Description of the EUT, including its function, characteristics, intended installation, and
power usage.
4) Description of platform’s power distribution architecture and definition of capacitor
network or LISN to be used for tests.
5) Approved exceptions or deviations from contractual test requirements, if any.
6) EUT setup. A description and diagram of the EUT test setup for each test should cover
the following:
a. Physical layout of the cables and EUT (see Figure 2.5-2).
b. Cable types, characteristics, and construction details (see Section 2.5.1.5.3 of
this document)
c. Interface at chamber penetration, e.g. bulkhead feedthrough connectors, stuffing
tube, etc.
d. Position of the capacitor network/LISN on the ground plane.
e. Use of bond straps and loads.
f. Test simulation and monitoring equipment.
7) EUT operation. A description of the EUT operation should cover the following:
a. Modes of operation for each test, including operating frequencies (where
applicable), and rationale for selection.
b. Control settings on the EUT.
c. Control settings on any test stimulation and monitoring equipment and
characteristics of input signals.
d. Operating frequencies (such as oscillator and clock frequencies) which may be
expected to approach limits.
e. Performance checks initiated to designate the equipment as meeting minimal
working standard requirements.
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f. Enumeration of circuits, outputs, or displays to be monitored during susceptibility

testing, including the specific definition of acceptance criteria for monitoring the
functional degradation of performance during exposure to an electromagnetic
disturbance.
g. Description of longest machine cycle or response time of critical circuits; used for
defining dwell time for susceptibility tests
The EMI Test Facility will provide the following information for the EMITP:
1) Test site description, covering the following:
a. Test facility and shielded enclosure or anechoic chamber, including size,
characteristics (e.g. shielding effectiveness), and placement of radio frequency
(RF) absorbers.
b. Description of feedthrough filters, if used, at chamber feedthrough panel
c. Ground plane (size and type) and methods of grounding or bonding the EUT to
the ground plane to simulate actual equipment installation.
d. Implementation of test facility and procedure requirements as specified in Section
2.5.1.5 of this document
2) Test instrumentation. Test instrumentation to be used should be described as follows:
a. Equipment nomenclature.
b. Characteristics of coupling transformers and band-reject filters.
c. Antenna factors of specified antennas, transfer impedances of current probes,
and LISN impedance(s), if used.
d. Description of the operations being directed by software for computer-controlled
instrumentation, the verification techniques used to demonstrate proper
performance of the software, and the specific versions of the software to be used.
In addition, sweep times, correction factors and how are they used, how final
data are determined and presented, and an audit trail that provides details on
what part of the software controls each function should be described.
e. Bandwidth (resolution and video) and scanning speeds of measurement
receivers.
f. Modulation characteristics and scan rates of the susceptibility test signals.
3) Measurements. The following should be described for each test.
a. Block diagram depicting test setup, including all pertinent dimensions.
b. Step-by-step procedures.
c. Test equipment used in performance of the test and the methods of grounding,
bonding, or achieving electrical isolation of the measurement instrumentation.
d. Selection of measurement frequencies.
Information to be recorded during the test, including frequency and units of recorded
information. Sample data sheets, test logs and graphs, including test limits, may be shown.
2.5-15
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2.5.1.6.3 EMI Test Report (EMITR)
The EMITR provides the data and information necessary to evaluate compliance of the EUT
with its EMI control requirements based on the project EMCCP, including the discussion of
recommended corrective actions, if needed.
The EMITR should provide the following:
1) Documentation references (e.g. project EMCCP, EMITP, GEVS, MIL-STD-461G, etc.).

2) Administrative data. The EMITR typically contains an administrative section covering
the following:
a. Contract number.
b. Authentication and certification of performance of the tests by a qualified
representative of the procuring activity.
c. Disposition of the EUT.
d. Description of the EUT, including its function, characteristics, intended
installation, actual cable types (characteristics and construction details - see
Section 2.5.1.5.3 of this document and Figure 2.5-2), and electrical current usage
on each power input line.
e. List of tests performed with pass/fail indications.
f. Any approved deviations from contractual test procedures or limits previously
authorized.
g. Identification of Non-Developmental Items (NDI) and Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) that may be part of the EUT.
h. Traceability of test equipment calibration.
i. A reference to the approved EMITP.
3) Detailed results. A separate appendix should be prepared for each test. If deviations
from an approved test procedure occurred during the test program, an additional
appendix should be provided with the “as run” procedures showing all red-lines and
procuring activity concurrence. A separate appendix should be provided for log sheets.
Each test appendix should contain the following factual data:
a. Test equipment nomenclature, serial numbers, version of software used (if any),
and calibration due date.
b. Photographs or diagrams of the actual test set up and EUT, with identification.
c. Transfer impedance of current probes.
d. Antenna factors.
e. LISN impedance(s), if used.
f. Identification of any suppression devices used to meet the contractual
requirements, including schematics, performance data, and drawings.
g. Sample calculations, such as conversions of measured levels for comparison
against the applicable limit.
h. The ambient radiated and conducted electromagnetic emission profile of the test
facility, when necessary.
2.5-16
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i. Data, and data presentation, as specified in the “data presentation” sections of

the individual test procedures of MIL-STD-461. Emissions data cannot be
provided on one single sheet (plot). Provide a minimum frequency resolution of
1% or twice the measurement receiver bandwidth, whichever is less stringent,
and a minimum amplitude resolution of 1 dB for each plot. Data files for specified
scans should be provided upon request in a standardized electronic format.
j. Scan speeds.
k. Measurement receiver bandwidths.
l. Antenna polarization.
m. Power line voltages, frequencies, and power factor.
n. Low-noise amplifiers (LNA) compression points.
o. Test susceptibilities and deviations from normal performance are not acceptable.
However, when susceptibility indications or deviations from normal performance
are noted in the EUT operation, a threshold level should be determined where
the susceptible condition or deviation is no longer present. These thresholds
need to be documented for further assessment.
4) Conclusions and recommendations, including results of the tests in brief narrative form,
a discussion of any remedial actions already initiated, and proposed corrective
measures required (if necessary) to assure compliance of the equipment or subsystem
with the contractual EMI requirements.
2.5.1.6.4 Waiver Requests
Each non-compliance to project level EMC requirements must be brought to the project to be
assessed for corrective actions needed to eliminate the non-compliance and for potential
impacts to the program. If the technical impacts to the platform are determined to be
acceptable, the non-compliance must be submitted as a waiver request against the
appropriate project level EMC requirements documents. If the board determines that the risk
of the non-compliance is acceptable to the program and that the EUT does not require
corrective action, then the waiver request will be granted.
Each waiver request should contain:
1) Documentation references (e.g. project EMCCP, EMITP, EMITR, GEVS, MIL-STD-

461G, etc.).
2) Identification of specific requirement(s) affected.
3) Detailed technical description of non-compliance, including:
a. Identification of the source
b. Detailed description of potential approach to fix or mitigate the non-compliance.
4) Assessment of the cost, schedule impact and any other impacts to the program (e.g.,
mass and space allocations) due to implementing, or not implementing, the fix.
2.5-17
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Table 2.5-2. EMI Requirements Summary
MIL-STD-461G GEVS Tailoring

Test Description
Designator Limit(s) Test Method
Conducted Emissions, Power Leads,
CE101 tailored DM
30 Hz to 150 kHz
Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, CE03 (DM)
CE102 tailored
150 kHz to 50 MHz (MIL-STD-462 Test Method)
Conducted Emissions, Common Mode, Power and

no equivalent new new
Signal Lines
Conducted Emissions, Turn-on Transients no equivalent new new
Conducted Emissions, Antenna Terminal CE106 tailored no change
alternate method
Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads CS101 tailored
available
Conducted Susceptibility, Antenna Port,
CS103 tailored no change
Intermodulation
Conducted Susceptibility, Antenna Port, Rejection of
Undesired Signals
Conducted Susceptibility, Antenna Port, Cross-
CS105 not applied not applied
Modulation
Conducted Susceptibility, Transients, Power Leads N/A CS06 CS06

(MIL-STD-462 Test Method)
Conducted Susceptibility, Structure Current CS109 not applied not applied
Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection, 10

kHz to 200 MHz
Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection,
CS115 no change no change
Impulse Excitation
Conducted Susceptibility, Damped Sinusoidal applied on case-by-case applied on case-by-case
CS116
Transients basis basis
Conducted Susceptibility, Lightning Induced applied on case-by-case applied on case-by-case
CS117
Transients basis basis
applied on case-by-case applied on case-by-case
Personnel Borne Electrostatic Discharge CS118
basis basis
alternate method
Radiated Emissions, Magnetic Field RE101 tailored available (RE04)
(MIL-STD-462 Test Method)
alternate methods
Radiated Emissions, Electric Field RE102 tailored
available
Radiated Emissions, Antenna Spurious and Harmonic
RE103 not applied not applied
Outputs
Radiated Susceptibility, Magnetic Field RS101 tailored no change
Radiated Susceptibility, Electric Field RS103 tailored tailored

Radiated Susceptibility, Transient Electromagnetic
RS105 not applied not applied
Field
2.5-18
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2.5.2. Detailed Requirements
The EMI requirements are divided into four categories: Conducted Emissions (CE), Conducted
Susceptibility (CS), Radiated Emissions (RE), and Radiated Susceptibility (RS). Table 2.5-2
provides the summary list of specific requirements defined in this document. For each
requirement, the equivalent MIL-STD-461G designator is identified, and GEVS tailoring of the
limit(s) and/or test method is indicated.
The details of the requirements are provided in the following subsections.
2.5.2.1 Conducted Emissions Requirements
Conducted emission requirements on power leads, signal leads, and antenna terminals should
be applied to payload and spacecraft hardware as defined in the following subsections.
2.5.2.1.1 Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, Differential Mode
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to equipment power leads, including returns, that
operate from a spacecraft primary power bus that may be shared with other loads.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to limit the conducted emissions from the EUT
in order to control load-induced effects on power quality.
Test method: From 30 Hz to 150 kHz, the basic MIL-STD-461G CE101 test method will apply
with the send and return wires run through the current probe for a differential mode (DM)
measurement as shown in Figure 2.5-4 and Figure 2.5-5. The current probe must be placed
within 5 cm of the capacitor network as shown in the figures.
From 150 kHz to 50 MHz, the test method shown in Figure 2.5-4 and Figure 2.5-5 shall apply
using a current probe that is suited to the higher frequency range. This is effectively the basic
MIL-STD-462 CE03 test method with the send and return wires run through the current probe
for a DM measurement.
Limit: The DM current emissions limits are shown in Figure 2.5-6. Because the (DM) test
method measures twice the true DM current (6 dB above the true value), the measured limit
must be set 6 dB above the true maximum DM current.
The default limit (blue curve) is for loads with a steady state current of 1 Amp DC or less. The
low frequency plateau shifts upward for higher currents by adding a factor of 20*log(load
current in Amperes). Example curves corresponding to load currents of 3 A rms and 10 A rms
are shown.
Further discussion of the limit and test method are provided in section 2.5.3.3.1.
2.5-19
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Figure 2.5-4. Conducted Emissions Test Setup (Schematic) - Differential Mode
Figure 2.5-5. Conducted Emissions Test Setup (Physical Layout) – Differential Mode
2.5-20
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Figure 2.5-6. Conducted Emissions Differential Mode Limits
2.5-21
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2.5.2.1.2 Conducted Emissions, Common Mode, Power and Signal Lines
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to power and signal cables.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to limit the common mode conducted emissions
(CMCE) from bulk cables in order to protect against cable-to-cable crosstalk. This requirement
is intended to be a companion to the Common Mode Conducted Susceptibility requirement
(CS114).
Limit: There is no MIL-STD-461G equivalent for this requirement.
The default limit is 50 dBµA from 10 kHz to 200 MHz as shown by the dark blue and red lines
in Figure 2.5-7. If the platform’s magnetic requirements necessitate control of common mode
currents below 10 kHz, it may be desirable to extend the limit down to 30 Hz as shown by the
light blue dashed line.
Discussion of this limit and tailoring guidelines are provided in Section 2.5.3.3.2.
Figure 2.5-7. Common Mode Conducted Emissions Default Limit
2.5-22
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Test Method: There is no MIL-STD-461G equivalent for this requirement.
The test method from 30 Hz to 10 kHz (if necessary) is essentially the same as the tailored
CE101 test method discussed in section 2.5.2.1.1, except that 1) the upper frequency limit is
10 kHz, and 2) the current probe is placed around each individual bulk cable under test for a
common mode measurement as shown in Figure 2.5-8 for power cables and Figure 2.5-9 for
signal leads. Because the wavelengths at these frequencies are significantly longer than the
cables, the current is uniform along the length and the position of the current probe along the
length of the cable is not crucial.
The test method from 10 kHz to 30 MHz is essentially the same as the tailored CE03 test
methods discussed in section 2.5.2.1.1, except that 1) the lower frequency limit is 10 kHz, and
2) the current probe is placed around each individual bulk cable under test for a common mode
measurement as shown in FIgure 2.5-9 or around both power leads as shown in Figure 2.5-
8. Also, the measurement is performed only to 30 MHz. In the upper end of this frequency
range, the cable will be “electrically long” (i.e. a significant fraction of a wavelength), and the
current distribution along the cable will not be constant due to standing waves. As discussed
in detail in section 2.5.3.3.2, the peak current will occur at the load end of the cable for power
leads and shielded cables. For unshielded cables and cables with unterminated shields, the
peak current may occur at different points along the line.
For the test cable configuration, that means that the current probe should be placed as close
to the access panel as possible, as shown in Figure 2.5-9, in order to catch the peak level at
these frequencies.
For CMCE measurements on power cables, the current probe should be placed adjacent to
the capacitor network as shown in Figure 2.5-8 (as it is for the differential mode
measurements).
The test method from 30 MHz to 200 MHz is adapted from the alternate RE102 test method
below 200 MHz for Bulk Cable Emission (BCE) defined in SL-E-0002, Space Shuttle
Specification, Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Requirements for Equipment.
The basic test setup is shown in Figure 2.5-10 and it uses an absorbing clamp instead of a
standard current probe.
As discussed in detail in section 2.5.3.3.2, the absorbing clamp is particularly effective on

longer cables, and it is most effective on EUTs with a single cable. In particular, it should be
used for the 2-meter primary power cables and the signal cables connecting to the access
panel. A typical length for the signal cables is approximately 4 meters, i.e. 2 meters running
along the front edge of the ground plane in addition to approximately 2 meters to the access
panel.
For cables longer than 4 meters, it may be desirable to extend the lower frequency limit of the
absorbing clamp measurements down to 10 MHz.
If CMCE measurements are desired on shorter cables connecting between different portions
of the EUT (e.g. a setup that includes multiple electronics boxes with cables connecting
between them), the absorbing clamp is less effective and less practical. In many cases, the
layout of such cables may not allow sufficient room for the absorbing clamp, and a standard
current probe must be used.
2.5-23
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As discussed above and in section 2.5.3.3.2, for the typical situation of shielded cables
terminated at both ends and equipment enclosures with class R bonds to structure (ground
plane), the current probe should be placed at the load end (opposite to the signal source) of a
properly terminated shielded cable in order to capture the peak current at all frequencies. If
signal sources are connected at both ends of the cable, measurements should be taken at
both ends.
For unshielded cables and cables with unterminated shields, the peak current may occur at
different points along the line. For such cables, the current should be measured with the
current probe located at least every tenth wavelength at the highest frequency of interest. At
30 MHz, λ/10 = 1 meter; at 200 MHz, λ/10 = 15 cm. For cables up to 1 meter in length, only
two positions are required, i.e. at each end of the cable. For cables longer than 1 meter, it
should be possible to insert the absorbing clamp to perform the measurement in a single
location, which will be more efficient than measurements with the current probe in multiple
locations.
A detailed discussion of current distribution along the cable, the absorbing clamp, and this test
method is provided in Section 2.5.3.3.2.
Figure 2.5-8. CMCE Test Setup, Modified CE101/CE03 Test Methods, Power Leads
2.5-24
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Figure 2.5-9. CMCE Test Setup, Modified CE101/CE03 Test Methods, Signal Cables
Figure 2.5-10. CMCE Test Setup, Absorbing Clamp Method
2.5-25
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2.5.2.1.3 Conducted Emissions, Time Domain, Transients
Applicability: This requirement applies to the following:
1) Turn-on transients generated by equipment that is connected to the spacecraft primary

power bus through an external relay, solid-state switch or circuit breaker located in the
bus power system.
2) Operational transients generated by equipment that enables and disables secondary
loads (e.g. secondary power converters, motors, reaction wheels, cryocoolers, etc.)
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that equipment inrush current due to
turn-on and operational transients will neither adversely affect the power bus nor overstress
its circuit protection device (e.g. fuse).
Limit: There is no MIL-STD-461G equivalent for this requirement. The default limit is shown
in Figure 2.5-13 and is described as follows:
The peak inrush current caused by turn-on or operational transient should not exceed
1000% of the unit peak operational current for the first 10 microseconds after the start
of the transient, should not exceed 300% of the unit peak operational current from 10
microseconds to 20 milliseconds after the start of the transient, and should return to
peak operational current within 20 milliseconds of the start of the transient. The
requirement should be met when the unit input voltage is the maximum steady-state
operational voltage of the unit.
The default limit must be compared against the characteristics of the specific circuit protection
device(s) used on the platform and tailored as necessary. Additional discussion is provided
in Section 2.5.3.3.3.
It is recommended that the inrush current measurement be repeated at payload and/or

spacecraft level as part of each unit’s integration procedure.
2.5-26
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Figure 2.5-11. Inrush Current Transient Default Limit
Test Method: There is no MIL-STD-461G equivalent for this requirement.
The basic test setup using a current probe is shown in Figure 2.5-12; an alternate test setup
that measures the voltage drop across a series resistor is shown in Figure 2.5-13. It is
recommended that the series resistor be placed in series with the return (-) lead in order to
minimize the DC common mode potential.
Given that this is a time domain measurement, a current probe must be selected that has a
flat transfer impedance at least from 20 Hz to 1 MHz in order to ensure accurate reproductions
of waveforms with a resolution of approximately 1 microsecond.
EUT Test Procedure:
1) Configure the test equipment as shown in Figure 2.5-12 if using the current probe
method or Figure 2.5-13 if using the series resistor method.
2) Set up oscilloscope initially as defined in the calibration procedure with the time scale
set to 50 µs/div for the first sweep.
3) Energize switch and record waveform of turn-on transient. If entire waveform is not
recorded on-screen, due to either amplitude or duration, readjust vertical sensitivity
and/or horizontal time base as necessary to yield on-screen trace.
4) Perform additional sweeps with the oscilloscope time scale set to 500 µs/div and 2
ms/div.
5) Repeat measurement for all operational transients in addition to the turn-on transient.
When making multiple inrush measurements, ensure that test sample power supply
filters have time to adequately discharge between measurements.
2.5-27
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Data presentation:
Data should be presented in the form of a print out or screen dump of actual
oscilloscope display, both for calibration and actual test waveforms. Entire waveform
should be displayed from one division before turn-on event to complete return to
nominal conditions.
Additional procedure details and discussions are provided in Section 2.5.3.3.2.
2.5.2.1.4 Conducted Emissions, Antenna Terminal
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to the antenna terminals of RF transmitters,

receivers, and amplifiers.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that emissions from the EUT do not
interfere with other antenna-connected receivers on the platform.
Limit and Test Method: MIL-STD-461G CE106 limits and test method shall apply in frequency
bands used by other antenna-connected receivers on the platform. For most GSFC platforms,
this will consist of frequencies above 200 MHz (see section 2.5.2.3.2, RE102).
2.5-28
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Figure 2.5-12. Inrush Current Emissions Test Setup (Current Probe)
Figure 2.5-13. Inrush Current Emissions Alternate Test Setup (Series Resistor)
2.5-29
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2.5.2.2 Conducted Susceptibility Requirements
Conducted susceptibility requirements on power leads, signal leads, and antenna terminals
shall be applied to payload and spacecraft hardware as defined in the following subsections.
2.5.2.2.1 Conducted Susceptibility, Primary Power Leads
Applicability: This requirement is applicable from 30 Hz to 150 kHz for DC input power leads,
not including returns.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to verify the ability of the EUT to withstand voltage
ripple on the spacecraft primary power bus.
Limit: The EUT shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of performance, or deviation
from specified indications, beyond the tolerances indicated in the individual equipment or
subsystem specification, when subjected to a test signal with voltage levels as specified in
Figure 2.5-14.
If the pre-calibration method is used, the requirement is also met when the power source is
adjusted to dissipate the power level shown in Figure 2.5-15 in a 0.5 Ω load and the EUT is
not susceptible.
If the direct current monitor/control method is used, the requirement is also met if 1 Vrms
cannot be established, but 4 Arms is injected without malfunction, degradation of performance,
or deviation from specified indications, beyond the tolerances indicated in the individual
equipment or subsystem specification.
As discussed in section 2.5.3.3.4, the 4 Arms short-circuit current level corresponds to the
default power limit in Figure 2.5-15. If a different current limit is preferred, it must be approved
by the project EMC engineer(s) and documented in the project EMCCP.
Test method: The general setup shown in Figure 2.5-16 may be applied. This setup is largely
based on the MIL-STD-461G CS101 test method.
An alternate test method is shown in Figure 2.5-17. Instead of performing the pre-calibration
to the specified power limit, the injected current is directly monitored and controlled to a not-
to-exceed short-circuit current level of 4 A.
NOTE: Whichever test method is used, the potential across the EUT must be monitored with
a differential voltage probe as shown in Figures 2.5-14 and 2.5-15. A standard probe will
connect the EUT’s return lead to the oscilloscope’s chassis, providing an undesirable
additional grounding path that may adversely affect the measurement.
CAUTION!!! When using any variation of the standard CS101 test method, the power
amplifier driving the coupling transformer (shown in MIL-STD-461G Figure CS101-4) MUST
be powered up and allowed to stabilize prior to applying power to the EUT. Failure to do so
has been demonstrated to cause instability and damage to EUTs.
Further discussion of the CS101 limits, test methods, and tailoring guidelines are provided in
Section 2.5.3.3.2. The requirement for conducted susceptibility on power leads from 150 kHz
to 200 MHz is defined in section 2.5.2.2.4.2 (CS114 test method).
2.5-30
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Figure 2.5-14. Conducted Susceptibility Voltage Limit, (30 Hz to 150 kHz)
Figure 2.5-15. Conducted Susceptibility Power Limit (30 Hz to 150 kHz)
2.5-31
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Figure 2.5-16. General CS101 Test Setup
Figure 2.5-17. Alternate CS101 Test Method With Direct Current Monitoring
2.5-32
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2.5.2.2.2 Conducted Susceptibility, Antenna Terminals
Applicability: These requirements are applicable to antenna terminals of radio frequency (RF)
receivers as specified in the individual procurement specification.
Purpose: The purpose of these requirements is to verify that the EUT rejects out-of-band RF
signals from other antenna-connected transmitters on the platform.
Limit and Test Methods: MIL-STD-461G CS103 (intermodulation) and CS104 (rejection of
undesired signals) limits and test methods shall be applied. Where appropriate, testing may
be limited to specific frequency bands used by antenna-connected systems on the spacecraft
and launch vehicle.
Additional guidelines for defining mission-specific limits and test methods are provided on the
GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
https://spaces.gsfc.nasa.gov/display/EMCWG/Home.
2.5.2.2.3 Conducted Susceptibility, Transients, Power Leads
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to equipment operating from spacecraft primary

power. It applies only to equipment operating from buses where equipment may be switched
on and off the bus at full potential. This requirement does not apply to platforms where all
loads are hardwired to the bus without a switch and are first energized as the bus is energized.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to verify the ability of the EUT to withstand
transients coupled onto its input power leads. Such transients include:
 Negative transients, which are generally due to equipment being switched onto the bus,
in which the bus is pulled instantaneously to near zero-volt potential and returns to
nominal potential after a recovery time. Such transients are common to all platforms.
 Positive transients, which are generally associated with a back electromotive force
(emf) from a rapidly changing inductive load (e.g. motor).
Limit: The limit is shown in Figure 2.5-18. This is the negative version of the CS06 waveform
defined by MIL-STD-461C. The pulse shall be applied at a minimum of once per second for
one minute.
For all platforms, the negative transient shall be applied. For platforms that include rapidly
changing inductive loads that are expected to generate significant back emf onto the bus, the
positive transient shall be applied as well.
Test Method: The MIL-STD-462 CS06 test method may be applied as shown in Figure 2.5-
19 and Figure 2.5-20. The series injection setup is recommended for most applications; for
higher power loads, the parallel injection setup may be used. Note that if the parallel method
is used, the standard source impedance capacitors should be removed in order to avoid
loading down the CS06 generator.
Section 2.5.3.3.3 provides further discussion of the CS06 limit and test method.
2.5-33
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Figure 2.5-18. Conducted Susceptibility Transient Waveform
Figure 2.5-19. Conducted Transient Susceptibility Test Setup – Series Injection
2.5-34
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Figure 2.5-20. Conducted Transient Susceptibility Test Setup – Parallel Injection
2.5-35
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2.5.2.2.4 Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection, 10 kHz to 200 MHz
2.5.2.2.4.1 Conducted Susceptibility, Power and Signal Cables, Common Mode
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to all interconnecting power and signal cables.
common mode currents coupled onto its interface cables. This requirement is intended to be
a companion to the Common Mode Conducted Emissions Requirement defined in Section
2.5.2.1.2 in order to mitigate the risk of crosstalk. In many cases, this requirement can replace
Electric Field Radiated Susceptibility below 200 MHz.
Limit: The EUT shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of performance, or deviation
from specified indications beyond the tolerances indicated in the individual equipment or
subsystem specification, when subjected to an injection probe drive level which has been pre-
calibrated to the GEVS current limit shown in Figure 2.5-21 and is modulated as specified in
MIL-STD-461G.
Requirements are also met if the EUT is not susceptible at forward power levels sensed by
the directional coupler that are below those determined during calibration provided that the
actual current induced in the cable under test is 76 dBμA, i.e. 6 dB higher than the level in the
plateau portion of the curve, over the entire frequency range, as shown by the red dashed
curve in Figure 2.5-21. (This is the injection method specified by MIL-STD-461G, which is
different from the method specified by MIL-STD-461F. This is discussed further in section
2.5.3.3.6).
The default limit in Figure 2.5-21 is defined to correspond with the default Radiated
Susceptibility on-orbit limit of 2 V/m as defined in section 2.5.2.4.2. If a more stringent on-orbit
limit is expected, the limit must be tailored accordingly.
Test Method: The MIL-STD-461G CS114 test method for common mode injection shall apply
from 10 kHz to 200 MHz.
Additional discussion of the CS114 limit and test method is provided in section 2.5.3.3.6.
2.5-36
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Figure 2.5-21. Common Mode Conducted Susceptibility Current Limits
2.5-37
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2.5.2.2.4.2 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, 150 kHz to 50 MHz
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to equipment operating from spacecraft primary

power.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to verify the ability of the EUT to withstand ripple
on the spacecraft primary power bus.
Limit, Primary: The EUT shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of performance, or
deviation from specified indications beyond the tolerances indicated in the individual
equipment or subsystem specification, when its primary power lead is subjected to the injected
potential limit shown in Figure 2.5-22 that is modulated as specified in MIL-STD-461G.
Prior to injection onto the EUT, the injection signal must be pre-calibrated using the MIL-STD-
461G CS114 test method to the current limit shown in Figure 2.5-23. This current limit is
equivalent to an injected potential of 1 Vrms into the 100 Ω in the CS114 calibration fixture.
Discussion of the CS114 limit and test method are provided in section 2.5.3.3.6.
Requirements are also met if the source cannot establish the required level at the EUT and
the EUT is not susceptible at the forward power levels determined during pre-calibration.
Limit, Alternate: The EUT shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of performance, or
deviation from specified indications beyond the tolerances indicated in the individual
equipment or subsystem specification, when its primary power lead is subjected to an injection
probe drive level which has been pre-calibrated to the limit shown by the blue curve in Figure
2.5-22 and that is modulated as specified in MIL-STD-461G.
The maximum allowable injected current levels are shown by the dashed red curve in Figure
2.5-23. Requirements are also met if the EUT is not susceptible at current levels that are below
these levels provided that the forward power levels sensed by the directional coupler are equal
to the pre-calibrated levels.
Conducted Susceptibility on power leads from 30 Hz to 150 kHz is addressed in Section

2.5.2.2.1.
Additional discussion of the CS114 limit and test method are provided in section 2.5.3.3.6.
2.5-38
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Figure 2.5-22. Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, 150 kHz to 50 MHz Voltage Limit
Figure 2.5-23. Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, 150 kHz to 50 MHz Current Limits
2.5-39
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Test Method, Primary: If the voltage limit shown in Figure 2.5-22 is applied, a modified version
of the MIL-STD-461G CS114 test method for injection onto power leads should be applied
(per MIL-STD-461G section 5.13.3.4.c) as shown in Figure 2.5-24. This test method directly
monitors the injected potential into the EUT instead of the current, as specified in the MIL-
STD-461G test method.
In principle, this test method is similar to the MIL-STD-462 CS02 test method with the
capacitive coupler replaced with the inductive injection probe.
The differential voltage probe must be placed < 30 cm from the EUT, and the injection probe
must be placed < 30 cm from the voltage probe as shown in Figure 2.5-20. This places both
probes within λ/10 of the EUT at the upper frequency limit of 50 MHz. These are upper limits
on these distances; the probes may be placed as close to the EUT as possible.
Note that this test method requires a dedicated power interface cable that allows for the
connection of the differential probe at this point.
Figure 2.5-24. Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads Test Setup
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Test Method, Alternate: If the alternate current limit shown in Figure 2.5-23 is applied directly,
the common mode injection on the power leads MUST be performed first. Due to the nature
of injecting on individual power leads as described below, the injection is a combination of
common mode and differential mode. If susceptibilities are observed at the same frequencies
and with similar signatures to those observed during common mode injection, then they are
likely common mode susceptibilities. If different susceptibilities are observed, they are likely
differential mode susceptibilities and may be addressed accordingly.
The MIL-STD-461G CS114 test method for injection onto power leads should be applied (per
MIL-STD-461G section 5.13.3.4.c) with the following modifications:
 Replace the LISN with the capacitor network described in section 2.5.1.6.2 and as
shown in Figure 2.5-24.
 Place the monitor probe < 30 cm from the EUT, and place the injection probe < 30 cm
of the monitor probe as shown in Figure 2.5-25. This places both probes within λ/10 of
the EUT at the upper frequency limit of 50 MHz. These are upper limits on these
distances; the probes may be placed as close to the EUT as possible.
 Perform the scan on each of the high and return leads from 150 kHz to 50 MHz.
Figure 2.5-25. Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads Test Setup, Alternate Method
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2.5.2.2.5 Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection, Impulse Excitation
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to interconnecting power and signal cables that
may be subjected to impulse signals.
Purpose: This test procedure is used to verify the ability of the EUT to withstand impulse
signals coupled onto EUT associated cabling. This test may be used to provide time domain
information in addition to the frequency domain information provided by the tailored CS114
test described in the previous section. The basic concern is to protect equipment from fast rise
and fall time transients that may be present due to platform switching operations and external
transient environments such as lightning, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), space charging, and
electrostatic discharge (ESD).
Test Method: The MIL-STD-461G CS115 test method shall apply for common mode injection
only. Individual power leads need not be broken out, because GSFC platforms do not use
platform structure for return.
Limit: The CS115 impulse defined in MIL-STD-461G may be applied. This waveform is
reproduced in Figure 2.5-26. If a susceptibility is observed, the threshold may be determined
as a function of repetition rate as well as amplitude.
The specific definition of what constitutes a “susceptibility” must be determined on a case-by-

case basis for each interface. For example, while a digital command/data interface (e.g.
SpaceWire) may be temporarily interrupted, the communication protocol should be robust
enough to restore the link as quickly as possible and to keep any resulting data loss within
acceptable limits. In such cases in which the response to the CS115 stimulus is temporary
and normal operations are restored within an acceptable time limit after the stimulus is
removed, the response should be noted, but it need not necessarily be indicated as a
“susceptibility” or a “failure.”
< 2 ns < 2 ns
90%
> 30 ns
4
REPETITION RATE = 30 Hz
Current (Amperes)
10%
0
Time (nanoseconds)
Figure 2.5-26. CS115 Default Limit
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2.5.2.2.6 Conducted Susceptibility, Damped Sinusoidal Transients, Cables and Power Leads
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to all interconnecting power and signal cables
that may be subjected to damped sinusoidal transients. The need for this test must be
determined on a case-by-case basis for each platform.
Purpose: This test procedure is used to verify the ability of the EUT to withstand damped
sinusoidal transients coupled onto EUT associated cables and power leads.
Test Method: MIL-STD-461G CS116 test method shall apply.
Limit: The CS116 limit defined in MIL-STD-461G may be applied.
2.5.2.2.7 Conducted Susceptibility, Lightning Induced Transients, Cables and Power Leads
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to all safety-critical equipment interconnecting

cables, including complete power cables, and individual high side power leads. It is also
applicable to non-safety critical equipment with interconnecting cables/electrical interfaces
that are part of or connected to equipment performing safety critical functions. It may be
applicable to equipment performing non-safety critical functions when specified by the
procuring activity. The need for this test must be determined on a case-by-case basis for each
platform.
Purpose: This test procedure is used to verify the ability of the EUT to withstand lightning
transients coupled onto EUT associated cables and power leads.
2.5.2.2.8 Personnel Borne Electrostatic Discharge
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to electrical, electronic, and electromechanical

subsystems and equipment that may be subjected to electrostatic discharge (ESD). The need
for this test must be determined on a case-by-case basis for each platform.
Purpose: This test procedure is used to verify the ability of the EUT to withstand electrostatic
discharge (ESD) in a powered-up configuration.
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2.5.2.3 Radiated Emissions Requirements
2.5.2.3.1 Radiated Emissions, Magnetic Field
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to equipment on platforms using devices that are
inherently susceptible to magnetic fields either by design or because they process very low-
level signals.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to verify that the magnetic field emissions from
the EUT and its associated electrical interfaces do not exceed specified requirements.
Test Method: MIL-STD-461G RE101 test method, which measures the magnetic field at a
distance of 7 cm from the EUT, may be applied. For some platforms, it may be desirable to
also measure the magnetic field at a distance of 1 m from the EUT as specified by the RE04
test method from MIL-STD-462, Notice 2. The 1 m measurement should be performed with a
sensor with comparable sensitivity and frequency range to that of the most sensitive potential
victim on the platform.
Limit: The limit must be defined and tailored in order to protect equipment on the platform with
known sensitivities to magnetic fields. For platforms using such equipment, it is recommended
that the project create and maintain a Magnetics Control Plan that defines its magnetic
environment and its requirements that have been tailored to that environment. The project
may elect to include the Magnetics Control Plan as part of its EMCCP or provide it as a
separate document. This plan should be updated and maintained throughout the program.
Guidelines for defining magnetic requirements are provided in “The Design, Construction and
Test of Magnetically Clean Spacecraft - A Practical Guide (Mario H. Acuña).”
2.5.2.3.2 Radiated Emissions, Electric Field
Applicability: This requirement is applicable for radiated emissions from equipment and
subsystem enclosures, all interconnecting cables, and antennas designed to be permanently
mounted to EUTs (receivers and transmitters in standby mode). The requirement does not
apply at the transmitter fundamental frequencies and the necessary occupied bandwidth of
the signal.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to verify that electric field emissions from the
EUT and its associated cabling do not interfere with on-board RF receivers. This requirement
is not intended to verify compatibility with neighboring non-RF equipment that has been tested
for RS103 that addresses radiated susceptibility to electric fields. While RE102 is concerned
with potential effects with antenna-connected receivers, RS103 simulates fields resulting from
antenna-connected transmitters.
Limit: The default limit is shown in Figure 2.5-27. The notches shown in the figure are notional
only. The limit must be tailored to protect the specific receivers used on the platform.
Test Method: The test method of MIL-STD-461G RE102 may be applied from 200 MHz to 18
GHz.
Guidelines for defining notches to protect receivers are provided in Section 2.5.3.3.7.3.
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This requirement and test method are applicable only at frequencies used by antenna-
connected receivers. For GSFC platforms, this is generally limited to frequencies above 200
MHz.
Below 200 MHz, the dominant concern is crosstalk, which is addressed by the Common Mode
Conducted Emissions requirements defined in Section 2.5.2.1.2 and Common Mode
Conducted Susceptibility requirements defined in Section 2.5.2.2.4 (CS114).
If the platform includes receivers that operate at frequencies below 200 MHz, then this
requirement and test method must be extended accordingly in order to protect the receivers
used at those frequencies.
Guidelines for tailoring the limit and test method are provided in Section 2.5.3.3.7.
Guidelines for defining notches to protect receivers are provided in Section 2.5.3.3.7.3.
Figure 2.5-27 Radiated Emissions Electric Field Limit with Suggested Notches
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2.5.2.4 Radiated Susceptibility Requirements
2.5.2.4.1 Radiated Susceptibility, Magnetic Field
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to equipment on platforms using devices that are
inherently susceptible to magnetic fields because they process very low-level, low frequency
signals.
radiated magnetic fields.
Limit and Test Method: MIL-STD-461G RS101 test method may be applied for AC magnetic
fields. The limits must be defined and tailored according to the equipment used on the platform
and documented in the project Magnetics Control Plan (see Section 2.5.2.3.1).
For platforms using equipment sensitive to DC magnetic fields, the test methods as well as
the limits defined and documented in the project Magnetics Control Plan.
Guidelines for defining magnetic requirements are provided in “The Design, Construction
and Test of Magnetically Clean Spacecraft - A Practical Guide (Mario H. Acuña)”.
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2.5.2.4.2 Radiated Susceptibility, Electric Field
Applicability: This requirement is applicable to equipment and subsystem enclosures and all
interconnecting cables.
Purpose: The purpose of this requirement is to verify the ability of the EUT and associated
cabling to withstand electric fields generated from intentional RF transmitters during all phases
of the project, including on orbit, on the launch vehicle, at the launch site, and all test
environments. This requirement is not intended to verify compatibility with neighboring non-
RF equipment that has been tested for RE102 that addresses electric field radiated emissions.
While RE102 is concerned with potential effects with antenna-connected receivers, RS103
simulates fields resulting from antenna-connected transmitters. Compatibility between non-
RF components and subsystems is addressed by the Common Mode Conducted Emissions
and Bulk Cable Injection Conducted Susceptibility (CS114 test method) requirements.
Test Method: The MIL-STD-461G RS103 test method shall apply.
The general test method of MIL-STD-461G requires real-time monitoring of the applied field
using electric field probes.
In some cases, the field may be pre-calibrated using the procedure described in MIL-STD-
461F.
Additional discussion of the RS103 test method are provided in section 2.5.3.3.8.
Limit: Equipment that must operate at launch shall be tested, at minimum, to the following
levels:
 20 V/m from 2 MHz to 18 GHz
These limits are based on typical fields from transmitters operating on the launch vehicle and
at the launch site. Specific launch vehicles and launch sites may impose different limits. Each
project must assess its compatibility to these environments once a launch vehicle and launch
site are selected. Further guidance relevant to Launch Vehicle & Launch Site Electromagnetic
Environments can be found in the following document:
 ELVL-2010-0042300 Electromagnetic Environments – A Guideline for
Spacecraft Launching from Eastern, Western and Pacific Ranges
In addition, the Interface Control Document (ICD) and/or User’s Guide for the appropriate
launch vehicle must be consulted for further guidance.
Equipment that will not be powered on during launch shall be tested, at minimum, to the
following levels:
 2 V/m from 2 MHz to 18 GHz
These limits are intended to define the minimum on-orbit environment created by the
transmitters on board the spacecraft. Specific platforms may impose different limits. Each
project must assess its compatibility to the environments defined in the appropriate platform-
specific documentation, and the limits must be tailored accordingly.
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Based on data and analysis compiled by the Department of Defense Joint Spectrum Center,
the on-orbit RF environment can likely exceed 2 V/m in specific frequency bands due to fields
transmitted from high gain antennas on the ground or on communications satellites.
Susceptibility test levels must be derived from the expected mission environment. Guidance
relevant to on-orbit RF environments are provided in the following document:
 JSC-CR-06-070 Space Vehicle RF Environments
Equipment that will not be powered on during launch is only required to survive the launch RS
levels without damage. “Survive-without-damage” requirements cannot be verified by test.
Such tests are inherently inconclusive; they merely verify that the equipment under test (EUT)
shows no obvious damage immediately after being subjected to the test environment. They
provide no verification that the EUT was not stressed by the environment. Verification of
“survive-without-damage” requirements must inherently be performed by analysis. An
approach for such an analysis is outlined in section 2.5.3.3.8.
Equipment that will not be powered on during launch, but that may be powered on during any
portion of the test campaign at the launch site, should be tested to the launch site levels in
addition to the on-orbit levels. If no susceptibility is observed at the launch site levels, then
the equipment may be powered on during the launch site test campaign without restrictions.
However, if a susceptibility is observed at the launch site levels but not at the on-orbit levels,
the project must assess the risk of interference at the launch site (i.e. fix the interference
problem) vs. the need to power up the equipment during the test campaign (i.e. keep the
equipment powered off at the launch site).
Additional discussion of the RS103 limits are provided in section 2.5.3.3.8.
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2.5.2.5 System Level Requirements
Guidance for evaluation of EMC at the system level is provided in MIL-STD-464.
“System level” refers to a higher level of integration than the component level, e.g.
instrument/payload level or spacecraft/observatory level.
At minimum, the following tests are recommended:
 Power quality (power bus aggregate voltage ripple, turn-on/turn-off transients)
 Aggregate radiated emissions, electric field (on-orbit and launch levels)
 Aggregate radiated susceptibility, electric field (on-orbit and launch levels)
 System self-compatibility (RF self-compatibility as well as compatibility between

non-RF components)
Further discussion of these tests as applied at instrument/payload and

spacecraft/observatory levels is provided in the following subsections.
2.5.2.5.1 Power Quality
The standard set of requirements for conducted emissions and conducted susceptibility
detailed earlier in this document are, by definition, component level tests intended to provide
an early assessment of power quality. There is no reason to repeat these same tests at higher
levels of integration.
At higher levels of integration, power quality may be assessed directly with the following
measurements, which will be discussed in the following subsections:
 Power bus aggregate voltage ripple, time domain
 Turn-on/turn-off transients
At instrument/payload level, power quality measurements must be performed across a Line

Impedance Simulation Network (LISN) placed in series with the spacecraft simulator’s power
supply as shown in Figure 2.5-28. The LISN represents the spacecraft primary power bus
source impedance and must be defined by the spacecraft provider.
Power quality measurements at spacecraft/observatory level are intended to evaluate the

ripple and transients that are seen by all equipment connected to it. As such, these
measurements must be performed at the power distribution point in the spacecraft power
subsystem, as shown in Figure 2.5-29. Ideally, test points to provide this access must be
designed into the power subsystem.
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Figure 2.5-28. Recommended Test Setup, Instrument/Payload Level Power Quality Measurements
Figure 2.5-29. Recommended Setup, Spacecraft/Observatory Level Power Quality Measurements
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2.5.2.5.1.1 Power Bus Aggregate Voltage Ripple, Time Domain
At the integrated payload, spacecraft, and/or observatory level, it is recommended that a

measurement be performed of the aggregate voltage ripple on the primary power bus using
the setup shown in Figure 2.5-28 or Figure 2.5-29 while the equipment is put through a typical
mission sequence.
A recommended limit is that the aggregate ripple should not exceed 1 volt peak-to-peak when
measured in the time domain with a bandwidth limit of 20 MHz.
2.5.2.5.1.2 Turn-On/Turn-Off Transients
As equipment is switched on and off of the primary power bus, the resulting voltage and current
transients imposed on the bus should be measured using the setup shown in Figure 2.5-28 or
Figure 2.5-29.
Turn-on transients are expected to induce a sag (negative-going pulse) on the primary power
bus. As each unit is switched onto the bus in the test configuration, the turn-on voltage
transient should be measured and compared against the negative applied CS06 pulse
discussed in section 2.5.2.2.3, to which all of the units should have been tested.
Turn-off transients are expected to induce a surge (positive-going pulse) on the primary power
bus. As each unit is switched off of the bus in the test configuration, the turn-off voltage
transient should be measured and compared against the positive applied CS06 pulse
discussed in section 2.5.2.2.3, to which all of the units should have been tested.
The current transients may also be measured in addition to the voltage transients. For time-
domain current measurements, a current probe test must be selected that has a flat transfer
impedance at least from 20 Hz to 1 MHz in order to ensure accurate reproductions of
waveforms with a resolution of approximately 1 microsecond. A typical oscilloscope current
probe is preferred unless its window is too small to fit around the power wire bundle. For larger
bundles, the recommended probe is the Pearson 3525.
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2.5.2.5.2 Aggregate Radiated Emissions, Electric Field (On-Orbit and Launch Levels)
The aggregate radiated emissions should be measured at integrated payload, spacecraft,

and/or observatory levels.
At instrument/payload level, it is only necessary to perform measurements in frequency bands

occupied by intentional receivers on the platform and at the launch site, generally defined by
the notches in the radiated emissions limit. In addition, measurement antenna locations may
be limited to locations that are representative of the relative locations of the antennas on the
platform and at the launch site that are being protected by the defined radiated emissions
limits.
At spacecraft/observatory level, it is only necessary to perform measurements in frequency

bands occupied by intentional receivers at the launch site, generally defined by the notches in
the radiated emissions limit. In addition, measurement antenna locations may be limited to
locations that are representative of the relative locations of the antennas on the launch vehicle
and at the launch site that are being protected by the defined radiated emissions limits.
This is NOT to be considered a repeat of the RE102 test performed at component level. RE102
is, by definition, a unit level test. Use of the RE102 nomenclature for tests at higher levels of
integration has been shown to cause confusion and must be avoided.
2.5.2.5.3 Aggregate Radiated Susceptibility, Electric Field (On-Orbit and Launch Levels)
The aggregate radiated susceptibility should be evaluated at integrated payload, spacecraft,

and/or observatory levels.
At instrument/payload level, it is only necessary to perform measurements in frequency bands

occupied by intentional transmitters on the launch vehicle, on the spacecraft, and at the launch
site, generally defined by the “tent poles” in the radiated susceptibility limit. In addition,
measurement antenna locations may be limited to locations that are representative of the
relative locations of the transmitting antennas on the platform and at the launch site.
At spacecraft/observatory levels, it is only necessary to perform measurements in frequency

bands occupied by intentional transmitters on the launch vehicle and at the launch site,
generally defined by the “tent poles” in the radiated susceptibility limit. In addition,
measurement antenna locations may be limited to locations that are representative of the
relative locations of the transmitting antennas on the launch vehicle and at the launch site.
This is NOT to be considered a repeat of the RS103 test performed at component level. RS103
is, by definition, a unit level test. Use of the RS103 nomenclature for tests at higher levels of
integration has been shown to cause confusion and must be avoided.
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2.5.2.5.4 System Self-Compatibility
System self-compatibility is addressed in two parts:
 RF self-compatibility
 Compatibility between non-RF components
2.5.2.5.4.1 RF Self-Compatibility
RF self-compatibility is addressed in two parts:
 RF communications subsystem as possible victim

 RF communications subsystem as possible culprit
2.5.2.5.4.1.1 RF Communications Subsystem as Possible Victim
The first part of RF self-compatibility addresses the on-board RF communications subsystem

as a possible victim. The intent is to evaluate the risk of interference to on-board RF receivers
due to unintentional emissions from the rest of the spacecraft/observatory.
MIL-STD-464C (section 5.1, “Margins”) specifies that “safety critical and mission critical
system functions shall have a margin of at least 6 dB,” and that “compliance shall be verified
by test, analysis, or a combination thereof.”
Because the RF uplink is certainly a mission critical function, the 6 dB margin must be verified
at integrated spacecraft and/or observatory level.
A straightforward technique to verify the 6 dB margin requirement is to apply an uplink signal

that is 6 dB below minimum level specified by the link budget while the spacecraft/observatory
is operated through a typical mission sequence. If the on-board communications subsystem
maintains lock on the uplink signal while the spacecraft is generating its maximum RF
emissions, this demonstrates indirectly that the spacecraft RF background is at least 6 dB
below maximum noise level that will allow the minimum signal level specified by the link budget
to meet its SNR requirements, thereby demonstrating that the 6 dB margin requirement is met.
The above technique is applicable and totally satisfactory as long as the number of possible
uplink frequencies is very small such that evaluating the link at each frequency over the course
of an integration test does not prolong the test schedule to an unacceptable degree. If there
are many more frequencies than could be practically evaluated in a reasonable amount of
time, then the technique specified by MIL-STD-464C is recommended and is summarized
below.
Disconnect the coaxial cable from the uplink antenna at the on-board uplink receiver’s input,
then connect it to a test receiver or spectrum analyzer sweeping the frequency band of the
uplink receiver. The spacecraft/observatory is operated through a mission sequence profile,
and the noise picked up by the antenna in the uplink receiver band is measured using a
bandwidth commensurate with the bandwidth of the on-board receiver. The measured noise
level in the receiver band must be at least 6 dB below the maximum permissible noise level that
will allow the minimum signal level specified by the link budget to meet its signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) requirements.
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2.5.2.5.4.1.2 RF Communications Subsystem as Possible Culprit
The second part of RF self-compatibility addresses the on-board RF communications

subsystem as a possible culprit. The intent is to evaluate the risk of interference to rest of the
spacecraft/observatory due to the intentional emissions from the on-board RF transmitters.
In principle, this portion of the test is straightforward. The RF communications system is placed
in its most emissive on-orbit mode while the non-RF equipment is operated through a mission
sequence profile. If all non-RF equipment operates within specifications during the entire
mission sequence, then compatibility is demonstrated
2.5.2.5.4.2 Compatibility Between Non-RF Components
Compatibility between non-RF components is generally addressed during the Comprehensive

Performance Test (CPT), during which all of the equipment is put through a normal mission
sequence.
While the primary purpose of the CPT is to evaluate the performance of each component, it
provides an opportunity to determine if any component is interfering with any other
components.
Prior to performing the CPT, it is recommended that a list of likely culprits and victims be
created. Time should be planned into the CPT to evaluate the response of the most likely
victims (e.g. detector subsystems) to the most likely culprits (e.g. motors).
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EMC _________________________________________________________________ APPLICATION GUIDE
2.5.3. Application Guide
For EMC requirements, GEVS uses MIL-STD-461G as its point of departure. A brief history
of MIL-STD-461 is provided in the following subsection.
This application guide, along with the Appendix of MIL-STD-461G, provides background
information for each emission and susceptibility and associated test requirement in the
previous sections of this document. This information includes rationale for requirements,
guidance in applying the requirements, and lessons learned from platform and laboratory
experience. This information should help users understand the intent behind the requirements,
should aid the procuring activity in tailoring emission and susceptibility requirements as
necessary for particular applications, and should help users develop detailed test procedures
in the EMITP based on the general test procedures in this document. This section is provided
for guidance purposes and, as such, should not be interpreted as providing contractual
requirements.
Each EMI test addresses at least one of the following concerns:

 Compatibility with the spacecraft power subsystem
 Compatibility with the spacecraft communications subsystem
 Compatibility between subsystems (crosstalk)
The EMI tests specified by MIL-STD-461 primarily address the first two concerns with little to
no emphasis on the third. Compatibility with the spacecraft power subsystem is addressed
through Conducted Emissions (CE101, CE102) and Conducted Susceptibility (CS101, CS114
on power lines) requirements; compatibility with the spacecraft communications subsystem is
addressed through Electric Field Radiated Emissions (RE102) and Electric Field Radiated
Susceptibility (RS103) requirements.
Regarding RE102 and RS103, Section A.5.17 of MIL-STD-461G states:
“There is no implied relationship between (RE102) and RS103 that addresses radiated
susceptibility to electric fields. Attempts have been made quite frequently in the past to
compare electric field radiated emission and susceptibility type requirements as a
justification for deviations and waivers. While RE102 is concerned with potential effects
with antenna-connected receivers, RS103 simulates fields resulting from antenna-
connected transmitters.”
In other words, RE102 and RS103 are specifically designed to assess compatibility with the
communications subsystem. They are not designed to address crosstalk between
subsystems.
When an EUT meets these requirements on a military platform, there is generally low risk of
crosstalk. This is primarily because the default RE102 limit corresponds to common mode
current levels on culprit cables that are too low to pose a significant risk. Outside the frequency
bands of antenna-connected receivers, the RE102 levels (and those of its MIL-STD-461C
predecessor, RE02) are significantly more stringent than necessary to control crosstalk. This
is precisely the reason that RE02 and RE102 exceedances have historically been the largest
sources of waivers on many GSFC platforms.
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Section A.5.17 of MIL-STD-461G provides the following tailoring guideline:
“It may be desirable to tailor the frequency coverage of the limit to include only frequency
bands where antenna-connected receivers are present.”
Most GSFC platforms do not use the antenna-connected receivers that operate at frequencies
below 200 MHz. Following this guideline, RE102 is only applicable above 200 MHz on most
GSFC platforms as discussed in Section 2.5.2.3.2.
On such platforms, crosstalk replaces RE102 as the dominant concern below 200 MHz. The
crosstalk concern is addressed with a measurement of Common Mode Conducted Emissions
(CMCE, no MIL-STD-461G equivalent) on power and signal cables as defined in Section
2.5.2.1.2. This requirement is intended to be a companion to the Common Mode Conducted
Susceptibility (CMCS, MIL-STD-461G CS114 test method) requirement as defined in Section
2.5.2.2.4. The results of these two tests enable a significantly more direct and efficient
assessment of cable-to-cable crosstalk than is possible using RE102 and RS103.
An extensive discussion of crosstalk is provided in the GEVS application note entitled,

“Inductive Crosstalk at the System Level,” available on the “GEVS Application Notes” page of
the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
https://spaces.gsfc.nasa.gov/display/EMCWG/GEVS+Application+Notes
The approach outlined above is adapted from the tailored RE102 requirements and test
methods defined in SL-E-0002, Space Shuttle Specification, Electromagnetic Interference
Characteristics, Requirements for Equipment. This specification replaces the traditional
RE102 test method below 200 MHz with a Bulk Cable Emission (BCE) measurement for all of
the reasons stated above. This approach has been demonstrated to control cable-to-cable
crosstalk more effectively and efficiently while at the same time eliminating the paperwork
associated with waivers against an inapplicable and unnecessarily stringent RE102 limit below
200 MHz.
2.5.3.1 A Brief History of MIL-STD-461
This section provides a comparison of the core requirements and test methods of the different
versions of MIL-STD-461 and its obsolete companion standard MIL-STD-462. It further
provides the rationale for GEVS’ specification of a particular requirement/test method in each
case. In most cases, GEVS specifies requirements and test methods from MIL-STD-461G. In
some isolated cases, GEVS specifies a requirement/test method from obsolete MIL-STD-
461C/462 when it provides a better fit for platform needs (e.g. CE03 and CS06 as discussed
below).
2.5.3.1.1 Nomenclature
One obvious cosmetic difference is that MIL-STD-461D (requirements) and MIL-STD-462D

(test methods), both released in 1993, introduced new nomenclature, e.g. CE101, CS101,
RE102, etc., which is a departure from the previous nomenclature used by MIL-STD-461C
and earlier, e.g. CE01, CS01, RE02, etc. This updated nomenclature has continued with the
release of MIL-STD-461E in 1999, MIL-STD-461G in 2007, and MIL-STD-461G in 2015.
2.5-56
The core requirements and test methods using the newer nomenclature will be compared
against their respective predecessors in the discussion of specific requirements below. The
main difference that led to the nomenclature shift concerned the power source impedance;
MIL-STD-461D/462D specified the use of Line Impedance Stabilization Networks (LISNs),
while MIL-STD-461C and earlier specified the use of 10 µF feedthrough capacitors. This will
be discussed further in the “Power Source Impedance” section below.
2.5.3.1.2 Document Organization
MIL-STD-461D and -462D introduced an Application Guide in the appendix in order to provide
additional engineering context for the requirements and test methods.
MIL-STD-461E, released in 1999, combined the requirements and the test methods into a
single document, and MIL-STD-462 was discontinued as a separate document. That format
has continued in versions F and G.
In the remainder of this section, any references to specific sections, tables, or figures pertain
to MIL-STD-461E and later.
2.5.3.1.3 Verification Requirements
MIL-STD-461E and later provide a number of “verification requirements” in section 4.3, i.e.
requirements on the general test setup and approach before defining any of the requirements
for specific tests.
These include requirements for the following, for which there are no equivalents in MIL-STD-
461C and earlier:
 Radio frequency (RF) absorber material (section 4.3.2.1, Table I)
 Power source impedance (section 4.3.6; discussed in next section of this document)
 Measurement bandwidth and measurement times for emissions testing (section

4.3.10.3.1, Table II*)
 Scan rates/step sizes for susceptibility testing (section 4.3.10.4.1, Table III)
 Modulation of susceptibility signals (section 4.3.10.4.2)
MIL-STD-461G Table II provides requirements for the proper use of FFT-based receivers for
emissions measurements.
Additional guidance is provided in MIL-STD-461G section A.4.3.10.3.3.
MIL-STD-461G also introduced new requirements on the calibration of measurement

equipment in section 4.3.11.
GEVS applies these verification requirements with some tailoring as indicated in section
2.5.1.5.
2.5-57
A standardized power source impedance is defined in order to represent expected

impedances on actual platforms and to ensure consistent results between different test
facilities. MIL-STD-461D/-462D and later specify the use of LISNs, while MIL-STD-461C and
earlier specify the use of a pair of 10 µF feedthrough capacitors. A thorough discussion of this
topic is provided in section 2.5.3.2.2 of this document and in section A.4.3.6 of the Application
Guide of MIL-STD-461G.
2.5.3.1.5 Conducted Emissions (CE)
CE101 (Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, Audio Frequencies) is a current measurement

that is essentially identical to its CE01 predecessor except for the upper frequency limit.
CE101 is specified to 10 kHz, while CE01 is specified up to 20 kHz. With the substitution of
the capacitor network for the LISNs, CE101 basically the same measurement as CE01 using
the same test equipment.
CE102 (Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, Radio Frequencies) is a voltage measurement

across a LISN. CE03 is a current measurement from the capacitor network. Because GEVS
recommends the capacitor network shown in Figure 2.5-1 to replace the LISNs, GEVS applies
the CE03 test method. A thorough discussion of this topic is provided in section 2.5.3.3.1.
GEVS further specifies that these CE measurements be performed as true differential mode
(DM) measurements as specified in section 2.5.2.1.1 and as common mode (CM)
measurements as specified in section 2.5.2.1.2. The CM measurements are performed on
signal cables as well as power leads.
A true DM measurement is performed with the return (-) power lead routed through the current
probe in the opposite direction to the high (+) lead as shown in Figure 2.5-4 and Figure 2.5-5.
The DM measurement specifically addresses power quality, i.e. ripple on the primary power
bus. The true DM measurement is unique to GEVS; it is not specified in any version of MIL-
STD-461.
The common mode conducted emissions (CMCE) measurement directly addresses crosstalk
when paired with the CS114 test on bulk cables (discussed in CS section below). These CMCE
measurements are very similar to the CE02 and CE04 test methods of MIL-STD-462; there is
no equivalent to these measurements in MIL-STD-461D and later.
An extensive discussion of the relationship between conducted and radiated emissions is

provided in the GEVS application note entitled, “Radiated Emissions as a Function of Common
Mode Current,” available on the “GEVS Application Notes” page of the GSFC EMC Working
Group SPACES site:
GEVS also specifies a measurement of inrush current as defined in section 2.5.2.1.3, along
with further discussion in section 2.5.3.3.3. Inrush current measurements are not specified in
any version of MIL-STD-461.
2.5-58
2.5.3.1.6 Conducted Susceptibility (CS)
CS101 (Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, Audio Frequencies) is very similar to its CS01
predecessor except for the upper frequency limit. CS101 is specified up to 150 kHz, while
CS01 is specified up to 50 kHz. With the substitution of the capacitor network for the LISNs,
which provides a low source impedance that guarantees that essentially all of the injected
ripple drops across the test sample, CS101 is basically the same test method as CS01 using
the same test equipment. A more thorough discussion is provided in section 2.5.3.3.4.
The CS101 limit is defined in MIL-STD-461D and later in order to provide margin with respect
to the ripple originating from electromechanical power sources typically used on aircraft. GSFC
spacecraft generally implement a battery dominated bus, as represented by the GEVS
capacitor network. The source impedance of a battery dominated bus is much lower than that
of an electromechanical source, which results in much lower ripple, especially at lower
frequencies. The inherently lower ripple from such sources leads to the GEVS tailored limit
that permits an alternative test method using a clamp-on injection probe, which protects flight
hardware from possible damage inherent in the traditional method using an injection
transformer. Further discussion is provided in section 2.5.3.3.4.
CS02 (Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, Radio Frequencies) is a capacitively coupled

voltage injection method from MIL-STD-462. This is a dated test method with many pitfalls;
GEVS replaces it with the CS114 test method of MIL-STD-461G. An extensive comparison
between these two test methods is provided in the GEVS application note entitled, “CS114 vs.
CS02 – Conducted Susceptibility,” available on the “GEVS Application Notes” page of the
GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
In addition to being a replacement for CS02, CS114 is primarily used for bulk cable injection
(BCI) on power and signal cables. In GEVS, this is also called a test of common mode
conducted susceptibility (CMCS), which may be paired with the CMCE test in order to directly
address crosstalk concerns. There is no equivalent to CS114 in MIL-STD-461C and earlier.
An extensive discussion of crosstalk is provided in the GEVS application note entitled,

“Inductive Crosstalk at the System Level,” also available at the link above for the “GEVS
Application Notes” page.
CS06 (Conducted Susceptibility, Transients) from MIL-STD-461C specifies a 10 microsecond

pulse. There is no equivalent to this test in MIL-STD-461D/462D or MIL-STD-461E. MIL-STD-
461F introduced CS106 specifically for Navy applications, submarine and surface ship
equipment in particular, and specified a 5 microsecond pulse to represent the typical transient
observed on these platforms. CS106 fell out of favor and is not included in MIL-STD-461G.
Considering all of these factors, GEVS recommends a tailored version of the CS06 test
method with the 10 microsecond pulse imposed taking the nominal bus potential to zero,
simulating a turn-on transient. Further discussion is provided in section 2.5.3.3.5.
2.5-59
MIL-STD-461D/462D introduced CS115 (Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection,

Impulse Excitation), which has been carried through versions E, F, and G. The basic concern
is to protect equipment from fast rise and fall time transients that may be present due to
platform switching operations and external transient environments such as lightning,
electromagnetic pulse (EMP), space charging, and electrostatic discharge (ESD). CS115 is a
replacement for requirements like RS02 (pulse) and RS06 chattering relay, both in MIL-STD-
461C.
MIL-STD-461D/462D also introduced CS116 (Conducted Susceptibility, Damped Sinusoidal

Transients, Cables and Power Leads, 10 kHz to 100 MHz) to simulate responses to external
stimuli such as EMP, and it has been carried through versions E, F, and G. CS116 has direct
predecessors CS10/11/12/13 in MIL-STD-461C, and MIL-STD-462, Notices 5 & 6.
MIL-STD-461G introduced CS117 (Conducted Susceptibility, Lightning Induced Transients,

Cables and Power Leads) as an additional test to specifically simulate response to lightning
strikes. There is no equivalent to this test in earlier versions of MIL-STD-461.
MIL-STD-461G also introduced CS118 (Personnel Borne Electrostatic Discharge) to address

effects of electrostatic discharging on electrical and electronic equipment caused by human
electrostatic discharge (ESD). The test equipment and procedures are based upon
internationally recognized standards such as IEC 61000-4-2. There is no equivalent to this
test in earlier versions of MIL-STD-461.
GEVS specifies CS114 and CS115 on all GSFC platforms. Applicability of CS116, CS117,
and CS118 must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
2.5.3.1.7 Radiated Emissions (RE)
RE101 (Radiated Emissions, Magnetic Field) is essentially identical to its RE01 predecessor.
RE102 (Radiated Emissions, Electric Field) is, in its general concept, similar to its RE02
predecessor. However, it introduces more realistic limits and some modified test methods
using different antennas and configuration. In particular, MIL-STD-461F introduced updates
to the rod antenna measurement configuration in the frequency range of 14 kHz to 30 MHz in
order to address known deficiencies with that test method. GEVS applies RE102 at
frequencies in which RF receivers are used on the platform, which is in most cases limited to
frequencies above 200 MHz. This eliminates the difficulties associated with the rod antenna.
In addition, GEVS favors the use of log spiral antennas over the standard double-ridged guide
(DRG) horn antennas, which makes it a bit more closely aligned with RE02. Additional
discussion is provided in section 2.5.3.3.7.
2.5.3.1.8 Radiated Susceptibility (RS)
RS101 (Radiated Susceptibility, Magnetic Field) is essentially identical to its RS01

predecessor.
RS103 (Radiated Susceptibility, Electric Field) is similar to its RS03 predecessor. The main
difference is that for RS103, the applied field is monitored using electric field probes, while for
RS03, the applied field is precalibrated with a receive antenna. Because electric field probes
are the standard devices used for this test at GSFC, even when a project specifies RS03, it is
likely that the RS103 test method is being implemented.
2.5-60
2.5.3.2 Test Facility and Procedure Requirements
2.5.3.2.1 Ambient Electromagnetic Level
Noise from Electrical Ground Support Equipment (EGSE) is one of the most common
contributors to high ambient levels. If the EGSE cables penetrate the chamber wall in an
uncontrolled manner as shown in Figure 2.5-30, common mode currents are allowed to enter
the chamber along with their resulting electric and magnetic fields. These fields will raise the
ambient electromagnetic field level, quite possibly to a level that violates the requirement
stated in Section 2.5.1.5.1.
Figure 2.5-30. Impacts of Uncontrolled EGSE Common Mode Currents
Figure 2.5-31. Proper EGSE Shielding and Grounding Configuration
2.5-61
In order to prevent these uncontrolled currents and fields from entering the chamber, all outer
shields of all EGSE cables should be terminated at the chamber wall, and a single point ground
should be established at the feedthrough panel as shown in Figure 2.5-31. Common mode
currents on the EGSE cables are thereby prevented from entering the chamber and do not
contribute to the ambient level.
The preferred method for terminating the shields is to provide a connector break at the
chamber feedthrough panel as shown in Figure 2.5-32. The outer shield of each cable is
connected directly to its backshell with 360-degree coverage, and the mating connector is
connected directly to the feedthrough panel, preferably with an EMI gasket.
An alternate method is to run the cables through a stuffing tube as shown in Figure 2.5-33.
The outer jacket of the cables inside the stuffing tube must be removed in order to expose the
shield, and the tube should be filled with stainless steel, bronze, or copper wool in order to
provide electrical continuity (bonding) between the shield braid(s) and the inside of the stuffing
tube wall.
For EMI test facilities in which contamination and cleanliness are a significant concern, the
stuffing tube may not be used. These facilities must implement the connector break and
terminate the shields at the feedthrough panel.
Additional guidance for grounding, bonding, and shielding for facilities and test configurations
is provided in MIL-HDBK-419A, Grounding, Bonding, and Shielding for Electronic Equipments
and Facilities (Volumes 1 & 2, 29 December 1987).
2.5-62
Figure 2.5-32. EGSE Cable Shield Termination – Connector Break (Preferred Method)
Figure 2.5-33. EGSE Cable Shield Termination – Stuffing Tube (Alternate Method)
2.5-63
MIL-STD-461G specifies the use of Line Impedance Stabilization Networks (LISNs) in series
with the power leads to the EUT. The purpose of the LISNs is to provide a standardized power
bus source impedance to represent expected impedances in actual installations and to ensure
consistent results between different test facilities. The LISN is intended to simulate the
common source impedance between the spacecraft power supply and the common
distribution point as shown in Figure 2.5-34. It is not intended to include the harness
impedance between the common distribution point and the load; this portion of the impedance
is most effectively simulated using flight representative cables.
LISNs are discussed in further detail in MIL-STD-461G section A.4.3.6.
MIL-STD-461G Section 4.3.6 specifies a default 50 µH LISN. This LISN simulates worst-case
power distribution wiring on large military platforms as shown in Figure 2.5-35. On such
platforms, power is distributed as a single wire 5 cm above structure (chassis), and structure
is used as the current return path. This wiring configuration has an inductance on the order
of 1 µH/m. In the worst case, the wiring may run as much as 50 meters to the common
distribution point, which gives the worst-case total inductance of 50 µH specified in the default
MIL-STD-461G LISN.
On the majority of GSFC platforms, the power distribution wiring more closely resembles that
shown in Figure 2.5-36. The power source impedance consists of a battery-dominated bus
charged from solar cells, with the point of distribution (fuse block or other circuit protection
devices) mounted in the immediate vicinity of the battery (< 1 m), providing for very low wiring
contribution to the common or shared bus impedance.
In addition, the chassis is almost never used as a deliberate current return path. A dedicated
return wire is generally twisted with the “send” or “hot” wire, which results in a lower inductance
(< 0.5 µH/m typical). For such platforms, the power source impedance is significantly less that
that simulated by the 50 µH LISN. The impedance is more accurately simulated by the
capacitor network shown schematically in Figure 2.5-37, which consists of a 10,000 µF line-
to-line capacitor, shunted by a pair of 10 µF feedthrough capacitors installed between each
power conductor and the ground plane.
The 10 µF feedthrough capacitors form an integral part of the standard setup specified by MIL-
STD-462 and are part of the standard suite of equipment available in any EMI laboratory.
These feedthrough capacitors provide a standard source impedance (< 1 Ω) at frequencies
above approximately 20 kHz. Because MIL-STD-461 and MIL-STD-462 also apply to
platforms with AC power sources operating at 60 Hz or 400 Hz, this level of control was
generally considered sufficient.
However, GSFC platforms usually implement battery dominated DC power busses, and it is
desirable to provide a low source impedance down to 30 Hz. The 10,000 µF line-to-line
capacitor extends the standardized source impedance (< 1 Ω) down to 30 Hz in order to cover
the full range of frequencies specified by the tests in this document. For all MIL-STD-461G
based test methods specified in this document, the LISNs will be replaced by this capacitor
network.
2.5-64
The 10,000 µF capacitor may be placed on either side of the pair of 10 µF feedthrough
capacitors. No discernable difference is observed in the source impedance of the network in
either configuration. Measurements documenting these findings are provided in the summary
slides entitled, “GEVS Impedance Control Capacitor Bank, Insertion Loss Measurements IAW
SAE ARP-936,” which are available on the on the GSFC EMC Working Group site:
If a given GSFC program identifies a need to use a LISN, it is recommended to follow the
tailoring guidelines of MIL-STD-461G section A.4.3.6, which specifies a 5 µH LISN as shown
in MIL-STD-461G Figure A-2 (schematic) and MIL-STD-461G Figure A-3 (impedance). If the
flight power distribution scheme is well defined and the 5 µH LISN is also unrealistically high,
a custom LISN or flight representative cables may be used. The specific LISN or test cables
used will be specified in the project EMCCP along with supporting rationale.
Figure 2.5-34. Common Source Impedance and Harness Impedance (General)
2.5-65
Figure 2.5-35. Power Distribution Wiring, Large Military Platforms (Worst Case)
Figure 2.5-36. Power Distribution Wiring, GSFC Platforms (Typical)
2.5-66
Figure 2.5-37. Capacitor Network Simulating Battery Dominated Bus Impedance
2.5.3.2.3 Construction and Arrangement of EUT Cables
As stated in Section 2.5.1.5.2 of this document, the power source impedance for the tests in
this document will be simulated by the capacitor network shown in Figure 2.5-1. The 10 µF
feedthrough capacitors are an integral part of the standard setup specified by MIL-STD-462.
The CE01 and CE03 test methods of MIL-STD-462, the predecessors of CE101 and CE102,
specify that the “length of power lead from the test sample to the feedthrough capacitor shall
not exceed 1 meter.” This clearly conflicts with the following requirement in MIL-STD-461G
Section 4.3.8.6.2: “Two meters of input power leads (including neutrals and returns) shall be
routed parallel to the front edge of the setup in the same manner as the interconnecting leads.”
It is recommended to use the 2 meter length as specified by MIL-STD-462. The rationale for
this recommendation is provided below.
The purpose of the 1 m maximum length specified by MIL-STD-462 is to minimize standing

waves by ensuring that the cables are electrically short (less than a significant fraction of a
wavelength) over the CE01 and CE03 frequency range. The wavelength λ in meters of an
electromagnetic wave is given by:
𝑐
𝜆=
𝑓
where:
c = speed of light = 3 x 108 m/s

f = frequency
Wavelength is alternately expressed as follows:
300
𝜆=
𝑓𝑀𝐻𝑧
At the CE03 upper frequency limit of 50 MHz, λ = 6 m. The 1 m cable is a sixth of a wavelength
(λ/6), which is sufficiently electrically short through this frequency range.
2.5-67
The purpose of the 2 m minimum length specified by MIL-STD-461G is to ensure that radiated
emissions and susceptibility testing properly assesses the performance of the EUT along with
all of its interconnecting cables. In order for the interconnecting cables to be properly
assessed, they must be electrically long (greater than a significant fraction of a wavelength)
over most of the frequency range covered by the tests. This is particularly important for the
radiated electric field emissions (RE102) and susceptibility (RS103) tests, for which the
nominal frequency range specified by MIL-STD-461G is 2 MHz to 18 GHz.
As discussed in detail in section 2.5.3.3.2.2, an electrically long interconnecting cable must be

treated as a wire-above-ground transmission line. The unshielded power leads connect to the
feedthrough capacitors, which are designed to present an effective short to the ground plane
above 20 kHz, which covers all of the frequencies at which the leads are electrically long. For
shielded signal cables, the shield is generally terminated to chassis at both ends. In either
case, the transmission line will effectively be terminated with a short instead of with its
characteristic impedance. This means that reflections and standing waves will develop along
the length of the cable, resulting in non-uniform potential and current distributions along its
length.
The analysis in section 2.5.3.3.2.2 further shows that a current maximum occurs at the load
end at all frequencies. For the power cables, the load end corresponds to the capacitor
network as shown in Figure 2.5-2. Thus, for current measurements on power leads, both
differential mode (DM) and common mode (CM), the current probe should be placed adjacent
to the capacitor network in order to capture the maximum amplitude at all frequencies of
interest.
For the signal cables, the load end corresponds to the access panel, where the shields should
be terminated. (A discussion of cable shield terminations is provided in section 2.5.3.2.1.)
Thus, for common mode current measurements on signal cables, the current probe should be
placed as close to the access panel as possible.
For these reasons, 1 meter power leads are no longer deemed necessary. The test objectives
may be accomplished just as effectively with 2-meter power leads. Furthermore, use of the 2-
meter power leads re-establishes consistency with MIL-STD-461G and helps mitigate further
confusion.
2.5-68
2.5.3.3 Detailed Requirements
2.5.3.3.1 Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, Differential Mode
The CE101 test method (and its CE01 predecessor) is a single-ended line-to-ground current
measurement as shown in Figure 2.5-38. This test method originates from military
architectures in which power is distributed to each load in a single-ended manner and uses
structure as the return path. This scheme is almost never used on GSFC platforms; dedicated
return wires are almost always provided in present GSFC power distribution schemes.
These single-ended measurements combine differential mode (DM) and common mode (CM)
information, which unnecessarily complicates the process of diagnosing and addressing the
effects of the measured emissions. Separating the DM and CM measurements provides more
directly meaningful limits and more useful information for diagnosing the source of a given
emission and for assessing its potential impacts.
The MIL-STD-461G test method CE102 specifies a voltage measurement across a LISN.
When conducted emissions are measured as a voltage, the results depend significantly on
the power bus source impedance, which can vary from platform to platform. For this reason
and for the reasons discussed above, a DM current measurement across the capacitor
network is preferred as specified in Section 2.5.2.1.1. This test method provides a worst-case
measurement of DM current emissions that is largely independent of the source impedance.
The measured DM current may be directly compared to the platform’s power bus impedance
in order to assess the contribution to power bus voltage ripple.
This is effectively the basic MIL-STD-462 CE03 test method with the send and return wires
run through the current probe for a DM measurement. It is also very similar to the tailored
CE101 test method described above; the primary difference consists of the selection of a
current probe that is suited to the higher (CE03) frequency range.
The Common Mode Conducted Emissions (CMCE) measurements are defined in Section
2.5.2.1.2.
The current probe must be placed within 5 cm of the capacitor network. This is particularly
true at the upper end of the CE03 frequency range, where the current distribution along the
line will not be uniform due to standing waves. Placing the current probe adjacent to the
capacitor network will ensure that the maximum current is captured at all frequencies. Further
discussion of current distribution and standing waves is provided in section 2.5.3.2.2.
Because the DM test method measures twice the true DM mode current (6 dB above the true
value), the measured limit must be set 6 dB above the true maximum DM mode current. The
limits below 150 kHz are based on the CE101 tailoring guidelines in MIL-STD-461G Section
A.5.4; the limits above 150 kHz are based on the CE03 limits of MIL-STD-461C.
The frequency breakpoint between the low and high frequency portions is 150 kHz. The limit
at 150 kHz is fixed at 62 dBµA, which is 6 dB above the tailored CE101 limit at 150 kHz as
specified in MIL-STD-461G Section A.5.4.
2.5-69
Figure 2.5-38. Conducted Emissions Test Setup – Single-Ended (Traditional)
2.5.3.3.2 Conducted Emissions, Common Mode, Power and Signal Lines
This test method addresses cable-to-cable crosstalk at frequencies up to 200 MHz. If the
platform implements particularly sensitive cables with known compromised shielding
performance (e.g. cryogenic cables with high resistance shields), it is recommended that the
susceptibility of such victim cables be characterized first as specified by the Common Mode
Conducted Susceptibility test (CS114) defined in Section 2.5.2.2.4. If any cable is susceptible
to levels lower than the default limit, it may be necessary to define a minimum separation from
potential culprit cables.
Guidance for addressing crosstalk and cable separation is provided in the GEVS application
note entitled, “Inductive Crosstalk at the System Level.” A brief summary is provided in section
2.5.3.3.2.3.
Emissions above 200 MHz are addressed by the Radiated Electric Field Emissions (RE102)
requirement defined in section 2.5.2.3.2.

Mode Current.” A brief summary is provided in section 2.5.3.3.2.2.
Both application notes are available on the “GEVS Application Notes” page of the GSFC EMC
Working Group SPACES site:
2.5-70
When performing CMCE measurements on a cable, the cable must be considered a wire-
above-ground transmission line, the parameters of which are discussed in section 2.5.3.3.9.
The general case for CMCE measurements is that of a shielded cable with the shield
terminated to chassis on both ends of the cable. This means that the wire-above-ground
transmission line will not be terminated in its characteristic impedance. The terminating
impedance on each end will be near 0 Ω, which will result in reflections on each end and
standing waves along the length of the cable. This behavior, and its implications for CMCE
measurements, is discussed in detail in section 2.5.3.3.2.4.
The absorbing clamp test method is discussed in the following section.
2.5.3.3.2.1 Absorbing Clamp Test Method, 30 MHz to 200 MHz
CISPR 16 specifies the absorbing clamp for use in the frequency range of 30 MHz to 1 GHz.
The previous version of this standard specified the use of the absorbing clamp from 150 kHz
to 200 MHz, following the example of SL-E-0002, which requires the clamp to be calibrated
differently from CISPR 16. Below 30 MHz, the added inductance of the clamp was found to
lower the measured current and to shift the pattern of peaks and nulls (described in section
2.5.3.3.2.2) by changing the effective electrical length of the cable. In this version of this
standard, it was decided to limit the use of the absorbing clamp to frequencies above 30 MHz,
where it is most effective.
Above 30 MHz, the cable is “electrically long” and must be considered a mismatched wire-
above ground transmission line. It will exhibit the pattern of peaks and nulls discussed in detail
in section 2.5.3.3.2.2.
In this frequency range, using a standard current probe may result in artificially high level at a
peak frequency or an artificially low level at a null frequency. In the former case, this could
cause an apparent test failure for a level that may be benign with the different cable layout in
the flight configuration. In the latter case, it could mask a real emission from the EUT that could
be more significant in the flight configuration. Moreover, as discussed in sections 2.5.3.3.2.2
and 2.5.3.3.2.3, the dominant factor is the net integrated average current, not the peaks and
nulls. In any event, using a standard current probe for CMCE measurements above 30 MHz
may produce skewed results that may not be directly applicable to the flight configuration.
What is desired is a means of the inserting a resistive, or absorbing, impedance in the line
above 30 MHz in order to dampen the peaks and nulls and provide a normalized measurement
of EUT emissions in this frequency range.
This function is performed by the absorbing clamp (fully described in CISPR 16), and it is the
central piece of equipment for CMCE measurements in this frequency range. It is a current
probe followed by a series of ferrite ring absorber elements. These add the desired resistive
impedance above 30 MHz and act to isolate the rest of the cable, minimizing the standing
waves associated with signals on an electrically long mismatched transmission line.
In order to get the full value of the absorbing clamp, it must be set up with the current probe
end of the device within 15 cm (λ/10 at 200 MHz) of the EUT.
2.5-71
2.5.3.3.2.1.1 Absorbing Clamp Calibration Procedure
In order to use the absorbing clamp for this test, it must be calibrated as a current probe, not
as an absorbing clamp per CISPR 16. The manufacturer may be requested to do this, or it
can be done in-house using the general setup shown in Figure 2.5-39.
A single spectrum analyzer may be used for both measurements. If this approach is used, a
50 Ω terminator must be connected to the port that is not being measured.
The version of this setup specified in CISPR 16 includes a 10 dB pad at each end of the
calibration fixture, along with a 6 dB pad at the current output of the absorbing clamp, in order
to minimize the effects of impedance mismatches at each of these interfaces. These pads may
certainly be used, but they will reduce the available signal to a level that may be comparable
to the noise floor of the measurement system.
If necessary, a low power amplifier may be connected in series with the signal generator output
in order to raise the level of the injected signal level in order to obtain a more accurate
measurement.
The general procedure is as follows:
1) This method uses two L-brackets with bulkhead mount BNC or N-type connectors on
either side of the CISPR 16 absorbing clamp. The signal generator and spectrum
analyzer attach to the connectors with coax. The center pins of the connectors are
connected by a solid copper wire, 12 to 20 AWG in size, approximately one meter in
length. The absorbing clamp is placed around the wire, with the current probe side of
the clamp (indicated by dashed line) as close as possible to the end attached to
spectrum analyzer #1, but in no case more than 15 cm away from the terminating end
of the fixture where spectrum analyzer #1 is located. The outer conductor of the
connector is bonded to the L-bracket, which is in turn bonded to the ground plane
beneath the absorbing clamp.
2) Set the terminating spectrum analyzer (#1) to sweep from 30 MHz to 200 MHz,
continuous sweep, max hold, and so that the data is measured in dBμA, if possible.
Otherwise, set it to read in dBμV.
3) Connect the output of the absorbing clamp into 50 Ω input of spectrum analyzer #2, and
set this spectrum analyzer to sweep from 30 MHz to 200 MHz, continuous sweep, max
hold, and so that the data is measured in dBμV.
4) Set the signal generator output to -10 dBm. Sweep the signal generator from 30 MHz
to 200 MHz, using a sweep time of between 100 ms and 500 ms.
5) If the terminating spectrum analyzer #1 is not able to display the data in dBμA, the
current into spectrum analyzer #1, and Thus, through the absorbing clamp current
probe, can be calculated from the voltage read at spectrum analyzer #1 using the
following relationship:
I (dBμA) = V (dBμV) – 34 dBΩ
2.5-72
6) Verify that the voltage measured by the absorbing clamp and displayed on spectrum
analyzer #2 (in dBμV) minus the detected current displayed on spectrum analyzer #1
(in dBμA) results in a value that closely approximates the transfer impedance given by
the curve in Figure 2.5-40. Retain the derived transfer impedance data for use in later
calculations during the testing phase of the BCE procedure.
Coax L-Bracket Single Wire L-Bracket Coax
Signal Spectrum
CISPR 16
Generator Analyzer #1
Absorbing Clamp
Ground Plane (Return Path)
Spectrum
Analyzer #2
Figure 2.5-39. Basic Common Mode Conducted Emissions Calibration Setup
Figure 2.5-40. Nominal Transfer Impedance of CISPR 16 Absorbing Clamp
2.5-73
2.5.3.3.2.1.2 Measurement System Integrity (MSI) Verification:
Prior to performing the BCE test, it is necessary to verify measurement system integrity (MSI).
MSI is checked at a minimum of three frequencies. The MSI check is conducted according to
the steps below:
1) Set up the equipment in the same manner as the calibration procedure above.
Spectrum Analyzer #2 is replaced by the measurement receiver and any
controller/automation used during the BCE test. The measurement receiver is
installed as it would be during the BCE test, with all interconnecting cables between it
and the clamp as per the test set-up.
2) Apply a calibrated signal level, which is at least 6 dB below the applicable limit, at 3
frequencies in the range of the low frequency current probe and 3 frequencies in the
range of the absorbing clamp (30 MHz, 100 MHz, and 200 MHz).
3) Scan the measurement receiver for each frequency in the same manner as a normal
data scan.
4) Verify that the signal level indicated by the measurement system is within +/- 3 dB of
the actual current level. If readings are obtained which deviate by more than ±3 dB,
locate the source of the error and correct the deficiency prior to proceeding with the
testing.
2.5.3.3.2.1.3 CMCE Testing
The test method from 150 kHz to 200 MHz requires the following test equipment:
1) Measurement receivers
2) Data recording device
3) Signal generators
4) Capacitor network consisting of two 10 µF feedthrough capacitors and one
10,000 µF capacitor (replacing the LISNs specified by SL-E-0002)
5) Absorbing clamp (per CISPR 16, Specification for radio disturbance and
immunity measuring apparatus and methods)
Setup the test equipment as shown in Figure 2.5-8. Place the absorbing clamp around the
cable, with the current probe side of the clamp as close as possible to the equipment under
test but in no case more than 15 cm away from the EUT.
Scan the measurement receiver according to Table II of MIL-STD-461G. Take the voltage
measured by the clamp (in dBμV) minus the transfer impedance at that frequency (in dBΩ) to
determine the current level (in dBμA). Compare this to the Common Mode Conducted
Emissions limit. This may be the limit shown in Figure 2.5-7 or the tailored limit defined in
order to protect potentially sensitive victim cables.
2.5-74
2.5.3.3.2.2 CMCE and Radiated Electric Fields
Figure 2.5-41 shows the electric and magnetic fields generated at a distance r from an
elemental electric (Hertzian) dipole model of infinitesimal length dl. The electric field
components are as follows:
Idl  1 1 
Er  2  0  02 cos   2 2  j 3 3 e  j 0 r
4  0 r 0 r 
Idl  1 1 1 
E   0  02 sin   j  2 2  j 3 3 e  j 0 r
4  0r 0 r 0 r 
E  0
When making radiated electric field measurements, it is generally assumed (with varying
degrees of accuracy) that the measurement antenna is in the far field. In this case, the 1/(βr)
terms dominate and the 1/(βr)2 and 1/(βr)3 terms go to 0. Thus, Er goes to 0 and we are left
with:
Idl e  j 0 r 
E far  j  0  0 sin  a
4 r
For constant β, r, and θ, the above can be simplified as:
|𝐸𝑓𝑎𝑟 | = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇 ∙ 𝐼𝑑𝑙
The total electric field at a distance r from the center of a wire of length l would be given by
the integrated sum of the individual current contributions at each position z along the wire:
𝑙
|𝐸𝑓𝑎𝑟 | = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇 ∙ ∫ 𝐼(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
0
Multiplying by l/l gives:
1 𝑙
|𝐸𝑓𝑎𝑟 | = 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇 ∙ 𝑙 ∙ ∫ 𝐼(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝑙 0
The last term in the expression above is the very definition of integrated average current:
1 𝑙
𝐼𝐴𝑉 = ∫ 𝐼(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝑙 0
Thus, the radiated electric field is determined by the net integrated average current on the
cable and not by the peak current.
Implications of net integrated average current on CMCE measurements are discussed in

section 2.5.3.3.2.4.
Further details are provided in the GEVS application note entitled, “Radiated Emissions as a
Function of Common Mode Current.”
2.5-75
Figure 2.5-41. Elemental Electric (Hertzian) Dipole Model
2.5.3.3.2.3 CMCE and Crosstalk
Figure 2.5-42 shows a simplified inductive crosstalk model. The culprit cable carries a common
mode current as a function of position, I(z), as shown. To first order, the B-field coupling to the
victim cable at position z will be proportional to the current at the corresponding position on
the culprit cable:
𝜇0
𝐵(𝑧) = 𝐼(𝑧)
2𝜋𝑟
The coupled potential in the victim cable is the time derivative of the total magnetic flux Φ
coupling through the loop formed by the victim cable over the ground plane. For frequencies
at which the cable is electrically short, the current is constant over the length of the culprit
cable, which means that, to first order, that the B-field is constant over the length of the victim
cable. In this case, Φ = BA, where A is the area of the victim loop given by the length l of the
wire multiplied by the height h above the ground plane.
For frequencies at which the cable is electrically long, Φ is the spatial integral of B(z) over the
length of the cable:
𝑙
𝜇0 ℎ 𝑙
Φ = ℎ ∫ 𝐵(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = ∫ 𝐼(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
0 2𝜋𝑟 0
where I(z) includes magnitude and phase at each position. Multiplying both numerator and
denominator by l gives:
𝑙
𝜇0 ℎ𝑙 1 𝑙
Φ = ℎ ∫ 𝐵(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = ∙ ∫ 𝐼(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
0 2𝜋𝑟 𝑙 0
The last term in the expression above is the very definition of integrated average current:
1 𝑙
𝐼𝐴𝑉 = ∫0 𝐼(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝑙
2.5-76
Figure 2.5-42. Simplified Inductive Crosstalk Model
Just as with radiated electric fields discussed in the previous section, crosstalk is determined
by the net integrated average current on the culprit cable and not by the peak current.
Implications of net integrated average current on CMCE measurements are discussed in

section 2.5.3.3.2.4.
Further details are provided in the GEVS application note entitled, “Inductive Crosstalk at the
System Level.”
2.5.3.3.2.4 Current Distribution on Mismatched Transmission Line
When considering common mode conducted emissions on a cable, the cable must be
considered a wire-above-ground transmission line, the pertinent parameters of which are
discussed in section 2.5.3.3.9.
In most cases, the characteristic impedance Z0 falls in the range of 200 – 300 Ω. A value of
300 Ω will be used herein as a case study.
The general case for CMCE measurements is that of a shielded cable with the shield
terminated to chassis on both ends of the cable. The wire-above-ground transmission line
will not be terminated in its characteristic impedance (the terminating impedance on each
end will be near 0 Ω), which will result in reflections on each end and standing waves along
the length of the cable. This behavior must be understood in order to assess their
implications for performing CMCE measurements.
The general transmission line model is shown in Figure 2.5-43.
The reflection coefficients at the source and load ends, ΓS and ΓL, respectively, are given by:
𝑍𝑆 − 𝑍0
Γ𝑆 =
𝑍𝑆 + 𝑍0
𝑍𝐿 − 𝑍0
Γ𝐿 =
𝑍𝐿 + 𝑍0
where ZS and ZL are the terminating impedances at the source and load ends, respectively.
2.5-77
Figure 2.5-43. General Transmission Line Model
The envelope of the current amplitude on a mismatched transmission line of length l as a

function of distance z from the source is given by:
𝑉𝑆 1 − Γ𝐿 𝑒 −𝑗2𝛽𝑙 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑧
𝐼(𝑧) = ∙
𝑍0 + 𝑍𝑆 1 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 𝑒 −𝑗2𝛽𝑙
where VS is the amplitude of the source end drive potential.
Multiplying numerator and denominator by the denominator’s complex conjugate gives:
𝑉𝑆 1 − Γ𝐿 𝑒 −𝑗2𝛽𝑙 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑧 1 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑙

𝐼(𝑧) = ∙ ∙
𝑍0 + 𝑍𝑆 1 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 𝑒 −𝑗2𝛽𝑙 1 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑙
𝑉𝑆 1 + Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 Γ𝐿 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑧 − Γ𝐿 𝑒 −𝑗2𝛽𝑙 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑧 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑙
𝐼(𝑧) = ∙
𝑍0 + 𝑍𝑆 (Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 )2 − 2Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 cos(2𝛽𝑙) + 1
𝑉𝑆 1 + Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 Γ𝐿 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑧 − Γ𝐿 𝑒 −𝑗2𝛽𝑙 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑧 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑙
𝐼(𝑧) = ∙
The numerator of the second term is split into its real and imaginary components as follows:
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑅𝑒 = 1 + Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 2 cos(2𝛽𝑧) − Γ𝐿 cos(2𝛽𝑧 − 2𝛽𝑙) − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 cos(2𝛽𝑙)

𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑚 = Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 2 sin(2𝛽𝑧) − 𝛤𝐿 sin(2𝛽𝑧 − 2𝛽𝑙) − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 sin(2𝛽𝑙)
This leads to the following expressions for the magnitude and phase of the current amplitude
as a function of position on the cable:
𝑉𝑆 √(𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑅𝑒 )2 + (𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑚 )2
|𝐼(𝑧)| = ∙
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑚
𝜃(𝑧) = tan−1
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑅𝑒
Figure 2.5-44 through Figure 2.5-47 show the relationship of current amplitude vs. position for
a wire-above-ground transmission line with Z0 = 300 Ω and terminated with ZS = ZL = 1 Ω. The
plots are normalized for VS = 2 V to give a peak current of 1 ampere. These plots carry a
number of implications for CMCE measurements as discussed below.
2.5-78
Figure 2.5-44. Current Amplitude vs. Position, DC to l = λ/4
Figure 2.5-45. Current Amplitude vs. Position, l = λ/4 to l = λ/2
2.5-79
Figure 2.5-46. Current Amplitude vs. Position, l = λ/2 to l = 3λ/4
Figure 2.5-47. Current Amplitude vs. Position, l = 3λ/4 to l = λ
2.5-80
From DC through frequencies corresponding to approximately l = λ/8, the current amplitude is

nearly constant over the entire length. (This is the very definition of “electrically short.”) At
these frequencies, the placement of the current probe for a CMCE measurement is not crucial;
it may be placed anywhere along the length of the cable. For l > λ/8, the current amplitude is
no longer constant over the cable length, and the location of the current probe for a CMCE
measurement becomes important. (This is the very definition of “electrically long.”)
At l = λ/4, the current is a minimum at the source and a maximum at the load. The current at
the source end may be several orders of magnitude lower than that at the load.
For λ/4 < l < λ, there is at least one current null along the length of the cable with a much lower
amplitude than the peak. These nulls occur at distances from the load end equal to odd
multiples of λ/4. The ratio of the maximum to minimum amplitude, called the standing wave
ratio (SWR), may span several orders of magnitude.
For l = λ/2 and l = λ, the maximum current amplitude is equal to the DC current. These are
resonant frequencies, which are discussed further below. Note that even in these cases, nulls
occur on the line at distances of odd multiples of (2n-1)λ/4 from the load end.
At all frequencies, a current maximum occurs at the load end.
Figure 2.5-48 shows the source end (z = 0) current amplitude as a function of l/λ for the same
configuration described above. At low frequencies for which the length is much shorter than a
wavelength the source end current is equal to the DC current of 1 A (120 dBµA). For l/λ >
0.001, the amplitude drops due to the standing waves that develop on the mismatched
transmission line according to the equation above. As shown in the figure, the source end
current reaches a minimum (null) when l = λ/4 and a maximum (peak) when l = λ/2, and it
repeats this pattern for odd multiples of λ/4 and even multiples of λ/2.
Figure 2.5-48. Source End Current vs. l/λ for Mismatched Transmission Line
2.5-81
Figure 2.5-49 shows the currents at the midpoint and at the load end of the mismatched
transmission line in comparison with the source end current. At frequencies for which l < λ/10,
the current is essentially uniform along the length. Thus, at these frequencies, the placement
of the current probe for a CMCE measurement is not crucial; it may be placed anywhere along
the length of the cable.
At frequencies for which l > λ/10, the measured current clearly depends very significantly on
probe position. Placing the current probe in a single location adjacent to the EUT (i.e. at the
source end) may result in an artificially high level at resonant peaks for which l = nλ/2 or an
artificially low level at nulls for which l = (2n-1)λ/4. In the former case, this could cause an
apparent test failure for a level that may be benign with the different cable layout in the flight
configuration. In the latter case, it could mask a real emission from the EUT that could be more
significant in the flight configuration.
As Figure 2.5-45 shows, the maximum current may be captured at all frequencies by placing
the current probe at the load end. While this approach addresses the nulls at l = (2n-1)λ/4, it
will still produce artificially high levels for the peaks at l = nλ/2.
The significance of this is that the pattern of peaks and nulls depends directly on cable length
and routing (height above ground plane, etc.). Unless the test cabling configuration precisely
replicates the flight configuration (which may be difficult to do; for example, the specific flight
cable lengths may not be defined at the time of a unit level test), the pattern of peaks and nulls
will be different between the two configurations, and the test results may not be directly
applicable to the flight configuration. Moreover, as discussed in sections 2.5.3.3.2.2 and
2.5.3.3.2.3, the dominant factor is the net integrated average current along the wire, not the
peaks and nulls.
Figure 2.5-49. Currents at Various Locations on Mismatched Transmission Line
2.5-82
Ideally, what is desired is a normalized measurement of the emissions from the EUT that is
independent of the cable configuration. This will provide a truer assessment of the frequency
content of the emissions from the EUT that may be more effectively use to assess compatibility
with the rest of the platform in the flight configuration.
The resonant behavior is determined in large part by the transmission line’s input impedance
Zi, which is given by:
𝑍𝐿 + 𝑗𝑍0 tan(𝛽𝑙)
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍0
𝑍0 + 𝑗𝑍𝐿 tan(𝛽𝑙)
When l is an odd multiple of λ/4, the tan(βl) terms dominate and the expression reduces to:
𝑍02
𝑍𝑖 =
𝑍𝐿
when l = (2n-1)λ/4, a shorted termination will map to an open circuit at the source end,
producing the current nulls as shown in Figure 2.5-49.
When l is a multiple of λ/2, the tan(βl) terms go to 0 and the expression reduces to:
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍𝐿
Thus, when l = nλ/2, a shorted termination will map to a short circuit at the source end,
producing the current peaks as shown in Figure 2.5-49.
By inserting a controlled resistance into the line in order to increase the effective ZL in the
frequency range where the peaks and nulls occur, the input impedance will decrease at the
nulls and increase at the peaks. This will provide damping of the peaks and nulls in order to
provide the normalized measurement of EUT emissions described above.
Figure 2.5-50 shows the effect of damping on the first null at l = λ/4. The added impedance
increases the minimum current at the source end while leaving the maximum current
unchanged. When the load impedance matches Z0, the current amplitude is constant across
the length of the cable. Moreover, at all values of damping impedance, the maximum current
is equal to the current for a properly matched terminating impedance of Z0. The implication is
that at null frequencies, the damping impedance has no effect on the maximum current on the
cable, and it provides the benefit of making the current more uniform along its length. Thus,
the specific position of the current probe for a CMCE measurement is no longer crucial.
Figure 2.5-51 shows the effect of damping on the first resonant peak at l = λ/2. The added
impedance decreases the maximum current at the source and load ends. When the load
impedance matches Z0, the current amplitude is constant across the length of the cable. At all
values of damping impedance, the peak current at the midpoint of the cable (λ/4 from the load
end) is equal to the ideal current for a properly matched terminating impedance of Z0. As was
the case described above for null frequencies, damping provides the benefit of making the
current more uniform along its length. Thus, the specific position of the current probe for a
CMCE measurement is no longer crucial.
2.5-83
Figure 2.5-50. Effect of Damping Impedance on Null at l = λ/4
Figure 2.5-51. Effect of Damping Impedance on Peak at l = λ/2
2.5-84
In order to more fully address the effect of damping on the resonant peaks for which l = nλ/2,
it is instructive to return to the full time-domain representation of the current distribution along
the wire, which is as follows using the expressions previously derived for magnitude and
phase.
𝐼(𝑧, 𝑡) = |𝐼(𝑧)|𝑒 𝑗𝜃(𝑧) ∙ 𝑒 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧)
Taking the real part:
𝐼(𝑧, 𝑡) = |𝐼(𝑧)| ∙ cos[𝜔𝑡 − 𝛽𝑧 + 𝜃(𝑧)]
The primary reason for performing CMCE measurements is to evaluate the risk of radiated
emissions and crosstalk. As discussed in sections 2.5.3.3.2.2 and 2.5.3.3.2.3, the dominant
factor for both of these concerns is the net integrated average current along the wire:
1 𝑙
𝐼𝐴𝑉 =
∫ 𝐼(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝑙 0
When the wire is driven at the frequency for which l = λ/2, the current distribution I(z) will be
exactly half a sinusoid with a phase shift that changes as a function of time. Figure 2.5-52
shows the “snapshot in time” for which I(z) is precisely symmetric about 0, giving an average
current of exactly 0. To first order, the resulting magnetic flux density B(z,t) at this “snapshot
in time” is also symmetric about 0, giving a net coupled magnetic flux of exactly 0.
Figure 2.5-53 shows the “snapshot in time” for which I(z) is entirely “positive” (on the same
side of the 0 line). This results in the maximum net coupled flux through the victim loop as
shown.
As shown in Figure 2.5-54, increased damping reduces the peak amplitude of I(z) at the
“snapshot” in time when the average current and net coupled magnetic flux are 0. As shown
in Figure 2.5-55, the current distribution at the “snapshot in time” corresponding to maximum
coupling is independent of the damping impedance.
Moreover, the average current at frequencies for which l = nλ/2 is independent of the damping
impedance (see derivation at the end of this subsection):
𝑉𝑆 2
𝑅𝑒[𝐼𝐴𝑉 (𝑡)] = ∙ ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝜔0 𝑡
𝑍0 𝑛𝜋
where n is an integral multiple of λ/2 and ω0 is the temporal frequency for which l = λ/2.
Thus, at resonant peaks for which l = nλ/2, damping provides the benefit of making the current
more uniform along its length of the wire without changing the average current, which is the
primary parameter of interest.
2.5-85
Figure 2.5-52. “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Field Cancellation
Figure 2.5-53. “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Coupling
2.5-86
Figure 2.5-54. Damping at “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Field Cancellation
Figure 2.5-55. Damping at “Snapshot in Time” for Maximum Coupling
2.5-87
Thus, inserting a damping resistance in the cable would effectively “detune” the resonant peaks without
changing the average current, and it would come closer to providing the ideal normalized measurement of
EUT emissions that is desired. The ideal would be to provide a matched termination equal to the
transmission line’s characteristic impedance. However, a matched termination at all frequencies would
significantly reduce the current emissions at frequencies for which the cable is electrically short, which is
not desirable. Moreover, such a connection would require breaking the shield termination and inserting a
300 Ω resistor, which is neither desirable nor practical.
What is desired is a means of inserting a damping resistance in the line at frequencies for which the cable
is electrically long that will dampen the peaks and nulls shown in Figure 2.5-48. This function is provided
by the absorbing clamp which inserts the desired damping impedance, Thus, minimizing the standing
waves on an electrically long mismatched transmission line and facilitating the normalized measurement of
EUT emissions at higher frequencies.
The resulting coupling onto victim cables is addressed in section 2.5.3.3.6.1 for Common Mode Conducted
Susceptibility (CS114 test method).
2.5-88
Derivation of average current for l = nλ/2:
𝑉𝑆 1 − 𝛤𝐿 𝑒 𝑗2𝛽𝑧 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧) 𝑉𝑆 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡

𝐼(𝑧, 𝑡) = ∙ 𝑒 = ∙ (𝑒 −𝑗𝛽𝑧 − 𝛤𝐿 𝑒 𝑗𝛽𝑧 )
𝑍0 + 𝑍𝑆 1 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿 𝑍0 + 𝑍𝑆 1 − Γ𝑆 Γ𝐿
For ZS → 0, ГS → -1:
𝑉𝑆 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡
𝐼(𝑧, 𝑡) = ∙ (𝑒 −𝑗𝛽𝑧 − 𝛤𝐿 𝑒 𝑗𝛽𝑧 )
𝑍0 1 + Γ𝐿
𝑉𝑆 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡 1 𝑙 −𝑗𝛽𝑧 𝑉𝑆 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡 1 𝑙

𝐼𝐴𝑉 (𝑡) = ∙ ∙ ∫ (𝑒 − 𝛤𝐿 𝑒 𝑗𝛽𝑧 )𝑑𝑧 = ∙ ∙ ∙ [−𝑒 −𝑗𝛽𝑧 − 𝛤𝐿 𝑒 𝑗𝛽𝑧 ]0
𝑍0 + 𝑍𝑆 1 + Γ𝐿 𝑙 0 𝑍0 + 𝑍𝑆 1 + Γ𝐿 𝑗𝛽𝑙
𝑉𝑆 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡 1
= ∙ ∙ ∙ [−𝑒 −𝑗𝛽𝑙 − 𝛤𝐿 𝑒 𝑗𝛽𝑙 + 1 + 𝛤𝐿 ]
𝑍0 1 + Γ𝐿 𝑗𝛽𝑙
For β = 2π/λ and l = nλ/2, β = nπ, and ω = nω0, where ω0 is the frequency for which l = λ/2.
For even n, e-jnπ = 1 and IAV(t) = 0.
For odd n, e-jnπ = -1, and:
𝑉𝑆 𝑒 𝑗𝑛𝜔0𝑡 1
𝐼𝐴𝑉 (𝑡) = ∙ ∙ ∙ [1 + 𝛤𝐿 + 1 + 𝛤𝐿 ]
𝑍0 1 + Γ𝐿 𝑗𝑛𝜋
𝑉𝑆 𝑒 𝑗𝑛𝜔0 𝑡 2
= ∙ ∙ ∙ [1 + 𝛤𝐿 ]
𝑍0 1 + Γ𝐿 𝑗𝑛𝜋
𝑉𝑆 2 1 + 𝛤𝐿
= ∙ ∙ ∙ [−𝑗𝑒 𝑗𝑛𝜔0𝑡 ]
𝑍0 𝑛𝜋 1 + Γ𝐿
Dependence on ГL cancels, leaving the following expression for average current at l = nλ/2
that is independent of ZL and ГL and is always equal to the average current into a properly
matched transmission line as determined by its characteristic impedance Z0:
𝑉𝑆 2
𝑅𝑒[𝐼𝐴𝑉 (𝑡)] = ∙ ∙ sin 𝑛𝜔0 𝑡
𝑍0 𝑛𝜋
2.5-89
2.5.3.3.2.5 Example Current Measurements
Some example current measurements were performed using the wire-above-ground fixture
depicted in Figure 2.5-56. The wire length was 4 meters to represent the length of a typical
signal cable running from the EUT to the feedthrough panel. The load end was terminated in
a short circuit, and the source end was driven by a 50 Ω signal source set to an output level
of 0 dBm (224 mVrms) and swept from 30 MHz to 200 MHz.
Figure 2.5-56. Current Measurement Fixture
2.5-90
Figure 2.5-57 shows the resulting current on the 4-meter wire measured from 150 kHz to 500
MHz with a standard current probe (Fischer F-65) at the source end, at the midpoint, and at
the load end. These measured values show excellent agreement with the theoretical
predictions shown in Figure 2.5-49. At the source end, nulls occur at odd multiples of 17 MHz
(approximately λ/4) and peaks occur at multiples of 34 MHz (approximately λ/2). For the CMCE
measurements using a standard current probe up to 30 MHz, placing the current probe near
the load end (near the access panel in the actual setup) will effectively address the first null in
most cases.
As discussed in section 2.5.3.2.1, all outer shields of all EGSE cables should be terminated at
the chamber wall in order to prevent common mode currents from EGSE from entering the
test chamber and increasing the ambient electromagnetic level. If the nature of specific EGSE
cables renders this approach undesirable or, the cables should be run through a stuffing tube
with the outer jacket removed and the tube filled with conductive wool as shown in Figure 2.5-
33.
Figure 2.5-58 shows the current measured from 30 MHz to 200 MHz with two different
absorbing clamps, the Fischer F-201-23mm and the Rohde & Schwarz MDS-21, compared
with the current measured with the F-65 current probe. The results are plotted on a linear
frequency scale in order to show the repeating pattern of peaks and nulls more clearly than
on a logarithmic frequency scale.
Both absorbing clamps give very similar results. The peaks and nulls are smoothed out and it
more closely resembles the ideal current into a matched load, by design. Thus, the absorbing
clamp provides something much closer to the desired normalized measurement of emissions
from the EUT that is independent of cable configuration in the frequency range that will contain
resonant peaks and nulls.
The absorbing clamp is most effective for longer cables. In particular, it should be used for the
2-meter primary power cables and the signal cables connecting to the access panel. If CMCE
measurements are desired on shorter cables connecting between different portions of the EUT
(e.g. a setup that includes multiple electronics boxes with cables connecting between them),
the absorbing clamp is less effective and a standard current probe should be used. Indeed, in
many cases, the layout of such cables may not allow sufficient room for the absorbing clamp.
As discussed above, the current probe should be placed at the load end (opposite to the signal
source) in order to capture the peak current at all frequencies. If signal sources are connected
at both ends of the cable, measurements should be taken at both ends.
If the total length of any cable is significantly longer than 4 meters, especially any cable that
does not have it shield terminated at the access panel, it may be desirable to extend the lower
frequency limit of the absorbing clamp measurements down to 10 MHz.
2.5-91
Figure 2.5-57. Measured Current with Standard Current Probe
Figure 2.5-58. Example Measured Currents With and Without Absorbing Clamp
2.5-92
2.5.3.3.3 Conducted Emissions, Time Domain, Transients
As stated in Section 2.5.2.1.3, one of the primary purposes of this requirement is to ensure
that equipment inrush current due to turn-on and operational transients will not overstress its
circuit protection device (e.g. fuse).
The spacecraft provider will allocate a size/value for each circuit protection device based on
the peak power allocation of its corresponding unit. The intent of this requirement is to
ensure that the unit’s inrush transient is within the allowable envelope for the given circuit
protection device, Thus, minimizing the likelihood of tripping the device during integration or
during flight operations.
The envelope shown in Section 2.5.2.1.3 is a specific example based on the FM12 style fuse
used on many platforms. This envelope must be compared against the characteristics of the
specific circuit protection device(s) used on the platform and tailored as necessary.
Although Figure 2.5-9 shows the current probe located between the capacitor network and
the switch, probe placement is not critical. The 2 m power cables are not a significant
fraction of a wavelength at the frequencies of interest in this measurement (see Section
2.5.3.2.3 for the relationship between frequency and wavelength). At the upper frequency of
1 MHz indicated above, λ = 300 meters. Even if a probe is used with flat response up to 10
MHz (giving a resolution of approximately 0.1 microsecond), λ = 30 meters at this frequency.
In either case, 2 m power cables are less than λ/10 for all frequencies of interest, and the
measurement will not be significantly affected by probe placement.
The test equipment required is as follows:
1) Storage/holdup capacitors: 10,000 µF or ten times the hold-up cap in the test sample,
whichever is larger
2) Oscilloscope (floated ground if small value series resistor is used)
3) Solid-state switch that closely simulates the characteristics of the switching device used
on the platform (example design shown in Figure 2.5-59)
4) One of the following current measurement devices:
a. Current probe with flat transfer impedance from 20 Hz to 1 MHz and minimum
sensitivity of -40 dBΩ
b. 10 mΩ resistor sized to handle steady-state test sample current
2.5-93
Figure 2.5-59. Solid State Switch Example Design
Measurement System Check procedure:
1) Configure the test setup for the measurement system check as shown in Figure 2.5-60
if using the current probe method or Figure 2.5-61 if using the series resistor method.
Ensure that the power switch is turned off (open). If using a current probe, it must be
oriented for a positive reading for the inrush current event. If using a resistor, the
oscilloscope leads must be connected so that the potential drop across the resistor
during the inrush event gives a positive reading.
2) Set up the oscilloscope as follows:
a. DC coupling
b. 5 mV/division sensitivity for resistor method; for current probe method, set
sensitivity as appropriate for probe’s transfer impedance
c. 50 µs per division time base
d. Single sweep after trigger, with hold
e. Display delay such that leading edge of waveform is one division right of the left
side of display grid
f. Trigger:
- level set to 10 mV for resistor method; for current probe method, set level as
appropriate for probe’s transfer impedance
- positive (rising) edge
3) Turn on the measurement equipment and allow a sufficient time for stabilization.
4) Energize switch and record waveform. Compare trace to the current profile shown in
Figure 2.5-62. If the current probe method is used, the displayed voltage must be
converted to current using the current probe transfer impedance. If the series resistor
test method is used, the measured voltage must be converted to current using the value
of the series resistor (nominally 10 mΩ).
5) If waveform departs from the Figure 2.5-62 waveform by more than 20%, check set up
for problems and rectify before proceeding.
2.5-94
Figure 2.5-60. Measurement System Check (Current Probe)
Figure 2.5-61. Measurement System Check (Series Resistor)
2.5-95
Figure 2.5-62. Inrush Current Calibration Waveform (20% Tolerance)
Figure 2.5-63. Input Power Voltage Sag Measurement Setup
2.5-96
Input Power Voltage Sag Measurement Procedure:
1) Configure the test setup for the power bus sag measurement as shown in Figure 2.5-
6335. Ensure that the power switch is in the open position.
2) Set up the oscilloscope as follows:
a. 5 V/division sensitivity with 0 Volts at bottom of display grid for nominal 28 Vdc
bus.
b. 50 µs per division time base
c. Single sweep after trigger, with hold
d. Display such that leading edge of waveform is one division left of the left side of
display grid
e. Trigger:
- level set to 1 – 2 Volts below nominal bus potential
- looking for negative going waveform (negative trigger slope)
3) Energize switch and look for waveform that sags more than 2.8 Volts (or 10% of
nominal). If sag is greater than 10%, then provide additional line-to-line capacitance
and/or decrease the impedance of the current monitoring device (especially if using the
series resistor) as necessary. Measure again and repeat process until bus sag is within
tolerance. When making multiple inrush measurements, ensure that test sample power
supply filters have time to adequately discharge between measurements.
2.5-97
2.5.3.3.4 Conducted Susceptibility, Primary Power Leads
A discussion of the CS101 requirement, test method, and tailoring guidelines are provided in
the following subsections.
2.5.3.3.4.1 Minimize Power Source Impedance (GEVS Capacitor Network)
In order for the CS101 test method to work as intended, most of the injected ripple must be
dropped across the EUT power inputs, with minimal ripple appearing across the power source.
This is accomplished by minimizing the power source impedance. For DC power sources,
MIL-STD-462 suggests a 100 µF capacitor across the power leads. For DC and single-phase
AC power sources, MIL-STD-461G suggests placing a 10 µF capacitor between the high (+)
and return (-) power leads.
Note that the CS101 setup shown in MIL-STD-461G is also intended for platforms using AC
power sources operating at 400 Hz. The value of 10 µF is an upper limit on the line-to-line
capacitance that may be placed across such an AC bus without significantly filtering the
intentional 400 Hz signal. GSFC platforms do not use AC power buses; they use battery
dominated DC power buses operating at or near +28 VDC. On DC power buses, the line-to-
line capacitance need not be limited to 10 µF.
The reactance of 10 µF is approximately 530 Ω at 30 Hz, which means that it will be ineffective
at lowering the power source impedance at the lower end of the CS101 frequency range. For
this reason, the capacitor network specified in Figure 2.5-1 is recommended. This capacitor
network consists of the pair of 10 µF feedthrough capacitors specified by MIL-STD-462 along
with a 10,000 µF line-to-line capacitor. The reactance of the 10,000 µF capacitor is
approximately 0.5 Ω at 30 Hz. This value in shunt with the 10 µF feedthrough capacitors will
provide a low power source impedance over the entire CS101 frequency range, forcing most
of the injected ripple to drop across the EUT power inputs as desired.
2.5.3.3.4.2 Injection of Test Signal on High (+) Power Lead Only
MIL-STD-461G Section 5.7 states that CS101 is applicable to “DC input power leads, not
including returns.” Section A.5.7 in the Application Guide of MIL-STD-461G further states:
“The required signal is applicable only to the high sides on the basis that the concern is
developing a differential voltage across the power input leads to the EUT. The series
injection technique in the test procedure results in the voltage dropping across the
impedance of the EUT power input circuitry. The impedance of the power return wiring is
normally insignificant with respect to the power input over most of the required frequency
range. Common mode voltages evaluations are addressed by other susceptibility tests
such as CS114 and RS103. Injection on a power return will result in the same differential
voltage across the power input; however, the unrealistic condition will result in a large
voltage at the return connection to the EUT with respect to the ground plane.”
When the power distribution point is close to the platform ground reference, the impedance
between these two points is very small. Thus, only a small potential difference can develop
between the (-) lead at the EUT and the ground reference. This is the case on most GSFC
platforms, and in such cases, injecting on the (+) lead only is sufficient. Injection on the return
(-) lead is unnecessary.
2.5-98
When the distance between the ground reference and the distribution point is quite long, the
impedance can be relatively large. In such cases, a large potential difference can develop
between the (-) lead of the EUT and the platform ground reference. This is the case on the
International Space Station (ISS), on which this distance can be greater than 100 feet. For this
reason, ISS requires CS01 to be performed on both the (+) and (-) leads.
ISS payloads must comply with the ISS specific documentation listed in section 2.5.1.1.
2.5.3.3.4.3 Powering on Drive Amplifier Before Powering on EUT
The transformer injection method of CS101 has been shown to pose a potential damage risk
to the EUT and the drive amplifier if proper precautions are not followed. The secondary
winding of the transformer typically has an inductance of approximately 1 mH. When the drive
amplifier is powered off, the transformer’s primary windings are effectively open-circuited. As
a result, the entire 1 mH of the secondary winding will be placed in series with the power lead
to the EUT. Such a large inductance in series with the power source has been shown to cause
instability and even damage to a switched mode power supply lacking adequate decoupling
from the power source.
For these reasons, the power amplifier driving the coupling transformer MUST be powered up
and allowed to stabilize prior to applying power to the EUT. Once the amplifier is powered on,
its output impedance (typically a few ohms or less) will be connected across the transformer’s
primary windings reduced by the square of the turns ratio as it is reflected across the
transformer secondary (more about this in the “Power/Current Limits” section.)
2.5.3.3.4.4 Directly Monitor and Control Potential at EUT
The standard injection transformer used at GSFC is the Solar Electronics 6220-1A, which
provides an additional secondary winding that may be used to monitor the voltage across the
secondary. The Solar website provides a figure and an application note that gives a potentially
misleading impression that it may be sufficient to monitor and control this potential in the
control loop for the test. This is not correct. Per Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law, the injected potential
at the transformer secondary will be dropped around the entire circuit loop formed by the EUT
input and the power source impedance. For this reason, the potential across the EUT input
must be monitored and controlled directly, as shown in the figures in the main body of this
document.
2.5.3.3.4.5 Use of High Impedance Differential Voltage Probe
The basic CS101 setup in MIL-STD-461G calls for the oscilloscope’s power cable to be
connected to an isolation transformer. The isolation transformer is used to electrically float the
oscilloscope’s reference in order to avoid creating a ground loop with the return (-) power lead
if the potential is measured with a standard single-ended voltage probe. This setup creates a
potential shock hazard and is not recommended.
This problem is easily solved by monitoring the EUT input potential using a high impedance
differential voltage probe. The probe itself will isolate the return (-) power lead from the
oscilloscope reference. An alternative option is to use two single-ended probes and to display
the difference between the channels (the reference leads for the two probes must be
connected together). In either case, the oscilloscope may be properly grounded and the
isolation transformer eliminated, resulting in a safer and simpler setup.
2.5-99
2.5.3.3.4.6 Voltage Limits
The default CS101 limit in MIL-STD-461G specifies two curves. Curve #1 is for power buses
of above +28 V, and Curve #2 is for power buses of +28 V or below. Curve #1 specifies a
level of 6.3 Vrms (136 dBµV) from 30 Hz to 5 kHz; Curve #2 specifies a level of 2 Vrms (126
dBµV) in that frequency range. Both limits slope downward above 5 kHz at a rate of -20
dB/decade.
NOTE: GSFC platforms have historically implemented a standard primary bus potential of
+28 VDC. Some recent platforms implement a higher bus potential, e.g. +30 V DC. It is generally
understood that Curve #2 applies to platforms that implement DC sources operating at bus
potentials at or near +28 VDC.
These default CS101 limits are defined in order to provide margin with respect to the power
generation characteristics defined in MIL-STD-704 for aircraft. The ripple levels in MIL-STD-
704 are based on electromechanical power sources, i.e. rotating machinery that turns a shaft
that provides motive power to an electrical generator. Such power sources have significant
ripple generated by the source itself.
GSFC platforms do not use electromechanical power sources. GSFC spacecraft use solar
panel arrays that charge a battery and provide direct current to loads. This type of power
system controls bus potential using a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) system operating at a
frequency determined by the platform, which can range from a few hundred Hz to a few
hundred kHz. Such power sources will have source-generated ripple at the PWM frequency,
but this ripple is significantly less than that generated by the electromechanical sources
specified in MIL-STD-704. Any ripple at frequencies other than the PWM frequency and its
harmonics is dominated by load-induced effects, which are controlled by conducted emissions
requirements.
On GSFC platforms, the voltage ripple for power distribution systems is generally specified in
the time domain as having a maximum aggregate amplitude of 1 V peak-to-peak. Because
the spectral distribution of this ripple is not specified, a conservative approach is to specify a
CS101 frequency-domain limit that envelopes this time-domain specification at all frequencies.
Given the above, a tailored CS101 voltage limit for GSFC platforms of 1 Vrms (2.8 V peak-to-
peak) from 30 Hz to 150 kHz is expected to be more than sufficient for most GSFC platforms.
If the ripple from the spacecraft power subsystem is expected to be higher than 1 V peak-to-
peak, the CS101 limit should be further tailored accordingly.
2.5.3.3.4.7 Power/Current Limits
Prior to applying the test signal to the EUT, it is necessary to limit the amount of power that
may be applied to the EUT. This is done by pre-calibrating the test signal using the setup
shown in Figure 2.5-64. The purpose of the pre-calibration step is to create a “look-up table”
that defines the signal generator level at each frequency required to dissipate a specified
power level into a 0.5 Ω load.
This “look-up table” defines the maximum signal generator setting at each frequency when
applying the test signal to the EUT. At each frequency, the signal level is increased until either
the voltage limit or the maximum signal generator setting is reached. This is inherent in the
definition of the CS101 limit in MIL-STD-461G, Section 5.7.2:
2.5-100
“The EUT shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of performance, or deviation from
specified indications, beyond the tolerances indicated in the individual equipment or
subsystem specification, when subjected to a test signal with voltage levels as specified in
Figure CS101-1. The requirement is also met when the power source is adjusted to
dissipate the power level shown in Figure CS101-2 in a 0.5 Ω load and the EUT is not
susceptible.”
MIL-STD-461C defines a power limit for CS01 of 50 W from 30 Hz to 50 kHz. This equates to
5 Vrms across the 0.5 Ω load, which corresponds to the default voltage limit from 30 Hz to 1.5
kHz as previously discussed. This also corresponds to a current of 10 Arms through the load.
MIL-STD-461G defines a power limit of 80 W from 30 Hz to 5 kHz. This equates to 6.3 Vrms
across the 0.5 Ω load, which corresponds to the voltage limit defined by Curve #1 as discussed
previously. This also corresponds to a current of 12.5 Arms through the load.
The tailored 1 Vrms voltage limit defined in Figure 2.5-14 corresponds to 2 W dissipated in the
0.5 Ω load and 2 Arms through the load. Clearly, the default power limits of 50 W or 80 W are
quite excessive in combination with a voltage limit of 1 Vrms.
The actual purpose of the power limit is to set a short-circuit current limit. This is best illustrated
through an examination of equivalent circuits. One equivalent circuit including the transformer
is shown in Figure 2.5-65, and a second equivalent circuit showing the amplifier’s output
impedance RO referred to the transformer secondary, REFF, is shown in Figure 2.5-66.
Because the Solar 6220-1A has a turns ratio of 2:1, REFF = RO/4.
The pre-calibration step effectively defines VOC at each frequency, the maximum effective
source potential “upstream” of the effective output impedance REFF as shown in Figure 2.5-66.
This is the open-circuit potential that would appear at the transformer secondary with no load.
When the EUT’s input impedance is greater than 0.5 Ω at any given frequency, the injection
circuit will have no trouble establishing the desired potential at the EUT. When the EUT’s
input impedance REUT drops below 0.5 Ω at any given frequency, the closed-circuit potential
across the load VCC, as a function of frequency, will be limited to:
𝑅𝐸𝑈𝑇 (𝑓)
𝑉𝐶𝐶 (𝑓) = 𝑉𝑂𝐶 (𝑓) ∙
𝑅𝐸𝑈𝑇 (𝑓) + 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑓)
The current applied to the EUT, IEUT, as a function of frequency will be:
𝑉𝑂𝐶 (𝑓)
𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑇 (𝑓) =
𝑅𝐸𝑈𝑇 (𝑓) + 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑓)
The maximum current will occur when the EUT’s input impedance drops to near 0 Ω (short-
circuit) at any given frequency. Thus, the ultimate goal of the pre-calibration step is to define
the short-circuit current ISC that may be applied to the EUT at each frequency:
𝑉𝑂𝐶 (𝑓)
𝐼𝑆𝐶 (𝑓) =
𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹 (𝑓)
Thus, ISC clearly depends directly on the output impedance of the drive amplifier. MIL-STD-
462 specifies that that REFF shall be 0.5 Ω or less; MIL-STD-461F does not specify a value for
REFF.
2.5-101
Figure 2.5-64. CS01/CS101 Pre-Calibration Setup
CS01/CS101 testing at GSFC is typically performed using either the model 2352-1 or the
model 6552-1A audio amplifier, both manufactured by Solar Electronics. The 2352-1 has a
specified output impedance of 2 Ω, which maps to REFF = 0.5 Ω referred to the transformer
secondary. The 6552-1A has a specified output impedance of 2.4 Ω, which maps to REFF =
0.6 Ω referred to the transformer secondary.
Both of these amplifiers were designed specifically for CS01/CS101. As such, they work over
the specified frequency range of 30 Hz to 150 kHz, but they block any DC component. If a
different audio amplifier is used, care must be taken to ensure that it cannot pass a significant
DC component onto the transformer primary. It has been shown that applying an uncontrolled
DC offset to the transformer primary can cause instability and potential damage to the EUT.
If unknown, REFF may be easily measured using the following procedure (reproduced from
MIL-STD-462, CS01 Test Method, paragraph 4.1):
1) Apply a potential to the primary of the transformer and measure the open-circuit
potential at the secondary (VOC).
2) Connect a known load, RL (0.5 Ω recommended), across the transformer secondary
and measure the closed-circuit potential at the secondary (VCC).
3) Calculate REFF as follows:
(𝑉𝑂𝐶 − 𝑉𝐶𝐶 )
𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝐿
𝑉𝐶𝐶
4) Repeat steps 1-3 at one frequency per octave from 30 Hz to 150 kHz.
2.5-102
Figure 2.5-65. CS101 Pre-Calibration Equivalent Circuit, Transformer Included
Figure 2.5-66. CS101 Pre-Calibration Equivalent Circuit, Referred to Transformer Secondary
The impact of REFF on ISC is best illustrated through a few examples:
 As stated above, the 50 W power limit corresponds to 5 Vrms across the 0.5 Ω load.
If using the 2352-1, then REFF = 0.5 Ω, VOC = 10 Vrms, and ISC = 20 Arms. If using the
6552-1A, then REFF = 0.6 Ω, VOC = 11 Vrms, and ISC = 18.3 Arms.
 Likewise, a 2 W power limit corresponds to 1 Vrms across the 0.5 Ω load. If using the
2352-1, then REFF = 0.5 Ω, VOC = 2 Vrms, and ISC = 4 Arms. If using the 6552-1A, then
REFF = 0.6 Ω, VOC = 2.2 Vrms, and ISC = 3.7 Arms.
But recall that the output impedance of the drive amplifier is neither specified nor controlled.
What happens to ISC when REFF is much lower than 0.5 Ω, e.g. 0.1 Ω?
 The 50 W power limit still corresponds to 5 Vrms across the 0.5 Ω load. If REFF = 0.1
Ω, then VOC = 6 Vrms and ISC = 60 Arms.
 The 2 W power limit still corresponds to 1 Vrms across the 0.5 Ω load. If REFF = 0.1
Ω, then VOC = 1.2 Vrms and ISC = 12 Arms.
Therefore…
THE SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENT APPLIED TO THE EUT MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY

HIGHER THAN INTENDED IF RELYING ONLY ON THE PRE-CALIBRATION STEP USING
AN AMPLIFIER WITH AN OUTPUT IMPEDANCE OF LESS THAN 2 Ω (R EFF < 0.5 Ω). IF
THE PRE-CALIBRATION STEP IS USED, THE AMPLIFIER’S OUTPUT IMPEDANCE MUST
BE CHARACTERIZED AND ITS IMPACTS ON SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENT WELL
UNDERSTOOD.
2.5-103
An alternative to the pre-calibration step is to monitor and control the current of the injected
signal directly as shown in Figure 2.5-17. This current monitor may be incorporated into the
control loop with a defined “not-to-exceed” value for short-circuit current. For the tailored 1
Vrms and 2 W limit, the equivalent short-circuit current limit is 4 A.
The current monitor/control method is the default method for audio frequency conducted
susceptibility specified by AIAA S-121, “Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements for
Space Equipment and Systems.”
An additional benefit to this approach is the EUT’s input impedance as a function of frequency
may be calculated directly as the ratio of the applied potential to the applied current at each
frequency. The measured input impedance may be provided to the spacecraft power
subsystem provider as part of a power bus stability analysis.
2.5.3.3.4.8 Alternate Test Method and Limits
As mentioned in Section 2.5.3.3.4.3, the MIL-STD-461G CS101 test method, along with its
CS01 predecessor from MIL-STD-462, has been shown to pose a potential damage risk to
the EUT if proper precautions are not followed.
In order to mitigate these concerns, an alternative injection technique similar to modern bulk
current injection technology is available. It was developed for the Apollo program Lunar
Excursion Module (LEM) in the mid-1960s. This technique uses an injection clamp instead of
a coupling transformer as shown in Figure 2.5-45. The recommended injection clamp is the
Solar Electronics 6541-1 or equivalent. This device inserts approximately 0.01 Ω in series
with each wire passing through it, which significantly reduces the risks associated with the 1
milliHenry series inductance in the CS101 test method.
The Solar Model 6541-1 has a multiple pin connector instead of the more typical coaxial
connector. The pins that connect to the power amplifier output are “C” and “D”. The other
pins are not connected for this test.
The balance of the test is identical to the MIL-STD-461G CS101 test method with the 6541-1
injection clamp taking the place of the coupling transformer. A 100-Watt audio amplifier is
required to drive the injection clamp. Note from Figure 2.5-45 that the signal is injected as a
Differential Mode signal.
If this test method is used, the recommended voltage and power limits are shown in Figures
2.5-45 and 2.5-46, respectively. If the actual ripple characteristics of the spacecraft power
subsystem exceed the levels below 500 Hz shown in Figure 2.5-19, then the standard CS101
injection transformer must be used.
The default CS01 limit in MIL-STD-461C is specified from 30 Hz to 1.5 kHz as “10% of supply
voltage or 5 Volts (rms), whichever is less”. The limit then slopes linearly downward to a level
of 1 Vrms at 50 kHz.
2.5-104
Figure 2.5-67. Conducted Susceptibility Alternate Test Setup (Differential Mode, 30 Hz to 150 kHz)
2.5-105
Figure 2.5-68. CS101 Alternate Voltage Limit
Figure 2.5-69. CS101 Alternate Power Limit
2.5-106
2.5.3.3.5 Conducted Susceptibility, Transients, Power Leads
The MIL-STD-461G CS106 requirement was developed specifically for Navy applications,
submarine and surface ship equipment in particular. The 5 microsecond pulse represents the
typical transient observed on these platforms (shown in MIL-STD-461G Figure CS106-1).
With the release of MIL-STD-461G in 2015, the CS106 requirement fell out of favor and was
no longer included.
The 10 microsecond pulse specified by the CS06 requirement of MIL-STD-461C is preferred

over the 5 microsecond pulse of CS106 because:
 it is more stringent limit than the CS106 pulse, and
 the CS06 transient generator is a standard piece of EMI test equipment in any EMI
test lab
For all platforms, the negative transient will be applied. For platforms that include rapidly
changing inductive loads that are expected to generate significant back emf onto the bus, the
positive transient will be applied as well.
Although this limit is expected to be sufficient for most platforms, it must be compared against
the worst-case expected transients generated by equipment on the platform. If significantly
longer transients are expected, the limit must be tailored accordingly, and a different transient
generator must be used.
An extensive discussion of the mechanisms that produce such transients, as well as the
history of the CS06 and CS106 test methods, is provided in the application note entitled, “CS06
– Conducted Transients on Primary Power Lines,” available on the GEVS Application Notes
page of the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
2.5.3.3.6 Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection, 10 kHz to 200 MHz
2.5.3.3.6.1 Conducted Susceptibility, Power and Signal Cables, Common Mode
The MIL-STD-461G CS114 limits are specifically defined in order to simulate currents that will
be developed on platform cabling from electromagnetic fields generated by antenna
transmissions both on and off the platform. In MIL-STD-461G Section A.5.13, the ratio of
common mode current to electric field intensity is given as 1.5 mA per V/m. Using this
relationship, the CS114 limit curves in MIL-STD-461G correspond to radiated susceptibility
(RS103) limits ranging from 5 V/m up to 200 V/m as follows:
MIL-STD-461G Curve #1: 5 V/m

2.5-107
While these types of levels may be expected at the launch site, they are significantly higher
than typical on-orbit levels, and they are almost certainly unnecessarily stringent for controlling
cable-to-cable crosstalk.
A more typical on-orbit level is 2 V/m as discussed in Section 2.5.2.4.2. This forms the basis
for the high frequency portion of the GEVS limit shown in Figure 2.5-21. In addition to
protecting against crosstalk, testing to these levels will demonstrate the ability of the victim
cables to withstand typical on-orbit electric fields.
Shielding options may be limited on some potential victim cables, such as those connecting
to equipment operating at cryogenic temperatures. Such cables may be susceptible to levels
lower than those shown in Figure 2.5-21. These cables must be identified and characterized
as early as possible for susceptibility to common mode currents. The thresholds of
susceptibility will be documented in the project EMCCP, and the Common Mode Conducted
Emissions limit for neighboring culprit cables must be defined accordingly in order to protect
the victim cables from crosstalk.
Shielding options may also be limited on potential culprit cables. If so, the crosstalk concern
must be addressed by properly separating victim and culprit cables.
As stated above, the default CS114 limit curves defined in MIL-STD-461G are derived directly
from corresponding RS103 limits. In order to understand this relationship, it is important to
understand the fundamentals of field-to-wire coupling and how they relate to the bulk cable
injection method of CS114. These topics are discussed in the following subsections.
The mechanism of crosstalk is discussed in general terms in section 2.5.3.3.2.3. As shown in

Figure 2.5-42, a common mode current on a culprit cable generates a magnetic flux that
couples into the loop formed by a victim cable over a ground plane.
As discussed in the next section, the more general case of an incident plane electromagnetic
wave also couples magnetic flux into the victim loop. Irrespective of the nature of the culprit,
when a magnetic flux is coupled into a victim cable loop, analysis of resultant potentials and
currents proceeds identically. As such, the analysis in the following sections is easily applied
to magnetic coupling resulting from crosstalk, as discussed in further detail in the GEVS
application note entitled, “Inductive Crosstalk at the System Level,” available on the “GEVS
Application Notes” page of the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
2.5-108
2.5.3.3.6.1.1 Field-to-Wire Coupling
As discussed in section 2.5.3.3.2 for CMCE measurements, a bulk cable must be considered
a wire-above-ground transmission line, the parameters of which are discussed in section
2.5.3.3.9. Field-to-wire coupling is discussed in detail in “On Field-to-Wire Coupling Versus
Conducted Injection Techniques”, Javor, Ken, 1997 IEEE EMC Symposium record. This paper
is available on the “Educational Documents” page of the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES
site:
https://spaces.gsfc.nasa.gov/display/EMCWG/Educational+Documents
While it is understood that field-to-wire coupling and crosstalk are distributed effects, i.e. that
the coupled potential is distributed along the length of the wire, the following analysis treats
the coupled potential as a lumped parameter. This approach significantly simplifies the
analysis and is considered sufficient for the purposes of defining an equivalent limit for the
CS114 test method, which applies the injected level as a bulk signal at one end of the cable
under test.
Figure 2.5-70 shows a notional diagram of the fields from a plane electromagnetic wave
impinging upon a wire of length l at a height h above a ground plane. The direction of the
incident wave as shown, with the magnetic field vector H penetrating the loop at normal
incidence, will generate the maximum coupling through the loop. Faraday’s law of
electromagnetic induction states that the magnitude of the coupled potential into a loop is the
time rate of change of the magnetic flux Φ through the loop:
𝑑Φ
|𝑉| = | |
𝑑𝑡
For an incident plane electromagnetic wave, the magnetic flux density B is:
𝐵 = 𝐵0 𝑒 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧) = 𝜇𝐻0 𝑒 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧)
The magnetic field intensity H is related to the electric field intensity E as follows:
𝐸0 𝐸0
𝐻0 = =
𝜂 √𝜇 ⁄𝜀
Thus:
𝜇𝐸0 𝐸0 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧)
𝐵= 𝑒 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧) = √𝜇𝜀 ∙ 𝐸0 𝑒 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧) = 𝑒
√𝜇 ⁄𝜀 𝑐
The total magnetic flux through the loop is the integral of B over the loop area. For a plane
wave, the field is constant over the height. Thus, the integral need only be taken over the
length:
ℎ𝐸0 𝑙 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑧) ℎ𝐸0 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑙)

Φ= ∫𝑒 𝑑𝑧 = − [𝑒 − 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡 ]
𝑐 0 𝛽𝑐
The time rate of change of Φ is:
dΦ 𝑗𝜔ℎ𝐸0
𝑉= =− [𝑒 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑙) − 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡 ]
𝑑𝑡 𝛽𝑐
2.5-109
Figure 2.5-70. Plane Electromagnetic Wave Impinging On Wire-Above-Ground
Because β = ω/c, the expression simplifies to:
𝑉 = −𝑗ℎ𝐸0 [𝑒 𝑗(𝜔𝑡−𝛽𝑙) − 𝑒 𝑗𝜔𝑡 ]
Taking the real part gives:
V = ℎ𝐸0 [− sin(𝜔𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙) + sin(𝜔𝑡)]
Further simplification is facilitated by the following trigonometric identity:
𝐴−𝐵 𝐴+𝐵
sin 𝐴 − sin 𝐵 = 2 sin ( ) cos ( )
2 2
Thus:
𝛽𝑙
𝑉 = 2ℎ𝐸0 sin ( ) cos(2𝜔𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙)
2
The maximum value will occur when the time dependent cosine term equals unity, resulting
in the following transfer function in terms of l/λ:
𝑉 𝛽𝑙 𝜋𝑙
= 2ℎ sin ( ) = 2ℎ sin ( )
𝐸0 2 𝜆
MIL-STD-461G specifies that for all tests, all interconnecting cables will be placed at a height
h = 5 cm above the ground plane. Thus, h = 5 cm will be used throughout all of the following
analysis.
The V/E transfer function as a function of l/λ for h = 5 cm is shown in Figure 2.5-71. The
transfer function has nulls at frequencies for which l is an integer multiple of λ, and it has peaks
at frequencies for which l is an odd multiple of λ/2.
2.5-110
Figure 2.5-71. V/E for Wire Above Ground, h = 5 cm
Using the simplification that sin(x) ≈ x for x << 1, at frequencies for which the wire is electrically
short (l < λ/10), the relationship simplifies to:
𝑉 𝑙
( ) ≈ 2𝜋ℎ ( )
𝐸0 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝜆
Thus, at frequencies for which the wire is electrically short, the induced potential increases
linearly with l/λ, which means it increases linearly with frequency.
The envelope shown by the dashed line is given by this linear relationship extended up to its
maximum value at l = λ/2, given by:
𝑉
( ) = 𝜋ℎ
𝐸0 𝑀𝐴𝑋
This value is extended as an asymptote for l > λ/2. For h = 5 cm, (V/E0)MAX ≈ 104 dBµV/(V/m)
≈ 150 mV/(V/m).
The physical significance of Figure 2.5-71 for l > λ/2 is that the coupled magnetic flux through
the loop includes both positive and negative contributions, resulting in some cancellation of
the net coupled flux. This further results in the decrease in the net coupled potential for l > λ/2
as shown. When the length is a multiple of a wavelength, the positive and negative magnetic
flux contributions completely cancel, and the net coupled potential is zero as shown.
2.5-111
For the purposes of defining a CS114 injected current limit, the envelope of V/E0 shown by the
dashed line in Figure 2.5-71 is sufficient and greatly simplifies the remaining analysis.
Therefore, this envelope will be used for the remaining discussion.
The resulting current on the wire is determined by the impedance of the wire-above-ground
transmission line. As discussed in section 2.5.3.3.9, the characteristic impedance Z0 can span
a range of values up to a few hundred ohms (300 Ω typical). For the purposes of performing
bulk current injection (BCI) using the CS114 test method, it is desirable to precalibrate the
injected level into a known and controlled impedance. The precalibrated levels are then
applied to the cable under test (CUT) with a maximum “target” current as discussed below.
The CS114 test method specifies precalibration into a standard 50 Ω fixture with 50 Ω
terminations at each end, giving a total loop impedance of 100 Ω (40 dBΩ). Thus, 50 Ω will be
used as the standardized value of Z0 in the remaining discussion.
Figure 2.5-72 shows the general calibration curve IC /E0 when the envelope of V/E0 is applied
to the 100 Ω (40 dBΩ) calibration fixture. The level in the high frequency plateau is 64 dBµA
per V/m, or 1.5 mA per V/m, which provides the basis for that relationship stated in MIL-STD-
461.
While it is useful to pre-calibrate into a known and controlled impedance, it is important to

understand that in most cases, the wire represents a shielded cable with the shield terminated
directly to chassis at both ends. Thus, the implications for injecting the precalibrated levels
into a wire shorted at both ends must be considered.
Figure 2.5-72. IC/E0 into 100 Ω CS114 Calibration Fixture
2.5-112
When the wire is electrically short, the impedance is dominated by the inductance:
𝑍𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 2𝜋𝑓𝐿𝑙
where L is the inductance per unit length.
Multiplying by c/c gives:
2𝜋𝑓 2𝜋 1 𝐿 𝑙 𝑙
𝑍𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐𝐿𝑙 = 𝐿𝑙 = 2𝜋√ ∙ ( ) = 2𝜋𝑍0 ( )
𝑐 𝜆 √𝐿𝐶 𝐶 𝜆 𝜆
where C is the capacitance per unit length.
Thus, when the wire is electrically short, V/E0 and Z both increase linearly with l/λ. When
dividing V/E0 by Z, the l/λ dependence cancels and I/E0 again has a constant value that is
inversely proportional to Z0:
𝐼 ℎ
( ) ≈
𝐸0 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑍0
When l = λ/2π, the impedance reaches its high frequency asymptote value of Z0, and I/E0
again has a constant value that is inversely proportional to Z0:
𝐼 𝜋ℎ
( ) ≈
𝐸0 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑍0
This is the same value in this frequency range as the case for the matched line.
These levels are shown by the green curve in Figure 2.5-73. The levels for l > λ/2π are 6 dB
above the corresponding levels for IC/E0, which provides the basis for injecting up to 6 dB
above the precalibrated current as specified by the CS114 test method.
Historically, there have been two different approaches for defining the maximum current to be
applied to the cable under test (CUT). MIL-STD-461E/F specified that the maximum applied
current to the CUT was 6 dB higher than the pre-calibrated level all across the frequency range
as shown by the red dashed curve in Figure 2.5-74. When compared against the dashed green
curve in Figure 2.5-73, this approach clearly presents an undertest at low frequencies for
which l < λ/8.
MIL-STD-461G reverted to the original approach specified by MIL-STD-461D/462D, which

was that the maximum current applied to the CUT was to be 2x (6 dB) higher than the level in
the flat part of the curve used for pre-calibration as shown by the solid red line in Figure 2.5-
74. Although this level presents an overtest for l < λ/2 as a representation of field-to-wire
coupling, it is preferable to the MIL-STD-461E/F approach because it provides a worst-case.
In addition, it provides a good basis for addressing the risk of crosstalk at these frequencies.
These concerns will be discussed further in the following subsections.
The CS114 curves specified in MIL-STD-461G show the l = λ/2 corner frequency at 1 MHz,
which corresponds to a cable length of 150 meters. While cables of this length may be found
on large military platforms, this is approximately an order of magnitude longer than typical
cables on GSFC platforms. This will be discussed further in the following subsections.
2.5-113
Figure 2.5-73. I/E0 with Precalibrated Levels Applied to Shorted 50 Ω Line
Figure 2.5-74. (I/E0)MAX per MIL-STD-461F and MIL-STD-461G
2.5-114
2.5.3.3.6.1.2 Precalibration
The purpose of the pre-calibration step is to create a lookup table that records the forward
drive level at each frequency required to establish the calibration current in a standard
calibration fixture as specified in MIL-STD-461G. These levels are not to be exceeded during
injection into a cable under test (CUT).
The general concept is similar to the pre-calibration step for CS101 as discussed in section
2.5.3.3.4.7. Because CS101 is defined as voltage injection, the purpose of the pre-calibration
step is to establish a short-circuit current limit. Because CS114 is defined as current injection,
the purpose of the pre-calibration step is to establish an open-circuit voltage limit.
In the pre-calibration setup specified by MIL-STD-461, one end the fixture is terminated in a
50 Ω coaxial load, and the other end is connected to the 50 Ω input of the measurement
device. From a loop circuit standpoint, the two 50 Ω loads are in series, providing a total loop
impedance of 100 Ω. Measurement of induced current in the fixture is performed by measuring
the voltage across the 50 Ω input of the measurement device. Therefore, the total drive voltage
injected into the fixture is actually 2x (6 dB higher) than that being measured. More information
about the pre-calibration step is provided in the MIL-STD-461G Application Guide.
In many cases, the setup can be substantially simplified from that specified in MIL-STD-461G.
Figure 2.5-75 shows a simplified setup that may be used in a development laboratory for early
diagnostic testing, and which is for many situations equally effective. In this simplified setup,
the drive level is simply the signal generator setting at each frequency that is needed to
establish the required current as read by the spectrum analyzer. Just as with the full setup,
these signal generator settings are maximum values to be applied at each frequency.
Figure 2.5-75. Simplified CS114 Calibration Diagram
2.5-115
Figure 2.5-76. CS114 Pre-Calibration Equivalent Circuit
An equivalent circuit for the CS114 pre-calibration setup is shown in Figure 2.5-76.
The injection probe acts as a coupling transformer as shown in the figure. The secondary
consists of the cable under test through the probe aperture; thus, the secondary consists of
only one winding. The injection probe input may have one or more windings, depending on
the manufacturer and model. The number of windings N will determine the effective source
impedance of the injection circuit, the implications of which are discussed in the next section.
MIL-STD-461G specifies a maximum and recommended minimum insertion loss associated

with the CS114 injection probe. This insertion loss in practice manifests itself primarily as a
shunt magnetizing inductance LM, as shown in the figure. The value of LM can be estimated
from the insertion loss curve. The typical insertion loss curves shown in MIL-STD-461G show
a “knee” at approximately 1 MHz. This knee occurs when the inductive reactance, 2πfLM, is
equal to 50 Ω. Thus, a typical value for LM is approximately 8 µH.
As shown in Figure 2.5-76, the calibration current IC induces a calibration potential Vcal across
the 50 Ω input impedance of the measurement device:
𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝐼𝐶 ∙ 50 Ω
From a loop circuit standpoint, the 50 Ω input of the measurement device is in series with the
50 Ω coaxial (dummy) load on the other side of the calibration fixture, providing a total loop
impedance of 100 Ω. For this reason, the measured potential Vcal is half of the total potential
Vemf induced in the calibration fixture:
𝑉𝑒𝑚𝑓 = 2 ∙ 𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 2 ∙ 𝐼𝐶 ∙ 50 Ω
𝑉𝑒𝑚𝑓
𝐼𝐶 =
100 Ω
2.5-116
As shown in Figure 2.5-72, the corner frequency for the high frequency asymptote occurs
when l = λ/2. The CS114 curves specified in MIL-STD-461G show the corner frequency at 1
MHz, which corresponds to a cable length of 150 meters. While cables of this length may be
found on large military platforms, this is approximately an order of magnitude longer than
typical cables on GSFC platforms. However, the shape of the precalibrated current curve is
also determined by the characteristics of the injection probe. This will be discussed in the next
section.
The shape of the curve in Figure 2.5-71, and the shape of the CS114 curves specified in MIL-
STD-461G, only apply to the current injected into the calibration fixture with a constant loop
impedance of 100 Ω. As with true field to wire coupling discussed in the next section, the
induced current in a real cable under test (CUT) will be determined by a combination of the
impedance of the loop formed by the cable and the ground plane and the source impedance
of the injection circuit.
2.5.3.3.6.1.3 Injection Onto Cable Under Test (CUT)
First, it is important to understand that for any signal source (signal generator, amplifier, etc.)
intended to operate in a 50 Ω system, the displayed value for the output potential (labelled VO
in Figure 2.5-76) assumes that the output is connected to a 50 Ω load. Because a real CUT
will not necessarily present a 50 Ω load, this displayed value for VO is not meaningful for the
purposes of circuit analysis. The more meaningful parameter is Vg, the potential on the
“upstream” side of the 50 Ω source impedance of the signal source, as shown in Figure 2.5-
76. This is the potential that will be applied to an open circuit, and it is always 2x (6 dB) higher
than the displayed output potential VO :
𝑉𝑔 = 2𝑉𝑂
(𝑉𝑔 ) = (𝑉𝑂 )𝑑𝐵 + 6 𝑑𝐵
𝑑𝐵
In the following analysis, Vg is the parameter that will be used.
The Thévenin equivalent circuit for CS114 injection onto a real CUT is shown in Figure 2.5-
77. The source impedance ZS mapped to the secondary is 1/N2 multiplied by the parallel
combination of LM and the 50 Ω output impedance of the signal source:
1 (50 Ω)(𝑗𝜔𝐿𝑀 )
𝑍𝑆 = ∙
𝑁 2 50 Ω + 𝑗𝜔𝐿𝑀
where N is the number of turns on the injection probe input. For most typical probes, N has a
value of either 1 or 2. Representative curves for N = 1 and N = 2 are shown in Figure 2.5-78.
In both cases, magnetizing inductance dominates below the knee frequency and the 50 Ω
source impedance dominates above the knee. Note that for N = 2, the entire curve shifts down
by a factor of 4 (1/N2), and the high frequency asymptote is 12.5 Ω.
Ignoring any additional loss in the injection probe beyond LM, the open-circuit potential at the
output of the probe, (Vemf)OC, is the potential required to establish the calibration current IC
through the 100 Ω impedance in the calibration fixture in series with ZS:
(𝑉𝑒𝑚𝑓 )𝑂𝐶 = 𝐼𝐶 ∙ √(100 𝛺)2 + (𝑅𝑒[𝑍𝑆 ])2 + (𝐼𝑚[𝑍𝑆 ])2
2.5-117
Figure 2.5-77. Thévenin Equivalent Circuit for CUT Injection
Figure 2.5-78. Representative ZS for N = 1 and N = 2
2.5-118
Figure 2.5-78 shows representative curves for (Vemf)OC corresponding to the specified limit for
IC shown in Figure 2.5-21 for N = 1 and N = 2. Because of the low source impedance below
the knee frequency, the open-circuit potential is essentially independent of N. Even above the
knee, the open-circuit potential does not vary significantly.
This is the maximum potential that can be injected into the CUT when its loop impedance goes
to infinity (or in practical terms, when it is much greater than 100 Ω). Thus, one of the primary
purposes of the CS114 calibration step is to limit the open-circuit potential that may be injected
into the loop at any given frequency to the precalibrated level determined for (Vemf)OC.
The short-circuit current that the injection circuit is capable of providing is given by:
(𝑉𝑒𝑚𝑓 )
𝑂𝐶
(𝐼𝐶𝑈𝑇 )𝑆𝐶 =
𝑍𝑆
Figure 2.5-79 shows representative curves for ISC for N = 1 and N = 2 that correspond to the
default limit for IC along with the maximum injected current specified by MIL-STD-461G are
also shown for reference.
Above the knee frequency in the IC curve, the injection circuit is capable of providing the
maximum current with sufficient headroom with either N = 1 or N = 2. Below the knee
frequency, the injection circuit can provide the maximum current with approximately 10 dB of
headroom for N = 2; it can just provide the maximum current with no headroom for N = 1.
Figure 2.5-79. Representative (Vemf)OC for N = 1 and N = 2
2.5-119
Figure 2.5-80. Representative ISC for N = 1 and N = 2
On GSFC platforms, a typical on-orbit RS103 level is 2 V/m as discussed in Section 2.5.2.4.2.
This corresponds to a CS114 calibration limit of 3 mA, or 70 dBµA, on the plateau portion of
the curve. This forms the basis for the GEVS limit shown in Figure 2.5-21 in the main body of
the document. In addition to protecting against crosstalk, testing to these levels will
demonstrate the ability of the victim cables to withstand typical on-orbit electric fields.
As previously stated, the knee frequency of 1 MHz corresponds to a default cable length of
150 meters, which is significantly longer than cables used on GSFC platforms. If CS114 is
strictly considered as a low frequency substitute for RS103, it would appear that these curves
are not an ideal fit and should be tailored.
If implemented, such tailoring would include the following items:

1) The knee frequency should be increased to be consistent with typical cable lengths
used on GSFC platforms, e.g. 15 meters, which is λ/2 at 10 MHz.
2) The injected frequency at low frequencies (when cable is electrically short) would be
adjusted to be consistent with the low frequency plateau shown in Figure 2.5-73.
However, the greater concern on GSFC platforms at lower frequencies is cable-to-cable

crosstalk. For this reason, GEVS applies the MIL-STD-461G approach in order to apply a
constant injected current limit of 70 dBµA across the frequency range as a more effective
means of establishing immunity to crosstalk against the limit for Common Mode Conducted
Emissions (CMCE) discussion in section 2.5.2.1.2.
2.5-120
2.5.3.3.6.2 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, 150 kHz to 50 MHz
The basic engineering concern of this test is the need to evaluate the conducted susceptibility
of equipment to ripple on its primary power inputs. For this purpose, MIL-STD-461C and MIL-
STD-462 defined CS01 for low frequencies (< 50 kHz) and CS02 for high frequencies (> 50
kHz).
With the release of MIL-STD-461D in 1993 and continuing through -461E (1999) and -461F
(2007), CS01 was replaced with CS101. CS101 is nearly identical to CS01 except that it goes
up to 150 kHz and that it requires a higher power amplifier than CS01. CS02 was discontinued
in MIL-STD-461D and all subsequent versions.
MIL-STD-461D and later versions specify the CS114 test method for evaluating conducted
susceptibility on power lines at frequencies above 150 kHz. CS114 is primarily intended to
evaluate susceptibility of bulk cables (power and signal) to common mode currents, but it is
also intended for injection of current onto power leads as stated in MIL-STD-461G Section
5.13.3.4.c:
“Also perform the procedures on power cables with the power returns and chassis
grounds (green wires) excluded from the cable bundle. For connectors which include
both interconnecting leads and power, perform the procedures on the entire bundle, on
the power leads (including returns and grounds) grouped separately, and on the power
leads grouped with the returns and grounds removed.”
The default CS02 limit was defined as a swept sinusoid with an amplitude of 1 Vrms, delivered
from a 50 Ω source from 50 kHz to 400 MHz. The voltage injection method is functionally
equivalent to the CS02 method with the capacitive coupler replaced with the inductive injection
probe. If using the voltage injection method, it is necessary to define a short-circuit current
limit in order to limit the current that may be injected into the EUT. If using the direct current
monitoring method of CS114, it is necessary to convert the CS02 voltage limit into a current
limit as discussed below.
A thorough comparison of the CS114 and CS02 test methods is provided in the GEVS
application note entitled, “CS114 vs. CS02 – Conducted Susceptibility,” available on the
“GEVS Application Notes” page of the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
As stated in the “Precalibration” section, the precalibration determines the open-circuit

potential that may be injected into the CUT, which in this case is the primary power lead to the
EUT.
If using the voltage monitor method, the injected potential will be limited to 1 Vrms across the
entire frequency range.
For the current monitor method, Figure 2.5-81 shows representative curves for (Vemf)OC
corresponding to the specified limit for IC on power lines shown in Figure 2.5-23 for N = 1 and
N = 2. Because of the low source impedance below the knee frequency, the open-circuit
potential is essentially independent of N. Above the knee, the open-circuit potential is
approximately 1.12 V for N = 2 and 1.5 V for N = 2, corresponding to the respective values of
ZS of 12.5 Ω and 50 Ω combined with the 100 Ω impedance in the calibration fixture.
2.5-121
Figure 2.5-81. Representative (Vemf)OC for N = 1 and N = 2
Figure 2.5-82. Representative ISC for N = 1 and N = 2
2.5-122
Figure 2.5-82 shows representative curves for ISC for N = 1 and N = 2. If the restriction is
removed to limit the current to 6 dB higher than the pre-calibrated current, these curves show
the amount of current that is available to inject into a low impedance.
As long as the injected levels are limited to the precalibrated forward power levels, ISC will be
limited to levels shown in Figure 2.5-78. In the event that software controls do not properly
limit the drive level, it is still good practice to monitor the injected current in real time and limit
it to the appropriate level for ISC as an additional safeguard.
If using the direct current monitor method, the common mode injection on the power leads
MUST be performed first. Due to the nature of injecting on individual power leads as described
above, the injection is a combination of common mode and differential mode. If susceptibilities
are observed at the same frequencies and with similar signatures to those observed during
common mode injection, then they are likely common mode susceptibilities. If different
susceptibilities are observed, they are likely differential mode susceptibilities and may be
addressed accordingly.
Direct differential mode injection was considered in order to be consistent with the direct
differential mode measurements of conducted emissions. Because the injection probe acts as
a transformer, the differential mode configuration, with both high and return leads running
through the probe, configures it as a 1:2 transformer. This alters the relationship of the source
impedance of the injection circuit to the load impedance of the EUT. This impedance
relationship is essential for defining the short-circuit current and open-circuit potential of the
injection circuit, which is the entire purpose of the pre-calibration step. While differential mode
injection is a good idea in principle, it was determined that it introduced unnecessary
complications to the test setup. Single line injection on each power lead is recommended as
a suitable compromise. In this respect, it is similar to the CS02 test method, which was line-
to-ground injection and was performed on each individual power lead as well.
The upper frequency limit is set to 50 MHz in order to be consistent with the upper frequency
limit for the conducted emissions tests. This allows the injection probe to be placed up to 60
cm (λ/10 at 50 MHz) from the EUT instead of the default 10 cm specified by MIL-STD-461G.
2.5-123
2.5.3.3.7 Radiated Emissions, Electric Field
2.5.3.3.7.1 Frequency Range
The basic limit and test method of MIL-STD-461G RE102 apply while incorporating the
following tailoring guidelines in section A.5.17 of the MIL-STD-461G Application Guide:
 “The limits could be adjusted based on the types of antenna-connected equipment on

the platform and the degree of shielding present between the equipment, associated
cabling, and the antennas. For example, substantial relaxations of the limit may be
possible for equipment and associated cabling located totally within a shielded volume
with known shielding characteristics.”
 “It may be desirable to tailor the frequency coverage of the limit to include only
frequency bands where antenna-connected receivers are present.”
The RE102 limit specifies the full range of frequencies used by antenna-connected receivers
on military platforms; not all of these frequencies are used on NASA platforms. Most GSFC
spacecraft do not use the electromagnetic spectrum below 2 GHz for the purpose of receiving
RF signals. A default low frequency limit of 200 MHz has been selected for radiated emission
control on GSFC platforms for the following reasons:
 Control of conducted emissions at ultra-high frequencies (UHF) is problematical. While

shield room radiated measurements are notoriously inaccurate, UHF conducted
emissions measurements are not going to be much better unless the absorbing clamp
is used. Because it cannot be guaranteed that the absorbing clamp will be used in all
cases, a radiated technique is preferred. In addition, above 400 MHz, equipment case
leakage may be as significant as radiation from the interconnecting cables.
 Many satellites use the Global Positioning System (GPS). While this doesn’t drive RE
control down to 200 MHz, it does require control down to 1 GHz.
 All launch platforms require strict control of the command destruct signal band around
400 MHz. While many portions of a GSFC satellite may be powered off during the
ascent portion of a mission, any that need to be powered will have to meet the stringent
command destruct band RE limit. Therefore, RE control at 400 MHz is required.
 200 MHz is a convenient breakpoint in the RE102 test method between different
antenna types.
For all of the reasons given above, the RE102 test method will apply between 200 MHz to 18
GHz with the limit shown in Figure 2.5-27. The figure includes a representative notch for the
S-band receiver (1.7-2.3 GHz), which should apply to most GSFC platforms. For equipment
that is powered on at launch, notches may also be applied to protect receivers on the launch
vehicle and at the launch site. Figure 2.5-27 also includes a representative notch for the
Launch Vehicle Command Destruct receiver (420-480 MHz). These notches, and any other
applicable notches for other receivers, must be tailored for the specific receiver frequency
ranges and sensitivity levels on the platform. In each notch, the measurement bandwidth that
simulates the protected receiver must be used instead of the MIL-STD-461G prescribed
bandwidth that would normally be used in that band.
2.5-124
Further guidance relevant to Launch Vehicle & Launch Site Electromagnetic Environments
can be found in the following documents:
 ELVL-2010-0042300 Electromagnetic Environments – A guideline for Spacecraft

launching from Eastern, Western and Pacific Ranges
Emissions below 200 MHz are addressed by the Common Mode Conducted Emissions
(CMCE) test on power and signal cables defined in Section 2.5.2.1.2. The purpose of that
test is to control cable-to-cable crosstalk while at the same time eliminating the paperwork
associated with waivers against an inapplicable and unnecessarily stringent RE102 limit
below 200 MHz. The CMCE test is adapted from the alternate RE102 test methods defined
in SL-E-0002, Space Shuttle Specification, Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics,
Requirements for Equipment.

Mode Current,” available on the “GEVS Application Notes” page of the GSFC EMC Working
Group SPACES site:
The guidance above should apply to most GSFC platforms. However, if any equipment on
the platform uses the electromagnetic spectrum below 200 MHz, then a radiated emission limit
must be imposed at those frequencies, and the corresponding RE102 test methods of MIL-
STD-46G should be applied. In addition, the antenna used for the measurement should
simulate that used on the platform.
2.5.3.3.7.2 Antennas
The MIL-STD-461G RE102 test procedure specifies the use of double ridge horn antennas
between 200 MHz and 18 GHz. Additional options include the log-spiral or log periodic
antenna. Although conical log spiral antennas are discouraged in MIL-STD-461G, they are
permitted on GSFC platforms because they offer some advantages in certain applications as
discussed below.
The double ridge horn has a constant aperture. This means the gain increases with frequency,
which translates to a decreased field-of-view as frequency increases. The log-spiral and log
periodic antennas have a lower and constant gain as a function of frequency, which translates
into a wider and more constant field of view. For these reasons, the log-spiral and log periodic
antennas are better suited to capture all of the radiated emissions from a given test setup
using fewer antenna positions, Thus, reducing total test time. This can be a particularly
significant advantage when performing a radiated emissions test on a larger test article such
as an integrated instrument, payload, or spacecraft, when costs for test time are significantly
higher due to “marching army” costs.
The log-spiral antennas offer similar advantages for radiated susceptibility testing, as
discussed in section 2.5.3.3.8.
2.5-125
A few notes regarding log-spiral antennas:
 Log-spiral antennas are circularly polarized, which means their response to a linearly
polarized field is 3 dB down from what it is for the proper circular polarization. This must
be addressed in one of two ways: 1) applying a -3 dB correction factor to the test
configuration, or 2) subtracting 3 dB from the nominal limit.
 The wide field-of-view (low gain) and circular polarization enable most measurements
to be completed using only one position and one polarization.
 The log-spiral antenna only works up to 10 GHz; the double ridge horn must be used
for measurements above 10 GHz.
 The low gain of the log-spiral antenna may not have the required sensitivity in the
notches, depending on the level of the notch. If so, it is recommended that a basic
sweep be performed using the log-spiral, then go back and scan the notch frequencies
with the double ridge horn.
2.5.3.3.7.3 Antenna Positions and “Spot Sizes”
MIL-STD-461G specifies the following for RE102 antenna positions:
 For testing from 200 MHz up to 1 GHz, place the antenna in a sufficient number of
positions such that the entire area of each EUT enclosure and the first 35 cm of cables
and leads interfacing with the EUT enclosure are within the 3 dB beamwidth of the
antenna.
 For testing at 1 GHz and above, place the antenna in a sufficient number of positions
such that the entire area of each EUT enclosure and the first 7 cm of cables and leads
interfacing with the EUT enclosure are within the 3 dB beamwidth of the antenna.
From the above, it is clear that emissions from the interconnect cables are being measured
along with emissions from the EUT enclosure itself. ALL CABLES CONNECTING TO THE
EUT ARE CONSIDERED PART OF THE TEST ARTICLE.
In order to optimize the number of antenna positions for a given test configuration, it is
necessary to determine the area of the EUT that is “seen” by the antenna at a given location.
This “seen” area is commonly called the “spot size.”
The spot size is determined by the 3 dB (half power) beamwidth, θ3dB, of the test antenna. It
is generally a function of frequency and may be specified in the manufacturer’s datasheet as
a curve or family of curves. When such curves are provided, the minimum value over the
frequency range of interest may be taken directly from the datasheet.
The value of θ3dB is always defined as the end-to-end span of the beam as shown in Figure
2.5-83. In order to calculate the diameter of the spot size, what is needed is the angle from
boresight to the edge of the beam, which is given by θ3dB/2. Thus, for a test antenna placed at
a distance r from the EUT, the diameter D of the spot seen by the antenna is given by:
𝜃3𝑑𝐵
𝐷 = 2𝑟 tan ( )
2
2.5-126
For standard RE102 measurements, r = 1 meter.
An antenna with a minimum θ3dB of 30 degrees in a given frequency range of interest will have
a spot size with a minimum diameter of 52 cm.
An antenna with a minimum θ3dB of 60 degrees in a given frequency range of interest will have
a spot size with a minimum diameter of 1.15 m.
Knowledge of spot sizes for each test antenna will allow the test engineer to select an optimal
number of antenna positions in order to provide sufficient coverage of the EUT and
interconnect cables while making most efficient use of test time.
Figure 2.5-83. RE “Spot Size” Calculation
2.5-127
2.5.3.3.7.4 Notches
As stated in MIL-STD-461, the purpose of the RE102 requirement is to protect sensitive

receivers from interference coupled through the antennas associated with the receiver. Some
platforms specify notches to protect specific receivers that are sensitive to levels that are lower
than the default RE102 limit. The purposes of this section are to 1) provide guidance for
defining meaningful limits that may be measured within the constraints of available
technology, and 2) to indicate strategies for measuring to such low limits.
2.5.3.3.7.4.1 Designing a Notch
The theoretical noise power in Watts delivered by a thermal source into an impedance
matched load is:
𝑃𝑁 = 𝑘𝐵 𝑇𝐵
where:
kB = Boltzmann’s constant = 1.38 x 10-23 J/K

T = temperature, K
B = bandwidth, Hz
When defining the noise floor of a piece of measurement equipment, a standard reference
temperature of T = 290 K is used. In this case, kBT = 4 x 10-21 W/Hz = –174 dBm/Hz.
Thus,
(𝑃𝑁 )𝑑𝐵 = −174 𝑑𝐵𝑚/𝐻𝑧 + 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐵
In a 50 Ω system (typical for RF receiver inputs), the potential in dBµV across the 50 Ω resistor
is 107 dB higher than the power in dBm. Therefore, the equivalent broadband thermal voltage
noise VN in a 50 Ω system is:
(𝑉𝑁 )𝑑𝐵 = −67 𝑑𝐵𝜇𝑉/√𝐻𝑧 + 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐵
The equations above represent the theoretical minimum broadband noise floor of the
measurement system for a given measurement bandwidth. Even when all other sources of
noise are eliminated, the noise floor cannot be reduced any lower than this.
The noise floor may be further converted to an equivalent minimum measurable electric field
level in dBµV/m using the antenna factor (AF):
𝐸(𝑑𝐵𝜇𝑉/𝑚) = 𝑉𝑁𝐹 + 𝐴𝐹(𝑑𝐵/𝑚)
The antenna factor is the reciprocal of the antenna’s effective height he, which is, by definition,
equal to the ratio of the received potential V to the incident electric field E:
𝑉
ℎ𝑒 =
𝐸
The effective height may be derived from the effective aperture Ae, which is given by:
𝐺𝜆2 𝐺𝑐 2
𝐴𝑒 = =
4𝜋 4𝜋𝑓 2
2.5-128
However, Ae is, by definition, the ratio of the received power P to the incident power density
PD.
For a 50 Ω receiver input:

𝑉2
𝑃=
50 Ω
For an incident plane wave in free space with electric field E:
𝐸2
𝑃𝐷 =
120𝜋
Thus,
𝐺𝑐 2 𝑃 (𝑉 2 /50 Ω)
𝐴𝑒 = = =
4𝜋𝑓 2 𝑃𝐷 𝐸 2 /120𝜋
𝑉2 50𝐺𝑐 2
=
𝐸 2 480𝜋 2 𝑓 2
𝑉 𝑐√𝐺
ℎ𝑒 = =
𝐸 9.73𝑓
1 9.73𝑓
𝐴𝐹 = =
ℎ𝑒 𝑐√𝐺
Figure 2.5-84. Side and Back Lobe Antenna Factor
2.5-129
Using c = 0.3 x 109 m/s, expressing f in GHz, and converting to dB gives:
𝐴𝐹(𝑑𝐵/𝑚) = 30.22 + 20 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑓𝐺𝐻𝑧 − 𝐺(𝑑𝐵𝑖)
When defining an RE102 notch limit to apply to neighboring equipment to protect the receiver,
the gain in the antenna’s main lobe should not be used in the above equation. Unintentional
radiated emission sources are always located in side or back lobes. A conservative worst-
case value for gain in side or back lobes is 0 dBi (unity); this is the value of G(dBi) that should
be used in the equation above. When the antenna pattern is omnidirectional, or nearly so, and
there is no pronounced main beam vs. back lobes, then it is not possible to place electronics
completely out of the “main” beam of the receiving antenna. In this case, the appropriate omni
or near omni gain should be used for G(dBi). The theoretical antenna factor from 1 – 18 GHz,
assuming G = 0 dBi across the frequency range, is shown as the solid blue curve in Figure
2.5-84.
The side/back lobe antenna factor in Figure 2.5-84 combined with the theoretical average
thermal noise floor leads to the family of curves in Figure 2.5-85 for noise equivalent electric
field as a function of measurement bandwidth. The figure also shows the default RE102 limit
with notional notches for comparison. All of these curves are normalized to a noise figure of 0
dB (discussed in the next section) and apply the theoretical antenna factor that assumes an
antenna gain of 0 dBi across the frequency. In addition, negligible cable loss is assumed.
The main purpose of Figure 2.5-85 is to provide guidance in defining meaningful notch limits
that correspond to the operating bandwidth of the victim radio that is being protected. Consider
the default S-band notch at 2025 – 2120 MHz. The figure shows that the displayed 20 dBuV/m
limit is commensurate with a receiver whose bandwidth is below 100 kHz. However, if the
measurement receiver operates with a bandwidth of 100 kHz or more, this limit would not be
realistic and the error in the limit definition must be investigated and corrected.
Figure 2.5-85. Theoretical Noise Floor Limits Considering Average Thermal Power
2.5-130
2.5.3.3.7.4.2 Instrumentation for Measuring a Low-level Notch Limit
The performance of a measurement system is governed by its noise factor F, which is defined
as the linear (non-dB) ratio of the device’s actual output noise floor to the theoretical thermal
noise floor limit, with both quantities expressed in terms of power:
𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

𝐹=
𝑘𝐵 𝑇𝐵
F is a departure from the ideal noise floor and is always greater than 1.
The noise figure (NF) is simply the noise factor expressed in dB. The device’s noise floor is
obtained by adding the specified NF to the theoretical thermal noise floor limit:
𝑃𝑁𝐹 = −174 𝑑𝐵𝑚/𝐻𝑧 + 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐵 + 𝑁𝐹
𝑉𝑁𝐹 = −67 𝑑𝐵𝜇𝑉/√𝐻𝑧 + 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐵 + 𝑁𝐹
If the measurement receiver noise floor is too high to make the desired measurement, a low
noise amplifier (LNA) between the antenna and receiver can lower the measurement system
noise factor according to the equation:
𝐹𝑅𝐶𝑉𝑅
𝐹𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑀 = 𝐹𝐿𝑁𝐴 +
𝐺𝐿𝑁𝐴 − 1
where FLNA is the LNA noise factor, FRCVR is the receiver noise factor, and GLNA is the LNA
gain. Note that all values are linear, i.e. not dB.
In order to minimize the contribution of the receiver’s noise floor to the overall measurement
system noise floor, GLNA should be at least a factor of 10 (10 dB) higher than FRCVR. However,
care must be taken to avoid selecting a gain that is high enough to overload the front end of
the measurement receiver.
The noise floor of EMI receivers and spectrum analyzers are typically expressed in terms of
displayed average noise level (DANL). DANL is specified in dBm or dBµV and normalized to
a particular bandwidth B0, which is typically 1 Hz or 10 Hz. From there, the noise floor at the
actual measurement bandwidth may be scaled accordingly by adding 10∙log10(B/BP0) to the
specified value. The noise figure is simply the difference (in dB) between the noise floor and
the theoretical noise floor limit.
It must be noted that the above discussion applies to the average thermal noise as a function
of measurement bandwidth. MIL-STD-461 requires that peak detection be used for all
frequency-domain emissions and susceptibility measurements. Peak detection will add 11 dB,
the crest factor of thermal noise (discussed in section 2.5.3.3.7.5), to the average value:
𝑉𝑁𝐹,𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 = −67 𝑑𝐵𝜇𝑉/√𝐻𝑧 + 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐵 + 𝑁𝐹 + 11 𝑑𝐵
It must be noted that DANL is generally specified with no front-end attenuation, while most
manufacturers recommend 10 dB of attenuation in front of the mixer in order to obtain the
desired voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR). This will raise the noise floor by another 10 dB.
However, if an LNA is placed in front of the mixer, the 10 dB attenuation is not necessary.
2.5-131
This is best illustrated with the following numeric example. As of this writing, commercial EMI
receivers have a typical DANL value of approximately -165 dBm, specified with 0 dB
attenuation and normalized to a 1 Hz bandwidth. After adding the 11 dB crest factor, the actual
noise floor is -154 dBm.
For B = 1 Hz, the theoretical noise floor limit is equal to kBT, which at T = 298 K is equal to 4
x 10-21 W = -174 dBm. Thus, the receiver noise figure in this frequency range is -154 dBm –
(-174 dBm) = 20 dB. In this example, GLNA should be at least 30 dB in order to minimize the
contribution of the receiver to the system noise floor.
If average detection is used, the noise figure is -165 dBm – (-174 dBm) = 9 dB. In this case,
a GLNA of 20 dB should be sufficient.
RE102 measurements are made using standard antennas with either antenna factor or gains
specified by the manufacturer. The antenna factor is added to the noise floor in order to
determine the “noise equivalent electric field” capability of the measurement system. MIL-
STD-461 requires the use of a double ridge guide horn above 200 MHz. From 1 – 18 GHz,
the antenna factor for the DRG specified in MIL-STD-461 is closely approximated by the
dashed red line in Figure 2.5-86. While MIL-STD-461 RE102 doesn’t control emissions above
18 GHz, a reasonable extrapolation of its intent above 18 GHz is another DRG of similar gain
as at lower frequencies. The antenna factor for such an antenna is closely approximated by
the green dashed curve in Figure 2.5-86.
The typical DRG antenna factors in Figure 2.5-86 combined with the theoretical peak thermal
noise floor leads to the family of curves in Figure 2.5-87 for noise equivalent electric field for
the measurement system. Again, all of these curves are normalized to a noise figure of 0 dB,
negligible cable loss is assumed, and they are compared to the default RE102 limit with the
same notional notches as in the previous example.
Figure 2.5-86. Typical Antenna Factors for Measurement Antennas
2.5-132
Figure 2.5-87. Theoretical Floor Limits for Measurement System Using Peak Thermal Power
As an example, in the S-band notch at 2000 – 2020 MHz, the minimum noise floor using the
prescribed 10 kHz bandwidth is not quite low enough to meet the 6 dB below ambient
requirement. The available options for reducing the noise floor are 1) use of a higher gain
measurement antenna, and/or 2) use average detection instead of peak detection (recall that
the noise floor for average detection is 11 dB lower than that for peak detection). This latter
option is only available if continuous wave (CW) spurs are the only signals of interest.
If a higher gain antenna is employed, it must meet at least one of the following criteria:
1) the measured gain is calibrated at one meter per SAE ARP-958, and/or
2) the maximum aperture of the antenna “D” obeys the requirement that 2D 2/λ is less than
or equal to one meter
The latter stipulation is necessary because it is quite common in this type of situation to use
standard gain horns or horn-fed dishes with quite high gains that are only specified in the far
field, and stipulation (2) guarantees that the far field manufacturer-cited gain can be used to
compute a one-meter antenna factor. If the antenna’s far field is greater than one meter, then
it must either be calibrated at one meter per SAE ARP-958, or it may not be used.
It is not appropriate to arbitrarily reduce the bandwidth in order to reduce the noise floor. If the
radio that is being protected implements a 10 kHz bandwidth, the measurement should be
performed with a 10 kHz bandwidth. Reducing the measurement bandwidth below that of the
platform receiver protected by the notch in order to reduce the noise floor will not provide an
accurate measurement of the receiver’s response to signals with wider than the measurement
bandwidth, and it will defeat the purpose of the test.
2.5-133
For the Ka-band notch at 27500 – 31000 MHz, the 1 kHz measurement bandwidth places the
noise floor well below that required to make the measurement. However, the implications for
sweep time must be considered. This notch has a width of 3500 MHz. The 1 kHz measurement
bandwidth corresponds to 250 Hz between frequency steps in the sweep, or a total of
14,000,000 frequency steps. In the traditional frequency swept method, MIL-STD-461G
specifies a dwell time of 0.015 second per frequency step, giving a total sweep time of 210,000
seconds = 58 hours. It must be noted that it applies to each polarization at each antenna
position. With multiple antenna positions, and two polarizations at each position, this could
easily add up to several weeks of testing on a single notch. Clearly this is not a very efficient
approach.
If the actual frequency span of the Ka-band receiver used on the platform is known to be much
narrower, the span of the notch should be narrowed accordingly in order to make most efficient
use of test time. However, in many cases, radiated testing must be performed prior to final
definition of the specific frequency ranges of receivers on the platform. In other cases, the test
article is one unit in a large production lot that is intended to be used on a large number of
platforms. In such cases, it is necessary to test over the full range of the notch.
A real-time FFT-based receiver/spectrum analyzer would significantly reduce the time for this
sweep. On such units, the real-time measurement window ranges from 7 MHz for older units
to 80 MHz on the latest units (as of this writing), and a dwell time of 1 second is typically used
for each window. Continuing with the Ka-band notch example above, a machine with a 7 MHz
real time window can over the notch in 3500 MHz/(7 MHz/second) = 500 seconds, or just over
8 minutes. A machine with an 80 MHz window would cover the Ka-band notch in 3500
MHz/(80 MHz/second) = 44 seconds. This example clearly illustrates that real-time FFT-based
receivers/spectrum analyzers can reduce the time required for these types of measurements
from several weeks down to a few hours, Thus, making significantly more efficient use of test
time. In addition, the FFT-based units are better suited to detect transient type signals than
traditional receivers.
Additional attention must be paid to the characteristics of the sources of potential emissions.
Figure 2.5-88 shows an example of a clock signal with a typical jitter specification of 50 parts
per million (ppm) on its fundamental frequency. This 50 ppm specification will apply at all
harmonics, which at 2 GHz equates to +/- 100 kHz. If the platform receiver uses a bandwidth
of less than 100 kHz (e.g.10 kHz), it may not capture all of the energy from this harmonic.
However, if a measurement bandwidth is used that simulates that of the platform receiver, the
measured response will be comparable to that of the platform receiver. If the measurement
bandwidth is arbitrarily reduced even lower in order to reduce the noise floor, the
measurement receiver will not capture all of the energy that may be captured by the platform
receiver, and it may miss it altogether. The worst-case result is that it may give a false
indication that the requirement has been met while masking a potential problem.
Figure 2.5-88. Measurement Bandwidth and Clock Jitter
2.5-134
2.5.3.3.7.5 Crest Factor for Thermal Noise
As discussed in the previous sections, the noise floor of a measurement device is generally
expressed as a root mean square (rms) quantity in terms of its Displayed Average Noise Level
(DANL).
However, MIL-STD-461G states in section 4.3.10.1, “A peak detector shall be used for all
frequency-domain emissions and susceptibility measurements.”
For any waveform, the ratio of the peak value to the rms value is defined as the Crest Factor
(CF):
𝑉𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝐶𝐹 =
𝑉𝑟𝑚𝑠
For a simple sinusoid, CF = √2 ≈ 1.414.
Thermal voltage noise follows a Gaussian (normal) probability distribution, where the
probability density f(x) for any given value of x is given by:
1 (𝑥−𝜇)2
−
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑒 2𝜎 2
𝜎√2𝜋
where:
µ = mean
σ = standard deviation unit
x = instantaneous noise voltage VN , normalized to (VN)rms (VN / (VN)rms)
This function is plotted in Figure 2.5-89. As shown in the figure, the probability density for
values of |x| > 3.5 is less than 0.001, which means that these values occur less than 0.1% of
the time. This means that 99.9% of the time, |x| < 3.5. Thus, for all practical purposes, the
peak value of x can be taken to be 3.5, which means that the peak value of |V N| can be taken
to be 3.5 times the rms value.
Converting the numeric value of 3.5 to dB gives:
20 log10 (3.5) ≈ 11 𝑑𝐵
...which is the Crest Factor for thermal noise.
When using peak detection for measurements as specified by MIL-STD-461G, this value must
be added to the DANL level specified for a given measurement device in order to get the true
noise floor of the system.
Practical applications of the Crest Factor are discussed in the previous section.
2.5-135
Figure 2.5-89. Probability Density of Thermal Voltage Noise
2.5-136
2.5.3.3.8 Radiated Susceptibility, Electric Field
2.5.3.3.8.1 Antennas
The MIL-STD-461G RS103 test procedure does not specify any particular antennas for the
standard test method. Although MIL-STD-461G discourages the use of conical log spiral
antennas, they offer some advantages in certain applications as discussed below.
The double ridge horn has a constant aperture. This means the gain increases with frequency,
which translates to a decreased field-of-view as frequency increases. The log-spiral and log
periodic antennas have a lower and constant gain as a function of frequency, which translates
into a wider and more constant field of view. For these reasons, the log-spiral and log periodic
antennas are better suited to illuminate a given test setup using fewer antenna positions, Thus,
reducing total test time. This can be a particularly significant advantage when performing a
radiated emissions test on a larger test article such as an integrated instrument, payload, or
spacecraft, when costs for test time are significantly higher due to “marching army” costs.
A few notes regarding log-spiral antennas:

 Log-spiral antennas are circularly polarized, which means that each of the horizontal and
vertical (linear) components of an applied field are 3 dB below the level for the proper
circular polarization. In order to produce the correct levels for the horizontal and vertical
components, the applied power level at the antenna input must be 3 dB higher than that
required to produce the desired level for a circularly polarized wave.
 The wide field-of-view (low gain) and circular polarization enable most susceptibility tests
to be completed using only one position and one polarization.
 The log-spiral antenna only works up to 10 GHz; a different antenna must be used for
radiated susceptibility testing above 10 GHz.
 The log-spiral antenna may not have sufficient power capability to achieve field levels
higher than 20 V/m, particularly those simulating launch site transmitters. In such cases,
an antenna with a higher power capability must be used.
2.5-137
2.5.3.3.8.2 Antenna Positions and “Spot Sizes”
MIL-STD-461G specifies the following for RS103 antenna positions:
 For testing from 200 MHz up to 1 GHz, place the antenna in a sufficient number of
positions such that the entire area of each EUT enclosure and the first 35 cm of cables
and leads interfacing with the EUT enclosure are within the 3 dB beamwidth of the
antenna.
 For testing at 1 GHz and above, place the antenna in a sufficient number of positions
such that the entire area of each EUT enclosure and the first 7 cm of cables and leads
interfacing with the EUT enclosure are within the 3 dB beamwidth of the antenna.
From the above, it is clear that susceptibilities of the interconnect cables are being evaluated
along with the susceptibility of the EUT enclosure itself. ALL CABLES CONNECTING TO THE
EUT ARE CONSIDERED PART OF THE TEST ARTICLE.
In order to optimize the number of antenna positions for a given test configuration, it is
necessary to determine the area of the EUT that is illuminated by the antenna at a given
location. This illuminated area is commonly called the “spot size.”
Spot sizes for RS103 configurations may be calculated in the same way as illustrated for
RE102 in section 2.5.3.3.7.5.
While RE102 measurements are specified with the antenna at a distance of 1 meter from the
EUT, RS103 poses no such restriction. The RS103 section in the Application Guide of MIL-
STD-461 revisions F and later provides the following guidance:
“This version of MIL-STD-461 allows larger distances than 1 meter between the transmit
antenna and the EUT boundary. This approach is actually preferable, where amplifier
power is available to obtain the required field, since more of the EUT is illuminated at one
antenna position.”
As discussed in section 2.5.3.3.7.5, spot size diameter scales directly with the distance r from
the antenna to the EUT. Thus, moving the test antenna to r = 2 meters will double the spot
diameter. This also means that the power required to deliver the same electric field will
quadruple. The relationship between transmitted power and electric field are discussed in
section 2.5.3.3.8.4.
This approach offers a tremendous advantage in selecting an optimal number of antenna

positions in order to provide sufficient coverage of the EUT and interconnect cables while
making most efficient use of test time. Because RS103 tends to be the most time-consuming
test in any campaign, optimizing antenna positions is a key consideration.
2.5-138
2.5.3.3.8.3 Field Probe Placement
If the real-time monitoring test method is used, guidelines for field probe placement are
summarized below, using MIL-STD-461G sections 5.20.3.3.d.(1) and 5.20.3.3.e.(b) as points
of departure:
1) General
a. Position at same distance from transmit antenna as EUT
b. Do not place directly at corners or edges of EUT components
2) Below 1 GHz
a. Vertical: Minimum of 30 cm above the ground plane
b. Horizontal: Within 35 cm of EUT
3) Above 1 GHz
a. Vertical: Place at height corresponding to the area of the EUT being illuminated
b. Horizontal: Within 3 dB beamwidth of transmit antenna
c. 3 dB beamwidth must be calculated from antenna characteristics and distance
between antenna and EUT (1 m default per MIL-STD-461G RS103)
d. Place one edge of ETU as close as possible to edge of beam to maximize
exposure to cables and to maximize available space for probe
e. Available space adjacent to EUT depends on size of EUT
f. If a larger beam is needed, the transmit antenna may be moved further away from
the EUT. The necessary power must be calculated to generate the desired
electric field at the desired distance (discussed in next section), and a suitable
amplifier to provide that power must be selected for the test.
2.5.3.3.8.4 Transmitted Power vs. Radiated Electric Field
A useful and important relationship exists between transmitted power and radiated electric
field.
Power density Pd of an electromagnetic wave is related to the electric field intensity E as

follows:
𝐸2
𝑃𝑑 =
𝜂
where η is the wave impedance. For a plane electromagnetic wave travelling in air or vacuum,
η is approximately equal to 120π Ω (~377 Ω). This plane wave assumption is sufficient for
most situations. Thus,
𝐸2
𝑃𝑑 =
120𝜋
For an isotropic source of electromagnetic energy, the power density at a distance r from the
source is simply the total transmitted power Pt divided by the surface area of a sphere of radius
r:
𝑃𝑡
(𝑃𝑑 )𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 =
4𝜋𝑟 2
2.5-139
For a real transmitting source, i.e. an antenna, the gain G is defined as the ratio of the power
density in a given direction to the power density of an ideal isotropic source transmitting the
same amount of power. The value of G (generally as a function of frequency) is provided in
the datasheet for any candidate test antenna.
By definition, the power density at a distance r from a real transmitting source is:
𝑃𝑡 𝐺
𝑃𝑑 =
4𝜋𝑟 2
Setting the two expressions for Pd equal to each other and solving for Pt gives:
𝐸2 𝑟2
𝑃𝑡 =
30𝐺
Solving for E gives:
√30𝑃𝑡 𝐺
𝐸=
𝑟
The previous two equations are extremely useful tools for defining and evaluating a radiated
susceptibility test configuration. The first calculates the amount of power required to establish
a given electric field at a given distance from the transmit antenna. The second calculates the
electric field that may be established at a given distance from the transmit antenna for a given
amount of available power.
Although these equations do not consider factors as room reflections and cable losses, they
provide a useful starting point for selecting an appropriate amplifier for a given test
configuration.
For example, in order to establish a field of 20 V/m at 1 meter with an antenna with G = 6, the
amount of power required is 2.2 Watts. An amplifier should be selected that can provide the
necessary power with sufficient headroom, but not so much headroom that provides a risk of
overtest. In this case, a 10-Watt amplifier would be a good selection.
If only a 100-Watt amplifier is available, then the maximum field level that could be applied is
134 V/m, which is clearly much higher than the 20 V/m requirement. In the event that the full
level is applied (i.e. if software safeguards are insufficient to prevent it), it would be a significant
overtest with an increased risk of damage. Thus, if the 100-Watt amplifier is the only one
available, it is recommended to put a 10 dB attenuator (with appropriate power rating) on its
output in order to limit the available power to 10 Watts. Another option is to connect the
amplifier output to a directional coupler, and connect the coupled port to the antenna input.
As discussed in section 2.5.3.3.8.2, the RS103 test method does not specify that the antenna
must be placed at r = 1 meter from the EUT. The test antenna may be placed further from the
EUT in order to produce a larger spot size as long as sufficient amplifier power is available
and the test antenna has sufficient power capacity. As shown in the equations above,
transmitted power scales with r2. Thus, moving the test antenna back to a distance of 2 meters
will quadruple the power required to produce a given electric field at the EUT. The equations
in this section give the test engineer the necessary tools to determine if that is a worthy trade-
off.
2.5-140
Additional discussion and examples are provided in the GEVS application note entitled,
“Transmitted Power vs. Radiated Electric Field,” available on the “GEVS Application Notes”
page of the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
2.5.3.3.8.5 RS “Survive Without Damage” Launch Site Limits
GSFC projects typically apply two sets of limits for radiated susceptibility (RS), one set for on-
orbit operations and a second set for launch.
For equipment that must be powered on and operational at launch, the equipment must of
course operate when exposed to these levels. As such, these limits should be verified by test.
For equipment that is not powered on at launch, the equipment is only required to survive
without damage after exposure to the launch levels. “Survive-without-damage” requirements
cannot be verified by test. Such tests are inherently inconclusive; they merely verify that the
equipment under test (EUT) shows no obvious damage immediately after being subjected to
the test environment. They provide no verification that the EUT was not stressed by the
environment. Verification of “survive-without-damage” requirements must inherently be
performed by analysis.
The mechanism for interference and/or damage from an incident electric field is that the
incident field will induce a coupled potential and current onto some element of the EUT, e.g.
cable, connector, improperly sealed seam, etc. The coupling efficiency of any slot, cable or
electrical circuit increases with increasing frequency until the cable is electrically long. In
general, this means that cables are the primary coupling path until very high frequencies, e.g.
several hundreds of MHz. In the remainder of this application note, the cable will be treated
as a bulk circuit element, and all coupling is assumed to be common mode unless otherwise
stated.
When a cable’s separation from the ground plane is electrically short, i.e. less than λ/10, the
cable acts as a wire-above-ground transmission line, the parameters of which are discussed
in section 2.5.3.3.9. For frequencies at which the cable-to-ground separation is electrically
long, i.e. greater than λ/10, the cable acts as a dipole antenna. The default cable-to-ground
separation specified by MIL-STD-461 is 5 cm, which equals λ/10 at 600 MHz. Therefore, 600
MHz is the frequency break point between the two analysis methods discussed herein.
Field-to-wire coupling is discussed in further in section 2.5.3.3.6.1.1.
The two analysis methods are presented in the following sections.
2.5-141
2.5.3.3.8.5.1 Transmission Line Method (f < 600 MHz)
At frequencies for which the cable’s separation from the ground plane is less than λ/10, the
transmission line model is used. Using the default 5 cm separation, this corresponds to
frequencies below 600 MHz. As shown in section 2.5.3.3.6.1.1, the worst-case coupled
common mode potential VCM increases with increasing frequency until the cable is electrically
long, at which point it reaches an asymptote value given by:
𝑉𝐶𝑀 = 𝜋ℎ𝐸
where h is the height of the cable above the ground plane. For h = 5 cm, the relationship is
approximately 150 mV per V/m. If the cable is unshielded, e.g. primary power, this potential
will be directly imparted to each wire in the bundle.
A typical RS launch level is 20 V/m. This would produce a worst-case coupled potential of 3
V onto each wire in an unshielded bundle. In a cable that is designed to carry primary power
with potentials of +28 Vdc or higher, a worst-case coupled potential of 3 V does not pose any
risk of damage. There should not be any risk of damage on such cables for coupled potentials
up to 28 V peak-to-peak = 10 Vrms, which corresponds to RS launch levels of up to 66 V/m.
For signal cables connected to circuits for which such potentials would pose a risk of damage,
such cables must be shielded with the shield properly terminated on both ends. For shielded
cables, an accurate estimate of worst-case coupled current may be obtained by applying the
guidance below from the CS114 limits of MIL-STD-461 (post 1993), as shown in Figure 2.5-
90. Further discussion of these CS114 limit curves and their relationship to the default RS103
limits is provided in section 2.5.3.3.6.
Figure 2.5-90. MIL-STD-461G CS114 Calibration Limits
2.5-142
The CS114 limit was specifically developed as a way of simulating currents on cables that
would be induced by an incident radiated field, e.g. from a radiated susceptibility test. As
such, each limit curve reproduced in Figure 1 corresponds to an RS103 limit.
The relationship between the CS114 and RS103 levels is provided in MIL-STD-461G section
A.5.13:
“The basic relationship for the limit level in the resonance (flat) portion of the curve is 1.5
mA per V/m that is derived from worst-case measurements on aircraft. For example, 110
dBμA corresponds to 200 V/m.”
This relationship follows naturally from the 150 mV per V/m relationship given above, because
the CS114 test method pre-calibrates the injected signal into a calibration fixture with a total
loop impedance of 100 Ω.
This gives the worst-case common mode current ICM for a given incident electric field E:
𝐼𝐶𝑀 = 𝐸 ∙ (1.5 mA/(V/m))
For shielded cables, ICM is the current induced on the shield. The ultimate concern is the
potential coupled to a signal carrying wire inside the cable. This will be determined by the
total transfer impedance of the shield, Ztot:
𝑉𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒 = 𝐼𝐶𝑀 ∙ 𝑍𝑡𝑜𝑡
The subject of transfer impedance is discussed in further detail in the GEVS application note
entitled, “Shield Transfer Impedance – RG-58C/U Example.” This note is available on the
“GEVS Application Notes” page of the GSFC EMC Working Group SPACES site:
Following the example discussed in that note for RG-58C/U, a value of 1 Ω is used for Zt as a
worst-case.
A typical RS launch level is 20 V/m. This would convert to an ICM of 30 mA and a Vwire of 30
mV.
Using the same analysis, an RS launch level of 66 V/m would convert to an ICM of 100 mA and
a Vwire of 100 mV.
Except in cases of cables connected to extremely sensitive circuitry, these are significantly
lower than any levels that should pose any risk of damage.
2.5-143
2.5.3.3.8.5.2 Dipole Method (f > 600 MHz)
At frequencies for which the cable’s separation from the ground plane is greater than λ/10, it
will behave as a dipole antenna. Using the default 5 cm separation, this corresponds to
frequencies above 600 MHz. In general, launch levels are applied at frequencies above 1
GHz, which means that the dipole model should suffice in most cases.
The worst-case coupling will result when it behaves as a tuned half-wave dipole antenna.
For any antenna, intentional or unintentional, the parameter for converting an incident electric
field intensity to a potential at the antenna’s output terminals is the antenna’s effective height,
he. The open-circuit effective height of a tuned half-wave dipole is given by:
𝜆 𝑐
ℎ𝑒 = =
𝜋 𝜋𝑓
where:
λ = wavelength (meters)
c = speed of light = 3 x 108 m/s
f = frequency (Hz)
The worst-case open-circuit common mode potential coupled onto a cable, VCM, is given by
the applied electric field E multiplied by he:
𝑉𝐶𝑀 = 𝐸 ∙ ℎ𝑒
The output impedance of a half-wave dipole antenna is approximately 73 Ω. The worst-case

common mode current ICM will occur when the antenna (i.e. the victim cable in this case) is
connected to a dead short, which will be the case for a shielded cable whose shield is
terminated to chassis or structure at both ends.
Thus, the maximum value of ICM will occur when VCM is dropped completely across this output
impedance:
𝑉𝐶𝑀
𝐼𝐶𝑀 =
73 Ω
For shielded cables, ICM can be taken to the current induced on the shield. Again, the ultimate
concern is the worst-case potential Vwire coupled to a signal carrying wire inside the cable:
𝑉𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒 = 𝐼𝐶𝑀 ∙ 𝑍𝑡𝑜𝑡
Again using RG-58C/U as an example, a value of 1 Ω may be assumed for Ztot as a worst-
case.
The following example illustrates this analysis approach for unshielded as well as shielded
cables.
A typical RS launch limit is a level of 20 V/m applied over the frequency range of 1 – 6 GHz.
In general, outside this frequency range, the launch levels are lower than the on-orbit levels.
The largest he in this frequency range is 0.095 m, corresponding to f = 1 GHz. The worst-
case value of VCM resulting from the measured electric field of 20 V/m is:
𝑉𝐶𝑀 = 𝐸 ∙ ℎ𝑒 = (20 𝑉/𝑚) ∙ (0.095 𝑚) = 1.9 𝑉
2.5-144
The worst-case value of ICM is:

1.9 𝑉
𝐼𝐶𝑀 = = 26 𝑚𝐴
73 Ω
In an unshielded cable, e.g. primary power, this potential and current will be directly coupled
to each wire in the bundle. In a cable that is designed to carry primary power with potentials
of +28 Vdc or higher and currents of several amperes, these levels do not pose any risk of
damage.
Note that he, is inversely proportional to frequency, which in turn means that VCM and ICM are
inversely proportional to frequency. Therefore, at 6 GHz, VCM and ICM will be a factor of 6
lower than the values calculated above at 1 GHz.
As stated above, there should not be any risk of damage on unshielded primary power cables
for coupled potentials up to 28 V peak-to-peak = 10 Vrms. This corresponds to an RS level
of approximately 100 V/m at 1 GHz and increasing linearly with frequency.
For signal cables connected to circuits for which such potentials would pose a risk of damage,
such cables must be shielded with the shield properly terminated on both ends.
For an RS launch level of 20 V/m applied from 1 – 6 GHz, the worst-case coupled potential to
a signal carrying wire inside the cable is given by:
𝑉𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑒 = 𝐼𝐶𝑀 ∙ 𝑍𝑡𝑜𝑡 = (26 𝑚𝐴)(1 Ω) = 26 mV
Using the same analysis, an RS launch level of 100 V/m would produce a worst-case Vwire of
130 mV at 1 GHz. The RS level that would couple this same level will increase linearly with
frequency. Again, except in cases of cables connected to extremely sensitive circuitry, these
are significantly lower than any levels that should pose any risk of damage.
Note that because coupling efficiency decreases with increasing frequency, the maximum
tolerable electric field increases with increasing frequency. In this example, the equipment
can withstand a level of 100 V/m at 1 GHz and a level of 1000 V/m at 10 GHz.
When possible, the transfer impedance of representative cables should be characterized

following the example outlined in section 2.5.3.8.8.1.3, and those values must be used in the
calculations above. The values used herein are used to illustrate the analysis approach and
are intended as a worst case, but it is possible that the actual values in a given application
may present an even worse case.
2.5-145
2.5.3.3.9 Wire-Above-Ground Transmission Line Parameters
A wire or cable above a ground plane will behave as a wire-above-ground transmission line,
the key parameters of which are described below.
The inductance and capacitance per unit length of a wire-above-ground transmission line in
free space are as follows:
𝜇0 ℎ ℎ 2
𝐿= 𝑙𝑛 [ + √( ) − 1]
2𝜋 𝑎 𝑎
2𝜋𝜀0
𝐶=
ℎ √ ℎ 2
𝑙𝑛 [ + ( ) − 1]
𝑎 𝑎
where:
µ0 = permeability of free space = 4π x 10-7 H/m

ε0 = permittivity of free space = 1/(36π) x 10-9 F/m
h = height of wire (cable) above ground plane
a = wire (cable) radius
The characteristic impedance Z0 is:
𝐿 1 𝜇0 ℎ ℎ 2
𝑍0 = √ = √ 𝑙𝑛 [ + √( ) − 1]
𝐶 2𝜋 𝜀0 𝑎 𝑎
But √(µ0/ε0) is the characteristic impedance of free space, which equals 120π ≈ 377 Ω. Thus:
ℎ ℎ 2
𝑍0 = 60 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 [ + √( ) − 1]
𝑎 𝑎
These relationships are plotted in Figure 2.5-91, Figure 2.5-92, and Figure 2.5-93. For the
examples used in this note, h/a = 100 (h = 5 cm and a = 0.5 mm), which gives the following
typical values:
L ≈ 1 µH/m
C ≈ 10 pF/m
Z0 ≈ 300 Ω
2.5-146
Figure 2.5-91. Inductance Per Unit Length, Wire Above Ground
Figure 2.5-92. Capacitance Per Unit Length, Wire Above Ground
2.5-147
Figure 2.5-93. Characteristic Impedance, Wire Above Ground
2.5-148
2.5.3.4 Abbreviations, Acronyms, Constants, and Relations
Abbreviations/acronyms:
AC Alternating Current
BCE Bulk Cable Emission
BCI Bulk Cable Injection
CE Conducted Emissions
CM Common Mode
CS Conducted Susceptibility
CW Continuous Wave
DANL Displayed Average Noise Level
dB Decibels
DC Direct Current
DM Differential Mode
EGSE Electrical Ground Support Equipment
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
ESD Electrostatic Discharge
EUT Equipment Under Test
FFT Fast Fourier Transform
LISN Line Impedance Stabilization Network

OR Line Impedance Simulation Network
RE Radiated Emissions
RS Radiated Susceptibility
VSWR Voltage Standing Wave Ratio
2.5-149
Constants
µ0 permeability of free space = 4π x 10-7 H/m ≈ 1.3 µH/m
ε0 permittivity of free space = 1/36π x 10-9 H/m ≈ 8.8 pF/m
Relations
Angular frequency 𝜔 = 2𝜋𝑓
Characteristic impedance 𝜇𝑟 𝜇0
of medium 𝜂=√
𝜀𝑟 𝜀0
Characteristic impedance 𝜇0
of air (µr = εr = 1) 𝜂0 = √ = 120𝜋 Ω ≈ 377Ω
𝜀0
Velocity of propagation in 1
𝑣=
medium √𝜇𝑟 𝜇0 𝜀𝑟 𝜀0
Velocity of propagation in 1
𝑐= = 3 × 108 𝑚/𝑠𝑒𝑐
air (µr = εr = 1) √𝜇0 𝜀0
Wavelength: 𝑐 300 0.3

𝜆= = =
𝑓 𝑓𝑀𝐻𝑧 𝑓𝐺𝐻𝑧
Wavenumber 𝜔 2𝜋
𝛽= =
𝑐 𝜆
2.5-150
SECTION 2.6
THERMAL
THERMAL THERMAL
2.6 THERMAL VERIFICATION TESTING – GENERAL
Based on the heritage protoflight qualification (“proto-qualification”) test verification approach used
by the Goddard Space Flight Center in lieu of a traditional qualification-acceptance test program,
these test guidelines are intended to demonstrate that the design, and manufacturing processes
will produce hardware that meets the mission requirements, yet remain available for flight. These
guidelines have been developed based on decades of successful NASA high reliability missions,
and emphasize thermal stress workmanship screening, combined with performance testing at
temperature extremes, for all levels of assembly. Modifications to these guidelines for higher risk
tolerant missions using GSFC guidelines, have been assessed, and are documented herein, if
applicable.
Thermal verification testing focuses on performance verification and workmanship screening at

temperatures extended beyond the mission allowable temperature range. This testing is an integral
part of an environmental test program for all ELV payloads and science instruments, and is
applicable to all mission risk classifications. An appropriate set of environmental tests and analyses
is designed to meet these fundamental objectives:
Flight Hardware Performance Verification: Verify hardware performs to specification

requirements at all levels of assembly, in vacuum and at temperatures extended beyond those
allowed during the mission lifetime, including any special tests needed. These extended
temperatures also serve as Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) plateaus where thermally
induced stresses identify latent defects in parts, materials, and workmanship using performance
data recorded during testing.
Thermal Performance Verification: Verify thermal subsystem performance, i.e. –
demonstrate that thermal subsystem design requirements are met, and that all hardware is
maintained within the established mission thermal limits, in thermal vacuum testing while simulating
planned mission phases/operational modes including survival/safe-hold, if applicable. This test
provides data to correlate the thermal model(s) which will improve the accuracy of mission
predictions.
Note that GEVS does not specify thermal design standards or requirements - those are provided
in other Branch documentation - rather it documents the standards for verification of the thermal
design requirements, through thermal testing. It is recommended that these thermal verification
tests occur after successful mechanical testing at the unit, subsystem, and system levels.
Successful completion of these thermal verification tests proves the flightworthiness of the
hardware.
2.6.1 Definitions
Test Philosophy
Protoflight: Test margin is 10°C beyond the Allowable Flight Temperature (AFT) range. (AFT is
defined as the specific temperature range where a unit can operate and meet performance
requirements over the mission lifetime.) Multiple units on the same payload/system or on multiple
systems launched at the same time, are all to be tested to protoflight levels. Protoflight testing is
preferred for all GSFC hardware. Qualification/Acceptance testing, defined below, is an acceptable
alternative to protoflight testing.
Qualification: Test margin is 15°C beyond the AFT range. The baseline qualification test approach
consists of designing and testing dedicated test hardware to qualification levels to verify the design,
demonstrate margin, and validate an acceptance test program allowing multiple builds and/or
rework cycles. Only in this test approach can subsequent flight hardware be acceptance tested to
2.6-2
THERMAL THERMAL
demonstrate functional and/or performance to specification. Due to the robustness of testing,

qualification hardware is not available for flight.
Acceptance: Test margin is 5°C beyond the AFT range. This approach tests flight hardware at the
lowest levels; traditionally following successful qualification testing that has demonstrated a robust
design and validated the acceptance testing as providing sufficient workmanship screening. If
approved, this type of testing should only be used after successful protoflight testing is completed
through the payload/system level, and mission performance is shown to perform successfully. It
should not be used on subsequent units on the same payload/system or on multiple systems
launched at the same time (see protoflight).
Level of Assembly
Unit: A functional item that is viewed as a complete and separate entity for purposes of
manufacturing, maintenance, or record keeping. Examples include individual electronics box,
battery, thruster, and mechanism.
Subsystem: An assembly of functionally related units, consisting of two or more units and may
include interconnection items, such as cables or tubing, and the supporting structure to which the
units are mounted. For GSFC missions, besides the functional subsystems (power, GN&C, COM,
propulsion, and thermal), science instruments and operational modules, such as robotic
servicing/assembly modules, are also considered as subsystems.
System: An integrated assembly of subsystems and units capable of supporting an operational role
in space. For GSFC missions, a system is typically a flight hardware payload of an ELV and is a
vehicle (satellite) including science instruments that constitute its mission.
Margins:
Thermal Test Margin: Temperature margin that is added to the unit operational (AFT) range and
intended to prove the design of the hardware is flight worthy by demonstrating performance at
temperatures beyond where it is allowed to operate. This test temperature range is based on
hardware performance at the largest range possible where specifications are met, and not on
mission predictions from thermal analysis. Acknowledging that different types of flight hardware
have very different ranges, these test ranges must be understood and specified early in the mission
development (typically in Phase A) to derive the operating temperatures to be used to develop the
thermal control subsystem. Note that test margin is not typically applied on non-operational
temperatures since they are established based on the actual hardware limits and damage may
occur if exceeded.
Cryogenic: Test temperature margins added to the unit operational (AFT) range for
cryogenic hardware should prescribe the same approach as non-cryogenic hardware,
but also consider whether it is achievable or detrimental to the hardware at these
extreme cold temperatures (Section 2.6.3.2.1). Additional information on cryogenic
test margins is contained in Section 2.7.3.4.
Thermal Design Margin: Temperature margin applied to thermal model predictions for operational
equipment, at all phases of the mission, from pre-Phase A through launch and final mission
predictions using the correlated thermal model. It is intended to account for the inherent uncertainty
in parameters used in the analysis, such as dissipations/power, model granularity, interface
conduction, ground simulation limitations, surface properties and geometry/nodalization, and
numerous other factors that go into the thermal models. It also accounts for the lingering error
between the correlated model temperature predictions and actual flight temperatures.
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Note: GEVS does not specify design margins; rather it prescribes methods to
verify these margins are met during thermal verification testing.
Cryogenic: The GSFC Cryogenics Branch (Code 552) has updated the prescribed
design (uncertainty) margins (Section 2.6.4.1) to be used on all cryogenic projects
throughout the development cycle. Additional information is contained in Section
2.7.3.4 and Table 2.7-2.
STOP: a multidiscipline Structural/Thermal/Optical Performance analysis typically performed for

distortion sensitive parts of the satellite, such as optics and/or optical paths, optical bench,
instrument mounting and pointing structure, where the thermal model generates appropriate
temperatures that are mapped onto a structural model to determine displacements/motions of the
various elements which are then applied to the optical model. Temperature variant properties
should be used in these analyses to ensure stresses and alignments are acceptable for the given
transition rate.
Temperature Ranges
The allowable operational and non-operational ranges are based on design limits of the unit, and
should be as robust as possible. They are not derived from temperature predictions for any mission.
Operational: the specific temperature range where a unit can operate and meet performance
requirements over the mission lifetime. This is typically referred to as Allowable Flight Temperature
(AFT).
Non-operational: the specific temperature range that a unit can withstand exposure to, and once
returned to its protoflight limits, can subsequently meet operational performance requirements. This
range is based on hardware survival limits, and is typically much broader than the operational
range. Hot turn-on limits should not exceed the protoflight limit, while the cold turn on limits may be
the same as the non-operational limit, allowing internal heat dissipation to warm the unit to the cold
protoflight limit and subsequently meet operational performance requirements.
Temperature Regimes
Non-cryogenic: >120K (-153°C)
Cryogenic: <120K (-153°C)
Thermal Control Type:
Passive: based on material selection to tailor conduction, natural convection (if applicable), and radiation
properties, including MLI, coatings, fillers, gaskets/washers/doublers/straps, constant conductance heat
pipes (CCHP).
Active: uses separate device(s) to control heat transfer, such as heaters, louvers, pumped fluid loops
(single- and two-phase), variable conductance heat pipes (VCHP), loop heat pipes (LHP), Capillary
Pumped Loops (CPL) technology, Thermo-Electric Coolers, mechanical louvers, forced convection (if
applicable). Typically requires temperature based feedback heater control.
Types of Testing:
Thermal Vacuum Cycling: refers to verification testing of flight hardware over the test temperature range
(AFT + test margin) while operating under vacuum, and repeated over the prescribed number of cycles and
durations.
Thermal Balance Testing: refers to specific phases of thermal vacuum testing that are designed to
demonstrate thermal subsystem performance in a stable, accurate energy balance at simulated worst hot
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and cold environments that are derived from the mission thermal analysis, while operating the test hardware
in the appropriate mission configuration and providing temperature and power data to correlate thermal
models.
Tolerances:
Pressure: no greater than:

Pascal Torr Tol (%)
> 1.3 x 104 > 1.0 x 102 +/- 5%
1.3 x 102 to 1.3 x 104 1.0 x 100 to 1.0 x 102 +/- 10%
1.3 x 101 to 1.3 x 102 1.0 x 10-1 to 1.0 x 100 +/- 25%
< 1.3 x 101 < 1.0 x 10-1 +/- 80%
Temperature: 2°C.
2.6.2 General Requirements
Thermal verification testing references all testing at any level of assembly that is performed during simulated
vacuum/pressure and temperature environments of the mission, with the fundamental purpose of
demonstrating that the hardware meets all performance and workmanship requirements.
Thermal vacuum cycling is intended to (a) demonstrate performance of the flight hardware and (b) provide
Environmental Stress Screening (ESS), over a temperature range extended just beyond that which the
flight hardware is allowed to operate in over the mission lifetime. To fully test the hardware and achieve
sufficient operating time, while inducing sufficient thermal stresses to identify latent workmanship defects
before flight, testing is repeated over the specified number of cycles at each level of assembly.
Thermal balance testing is performed as part of subsystem (instrument) and system (space vehicle) thermal
vacuum testing to verify the thermal subsystem design meets requirements. These test phases are
designed to verify all aspects of the thermal hardware, including heater operation and control, radiator
sizing, and critical heat transfer paths, by demonstrating thermal control requirements are met in the
bounding simulated environments of the mission, while providing the temperature and power data
necessary to correlate the thermal analytical model(s) that will be used to provide temperature predictions
for mission usage. All payloads are to be tested at the worst case hot and cold thermal vacuum
environments derived from those expected for their particular mission, to achieve the specific test margins.
This section establishes a baseline thermal environmental verification program at all levels of assembly to
provide a high probability of success for meeting performance requirements over mission life. The following
sections contain specifications applicable to each level of assembly. Additionally, the hardware must
withstand, as necessary, the temperature and/or humidity conditions of transportation, storage, launch,
flight, and crewed spaces.
2.6.2.1 Applicability
The test specifications in the following sections apply to all flight hardware for all GSFC missions, whether
in-house or contracted, and for any mission risk classification. In-house projects must incorporate these
specifications within their verification requirements documentation and ensure that the flight unit
qualification complies with these specifications. For out-of-house projects, it is incumbent upon the project
to incorporate these specifications within their contractual documents, so that the prime contractor has
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the hardware verification complies with these specifications. The
contractor will also provide necessary and sufficient evidence to demonstrate compliance.
2.6.2.2 Spare Hardware
Spare hardware is typically procured concurrently with the flight hardware for a project and undergoes a
test program in which the number of thermal cycles and test levels/durations are equivalent to the total
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number of cycles to which other flight components (i.e., non-spare) are subjected at the component,
subsystem, and payload levels of assembly, thus allowing them to be used at any point in the assembly.
As a minimum, spare components are to be subjected to eight thermal cycles prior to integration onto the
subsystem/instrument or system/satellite before system test, and twelve cycles if integrated after system
test.
2.6.2.2.1 Multiple Hardware
Historically, GSFC missions have been predominantly unique, singular flight systems, but the trend to
missions with multiple flight systems continues to increase in recent years. Similar to “Spare Hardware”
above, hardware for these missions is typically procured or manufactured concurrently and should follow
GSFC’s protoflight test approach, receiving the same number of cycles and to the same temperature range,
at the various levels of assembly. Similarly, thermal balance testing should be repeated on all multi-flight
subsystems and systems, to verify performance and workmanship of the thermal subsystem.
2.6.2.2.2 Reworked or Repaired Equipment
Retesting is required if a test discrepancy or test item failure occurs while performing any of the required
testing steps, and root cause investigation requires any hardware disassembly, rework or repair.
For repaired equipment, subsequent retesting must be sufficient to return the hardware to flight worthiness.
The point in the integration flow at which the rework was necessary, the amount of rework, and the point at
which it will be reinstalled on the flight system, all influence the required amount of retesting. Ideally, the
total number of successful cycles completed following the rework, must meet the 12 cycle specification.
- For hardware that fails during unit level testing, following the necessary repairs/rework, repeat the
entire unit level thermal vacuum testing.
- For hardware that fails during subsystem level testing:
o The repaired/reworked unit(s) repeat a minimum of 4 unit level cycles, prior to reinstallation
into the subsystem, for subsequent completion of at least 2 subsystem cycles.
o If no subsequent subsystem cycles will be completed prior to installation into the system,
then the repaired/reworked unit(s) repeat a minimum of 8 unit level cycles, prior to
reinstallation into the subsystem.
- For hardware that fails during system level testing:
o Subsystem hardware:
 If subsequent system testing remains: the subsystem unit is removed, repaired,
and retested for a minimum of 6 cycles, prior to reinstallation into the
subsystem/system, which then completes the remaining system level testing
 If no system level testing is to be repeated: the subsystem is removed, repaired,
and retested for a minimum of 6 cycles, prior to reinstallation into the system, which
then completes the remaining system level testing
o System hardware:
 If subsequent system testing remains: the unit is removed, repaired, and retested
for a minimum of 6 cycles, prior to reinstallation into the system, for subsequent
completion of at least 2 system cycles.
 If no system level testing is to be repeated: the unit is removed, repaired, and
retested for a minimum of 10 cycles, prior to reinstallation into the system.
2.6.2.2.3 Mission Risk Classification
GEVS thermal test verification specifications were originally written assuming a low risk project, but have
been determined to be directly applicable to higher risk missions, specifically Class C and D, including
CubeSats. Separate guidelines have been documented for GSFC CubeSat missions - while acknowledging
that the small size and integrated nature of CubeSats may lend itself to completing all cycles at the CubeSat
(system) level, the project is to use a risk based approach in determining how much testing is appropriate
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prior to integration vs. conducting all testing at the system level. 12 cycles to protoflight levels (before flight)
is still the standard and should be the goal for these projects. Projects with 7120.8 and DNH mission
classifications, having higher risk postures, should work with Code 545 to tailor these requirements prior to
design/implementation.
2.6.2.2.4 Cryogenic Instruments
The increased development of cryogenic instruments for GSFC missions necessitates detailed
considerations of the unique test verification specifications for cryogenic hardware. This section defines the
test verification guidelines for hardware operating above 120K using passive thermal control. Section 2.7
provides verification guidelines for passive thermal control below 120K and for active controlled cryogenic
hardware in the < 200K regime.
2.6.2.3 Level of Testing; Test Setup /Configuration
The GSFC thermal verification test approach considers three levels of testing; unit (component), subsystem
(instrument), and the system (satellite/vehicle/payload). If it is impractical to test an entire integrated
payload, the test may be conducted at the highest practicable level of assembly and ancillary testing and
analyses will be completed to verify the flightworthiness of the integrated payload. In cases where testing
is compromised, for example, the inability to drive temperatures of the all-up assembly to the qualification
limits, additional testing at lower levels of assembly may be warranted.
Typically, the test configuration remains unchanged between thermal vacuum cycling and thermal balance
testing, using the same thermal targets and environmental simulators to drive the hardware to protoflight
temperatures during the verification cycles, and provide the simulated mission hot and cold environments
surrounding the test article for thermal balance testing. Pre-test thermal analysis is required to ensure these
targets are designed to meet the requirements of both thermal tests.
A rigorous review of the test setup, including any instrument and/or component stimulators, ensures the
test objectives will be achieved and that no test induced problems are introduced. The baseline approach
is to test in the full flight configuration, or as close as is practicable, which is described/documented in the
test plan/procedure, and is accurately represented in the test thermal model. Test heaters on the payload
may be required to achieve proper and safe temperatures.
Understanding that at times allowances have to be made due to various factors, especially at system level,
some typical configuration differences from flight might include (but not be limited to):
Solar arrays are rarely included in system level testing, due to their size when deployed,
or blockage of critical thermal FOVs when stowed.
Deployed telescopes/sunshields or large deployable antennas/platforms may be too large

for a test chamber, requiring separate thermal balance tests for all flight elements or sub-
assemblies, and analytical thermal models of the subsystem. Alternately, they may be co-
located in the system test chamber, but not in the flight location, so separate and
appropriate thermal environments must be provided for them, and accurately modelled.
Propulsion system is empty of fuel for obvious safety reasons, although an inert, surrogate
fluid may be considered if deemed necessary for critical transient requirement verification.
If full-up system (Flight Element) thermal vacuum performance verification testing is impractical, due to the
sheer scale of the system hardware or facility availability, this means the goal must be to complete the
prescribed total of 12 (before flight) thermal vacuum cycles for all flight hardware and the required
performance testing and operating times at the lower levels of testing.
If thermal-balance testing cannot be executed at the system level, testing is completed at the next practical
lower level of assembly/test, such that all Flight Elements are thermal balance tested, resulting in a
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correlated thermal model for each. These lower level correlated Flight Element thermal models are then
integrated into a system thermal model for final system mission predictions. Other metrics such as thermo-
optical property measurements of flight coatings, component level tests, and review and verification of
manufacturing and installation procedures for thermal hardware are shown to exist which preclude full re-
verification testing.
Electronic card/piece part thermal analyses should be performed to ensure that derated junction
temperature limits are not exceeded during the expected operational mission conditions. Derated limits
are established by EEE-INST-002 or project accepted equivalent. For boxes seeing acceptance,
protoflight or qualification temperature levels, margins to vendor Tj(max) or alternate level determined by
the Parts Control Board (PCB) based on parts screening program should be verified. All flight and test
temperature sensors are to be monitored throughout the test and alarmed if possible. These sensors are
used to verify the PCB-determined derated temperature limits and to validate the board/unit level thermal
analyses and Tj(max) margins.
2.6.2.3.1 Unit Testing
Unit level thermal verification testing focuses on performance and functional testing as well as survivability,
in a thermal vacuum environment at temperatures extended beyond the AFT range, and proves
flightworthiness of the unit. It provides the optimum opportunity for environmental stress screening, and
also serves to verify the unit thermal design, especially for units with high dissipations, or gimbals, solar
array drives, etc. Unit level testing applies to subsystem/instrument and to system/payload development
programs.
Simulating flight-like heat flow and resulting temperatures, units are tested in a flight configuration in thermal
vacuum. If the flight thermal control is by conduction only through the mounting surface, unit testing must
ensure no additional radiative heat transfer from other surfaces occurs by using blankets, and a conductive
mount to a temperature controlled mounting surface provides temperature control. If the unit thermal design
relies on radiative heat transfer only, unit level testing simulates this using flight-like coatings, radiative
areas, and simulated sinks, and the conductive interfaces are isolated. If both radiative and conductive heat
transfer is used, then flight-like representations of both are simulated.
The maximum and minimum temperatures to be imposed during unit level thermal vacuum testing
represent, as discussed above, a temperature range large enough, including margins, to induce stress
during temperature cycling. The basis for these test temperatures is based on the project established
hardware based unit AFT range, plus margins.
Unit level tests cycle the unit through all operational modes to fully characterize the performance and
functionality of the unit, testing all electrical and data paths, both primary and redundant. Additionally, units
demonstrate turn-on after exposure to hot and cold non-operational limits. Units with internal redundancy,
performance and functional testing demonstrate hot and cold starts on primary and redundant circuits and
paths. During the test, data is monitored for failures, degradation trends, and intermittent behavior. The
unit are powered on and monitored during all temperature transitions, and the health of the unit is monitored
and key parameters trended. Performance of the unit is monitored during the test temperature transitions.
2.6.2.3.2 Subsystem Testing
Subsystem level thermal verification testing focuses on subsystem performance verification in modes
representative of planned mission operations/functions at temperatures in excess of the extremes predicted
for the mission, and during temperature transitions. Thermal balance testing is required at this level for
subsystem thermal design verification, while providing temperature and power data for thermal model
correlation.
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These tests also provide subsystem stressing cycles to temperatures extended beyond the AFT range,
while demonstrating hot and cold turn-on, and satisfactory operation over the range of possible flight
voltages. The test article thermal configuration is as planned for flight to maintain flight-like heat flows and
provide meaningful thermal balance data and thermal subsystem demonstration.
As an integrated assembly of hardware with different temperature ranges, achieving protoflight

temperatures will likely be limited by the hardware with the least robust range, and/or heater control, but
the goal should be to achieve as much margin as practicable without violating any individual protoflight limit.
Thermal balance testing is required at this level for thermal design verification, while providing temperature
and power data for thermal model correlation.
Those subsystems that, at the vehicle level, cannot be tested to their appropriate thermal environments or
cannot meet performance testing requirements either due to configuration requirements or interaction with
other subsystems, are tested at the subsystem level to include system level verification temperature and
cycling requirements, including additional cycles, if necessary.
2.6.2.3.3 System Testing
System level thermal verification testing focuses on system performance verification in modes
representative of planned mission operations/functions at temperatures in excess of the extremes predicted
for the mission, and during temperature transitions. This test provides the final verification cycles for the
units and subsystems, although not all hardware may achieve their individual test limits due to limits
imposed by less robust hardware. Additional modes to be tested at this level include launch/ascent (during
chamber depressurization), various planned operational modes, safehold, survival, etc. The tests also
demonstrate hot and cold “power up” from these minimal power states, and satisfactory operation over the
range of possible flight voltages.
As an integrated assembly of hardware with different temperature ranges, achieving protoflight

temperatures will likely be limited by the hardware with the least robust range, and/or heater control, but
the goal should be to achieve as much margin as practicable without violating any individual protoflight limit.
The test article thermal configuration is as planned for flight to maintain flight-like heat flows and provide
meaningful thermal balance data and thermal subsystem demonstration.
Thermal balance testing is required at this level for final system thermal design verification, while providing
temperature and power data for the thermal model correlation.
2.6.2.4 Special Considerations
2.6.2.4.1 Unrealistic Failure Modes
Unrealistic environmental conditions that could induce test failure modes are to be avoided. For instance,
hardware characteristics or orbital predictions, are used to limit maximum rates of temperature change to
acceptable limits.
2.6.2.4.2 Card Level Analysis Verification
During protoflight testing, specifically at hot plateaus, consideration should be given to monitoring
temperature sensors placed at strategic points on electronic cards or piece parts to confirm that the detailed
thermal analyses performed were conservative. These temperature monitors can either be flight sensors
or test sensors.
2.6.2.4.3 Test Temperature Sensor Location
Test temperatures for a thermal vacuum soak are based on the temperatures at selected location(s) or
average temperature of a group of locations, selected in accordance with an assessment to ensure that
components or critical parts of the payload achieve the desired temperature for the required time during the
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testing cycle. In some cases, the temperature sensors are attached to the component base plate or to the
heat sink on which the component is mounted, if the temperature requirement is defined at the mounting
interface.
2.6.2.4.4 Vacuum
Extraneous effects such as gaseous conduction in residual atmosphere should be kept negligible by
vacuum conditions in the chamber; pressures below 1.33 X 10-3 Pa (1 X 10-5 torr) are usually sufficiently
low.
2.6.2.4.5 Zero-Q Heaters
Certain test-peculiar conductive paths, such as test cables attached to the thermal balance test article, are
controlled so that non-flight-like heat flow into or out of the test article., does not occur. During thermal
balance the test cabling is minimized. If possible, hat couplers, stimuli, and other non-flight GSE should not
be present during thermal balance testing. At a minimum, necessary test cables are wrapped with multilayer
insulation (MLI) for a sufficient distance from the test article. A more positive method of control is to place
a guard heater on the test cable a short distance from the test article. Also, place two temperature sensors
spanning the interface, one on the spacecraft at the connector, the other on the test cable at the connector,
and wrap the cable and heater with MLI over a sufficient distance from the test article. The heater is
controlled until the temperatures of the two sensors are the same, thereby minimizing the heat flow through
this path.
2.6.2.4.6 Hardware Orientation
The test article must be oriented so that heat pipes are level, or in reflux orientation. Heat pipes, CPLs,
LHPs and other two-phase heat transfer devices will be affected by component orientation in the 1g
environment, thus limiting a 0g simulation in the test environment. Test planning must provide orientations
of flight hardware that position these devices in a gravity neutral or reflux orientation to assure their
operation in the test configuration. Hardware levelness or other orientation requirements must be verified
in the test chamber, prior to pump down, and actively monitored during the test, to ensure undetected
gravity/levelness issues do not degrade performance from this hardware. It is imperative that for
instruments with gravity induced effects, the test orientations planned for SCTV be initially tested during the
instrument/subsystem level tests.
2.6.2.4.7 Cryogenic Payloads
For cryogenic payloads, chamber walls and/or cryopanels may need to be colder than Liquid Nitrogen
temperatures to adequately reject heat. Temperature variations of emissivity should be taken into account
in the sink temperature determination analysis.
For active cryogenic control hardware, Code 552 and Section 2.7 should be consulted for specific guidance:
Dewar Systems: A test dewar may be necessary to simulate the conditions that a payload
would see inside a flight dewar. The cooling in a test dewar is available over the
temperature range of approximately 0.3 to 80 Kelvin (with gaps). The dewar system may
utilize solid cryogens, (i.e. Argon, Nitrogen, Neon or Hydrogen) or liquid cryogens (i.e.
helium, nitrogen). During ground testing there is a gravity effect on cryogens that is not
seen in flight. Interfaces between the top of the dewar and the payload may be warmer
than what would be seen in flight.
Coolers: Thermoelectric Coolers are semiconductor-based electronic components that

function as a small heat pump. Heat moves through the module in proportion to the applied
voltage. The devices offer active cooling and precise controllability and are used primarily
for “spot cooling” (cooling of a single component).
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Coolers are also used to recycle cryogen in a closed loop system. This reduces the
amount of cryogen needed during a test. This is frequently done when helium is used to
reduce cost.
2.6.2.5 Environment Simulation (General)
By definition, thermal vacuum testing is performed in the simulated thermal and vacuum environments of
space. While the pressure is uniformly very low outside of planetary atmospheres, the thermal environment
of space varies greatly for near Earth missions, and even more so for interplanetary missions. Although
primarily due to the solar intensity, more localized planetary effects (IR emissions, albedo, eclipses) must
also be considered, depending on the mission. The geometric complexity and trajectory/orbit/orientation of
the flight system throughout the mission, where some parts may be sunlit and exposed to planetary effects
and others may be in shadow and exposed to the coldest space temperatures, requires significant analysis
to determine these environments for all parts of the hardware.
Once the full set of mission environments is understood, and the bounding hot and cold conditions have
been determined for testing, designing the means to simulate them during thermal vacuum testing must be
completed. Correctly simulating these environments is required primarily for thermal balance verification of
the thermal subsystem, but using these same environments to achieve the required hot and cold test
margins during subsystem and system thermal vacuum verification, also influences their design. All of this
must be considered early in the test design in order to meet requirements of both types of testing. Further,
maintaining the correct environment simulation for subsystems (instruments) during system thermal
vacuum and balance testing, is key to successfully validating performance at the system protoflight levels
and system thermal performance in the final test in mission environments.
2.6.2.5.1 Unit testing
Usually the simplest test set-up - most electronics units are conductively mounted and radiatively isolated
or located in a benign radiation environment, so simulating the thermal environment at this levels is primarily
done with a temperature controlled mounting surface (platen) used to change the unit interface temperature.
Some units and many mechanisms, antennas, and other types of hardware exposed to the external thermal
environment, may need to include radiative heat exchange or be blanketed, to accurately simulate the
expected flight heat flow and validate the performance in a flight-like thermal environment.
Other units, such as lasers, may require optical support equipment during testing. The unique requirements
for each type of unit needs to be considered and implemented early in a project to ensure correct testing of
hardware at the unit level.
2.6.2.5.2 Subsystem/Instrument testing
Typically heavily dependent on correct environment simulation during thermal balance testing, especially
when combining cryogenic and non-cryogenic hardware at this level of assembly, for performance and
thermal verification testing. The use of separate thermal “targets” is typical, using liquid and gaseous
nitrogen, or helium, as necessary, and may be combined with optical stimulators/calibrators over the
aperture(s).
For instruments with two-phase thermal hardware, maintaining common test orientations between
subsystem and system testing allows data trending. Similarly, gravity needs to be considered during these
tests as some orientations might mask performance issues.
2.6.2.5.3 System/Payload testing
Is usually the most complicated test configuration for performance and thermal verification testing, with
large near-ambient temperature spacecraft bus, and several science instruments/sensors, some of which
may be cryogenic. Simulating the widely varying thermal environments typically uses a background
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radiative sink (cold shroud) and numerous localized thermal “targets” is typical, using liquid and gaseous
nitrogen, or helium, as necessary, sometimes combined with optical simulators/calibrators over instrument
apertures. Accurately simulating the interfaces and backload heating effects on the instruments can be
critical at this level.
2.6.2.5.4 Type of Simulation
The methods available to simulate environmental conditions are generally determined by the size of the
chamber, and the payload. The project test engineer should try to achieve the highest practical order of
simulation; that is, the one that requires the minimum number of assumptions and calculations to bound
the flight worst case thermal environment. The closer the simulation is to the spectrum, intensity and the
worst case environments, the less reliance on the thermal analytical model to verify the adequacy of the
thermal design. The effects of shadowing, blockage, and/or reflections (both diffuse and specular) in the
flight and test configurations are assessed and determined to be needed for an accurate simulation, or are
artifacts that could adversely affect the simulation. While an overall radiative sink temperature can be
achieved by using the chamber shroud and varying its temperature, it usually does not provide sufficient
controllability to allow different environments (sink) around the test article, as in most missions. Numerous
individual thermal targets could be used for all primary thermal control surfaces surrounding the test
hardware, but at higher levels of assembly this can become very complicated and difficult to implement
correctly and safely. Note that surfaces covered with Multi-Layer Insulation, if sufficiently large may
contribute significantly to the heat flow and require heating/cooling sources to correctly simulate the
expected mission environments and heat flow.
The optimum approach typically utilizes localized, discrete heating (thermal targets) around the test article,
with a background cold radiative sink – the chamber shroud – to create an effective radiative “sink
temperature” that is determined based on the predicted mission environmental heating of the surfaces of
the test article. Typical temperature regime capabilities of thermal vacuum chambers are:
(1) Controlled with Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2): ~ 170-375 K

(2) Flooded with Liquid Nitrogen (LN2): ~ 80-90 K
(3) Liquid Helium (LHe): 20-30 K
Methods of simulation and the major assumptions for a successful test are described below:
2.6.2.5.4.1 Radiative Sink Temperature
An effective sink temperature is calculated using spacecraft thermal math models that encompass the
effects of solar, Earth IR, albedo and IR effects from other spacecraft surfaces (i.e. backloading), with the
appropriate correction for gray body radiation. Test and flight predicts of the energy flow from critical
surfaces should be compared. Predictions of both the energy flow and temperatures from the test model
should be at least as severe as calculated in the flight model.
2.6.2.5.4.2 Cryopanels
Sink temperatures for individual radiators and critical thermal control surfaces can be controlled with
cryopanels. Cryopanels for cryogenic systems may require special enhancements, for example, open-face
honeycomb radiators to increase emittance values, using fluids noted above. Temperatures in between
those regimes can be achieved using heaters added to the cryopanel, or a heater plate that is conductively
coupled to the cryopanel, or combined with quartz lamps or calrods (see below).
2.6.2.5.4.3 Radiator Heaters
For simply shaped payloads, the absorbed energy from all exterior sources as determined by analysis, is
simulated at the exterior surface of the payload (usually the radiators) using I 2R heaters. Although this
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approach can be useful for thermal-cycling, this is not a valid thermal balance approach and does not allow
verification of the thermal control coatings emittance, requiring measurement before flight to ensure
accuracy of the model. Also, the project must understand that these heaters must be removed before flight,
and any underlying thermal control material/coating will likely be damaged, requiring repair or recoating
before flight.
2.6.2.5.4.4 Heater Plates
This is one of the most used methods of simulating the thermal environment, especially if the payload outer
surfaces are not to be touched. The same information is needed for the plates as for the skin heaters and
the exchange factor between the plates/cryopanels and the payload must be known. In both cases, a
balance equation considering absorptivity, emissivity, incident and rejected energies must be solved to
establish accurate test conditions. Pre-test analysis must be used to optimize the size/location of these
plates to ensure accurate simulation and to provide flexibility in achieving protoflight test levels.
2.6.2.5.4.5 Fluid Coldplates
Similar to heater plates, a fluid coldplate typically allows a wider temperature range on the cold end,
depending on the fluid used. The same information is needed for the plates as for the skin heaters and the
exchange factor between the plates/cryopanels and the payload must be known. In both cases, a balance
equation considering absorptivity, emissivity, incident and rejected energies must be solved to establish
accurate test conditions. Again, pre-test analysis must be used to optimize sizing/location.
2.6.2.5.4.6 Quartz lamps/calrods
This is an acceptable method of simulating planetary and solar heating, so long as the differences in
spectral output are measured and the input is adjusted. Care must be taken to understand the spectral
distribution of energy due to the high temperature of the emitting source, and thermo-optical properties
adjusted appropriately. While the spectral mismatch does not significantly affect the emissivity, the effect
on the absorptivity can be large and should therefore be determined and compensated for in the test and/or
analysis. One technique used to monitor and control lamps is to place calorimeters 1 at the surface of the
payload to measure the incident energy from the lamps. For hardware safety reasons, since these are
typically very high power, electrical fusing and cabling must account for conceivable failure modes, and the
test set-up should avoid exposed terminals.
2.6.2.5.4.7 Solar Simulation
Solar inputs can be simulated by mercury-xenon, xenon, or carbon arc source, cryopanels, and/or heaters
as described below. The spectrum and uniformity of the source used to simulate the sun and planet albedo
must be thoroughly measured and understood through pre-test measurement. Again, calorimeters are
effective in measuring simulated solar fluxes.
2.6.2.5.4.8 Atmospheric Simulation
For systems or subsystems that will operate in partial atmosphere, such as Mars surface experiments,
testing should include the same atmospheric conditions, to the maximum extent practical.
2.6.2.5.4.9 Conductive interfaces
1
Calorimeters are passive, in-situ temperature measurement devices, using thermocouples attached between
an outer (sink facing) layer of same material as the test article, and isolated on the reverse side from the test
article by MLI. Calorimeter design must carefully address parasitic heat paths to ensure accuracy, especially
at low temperatures.
2.6-13
THERMAL THERMAL
Temperatures may be simulated with cold plates that are held at worst-case boundary conditions. Their
temperature can be varied for cold flight, hot flight, and safe-hold conditions or parametrically varied.
Since the payload must be mechanically supported during testing there is generally a non-flight conductive
heat flow path that is, in flight, a radiative interface, usually with the space environment (e.g., the launch
vehicle attachment interface). As much conductive isolation as possible should be used between the test
article and this non-flight conductive interface. A heater is placed on the test fixture side of such a conductive
interface and two temperature sensors spanning the interface are used. The heater is controlled until the
temperatures of the two sensors are the same, thereby minimizing the heat flow through this path. Without
good isolation here, it is likely that an unrealistic and hard to quantify bias will be introduced at this interface,
making the test results difficult to assess. Isolation is typically achieved by using low thermal conductance
standoffs. However, the payload may need to be suspended with low conductance cables if the system has
a high sensitivity to small heat flows. Similarly, heat flows to/from large cable bundles during test must be
considered and minimized to achieve accurate thermal balance conditions.
The setup for testing, including any instrument and/or component stimulators, is designed/configured to
ensure that the test objectives will be achieved, and that no test induced problems are introduced. All
subsystem and system test configurations are documented and described in test plans and test procedures,
with the test hardware in flight configuration, as nearly as practicable, and reflected in the test thermal
model. Test heaters on the payload may be required to achieve proper and safe temperatures.
All flight and test temperature sensors are alarmed and continuously monitored throughout the test. The
operational modes of the payload are monitored in accordance with Section 2.3.
2.6.2.6 Tailoring
As noted in Section 1.3, GEVS is written as an endorsement of GSFC’s heritage verification approach in
which the entire payload is tested or verified under conditions that simulate the flight operations and flight
environment as realistically as possible. While it acknowledges tailoring of these standards may be
necessary in “unavoidable exceptions, or conditions which make it preferable to perform the verification
activities at lower levels of assembly”, or “to reflect hardware characteristics such as physical size and
complexity”, such tailoring must be done with concurrence of the technical authority, and documented at
MCR/SRR. While contingencies late in the development cycle may force deviation from these fundamental
specifications to maintain cost, or schedule, the baseline verification plan should follow this approach. The
project should proactively work with the technical community early in the development cycle to generate a
rigorous test plan in line with mission success.
2.6.3 Thermal Vacuum Verification
In lieu of a traditional qualification-acceptance test verification program, the Goddard Space Flight Center
utilizes a “protoflight qualification” (“proto-qualification”) thermal test program, where reduced test levels
(temperature range) allow the test hardware to be available for flight. Further reduction in temperature range
to “acceptance” levels for post-protoflight hardware (follow-on, spares, etc) reduces the workmanship
screening effectiveness. It is recommended that for projects with multiple flight units, elements or systems,
all hardware be tested to protoflight levels, rather than reducing test specifications for “follow-on” units.
Table 1 illustrates the prescribed operational temperature test margins. Design margins required are
included in the prediction of the expected flight temperatures and margined predictions must be within the
allowable temperature range. Unit survival limits should be defined by the hardware limits, and should be
at/or outside the protoflight temperature range of the hardware.
2.6.3.1 Requirements
The heritage verification approach has been developed for the three levels of testing typically considered;
the unit (component), subsystem (instrument), and the system (payload/spacecraft), based on the test
parameters available: test levels, number of cycles and transition rate. If it is impractical to test an entire
2.6-14
THERMAL THERMAL
integrated payload, the test may be conducted at the highest practicable level of assembl(ies), along with
any ancillary testing needed. In this scenario, the final verification and flightworthiness of the integrated
payload will be based on an integrated set of analyses.
In cases where testing is compromised, for example, the inability to drive temperatures of the all-up
assembly to the qualification limits, testing at lower levels of assembly may be warranted. For units/sub-
assemblies not included in system level thermal vacuum testing, lower level testing must be used to
complete the total pre-flight cycle quantity before final system integration.
Above the unit level of assembly, it becomes more difficult to achieve individual protoflight temperatures on
all hardware that typically has very different allowable ranges, yet are often located in close proximity to
each other. This usually results in a unit with a less robust temperature range limiting the achievable
temperature of adjacent units having more robust ranges, thus under-testing some hardware while not over-
stressing others. To better achieve the required workmanship screening, options may be considered to
complete all workmanship stress screening cycles at the unit level where individual protoflight temperatures
are easily achieved and cycling time is minimal, allowing subsystem and system level testing to focus more
on demonstrating performance at test temperature levels appropriate to those levels of assembly. In this
scenario, subsystem and system level cycles may be reduced, as long as a minimum of twelve before flight
is met.
2.6.3.2 Test Parameters
Test/workmanship margin, temperature cycling, soak duration, test chamber conditions, transition rates,
temperature and pressure regimes, are some of the key parameters of the environmental verification test.
Overall test effectiveness is primarily affected by the test temperature range, number of cycles, and
temperature-rate-of-change. Specifications for passive cryogenics systems operating <120K, are
discussed under each of these parameters, while active cryogenic systems are covered in Section 2.7.
2.6.3.2.1 Test Margins
Temperature margins are established to demonstrate performance beyond where units are allowed to
operate (AFT) in flight and to induce sufficient thermal stress conditions to detect unsatisfactory
performance that otherwise may not be discovered before flight. The basis for these test temperatures is
the individual unit operational and non-operational limits that are based on hardware capability, not thermal
analysis predictions, and are as broad as possible. For instrument/subsystem and spacecraft level testing,
the minimum and maximum temperatures imposed is derived from the collection of various unit temperature
ranges, while acknowledging the least robust range.
2.6-15
THERMAL THERMAL
Figure 2.6-1 - Thermal-Vacuum Test Temperatures Margins (Passive Thermal Control)
2.6.3.2.1.1 Non-Cryogenic hardware (>120K)
For all units, a test temperature margin of no less than 10°C is imposed on the unit level operational
temperature range (AFT) at all levels of testing (Figure 2.6-1).
At subsystem/system level, for hardware not actively controlled directly by heaters or other thermal
hardware, the test temperature margin achievable is dependent on the collection of unit protoflight ranges
(often limited by the least robust range); a minimum of 15°C outside of the predicted mission temperature
ranges for the various units defines the” subsystem or system protoflight” condition.
At subsystem/system level, for hardware actively controlled by heaters or other thermal hardware whose
temperature control range is not selectable/ variable such that the control system will not allow the hardware
to be stressed via temperature at the hot or cold end, then test margin to be demonstrated is as determined
by the control range. (Note: thermal balance testing must demonstrate design margin as described in
Section 2.6.4.3)
For subsystems/systems having units with redundant, fixed temperature (setpoint) operational heater
control, the cold end margin for unit level testing of those units may be reduced from 10°C to 5°C, as long
as the heater control duty cycle requirement (Section 2.6.4.1) is met. Higher level testing with the heater
control enabled need not attempt to drive the hardware below the setpoint.
Units not directly heater controlled must provide 10°C cold test margin.
Actively Controlled Hardware (>120K): For components/subsystems/payloads with active thermal control,
such as Thermo-Electric Coolers (TECs), Loop Heat Pipes (LHPs), Capillary Pumped Loops (CPLs), or
other devices controlled using heaters with selectable/variable set points, the required range of
2.6-16
THERMAL THERMAL
temperature control is demonstrated in the worst hot (minimum setpoint) and worst cold (maximum
setpoint) thermal environments during thermal balance testing.
For subsystems/systems having units with variable/selectable temperature operational heater control, the
goal should be to drive the hardware +/-10°C and no less than 5°C from the nominal setpoint.
2.6.3.2.1.2 Cryogenic Hardware (<120K):
The 10°C thermal vacuum protoflight test margin should be the goal for cryogenic hardware (such as
detectors), especially in the upper end of the cryogenic range, noting that the full 10°C may not be possible
for some passive cryogenic systems, in the extreme cryogenic range, due to test setup limitations, and
performance testing limitations outside the normal temperature range. These limitations on margins should
be established in collaboration between the Project and ETD Thermal Engineering based on the unique
characteristics of the test article, and documented by System Requirements Review. Additional information
about cryogenic test margins is contained in Section 2.7.3.4.
For cryogenic hardware that is actively controlled by ADRs, dewars, etc, refer to Section 2.7 or contact
Code 552.
2.6.3.2.2 Thermal Vacuum Cycle Quantity
Cycling between temperature extremes has the purpose of checking performance during both stabilized
conditions and transitions thereby causing temperature gradient shifts, thus inducing stresses that are
intended to uncover incipient problems. The number of cycles is not based on the expected temperature
cycles during the mission, but is intended to induce a prescribed amount of thermal stress in the test
hardware.
2.6.3.2.2.1 Non-Cryogenic hardware (>120K)
For all flight hardware, a minimum of 12 cycles before flight is prescribed, achieved at each of the lower
levels of assembly as discussed in Section 2.6.2.6.
Table 2.6-1 summarizes these generic test parameters, applicable to all missions at GSFC, for thermal
verification of non-cryogenic hardware at the unit, subsystem, and system levels of assembly:
Table 2.6-1 -Thermal Vacuum Verification Summary (Non-Cryogenic)
Test Article LoA Subsystem / System / Satellite

Test Parameter Unit Instrument (2)
TV Cycle Qty ( preferred )(1)(2)

Subsystem / Instrument: 4 (0) 4 (8) 4
System / Payload: 8 N/A 4
TV Cycle Qty (alternate)(1)(2)
Subsystem / Instrument: 6 4 2
System / Payload: 10 N/A 2
AFT range +/-10C
Test Temperature Margin (3) (Figure 2.6-1) AFT range +/-10C AFT range +/-10C (5) (5)
Plateau Duration (hrs) (4)

4 12 24
Maximum Transition Rate (°C/min) (6) 1.0 1.0 1.0
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THERMAL THERMAL
Notes:
1. The goal for workmanship screening is a minimum of 12 cycles before flight; the preferred approach is the
GSFC heritage protoflight, with the system test providing the final four (4) cycles for all flight hardware, and
instrument hardware completing 8 cycles before delivery to system I&T (a minimum of four (4) of those
cycles must be performed at the subsystem/instrument level of assembly). If the project desires to reduce
subsystem and/or system cycle quantity, an alternate approach is offered, requiring additional workmanship
screening cycles at the lower levels, rather than under-testing the flight hardware.
2. Due to stabilization time constraints of cryogenic hardware, refer to Section 2.6.2.3
3. Actively controlled cryogenic hardware should refer to Section 2.7. Test and design margins for passively
controlled cryogenic hardware are addressed in this section of GEVS.
4. These are estimates of the soak time initialized after achieving specified stabilization criteria, to allow
completion of the planned testing at each plateau. Pre-test thermal analysis must confirm these durations,
or modify them as needed so long as stabilization and test requirements are met. They may also need to
be extended to meet total vacuum operating time requirements at hot and cold plateaus.
5. Temperatures achieved may be the same as individual unit protoflight temperatures, but should be at least
10°C beyond worst case hot & cold mission margined temperatures predictions (already includes the 5°C
design/uncertainty margin).
6. These are suggested rates, which may be easily achievable at unit level, but complicated by thermal
isolation and/or larger thermal mass at higher levels of assembly. Project specific rates achievable in test
should be determined analytically by PDR, compared to mission transition rates, and implemented in test
and/or procurement specifications.
Based on testing derived by other branches at GSFC, specifically Code 543 (Mechanical Engineering)
and Code 597 (Propulsion), the following hardware specific cycling specifications may apply:
Hardware Cycle Qty Comments/Notes

Structure:
Metallic 2 (min) if structural margins are driven by thermal stresses; recommend
complete alignment performance test prior to instrument assembly,
for optically sensitive structure
Bonded/bolted 2 (min) Recommend complete alignment performance test prior to
instrument assembly, for optically sensitive structure,
Bonded only 2 (min) if primary load path; no cycles needed if secondary structure,
unless structural margins are driven by thermal stresses
Radiator panels 4 (min) no embedded thermal hardware
4 (min) with embedded thermal heat pipes, LHPs, etc. Also requires IR
imaging (Section 2.6.4.4)
Propulsion:
Static not required Tanks, lines, filters, fittings, venturis
8b pressure transducers
Dynamic 1d non-electronic hardware (regulators, fill & drain valves)
8 a,b,c,d electronic (w/solenoids or other EEE parts), i.e. –valves, including
thrusters
Notes:
a) Dynamic electronic components must demonstrate the pull in voltage at hot and cold plateaus
(to identify force margins)
b) All electronic components should demonstrate in qualification the amount of time they can
withstand the maximum voltage
c) Engines should have validated hot fire models, no dedicated cycle testing is required
d) Functional testing must be performed at the hot and cold extremes
If thermal cycle testing is being performed as a performance or workmanship screen for mechanical
hardware and the hardware does not contain any heat generating components, it is acceptable to perform
2.6-18
THERMAL THERMAL
thermal cycle testing under ambient pressure conditions. The number of cycles for this type of testing
may be less than the minimum of the 8 thermal-vacuum cycles required for qualification. The number of
cycles should follow the guidelines shown in the above table. Examples of where these reduced
requirements may be applied are when thermal-cycling a honeycomb panel with bonded inserts to verify
integrity under thermal loading or during testing of a mechanism to verify operation at temperature
extremes.
2.6.3.2.2.2 Cryogenic hardware (<120K)
The baseline cycling specification may not apply to cryogenic systems, due to time constraints and may
cause undue stress on flight systems. While long transitions to cryogenic temperatures may have structural
effects on passive cryogenic hardware, operational conditions must be considered when determining
cryogenic system cycling quantity. The number of cycles is established in collaboration between the Project
and structural and thermal engineers based on the unique characteristics of the test article, and
documented at System Requirements Review (Note: parts of the subsystem/instrument not considered
cryogenic must still complete the baseline number of cycles before system level integration), requiring test
targets/thermal control to achieve this. Additional information about cryogenic cycling is contained in
Section 2.7.3.4b.
2.6.3.2.3 Plateau Durations
The duration of each of the test plateaus, at any level of testing, is sufficient to complete the required
performance testing to demonstrate performance and uncover early failures, and to meet required hot and
cold operating times. The plateau test time may vary based on such factors as the number of mission-
critical operating modes, the test item thermal inertia, required operating time at temperature, and test
facility characteristics.
Unit testing: temperature soaks and dwells time begin when the “control” temperature, usually the
baseplate or platen, is within 2°C of the protoflight test temperature. Hot and cold operational plateaus are
a minimum of 4 hours in duration, or the time needed to complete performance testing, whichever is
greater, while non-operating plateaus are held for a minimum of 2 hours.
Subsystem testing: temperature soaks and dwell time begin when 98% of the temperature sensors on the
test article are within 2°C of the expected test temperature, or are changing <0.1°C/hour, and are held for
a minimum of 12 hours in duration (both hot and cold operational plateaus) or the time needed to complete
performance testing, whichever is greater. Survival/safehold plateaus are maintained a minimum of (8)
hours at proper temperature conditions.
System testing: temperature soaks and dwell time begin when 98% of the temperature sensors on the test
article are within 2°C of the expected test temperature, or are changing <0.1°C/hour, and are held for a
minimum of 24 hours in duration (both hot and cold operational plateaus) or the time needed to complete
performance testing, whichever is greater. Survival/safehold plateaus are maintained a minimum of (8)
hours at proper temperature conditions.
2.6.3.2.3.1 Cryogenic Hardware
The plateau durations for cryogenic elements may be significantly longer than noted above. Plateau start
times and durations should be established by cognizant engineers based on the settling time, operational
characteristics/limits, and verified via thermal analysis.
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THERMAL THERMAL
2.6.3.2.4 Pressure
The chamber pressure after the electrical discharge checks are conducted is less than 1.33 X 10-3 Pa. (1
X 10-5 torr). The ability to function through the voltage breakdown region is demonstrated during pump
down, and/or repressurization, if applicable to mission requirements (those elements that are operational
during launch).
Hardware operating in partial pressures, such as surface experiments on Mars, are tested in all mission
environments that they operate in, including vacuum and partial pressure(s), as applicable.
2.6.3.3.1 Electrical Discharge Check
Items that are electrically operational during pressure transitions undergo an electrical discharge check to
ensure that they will not be permanently damaged from electrical discharge during the ascent and early
orbital phases of the mission, or during descent and landing (if applicable). The test is designed to include
checks for electrical discharge during the corresponding phases of the vacuum chamber operations,
typically pumpdown and/or repressurization.
2.6.3.3.1.1 Outgassing Phase
If the test article is contamination sensitive (or if required by the contamination control plan) an outgassing
phase must be included to permit a large portion of the volatile contaminants to be removed. The outgassing
phase will be incorporated into a hot exposure that will occur during thermal-vacuum testing. The test item
will be cycled hot and remain at this temperature until the contamination control monitors indicate that the
outgassing has decreased to an acceptable level.
2.6.3.3.1.2 Hot Conditions
The temperature controls are adjusted to cause the test item to stabilize at the upper test temperature. Hot
turn-on capability is demonstrated as required. The duration of this phase is sufficient to permit the
performance of the functional tests with a minimum soak time as specified in Table 2.6-1.
2.6.3.3.1.3 Transitions
The test item remains in an operational mode during the transitions between temperatures so that its
functioning can be monitored under a changing environment. The requirement may be suspended when
turn-on of the test item is to be demonstrated after a particular transition. Although flight-like heat paths
should be maintained, in certain cases it may be possible to expedite transitions by removing thermal
insulation to expedite cool-down rates. Caution must be taken not to violate temperature limits, or to induce
test failures caused by excessive and/or unrealistic gradients or transition rates.
At unit level, temperature transitions should be as robust as possible, as suggested in the table above. At
higher levels of assembly, the additional thermal mass and larger time constant will tend to “self-limit”
achievable rates, although a goal should be to at least achieve flight-like rates. The rate of transition
specified ensures that stresses caused by thermal gradients will not damage the test article. STOP
(Structural/Thermal/Optical) analyses should be performed to ensure stresses and alignments are
acceptable for the given transition rate. Care must be exercised with cryogenic systems where the thermal
stresses can be severe. The cool-down and warm-up for cryogenic systems should be as flight like as
possible. Contamination effects may also be a factor.
2.6.3.3.1.4 Cold Conditions
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THERMAL THERMAL
The temperature controls are adjusted to cause the test item to stabilize at the lowest test temperature.
Cold turn-on capability is demonstrated at the start of the cold condition, and the duration of the cold phase
is sufficient to permit the performance of the functional tests with a minimum soak time as specified in Table
2.6-1.
2.6.3.3.1.5 Hot and Cold Start Demonstrations
Start-up capability is demonstrated to verify that the test item will turn on after exposure to the extreme
temperatures that may occur in orbit. Turn-on capability is demonstrated under vacuum at least once at
both the low and high temperatures, on primary and redundant side, as applicable. Test turn-on
temperatures are defined by the expected mission operations without any margin; that is, temperatures
should be at either survival/safe-hold or qualification temperature conditions, whichever are more extreme,
as appropriate.
Unit/Component: this demonstration is performed after exposure to non-operating temperatures, or the

protoflight temperatures, whichever is more extreme. Cold turn-on typically follows exposure to the cold
non-operating temperature, or the protoflight temperature, whichever is more extreme. Hot turn-on typically
follows the bakeout plateau, allowing the unit to cool to the hot protoflight limit (if less than the bakeout
temperature) before turn-on.
Subsystem/Instrument: this demonstration is consistent with the scenario regarding which

units/components are actually power cycled (off/on) in orbit, and also for recovery from a survival/safe-
hold mode in orbit.
Payload/Spacecraft: this demonstration is consistent with the scenario regarding which units/components
are actually power cycled (off/on) in orbit, and also for recovery from a survival/safe-hold mode in orbit.
For example, recovery from cold survival/safehold temperatures to cold operational temperatures may be
accomplished either by using a flight heater, or alternately, by turning the units/components of the test item
back on and allowing internal dissipation to warm temperatures. Proper operation is then checked after the
component has returned to the protoflight limit. The duration of the soak with the test item off, or in
survival/safe-hold mode, is in accordance with Table 2.6-1.
2.6.3.3.1.6 Functional Test
Functional tests are be performed at each hot and cold soak plateau and during transitions. A
comprehensive performance test (CPT) is performed at least once during hot plateau(s) and once during
cold plateau(s), exercising complete primary and redundant operations, unless it is determined to be
impractical. In that case, with project approval, a limited functional test may be substituted if satisfactory
performance is demonstrated for the major mission critical modes of operation. Otherwise, the requirements
of 2.3.2 apply. Functionality and performance of the thermal control system hardware is demonstrated
during the thermal-balance portion of the test.
2.6.3.3.1.7 Return to Ambient
If the mission includes a requirement for the test item to remain in an operational mode through the descent
and landing phases, the test segment is included to verify that capability. If possible, the test article should
be kept warmer than the surroundings to protect against contamination from the test facility. Before the
chamber can be backfilled with air, all sensors should read above the dew point to insure that water does
not condense on the payload.
2.6-21
THERMAL THERMAL
2.6.3.3.1.8 General
The margins, soak criteria, cycling, and duration guidelines listed above apply primarily to test articles
around room temperature (except where noted). Test parameters for high temperature and cryogenic
systems should be should be determined early in the program by Code 545, Code 552 (in the case of
cryogenic systems) and the project engineering and science teams. Notional test profiles summarizing
some of the above parameters are shown in Figure 2.6-2 for unit, subsystem/instrument, and
system/satellite level thermal vacuum testing. Thermal models should be used to estimate transition and
stabilization times. The “control” temperature criterion for cryogenic systems should be determined by the
thermal engineer and the Project as it may be significantly more stringent than 2°C.
2.6-22
THERMAL THERMAL
Figure 2.6-2 - Notional TV Test Temperature Profiles (Unit, Subsystem, System Level)
2.6.3.4 Special Tests
Special tests may be required to evaluate unique features, such as a radiation cooler, or to demonstrate
the performance of external devices such as solar array hinges or experiment booms that are deployed
after the payload has attained orbit.
The test configuration reflects, as nearly as practicable, the configuration expected in flight.
When items undergoing test include unusual equipment, special care must be exercised to ensure that the
equipment does not present a hazard to the test item, the facility, or personnel.
Special tests must be included in the project environmental verification specification (1.10.2).
2.6.3.5 Environment Simulation (TV)
As noted in paragraph 2.6.2.5, using the same test set-up and thermal/optical targets in subsystem and
system thermal vacuum testing is desirable for cost reasons, although additional thermal targets or heating
methods may be used to fully achieve test goals at subsystem or system level.
Thermal analyses of the test set-up, including planned targets and environmental simulation, must be
completed to ensure acceptable protoflight levels are achieved.
Testing at all levels of assembly, is considered successful if:
2.6.3.6.1 Test Levels Achieved: The predicted test levels (temperatures) are achieved (within
tolerance) for all relevant hardware. Any exceedances must be documented in the appropriate anomaly
database and vetted for the associated hardware’s continued availability for flight.
Performance: Unit Level:
Further, following unit, subsystem, and system level testing:
2.6.3.6.2 Failure-Free-Performance: At least 100 trouble-free hours of functional operations at the hot
conditions, and 100 trouble-free hours of functional operations at the cold conditions must be
demonstrated in the thermal verification program. It is noted that a total of 350 hours of failure-free hours
is a requirement of which 200 are to be in vacuum. (Section 2.3.4).
2.6-23
THERMAL THERMAL
2.6.4 THERMAL BALANCE VERIFICATION
Thermal balance phases, performed as part of subsystem/instrument or system/space vehicle thermal

vacuum testing, are used to verify thermal design and hardware performance guidelines2, including heater
operation, radiator sizing, thermal blanket performance, and critical heat transfer paths, while providing
temperature and power data to be used in correlating the analytical thermal model(s) that will be used for
mission operations. Thermal subsystem performance verification can only be demonstrated in thermal
vacuum testing, with test phases designed to operate the flight hardware in various flight-like modes, while
exposed to the simulated worst hot and cold environments expected for the mission.
Pre-test analysis is performed using the element or system thermal model to aid in test design and to assure
hardware safety. The test model is correlated to test data to generate the model used for delivery
(instrument) or launch (system).
The test objectives are to validate the thermal design and to verify functional performance by:
1. Verifying that the flight hardware system thermal control design satisfies the AFT, thermal gradient, and
thermal stability requirements under a combination of extreme simulated mission thermal environmental
and operational conditions
2. Collecting sufficient data to enable thermal math model correlation so that untestable conditions can be
validated by analysis
While the actual thermal balance test scenarios for each mission may be unique and are to be determined
by the project thermal engineer, a minimum of three test conditions are imposed:
- Operational hot case, with maximum environmental conditions and maximum power
configuration
- Operational cold case, with minimum environmental conditions and minimum power
configuration
- Survival:
o Subsystem/Instrument: Non-operational case (subsystems/instruments), with
minimum environmental conditions
o System/Satellite: Survival or Safe Mode, with minimum environmental
conditions and appropriate power configuration.
Additional cases to be considered include: a transient case to check the thermal time constant of the model,
safe mode, and nominal “day-in-the-life” conditions. Short-term, mission-like, transient simulations may be
warranted, especially if the units are operating near their limit, and these should be added at the end of the
appropriate steady state thermal balance plateau after stability is declared.
2.6.4.1 Guidelines
The principal goal of thermal balance testing is to verify thermal design margins in worst case expected hot
and cold thermal environments, by demonstrating thermal subsystem performance while simulating
operational and safehold/survival environmental conditions for the mission. For example, these design
margins include:
 Thermal design (uncertainty) margin: accounts for lingering error between correlated model
temperature predictions and actual temperatures seen in flight. Typically, for non-cryogenic
hardware at GSFC, this is implemented by reducing the Allowable Flight Temperature range
by 5°C (hot and cold limits), creating an analytical prediction range, that encompasses all
worst-case temperature predictions
2
See branch documentation 545-PG-8700.2.1 for specific thermal design requirements
2.6-24
THERMAL THERMAL
Cryogenic: The increased number of cryogenic payloads necessitates an updated definition of

design margin. The GSFC Cryogenics Branch (Code 552) has recently updated the prescribed
design uncertainty margins to be used on all cryogenic projects throughout the development cycle.
For passive cryogenic systems, the design margin is expressed as heat load margin 3 and recent
guidelines show how this margin can be reduced4 as a function of design maturity from project start
through launch readiness. See Table 2.7-2.
Heat load margins are applied to the current best estimate of the cryogenic heat loads,
including parasitics; and applied at the location in which they are incurred.
Margin% = (Cooling Capability – Current Best Estimate) / Current Best Estimate
For the prescribed 33% margin (at PSR/launch), a heat rejection calculation below 120K shows the
commensurate temperature margins:
TMARGIN (K) TPREDICT (K)
5K 103 - 120K
4K 81 - 103K
3K 59 - 81K
2K 35 - 59K
1K 14 - 35K
Therefore, thermal design margin is applied as 5K temperature margin above 120K, and as the
prescribed heat load margin below 120K, or the approximate commensurate temperature margin
noted above.
 Operational heater duty cycle margin (or equivalent for “non-ON/OFF” control); less than
70% duty cycle in worst cold case, using appropriate minimum voltage as established by
the project, including line losses.
 Survival heater duty cycle margin, dependent on survival setpoint/temperature limit and
available resources; using appropriate minimum voltage as established by the project, and
line losses
 Interface temperatures, gradients, and heat flows are within project requirements
 Demonstration of heat transport capability and controllability setpoint range for two-phase
flow systems, such as LHP and CPL, in worst case environments. Controllability over the
entire setpoint control range must be demonstrated over the expected range of margined
hot and cold environments (+/-30% over the hot and cold mission environments), including
appropriate dissipative loads on these systems.
Thermal balance testing is primarily influenced by accurately determining and simulating the appropriate
hot and cold mission thermal environments, accurate power measurements, stabilization at plateaus, and
accurate modeling of the test article configuration, including the non-flight fixtures, thermal targets, etc.
2.6.4.2.1 Environment Simulation (TB)
As noted in paragraph 2.6.2.5, the same test set-up and thermal/optical targets determined for thermal
balance testing is usually desirable for thermal vacuum testing, although additional thermal targets or
heating methods may be used to fully achieve test goals at subsystem or system level.
3
Spacecraft Thermal Control Handbook: Fundamental Technologies (Vol 2), Chapter 19 (Aerospace Corp)
4
Cryogenic Design Margin – proposed GOLD Rule (Code 552)
2.6-25
THERMAL THERMAL
Thermal subsystem verification is demonstrated during thermal balance testing, so the thermal
environments used must closely simulate the expected worst hot and cold case mission environments used
in the project analysis. A typical mission may have very different thermal environments surrounding the
satellite that may change drastically through an orbit due to eclipse or other effects, or throughout the
mission due to varying beta angles, distance from the sun, etc. But, since temperature stability is critical for
thermal balance testing, environmental simulation must be steady state using the orbit average, or
maximum/minimum environments as appropriate, and determined by the thermal engineer. Careful
consideration of designing test thermal targets to correctly simulate these environments around the test
article is key to a successful thermal balance test. Further, since these same targets are typically used to
demonstrate system performance beyond the maximum allowable mission temperatures, their design must
be even more flexible, and detailed pre-test analysis using the intended target configuration and
environmental simulation will be key to the success of the test. This analysis must compare mission predicts
to those from the corresponding simulated test cases, in order to validate the thermal balance test set-up.
Similarly, an assessment of the test temperatures predicted for the hot and cold cycle plateaus to the
various temperature goal of the hardware, will validate the test capability to achieve the desired test levels.
The type of simulation to be used is generally determined by the size of the chamber, the methods available
to simulate environmental conditions, and the payload. Generally, the project test engineer should try to
achieve the highest practical order of simulation; that is, the one that requires the minimum number of
assumptions and calculations to bound the flight worst case thermal environment. The closer the simulation
is to the spectrum, intensity and the worst case environments, the less reliance on the thermal analytical
model to verify the adequacy of the thermal design. An assessment and accounting of the effects of
shadowing, blockage, and/or reflections (both diffuse and specular) in the flight and test configurations, is
needed for an accurate simulation, and to ensure they do not adversely affect the simulation. Methods of
simulation and the major assumptions for a successful test are described below:
2.6.4.2.2 Internal Power
Through the design phase of a project, thermal analyses typically use the estimated unit dissipations, as
provided by the systems engineer or the hardware provider/designer, applying margins to bound the hot &
cold analysis cases. These unit power levels should be confirmed through measurements, to the maximum
extent practical, at subsystem and system level tests, to ensure model correlation accuracy.
Power dissipation of individual components should be measured to an accuracy of 1% at voltage and

temperature extremes during (component) testing. For voltage converters, where efficiency usually varies
as a function of power load, sufficient measurement resolution must be provided to accurately determine
the converter load and efficiency.
Based primarily on measurements during unit level testing, thermal analysis at higher levels of assembly
must use these measured powers to be more accurate, using different operating modes if applicable, for
discerning between bounding hot and cold analysis cases. At subsystem/instrument and system/satellite
level, systems engineering should provide (1) details on what can be directly measured using flight or test
current/voltage monitors, (2) how this information, in conjunction with component/subassembly test data,
will be used to determine individual component dissipations during these higher level tests, and (3) a plan
to resolve discrepancies during test. Testing at these higher levels should also verify internal power
dissipations and line losses, if possible, in all expected flight operational scenarios.
2.6.4.2.3 Test Article Configuration
While the goal is for the test article to be as “flight-like” configuration as possible, at the subsystem/system
level there may be some exceptions to this, as discussed in Section 2.6.2.3. Care must be taken to
accurately model any difference between the flight and test configurations, including the test chamber and
thermal targets in the analytical model.
2.6.4.2.4 Thermal Analysis
2.6-26
THERMAL THERMAL
Throughout a project’s life cycle, thermal analytical models are developed for the various flight elements,
and matured through the development process, culminating with the integration of each element model into
a system level model by the system hardware integration entity to be able to predict thermal performance
during the mission. Element and integrated system models are used to predict thermal performance in the
respective thermal vacuum and thermal balance tests, and data from each thermal balance tests is used
to adjust the respective pre-test thermal models to closely match the recorded test data during the model
correlation process. The correlation process and criteria are summarized in Section 2.6.4.4, and discussed
in detail in GSFC Thermal Branch guideline documentation.
2.6.4.2.5 Stabilization at Thermal Balance Plateaus
Temperature stability is critical in assessing the performance of the thermal control subsystem in the
simulated environments, and in ensuring the correct data is used for thermal model correlation. Thus, the
thermal stability requirement for thermal balance testing is more stringent than it is for thermal vacuum cycle
testing. The various parts of the test article will stabilize at different rates, depending on their thermal time
constant that is a function of thermal capacitance and heat flows.
As the test thermal models are developed leading up to PER, analytically determined values can be
completed to validate this criteria. These models are initially used to provide steady state predictions, but
to ensure validity of the data they also must be used to transiently assess stabilization of the various parts
of the test hardware leading to PER, and to establish the various temperature stabilization criteria and
validate the test timeline.
There are different approaches to determining a stabilization criteria, but 545/Thermal Branch guidelines
are to use more stringent overall requirement, or to tailor the stability criteria on a more discrete, thermal
zone basis.
Prior to detailed analysis of these test transitions and stability, a reasonable overall criteria of <0.1°C/hour
(for 4 consecutive hours) for all temperature sensors may be used, to establish preliminary test timelines.
Overall criteria: <0.1°C/hour (and continuously decreasing for 4 consecutive hours) for all temperature
sensors. Or, on a more discrete, thermal zone basis:
∆Qi = (MCP)i (∆T/∆t)i
Where:
∆Qi = change in energy (% of dissipation load, W) for each thermally discrete zone (i)
MCP = Thermal mass (mass * specific heat, Joules/°C)
∆T/∆t = Stabilization rate (°C/min)The typical energy change (∆Qi) for thermal balance stabilization
is 3% of total Qi for the zone; this should be applied to the overall test article, and also discretely to
thermally segregated zones or hardware within the test article.
For zones or hardware with no dissipative heat loads, final stabilized equilibrium temperatures should be
continuously estimated during the transitions, and there are different methods to do this, they are not
repeated here.
For thermal zones cycling on thermostatic heaters, the above criterion is not applicable, but verification of
the repeatability of the heater duty cycle is important. A heater can be considered “stabilized” if the heater
duty cycle is repeatable within 5% over 3 successive cycles, by comparing ON/OFF cycle durations. If
heaters interfere with each other such that a clear, repeatable duty cycle does not occur or if a non-cycling
heater control is used, then engineering judgment must be used to assess whether the thermal zone has
achieved equilibrium.
Once criteria are established, assessing stabilization during the test using real time temperature data is key
to ensure the test is run efficiently, while collecting accurate thermal balance data. Thermal branch
guidelines provide information on achieving this.
2.6-27
THERMAL THERMAL
During the bounding hot and cold thermal balance plateaus, the thermal design is demonstrated to maintain
all temperatures within the allowable temperature ranges, including margins, giving confidence the flight
hardware will be within the same ranges throughout the mission. All primary and redundant thermal
hardware is exercised, and active heat transport devices should be exercised over their planned operating
range.
For actively controlled two-phase systems, design margin is demonstrated by increasing and
decreasing the simulated worst case mission environment (external heat loads) by at least 30 %.
Demonstration that the active temperature control hardware maintains set-point control under these
stressed conditions provides the required design margin. The goal of this testing is to create a load
or an environmental condition in excess of what the system will see on-orbit in order to stress the
system and demonstrate its overall flightworthiness.
Many projects add special tests at the end of the hot or cold balance plateaus, or both. Depending on the
mission, project requirements, and pre-test predicted margins, examples of special tests may include:
- Infrequent extended eclipses, survival or stability, etc
- Transfers from launch vehicle to ISS where heater power may not be available
- Stability during slew maneuvers
- Thruster catalyst bed heat-up
- Battery charge/discharge cycles
- Alignment tests/measurements to measure/verify STOP models
- Design control range for active thermal two-phase heat transport systems with selectable
temperature set-points, such as LHPs.
For radiators using embedded two-phase heat transport hardware, such as constant or variable
conductance heat pipes, or Loop Heat Pipes, it is critical that infrared imaging be used to verify uniform and
consistent heat paths from and between the embedded hardware, including images of both facesheets
taken without perturbing the test heat load or physical configuration. Optimally, this test is done before
shipment from the vendor, but can be completed after receipt or fabrication of the radiators, such as during
incoming inspection. This imaging for instrument or satellite hardware, as appropriate for the hardware
institution, follows mechanical environments to verify bond integrity and thermal performance is maintained,
prior to thermal vacuum testing.
Acceptance requirements for thermal balance testing, at any level, include:

- successful demonstration of thermal subsystem performance in the bounding hot and cold
simulated mission environments including operational and survival modes, meeting all design
requirements.
- successful correlation of the test article thermal model, as discussed below, for all balance
cases.
Demonstration of thermal subsystem performance: The test setup must accurately simulate the selected
hot and cold mission environments, so that the thermal control performance can be correctly demonstrated.
Simulated thermal balance test environments achieved must match expected flight thermal environments
(those used in the analysis cases during the development cycle) within 10% (TBR). In these cases, all
temperatures must be maintained within appropriate allowable ranges, per project documentation, with
required design/analytical uncertainty applied. All heater circuits must demonstrate duty cycles meet design
requirements documented in branch guidelines.
2.6-28
THERMAL THERMAL
Thermal Model Correlation: Thermal model correlation is the process where adjustments are made to the
thermal model to achieve better agreement with thermal balance test data. The purpose of the correlation
is to improve and quantify the accuracy of the thermal model using test data, thus increasing confidence
that the thermal model will accurately predict temperatures and heater power for the mission. Test data
consist of temperatures, heater power, heater duty cycle, and any boundary conditions (bus voltage,
environmental flux data, chamber wall, plate temperatures, etc.) recorded when the thermal balance
stability criteria were satisfied for each thermal balance test phase.
The inability of the thermal model to accurately match the test data, typically indicates a deficiency in the
model, test setup, or test article hardware. Details of the correlation process are documented in Thermal
Branch guidelines, and the model is considered accurate if the correlation goals are met. GSFC
recommends a statistical approach, using the success criteria below. Once the correlation is completed,
the correlated test thermal model is reconfigured into the flight configuration, and then used to generate
final temperature predictions for the various mission phases.
As a goal, the thermal model should correlate to the test data closely, using the difference between the
model test temperature predictions and test temperature data (the “errors”) as a means to validate the
thermal model for use in flight analysis, and the following correlation criteria:
o Average Deviation of the Errors (∆T AVG): < +/- 1.0°C (∆T = TMODEL – TDATA)
o Standard Deviation (σ) of the Errors: < 2.5°C
Errors > 5°C must be justified as to why that is acceptable, considering the same predictive error for flight.
o Heater power predictions duty cycles must match thermal balance data within 5%, for all
operational and survival heater circuits
Details of the correlation process, per Thermal Branch guidelines and vetted through the engineering peer
review process, must be documented and retained along with the final mission models, as part of the project
configuration management system through the mission lifetime.
Differences from pre-test predictions >3°C must be assessed during the correlation process, and design
margins re-assessed as needed.
2.6.5 CONTAMINATION VERIFICATION
Project contamination requirements are described in Section 2.8; this section deals with preventing
contamination during thermal vacuum testing, since elements of a test item can be sensitive to
contamination arising from test operations or from the test item itself. If the test item contains sensitive
elements, the test chamber and all test support equipment is examined and certified prior to placement of
the item in the chamber to ensure that it is not a significant source of contamination. Particular care is taken
to prevent potential contaminants emanating from the test item are not masked by contaminants from the
chamber or the test equipment. Chamber bakeout and certification may be necessary for contamination
sensitive hardware.
The level of contamination present during thermal vacuum testing is to be monitored using, as a minimum,
a Temperature-controlled Quartz Crystal Microbalance (TQCM) to measure the accretion rate and a cold
finger to obtain a measure of the content and relative amount of the contamination. The use of additional
contamination monitors such as a Residual Gas Analyzer (RGA), Gas Chromatographs/Mass
Spectrometers (GC/MS), Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrometers (FTIS), Cryogenic QCM’s, mirrors, and
chamber wipes can also be considered. When using TQCMs, RGAs, or mirrors, the locations of the sensors
must be carefully selected so that they will adequately measure outgassing from the desired source.
Transitions from cold to hot conditions increase contamination hazards because material that has accreted
on the chamber walls may evaporate and deposit on the relatively cool test item. Transitions are to be
conducted at rates sufficiently slow to prevent that from occurring. It is recommended that testing start with
a hot soak and end with a hot soak to minimize this risk. However, if it is necessary that the last exposure
2.6-29
THERMAL THERMAL
be a cold one, the test procedure includes a phase to warm the test item before the chamber is returned to
ambient conditions so that the item will remain the warmest in the test chamber, thus decreasing the
likelihood of its contamination during the critical period. In all cases, every effort should be made to keep
the test article warmer than its surroundings during testing.
2.6-30
THERMAL THERMAL
2.6.5.1 Temperature-Humidity Verification
Temperature-Humidity Applicability Demonstration

If the environment is such that The test applies to The hardware must be tested at temperature and relative humidity conditions at least
condensation can occur, as payloads that are to be 10°C and 10% RH beyond the limits expected during the mission. The upper
shown by analysis, tests must located in crewed humidity conditions, however, should not exceed 95% RH unless condensation can
Crewed Spaces
be conducted to demonstrate spaces and to occur during the mission; in that event, tests must be conducted to demonstrate that
that the hardware can function equipment placed in the hardware can function properly after (or, if applicable, during) such exposure.
under the severest conditions crewed spaces for the Temperature cycling, duration, performance tests, and other requirements (except
that credibly can be expected. control or support of those related to vacuum as described in 2.6.2.4) must apply.
payloads located in
unpressurized areas.
Hardware that is to undergo a If the test would make The test item must be placed in a temperature-humidity chamber and a functional
specified temperature and the hardware un- performance test must be performed before the item is exposed to the test
humidity environment during a flightworthy, such as by environment. If a functional performance test was conducted as part of the post-
re-entry and that must survive rendering thermal test checkout of the preceding test, those results may be sufficient.
this re-entry with a specified control surfaces The temperature and humidity profiles in Figure 2.6-3 set the parameters for the
Descent and Landing
performance capability (e.g. ineffective, then it should demonstration. The payload must be in a configuration appropriate for the descent
throughput or reflectivity) must not be performed on the and landing phase.
be subjected to a temperature- flight item. Instead, an Electrical function tests (2.3) must be conducted after the test exposure to
humidity test to verify that it can analysis based on tests determine whether acceptable limits of degradation have been exceeded.
survive the environmental of engineering or
conditions during descent and prototype models, or
landing without experiencing other convincing
unacceptable degradation. methods, may be used.
Check the GSFC Technical Standards Program website at http://standards.gsfc.nasa.gov or contact the Executive Secretary for the GSFC Technical Standards Program to verify that this is
the correct version prior to use.
2.6-31
THERMAL THERMAL
Temperature-Humidity Applicability Demonstration

Hardware that will not be The test applies to all The demonstration must be performed prior to the thermal-vacuum test. An
maintained in a temperature- payload equipment. It analysis must be made to establish the uncontrolled temperature and humidity
humidity environment that is need not be conducted limits to which the item will be exposed from the time of its integration at the
controlled within acceptable on equipment for which component level through launch. The item must be placed in a temperature-
limits during transportation and the demonstrated humidity chamber and electrical function tests (2.3) must be conducted before the
storage must be subjected to a acceptable limits have item is exposed to the test environment.
Transportation and Storage
temperature-humidity test to been established during If an electrical function test was conducted during the post-test checkout of the
verify satisfactory performance other portions of the preceding test, the results of that may suffice. Functional tests must also be
after (and, if applicable, during) verification program. conducted during the test exposure if the item will be required to operate during
exposure to that environment. the periods of uncontrolled environment.
The test must include exposure of the hardware to the extremes of temperatures
and humidity as follows: 10°C and 10 RH (but not greater than 95% RH) higher
and lower than those predicted for the transportation and storage environments.
The test item must be exposed to each extreme for a period of six (6) hours.
Electrical function tests must be conducted after the test exposure to demonstrate
acceptable performance.
Check the GSFC Technical Standards Program website at http://standards.gsfc.nasa.gov or contact the Executive Secretary for the GSFC Technical Standards Program to verify that this is
the correct version prior to use.
2.6-32
THERMAL THERMAL
2.6.6 LEAKAGE (INTEGRITY) VERIFICATION
Tests are conducted on sealed items to determine whether leakage exceeds the rate prescribed for the
mission.
2.6.6.1 Levels of Assembly
Tests may be conducted on the component level of assembly to gain assurance that the item will function
satisfactorily before tests are made at higher levels. Checks at the payload level need include only those
items that have not demonstrated satisfactory performance at the lower level, are not fully assembled until
the higher levels of integration, or the integrity of which is suspect.
Leakage rates are checked before and after stress-inducing portions of the verification program. The final
check may be conducted during the final thermal-vacuum test.
A mass spectrometer may be used to detect flow out of or into a sealed item.
If dynamic seals are used, the item is operated during the test, otherwise operation is not required. The test
should be conducted under steady-state conditions, i.e., stable pumping, pressures, temperatures, etc. If
time constraints do not permit the imposition of such conditions, a special test method is devised.
The above provisions apply to the acceptance testing of previously qualified hardware.
Figure 2.6-3 Temperature-Humidity Profile for the Descent and Landing Demonstration
2.6-32
SECTION 2.7
CRYOGENICS & FLUIDS
CRYOGENICS ___________________________________________________________________CRYOGENICS
2.7 Cryogenic Philosophy
At Goddard Space Flight Center, Cryogenic engineering activities are defined as applicable to systems
operating below 120K. For systems that are above 120K (with exception of cryocooler systems), please
reference Section 2.6 on Thermal Engineering. In the special case of cryocoolers, if the cooling load
temperature of the cryocooler system is operating at 200K or below, the constructs put forth in this
section also apply.
Most unit level testing for design and workmanship verification includes temperature cycling between
high and low temperature values. The temperature cycles thermally stress the unit being tested. Since
most cryogenic systems cool down from room temperature to an operational temperature below 120K,
the classical interpretation of high and low values for cycling is ill-applied. When testing a system that
is cooled from room temperature to an operational value below 120K, upon return to room
temperature, the cool down and return to ambient cycle should be considered as an actual temperature
cycle. For temperature cycling to low side values above 120K, or high side values above room
temperature, please reference Section 2.6 on Thermal Engineering.
2.7.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS VACUUM AND THERMAL VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
The vacuum, thermal, and electrical requirements herein apply to ELV payloads. An
appropriate set of tests and analyses shall be selected to demonstrate the following payload
or payload equipment capabilities.
a. The payload shall perform satisfactorily (at low temperature) within the vacuum and
Cryo-Thermal mission limits.
b. The Cryo-Thermal design and the Cryogenic TCS (Thermal Control System) shall
maintain the temperature controlled hardware within the established temperature
limits during planned mission phases, including survival/safe-hold, if applicable.
c. The quality of workmanship and hardware materials used shall be sufficient to pass
performance testing and thermal cycle test screening (when appropriate) in
vacuum, or under ambient pressure.
2.7.2 Summary of Requirements
Table 2.7-1 summarizes the tests and analyses that collectively fulfill the general requirements
of Section 2.7. Tests noted in the table may require supporting analyses. The order in which
tests and/or analyses are conducted should be determined by the project in conjunction with
the cognizant cryogenics engineer and set down in the environmental verification plan,
specification, and procedures (2.1.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.4). Mechanical testing should occur prior to
Cryo-thermal testing at the systems level
The Cryo-thermal cycling requirements highlighted in paragraph 2.7.3.4 apply to most

cryogenic systems in general. However, the convention of thermally stressing a cryogenic unit
via additional heat load does not apply to “room temperature” electronics used to operate
cryogenic systems/components. These items must be qualified for proper thermal
performance in a flight-like vacuum environment. Qualification and acceptance thermal-
2.7-1
vacuum verification programs at temperature regimes above 120K tend to use temperature
as a basis for margin. For details on how to apply temperature margin within this temperature
regime, please reference section 2.6.2.4.a.
The thermal cycle fatigue life test requirements of 2.4.2.1 also applies to electronics used to
control parts of the cryogenic system, as well as parts of cryogenic hardware that may be
susceptible to thermally induced mechanical fatigue.
2.7.3 Cryo-Thermal-Vacuum Qualification
The Cryo-thermal vacuum qualification program should ensure that the payload operates
satisfactorily in a simulated space environment at thermal loading conditions with margin
added. The effective thermal loading conditions will be in excess of that expected during the
actual mission. The percent excess thermal loading will be a function of the stage in the
systems life cycle that the project is at during the test.
Table 2.7-1
Cryogenic Vacuum, Thermal, Electrical and Mechanical Requirements
Payload or
Subsystem
Highest Unit/
Requirement including
Practicable Level Component
Instruments
of Assembly
Thermal-Vacuum1,5 T T T2
Thermal Balance1,3,5 T and A T,A T,A
Temperature-Pressure-
Humidity3 (Habitable Volumes) T/A T/A T/A
Temperature-Humidity4
(Transportation & Storage) A A A
Cold Vibration Testing6 T T T

Leak Testing7 T T T
1. Applies to hardware carried in unpressurized spaces and to ELV-launched hardware.
2. Temperature cycling at ambient pressure may be substituted for thermal-vacuum

temperature cycling of cryogenic system warm components (i.e., components that operate at
or near room temperature) if it can be shown as acceptable via analysis. Temperature levels
and gradients predicted via thermal analysis must be as severe in air as when tested under
vacuum conditions.
3. Applies to flight hardware located in pressurized environments.
4. Consideration should be given to environmental control of the enclosure.
2.7-2
5. Survival/Safehold testing is performed on equipment which may experience (non-operating)

temperature extremes more severe than when operating. The equipment tested is not
expected to operate properly within specifications until the temperatures have returned to
qualification temperatures.
6. Projects that include payloads that will launch with critical Cryo-thermal system components
at operational temperatures must include cold vibration testing of said components in the
environmental test campaign. The equipment is expected to operate properly within
specifications at temperature following the cold vibration testing.
7. Hardware that passes this test at the lower assembly levels need not be retested at the
higher assembly levels unless there is concern that the structural integrity of the vessel wall
has been compromised.
T = Test required.
A = Analysis required; tests may be required to substantiate the analysis.
T/A = Test required if analysis indicates possible condensation.
T, A = Test is not required at this level of assembly if analysis verification is established for
non-tested elements.
2.7.3.1 Applicability
All flight hardware must be subjected to thermal-vacuum testing in order to demonstrate

satisfactory operation in modes representative of mission functions at the nominal operating
temperatures with heat load margin on the extremes predicted for the mission, and during
temperature transitions. The tests should demonstrate satisfactory operation over the range
of possible flight voltages. In addition, hot and cold turn-on should be demonstrated (as
appropriate) for portions of the overall cryogenic system operating at or near room
temperature. Exceptions to this standard are applicable for stored cryogen dewar systems
tested in ambient with a guard vacuum in the dewar. For details, please reference the
cognizant cryogenic engineer on the project.
The Goddard Space Flight Center generally utilizes a protoflight qualification test program.
Since the basis of the protoflight qualification test program is to demonstrate the ability to
operate under extreme thermal conditions and the cryogenic temperature regime is inherently
extreme, temperature based operational and contingency test margins are ill-applied to cold
segments of the cryogenic system. For warm segments of the cryogenic system please
reference section 2.6.2.1 for temperature and contingency margins.
Spare components must undergo a test program in which the demonstration and/or
performance requirements at temperature should be the same as that which other flight
components are subjected to at the component, subsystem, and payload levels of assembly.
As a minimum, spare components should be subjected to eight cold cycles prior to integration
onto the payload/spacecraft.
2.7-3
Redundant components should be exercised sufficiently during the test program to verify
proper orbital operations. Testing to validate all applicable operational modes should be
performed. The method of conducting the tests should be described in the environmental
verification test specification and procedures (2.1.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.4).
For spare and redundant components, the test temperature levels and heat load margin
demonstrated should be the same as those for flight components.
For repaired equipment, usually a component, subsequent testing must be sufficient to

demonstrate flight worthiness. If additional testing is expected at either the Subsystem or the
Payload level, the standards for flight worthiness should be the same as for new equipment.
For portions of the cryogenic system operating near room temperature, please reference
Section 2.6.2.4.b for the satisfactory number of temperature cycles.
Thermal balance verification at cryogenic temperatures is typically performed as part of the

thermal-vacuum test program. The approach used should be described in the environmental
verification specification and procedures.
a. Unrealistic Failure Modes - Care should be taken during the test to prevent unrealistic
environmental conditions that could induce test failure modes. For instance, maximum
rates of temperature change should not exceed acceptable limits. The limits are based on
hardware characteristics or orbital predictions.
b. Avoiding Contamination - Elements of a test item can be sensitive to contamination arising

from test operations or from the test item itself. If the test item contains sensitive elements,
the dewar (and/or test chamber) and all test support equipment should be examined and
certified prior to placement of the item in the chamber to ensure that it is not a significant
source of contamination. Particular care should be taken that potential contaminants
emanating from the test item are not masked by contaminants from the chamber or the test
equipment. Chamber bakeout and certification may be necessary for contamination
sensitive hardware.
c. Vibration – At low temperatures, vibrational loading of cryogenic volumes can result in

thermal heating. This phenomena is especially of concern when dealing with Sub-Kelvin
cooling systems where the associated thermal loading can impact the operational
temperature of the item being cooled. Care should be taken during ground testing to
minimize the propagation of vibrational loading into the cryogenic volume undergoing
testing.
d. Magnetic Fields – When working with Sub-Kelvin ADR (Adiabatic Demagnetization

Refrigeration) systems, care should be taken to insure that magnetic fields present on the
platform are not substantial enough to penetrate the ADR magnetic shielding and affect
the cooling performance of the ADR system.
e. Cold Surfaces - Transitions from cold to hot conditions increase contamination hazards
because material that has accreted on the chamber walls may deposit on cold surfaces.
Transitions must be conducted at rates sufficiently slow to prevent that from occurring.
2.7-4
The test procedure should include a warm-up phase that allows the test item to warm up
to ambient prior to vacuum conditions in the chamber being broken. This will effectively
decrease the likelihood of its contaminants collecting on test articles.
f. Card Level Analyses Verification – For requirements pertaining to card level verification,
please reference section 2.6.2.2.c.
g. EEE Parts – Selection of EEE parts and/or assemblies for use either in or with Cryogenic
Cooling systems will be at the discretion of the cognizant Cryogenics Engineer
w/concurrence and screening support provided by Code 560. In the event that EEE parts
and/or assemblies are acquired as part of a procurement (e.g., Cryocooler electronics,
ADR electronics, electromechanical plumbing valves, etc.) then the cognizant Cryogenics
engineer and the Code 560 project representative will work with the vendor to ensure
screening requirements are adhered to.
h. Test Temperature Sensor Location - Test temperatures for a cryogenic thermal vacuum,
Dewar or cryostat test should be based on the temperatures at designated locations (e.g.
inner vessel wall, shield, etc.). The locations should be selected in accordance with an
assessment to ensure that components or critical parts of the cryogenic system achieve
the desired temperature for the required time during testing. The temperature sensors
should be attached either on the component of interest or within close proximity to a
physical location with a predetermined temperature requirement. For additional information
on the “control” temperature criterion to be used, contact the cryogenic engineer supporting
the Project or the Cryogenics and Fluids Branch.
2.7.3.3 Level of Testing
There is a minimum of three levels of testing; the component, subsystem/instrument, and the
payload/ spacecraft level. In cases where testing is compromised as demonstrated by an
inability to achieve operational cryogenic temperatures within the full-up assembly, testing at
lower levels of assembly may be warranted. Component level testing may require vacuum
and/or hermetic seal pressure tests (e.g., heat switch shells, ADR salt pills, cryocooler fluid
loop, etc.). In addition, thermophysical properties and Cryo-mechanical strength tests at
cryogenic temperatures may be required for construction materials that are not well
characterized. Please reference Code 552 or the project’s cryogenics engineer for
determination of such.
Cryo-Thermal margins, operational temperatures, temperature cycling, hold time at

temperature, superconducting current loads, test chamber conditions, transition rates,
temperature and pressure regimes are key parameters that define the environmental
conditions associated with environmental testing:
a. Workmanship Margins – Heat Load margins should be established to induce thermal

stress conditions to detect unsatisfactory performance that would not otherwise be
uncovered before flight. The workmanship test margin is defined as an increase in a
condition beyond the range of conditions the hardware would experience over the
projected lifetime. This could include temperature, heat loads, current applied, static
and vibrational loads, magnetic field penetrations and/or environmental conditions.
2.7-5
The minimum temperature to be imposed during unit level thermal vacuum testing
should represent, as indicated above, a temperature low enough, to induce stress
during cool down, followed by operation. The basis for the test temperature should be
established using unit temperature requirements. For instrument/subsystem and
spacecraft level testing, the operational temperatures imposed should be derived from
the collection of various unit temperature ranges. For multiple instrument/spacecraft
builds where a correlated model is developed on the first build, subsequent builds may
base the thermal vacuum test temperatures on predicted temperatures derived
analytically using the test verified model, only if these builds are identical in
configuration. When a thermal balance test precedes the thermal vacuum test, results
from that test may be used to refine the thermal vacuum test criteria, presuming there
is sufficient time to correlate the model and generate updated predictions prior to the
thermal vacuum test. If predictions from a verified model are not available at the time of
the thermal vacuum test, the basis for the operational temperature tested to should be
established by the Project Office (w/consultation from the cognizant Cryogenics
Engineer). This basis should constitute the “flight” operational temperature tested to.
For passively controlled systems, a qualification heat load margin should be applied to
the “flight“ minimum operating temperature. The margin for acceptance testing of
previously qualified hardware may be reduced depending on the phase of the life cycle,
as long as testing to these levels does not preclude protoflight test levels from being
achieved at higher levels of assembly.
Test margins for actively controlled hardware, as specified in the following three
paragraphs, should apply to both qualification/protoflight and to acceptance testing of
said systems and components. (For the purposes of this document, the following are
considered to be actively controlled cryogenic hardware: Cryocoolers, ADR (Adiabatic
Demagnetization Refrigerators), Stored Cryogen Dewar Systems (i.e., stored Cryo-
materials in either liquid or solid phase), Cryogenic circulation loops, Vapor Cooled
Shields for Dewars/Cryostats, Cryocooler-cooled Shields and TVS (Thermodynamic
Vent Systems).)
For actively controlled systems such as Heaters, Thermoelectric Coolers (TECs),

Cryocoolers and ADRs, a test thermal margin must be imposed on a setpoint that is
under control based on the phase of the life cycle at the time of test. The margin used
shall be borrowed from the Cryo-Thermal design guidelines listed in Table 2.7-2. The
required range of thermal control at temperature shall be demonstrated in the “flight”
operational thermal environment during thermal balance testing.
Table 2.7-2
Margin as a function of Phase In Project Life Cycle
Life Cycle Phase Heat Load Margin (%)
Pre-Phase A 100
Phase A 100
Phase B 80
Phase C 50
Phase D 40
Phase E 33
2.7-6
For a component/subsystem/payload with an active control system, thermal stressing

of the cooling system at temperature should be induced by the increase of a heat load
which simulates heat leak into the system. The active temperature control hardware
must maintain control under these stressed conditions. The goal of this testing is to
create an environmental condition in excess of what the system will see on-orbit in order
to stress the system and demonstrate its overall flightworthiness.
Margins based on high/low temperatures are not applicable to all portions of cryogenic
systems operating within the cryogenic temperature regime. Alternatively, heat load
margins on Cryogenic systems should be established by the Cryogenics engineer and
the Project based on the unique characteristics of the test article.
The survival/safehold thermal-vacuum tests should consist of driving the unit, without
any thermal margin, to the desired temperature, and then returning that unit to the
operational temperature, if different, to functionally check the operation. No component
should be allowed to exceed the non-operating temperature limit with allowable
tolerances.
For testing at higher levels of assembly, the “not-to-exceed” temperatures should be

established based on temperatures actually achieved during testing at lower levels of
assembly.
b. Temperature Cycling of Cryogenic systems - Temperature cycling for purposes of inducing

thermal stresses in cryogenic systems is only applicable to portions of the cryogenic TCS
that operate above 120K (e.g., Cryocooler, ADR or valve/manifold control electronics).
Cycling during ground testing may also be preclusive due to time constraints and may
cause undue stress on flight systems. The number of cycles should be determined by the
project with the consultation of the project’s cognizant Cryogenics Engineer. For rules and
guidelines pertaining to temperature cycling of items above 120K, please reference section
2.6.3.2.2.2.
c. Duration - The total test duration must be sufficient to demonstrate performance and
uncover early failures. The duration varies with the time spent in flight at the temperature
levels and with such factors as the number of mission-critical operating modes, the test
item thermal inertia, and test facility characteristics. Minimum temperature dwell times are
as follows:
1. Payloads/Spacecraft - Payloads must be exposed for a minimum of one hundred

fifty (150) hours at operating temperature. The thermal soak at operating
temperature must be of sufficient duration to allow time for the required
performance tests (functional, comprehensive, etc.) for all modes of operations
including safehold/survival. Projects seeking to reduce the durations of time at
temperature must submit deviations and receive approval from ETD prior to PDR.
2. Subsystem/Instrument - Subsystems and instruments must be exposed for a

minimum of one hundred fifty (150) hours at operating temperature. The thermal
soak at temperature must be of sufficient duration to allow time for the required
performance tests for all modes of operation including safehold/survival.
2.7-7
3. Unit/Component - Components must be exposed for a minimum of one hundred

fifty (150) hours at operating temperature. The thermal soak at operating
temperature must be of sufficient duration to allow time for the required
performance tests for all modes of operation. Turn-on demonstrations should be
performed at temperature. If temperature cycling is occurring for warm segments
of the cryogenic thermal control system, please reference section 2.6.2.4.c.
The survival/safehold TV test should consist of soaking the non-operating

element for at least four (4) hours at operating temperature conditions.
d. Pressure - The chamber pressure after the electrical discharge checks are conducted
must be less than 1.33 X 10-3 Pa. (1 X 10-5 Torr). The ability to function through the
voltage breakdown region must be demonstrated if applicable to mission requirements
(those elements that are operational during launch).
2.7.3.5 Test Setup
The setup for the test, including any instrument and/or component stimulators, should be
reviewed to ensure that the test objectives will be achieved, and that no test induced problems
are introduced. The payload test configurations should be as described in the test plan and
test procedure. The test item should be, as nearly as practicable, in flight configuration with
associated cryogenic GSE as required. Heating and/or cooling on the payload may be required
to achieve operational temperatures ranges.
Critical temperatures for warm segments of the cryogenic system should be monitored
throughout the test and alarmed if possible. The operational modes of the payload should be
monitored in accordance with 2.3. The provisions of 2.3 apply except when modified by the
time considerations of 2.7.2.4 d.
a. Electrical Discharge Check - Items that are electrically operational during pressure
transitions must undergo an electrical discharge check to ensure that they will not be
permanently damaged from electrical discharge during the ascent and early orbital
phases of the mission, or during descent and landing (if applicable). The test should
include checks for electrical discharge during the corresponding phases of the vacuum
chamber operations.
b. Outgassing Phase - If the test article or system is contamination sensitive (or if required
by the contamination control plan) an outgassing phase must be included to permit a
large portion of the volatile contaminants to be removed. The outgassing phase will be
incorporated into a hot exposure that will occur during thermal-vacuum testing. Please
reference section 2.6 for additional details.
c. Transitions - The test item should remain in an operational mode during the transitions
between temperatures so that its functioning can be monitored under a changing
environment. The requirement may be suspended when turn-on of the test item is to be
2.7-8
demonstrated after a particular transition. Caution must be taken not to violate

temperature limits, or to induce test failures caused by excessive and/or unrealistic
gradients or CTE mismatches. Violation of functional specifications is acceptable during
transitions with the approval of the Project Office.
The rate of transition should be specified by the cognizant cryogenics engineer to insure
that stresses caused by thermal gradients will not damage the test article. Upon warm-
up to ambient temperatures, the temperature gradient between the chamber and the
test item should not exceed 20K.
e. Operational Temperature Conditions - The temperature controls should be adjusted to

cause the test item to stabilize at the desired operational temperature. Turn-on
capability should be demonstrated at the start of this temperature condition. The
duration of the test should be sufficient to permit the performance of the functional tests
with a minimum soak time as specified in section 2.7.2.4.c.
f. Start-Up Demonstrations - Start-up capability should be demonstrated to verify that the

test item will turn on after exposure to flight like operational temperatures. Turn-on
capability should be demonstrated under vacuum (and/or flight like conditions), at
temperature on the primary and redundant side, as applicable. The test turn-on
temperature is defined by the expected mission operations with margin. At the
Unit/Component level, this demonstration should consist of power-off, power-on cycles
for each unit/component. At the Subsystem/Instrument level, and Payload/Spacecraft
level, this demonstration should be consistent with the scenario regarding which
units/components are actually power cycled (off/on) during flight, and also for recovery
from a survival/safe-hold mode in orbit. For example, recovery from cold
survival/safehold temperatures to cold operational temperatures may be accomplished
by turning the units/components of the test item back on and allowing internal
dissipation to warm the item to operational temperatures. Proper operation is then
checked after the component has returned to operational temperature levels. The
duration of the soak with the test item off, or in survival/safe-hold mode, should be in
accordance with section 2.7.2.4.c.
i. Functional Test - Functional tests should be performed at the low temperature plateau
and during transitions. A comprehensive performance test (CPT) should be performed
at least once during operational plateau(s) at cryogenic temperatures, exercising
complete primary and redundant operations, unless it is determined to be impractical.
In that case, with project approval, a limited functional test may be substituted if
satisfactory performance is demonstrated for the major mission critical modes of
operation. Otherwise, the requirements of section 2.3.2 apply. Functionality of the
thermal control system hardware should be demonstrated during the Thermal-Vacuum
Qualification test.
j. Return to Ambient –In general, the temperature gradient between the chamber
surroundings and the test item should not exceed 20K during warm-up to ambient
conditions in order to protect against contamination from the test facility. Should the
project seek to conduct warm-up to ambient with an alternate temperature gradient,
concurrence must be obtained from the Cryogenics engineer and the Contamination
engineer.
2.7-9
Before the chamber can be backfilled with air, all sensors should read above the dew
point to insure that water does not condense on the payload.
i. General - Test parameters for cryogenic systems should be based on flight operations.
Parameters should be determined early in the program by the Cryogenic Engineer and
the Science teams.
Special tests may be required to evaluate unique features, such as radiative thermal loading
from a surface (temperature ranging 120K to 10K) on a low temperature stage or heat rejection
efficiency of a Cryo-radiator with heat load margin applied.
The test configuration shall reflect, as nearly as practicable, the configuration expected in
flight.
When items undergoing test include unusual equipment, special care must be exercised to
ensure that the equipment does not present a hazard to the test item, the facility, or personnel.
Any special tests shall be included in the environmental verification specification.
2.7.3.8 Failure-Free-Performance
The total number of trouble-free hours for functional operations at temperature will be driven
by the period of time required for completion of a single in-flight measurement event while at
operational temperatures. The final determination for the hour based requirement is subject to
the project with guidance from the cognizant cryogenic engineer. Once established, the
requirement must be demonstrated in the Cryo-thermal verification program. Hours of
operation will be classified as “failure free” permitting they have been demonstrated under
vacuum conditions (Refer to section 2.3.4) as appropriate. This is with exception to stored
cryogen Dewar systems tested in ambient with a guard vacuum of ≤ 10-5 Torr. Failure free
hours of operation for Dewar testing with stored Cryo-materials may consist of a combination
of vacuum and ambient testing.
2.7.4 Thermal Balance Qualification
The adequacy of the Cryo-thermal design and the capability of the thermal control system
shall be verified under simulated space environmental conditions, as defined by the cryogenics
engineer. Consideration should be given for testing an “off-nominal” case such as a safehold
or survival mode. The test environments used should envelope flight operational environment
thereby promoting validation of the adequacy of the cryogenic temperature control system
design. Thermal Balance Test data obtained can be used to correlate and/or validate the
thermal model. Correlated thermal models may then be relied upon for temperature prediction
under non-tested T-Vac and/or Flight conditions. It is preferable that the thermal balance test
precede the thermal vacuum test so that the results of the balance test can be used to
establish the temperature goals for the thermal vacuum test.
Thermal design margins must be verified under operational temperature conditions and
thermal loads. This standard also extends to safehold and survival conditions. Select
examples of the margins to be established are:
2.7-10
• Operational heater duty cycle less than 70%, including minimum voltage as
established by the project;
• Survival heater margin, dependent on survival setpoint/temperature limit and

available resources;
• Interface heat flows are within requirements;
• Hold time at temperature for ADR (Adiabatic Demagnetization Refrigeration) and

stored Cryogen dewar systems;
• Current load tested with margin against required superconducting current, at

temperature, for High Temperature Superconducting leads;
• Radiator heat rejection margin in worst case environments, dependent on available

resources.
2.7.4.1 Alternative Methods
It is preferable to conduct a thermal balance test on the fully assembled payload. If that is
impracticable, one of the following alternative methods may be used:
Test a thermally similar physical representation of the flight payload (e.g. a physical thermal
model) and compare the results with predictions derived from the analytical model (modified
as necessary).
If the flight equipment is not used in the tests, additional tests to verify critical thermal
properties, such as views to warm surfaces, thermal control coating absorptivity and
emissivity, shall be conducted to demonstrate similarity between the item tested and the flight
hardware.
2.7.4.2 Use of a Thermal Analytical Model
In the course of a payload program, analytical thermal models are developed for the payload,
its elements, and the mission environment for the purpose of predicting the thermal
performance during the mission. The models can also be modified to predict the thermal
performance in a test-chamber environment. That is, the models are frequently used, with
appropriate changes to represent known test chamber configurations, to develop the proper
environments for thermal balance test cases and to develop the proper controls for thermal
vacuum test levels. Frequently it is not possible to provide a direct, one-to-one test
environment to simulate the space environment (e.g., chamber walls are warmer than space,
or heaters are used to foster Earth IR and Solar loading), so it is necessary to use the analytical
model to establish the appropriate test environments.
Correlation of the results of the chamber thermal balance tests with predictions derived from
the modified analytical model provides a means for validating the design, evaluating the as-
built temperature control system, and for improving thermal math model accuracy. The verified
2.7-11
analytical model can then be used to predict response to untested cases as well as generating
flight temperature predictions.
2.7.4.3 Method of Cryo-Thermal Simulation
The type of simulation to be used is generally determined by the size of the chamber, the
desired operational temperature, the predicted heat leak into the system, the methods
available to simulate environmental conditions, and the payload. In planning the method to be
used, the test engineer should try to achieve the highest practical order of simulation; that is,
the one that requires the minimum number of assumptions and calculations to bound the flight
low temperature environment. The closer the simulation is to the spectrum, intensity and the
worst case environments, the less reliance there is on the analytical model to verify the
adequacy of the cryogenic design. Appropriate consideration should be given to account for
the effects of stray light, shadowing, blockage, and/or reflections (both diffuse and specular),
as well as emissivity of metals as a function of temperature. In the flight and test configurations
they either are needed for an accurate simulation, or are artifacts that could adversely affect
the simulation. Methods of simulation and the major assumptions for a successful test are
provided below:
a. Solar input/Planetary Input
For details on Solar and Planetary Inputs, please reference section 2.6.3.3.
b. Interfaces – Conductive interface temperatures may be simulated with cold plates that
are held at worst-case boundary conditions. Their temperature can be varied for cold
flight, hot flight, and safehold conditions or parametrically varied. Thermal performance
across interfaces along heat flow path are critical to achieving desired operational
temperatures in Cryogenic Systems.
Since the payload must be supported during testing there is generally a non-flight
conductive heat flow path that is, in flight, a radiative interface, usually with the space
environment (e.g., the launch vehicle attachment interface). As much conductive
isolation as possible should be used between the test article and this non-flight
conductive interface. A heater is placed on the test fixture side of such a conductive
interface and two temperature sensors spanning the interface are used. The heater is
controlled until the temperatures of the two sensors are the same, thereby minimizing
the heat flow through this path. Without good isolation here, it is likely that an unrealistic
and hard to quantify bias will be introduced at this interface, making the test results
difficult to assess. Isolation is typically achieved by using fiberglass standoffs. However,
the payload may need to be suspended with low conductance cables if the system has
a high sensitivity to small heat flows.
c. Radiative Sink Temperature – The overall radiative sink temperature is typically

achieved by varying the chamber shroud temperature. Three typical temperature
regimes of chambers are (1) Flooded with Liquid Nitrogen, (LN2 approximately 80-90
K), (2) Controlled with Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2 approx. 170-275K), and (3) Gaseous
Helium (20-30 K).
2.7-12
Sink temperatures for individual radiators and critical surfaces are controlled with
cryopanels. Cryopanels for cryogenic systems may require special enhancements, for
example, open-face honeycomb radiators to increase emittance values. Three typical
temperature regimes of cryopanels are (1) GN2 (approximately 130-275 K), (2) LN2
(approximately 80-90 K), and (3) GHe (approximately 20-30 K). For temperatures in
between these values heaters can be added to the cryopanel or a heater plate that is
conductively coupled to the cryopanel can be used.
Test and flight predicts of the energy flow from critical surfaces should be compared.
Predictions of both the energy flow and temperatures from the test model should be at
least as severe as calculated in the flight model.
d. Passive Payloads - For passive cooling of cryogenic payloads, chamber walls and/or
cryopanels may need to be colder than Liquid Nitrogen temperatures to adequately
reject heat. Temperature variations of emissivity should be taken into account in the
sink temperature determination analysis.
e. Dewar Systems – A test dewar may be necessary to simulate the conditions that a
payload would see inside a flight dewar. Cooling in a test dewar is available over the
temperature range of approximately 0.05 to 120 Kelvin (with gaps). The dewar system
may utilize solid cryogens, (e.g., Argon, Nitrogen, Neon or Hydrogen), liquid cryogens
(e.g., Neon, Argon, Helium or Nitrogen), During ground testing there is a gravity effect
on cryogens that is not seen in flight. Interfaces between the top of the dewar and the
payload may be warmer than what would be seen in flight.
f. Cryocoolers - Cryocoolers are low temperature Cryo-mechanical heat pumps. Standard

cryocoolers consist of a compressor, expander device, and heat exchangers on the
high pressure side and at the load location. The boundary temperatures for standard
cryocoolers are 300K and the load temperature at the heat acquisition location (i.e., a
cryogenic temperature). Cryocoolers use gas phase cryogenic fluid as the refrigerant.
g. Thermal Straps – Thermal Straps are solid state thermal conductors made from either
a series of foils or braided wires. They provide a conductive heat flow path across two
boundary temperatures. Boundary temperatures driving the heat flow process in these
devices can be as low as 100 mK. Thermal Straps are used in applications spanning
100 mK all the way to 300K.
h. Zero-Q - Certain test-peculiar conductive paths, such as test cables attached to the
thermal balance test article, are controlled so that non-flight-like heat does not flow into
or out of the test article. During thermal balance the test cabling is minimized. If possible,
non-flight GSE should not be present during thermal balance testing. At a minimum,
necessary test cables are fabricated to cryogenic standards for reduced parasitic heat
leak and are wrapped with multilayer insulation (MLI) to a sufficient distance from the
test article.
One method of control is to place a guard heater downstream of two temperature

sensors. Control is then applied to the downstream sensor nearest the heater in an
effort to match its value with that of the sensor nearest the test article. The heater is
controlled until the temperatures of the two sensors are the same, thereby minimizing
the heat flow through this path.
2.7-13
i. Avoiding Contamination – Refer to section 2.6.2.2.b
j. Hardware Orientation – Cryogen Storage Tanks, Heat Switches, Heat Pipes, Pulse
Tube Cryocoolers and other cryogenics hardware will be affected by component
orientation in the 1g environment if improperly aligned with the gravity vector. The plan
established for testing should accommodate orientations of the flight hardware that
position these devices in a gravity neutral orientation. Hardware levelness or other
orientation requirements should be verified in the test chamber, prior to pump down.
2.7.4.4 Internal Power
Power dissipation of individual components should be measured using a four wire technique
to resolve both current and voltage independently. Subassembly testing should verify internal
power dissipations and line losses, if possible. Prior to spacecraft level testing, the Project
should provide: (1) details on what can be directly measured using current/voltage monitors,
(2) how this information, in conjunction with component/subassembly test data, will be used
to determine individual component dissipations during the spacecraft test, and (3) a plan to
resolve discrepancies during test.
Extraneous effects such as gaseous and/or molecular conduction in residual atmosphere

should be kept negligible by vacuum conditions in the chamber; pressures below 1.33 X 10-3
Pa (1 X 10-5 Torr) are usually sufficiently low to mitigate these effects.
The number of energy balance conditions simulated during the test must be sufficient to verify
the thermal design and analytical model. To verify and correlate the thermal analytical model,
a minimum of three test cases is required. It should be noted, however, that the number of
variables associated with a thermal analytical model is large compared to the number of
thermal balance cases that can be practically included in a test. The verification of the thermal
design, whenever possible, should therefore be accomplished by using test environments that
bound the low temperature flight environment such that the test results directly validate the
adequacy of cryogenic thermal control system design. The duration of the thermal balance
test depends on the mission, payload design, payload operating modes, and times to reach
stabilization. Ideally, stabilization criteria should be a small percentage of the residual energy
in the system versus performance at steady state as predicted either through thermal analysis
or extrapolation of an exponential decay function. The stabilization criteria will be dependent
upon the operational temperature the Cryogenic cooling system is designed to operate at and
will be defined by the project’s cognizant cryogenics engineer.
The exposures must be long enough for the payload to reach stabilization so that temperature
distributions in the steady-state conditions may be verified. The conditions defining
temperature stabilization should be described in the environmental verification specification
and should be determined by the Cryogenics Engineer.
2.7-14
The differences allowed between predicted and measured temperatures are determined by
the cognizant Cryogenics Engineer and verification of the thermal analytical model is
considered accomplished if the established criteria are met. This criterion should be
established prior to the environmental testing.
A thermal balance qualification test is required (based on the nominal operational temperature
predicted). A full qualification thermal balance test may be waived by a project only with the
consent of the Cryogenics Engineer permitting that sufficient margin is known to exist.
2.7.5 Temperature-Humidity-Oxygen Deficiency Verification
2.7.5.1 Temperature-Humidity: Transportation and Storage
Specialized hardware that requires temperature regulation during storage and transfer (e.g.,
ADR salt pills or High Temperature Superconducting leads) must not be subject to
temperature humidity testing given the components/subsystems are temperature controlled
and maintained below well-established temperature limits. Hardware that will not be
maintained in a temperature-humidity controlled environment that is maintained within
acceptable limits during transportation and storage should be subjected to a temperature-
humidity test to verify satisfactory performance after (and, if applicable, during) exposure to
that environment.
2.7.5.1.1 Applicability
The test applies to all payload equipment exposed to ambient. It need not be conducted on
equipment for which the demonstrated acceptable limits have been established during other
portions of the verification program.
2.7.5.1.2 Demonstration
The demonstration should be performed prior to the thermal-vacuum test. An analysis should
be made to establish the uncontrolled temperature and humidity limits to which the item will
be exposed. The item should be placed in a temperature-humidity chamber and electrical
function tests (2.3) should be conducted before the item is exposed to the test environment.
If an electrical function test was conducted during the post-test checkout of the preceding test,
the results of that may suffice. Functional tests (where appropriate) should also be conducted
during the test exposure if the item will be required to operate during the periods of
uncontrolled environment.
The test should be designed to expose the hardware to the extremes of temperatures and
humidity predicted for the transportation and storage environments .Exposure to test
conditions will be performed for a period of (6) hours. Electrical function tests should be
conducted after the test exposure to demonstrate acceptable performance.
2.7-15
2.7.5.1.3 Acceptance Requirements
The above provisions apply to previously qualified hardware.
2.7.6 Leakage (Integrity Verification)
Tests should be conducted on sealed items to determine whether leakage exceeds the rate
prescribed for the successful operation of the cryogenic hardware by the project, with
consultation from the Cryogenics Engineer.
2.7.6.1 Levels of Assembly
Tests may be conducted at the component level of assembly to gain assurance that the item
will function satisfactorily before tests are made at higher levels. Nonetheless, checks at the
payload level will include only those items that have not demonstrated satisfactory
performance at the lower level, are not fully assembled until the higher levels of integration, or
the integrity of which is suspect.
Leakage rates are checked before and after stress-inducing portions of the verification
program. The final check may be conducted during the final thermal-vacuum test.
A leak detector may be used to detect flow out of or into a sealed item.
The test should be conducted under steady-state conditions, (i.e., stable pumping, pressures,
temperatures, etc). If time constraints do not permit the imposition of such conditions, a special
test method should be devised.
The above provisions apply to the acceptance testing of previously qualified hardware.
2.7-16
SECTION 2.8
CONTAMINATION CONTROL
CONTAMINATION CONTROL CONTAMINATION CONTROL
2.8 Contamination and Coatings Engineering and Planetary Protection
The objective of the Contamination and Coatings Engineering Program is to decrease the
likelihood that the performance of flight hardware, engineering test units, and GSE, and
research endeavors, will not be unacceptably degraded by contaminants. The objective of a
Planetary Protection Program is to protect solar system bodies (i.e., planets, moons,
comets, and asteroids) from contamination from Earth life, and to protect Earth from
possible life forms that may be returned from other solar system bodies. This Section is
organized as follows:
2.8.1 Contamination Engineering

2.8.2 Coatings Engineering (both optical and thermal)
2.8.3 Planetary Protection
2.8.1 Contamination
Since contamination control programs are dependent on the specific mission goals, instrument
designs, planned operating scenarios, etc. it is necessary for each program to develop
contamination requirements for each sensitive element based on contamination susceptibility,
performance and lifetime requirements and cross-contamination potential. From the overall
lifetime allowable contamination requirements, an allowable contamination budget will then be
developed to allocate that amount among the various mission phases, so that the total end-
of-life limit will be achieved. A governing Contamination Control Plan (CCP) which defines the
complete contamination control program to be implemented for the mission will be written.
The specific verification plans and requirements must be defined in the CCP. The supporting
procedures that follow provide an organized approach to the attainment of the objectives so
that the allowable contamination limit is not violated during each mission phase. The
contamination engineering approach commences with concept and continues through end-of-
life for the mission.
2.8.1.1 Summary of Contamination Verification Process
3 Determination of contamination sensitivity;

4 Determination of a contamination requirements;
5 Determination of a contamination budget;
6 Development and implementation of a contamination control plan and supporting
documents;
7 Development of contamination verification plans;
8 Performance of analytical modeling to predict contamination deposition; and comparison
of prediction results to contamination requirements;
9 Performance of monitoring of hardware surfaces, air cleanliness, cleanrooms, purges,
etc. to verify that requirements are being met.
10 Ongoing comparison between hardware cleanliness levels, and/or witness plate
cleanliness levels, versus the contamination budget requirements for that phase of build-
up or integration.
11 If at any time there is a noncompliance between the cleanliness level of the hardware
and the requirement level expected for that phase of the mission, the Contamination
Engineer should notify the Project. Together, the CC Engineer and the Project will
2.8-1
determine the cause of the non-compliance and put together a corrective action plan to
ensure requirements will be met.
12 Such corrective action may include: additional cleaning, covers, purges, improving the
level of the cleanroom, limiting cleanroom activities, re-assessing the requirement, etc.
Each of the above activities should be documented at each mission phase and submitted to
the project manager for concurrence and approval. The Contamination Engineer should
keep track of requirements compliance, and of monitoring/verification data during each
mission phase. Should requirements be exceeded at any time, the Contamination Engineer
will enact a process or approach for mitigating the requirements excursion and bringing the levels
back within limits.
2.8.1.2 Contamination Engineering Approach
There is a general approach to performing contamination engineering for a project, which

includes identifying requirements, performing analyses, verifying requirements through
analytical methods, and later through monitoring methods. Should analytical results or
monitoring methods show that requirements have been exceeded, there are a variety of
corrective actions, additional mitigation methods, and further verification that should be
exercised until requirements are met.
The basic approach which should be followed for all Contamination programs is:
a) Assemble information on the spacecraft performance goals and design requirements.
b) Identify sensitive surfaces, components, and systems and assign quantitative
contamination requirements for each element.
c) Evaluate information, history and flight data from previous missions; apply applicable
“lessons learned” to current program.
d) Design, document, and implement a comprehensive contamination control program
for the spacecraft beginning with the concept definition phase, and continuing on
through fabrication, assembly, integration and test, transport, launch, and on-orbit,
and post-mission or retrieval mission phases.
e) Study spacecraft design and identify potential “problem” areas. (e.g. acceptable vs.
non-acceptable vent locations).
f) Perform trade-off studies to evaluate technical adequacy, cost and schedule impacts,
of proposed contamination control measures (e.g. performing bakeouts of
components vs. incorporating Molecular Adsorbers).
g) Perform laboratory testing whenever needed, to assess contamination potentials of
materials, and to evaluate contamination levels versus performance degradation.
h) Utilize special contamination mitigation devices and techniques, when appropriate:
molecular adsorbers, special coatings, on-orbit covers for sensitive apertures, on-orbit
heaters, special vent placements, etc.
i) Work with the project to include on-orbit flight contamination monitors to measure
mission contamination levels, if contamination is critical to the mission.
j) Perform analytical modeling to predict expected contamination deposition levels for
sensitive surfaces.
k) Perform cleaning, vacuum bakeouts, and implement protection devices (covers, bags,
containers, etc.) to minimize resultant contamination levels.
l) Perform adequate monitoring and verification of contamination levels on and near the
spacecraft during all assembly, integration and testing, transport, storage, and launch
readiness mission phases.
m) Monitor launch and on-orbit contamination environments, and/or evaluate the
performance of spacecraft systems to determine effects of contamination.
2.8-2
n) Develop “lessons learned” list for implementation on follow-on projects.
2.8-3
The below flowchart illustrates this process.
Figure 2.8-1 Contamination Engineering Approach
2.8-4
2.8.1.3 Contamination Sensitivities
An assessment should be made early in the program to determine whether the possibility
exists that the item will be unacceptably degraded by molecular or particulate contaminants,
or is a source of contaminants to other contamination sensitive hardware. The assessment
should take into account all the various factors during the entire development program and
flight including identification of materials (including quantity and location), manufacturing
processes, integration, test, packing and packaging, transportation, and mission operations
including launch and return to earth, if applicable. In addition, the assessment should identify
the types of substances/materials that may contaminate and cause unacceptable degradation
of the test item. Contamination is any substance that can cause deleterious effects on
performance of the mission either through residence of material on a surface, deposition of
nonvolatile residue, particles, degradation of a surface, cross contamination, bulk material
outgassing, or interaction of any ambient, vacuum, or space environment with the surface or
material returning to the surface.
If the assessment indicates a likelihood that contamination will degrade performance of the
flight item or other sensitive hardware associated with the mission, a contamination control
program should be instituted. The severity of contamination program should be in accordance
with the importance of the item's function to mission success, its sensitivity to contamination,
and the likelihood of its being contaminated.
2.8.1.4 Contamination Requirements
The amount of degradation of science performance that is allowed for critical, contamination-
sensitive items should be established, usually by the Project Scientist with support from the
project contamination engineer. Likewise, the amount of permissible degradation of key
performance properties (thermal, optical, mechanical, etc.) of other contamination sensitive
hardware (optics, solar arrays, thermal coatings, star trackers, mechanisms, power systems,
etc.) that are necessary to support the mission should be determined by the designer of the
hardware or the mission systems engineer. From these limits, the amount of contamination
that can be tolerated, or the contamination requirements shouldl be established. The rationale
for such determination and the ways in which contaminants will cause degradation is the
mission level requirement and should be described in the contamination control plan, and any
project documentation or contract documentation necessary to ensure these contamination
requirements are achieved.
2.8.1.5 Contamination Budget
Contamination budgets (a breakdown of the overall end-of-life allowable contamination levels)

for allowable surface accumulation should be developed for all elements of the flight hardware
and, when applicable, critical ground support hardware. Comprehensive outgassing rates
may need to be developed to meet the specified budget allotments. The budgeted levels
should reflect both the hardware’s own sensitivity to contamination as well as the ability of the
hardware to cross-contaminate to other hardware associated with the mission. The budget
should describe the required outgassing rates and surface cleanliness levels through all
phases of ground and mission operations up to end-of-life. The budgets should be expressed
in terms of verifiable requirements – e.g, outgassing rates, partial pressures, surface
cleanliness levels, visual cleanliness levels, etc. The necessary contaminant transport
modeling and materials properties testing should be conducted as required for the various
2.8-5
environments and factors which affect contaminant generation, transport and accumulation
(e.g, mass transport in vacuum, particle fallout in cleanroom, particle redistribution during
launch, atomic oxygen, radiation, uv, etc. ) to validate the budgeting efforts. The budget should
be monitored to ensure that, given the actual contamination, the mission performance will
remain acceptable. In the event that contamination build-up predictions are not borne out,
corrective action should be taken.
Cleaning, thermal vacuum bakeout, and other mitigations may be used to bring hardware into
compliance with the budget. When such mitigations cannot be performed or can only be
performed a limited number of times, then protective measures may be required to maintain
the contamination budgets throughout ground, launch, and post-launch operations. Such
measures could include: bagging, containers, GSE/flight barriers, baffles, covers or doors,
purging, etc. Contamination avoidance methods, such as cleanrooms and instrument covers,
will affect the budget and a general description of their usage should be included.
2.8.1.6 Contamination Control Plan (CCP)
The CCP is the most important contamination control document for any program. A detailed
contamination control plan should be prepared that describes the requirements and
procedures to be followed to control contamination. It should establish the implementation
plans and describe the methods that will be used to measure and maintain the levels of
cleanliness required during each of the various phases of the hardware lifetime.
From the overall end-of-life allowable deposition requirements, the breakdown of specific
allowable contamination levels, at progressive points in the build-up, integration, testing,
launch readiness process, and on-orbit mission phases should be derived. This breakdown
is often called a contamination “budget” and should be clearly presented in the CCP.
The CCP should also specify when and by what methods the various contamination
requirements will be verified. It is good contamination practice to include frequent verification
of contamination levels (especially during events) so that problems associated with excess
contamination levels can be identified and solved as soon as possible.
The CCP should also present the overall plan for controlling contamination, from fabrication
and assembly, throughout integration and testing, and continuing with launch site, launch, and
on-orbit plans. Any laboratory and analytical support should also be identified in the CCP. All
necessary supporting documents should be referenced in the CCP.
2.8.1.6.1 Supporting Contamination Documentation
The following documentation list represents the type of supporting documents which may be
required for a project:
 CCP Implementation Plan

 Hardware Cleaning Procedures
 Hardware Cleanliness Verification Procedures
 Molecular Wash Method
 Molecular Wipe Method
 Particulate Tape Lift Sampling
 Particle Counting Method
2.8-6
 Optical Measurement Methods

 Actual instrument throughput/performance measurements
 Witness Plate Measurements
 Cleanroom Personnel Training/Certification Documents
 Cleanroom Personnel Operations Requirements
 Cleanroom Operating Procedures
 Approved Materials Lists and processes
 Cleanroom Monitoring Methods
 Purging Plans
 Hardware Bagging Requirements
 Contamination Protection Methods
 Material/Hardware Outgassing Certification Plans
 Thermal Vacuum Bakeout Plans and Procedures
 Transportation/Storage Cleanliness Plans
 Launch Vehicle/Payload Interface Documents
 Launch Site Cleanliness Requirements
 Launch/On-orbit Contamination Requirements
 Testing Results Reports (Thermal Vacuum Bakeouts, Vibration Testing, Functional
Testing, etc.)
 Hardware Certification Logs and Anomaly Reports
 Lessons Learned Summary Report
The basic standards and practices, and some procedural documents already exist in open
literature and are controlled by various technical societies (ASTM, IES, etc.). A spacecraft
project may utilize these documents and reference them in the higher level documents, rather
than develop completely new documents.
2.8.1.7 Contamination Engineering During Design
From the earliest stages of a program, iterative analyses must be done to determine
contamination sensitivities of hardware and contamination transport (molecular outgassing,
diffusion, particle redistribution, contact transfer, plume, venting, etc.) These analyses need
to consider not only the hardware’s own contamination sensitivity but also the sensitivity of
other hardware and the allowable degradation of performance – especially science -- by
contamination. Likewise, a general plan for achieving the outgassing, surface cleanliness,
and other critical cleanliness levels should be formulated. It should identify elements that will
significantly affect the complexity or difficulty of the contamination control program so that the
appropriate cost, schedule, performance, and risk trades may be made in conjunction with the
project management. The need for protective design elements (reducing lines of sight of
contaminating surfaces to contamination sensitive surfaces, doors, purges, cold cups,
molecular traps, cleanable surfaces, bakeout flight heaters, etc.) to assure performance or
reduce overall programmatic cost should be identified as early as possible in the program.
Standard material selection requirements that are often part of contracts and specifications for
hardware may need to be made more stringent to cost effectively achieve performance
requirements. The contamination engineer should determine if more stringent criteria (particle
generation, water content, outgassing, “as-used” temperatures, etc.) are required as early as
possible in a program to minimize impact to cost and schedule. At a minimum, established
material screening criteria for vacuum stability (ASTM E 595, JSC 0700 Vol. XIV, and NASA
Reference Publication 1124) should be imposed in project requirements documents. These
2.8-7
screening criteria exist not only for contamination considerations, but also to assure that
material properties remain stable after exposure to vacuum. While useful for many
applications, these screening criteria are insufficient for many state-of-the-art instruments and
spacecraft designs. Material selection criteria for particle generation, cleanability, specific
chemical restrictions, and other unique mission specific parameters may have to be defined
and implemented in the appropriate contractual and programmatic documents. The ASTM
E1559 tests material outgassing according to on-orbit source and receiver predicted
temperatures.
2.8.1.8 Contamination Engineering Analyses
It is recommended that a detailed analysis plan be developed for each spacecraft mission.
Usually, a preliminary analysis is performed early in the program, so that results may be used
to aid in making design decisions. Then, once the final design is established, a detailed
analysis is performed and fine-tuned. This stage aids in verifying the spacecraft design and
performance expectations, and is also used to set bakeout acceptance criteria for the
hardware. A final, flight prediction analysis is typically performed near the end of spacecraft
integration and test, to establish the final estimates of on-orbit contamination levels.
2.8.1.8.1 Molecular Contamination Analyses
These analyses generally consist of utilizing an existing analytical tool (e.g. Molflux, CAP,
ISEM, DSMC, and an entire library of plume definition/effects tools), creating a geometric
model of the spacecraft (with critical surfaces well-defined), assigning materials and materials
outgassing rates to each surface, assigning temperature profiles to each surface, and then
exercising the code. Results are usually reported in mass/unit area, and additional iterations
of the runs (with different temperatures, materials, etc.) may easily be accomplished. Once
the mass/unit area values are ascertained, it is also possible to perform “effects analyses” to
predict the resulting impact on performance. For example, a modeling analysis may predict
that 100 Angstroms of silicone will deposit on a critical surface. Then, using different analytical
tools (which are usually based on experimental test programs), it is possible to evaluate
performance of the optical system with this coating of 100 Angstroms of silicone. A 100
Angstrom layer of silicone, within a UV instrument, can mean significant degradation.
Additionally, if one considers specific on-orbit parameters (such as solar exposure), it is
possible to further assess the impacts via analytical methods.
Materials properties become an important input factor in the molecular analyses. Outgassing
rates, and reemission rates are both input into the codes. The industry has, over the years,
developed an extensive materials properties data base, and where possible, the input data is
obtained from these previously performed materials tests. It is often necessary to perform
materials outgassing testing on specific materials, for which no other data exists.
2.8.1.8.2 Particulate Contamination Analyses
The particle analyses vary in methodology, depending on the mission phase. Differing
physical principals apply to the various mission phases (e.g., particle fallout values are
different in 1g environments versus 0 g environments).
2.8-8
For the ground-based assembly, integration, test, transport, storage, and prelaunch phases,
calculations are made based on exposure to the various cleanroom environments.
Parameters that affect this analysis are:
 How clean is the air?

 How long is the spacecraft exposed?
 Number of personnel working on and near the spacecraft
 Other activities performed near the spacecraft (drilling, sanding, painting, etc.)
 Test chamber attributes and operations
 Number of scheduled cleanings
 Methods of protection employed
Based on these analyses, it is possible to identify potential hazards or threatening timeframes

for the spacecraft critical surfaces, and preparations to protect the spacecraft may be made,
well in advance of the activities. In addition, these analysis results may be used to determine
the schedule of cleaning for the spacecraft. The analysis may show that contamination builds
up quickly in one facility versus another, and more frequent hardware cleaning may be
advisable.
For the launch period, vibration and acoustics levels act to remove and relocate particles from
surfaces. In addition, the changing gravity levels, and venting of the spacecraft and launch
vehicle payload volume become important influencing parameters. There are models and
codes to evaluate these events, and determine the resulting particle redistribution during
launch.
During the on-orbit mission phases, particles become dislodged from surfaces due to
spacecraft operations (launch vibro-acoustic modes, solar array openings, aperture cover
ejections, attitude and altitude changes) and other phenomena such as micrometeoroid
impacts. These particles tend to be ejected into a type of “orbit” around the spacecraft and
could potentially interfere with instrument and sensor viewing. There are codes that predict
these trajectories (based on particle size, shape, relative velocities of spacecraft and particle,
and mass), and then predict the potential for re-encounter with the spacecraft, and subsequent
deposition.
In all cases, once the particle deposition predictions are determined, it is then possible to
perform effects analyses. For example, after predicting the particle deposition (number and
sizes of particles) on an optical element, analyses may be performed to assess the scattering
associated with the particles on a mirror, or the transmission loss due to particles obscuring a
lens. With these analysis results, spacecraft performance may be predicted, and corrective
actions may be taken. At the very least, by knowing the level of particle contamination and
the predicted effects, it is possible to more effectively evaluate the flight data (making data
corrections for the spurious particulate effects).
2.8.1.8.3 Other Analyses
There are many other analyses performed for spacecraft programs that are related to
contamination. These include:
 Atomic Oxygen Prediction Analyses

 Predicts atomic oxygen fluence
2.8-9
 Can predict materials erosion rates

 Combined Effects Analyses (e.g. UV plus Atomic Oxygen)
 Contamination Effects Analyses
 Thermal properties changes
 Optical properties changes
 Lifetime and performance impacts
 Materials Properties Analyses
 Specific analyses on materials outgassing rates and cumulative amounts
 Particulate generation analyses for specific materials
 Materials aging studies
2.8.1.9 Contamination Engineering During Integration and Test
The goal of the integration and testing phase is to perform the necessary activities without
compromising the cleanliness integrity of the spacecraft hardware. It should be noted, here,
that there are generally some testing activities which must be accomplished in non-cleanroom
environments (e.g. vibration/acoustics testing facilities are typically not cleanrooms).
Significant pre-planning, the use of protection devices (covers, bags, etc.), and frequent
sampling of cleanliness levels, must be implemented for these testing periods. Contamination
control during the integration phase becomes crucial to the success of the overall mission.
Many programs fall short during this phase, without realizing that this is where the strictest of
attention to details such as contamination control become all-important.
During spacecraft integration, all systems, subsystems, boxes, solar arrays, etc. are merged
together and now constitute the entire spacecraft program. It is especially important to identify
the most critical elements (usually the optical and thermal control elements) and to plan
integration activities, while keeping in mind the strict contamination requirements of these
crucial systems.
The spacecraft is generally maintained only in cleanroom environments and bagging and
protection of the entire spacecraft is recommended during all downtimes.
A major part of the development of the contamination control plan is to develop a cost-effective
integration and test plan. There are often many possible means of maintaining a particular
cleanliness level. It is important to work with the program to determine which solution(s) best
meet the project’s overall cost, risk, schedule, and, most importantly, mission success criteria.
Critical elements that contribute to a program’s overall cost and success include: type of
facility, gowning requirements, Ground Support Equipment design and cleanliness, cleaning
processes, thermal vacuum plans and tests, bagging provisions, shipping and handling
provisions, contamination verification and testing, etc. Contamination requirements need to
be established in the contamination control program that addresses these elements and any
others that can prevent contamination or reduce the risk of contamination.
A thorough cleanliness monitoring and verification program must be enacted during integration
and testing activities, and checked regularly. Each major integration event and testing activity
must be separately monitored to characterize the levels of contamination which may have
occurred during that unique period. This serves to prove that the integration and/or testing
event was a “clean” event, or aids in forensics should there be an anomaly during one of these
activities. All of the testing requirements are delineated in the CCP and supporting documents.
2.8-10
2.8.1.10 Thermal Vacuum Bakeouts
The importance of the thermal vacuum bakeout and certification phases for space hardware
has become a dominant factor in Contamination Engineering planning. Experience has shown
that taking the time, at this point in the program development, to fully bakeout and certify each
component, assembly, subsystem, etc., has significant pay-offs later during the on-orbit
mission phase, reference Hubble Space Telescope’s Wide field Planetary Camera II ultraviolet
performance. Clearly, by reducing the spacecraft outgassing levels in a controlled vacuum
chamber during this ground phase, the amount of material left to outgas during on-orbit periods
is diminished. For those spacecraft and instruments which are sensitive to even small
amounts of molecular contamination, it is important to plan for and cost-out a thorough vacuum
bakeout and certification program.
The general philosophy behind vacuum bakeouts and certification of space hardware is as
follows:
 Commence with bakeouts at the parts level, if possible. Bakeout hardware at

the highest temperature possible.
 Set quantitative acceptance criteria for each bakeout. These criteria should be
based on the total allowable outgassing level for the spacecraft. Usually
computer modeling analyses aid in the determination of the allowable
outgassing level for hardware.
 Do not accept hardware which does not meet the acceptance criteria or adjust
the outgassing cleanliness budget accordingly.
 As parts become assembled, often, the maximum temperature limits become
lower. Bakeouts at lower temperatures are less effective, and take
considerably longer to complete.
 Develop a detailed Thermal Vacuum Bakeout and Certification Plan for your
program. Include the overall plan, schedule, need for instrumentation, and
QCM acceptance criteria, as well as a list of the responsible individuals to
contact during the test.
2.8.1.11 Spacecraft Transportation and Storage Phases
During transportation and storage, it is important to preserve the state of cleanliness of the
space hardware. Generally this means sufficiently protecting the hardware via covers,
containers, bagging, etc. and often means employing a high purity purging of flight hardware.
Develop a purge plan early in the program to accommodate purge system procurement.
2.8.1.12 Launch Site Contamination Control
The purpose of a Launch Site Contamination Control Plan (LSCCP) is to identify all
contamination requirements, all interface requirements, all necessary equipment and supplies
needed at the launch site, all necessary personnel requirements, an overall schedule, and a
detailed plan of activities for the launch site. Contamination Engineers should work with the
launch site teams, spacecraft and instrument teams, and support launch site activities up
through launch.
2.8.1.13 Launch Vehicle and Companion Payload Considerations
2.8-11
The following information must be obtained and integrated into the overall contamination
control program: Obtain and review system information regarding the launch vehicle and
companion payloads.
 Evaluate the mission scenario and timeline.

 Identify potential contamination sources; attempt to qualitatively prioritize the
magnitude of threat posed by the launch vehicle and companion payload
sources:
 Fairing materials
 Fairing surface cleanliness levels
 Primary engine firings and plumes
 Secondary engine firings and plumes
 Launch vehicle venting
 Launch pad purging and T-0 purges, including materials and
certifications of gas at point of delivery.
 Companion payload materials and venting
 Companion payload ejection and orbit insertion (springs, pyrotechnic
devices, engine firings, etc.)
 Effects of Helium on spacecraft system performance as applicable.
 Perform modeling and plume analyses (typically during CDR timeframe) to
quantify contamination threats.
 Develop resolution methods, if required, such as:
 Implement a change-out or substitution of specific materials
 Improve cleanliness levels of launch vehicle and/or companion payload
(such as performing additional vacuum bakeout of components, plan for
more rigorous cleaning of surrounding launch vehicle or companion
payload surfaces, etc.)
 Design protective shields or barriers for your spacecraft or
 Change ejection and orbit insertion methods
2.8.1.14 Launch and Orbit Insertion Mission Phases
There are several parameters associated with the launch and orbit insertion mission phases
which may be discussed and adjusted to fit individual spacecraft needs. For example, it may
be possible to work with the launch vehicle team to adjust the retro maneuvers to minimize
plume impingement on the released spacecraft. Usually, a detailed analysis and justification
for these types of adjustments is required, before approval is given.
2.8.1.15 On-Orbit Through End-of-Life Mission Phases
There are a number of actions which may be taken during the on-orbit through end-of-life
mission phases to minimize contamination levels and even to “clean-up” certain surfaces while
on-orbit. Careful planning and in some cases, special equipment may be necessary to carry
out contamination control measures at this stage of a mission.
For spacecraft which are sensitive to molecular contaminants, all on-orbit sources must be
minimized. This may include inhibiting engine firings, redirecting vents and other high
outgassing sources.
2.8-12
For instruments which require clear FOV operations, it may be necessary to inhibit certain on-
orbit operations during viewing times. Inhibits of vents, mechanisms, solar array movement,
engine firings, and any other particle “jostling” activities may be required.
In the case of spacecraft which are sensitive to photopolymerized molecular contaminants, it

is recommended that solar exposure be limited. This may mean designing on-orbit maneuvers
such that sensitive elements are not exposed to solar illumination, thus minimizing the risk of
photopolymerization of contaminants.
The planning for the operations of any aperture doors or covers must be evaluated well in
advance of the actual flight. It may be necessary, however, based on actual mission
circumstances, to utilize the aperture doors and covers in order to prevent further
contamination of critical surfaces.
In the case of lower altitude spacecraft, with surfaces which are vulnerable to the effects of
atomic oxygen degradation (erosion), it is recommended that sensitive surfaces never be
oriented into the RAM direction. Or if this is impractical, it may be possible to design barriers
to “shadow” or protect the vulnerable surfaces from the atomic oxygen environment.
Ironically, the atomic oxygen environment may also serve a beneficial purpose for other
surfaces. For example, if a fairly stable surface become contaminated with a molecular
residue, it may be possible to deliberately orient the surface in the RAM direction so that it is
exposed to atomic oxygen impingement, which usually “erodes” away the contaminant layer,
leaving the substrate surface once again clean.
It may also be possible not only to deliberately locate vents in areas of the spacecraft which
pose little threat the sensitive elements, but also to design vent barriers or deflectors to deflect
venting products (usually considered contaminants) away from sensitive spacecraft elements.
Molecular Adsorber pucks may be utilized in vent locations to “capture” molecules in high
outgassing volumes.
For sensitive missions, it is always advisable to design and fly an accompanying contamination
monitor with the spacecraft so that direct measurements of accumulated contamination may
be confirmed.
Another aspect of this mission phase which is often neglected is the ability of engineers to
evaluate mission performance data (actual optical measurements, temperature data, etc.) and
to derive what the effects of contamination might be. For example, if the temperature of a
thermal control surface is rising faster than anticipated, it may be because of layer of
contamination has deposited on it, and has changed the absorptance properties of the surface,
which in turn is causing the surface to heat up faster. Knowing this information, it may be
possible to take corrective action, such as exposing the surface to atomic oxygen (to erode
the contaminant layer) or to modify the thermal system (via computer commands) to rely more
heavily on another, uncontaminated thermal component for spacecraft temperature control.
If the spacecraft is demonstrating unexpected responses or seemingly incorrect data, is has

often been possible to quickly perform modeling analyses, or perform an experimental
investigation to simulate the actual environment (temperatures, solar activity, etc.) being
experienced by the spacecraft. Then, is has been possible to verify what is happening,
2.8-13
through these ground-based investigations, and help to prevent further degradation, or devise
scenarios for correcting or compensating for the on-orbit anomaly.
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the possibility of performing on-orbit cleaning
of contaminated surfaces and systems. The most obvious method for achieving this is
designing heater systems under sensitive elements (mirrors, lenses, detectors, etc.) which
can be turned on to heat-up and “outgas” contaminants from surfaces. This method has
already be implemented on a number of spacecraft in the past, including the HST.
2.8.1.16 Spacecraft Post-Mission and Follow-on Program Phases
It is often during the post-mission analysis of on-orbit performance that the aerospace
community learns the most valuable lessons from the mission. Many program improvements,
and “lessons learned” have resulted from taking a clear and complete look at what happened
during the life of the spacecraft.
2.8-14
2.8.2 Coatings Engineering
Coatings Engineering for a spacecraft mission, instrument, or component involves 3 main

steps. An additional step may be required where a coating need to be qualified:
 Assessment of Mission Needs: Selection of coatings for various applications to meet

thermal and optical performance requirements for individual surfaces or systems is
the first step. Determination of Beginning of Life (BOL) and End of Life (EOL)
requirements is then assessed. Thermal radiative property predictions and preliminary
testing may be required to determine that the selected coatings are valid.
Documentation for methods of applications, curing, handling, and special instruction
must be developed.
 Research & Development or New Coatings Development: If necessary, due to project
performance needs, new or tailored coatings may be required and research and
development may be required to develop flight worthy coatings. Absorptance tailoring
of Coatings, emittance tailoring of coatings, new application techniques, composite
coatings, etc. may require development to support the mission.
 Coatings Application: Once agreed upon, the application of the Thermal Control
Paints, Thin Film Coatings, Dielectric Coatings, Conductive Coatings, Lacquers,
Tapes, Molecular Adsorber Coatings, etc. will be performed. Full validation of
adhesion, thickness, smoothness, bonding, coverage, and integrity of the application
should be performed after application, until coating is acceptable and meetings
requirements.
 Coatings Flight Qualification and Measurements: If a flight coatings needs to be
qualified for flight, the coating engineer will design a test program accommodating any
special testing required by the project specific requirements, such as: mission
parameters, spacecraft configuration, desired thermal/optical coating’s properties,
coating application, need for a conductive coating, space environmental effects and\or
contamination issues. As dictated by the coatings engineer and the project, a set of
post application characterization measurements will be performed to verify the
characteristics of the coating. These may include: Optical Property Characterization,
Thermal Radiative Property Characterization, Hemispherical Emittance
Characterization, Bi-Directional Reflectance Distribution Function (BRDF), Light
Scattering/Surface Specularity, Electrostatic Discharge Testing, UV Degradation
Testing, Thermal Cycle Testing, Solar Wind Testing, and Outgassing Testing.
To design a thermal control system that address the mission’s requirements, the thermal
radiative properties and durability of the material must be obtained through thermal
optical/radiative property measurement and space environmental testing.
Thermal Optical/Radiative Properties (Reflectance = ρ, Transmittance = τ, Absorptance = α,

and Emittance =ε) are used to evaluate a material’s ability to maintain temperatures. The
reflectance of a material’s surface is measured over the Infrared, Visible and Ultraviolet
regions of the electromagnetic spectrum to calculate the solar absorptance and over the
infrared region to calculate emittance. Thermal coatings are tested for good coating adherence
to the substrate through Coating Adhesion testing and/or thermal cycle testing.
2.8-15
2.8.2.1 Key Verification Milestones for Coatings Selections and Testing
• System Requirements Review (SRR)

– Conceptual Design presented - including which coatings are planned for key
thermal and optical surfaces.
• Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
– Major trade studies complete
– A complete design, meets all requirements within system resources (power,
mass, volume, cost, schedule)
– All coatings for key thermal control surfaces and optical surfaces should now be
assigned and preliminary test data available at the review
• Critical Design Review (CDR)
– Detailed design complete, ready to fabricate, and assemble/integrate
– Results of development tests, activities
– Test concepts presented
– Complete coatings selection, design, application methodology, environmental
test data, etc. will be presented at CDR
• Pre-Environmental Design Review (PER)
– Details since CDR presented: design changes, problems, detailed analysis
complete
– Results of 1st complete system functional
– Details of planned environmental tests: EMI, Mechanical (vibe, acoustics),
Thermal Vac & Balance (TB)
– All coatings will have been applied, tested, and validated.
• Pre-Ship Review (PSR)
– Results of testing, including problems & resolution; TB correlation, final flight
predictions.
– Plans for ship, launch site ops
– Any touch-up of coatings will occur as needed
• Launch Readiness Review (LRR)
– Report on launch site preps, all paperwork complete, staff & plans for L&EO
– Pre-launch touch-up will occur as needed
Planetary protection is essential for several important reasons: to preserve our ability to study
other worlds as they exist in their natural states; to avoid contamination that would obscure
our ability to find life elsewhere.
Planetary Protection during spacecraft design, fabrication, assembly, integration and testing,
follows a similar approach to that of contamination control, with the difference that the goal is
to minimize, prevent, clean, measure, and verify the microbial contamination levels on
spacecraft surfaces.
Planetary Protection encompasses a set of requirements pertaining to spacecraft hardware

and missions involving (1) the control of terrestrial microbial contamination associated with
robotic space vehicles intended to land, orbit, flyby, or otherwise encounter extraterrestrial
solar system bodies, and (2) the control of contamination of the Earth and the Moon by
extraterrestrial material collected and returned by robotic missions. Detailed compliance and
verification requirements for Planetary Protection programs for NASA missions are found in
2.8-16
NPR 8020.12C (or latest version), “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial
Missions”, and NPD 8020.7G, “Biological Contamination Control for Outbound and Inbound
Planetary Spacecraft” (Revalidated 11/25/08).
2.8.3.1 Classification of Missions
Specific planetary protection requirements for each planned mission will be determined by the
NASA Planetary Protection Office (PPO), in accordance with the governing documents, and
consistent with the policy and guidelines of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR),
recommendations of the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council (NRC), and
advice from the NASA Advisory Council. Requests for categorization of missions and
associated mission requirements must be submitted to the PPO during the mission design
phase (before the completion of the draft Planetary Protection Plan) by the mission Project
Manager. Such correspondence must be accompanied by a mission description and must
include a request and justification for a specific mission categorization. The PPO will respond,
in writing, with the appropriate categorization, conveying such explanatory information or
supplemental conditions as may be appropriate. Subsequent approval of a mission's Planetary
Protection Plan will constitute formal categorization of the mission.
2.8.3.2 Planetary Protection Categorization of Missions
Each planetary mission will fall into one or more categories based on the planetary protection
priorities of each extraterrestrial solar system body and the mission plan. Planetary protection
priorities and corresponding mission categories are given in the following table. Each category
has increasingly more severe requirements as the Mission Category Level increases.
Documentation, microbial cleanliness, sampling, monitoring and verification requirements
become more complex. The NASA Headquarters Planetary Protection Office (PPO) is
responsible for reviewing each planetary mission, including planned operations, possible
unplanned events involving planets, asteroids, comets, etc., and then assigning a Planetary
Protection Category and Mission Type to each program. The PPO must follow the progress
and adherence to Planetary Protection requirements and verification plans throughout the life
of each mission.
Planetary Targets Priority Mission Type Mission Category

Not of direct interest for understanding the Any I
process of chemical evolution, or where
exploration will not be jeopardized by
terrestrial contamination. No protection of
such planets is warranted and no
requirements are imposed.
Of significant interest relative to the process Any II
of chemical evolution but only a remote
chance that contamination by spacecraft
could jeopardize future exploration.
Of significant interest relative to the process Flyby, Orbiter III
of chemical evolution and/or the origin of life
or for which scientific opinion provides a
significant chance of contamination which
would jeopardize a future biological
experiment or exploration program(s).
2.8-17
Of significant interest relative to the process Lander, Probe IV

of chemical evolution and/or the origin of life
or for which scientific opinion provides a
significant chance of contamination which
would jeopardize biological experiments or
exploration programs(s).
Any Solar System Mission All Earth-Return V
Notes:
1) For missions that target or encounter multiple planets, more than one category may
be specified for planets targeted or encountered.
2) For missions utilizing gravity assist means of a flyby of another planet, requirements
will usually be those for the target requiring the higher degree of protection.
2.8.3.3 Planetary Protection Plan Development (Categories II-V)
Each Planetary Mission (Categories II-V) is required to produce and follow a Planetary
Protection Plan. The Planetary Protection Plan should be the primary planning document
describing how a planetary flight project will meet its planetary protection requirements. The
Planetary Protection Plan should indicate planned conformance to those requirements and
must include, as a minimum, the items given in the following outline (see below). It is
recognized that each project will prepare various other documents that may adequately cover
some of the topics in the outline (e.g., the Project Plan may thoroughly cover the subject of
Planetary Protection Management). In such instances, it is suggested that the Planetary
Protection Plan include only the major aspects of the topic and that free reference be made to
the basic project documents that provide specificity.
The Planetary Protection Plan must include, but is not limited to, the items given in the
following outline:
General
Introduction
NASA Planetary Protection Constraints
Designation of Mission Category
Planetary Protection Specifications
Planetary Protection Management and Organization
Organization Description
Responsibilities and Relationships
System Interface Management
Contractor Management
Data Management
Documentation
Identification of References and Applicable Documents
Facilities
Identification and Description of Controlled Facilities
Activities Performed
Hardware Affected
Schedules
Identification of Milestones
Preliminary Schedules
2.8-18
In addition, the following subsidiary plans should be prepared when required for the
particular category assigned:
1. Contamination Analysis Plan
2. Microbiological Assay Plan
3. Microbial Reduction Plan
4. Earth Safety Analysis Plan
2.8.3.4 Measurements and Verification
Specific constraints imposed on spacecraft involved in solar system exploration will depend
on the nature of the mission and the identity of the target body or bodies. These constraints
will take into account current scientific knowledge about the target bodies through
recommendations from both internal and external advisory groups, but most notably from the
Space Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences. The most likely constraints on
missions of concern will be a requirement to reduce the biological contamination of the
spacecraft, coupled with constraints on the spacecraft operating procedures, an inventory of
organic constituents of the spacecraft and organic samples and restrictions on the handling
and methods by which extraterrestrial samples are returned to Earth. In the majority of
missions, there will also be a requirement to document spacecraft flyby operations, spacecraft
impact potential and the location of landings or impact points of spacecraft on planetary
surfaces or other bodies. Specific requirements (reviews, documentation, and levels of
cleanliness) are detailed in implementing procedures and guidelines, primarily NPR 8020.12,
“Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions,” and will be used to
measure adherence to this directive.
2.8.3.5 Documentation Requirements for Planetary Protection Requirements and Verification
Since Planetary Protection includes a similar approach as the contamination control approach,
there are a number of documentation requirements, analyses reports, and monitoring reports
needed to satisfy Planetary Protection verification requirements. Below is a summary of
documentation requirements.
 Category I missions:
o Certification of mission as Category I relieves a project of all further
planetary protection requirements.
 Category II missions:
o A Planetary Protection Plan outlining intended or potential impact targets.
o Brief Pre- and Post-Launch Planetary Protection Reports detailing impact
avoidance strategies.
o End-of-Mission Report providing the final actual disposition of launched
hardware and impact location.
 Category III missions:
o A Planetary Protection Plan that details the planned approach to
compliance with planetary protection requirements, including subsidiary
plans.
o A Pre-Launch Planetary Protection Report which documents that all
requirements have been met (note that an inventory of bulk constituent
organics, if the probability of impact is significant, must be included in the
Pre-Launch Planetary Protection Report).
o A Post-Launch Planetary Protection Report that updates the Pre-Launch
Planetary Protection Report.
2.8-19
o An End-of-Mission Report which provides a complete report of compliance,

the final actual disposition of launched hardware, and, in the case of
accidental impact, the probable location of impact and its region of
uncertainty.
 Category IV missions:
o A Planetary Protection Plan that details the planned approach to
compliance with the implementation requirements (e.g., mission
description, probability estimates, microbial burden estimates,
contamination analysis plan, assay plan, microbial reduction plan).
o A Pre-Launch Planetary Protection Report that documents the degree to
which all requirements have been met and that must include the values of
the microbial burden at launch and the organics inventory.
o A Post-Launch Planetary Protection Report that updates the Pre-Launch
Planetary Protection Report.
o An End-of-Mission Report that provides a complete report of compliance
and the final disposition of all launched hardware.
o An inventory of bulk constituent organics that includes:
 Parts lists, material lists, and other program documentation
containing data relevant to organic material identification that are
prepared by a flight project to specify and control the materials that
are included in a vehicle destined for planetary landing.
o The locations of landings and impact points (determined and defined as
accurately as mission constraints permit) of major components of space
vehicles on the planet surface,
o Estimates of the condition of each landed spacecraft to assist in calculating
the spread of organic materials.
 Category V missions. Missions categorized as "Unrestricted Earth return" have
outbound phase requirements, only (see above requirements). Missions
categorized as "Restricted Earth return" require:
o A Planetary Protection Plan, including outbound phase requirements, if
any, and an Earth Safety Analysis Plan.
o A Pre-Launch Planetary Protection Report, including outbound phase
requirements, if any, that must document the degree to which all Earth-
return requirements to be attained prior to launch have been met.
o A Post-Launch Planetary Protection Report, including outbound phase
requirements, if any, to update the Pre-Launch Planetary Protection Report
with respect to Earth-return requirements.
o After sample collection, a report analogous to the outbound phase launch
report: i.e., an Earth Pre-Launch Report.
o An Earth Pre-Entry Report demonstrating readiness to enter the Earth's
atmosphere in compliance with planetary protection requirements.
o An End-of-Mission Report to address compliance with requirements for the
protection of the Earth's biosphere and detailing the transfer of the samples
to an appropriate containment facility.
o A Sample Pre-Release Report to provide verification of sample analysis
procedures subsequent to the End-of-Mission and demonstrating that any
planned sample release will not harm the Earth's biosphere.
2.8-20
SECTION 2.9
END-TO-END TESTING
END-TO-END COMPATIBILITY END-TO-END COMPATIBILITY
2.9 END-TO-END COMPATIBILITY TESTS AND SIMULATIONS
2.9.1 Compatibility Tests
The end-to-end compatibility test encompasses the entire chain of payload operations
that will occur during all mission modes in such manner as to ensure that the system
will fulfill mission requirements. The mission environment should be simulated as
realistically as possible and the instruments to the extent practical should receive
stimuli of the kind they will receive during the mission. The RF links, ground station
operations, and software functions should be fully exercised. When acceptable
simulation facilities are available for portions of the operational systems, they may be
used for the test instead of the actual system elements.
The specific environments under which the end-to-end test is conducted and the
stimuli, payload configuration, RF links, and other system elements to be used must
be determined in accordance with the characteristics of the mission.
2.9.2 Mission Simulations
After compatibility between the network and the user facility have been demonstrated,
data flow tests should be performed that exercise as much of the total system as
possible. Once the data flow paths have been verified, mission simulations are
enacted to validate nominal and contingency mission operating procedures and to
provide for operator training. To provide ample time for checkout of the Mission
Operations Center (MOC), it is essential that mission operators take part in mission
simulations from the early stages.
Mission simulations are the responsibility of the mission operations manager and
should involve all participating elements and operating personnel (from project and
support elements).
2.9-1
APPENDIX A
GENERAL INFORMATION
Appendix A ____________________________________________________________ General Information
Appendix A – General Information

Acoustic Fill effects
The acoustic sound pressure level in the area between the payload and the payload fairing, or orbiter side
walls, increases as the gap decreases. Thus for large payloads, a fill factor is often used to adjust for this
effect.
NASA-STD-7001, Payload Vibroacoustic Test Criteria recommends the use of the following acoustic Fill
Factor:
where: Ca is the speed of sound in air (typically 344.4 meters/second, 1130 ft/sec, or 13,560 in/sec)
f is the one-third octave band center frequency (Hz),
Hgap is the average distance between the payload and the fairing, or cargo bay, wall, and
Volratio is the ratio between the payload volume and the empty fairing, or cargo bay, volume
for the payload zone of interest.
This fill-factor is added to the empty fairing expected or test levels. However, engineering judgment must
be used in the application of this fill-factor for irregular shaped payloads. Also, Many acoustic specifications
are now provided with some fill-factor included.
As an example, assume a cylindrical payload section of radius R S in a fairing of radius RF shown in Figure
A-1.
Figure A-1 - Cylindrical Payload in Fairing Acoustic Fill-Factor
A-1
The fill-factor to be added to the empty fairing acoustic levels for various size payloads, assuming a
fairing diameter of 3.0 meters, is given in Table A-1, and is shown in Figure A-2.
Table A-1
Acoustic Fill-Factor (dB)
3 meter Payload Fairing
Payload Diameter (meters)/Volume Fill Ratio (%)

1/3 Octave Band
Center Freq. (Hz)
2.85/90.3 2.75/84.0 2.50/69.4 2.25/56.3 2.0044.4
25 9.7 7.6 4.8 3.3 2.3

32 9.6 7.5 4.7 3.2 2.3
40 9.5 7.4 4.6 3.2 2.2
50 9.3 7.2 4.5 3.1 2.1
63 9.2 7.1 4.4 3.0 2.0
80 8.9 6.9 4.2 2.8 1.9
100 8.7 6.6 4.0 2.7 1.8
125 8.4 6.4 3.8 2.5 1.7
160 8.1 6.1 3.6 2.3 1.6
200 7.7 5.7 3.4 2.2 1.4
250 7.3 5.4 3.1 2.0 1.3
315 6.9 5.0 2.8 1.8 1.1
400 6.4 4.6 2.5 1.6 1.0
500 5.9 4.2 2.2 1.4 0.9
630 5.3 3.7 2.0 1.2 0.7
800 4.8 3.3 1.7 1.0 0.6
1000 4.3 2.9 1.4 0.8 0.5
1250 3.8 2.5 1.2 0.7 0.4
1600 .0. 2.1 1.0 0.6 0.4
2000 2.9 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.3
2500 2.5 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.2
3150 2.1 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.2
4000 1.7 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.2
5000 1.5 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1
6300 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1
8000 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1
10000 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1
A-2
Acoustic Fill-Factor (3.0 meter diameter PLF)
10
7
S/C
Diameter
6 (meters)
2.85
Fill-Factor (dB)
2.75
5 2.50
2.25
2.00
4
0
10 100 1000 10000
Frequency (Hz)
Figure A-2 - Acoustic Fill-Factor for various size Payloads in a 3 meter Diameter Payload Fairing
Additional methods for determining vibroacoustic loads can be found in Dynamic Environmental Criteria
NASA Technical Handbook, NASA-HDBK-7005.
Component Random Vibration
Component random vibration testing is one of the primary workmanship tests to uncover flaws or defects
in materials and production. To the greatest extent possible, test levels should be based on knowledge of
the expected environment from previous missions or tests. However, it is important to test with sufficient
amplitude to uncover the defects. Therefore, as a rule, the input levels should always be greater than or
equal to workmanship test levels for electronic, electrical, or electro-mechanical components. If the
hardware contains delicate optics, detectors, sensors, etc., which could be damaged by the levels of the
workmanship test in certain frequency bands, the test levels may, with project concurrence, be reduced in
those frequency regions. A force-limiting control strategy is recommended. The control method should be
described in the Verification Test Procedure and approved by the GSFC project.
The qualification (prototype or protoflight) test level is generally 3 dB greater than the maximum expected
(acceptance) test level. That is not always the case however. If the expected level is less than the
workmanship level an envelope of the two is used to determine the acceptance test level. The qualification
level is also an envelope of the maximum expected + 3 dB and the workmanship level. Under this condition,
the qualification envelope may not exceed the acceptance level by 3 dB. Figure A-3 demonstrates this.
A-3
Figure A-3 Determination of Qualification and Acceptance Random Verification

Test Levels
A-4
Mechanical Shock
The maximum shock producing event for payloads is generally the actuation of separation devices. The
expected shock environment should be assessed for the device to be used, and a spacecraft separation
test should be performed if pyrotechnic devices are to be used for the separation.
A pyrotechnic shock environment is characterized as a high intensity, high frequency, and very short
duration acceleration time history that resembles a summation of decaying sinusoids with very rapid rise
times. In addition, it is characterized most realistically as a traveling wave response phenomenon rather
than as a classical standing wave response of vibration modes. Typically, at or very near the source, the
acceleration time history can have levels in the thousands of g's, have a primary frequency content from 1
kHz to 10 kHz, and decay within 3-15 milliseconds. When assessing the source pyro shock environment
descriptor as given in the GEVS, the following three factors must be considered:
a. Because of the very complex waveform and very short duration of the time history, there is no
accepted way for giving a unique, "explicit" description of the environment for test specification
purposes. The accepted standard non-unique, "implicit" description is a "damage potential" measure
produced by computing the Shock Response Spectrum (SRS) of the actual environment time history.
A SRS is defined as the maximum absolute acceleration response, to the environment time history,
of a series of damped, single-degree-of-freedom oscillators that have a specified range of resonant
frequencies and a constant value of viscous damping (e.g., Q=10). This type of descriptor is
contained in the GEVS. The resulting fundamental objective of the verification test is to create a test
environment forcing time history that has nearly the same SRS as the test specification and thereby
give some assurance that the test environment has approximately the same "damage potential" as
the actual environment.
b. Because of the high frequency, traveling wave response like nature of the subject environment, the
acceleration level will be rapidly attenuated as a function of distance from the source and as the
response wave traverses discontinuities produced by joints and interfaces.
c. Because of the high frequency, short duration nature of the pyro-shock environment, "potential for
damage" is essentially restricted to portions of the payload, or instrument that, for example, have
very high frequency resonances (i.e., electrical/electronic elements such as relays, circuit boards,
computer memory, etc.) and have high frequency sensitive electromechanical elements such as
gyros, etc.
An Aerospace Systems Pyrotechnic Shock study was performed for GSFC and a report was generated in
1970 entitled Aerospace Systems Pyrotechnic Shock Data, NASA Contractor Report-116437, -116450, -
116401, -116402, -116403, -116406, and -116019, Vol. I-VII. (Additional information and references can
be found in Pyroshock Test Criteria NASA Technical Standard NASA-STD-7003). The following
information, extracted from the 1970 final report of this study, is provided to aid in assessing expected
shock levels. The results are empirical and based on a limited amount of data, but provide insight into the
characteristics of the shock response spectrum (SRS) produced by various sources, and the attenuation
of the shock through various structural elements.
The study evaluated the shock produced by four general types of pyrotechnic devices
 Linear charges (MDF and FLSC);
 Separation nuts and explosive bolts;
 Pin-puller and pin-pushers;
 Bolt-cutters, pin-cutters and cable-cutters
A-5
Empirically derived expected SRS’s for these four categories are given in Tables A-4 through A-7. It was
found that the low-frequency region could be represented, or enveloped, by a constant velocity curve. All
shock response curves are for a Q=10.
The attenuation, as a function of frequency and distance was evaluated for the following general types of
structure:
 Cylindrical shell;
 Longeron or stringer of skin/ring- frame structure;
 Ring frame of skin/ring- frame structure;
 Primary truss member;
 Complex airframe;
 Complex equipment mounting structure;
 Honeycomb structure.
It was found that the attenuation of the Shock, as a function of distance from the source, could be
separated into two parts; the attenuation of the low-frequency constant velocity curve, and the attenuation
of the high-frequency peak levels. The attenuation of the constant velocity curve was roughly the same
for all types of structure; whereas the attenuation of the higher frequency peak shock response was
different for the various categories of structure. Figure A-8 gives the attenuation of the constant velocity
portion of the SRS as a function of distance, and Figure A-9 gives the attenuation of the peak SRS level
as a function of distance for the various general categories of structure. It must be emphasized that this
information was derived empirically from a limited set of shock data.
As an example of the use of these attenuation curves, assume that the source spectrum is that for an
explosive bolt given in Figure A-5, and that an estimate of the shock levels 80 inches from the source is
being evaluated for complex equipment mounting structure. From Figure A-8, the constant velocity, low-
frequency envelope will be attenuated to approximately 20% of the original level. From Figure A-9, the
peak level will be attenuated to approximately 7.8% of the original level. The assumed source spectrum
and new estimate of the SRS envelope is shown in Figure A-10.
Structural interfaces can attenuate a shock pulse; guideline levels of reduction are as follows:
Interface Percent Reduction

Solid Joint 0
Riveted butt joint 0
Matched angle joint 30-60
Solid joint with layer of different material in joint 0-30
The attenuation due to joints and interfaces is assumed for the first three joints.
A reduction of shock levels can also be expected from intervening structure in a shell type structure. An
example is shown in Figure A-11.
A-6
Figure A-4 - Shock Environment Produced by Linear Pyrotechnic Devices
A-7
Figure A-5 - Shock Environment Produced by Separation Nuts and Explosive Bolts
A-8
Figure A-6 - Shock Environment Produced by Pin-Pullers and Pin-Pushers
A-9
Figure A-7 - Shock Environment Produced by Bolt-Cutters, Pin-Cutters, and Cable-Cutters
A-10
Figure A-8 - Attenuation of Constant Velocity Line
A-11
Honeycomb structure
Longeron or stringer of skin/ring-frame structure
Primary truss members
Cylindrical shell
Ring frame of skin/ring-frame structure
Complex equipment mounting structure
Complex airframe
Figure A-9 - Peak Pyrotechnic Shock Response vs Distance
A-12
Figure A-10 - Shock Attenuation Example
A-13
Figure A-11 - Reduction of Pyrotechnic Shock Response due to Intervening Structure
A-14
Appendix B
Guidelines For CubeSats
Appendix B_______________________________________________________________CubeSats
Appendix B - Environmental Verification for CubeSats

Companion to GSFC-STD-7000 (General Environmental Verification Standard)
David Everett and Leslie Hartz

with inputs from Scott Glubke, Scott Gordon, Eric Grob, Randy Hedgeland, Ken Javor, John McCloskey,
Carlton Peters, and Tim Trenkle
May 17, 2018
This document describes the risks retired with the verifications described in the General Environmental
Verification Standard (GEVS) for GSFC Flight Programs and Projects (GSFC-STD-7000), with the focus
on projects such as cubesats, where limited resources and relatively high risk tolerance will lead projects
to reduce the scope of testing. This document will enable these projects to more effectively trade cost vs.
technical risk when they are developing their verification plans.
This section directly references specific GEVS sections above.
Section 2.2 of GEVS provides general guidance on environmental verification.
Section 2.2.2 Verification Program Tailoring

This section is particularly applicable to cubesats, since a full, GEVS-defined approach would be overkill
for a cubesat. GEVS is “written assuming a low-risk program.”
Section 2.3 Electrical Function Test Requirements

Section 2.3.1 Electrical Interface Tests
This section describes the importance of verifying interfaces prior to connecting electronics. These tests
are commonly referred to as safe-to-mate tests. Thorough safe-to-mate tests take some time to plan out
and execute, but they prevent damage caused by errors in electrical interfaces. A knowledgeable engineer
must determine the resistances and signal levels expected on each pin of an electrical interface, determine
the proper test equipment (the wrong meter can cause damage in some cases), and capture that
information in a procedure. These measurements are then made with a break-out box prior to integration.
For interfaces with many signals, these tests frequently catch mistakes in pin assignments or errors in
harness wiring. These tests also catch errors in signal waveforms caused by mistakes or
misunderstandings in the design or assembly errors.
This section of GEVS does not mention interfaces tests prior to flight integration, but, in general, ALL
projects should plan to conduct interface tests as soon as breadboard designs exist, per GSFC-STD-1000,
rule 1.44. These tests will identify mistakes and misunderstandings at a time when the problems can be
fixed with little or no schedule and cost impact.
2.3.2 Comprehensive Performance Test (CPT)
All projects should follow the principles described here, although what is considered “comprehensive” will
certainly be much less for a cubesat than a larger mission. CPT’s are generally run once before
environmental testing as a baseline, once spread out over the hot environmental testing, once spread out
over the cold environmental testing, and once at the end of environmental testing. It may not be possible
to cover all items in the CPT during the hot and cold testing. For cubesats, the project may need to further
descope some aspects of the standard CPT testing, based on the costs of the test relative to the risks
retired by the testing.
2.3.3 Limited Performance Tests (LPT)
Limited Performance Tests are frequently called “functional” tests. For a cubesat, the CPT may be short
enough that no LPT is necessary. The primary purpose of the LPT is to ensure nothing has broken during
environmental testing. With large spacecraft, the CPT is too long to execute multiple times during
environmental testing.
B-1
2.3.4 Performance Operating Time and Failure-Free Performance Testing

GOLD rule 2.01 in GSFC-STD-1000 duplicates the requirements associated with this section of GEVS, but
it allows fewer than 1000 operating hours for missions which are class D and below.
Operating hours as a system provides a higher likelihood that rare timing problems will manifest
themselves. Total component operating hours on the ground help screen out early failures related to
manufacturing defects and design errors. Hours in vacuum are generally more stressful on components,
especially at hot temperature, because there is no convection to cool the parts. In general, the more
operating hours the better, to identify problems.
Cubesat projects should investigate alternative testing options, such as a 500-hour burn-in at elevated
temperature, which can provide screening for a variety of parts, design, and workmanship issues. The
duration of a cubesat mission should be factored in to the considerations related to operating time and
failure-free performance testing.
2.4 Structural and Mechanical Verification Requirements

It is of utmost importance to ensure that the cubesat hardware poses no risks to any primary payload with
which it is manifested. The second consideration should be to reduce the risk of structural and mechanical
failure of the cubesat as much as possible given the programmatic constraints that cubesats usually face.
Given the constrained resources of most cubesat programs, a structural qualification unit is not likely. Most
cubesat projects that are launching a single cubesat will want to follow a protoflight model for structural
verification. Missions with multiple identical cubesats will want to consider protoflight testing for the first
unit with acceptance testing for the follow on units.
The baseline structural and mechanical verification program defined in GEVS assumes that a payload is
sufficiently modularized to allow for testing lower levels of assembly. For cubesats this is typically not the
case, so mechanical verification testing will almost always be performed at the payload level on the cubesat
mounted in its dispenser system. Verification tests defined in GEVS for lower levels of assembly should
be addressed as required during cubesat testing.
2.4.1 Structural Loads Qualification

Qualification of the cubesat for its structural loads environment will be accomplished by a combination of
test and analysis. Structural loads qualification is typically performed by test and accompanied by analysis
showing positive margins of safety against limits loads using the factors defined in Table 2.2-3 in GEVS.
For metallic structure, it may be possible to demonstrate strength qualification by analysis only using higher
no-test factors of safety.
Determining the structural loading environment for cubesats will depend on a number of factors including
the first frequency of the cubesat-dispenser system and whether or not a vibration isolation system is used.
For larger payloads, a coupled loads analysis (CLA) is used to derive the quasi-static limit loads for
structural loads verification. Since most cubesats do not respond dynamically to the low-frequency launch
environment, a dedicated CLA will not be run to derive launch loads. The cubesats will be analyzed and
tested for a set of conservative quasi-static limit loads that have been developed to envelope the expected
loads for a given launch configuration. If the first frequency of the combined cubesat-dispenser (and
possible load isolation system) falls below 100 Hz, a model of the cubesat system might need to be provided
to the launch vehicle provider for inclusion in the coupled loads analysis to derive limit loads for structural
qualification. Cubesat systems with modes below 100 Hz may also need to provide a test verified model
that has been correlated through a modal survey or vibration testing
Whenever possible, structural testing of the cubesat should be performed inside its dispenser or an identical
substitute. This ensures that the interfaces and loads on the cubesat are as flight like as possible. In
addition, the rail-style dispenser can result in rattling of the cubesat, which results in non-linear response,
which can only be simulated by test. Tests should be performed in each of three orthogonal axes.
2.4.1.1 Coupled Loads Analysis

Given the late manifesting, high frequency and low mass nature of cubesats, a formal couple loads analysis
is unlikely to be possible for most cubesat programs. When developing the structural loads for a cubesat,
the mechanical experts should try to envelop the structural loads from all possible launch services.
B-2
2.4.1.2 Modal Survey – Frequency Verification

Because of their low mass, high frequency and simple mode shapes, a dedicated modal survey test of the
cubesat-dispenser system is generally not necessary. Usually a test verified model would only be required
if the cubesat or cubesat-deployer system has modes below 100 Hz. If a test-verified model of the cubesat-
dispenser system is required, the correlation can usually be performed based on measured responses from
vibration testing that can be used to tune the finite-element model so that it accurately represent the
frequency and response amplitudes from the test. In most cases, if a test verified model is not required, a
low-level signature test (sine or random) in each axis is sufficient to verify the first frequency of the cubesat
system. A low-level signature test is generally performed before and after vibration testing to ensure that
the structural characteristics of the system have not changed after exposure to the vibration environment.
2.4.1.3 Design Strength Qualification

Strength qualification of cubesats can be accomplished in a number of ways. First, if the random vibration
(or sine vibration, if required) environment is the enveloping source of structural loads, the vibration test
can serve as the strength qualification test. Care should be taken when using this approach to ensure that
realistic analytical assumptions for damping and load paths are used to determine loading under dynamic
vibration.
If vibration cannot be shown to be the driving environment for structural loads and the cubesat has simple,
easy-to-analyze load paths, strength verification can be accomplished through analysis only using no-test
factors of safety as outlined in this section of GEVS. It should be noted that a no-test approach is only
applicable to metallic structures and cannot be used for beryllium, welded, ceramic, composite, or bonded
structures.
If vibration testing or a no-test analytical approach cannot be shown to be adequate to demonstrate

structural qualification, the project should perform a dedicated strength test.
2.4.1.4 Structural Reliability (Residual Strength Verification)

Cubesat projects should assess the structural risks associated with using materials not in table 1 of MSFC-
SPEC-3029. The risks will be primarily related to mission success, since the launch container provides
protection to the primary payload.
2.4.1.5 Acceptance Requirements for Strength Qualification

This section applies to all cubesats. Strength testing is generally not required for a follow-on cubesat whose
design has been previously demonstrated to be strength qualified except for structures using materials that
have been identified as requiring proof testing.
2.4.2 Vibroacoustic Qualification

Random vibration, without acoustics testing, is generally sufficient for cubesats. Cubesats do not have
large surface areas that can absorb acoustic energy, and the stiffness of most dispensers provides
additional protection. Random vibration is likely to be the most important mechanical environments test for
most cubesats. It is the primary structural loading environment for cubesats with a first frequency greater
than 100 Hz. It is also an excellent workmanship test. This test alone may be sufficient for a cubesat.
Force limiting will generally NOT be useful for cubesats because of their low mass, but special
circumstances may make the extra complexity of force limiting worth the effort (for instance, an interface
with high random environment but not much mass available to deliver energy to the cubesat or a cubesat
deployer on an isolation system with high mass participation modes that would result in unrealistic loading
during vibration testing).
2.4.2.3 Payload Random Vibration Qualification Tests

Whenever possible, vibration testing of the cubesat should be performed inside its dispenser or an identical
substitute. This ensures that the interfaces and loads on the cubesat are as flight like as possible. Cubesats
typically do not have levels of assembly below the payload level. Therefore, all vibration testing is
performed at the payload level of assembly. However, the requirement to expose electrical, electronic, and
electro-mechanical hardware to minimum workmanship levels should be maintained for cubesats as a
B-3
screen for workmanship flaws in electronics boards. The cubesat protoflight vibration environment should
therefore be derived as the envelope of limit level + 3dB and minimum workmanship.
Section 2.4.2.5 Component/Unit Vibroacoustic Qualification
This section is not typically applicable to cubesats as all verification testing will be performed at the
payload level of assembly.
As part of payload level of assembly testing, vibration testing of the CubeSat inside the dispenser typically
requires demonstration of no power on until released from the dispenser, and no RF emissions until after
thirty minutes after release from the dispenser.
Section 2.4.2.8 Retest of Reworked Hardware

This section provides guidance on testing after rework.
2.4.3 Sinusoidal Sweep Vibration Qualification

Because of the higher resonant frequencies in a small cubesat, a sinusoidal sweep is generally NOT
required. A sine test would only be required if the resonant frequency of the cubesat is less than 1.5 times
the upper frequency defined for the launch vehicle sine environment. A mechanical engineer should verify
this assumption for all cubesats.
A sine vibration test should also be considered if cubesat uses a rail-style dispenser or a load isolation
system. The rail-style dispenser system can cause non-linear responses due to rattling under the low-
frequency dynamic launch environment simulated by sinusoidal vibration. The load isolation system may
drop the frequency of the system to where it could respond to a sine input.
Whenever possible, sine vibration testing of the cubesat should be performed inside its dispenser or an
identical substitute. This ensures that the interfaces and loads on the cubesat are as flight like as possible.
Vibration testing of the cubesat inside the dispenser typically requires demonstration of no power on until
released from the dispenser (i.e., now vibe-induced power on) and no RF emissions until after 30 minutes
after release from the dispenser.
2.4.4 Mechanical Shock Environment

Self-induced and externally induced shock should be considered when assessing the cubesat for sensitivity
to the shock environment. Release from the launch container will provide an external shock to a cubesat.
Launch vehicle separation events are also sources of external shock for cubesat payloads. However, the
interfaces between launch vehicle shock sources and the launch container plus the interface between the
container and the cubesat will help reduce the severity of the launch vehicle shock environment. All external
shock sources for the cubesat should be captured in interface requirements from the container
manufacturer or the launch provider.
Cubesat designers also need to consider internal sources of shock from deployments (both the release and
the hard stop of any undamped release) of on-board mechanisms and from any other sudden release of
stored energy that will occur during operation of the payload.
2.4.4.1 Subsystem Mechanical Shock Tests

This section provides guidance on testing for shock and for assessing the risk associated with not
performing a shock test. The shock verification approach defined in this section is applicable to cubesats.
2.4.4.2 Payload (Spacecraft) Mechanical Shock Tests

As stated above, the cubesat designer should consider the environment and determine whether or not a
system-level test is appropriate.
2.4.5 Mechanical Function Verification

This section provides guidance on verification of mechanisms, including life tests and torque margin. Some
or all of it may be applicable, depending on the type of mechanisms in the system. The primary difference
between a cubesat and a large, class B mission may just be in the level of detail in the analyses. Cubesat
B-4
designers should make conservative, simplifying assumptions and move forward, assuming the margin
requirements are met. Be aware of forces that become significant for small mechanisms, such as friction,
electrostatic force, surface tension, etc., and ensure sufficient force is available to drive the mechanism
under all conditions.
During design, consider how the deployments will be tested. Under most cases, the designer should be
able to provide enough force and strength to perform deployment tests on the ground without g-negation
devices.
2.4.6 Pressure Profile Qualification
Cubesat designers should ensure adequate venting for the worst-case pressure profile. A good rule of
thumb that envelopes all launch vehicles is to provide a vent area of 0.05 square inches (0.25” diameter
hole) per cubic foot of enclosed volume. This will ensure that the peak pressure level with the volume is
less than 0.5 psi during launch. The small volume of a cubesat limits the concerns associated with pressure
profile.
2.4.7 Mass Properties Verification

As this section states, mass properties verification is dependent on mission requirements.
2.5 Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements

Given that cubesats typically launch unpowered, the interference to the launch vehicle or from the launch
environment is not applicable in most cases. In general, the most significant concerns for cubesats consist
of self-compatibility, compatibility with ground-based tracking radars, and compatibility with on-board
antenna(s) on-orbit.
GEVS is based primarily on MIL-STD-461, which specifies tests at the component level prior to integration
into a larger platform, e.g. instrument, payload, spacecraft, etc. Because cubesats are generally small, self-
contained enclosures, the equivalent of a “component level” test program would apply at the card level, for
which the tests specified in GEVS are generally not applicable.
This places an emphasis on the need to identify and correct potential issues at the card level to the extent
feasible. This may be accomplished with a combination of test and analysis, the specifics of which must be
determined by the needs of each platform. A minimum set of recommendations is provided in section 2.5.1
below.
The integrated cubesat platform must demonstrate compatibility with its communications subsystem. A
minimum set of recommendations is provided in section 2.5.2 below.
Card Level Tests

For cards that provide sources of power to other cards, an assessment of power quality should be
performed at card level. This may consist of a simple measurement of differential voltage ripple in the time
domain (i.e. on an oscilloscope). The voltage ripple limit must be determined by the specific needs of the
platform, but a recommended limit is 200 mV peak-to-peak on top of a 12 Vdc bus, measured in the time
domain with a bandwidth of 1 MHz.
Most cubesat platforms consist of a single instrument. On such platforms, there are no hard and fast
requirements for conducted emissions (CE), conducted susceptibility (CS), or power quality to be applied.
Such requirements are intended to establish compatibility between multiple instruments or payloads
operating from a common power bus. Thus the main issue regarding power on single instrument cubesats
reduces to compatibility between the single instrument and the power subsystem.
On cubesat platforms that include more than one instrument or experiment, measures must be taken to
control the ripple generated by any instrument that may be seen by the other instrument(s). This is best
done with a measurement of current ripple at card level. The limit must be tailored to each specific platform.
A recommended starting point is to characterize the impedance between the power source and the common
distribution point. The current limit may be derived from the allowable voltage ripple at the distribution point
and the common source impedance, while also allowing for the number of different loads. Because the
B-5
source impedance varies with frequency, the current limit will also vary with frequency. Thus it is
recommended that this measurement be performed in the frequency domain with a spectrum analyzer,
similar to the CE101 test method of MIL-STD-461G.
Once all of the cards are integrated but prior to closing up the box, a measurement of aggregate time
domain differential voltage ripple should be performed at the common distribution point in the power
subsystem in order to verify that the voltage ripple requirement above is still met with all of the loads
operating. Designers of the system should consider a layout that enables this test.
On cubesat platforms with one or more instruments that are particularly sensitive to magnetic fields (e.g.
magnetometers), it may be necessary to apply some limit of magnetic field emissions to other equipment
in the system. This may be done at the card level with a tailored version of the RE101 test method of MIL-
STD-461G. The ultimate verification will be an assessment of card-to-card compatibility in the integrated
configuration.
Integrated Cubesat Level Tests

At the integrated cubesat level, it must be demonstrated that its radiated emissions do not interfere with the
uplink signal(s) to its receiving antenna(s). The recommended method, per MIL-STD-464, is first to connect
the output of the receive antenna directly to an external EMI receiver or spectrum analyzer, then measure
the received RF power levels at the uplink frequencies while the platform is put through its normal
operations. If it is possible to define a limited set of “most emissive modes,” it may be sufficient to test only
in those modes, and it will make most efficient use of test time.
A radio frequency (RF) link margin analysis should be performed in order to determine the minimum signal
that may be read by the on-board receiver(s). This level is used as the benchmark for the measurement
outlined above. Thus the combination of measurement and analysis provides a direct assessment of radio
frequency (RF) self-compatibility while also providing an assessment of margin.
Also, the integrated cubesat must demonstrate that it is compatible with the RF energy generated by its
transmitter(s) and antenna(s). This may be demonstrated by transmitting the full power levels out of each
transmit antenna while the platform is put through its normal operations. If it is possible to define a limited
set of “most susceptible modes,” it may be sufficient to test only in those modes, and it will make most
efficient use of test time.
2.6 Thermal Vacuum
2.6.1 Summary of Requirements

Due to the small size and integrated nature of cubesats, the project should determine how much testing is
appropriate prior to integration vs. conducting all testing at the system level. Component-level testing
reduces the risk that a problem will be found later, after integration. Specifics on thermal vacuum testing:
 Bakeout: From a “do no harm” perspective, a system-level bakeout is generally required to ensure
the cubesat does not have any outgassing products that might damage the prime payload.
 Balance: Thermal balance testing at the system level will demonstrate proper thermal analysis
and temperature control.
 Temperature: Testing the system over temperature ensures that all components work together
as timing and other parameters change over temperature.
 Cycling: Thermal cycling stresses components and assemblies to weed out weak designs and
workmanship issues. Because of the small size of components and even the entire system, the
temperature can generally be cycled fairly quickly, so the cost of performing a cycle is not that
great. Other testing, such as a high-temperature burn in, might be considered as an alternate
approach to extra cycling.
2.6.2 Thermal-Vacuum Qualification

This section, with the margins and cycles, is appropriate for cubesats, with the considerations listed above.
B-6
The use of a TQCM is not required if the cubesat can meet the time-at-temperature requirements of
bakeout.
It is not necessary for a cubesat to dwell for 24 hours at each extreme. Dwell times should be based on
how quickly the spacecraft internal temperatures will stabilize and how long it takes to run performance
testing.
Failure-free performance duration of 100 hours hot and 100 hours cold reduces the risk that some vacuum
or temperature related problem is missed during the testing. The project should carefully look at the risks
vs. benefits of reducing these times.
2.6.3 Thermal Balance Qualification

This section is generally applicable to cubesats.
The survival case for cubesats might be unpowered during launch.
Because of the small size, the cubesat may be more susceptible to heat leaks through cabling and
mounting.
2.6.4 Temperature-Humidity Verification

This section is only applicable for components in pressurized volumes.
2.6.5 Leakage (Integrity Verification)

Any components that rely on a pressurized volume should be tested to ensure they do not leak more than
is acceptable.
2.8 Contamination and Coatings Engineering, and Planetary Protection

2.8.1 Contamination
This section is applicable to cubesats. The first step is determination of contamination sensitivity.
Sensitivity to contamination should be based upon the optical, thermal, and mechanical system
performance requirements. Assessments should address all environments including materials outgassing,
on-orbit and thermal vacuum molecular transport, particle generation, materials degradation, thruster plume
impingement, solar radiation, atomic oxygen, charged particle effects, and any synergistic effects among
these environments. The primary payload may drive the contamination control requirements for the cubesat
system. For many cubesats, proper material selection and relatively straightforward handling techniques
may be sufficient to achieve the necessary contamination control.
2.8.2 Coatings Engineering

This section is applicable to cubesats. Since many cubesats have a short mission duration, the degradation
of coatings from beginning of life to end of life will likely be relatively small. GSFC Coatings Committee and
thermal engineering experts maintain the latest coatings performance information. Unproven coatings
should be reviewed by the GSFC Coatings Committee.

Cubesats will be required to comply with planetary protection requirements if they are leaving Earth orbit
or going to the moon.
2.9 End-to-End Testing

End-to-end testing per this section of GEVS is applicable to cubesats. It is easy to miss subtle design
issues that will cause problems in flight. Compatibility testing and mission simulations provide an
inexpensive way to retire these sort of risks.
Appendix A
The acoustic fill information is most likely not useful for a cubesat. The random vibration and shock
information might be useful.
B-7

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GODDARD TECHNICAL GSFC-STD-7000B

General Environmental Verification Standard (GEVS)

THIS STANDARD HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR EXPORT CONTROL RESTRICTIONS;

Original signed by:

General Environmental Verification Standard (GEVS)

Original signed by: Original signed by:

Tristram T. Hyde David F. Mitchell

Original signed by Original signed by:

Thomas V. McCarthy Eric K. Isaac

NASA GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER

DOCUMENT HISTORY LOG

Change No. Date Nature of Change

Baseline April 2005

SECTION 1 – GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................ 1-1

Section 2 - VERIFICATION PROGRAM

SECTION 2.1 - SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION

SECTION 2.2 - ENVIRONMENTAL VERIFICATION

2.2 APPLICABILITY ..................................................................................................... 2.2-1

SECTION 2.3 - ELECTRICAL FUNCTION & PERFORMANCE

2.3 ELECTRICAL FUNCTION TEST REQUIREMENTS .............................................. 2.3-1

SECTION 2.4 - STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL

2.4 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ............... 2.4-1

2.4.1.1 Coupled load analysis ..................................................................................... 2.4-4

2.4.7.2 Acceptance Requirements ............................................................................ 2.4-39

SECTION 2.5 - EMC

2.5 ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) REQUIREMENTS ....................... 2.5-1

SECTION 2.6 - THERMAL

2.6 THERMAL VERIFICATION TESTING – GENERAL ............................................... 2.6-2

2.6.3 THERMAL VACUUM VERIFICATION .............................................................. 2.6-14

SECTION 2.7 - CRYOGENICS

2.7 Cryogenic Philosophy ............................................................................................ 2.7-1

2.7.3.7 Special Tests ................................................................................................ 2.7-10

SECTION 2.8 - CONTAMINATION CONTROL

2.8.1.13 Launch Vehicle and Companion Payload Considerations ............................. 2.8-11

SECTION 2.9 - END-TO-END TESTING

2.9 END-TO-END COMPATIBILITY TESTS AND SIMULATIONS ............................... 2.9-1

2.2-1 Flight System Hardware Levels of Assembly ..................................................................... 2.2-3

2.2-2 Test Factors/Durations ....................................................................................................... 2.2-5

2.4-1 Structural and Mechanical Verification Test Requirements ............................................... 2.4-2

2.4-3 Generalized Random Vibration Test Levels, Components. ............................................. 2.4-19

2.5-2 EMI Requirements Summary ........................................................................................... 2.5-18

2.6-1 Thermal Vacuum Verification Summary (non-cryogenic) ................................................ 2.6-17

2.7-2 Margins As A Function Of Phase in Project Life-Cycle ...................................................... 2.7-6

A-1 Acoustic Fill-Factor, 3 meter Payload Fairing .......................................................................A-2

2.1-1 Environmental Test Matrix ................................................................................................. 2.1-5

2.1-2a Verification Test Report ...................................................................................................... 2.1-6

2.1-2b Verification Test Report (continued) ................................................................................... 2.1-7

2.5-2 General Test Setup Diagram ........................................................................................... 2.5-11

2.5-6 Conducted Emissions Differential Mode Limits ................................................................ 2.5-21

2.5-7 Common Mode Conducted Emissions Default Limit ........................................................ 2.5-22

2.5-10 CMCE Test Setup, Absorbing Clamp Method ................................................................. 2.5-25

2.5-11 Inrush Current Transient Default Limit ............................................................................. 2.5-27

2.5-16 General CS101 Test Setup .............................................................................................. 2.5-32

2.5-18 Conducted Susceptibility Transient Waveform ................................................................ 2.5-34

2.5-19 Conducted Transient Susceptibility Test Setup ............................................................... 2.5-34

2.5-21 Common Mode Conducted Susceptibility Current Limits................................................. 2.5-37

2.5-24 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads Test Setup ........................................................ 2.5-40

2.5-26 CS115 Default Limit ......................................................................................................... 2.5-42

2.5-30 Impacts of Uncontrolled EGSE Common Mode Currents ................................................ 2.5-61