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Financial troubles
Editorial | Published October 18, 2021 - | Updated about 3 hours ago

THE PTI administration has found itself left with no option but to go back to the
IMF with a request for the resumption of the $6bn loan programme stalled since
March.

With the 2023 elections in sight, the government was reluctant to introduce the unpopular
measures suggested by the global lender. The strict programme conditions, especially the ones
related to electricity pricing and tax reforms, were also seen as major impediments to the
government’s plans to grow a shrinking economy in time for the next elections.

The IMF’s ‘open and constructive discussions’ with Pakistan’s finance managers including Shaukat
Tarin seem to be yielding the ‘desired results’. The sixth review of the programme is expected to
be over soon with the IMF releasing two outstanding tranches amounting to $1bn once it
completes the validation of the data on power and gas tariffs and tax collection shared by
Pakistan.

What Islamabad has agreed to give in return will be fully known once the IMF executive board
approves the deal and releases the document. At the moment, we only know that Mr Tarin has
given in to a major IMF demand to raise electricity prices. Speaking to Pakistani journalists in
Washington after his meetings with IMF officials, he repeated his old position that raising [power]
tariffs without structural changes only increases inflation and makes industry uncompetitive.

“We will increase these tariffs in a gradual manner so it does not increase inflation a whole lot,” he
explained, trying to justify his volte-face.

The resumption of the IMF deal is crucial for Pakistan to sustain its external sector in the short to
medium term since the growing trade gap is fuelling the current account deficit and bringing the
already meagre foreign exchange reserves under massive stress. But it is bad news for ordinary
people. Besides making electricity a lot more expensive, the IMF is likely to force Islamabad to
implement measures to boost income, consumption and import taxes to pull up its revenue target
of Rs5.8tr for the present fiscal year to Rs6.3tr, abolish or significantly reduce all kinds of
subsidies, and hike interest rates. The brunt of these inflationary actions will primarily be borne
by the low-middle-income families already struggling to cope with eroding funds.

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Does the government realise this and can Mr Tarin — whose term as unelected finance minister
expired Friday night because a Senate seat to get him elected to the Upper House could not be
found — clinch any concessions from the IMF on behalf of ordinary Pakistanis? At the end of the
day, Mr Tarin may keep his office in Q Block as a minister or as an adviser. However, the
conditions tied to the loan programme are going to unleash a strong public backlash. How will a
politically beleaguered government deal with public outrage and what will it mean for the PTI’s
electoral prospects? Only time will tell.

Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2021

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Complaint portal
Editorial | Published October 18, 2021 - | Updated about 3 hours ago

IN a ruling on Thursday, the Mingora bench of the Peshawar High Court held that
the Prime Minister’s Performance Delivery Unit and the Pakistan Citizen Portal
cannot take action on a complaint regarding provincial departments. Such action,
it said in its judgement, violated provincial autonomy as enshrined in the
Constitution. The court’s verdict was in response to a petition filed by government
employees, who drew the attention of the two-member bench towards the
harassment they had faced at the hands of the police on a frivolous charge of
possessing chemical and biological weapons. The court held that “the impugned
proceedings initiated and conducted on the authority of the Pakistan Citizen
Portal, which includes the entertaining of the complaint and referring the same to
the Swat DPO for taking necessary action, are unconstitutional for being beyond the
executive authority of the federation, illegal, without lawful authority and
resultantly null and void”. The bench, however, rejected the petitioners’ plea that
criminal proceedings be started against the complainants.

Launched by Prime Minister Imran Khan on Oct 28, 2018, under the umbrella of PMDU, the PCP
was designed to provide a platform to citizens to communicate directly with all government
entities and to have their issues resolved by the relevant authorities. The creation of the PCP was
an acknowledgement at the highest level of a broken system with few checks and balances and
little oversight, which had failed to respond to citizens’ complaints. There can be no two opinions
about the need for such digital platforms; it is necessary to provide quick and easy access to
citizens to forums where their issues can be resolved. But the honourable bench was right in
pointing out that the federation has no business dealing directly with departments that fall within
the purview of the provinces. For their part, the federating units cannot distance themselves from
their responsibility of providing such a mechanism to their citizens. As things stand, KP is perhaps
the only province where a Performance Management & Reform Unit has been operating since
January 2016. It is time all provinces joined hands to establish a well-integrated federal-provincial
digital platform — with a proper oversight mechanism and performance benchmarks — to address
citizens’ complaints. It is equally important for the PCP, established under Schedule-II of the
Rules of Business, 1973, under the Cabinet Division, to institute immediate remedial measures to
shield citizens and government officials from frivolous complaints.

Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2021

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Capital’s master plan

Editorial | Published October 18, 2021 - | Updated about 3 hours ago

IT is encouraging that on Thursday, the restructured commission formed by the

federal cabinet to revise Islamabad’s master plan finally met to chalk out the
modalities. At the meeting held at the offices of the Capital Development Authority,
eight independent committees were formed. Their task is to come up with solutions
relating to different aspects of the challenge that include regional planning and
transport access, population, and urban, legal and environmental issues. These
eight committees will review the city blueprint and, if the need so arises, engage
consultants or buttressing government agencies, such as the Ministry of Climate
Change for environmental issues. The timeline has been capped at six months.

Due to various reasons, including a rapidly expanding population and market forces, it has not
been possible to keep the development of the capital city within the ambit of the original master
plan designed by the Greek firm Doxiadis Associates. True, none of our cities show cohesive
development — but many of them have a history of organic growth stretching back centuries. For
a city established from scratch a handful of decades ago (the Capital of the Republic
[Determination of Area] Ordinance was promulgated in 1963), the currently chaotic state of
Islamabad demands revision of the master plan with some dynamic measures being taken. From
issues such unplanned housing societies (such as Banigala, which was given legal cover
retrospectively) and crises of civic infrastructure management as seen in the recent flooding of
Sector E-11, to the rapid ‘colonisation’ of areas originally reserved for local growers — for example
Chak Shehzad, where small-scale agriculturalists have been forced out of the market by land-price
dictates and cold-storage constraints — the problems are myriad. Earlier reviews of the master
plan (for example, in 1986 and 2005) were unable to obtain cabinet approval. Now that the
exercise is again being undertaken, rather than focus on a restrictive timeline, overarching
emphasis must remain on doing the job properly and comprehensively. Bureaucratic haste may
later be responsible for a very high cost.

Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2021

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Curtness of courts
Adeel Wahid | Published October 18, 2021 - | Updated about 3 hours ago

THE high courts and the Supreme Court in Pakistan, sometimes referred to as the
superior courts, have a prerogative that the other adjudicatory forums have been
held not to possess. They can, at times, be short with you, by rendering orders
consisting of no more than a sentence or two. Matters of monumental significance,
which may have taken weeks, months or even years of adjudication, may be resolved
by the superior courts with only a couple of sentences to show for it — through what
is known as a ‘short order’.

A detailed judgement may come much later, but that does not, in the words of the superior courts,
take anything away from the binding nature of the short order.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in ‘The State vs Asif Adil & Others’ (1997), the superior
courts have repeatedly reminded litigants, and the public at large, that the practice of rendering
short orders by the superior courts is nothing peculiar. Short orders are the final orders, which
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must be acted upon. For the purposes of filing an appeal, the period of limitation begins to run
from the time the short order is rendered.

There are at least four problems with short

orders.

In some situations, the short order, which often reveals only the conclusion, without the requisite
reasoning, may, at times, not even be followed by a detailed judgement. This may happen, for
instance, when the short order is rendered by an additional justice, who is later not confirmed. The
lack of opportunity, incentive or inclination may mean that the outgoing justice never gets around
to writing the judgement before departing. These were, for instance, the facts in the case of ‘Asif
Adil’.

Second, short orders may be rendered by justices just before their retirement, and the time may
run out before their having penned the detailed judgement. Again, the short orders seal the deal,
without the detailed judgements ever getting written.

The practice of issuing short orders, followed by post-hoc reasoned detailed judgements have also
led to certain anomalous situations. In the ‘Matter of Reviews on Behalf of Justice (Retd) Abdul
Ghani Sheikh & Others (2013)’, for instance, the Supreme Court sat in review in a case where the
five justices, in their short order, unanimously agreed to set aside the infamous Supreme Court
judgement ‘Accountant General vs Ahmed Ali U Qureshi (2008)’ that had allowed the rogue
Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) justices the benefits of pensions after retirement.

But later, at the time of detailed judgement, there emerged a three-two split, with the majority
deciding that the already received benefits need not be recouped. In review, the seven justices
again split on whether the short order mandated the recovery of already doled-out benefits.
Eventually, it was resolved that the matter be reheard.

Even without this example, most people are aware as to where the devil resides: in the details.
And a short order wholly lacks them.

There are at least four problems with short orders. First, a short order may or may not have been
rendered on the basis of mere intuition, and in the absence of more, there is no way to tell.

Second, for the purposes of filing a timely appeal, the litigant ought to know the reasons why she
did not prevail.

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Third, the superior courts are often confronted with issues of weighty implications, where
justifying conclusions only lends credence to those decisions.

Fourth, and importantly, providing reasons for deciding cases is a matter of basic courtesy and
respect. With persons one wants to engage with, and whose intellect one respects, one reasons
through to a conclusion. It is one thing to say that you should do ‘x’ because I said so, and totally
an­other to convince and persuade an individual to do ‘x’ on the basis of sound reasoning.

The irony, however, lies in the fact that the superior courts have held that it is only them, and no
other adjudicatory forum, that are entitled to render short orders. It is unclear why the superior
courts should be exempt from the very requirement imposed on others.

Granted that the superior courts in Pakistan are overburdened, exercising jurisdiction over a wide
range of, at times, relatively trivial matters. There are important conversations that need to
happen regarding, among others, the expansiveness of the superior courts’ jurisdiction; the
needless exercise of suo motu powers; the non-appointment of judicial-members in the statutory
tribunals. There is also a need for resources such as competent research assistants and law clerks
that may help the justices with their many responsibilities.

At the same time, however, there has to be an assurance to litigants, and the public at large, that
the conclusions the justices reach follow from the premises. Writing the judgement may be onerous
and time-consuming, but there cannot be a prerogative to be short with the people.

The writer is a litigator based in Islamabad.

awahid@umich.edu

Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2021

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Intolerance grows
Huma Yusuf | Published October 18, 2021 - | Updated about 2 hours ago

PAKISTAN’S social and moral trajectory is alarming. The rejection of a bill aimed at
stemming forced religious conversions by a parliamentary committee convened to
address the issue is the latest in a line of dismaying developments highlighting
Pakist­an’s deepening schisms and intolerance.

There are mumbles about why the bill was rejected: the proposed age limit on conversions; and
the call for a 90-day cool-off period to consider the decision before proceeding. But the real reason
is that the current social, religious and political environment in the country has become so
oppressive that a meaningful act of inclusion is deemed inconceivable.

The religious affairs minister reportedly said that the ‘environment is unfavourable’ for such a law,
and implied it would generate resentment that would make minorities more vulnerable. The law
minister also cautioned that the legislation would be ‘dangerous’, implying violent retaliation.

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This is a good example of the ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakistan of which we were forewarned over
the past decade. The fact that government representatives are resigned to a status quo in
which minority rights are not worthy of upholding should be problematic for everyone.

An act of inclusion is deemed inconceivable.

A key problem is that the term ‘forced conversion’ glosses over what’s really at stake. Reportedly,
some 1,000 girls from religious minorities, primarily Hindus, are forced to convert each year.
These conversions can involve abduction, rape, violence, human trafficking and extortion. They
also enrich clerics who receive payments for solemnising such marriages, corrupt police officials
who take bribes instead of investigating, and magistrates who look the other way. By rejecting the
bill, our lawmakers are condoning these other activities. How does this serve Islam?

There is already a law prohibiting forced marriage, and making the marriage of minors and non-
Muslim women punishable with imprisonment. But it remains unenforced, which is why a bespoke
bill on forced conversions was proposed.

Sadly, religious minorities’ desperation to protect their own is not being heeded. Many religious
and political stakeholders deny that forced marriages occur. Or they wave off the issue as a quirk
of three districts in Sindh, and not worth of being addressed through national legislation. Similar
bills have been rejected in 2016 and 2019. Disdain for minorities has also been entrenched in the
current process. The religious affairs ministry apparently did not consult minority representatives
while reviewing the bill, while the Council of Islamic Ideology invited the cleric accused of enacting
forced conversions in Sindh for a briefing.

Most readers from the religious mainstream will gloss over these words, thinking they have little
direct relevance. But the way a state treats its minorities is ultimately reflective of how it will treat
all its citizens. All Pakistanis should be concerned by the callousness.

Minority rights ensure respect for distinct identities, whether along religious, ethnic, linguistic,
gender or any other lines. The goal is to ensure that difference is tolerated and protected. Where
minority protections work well, groups can engage and collaborate with each other no matter
what distinguishes them. Managing religious pluralism, or any other minority identity, creates
the right

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social and judicial environment, governance and frameworks to ensure that all differences can be
negotiated, leading to more social resilience.

Minority inclusion also ensures that marginalised groups do not react to majority pressure by
ramping up efforts to preserve and protect their identity in a way that breeds passionate defence
and potentially fuels armed conflict. In Pakistan, this trend has been apparent among non-
dominant Muslim sects but is even more relevant in the context of ethnolinguistic identity. The
state’s weak response to inclusion since its inception has set the stage for constant hostile
confrontation.

The failure to pass this bill also undermines the writ of the state and highlights its inability to
guarantee citizens’ protection and freedom. Non-Muslim religious minorities are vulnerable
enough that their maltreatment does not produce destabilising results. But their predicament
shapes how other minorities view the state and their expectations of lawmakers, with more
serious consequences.

In democracies, majority rule is constrained in order to protect minority rights — all minority
rights. Ultimately, the goal is to make sure the majority cannot oppress those with dissenting or
contrarian views. When unchecked and uncompelled to accommodate minority or marginal
positions, the majority becomes authoritarian in a way that erodes everyone’s rights. Religious
minorities are already struggling to keep their loved ones safe, and to preserve the dignity and
sanctity of their faith. Do you want to be in the same position some day?

The writer is a political and integrity risk analyst.

Twitter:****@humayusuf

Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2021

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Moral panic
Umair Javed | Published October 18, 2021 - | Updated about 2 hours ago

IS Pakistan in the middle of a moral crisis? Is cultural breakdown afflicting all

aspects of social life? Have Pakistanis, as a collective entity, moved away from their
roots? If public statements and actions are anything to go by, these are pressing
questions occupying the mind of the prime minister since he stepped into office in
2018.

The latest step to stem the tide of this proclaimed moral decay is the establishment of a religious
authority, designated as a gift to the young people of Pakistan. Its job, from what little reporting
exists on it, is to catalyse research on Islam in universities, spread religious and culturally
appropriate moral messages to a domestic audience, and present the real face of Islam to the
outside world. Whether this takes shape or not remains to be seen; what also remains to be seen is
the actual ordinance the president promulgated this past week.

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Leaving aside the wholesale equivalence drawn between Pakistani culture and Islam, and the
general ignorance of doctrinal and ritualistic differences that dot this society, one can still assess
important aspects that the PM draws on to declare a state of moral decay. In repeated interviews,
the PM mentions rising divorce rates, breakdown of the family system, and spread and
consumption of fahaashi in entertainment and elsewhere. It is worth evaluating whether such
cultural shifts are new and sudden, happening at a scale large enough to have impact,
unilateral/linear in their direction.

The PM and others perhaps see decay

through the growth of entertainment and
fashion industries.

Divorce rates are the easiest to measure, with the availability of fresh census data. The story there
is not quite as pervasive as the scale at which moral panic is being generated. In 20 years, the
divorce rate among population aged 15 and above has gone up from 0.34 per cent to 0.40pc. The
change seems even more nominal if one factors in improved reporting, greater awareness about
Islamic marital rights, and better data coverage that has likely taken place in the interim period.
Given the time frame and the extremely low baseline, this change hardly comes across as one
indicating the death of marriage as a social institution.

What is also interesting to note is that the rate of marriage has also increased during this time
period (1998-2017) from 63.7pc to 64.9pc among Pakistanis above the age of 15. If the people of
Pakistan are marginally more likely to get divorced these days, they are also marginally more
likely to get married as well. The latter is a more worthwhile indicator of large-scale cultural
behaviour, as marriage rate decline is usually associated with the historical evolution of Western
societies. From these two data points, at least, it doesn’t seem Pakistan is even remotely on that
trajectory.

The second statistic frequently mentioned is the breakdown of the family system. We have no way
of knowing whether sons and daughters talk back to their parents or fight with them at ever
higher rates, or whether they’re getting married without parental consent. The census,
unfortunately, does not record such data. What we do have though is average household size and
composition, which is a reasonably good measure of who all are cohabiting in one residence and
sharing household finances.

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Since 1998, average household size has decreased from 6.8 persons to 6.4 persons per household.
This reduction of 5pc over 20 years has taken place alongside declining fertility rates that are
associated with economic growth, and alongside expanding urbanisation and intra-household
migration. Once these factors are taken into account, there is likely nothing left behind that needs
to be explained by supposed cultural shifts of children leaving parents or kicking out grandparents
or any such drastic act that conservative minds in South Asia usually associate with Western
immorality.

Finally, the third variable of moral decay is the spread of sexualised immorality through
entertainment consumption and other associated avenues. This remains the hardest to measure,
given its intangibility. Given their average age, the PM and others engaged in spreading moral
panic likely see decay through the growth and proliferation of private entertainment media and
the rise of a fashion industry, as well as the associated change in dressing and consumption
patterns among some segments (usually women).

Such indicators are a good example of selective assessment based on prior notions. For every
example of ‘fahaashi’ that some may draw on, one can find at least two more of increased
religiosity and conservative cultural consumption.

Since the early 2000s, if Pakistan has seen growth in various fashion and entertainment segments,
it has also witnessed the concurrent rise of regressive themes in television dramas; the growth of
religious televangelism in private media; the spread of conservative, spiritual movements such as
Dawat-i-Islami, Tableeghi Jamaat and Al Huda; and the associated increase in consumption of
religious commodities. This is well documented in anthropologist Ammara Maqsood’s excellent
book on Pakistan’s middle class where she shows how Quranic study circles have proliferated in
urban centres and how upwardly mobile men and women are likely to consume products
associated with religious piety (in dressing, entertainment and other acts of leisure).

If we take the unintelligent conflation of Pakistani culture solely with religion as true, there is
mounting evidence that society has actually gone closer to such supposed roots than drifting away
from it. On top of this, for the past two decades, the country has been in the midst of a large-scale
Barelvi as well as Deobandi revival, with ever more violence around the blasphemy law, and
associated suppression of minority rights in its name. And perhaps this is precisely the problem
that requires the state’s attention and resources, which currently are being devoted to countering
problems that don’t actually exist.

The writer teaches politics and sociology at Lums.

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Twitter: @umairjav

Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2021

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Challenges amid discord

Maleeha Lodhi | Published October 18, 2021 - | Updated about 3 hours ago

PAKISTAN continues to face imposing internal and external challenges. But the
ability to address them is being jeopardised by several factors — lack of national
unity, intensely polarised politics, institutional disharmony, and absence of
political will to undertake long postponed, fundamental economic reforms.

Sharply polarised politics have become a familiar aspect of the country’s political landscape. With
government-opposition tensions showing no sign of abating, a non-consensual democracy is in
operation. Unilateral, go-it-alone governance seems to be even more pronounced now. The latest
example is the PTI government’s plan via a presidential ordinance to extend the term of the NAB
chairman despite the opposition’s vociferous objections. It is also exemplified by the government’s
insistence on instituting electronic voting for the next election, without any agreement with
opposition parties or the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). This adds up to a deeply divided
polity that can hardly generate the consensus needed to address national challenges.

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Institutional disharmony has most dramatically and consequentially been evidenced in the posting
of the head of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency and appointment of his successor. The
prolonged impasse between Prime Minister Imran Khan and the army leadership on such a
sensitive matter may have echoes from similar unedifying experiences in the past. But it indicated
that the ‘same page’ narrative was wearing thin and that civil-military relations were unlikely to
be the same again. The public manner in which the government played this issue only added to the
strains in the relationship. This has bred uncertainty at a time when energy needs to be directed
to deal with the country’s multiple challenges.

Institutional disharmony and polarised

politics are impeding efforts to address the
country’s challenges.

The government’s confrontational stance towards the ECP is another example of lack of
institutional harmony between the executive and a constitutional body, mandated to act
independently. Rather than engage the ECP to address its objections to electronic voting, ministers
have been vilifying the Commission and accusing it of partisanship. This underlines the PTI
leadership’s proclivity to bulldoze its way in displays of intolerance.

Introduction of the Single National Curriculum also illustrates the government moving on its own
rather than first building a wide consensus among stakeholders and eliciting a buy-in for the move.
The initiative is widely seen by educationists as a leap backwards rather than a step in the
direction of modernising the education sector to bring it into sync with 21st-century requirements.

All this at a time when the country confronts formidable challenges at home and abroad. The
biggest challenge is a fragile economy faced with an internal and external cash liquidity crunch,
growing resource constraints, spiralling debt, rising inflation, runaway food prices, falling rupee
and sluggish growth and investment. Beyond the unresolved problems of a rentier economy rooted
in chronic budget and balance-of-payments deficits there are warning signs of danger ahead that
can snowball into a crisis.

First and foremost, delay in forging agreement with the IMF is already exacting a toll — depleting
foreign exchange reserves, pressure on the rupee and eroding business confidence. If the Fund
programme is delayed beyond December certain consequences will flow — significant financial
outflow, fall in reserves, inability to service debt and an external financing crisis. The rollover of
debt payments to key creditor countries is also predicated on a Fund programme.

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Another warning signal is rising debt, both internal and external. Public debt is now 91 per cent of
GDP (it was 79pc in 2018). Power sector debt has risen exponentially while the circular debt
problem has been compounded with no indication of any meaningful resolution. Inability to deal
with power sector arrears risks cuts in power supply in winter when demand for gas rises. A third
danger sign and the most politically consequential is rising inflation. This is due to a combination of
reasons including supply-side and monetary factors while unbridled subsidy schemes have also
contributed to it. Food inflation is even higher which is already generating much public disquiet.
Unless the government comes to grips with these clear and present dangers the economy risks
being blown off course.

Foreign policy challenges are no less imposing with Afghanistan posing the most proximate
challenge. Uncertainty continues over whether the Taliban will be able to govern and meet key
expectations of the international community essential to avert an economic collapse. In this fluid
environment the government has adopted an ill-thought narrative, acting as a virtual
spokesperson for the Taliban. It is one thing to help a neighbour, extend humanitarian assistance
and call for international engagement. This makes eminent sense. But it is quite another to offer
assurances on the Taliban’s behalf when they have yet to deliver on international obligations. It
also does not behove officials to publicly make apocalyptic predictions of what might happen in
Afghanistan if the international community doesn’t engage. Our policy should distinguish between
Pakistan’s interests and the Taliban’s which are far from identical.

Other external challenges also have to be met. Despite the government’s repeated claims to have
conducted an effective foreign policy the record shows otherwise. Key areas and the state of
Pakistan’s priority relationships offer little reason for self-congratulation. The government has yet
to build diplomatic support on Kashmir, relations with the US remain in a state of disrepair and
China’s concerns over tardy implementation of CPEC projects have still to be adequately
addressed. Lack of sustained and institutionalised engagement with Saudi Arabia, has meant a lost
opportunity — the ambitious Saudi investment plan unveiled two years ago has not been realised.

Daily press releases and non-stop press conferences or tweets do not obscure the fact that
diplomatic gains have been elusive. Megaphone diplomacy aimed only at the home audience does
nothing for the country. Ministers go on and on about how the government has effectively
presented Kashmir’s case to the world. But they fail to show what tangible outcome has been
achieved from this. The test of foreign policy is to secure outcomes that advance the country’s
interests and not the number of speeches that are delivered.

The country’s domestic and foreign policy challenges need prudent decisions and purposeful
actions. What seems to stand in their way is a lack of focus on governance, tensions between key
institutions and a deeply polarised polity.

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The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK & UN.

Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2021

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