Chavez vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008.

11/10/21, 10:22 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 545
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 441

Chavez vs. Gonzales
*
G.R. No. 168338. February 15, 2008.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M.

GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC),
respondents.
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Where serious constitutional

questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of procedure.—
Petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed
to allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” But as early
as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious
constitutional questions are involved, “the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must,
technicalities of procedure.” Subsequently, this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers
as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal
questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with
the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine
whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them.
Same; Freedom of Expression; In line with the liberal policy of
the Supreme Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue
of overarching significance to our society, the Court brushes aside
technicalities of procedure and takes cognizance of the instant
petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all
the civil rights, the freedom of expression.—In line with the liberal
policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue
of overarching significance to our society, we therefore brush
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017d07adcfb269beb7d9000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/153
aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this

petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all
the civil rights, the
_______________
* EN BANC.
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442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Gonzales
freedom of expression.The petition raises other issues like

the extent of the right to information of the public. It is
fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues
but only the most decisive one which in the case at bar is
whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of
speech and of the press.
Freedom of Expression; Hierarchy of Rights; Freedom of
expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of
every democratic government, and given a preferred right that
stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or
other liberties.—Freedom of expression has gained recognition as
a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and
given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than
substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate
rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied
almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of
Rights, were considered the necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of free speech. This preferred
status of free speech has also been codified at the international
level, its recognition now enshrined in international law as a
customary norm that binds all nations.
Same; Same; In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem
accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system; It is only when the people have unbridled
access to information and the press that they will be capable of
rendering enlightened judgments—we cannot both be free and
ignorant.—In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem
accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system. This right was elevated to constitutional
status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions,
reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that
freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every

other form of freedom. Moreover, our history shows that the
struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the
press was, at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable
preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms. For it is only
when the people have unbridled access to information and the
press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened
judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we
cannot both be free and ignorant.
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Same; Freedom of the Press; To be truly meaningful, freedom

of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the
articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or
derided by others, or though such view “induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger.”—Freedom of speech and of the press means
something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs
or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures,
and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter
of public consequence. When atrophied, the right becomes
meaningless. The right belongs as well—if not more—to those
who question, who do not conform, who differ. The ideas that may
be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those
that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly
meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and
even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it
be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view “induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger.” To paraphrase Justice Holmes,
it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the
thought that agrees with us.
Same; Same; Relativity of Liberties and Freedoms; The scope
of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to
nearly all forms of communication—it protects speech, print and
assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not
confined to any particular field of human interest; The
constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas—
the protection afforded free speech extends to speech or
publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or
informative; While all forms of communication are entitled to the
broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of
film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media,

as will be subsequently discussed.—The scope of freedom of
expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all
forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly
regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to
any particular field of human interest. The protection covers
myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues,
about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The
constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of
free speech and free press
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational

ends, inasmuch as the Constitution’s basic guarantee of freedom
to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that
are conventional or shared by a majority. The constitutional
protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection
afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are
entertaining as well as instructive or informative. Specifically, in
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, 137 SCRA
628 (1985), this Court stated that all forms of media, whether
print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
clause on freedom of speech and of expression. While all forms of
communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of
expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be
subsequently discussed.
Same; Same; Tests for Restraints on Freedom of Speech and
Expression.—Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and
expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests,
i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits
limitations on speech once a rational connection has been
established between the speech restrained and the danger
contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a
standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values
and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and present
danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech
will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.

This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high.”As articulated in our jurisprudence,
we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or
clear and present danger test to resolve free speech
challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have
generally adhered to the clear and present danger test.
Same; Same; The press is the chief source of information on
current affairs, the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful
vehicle of opinion on public questions, the instrument by which
citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their
aspirations and their
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grievances—it is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep

government responsible and efficient.—Much has been written on
the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the larger right
of free discussion and expression. Its practical importance,
though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of
information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and
perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is
the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed
of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It is the
sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and
efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every
administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed.
As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731
(1918): The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with
the balm of clear conscience.
Same; Same; Four Aspects of Freedom of the Press.—
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the
1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the
press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to
information;and (4) freedom of circulation.
Same; Same; Prior Restraint; Words and Phrases; Prior

restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or
other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination; Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the
executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.—Prior
restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus,
it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a
proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to
publication including the payment of license taxes
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against

publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices
of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their
printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or
censorship. Any law or official that requires some form of
permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an
infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at
the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Certain previous restraints may be
permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful
evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by
which it should be measured against.—Given that deeply
ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior
restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is
presumed invalid, and “any act that restrains speech is hobbled
by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows,” it is important to stress not all prior restraints
on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be
permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a
careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate
test by which it should be measured against.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Content-Neutral”
and “Content-Based” Regulations, Distinguished.—It is not
enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some

form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be
made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation,
i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e.,
the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which
the challenged act is assayed with.
Same; Same; Same; Content-Based and Content-Neutral
Regulations; Standards of Review; When the speech restraints take
the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity.—When the
speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required
for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed
to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the
strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an in-
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
termediate approach—somewhere between the mere

rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling
interest standard applied to content-based restrictions. The test
is called intermediate because the Court will not merely
rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the
restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or
significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the
suppression of expression. The intermediate approach has been
formulated in this manner: A governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact,
and only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.—On the other hand, a governmental action

that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content
is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and
invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the government can
overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be
struck down.
Same; Same; Same; Press and Broadcast Media Dichotomy;
Reasons; The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces
its origins in the United States—there, broadcast radio and
television have been held to have limited First Amendment
protection, and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from
the application of the “strict scrutiny” standard that they would
otherwise apply to contentbased restrictions; The three major
reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are:
(a) the scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates
[i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be
limitless]; (b) its “pervasiveness” as a medium; and (c) its unique
accessibility to children.—The regimes
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
presently in place for each type of media differ from one

other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books,
newspapers, magazines and traditional printed matter,
broadcasting, film and video have been subjected to regulatory
schemes. The dichotomy between print and broadcast media
traces its origins in the United States. There, broadcast radio and
television have been held to have limited First Amendment
protection, and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from
the application of the “strict scrutiny” standard that they would
otherwise apply to content-based restrictions. According to U.S.
Courts, the three major reasons why broadcast media stands
apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies by
which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited
while print medium may be limitless]; (b) its “pervasiveness” as a
medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children. Because cases
involving broadcast media need not follow “precisely the same
approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media,” nor go
“so far as to demand that such regulations serve ‘compelling’
government interests,” they are decided on whether the
“governmental restriction” is narrowly tailored to further

a substantial governmental interest,” or the intermediate
test.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While Philippine jurisprudence
has also echoed a differentiation in treatment between broadcast
and print media, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast
media will show that—as we have deviated with the American
conception of the Bill of Rights—we likewise did not adopt en
masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast
media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based
prior restraints.—As pointed out by respondents, Philippine
jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in treatment
between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a review of
Philippine case law on broadcast media will show that—as
we have deviated with the American conception of the Bill
of Rights—we likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S.
conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media,
particularly as to which test would govern content-based
prior restraints. Our cases show two distinct features of this
dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is in
the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not
imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to
unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and
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inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government interest

that also has constitutional protection, such as national security
or the electoral process. Second, regardless of the regulatory
schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has
consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to
content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction
as to traditional print or broadcast media.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cable Television; Digital
Technology; While historically, the scarcity of frequencies was
thought to provide a rationale, cable and satellite television have
enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels
—digital technology will further increase the number of channels
available; Modern developments show a need for a reexamination
of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast
media regulation.—Parenthetically, these justifications are now
the subject of debate. Historically, the scarcity of frequencies
was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and satellite

television have enormously increased the number of actual and
potential channels. Digital technology will further increase the
number of channels available. But still, the argument persists
that broadcasting is the most influential means of
communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is
spent watching television. Since it has a unique impact on people
and affects children in a way that the print media normally does
not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve
pluralism. It has been argued further that a significant main
threat to free expression—in terms of diversity—comes not from
government, but from private corporate bodies. These
developments show a need for a reexamination of the traditional
notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Internet; The emergence of
digital technology—which has led to the convergence of
broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry—
has likewise led to the question of whether the regulatory model for
broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment; Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated,
yet the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, and
the rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally
to the Internet.—The emergence of digital technology—which has
led to the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and
the computer industry—has likewise
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
led to the question of whether the regulatory model for

broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment.Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated,
yet the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, and
the rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally
to the Internet. Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative
bodies and the government agencies regulating media must agree
to regulate both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory
framework and rationale to justify the differential treatment.
Same; Same; Same; Privacy of Communications; Anti-
Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200); Garci Tapes; Given all the
unsettled facets of the Garci tape, it is even arguable whether its
airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.—This outlines the
procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells
out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden
of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the
quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the
case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these
acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to
hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the
great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a
tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law.
The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and
confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of
the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is
also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two
versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other,
an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on
the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of
the wiretappers, the manner of its commission and other related
and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Not every violation of
a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press—the totality of the injurious effects of the violation
to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the
preferred
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status accorded by the Constitution and by related international

covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press; The need
to prevent the violation of laws cannot per se trump the exercise of
free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead
to greater evils.—We rule that not every violation of a law will
justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and
doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if
violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort
but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great
significance but their violation, by itself and without more,
cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine,
violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which

should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of
speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of
the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in
light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by
related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and
of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement
of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance
with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be
misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means,
violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for
they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to
prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of
free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach
can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test,
the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of
the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not decisive that
the press statements made by Secretary of Justice and the National
Telecommunications Commission were not reduced in or followed
up with formal orders or circulars—it is sufficient that the press
statements were made by them while in the exercise of their official
functions; Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on
behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the
rule on prior restraint—the concept of an “act” does not limit itself
to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.—
This is not all the
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faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of

whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice
and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In
resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the
press statements made by respondents were not reduced
in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his
statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its

statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such
as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in
an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to
acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The
press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as
they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the
right to free speech and press.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Chilling Effect
Principle; There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the
complained acts on record—the warnings given to media came
from no less the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC),
a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of
the radio and broadcast media, and they also came from the
Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the
awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the
laws of the land.—There is enough evidence of chilling effect of
the complained acts on record. The warnings given to media
came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel
the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media.
They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the
Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those
perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the
warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an
ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner
Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech
and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some
media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of
misinterpretation.
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Same; Judicial Review; In cases where the challenged acts are

patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, the Court
should be swift in striking them down as nullities per se—a blow
too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.—The
constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional
acts should always be exercised with care and in light of the
distinct facts of each case. For there are no hard and fast rules
when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits
and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone. Issues

revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case
basis, always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each
case. But in cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions
of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in
striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck
for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring Opinion:
Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint;

Garci Tapes; The threat of suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorization hurled against radio
and television stations should they air the Garci Tape is definitely
a form of prior restraint.—The threat of suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorization hurled against radio and television stations
should they air the Garci Tape is definitely a form of prior
restraint. The license or authorization is the life of every media
station. If withheld from them, their very existence is lost. Surely,
no threat could be more discouraging to them than the suspension
or revocation of their licenses. In Far Eastern Broadcasting v.
Dans, 137 SCRA 628 (1985), while the need for licensing was
rightly defended, the defense was for the purpose, not of
regulation of broadcast content, but for the proper allocation
of airwaves. In the present case, what the NTC intends to
regulate are the contents of the Garci Tapes—the alleged taped
conversation involving the President of the Philippines and a
Commissioner of the Commission on Election. The reason given is
that it is a “false information or willful misrepresentation.” As
aptly stated by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio that “the NTC
action in restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-
based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the
Garci Tapes.”
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Same; Same; Same; Same; Content-Based Regulations;

History teaches us that licensing has been one of the most potent
tools of censorship; Clearly, content-based prior restraint is highly
abhorred in every jurisdiction.—History teaches us that licensing
has been one of the most potent tools of censorship. This powerful
bureaucratic system of censorship in Medieval Europe was the
target of John Milton’s speech Areopagita to the Parliament of
England in 1644. Under the Licensing Act of 1643, all printing

presses and printers were licensed and nothing could be published
without the prior approval of the State or the Church Authorities.
Milton vigorously opposed it on the ground of freedom of the
press. His strong advocacy led to its collapse in 1695. In the U.S.,
the first encounter with a law imposing a prior restraint is in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Here, the majority voided
the law authorizing the permanent enjoining of future violations
by any newspaper or periodical if found to have published or
circulated an “obscene, lewd and lascivious” or “malicious,
scandalous and defamatory” issue. While the dissenters
maintained that the injunction constituted no prior restraint,
inasmuch as that doctrine applied to prohibitions of publication
without advance approval of an executive official, the majority
deemed the difference of no consequence, since in order to avoid a
contempt citation, the newspaper would have to clear future
publications in advance with the judge. In other similar cases, the
doctrine of prior restraint was frowned upon by the U.S. Court as
it struck down loosely drawn statutes and ordinances requiring
licenses to hold meetings and parades and to distribute literature,
with uncontrolled discretion in the licensor whether or not to
issue them, and as it voided other restrictions on First
Amendment rights. Then there came the doctrine that prior
licensing or permit systems were held to be constitutionally valid
so long as the discretion of the issuing official is limited to
questions of times, places and manners. And in New York Times
Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713. (1971), the same Court,
applying the doctrine of prior restraint from Near, considered the
claims that the publication of the Pentagon Papers concerning the
Vietnam War would interfere with foreign policy and prolong the
war too speculative. It held that such claim could not overcome
the strong presumption against prior restraints. Clearly,
content-based prior restraint is highly abhorred in every
jurisdiction.
455
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Any action of the

government by means of which it might prevent free and general
discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as
citizens.—Another objectionable portion of the NTC’s Press
Release is the warning that it will not hesitate to apply with
full force the provisions of the Circulars and their
accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television

stations and their owners/operators. This is a threat of a
subsequent punishment, an equally abhorred form of censorship.
This should not also be countenanced. It must be stressed that the
evils to be prevented are not the censorship of the press merely,
but any action of the government by means of which it
might prevent such free and general discussion of public
matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.
There is logic in the proposition that the liberty of the press will
be rendered a “mockery and a delusion” if, while every man is
at liberty to publish what he pleases, the public authorities might
nevertheless punish him for harmless publications. In this regard,
the fear of subsequent punishment has the same effect as that of
prior restraint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To prevent the airing of the
Garci Tapes on the premise that their contents may or may not be
true is not a valid reason for its suppression.—To prevent the
airing of the Garci Tapes on the premise that their contents may
or may not be true is not a valid reason for its suppression. In
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Justice William
Brennan, Jr. states that the authoritative interpretation of the
First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to
recognize an exception for any test of truth—whether
administered by judges, jurists, or administrative officials—and
especially not one that puts the burden of proving truth on the
speaker. He stressed that “the constitutional protection does
not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the
ideas and belief which are offered.” Moreover, the fact that
the tapes were obtained through violation of the AntiWiretapping
Law does not make the broadcast media privy to the crime. It
must be stressed that it was a government official who
initially released the Garci Tapes, not the media.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Information;
Suffrage; The right of the people to know matters pertaining to the
integ-
456
Chavez vs. Gonzales
rity of the election process is of paramount importance—election is

a sacred instrument of democracy.—The right of the people to
know matters pertaining to the integrity of the election
process is of paramount importance. It cannot be sideswiped

by the mere speculation that a public disturbance will ensue.
Election is a sacred instrument of democracy. Through it,
we choose the people who will govern us. We entrust to
them our businesses, our welfare, our children, our lives.
Certainly, each one of us is entitled to know how it was conducted.
What could be more disheartening than to learn that there exists
a tape containing conversations that compromised the integrity of
the election process. The doubt will forever hang over our heads,
doubting whether those who sit in government are legitimate
officials. In matters such as these, leaving the people in darkness
is not an alternative course. People ought to know the truth. Yes,
the airing of the Garci Tapes may have serious impact, but this is
not a valid basis for suppressing it. As Justice Douglas explained
in his concurring opinion in the New York Times, “the dominant
purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of
embarrassing information. A debate of large proportions
goes in the nation over our posture in Vietnam. Open
debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our
national health.”
Same; Same; Same; The struggle for freedom of expression is
as ancient as the history of censorship—from the ancient time
when Socrates was poisoned for his unorthodox views to the more
recent Martial Law Regime in our country, the lesson learned is
that censorship is the biggest obstacle to human progress.—Burke
once called the Press the Fourth Estate in the Parliament. This is
because its ability to influence public opinion made it an
important source in the governance of a nation. It is considered
one of the foundations of a democratic society. One sign of its
importance is that when a tyrant takes over a country, his first
act is to muzzle the press. Courts should therefore be wary in
resolving cases that has implication on the freedom of the
press—to the end that the freedom will never be curtailed absent
a recognized and valid justification. In fine let it be said that the
struggle for freedom of expression is as ancient as the history of
censorship. From the ancient time when Socrates was poisoned
for his unorthodox views to the more recent Martial Law Regime
in our country, the lesson learned is that cen-
457
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 457
Chavez vs. Gonzales
sorship is the biggest obstacle to human progress. Let us not

repeat our sad history. Let us not be victims again now and in the
future.
CARPIO,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Freedom of Expression; Chilling Effect Principle; Judicial

Review; Locus Standi; Facial Challenges; When the issue involves
freedom of expression, any citizen has the right to bring suit to
question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of
freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is
directed at such citizen—the government action may chill into
silence those to whom the action is directed.—Petitioner has
standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of
expression, as in the present case, any citizen has the right to
bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action
in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the
government action is directed at such citizen. The government
action may chill into silence those to whom the action is directed.
Any citizen must be allowed to take up the cudgels for those who
have been cowed into inaction because freedom of expression is a
vital public right that must be defended by everyone and anyone.
Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a
free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance
that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest
opportunity. We have held that any concerned citizen has
standing to raise an issue of transcendental importance to the
nation, and petitioner in this present petition raises such issue.
Same; Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to
the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights; Freedom
of expression provides a civilized way of engagement among
political, ideological, religious or ethnic opponents for if one cannot
use his tongue to argue, he might use his fist instead.—Freedom of
expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic
society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to the
exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. No society
can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of
expression. Freedom of expression guarantees full, spirited, and
even contentious discussion of all social, economic and political
issues. To survive, a free and democratic society must zealously
safeguard freedom of expression. Freedom of expression allows
citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates
for public office. Freedom of expression
458
Chavez vs. Gonzales
crystallizes important public policy issues, and allows citizens to

participate in the discussion and resolution of such issues.
Freedom of expression allows the competition of ideas, the clash of
claims and counterclaims, from which the truth will likely
emerge. Freedom of expression allows the airing of social
grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from
marginalized groups who otherwise would not be heard by
government. Freedom of expression provides a civilized way of
engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic
opponents for if one cannot use his tongue to argue, he might use
his fist instead.
Same; Prior Restraint; Content-Based Regulations; The
exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint,
apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression,
namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy
of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security—all
other expression is not subject to prior restraint; Expression not
subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value
expression, and any content-based prior restraint on protected
expression is unconstitutional without exception.—The exceptions,
when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this
jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely:
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All
other expression is not subject to prior restraint. As stated
in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication
Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), “[T]he First Amendment (Free
Speech Clause), subject only to narrow and well understood
exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the
content of messages expressed by private individuals.” Expression
not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-
value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on
protected expression is unconstitutional without exception.
A protected expression means what it says—it is absolutely
protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint
on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on
the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures,
or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.
Same; Same; While only unprotected expression may be
subject to prior restraint, any such prior restraint on unprotected
expression must hurdle a high barrier—first, such prior restraint
is presumed
459
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 459
Chavez vs. Gonzales
unconstitutional, and, second, the government bears a heavy

burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.—
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected
expression or low-value expression. By definition, prior restraint
on unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is
imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there
are currently only four categories of unprotected expression that
may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or
misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in
October 2007. Only unprotected expression may be subject to
prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on
unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such
prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the
government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality
of the prior restraint. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny any
government action imposing prior restraint on unprotected
expression. The government action will be sustained if there is a
compelling State interest, and prior restraint is necessary to
protect such State interest. In such a case, the prior restraint
shall be narrowly drawn—only to the extent necessary to
protect or attain the compelling State interest.
Same; Same; Subsequent Punishment; While there can be no
prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be
subject to subsequent punishment, either civilly or criminally;
Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior
restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent
punishment.—While there can be no prior restraint on protected
expression, such expression may be subject to subsequent
punishment, either civilly or criminally. Thus, the publication of
election surveys cannot be subject to prior restraint, but an
aggrieved person can sue for redress of injury if the survey turns
out to be fabricated. Also, while Article 201 (2)(b)(3) of the Revised
Penal Code punishing “shows which offend any race or religion”
cannot be used to justify prior restraint on religious expression,
this provision can be invoked to justify subsequent punishment of
the perpetrator of such offensive shows. Similarly, if the
unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same
expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly
or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected
expression. However, if the expression cannot be subject to the
lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically it cannot
also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint.

Thus,
460
Chavez vs. Gonzales
since profane language or “hate speech” against a religious

minority is not subject to subsequent punishment in this
jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.
Same; Same; Prior Restraint; Garci Tapes; Suffrage; The
public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because
it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of
unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction—it is
essentially a political expression because it exposes that a
presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with
a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the
last presidential elections; If ever there is a hierarchy of protected
expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank,
and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of
fair and honest elections would be at the top.—The public airing of
the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not
fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected
expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci
Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that
a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations
with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in
the last presidential elections. Obviously, the content of the Garci
Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public
discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected
expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public
discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the
highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves
the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected
expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank,
and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of
fair and honest elections would be at the top. In any event, public
discussion on all political issues should always remain
uninhibited, robust and wide open.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No.
4200); The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in
itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing of the
Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the
enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws,
curtailing freedom of expression.—The rule, which recognizes

no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior
restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the
NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts
determine that the sub-
461
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 461
Chavez vs. Gonzales
ject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security

of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there
is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the
Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the
tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged
violation of the AntiWiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to
impose a prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because
the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law,
and that includes antiwiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of
expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four
recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the
content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these
categories of unprotected expression.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Right to
Information; The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the
right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a matter
of important public concern—the Constitution guarantees the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern.—The
airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy
because the content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of important
public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any
person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file
a complaint for violation of the AntiWiretapping Law after the
commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful
defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; National
Telecommunications Commission; Unless ruled by the courts as a
valid prior restraint, government agencies cannot implement
outright such prior restraint because such restraint is presumed
unconstitutional at inception; As an agency that allocates
frequencies or airwaves, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) may regulate the bandwidth position,

transmitter wattage, and location of radio and television stations,
but not the content of the broadcasts.—The NTC has no power to
impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of
the NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship
power over radio and television stations. In the present case, the
airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never
be subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the
462
Chavez vs. Gonzales
sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes

unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to
adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of
the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to
prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint. Any order imposing
prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior
adjudication by the courts on whether the prior restraint is
constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the
presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected
expression. Unless ruled by the courts as a valid prior restraint,
government agencies cannot implement outright such prior
restraint because such restraint is presumed unconstitutional at
inception. As an agency that allocates frequencies or airwaves,
the NTC may regulate the bandwidth position, transmitter
wattage, and location of radio and television stations, but not the
content of the broadcasts. Such content-neutral prior restraint
may make operating radio and television stations more costly.
However, such content-neutral restraint does not restrict the
content of the broadcast.
AZCUNA,J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Freedom of Expression; Telecommunications Industry;

Chilling Effect Principle; The challenged National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and Department of
Justice (DOJ) warnings violate Sec. 10, Art. XVI of the
Constitution—the regulatory warnings involved in this case work
against a balanced flow of information in our communication
structures and do so without respecting freedom of speech by
casting a chilling effect on the media.—I vote to GRANT the
petition on the ground that the challenged NTC and DOJ
warnings violate Sec. 10, Art. XVI of the Constitution which

states: Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for
the full development of Filipino capability and the emergency of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of
the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and
across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the
freedom of speech and of the press. x x x The regulatory warnings
involved in this case work against a balanced flow of information
in our communication structures and do so without respecting
freedom of speech by casting a chilling effect on the media. This is
definitely not the policy environment contemplated by the
Constitution.
463
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 463

Chavez vs. Gonzales
TINGA,J., Separate Opinion (Dissenting and Concurring):

Garci Tapes; The assailed act of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC), contained in what is after all an
unenforceable Press Release, hardly constitutes “an immediate and
irreversible sanction”—the issuance does not prohibit the airing of
the Garci tapes or require that the broadcast station obtain
permission from the government or the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to air such tapes.—Yet
prior restraint “by contrast and by definition, has an immediate
and irreversible sanction.” The assailed act of the NTC, contained
in what is after all an unenforceable Press Release, hardly
constitutes “an immediate and irreversible sanction.” In fact, as
earlier noted, the Press Release does not say that it would
immediately sanction a broadcast station which airs the Garci
tapes. What it does say is that only “if it has been subsequently
established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a
prosecution or appropriate investigation” that the stations could
be subjected to possible suspension. It is evident that the issuance
does not prohibit the airing of the Garci tapes or require that the
broadcast stations obtain permission from the government or the
NTC to air such tapes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Still, without undertaking a
demonstration how the Press Release actually restrained free
expression, the majority surprisingly makes a leap of logic,
concluding as it does that such an informal act as a press
statement is covered by the prior restraint concept; Absent prior
restraint, no presumption of invalidity can arise.—The Press
Release does not fit into any of the acts described above in the
majority opinion. Neither can it be identified as an “official
government restriction” as it simply does not levy any actual
restriction on the subjects of NTC regulation. Still, without
undertaking a demonstration how the Press Release actually
restrained free expression, the majority surprisingly makes a leap
of logic, concluding as it does that such an informal act as a press
statement is covered by the prior restraint concept. As with
Justice Carpio, the majority does not precisely explain how the
Press Release could constitute an actual restraint, worded as it
was with nary a notion of restriction and given its lack “of an
immediate and irreversible sanction.” Absent prior restraint, no
presumption of invalidity can arise.
464
Chavez vs. Gonzales
Same; Same; Same; Chilling Effect Principle; A government

act that has a chilling effect on the exercise of free expression is an
infringement within the constitutional purview; If it can be said
that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication chills
speech, prior restraint freezes it at least for the time.—A
government act that has a chilling effect on the exercise of free
expression is an infringement within the constitutional purview.
As the liberal lion Justice William Brennan announced, in
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), “the threat of restraint,
as opposed to actual restraint itself, may deter the exercise
of the right to free expression almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions.” Such threat of restraint is
perhaps a more insidious, if not sophisticated, means for the State
to trample on free speech. Protected expression is chilled simply
by speaking softly while carrying a big stick. In distinguishing
chilling effect from prior restraint, Nebraska Press Association,
citing Bickel, observed, “[i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal
or civil sanctions after publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint
“freezes” it at least for the time.” An act of government that chills
expression is subject to nullification or injunction from the courts,
as it violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. “Because
government retaliation tends to chill an individual’s exercise of
his right to free expression, public officials may not, as a general
rule, respond to an individual’s protected activity with conduct or
speech even though that conduct or speech would otherwise be a
lawful exercise of public authority.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There appears to be no case in
American jurisprudence where a First Amendment claim went
forward in the absence of evidence that speech was actually

chilled.—On the one hand, Justice Carpio does not bother to
engage in any “chilling effect” analysis. On the other hand, the
majority does conclude that the acts of the NTC had a chilling
effect. Was there truly a chilling effect resulting from the Press
Release of the NTC? While the act or issuance itself may evince
the impression of a chilling effect, there still must be factual
evidence to support the conclusion that a particular act of
government actually engendered a chilling effect. There appears
to be no case in American jurisprudence where a First
Amendment claim went forward in the absence of
evidence that speech was actually chilled.
465
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 465
Chavez vs. Gonzales
Same; Same; Same; Same; It makes utter sense to impose even

a minimal evidentiary requirement before the Court can conclude
that a particular government action has had a chilling effect on
free speech—without an evidentiary standard, judges will be
forced to rely on intuition and even personal or political sentiments
as the basis for determining whether or not a chilling effect is
present.—It makes utter sense to impose even a minimal
evidentiary requirement before the Court can conclude that a
particular government action has had a chilling effect on free
speech. Without an evidentiary standard, judges will be forced to
rely on intuition and even personal or political sentiments as the
basis for determining whether or not a chilling effect is present.
That is a highly dangerous precedent, and one that clearly has not
been accepted in the United States. In fact, in Zieper v. Metzinger,
the U.S. District Court of New York found it relevant, in ruling
against the petitioner, that Zieper “has stated affirmatively that
his speech was not chilled in any way.” “Where a party can show
no change in his behavior, he has quite plainly shown no chilling
of his First Amendment right to free speech.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the employment of the “chilling
effect mode of analysis,” disregarding the actual effects would
mean dispensing with any evidentiary requirement for the
constitutional claim, a doctrine which does not bode well for the
Court’s future in constitutional adjudication, and one I expect that
will be significantly modified in due time.—The majority states
that “[t]here is enough evidence of chilling effect of the
complained acts of record,” alluding to “the warnings given to
media [which] came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency
that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and
broadcast media.” With due respect, I submit that what the record
establishes is merely the presence of the cause for chilling (the
Press Release), but not the actual chilling effect itself on the
broadcast media. In that respect, the Joint Statement of the NTC
and the KBP executed just three (3) days after the issuance of the
Press Release, becomes material. In the employment of the
“chilling effect mode of analysis,” disregarding the actual effects
would mean dispensing with any evidentiary requirement for the
constitutional claim. That is a doctrine which does not bode well
for the Court’s future in constitutional adjudication, and one I
expect that will be significantly modified in due time.
466
Chavez vs. Gonzales
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the unequivocal threats to

prosecute would-be-offenders, made no less by the head of the
principal law agency of the government charged with the
administration of the criminal justice system, that constitute the
violation of a fundamental freedom that in turn warrants this
Court’s intervention.—The majority and concurring opinions
hardly offer any rebuke to the DOJ Secretary even as they vote to
grant affirmative relief against his actions. This ensued, I
suspect, due to the undue focus placed on the arguments
concerning the NTC, even though the petition itself was not so
oriented. But for my part, it is the unequivocal threats to
prosecute would-be-offenders, made no less by the head of the
principal law agency of the government charged with the
administration of the criminal justice system, that constitute the
violation of a fundamental freedom that in turn warrants this
Court’s intervention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Quite clearly, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary did infringe on the right to free expression
by employing “the threat of restraint,” thus embodying
“government retaliation [that] tends to chill an individual’s
exercise of his right to free expression.”—Was there an actual
infringement of the right to free expression committed by the DOJ
Secretary? If so, how was such accomplished? Quite clearly, the
DOJ Secretary did infringe on the right to free expression by
employing “the threat of restraint,” thus embodying “government
retaliation [that] tends to chill an individual’s exercise of his right
to free expression.” The DOJ Secretary plainly and directly
threatened anyone in possession of the Garci tapes, or anyone
who aired or disseminated the same, with the extreme sanction of
criminal prosecution and possible imprisonment. He reiterated
the threats as he directed the NBI to investigate the airing of the

tapes. He even extended the warning of sanction to the Executive
Press Secretary. These threats were evidently designed to stop
the airing or dissemination of the Garci tapes—a protected
expression which cannot be enjoined by executive fiat.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary has yet to make operational his threats
does not dissuade from the conclusion that the threats alone
already chilled the atmosphere of free speech or expression.—
Tasked with undertaking the defense of the DOJ Secretary, the
OSG offered not even a ghost of a contest as soon as the bell for
the first round rang. In abject surrender, it squeezed in just one
paragraph in its 27-page
467
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 467
Chavez vs. Gonzales
Comment for that purpose. The arguments offered in that solitary

paragraph are meager. It avers that the media reports are
without probative value or, at best, inconclusive as the
declarations therein may have been quoted inaccurately or out of
context. Yet the OSG does not deny that the statements were
made, failing even to offer what may have been the “accurate
context.” The OSG also points out that the DOJ Secretary has not
actually “made any issuance, order or instruction to the NBI to go
after such media organizations.” Yet the fact that the DOJ
Secretary has yet to make operational his threats does not
dissuade from the conclusion that the threats alone already
chilled the atmosphere of free speech or expression.
VELASCO,JR.,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Chilling Effect Principle; With the view I take of the situation, the
very fact that the Kapisanan ng mga Brodcasters sa Pilipinas
(KBP) agreed to come up with the joint press statement that “NTC
did not issue any [Memorandum Circular] or order constituting a
restraint of press freedom or censorship” tends to prove, rather
than disprove, the threatening and chilling tone of its June 11,
2005 press release.—The facts on record are sufficient to support a
conclusion that the press release issued by NTC—with all the
unmistakable threat embodied in it of a possible cancellation of
licenses and/or the filing of criminal cases against erring media
owners and practitioners—constitutes a clear instance of prior
restraint. Not lost on this writer is the fact that five (5) days after
it made the press release in question, NTC proceeded to issue
jointly with the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas
(KBP) another press release to clarify that the earlier one issued
was not intended to limit or restrain press freedom. With the view
I take of the situation, the very fact that the KBP agreed to come
up with the joint press statement that “NTC did not issue any
[Memorandum Circular] or order constituting a restraint of press
freedom or censorship” tends to prove, rather than disprove, the
threatening and chilling tone of its June 11, 2005 press release. If
there was no prior restraint from the point of view of media, why
was there a need to hold a dialogue with KBP and then issue a
clarifying joint statement? Moreover, the fact that media owners,
operators, and practitioners appeared to have been frozen into
inaction, not making any visible effort to challenge the validity of
the NTC press statement, or at least join the petitioner in his
battle for press
468
Chavez vs. Gonzales
freedom, can only lead to the conclusion that the chilling effect of
the statement left them threatened.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There was no proof at all of the
possible chilling effect that the alleged statements of Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Gonzales had on the reporters and media
practitioners—the DOJ Secretary, as head of the prosecution arm
of the government and lead administrator of the criminal justice
system under the Administrative Code is, to be sure, impliedly
empowered to issue reminders and warnings against violations of
penal statutes; For the reason that it is unclear as to whether the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary exceeded his mandate
under the premises, the prior-restraint issue in the DOJ aspect of
the case is not yet ripe for adjudication.—While the Court has
several pieces of evidence to fall back on and judiciously resolve
the NTC press release issue, the situation is different with respect
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) warning issue. What is at
hand are mere allegations in the petition that, on June 8, 2005,
respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters in
possession of copies of the compact disc containing the alleged
“Garci” wiretapped conversation and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents that they could be held liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Act, adding that persons possessing or airing
said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest
by anybody who had personal knowledge of the crime committed

or in whose presence the crime was being committed. There was
no proof at all of the possible chilling effect that the alleged
statements of DOJ Secretary Gonzales had on the reporters and
media practitioners. The DOJ Secretary, as head of the
prosecution arm of the government and lead administrator of the
criminal justice system under the Administrative Code is, to be
sure, impliedly empowered to issue reminders and warnings
against violations of penal statutes. And it is a known fact that
Secretary Gonzales had issued, and still issues, such kind of
warnings. Whether or not he exceeded his mandate under
premises is unclear. It is for this main reason that I found the
prior-restraint issue in the DOJ aspect of the case not yet ripe for
adjudication.
CHICO-NAZARIO,J., Separate Opinion:

Chilling Effect Principle; Administrative Law; The reason escapes
me
469
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 469
Chavez vs. Gonzales
as to why a prohibition, when it was stated in the National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) Memorandum Circulars
and in the authorizations and permits, was valid and acceptable,
but when it was reiterated in a mere press statement released by
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), had become
a violation of the Constitution as a prior restraint on free speech.—
A scrutiny of the “fair warning” issued by the NTC on 11 June
2005 reveals that it is nothing more than that, a fair warning,
calling for sobriety, care, and circumspection in the news
reporting and current affairs coverage by radio and television
stations. It reminded the owners and operators of the radio
stations and television networks of the provisions in NTC
Memorandum Circulars No. 11-12-85 and 22-89, which are also
stated in the authorizations and permits granted to them by the
government, that they shall not use their stations for the
broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. It must be emphasized that the NTC is merely
reiterating the very same prohibition already contained in its
previous circulars, and even in the authorizations and permits of
radio and television stations. The reason thus escapes me as to
why said prohibition, when it was stated in the NTC

Memorandum Circulars and in the authorizations and permits,
was valid and acceptable, but when it was reiterated in a mere
press statement released by the NTC, had become a violation of
the Constitution as a prior restraint on free speech.
Same; Same; Same; Same; We should be judicious in giving
too much weight and credence to press statements—it would be a
dangerous precedent to rule that press statements should be
deemed an official act of the administrative agency or public
official concerned.—We should be judicious in giving too much
weight and credence to press statements. I believe that it would
be a dangerous precedent to rule that press statements should be
deemed an official act of the administrative agency or public
official concerned. Press statements, in general, can be easily
manufactured, prone to alteration or misinterpretation as they
are being reported by the media, and may, during some instances,
have to be made on the spot without giving the source much time
to discern the ramifications of his statements. Hence, they cannot
be given the same weight and binding effect of official acts in the
form of, say, memorandum orders or circulars.
470

Chavez vs. Gonzales
NACHURA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; When the issue concerns a

public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has
an interest in the execution of the laws.—Petitioner has standing
to file the instant petition. The test is whether the party has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. When suing as a
citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. When the
issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is
a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
Same; Moot and Academic Issues; It is unnecessary to indulge
in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.—The exercise by this Court
of the power of judicial inquiry is limited to the determination of
actual cases and controversies. An actual case or controversy

means an existing conflict that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, one that is not conjectural or anticipatory,
otherwise the decision of the court will amount to an advisory
opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions
since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a
case in which no practical relief can be granted. Indeed, it is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case
presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have
any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.
Same; Same; Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review Rule;
Courts shall decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition yet evasive of review.—In the instant case, it
is readily observable that the subsequent joint statement of the
respondent NTC and the Officers and Board of Directors of the
KBP after their June 14, 2005 dialogue not only substantially
diminished
471
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 471
Chavez vs. Gonzales
but, in fact, obliterated the effects of the earlier press warnings,

thus rendering the case moot and academic. Notably, the joint
press statement acknowledged that “NTC did not issue any
memorandum circular or order constituting a restraint of press
freedom or censorship.” A case becomes moot when its purpose has
become stale. Be that as it may, the Court should discuss and
resolve the fundamental issues raised herein, in observance of the
rule that courts shall decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition yet evasive of review.
Freedom of Expression; Prior Restraint; As an aspect of
freedom of expression, prior restraint should not be confused with
subsequent punishment; The doctrine of prior restraint originated
in the common law of England where prior restraints of the press
were not permitted, but punishment after publication was.—As an
aspect of freedom of expression, prior restraint should not be
confused with subsequent punishment. In Alexander v. U.S.,
petitioner’s complaint was that the RICO forfeiture provisions on
businesses dealing in expressive materials constituted “prior
restraint” because they may have an improper “chilling” effect on
free expression by deterring others from engaging in protected

speech. In rejecting the petitioner’s contention and ruling that the
forfeiture is a permissible criminal punishment and not a prior
restraint on speech, the U.S. Supreme Court said: The term prior
restraint is used “to describe administrative and judicial orders
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the
time that such communications are to occur.” Temporary
restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders
that actually forbid speech activities—are classic examples of
prior restraints. x x x x Finally, petitioner’s proposed definition of
the term “prior restraint” would undermine the time-honored
distinction between barring speech in the future and penalizing
past speech. The doctrine of prior restraint originated in the
common law of England where prior restraints of the press were
not permitted, but punishment after publication was. This very
limited application of the principle of freedom of speech was held
inconsistent with our First Amendment as long ago as Grosjean v.
American Press Co. While we may have given a broader definition
to the term “prior restraint” than was given to it in English
common law, our decisions have steadfastly preserved the
distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments.
Though petitioner tries to dismiss this distinction as “neither
meaningful nor useful,” we think it is critical
472
Chavez vs. Gonzales
to our First Amendment jurisprudence. Because we have

interpreted the First Amendment as providing greater protection
from prior restraints than from subsequent punishments, it is
important for us to delineate with some precision the defining
characteristics of a prior restraint. To hold that the forfeiture
order in this case constituted a prior restraint would have the
exact opposite effect. It would blur the line separating prior
restraints from subsequent punishments to such a degree that it
would be impossible to determine with any certainty whether a
particular measure is a prior restraint or not.
Same; Same; Freedom of the Press; Chilling Effect; Warnings
on possible license revocation and criminal prosecution are simply
what they are, mere warnings—they have no compulsive effect, as
they do not impose a limit on speech or other forms of expression
nor do they prevent the expression of a message.—There is no
parity between these cases and the case at bench. Unlike the
government acts in the above-cited cases, what we have before us
now is merely a press release—not an order or a circular—

warning broadcast media on the airing of an alleged taped
conversation, with the caveat that should its falsity be
subsequently established, the act could lead to the revocation or
cancellation of their licenses, after appropriate investigation. The
warnings on possible license revocation and criminal prosecution
are simply what they are, mere warnings. They have no
compulsive effect, as they do not impose a limit on speech or other
forms of expression nor do they prevent the expression of a
message.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. No.
4200); Conviction under the law should fittingly be a just cause for
the revocation of the license of the erring radio or television station.
—The Anti-Wiretapping Law (Republic Act 4200) is a penal
statute. Over the years, no successful challenge to its validity has
been sustained. Conviction under the law should fittingly be a
just cause for the revocation of the license of the erring radio or
television station.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

473
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 473

Chavez vs. Gonzales
PUNO, C.J.:
A. Precis
In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the

press is crucial and so inextricably woven into the right to
free speech and free expression, that any attempt to
restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that
only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to
curtail it. Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to
uphold this cherished freedom. We have struck down laws
and issuances1
meant to curtail this right,
2
as in Adiong v.
COMELEC, Burgos v.3 Chief of Staff, Social Weather
Stations4 v. COMELEC, and Bayan v. Executive Secretary
Ermita. When on its face, it is clear that a governmental
act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free
exercise of speech, it must be nullified.
B. The Facts
1. The case originates from events that occurred a year

after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5,
2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
opposition was planning to destabilize the administration
by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation
allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation
5
was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Later, in a
Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two
versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version,
and the other, a
_______________
1 G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.

2 218 Phil. 754; 133 SCRA 800 (1984).
3 G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496.
4 G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226.
5 Rollo, pp. 6-7 (citing the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), June 7,
2005, pp. A1, A18; PDI, June 14, 2005, p. A1); and p. 58.
474

Chavez vs. Gonzales
spliced, “doctored” or altered version, which would suggest

that the President had instructed the COMELEC official6 to
manipulate the election results in the President’s favor. It
seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was
that of President
7
Arroyo, but subsequently made a
retraction.
2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President
Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released
an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap.
Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the
President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo,
COMELEC 8
Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator
Barbers.
3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice
(DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that
those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included

Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had
personal knowledge if the crime 9 was committed or was
being committed in their presence.
4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary
Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to go after media organizations “found to have caused
the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the
President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.
Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a
joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature
of the Internet me-
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 7-8 (citing the Manila Standard, June 10, 2005, p. A2); and
58.
7 Id., at pp. 7-8 and 59.
8 Id.
9 Id., at pp. 8-9 and 59.
475
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 475

Chavez vs. Gonzales
dium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the tape

more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting
the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe,
and supposedly declared, “I [have] asked the 10
NBI to
conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned.”
11
5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release:
NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION

OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING
LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM
STANDARDS
x x x x x x x x x
Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and
in order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns
all radio stations and television network owners/operators that
the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by
Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use
[their] stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false

information or willful misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has
come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are
in possession of alleged taped conversations which they claim
involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of
the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of election laws.
These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations
are products of illegal wiretapping operations.
Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly
authenticated nor could it be said at this time that the tapes
contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was
recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the
continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by
radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority
and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and television
stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes
are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate
investigation, the concerned radio and television
_______________
10 Id., at p. 9.
11 Id., at pp. 10-12, 43-44, 60-62.
476

Chavez vs. Gonzales
companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of

such false information and/or willful misrepresentation
shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the
said companies.
In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent
NTC circulars on program standards to be observed by radio and
television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85
explicitly states, among others, that “all radio broadcasting and
television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off
from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other matters being
broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false
information or such other willful misrepresentation, or to propose
and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition.” The foregoing
directive had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No.
22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited radio, broadcasting
and television stations from using their stations to broadcast or
telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false
information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging

or assisting in subversive or treasonable acts.
The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the
requirements of due process, to apply with full force the
provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying
sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their
owners/operators.
6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board

of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa
Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the
press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to
information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a12 Joint
Press Statement which states, among others, that:
• NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press

and the right to information on matters of public concern.
KBP & its members have always been committed to the
exercise
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 62-63, 86-87.
477
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 477

Chavez vs. Gonzales
of press freedom with high sense of responsibility and

discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.
• NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or
Order constituting a restraint of press freedom or
censorship. The NTC further denies and does not intend
to limit or restrict the interview of members of the
opposition or free expression of views.
• What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of
press freedom [be] done responsibly.
• KBP has program standards that KBP members will
observe in the treatment of news and public affairs
programs. These include verification of sources, non-
airing of materials that would constitute inciting to
sedition and/or rebellion.
• The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or
willful misrepresentation is made in the treatment of
news or commentaries.
• The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with

sensitivity and handled responsibly giving due
consideration to the process being undertaken to verify
and validate the authenticity and actual content of the
same.”
C. The Petition
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and
the NTC, “praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari
and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul
void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional 13and oppressive exercise of authority by
the respondents.”
Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of
the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of
the
_______________
13 Id., at p. 6.
478

Chavez vs. Gonzales
14
people to information on matters of public concern,
petitioner specifically asked this Court:
“[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of

respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the
present that curtail the public’s rights to freedom of expression
and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern
specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial
taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the
further commission of such15acts, and making of such issuances,
and orders by respondents.”
16
Respondents denied that the acts transgress the
Constitution, and questioned petitioner’s legal standing to
file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to
the validity of the “fair warning” issued by respondent
NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional
guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was
issued pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate the
17
17
telecommunications industry. It was also stressed that
“most of the [television] and radio stations continue, even
to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within 18
the
parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP.”
D. The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing
To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the

constitutional challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a
member
_______________
14 Respondents have “committed blatant violations of the freedom of

expression and of the press and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern enshrined in Article III, Sections 4 and 7 of the
1987 Constitution. Id., at p. 18. Petitioner also argued that respondent
NTC acted beyond its powers when it issued the press release of June 11,
2005. Id.
15 Id., at p. 6.
16 Through the Comment filed by the Solicitor-General. Id., at pp. 56-
83.
17 Id., at pp. 71-73.
18 Id., at pp. 74-75.
479
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 479

Chavez vs. Gonzales
of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts

and statements made by respondents as violations of the
right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For
another, the recipients of the press statements have not
come forward—neither intervening nor joining petitioner in
this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint
statement with respondent NTC that does not complain
about restraints on freedom of the press.
It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the
requisite legal standing, having failed to allege “such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely
depends for 19
illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”
But as early as half a century ago, we have already held
that where serious constitutional questions are involved,
“the transcendental importance to the public of these cases

demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, 20
brushing aside if we must, technicalities of procedure.”
Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently
refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and
_______________
19 The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being
challenged. The term “interest” is material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622, citing Joya vs.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, August
24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568. See Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910,
July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540, 562–563; and Agan v. PIATCO (Decision),
450 Phil. 744; 402 SCRA 612 (2003).
20 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949), cited in Osmeña v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.
480

Chavez vs. Gonzales
resolving serious21
legal questions that greatly impact on
public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the
1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other
branches of government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them.
Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on
locus standi when a case involves22
an issue of overarching
significance to our society, we therefore brush aside
technicalities
23
of procedure and take cognizance of this
petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most
exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of expression.The
petition raises other issues like the extent of the
right to information of the public. It is fundamental,
however, that we need not address all issues but
only the most decisive one which in the case at bar is
whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom
of speech and of the press.
But aside from the primordial issue of

determining whether free speech and freedom of the
press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives
this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence
of freedom of
_______________
21 See Agan v. PIATCO (Decision), 450 Phil. 744; 402 SCRA 612 (2003).
22 Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phil. 894; 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991,
194 SCRA 317; Guingona v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991, 196
SCRA 221; Osmeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199
SCRA 750; Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 274
Phil. 323; (1991); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February
14, 1992, 206 SCRA 290; Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, 400 Phil. 307; 346 SCRA 485 (2000).
23 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 274 Phil.
323; 197 SCRA 52 (1991), citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. L-81311, June 30, 1988,
163 SCRA 371.
481
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 481

Chavez vs. Gonzales
speech and of the press now beclouded by the

vagaries of motherhood statements; (2) to clarify the
types of speeches and their differing restraints
allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of
prior restraint, content-neutral and content-based
regulations and their constitutional standard of
review; (4) to examine the historical difference in the
treatment of restraints between print and broadcast
media and stress the standard of review governing
both; and (5) to call attention to the ongoing blurring
of the lines of distinction between print and
broadcast media.
E. Re-examining The law on freedom of speech, of

expression and of the press
No law shall be passed abridging the

freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition 24 the

government for redress of grievances.
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a

fundamental principle of every democratic government,
and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level
than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The
cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution, copied almost verbatim 25
from the First
Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights, were considered the
necessary consequence of 26republican institutions and the
complement of free speech. This
_______________
24 1987 PHIL.CONST. Art. III, §4.

25 U.S. Bill of Rights, First Amendment. (“Congress shall make no
law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”)
26 The First Amendment was so crafted because the founders of the
American government believed—as a matter of history and experience—
that the freedom to express personal opinions was
482

Chavez vs. Gonzales
preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the

international level, its recognition now enshrined in
international
27
law as a customary norm that binds all
nations.
In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem
accorded freedom of expression28
is a fundamental postulate
of our constitutional system. This right was elevated to
constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both
political and legal, that freedom of speech is an
indispensable
29
condition for nearly every other form of
freedom. Moreover, our history shows that the struggle to
protect the freedom of speech,
_______________
essential to a free government. See LARRY KRAMER,THE PEOPLE

THEMSELVES:POPULARCONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004).
27 Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights

(UDHR) states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Although the UDHR is
not binding as a treaty, many of its provisions have acquired binding
status on States and are now part of customary international law. Article
19 forms part of the UDHR principles that have been transformed into
binding norms. Moreover, many of the rights in the UDHR were included
in and elaborated on in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), a treaty ratified by over 150 States, including the
Philippines. The recognition of freedom of expression is also found in
regional human rights instruments, namely, the European Convention on
Human Rights (Article 10), the American Convention on Human Rights
(Article 10), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(Article 9).
28 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 492; 27 SCRA 835, 856 (1969).
29 Salonga v. Cruz-Pano, G.R. 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
458-459; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 489, 492-493; 27 SCRA 835,
856 (1969); Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 151-A Phil. 676-677; 51 SCRA 189 (1973);
National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992, 207
SCRA 1, 9; Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207
SCRA 712, 715.
483
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
expression and the press was, at bottom, the struggle for

the indispensable
30
preconditions for the exercise of other
freedoms. For it is only when the people have unbridled
access to information and the press that they will be
capable of rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-
quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free
and ignorant.
E.1. Abstraction of Free Speech

Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various
concepts that we have adopted as part and parcel 31
of our
own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom. What is
embraced under this provision was discussed exhaustively32
by the Court in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, in
which it was held:
“…At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be

no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless
there be a clear and present danger
33
of substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.”
_______________
30 Indeed, the struggle that attended the recognition of the value of free
expression was discussed by Justice Malcolm in the early case United
States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 739 (1918). Justice Malcolm generalized
that the freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was
unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. Despite the presence of
pamphlets and books early in the history of the Philippine Islands, the
freedom of speech was alien to those who were used to obeying the words
of barangay lords and, ultimately, the colonial monarchy. But ours was a
history of struggle for that specific right: to be able to express ourselves
especially in the governance of this country. Id.
31 Id.
32 137 Phil. 471, 492; 27 SCRA 835, 856-857 (1969).
33 Id.
484

Chavez vs. Gonzales
Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a

constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is
undeniable, whether as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring participation
by the people in social, including political, decision-making;
and of 34maintaining the balance between stability and
change. As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in
Philippine and American decisions was to recognize the
broadest scope and assure the widest latitude for this
constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate on35 public issue
should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.
Freedom of speech and of the press means something
more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or
economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate 36
of
opinion on any matter of public consequence. 37
When
atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right
belongs as well—if not more—to 38
those who question, who
do not conform, who differ. The ideas that may be
expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those

that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be
truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should
allow and even encourage the articulation of the
unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by
others; or though such view “induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction39with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger.” To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is
freedom
_______________
34 Id., at p. 493; p. 857, citing Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General

Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale Law Journal 877 (1963).
35 Id. citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949).
485
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
for the thought that40 we hate, no less than for the thought
that agrees with us.
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it
extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It
protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as
well as political causes, and is not confined to any
particular field of human interest. The protection covers
myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all
issues, about which information is needed or appropriate,
so as to enable members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection
assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and
free press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news,
or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution’s basic
guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to
the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a
majority.
The constitutional protection is not limited to the
exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech
extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as
well as instructive or informative. Specifically, 41
in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, this Court
stated that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast,
are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on

freedom of speech and of expression.
While all forms of communication are entitled to the
broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the
freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
to newspapers and other print media, as will be
subsequently discussed.
_______________
40 Id. citing U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 655 (1929).

41 G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 628.
486

Chavez vs. Gonzales
E.2. Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech

From the language of the specific constitutional provision,
it would appear that the right to free speech and a free
press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities
of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation
of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would
abridge such42
freedom. For freedom of expression is not an
absolute, nor is it an “unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language and prevents
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.”
Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some
types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the
State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may
not be injurious to the equal
43
right of others or those of the
community or society. The difference in treatment is
expected because the relevant interests of one type of
speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of
another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore
been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the
permissible
44
scope of restrictions on various categories of
speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our
jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as
well as “fighting words” are not45entitled to constitutional
protection and may be penalized.
_______________
42 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 494; 27 SCRA 835, 858 (1969).
43 HECTORS.DELEON,IPHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONAL
LAW:PRINCIPLES AND CASES 485 (2003) [Hereinafter
DELEON,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
44 See JOHN E. NOWAK &RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16.1, 1131 (7th ed. 2000 [Hereinafter NOWAK
&ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
45 DELEON,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at p. 485. Laws have also
limited the freedom of speech and of the press, or otherwise affected the
media and freedom of expression. The Constitution itself imposes certain
limits (such as Article IX on the Commission on Elections, and Article XVI
prohibiting foreign media ownership); as do the
487
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions

on speech (overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been
applied differently
46
to each category, either consciously or
unconsciously. A study of free speech jurisprudence—
whether here or abroad—will reveal that courts have
developed different tests as to specific types or categories of
speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech;
obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of
the traditional print media; libelous speech; speech
affecting associational rights; speech before hostile
audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects the right to
a fair trial; and
47
speech associated with rights of assembly
and petition.
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and
expression are evaluated by either or a combination of
three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine
which permits limitations on speech once a rational
connection has been established between 48 the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a
_______________
Revised Penal Code (with provisions on national security, libel and

obscenity), the Civil Code (which contains two articles on privacy), the
Rules of Court (on the fair administration of justice and contempt) and
certain presidential decrees. There is also a “shield law,” or Republic Act
No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477. Section 1 of this law
provides protection for non-disclosure of sources of information, without
prejudice to one’s liability under civil and criminal laws. The publisher,
editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of a newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source

of any information or news report appearing in said publication, if the
information was released in confidence to such publisher, editor or
reporter unless the court or a Committee of Congress finds that such
revelation is demanded by the security of the state.
46 See NOWAK &ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16.1, 1131
(7th ed. 2000).
47 Id.
48 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957); Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471; 27 SCRA 835 (1969). See People v. Perez,
488

Chavez vs. Gonzales
standard when courts need to balance conflicting social

values and individual interests, and requires a conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
49
observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c)
the clear and present danger rule which rests on the
premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an
evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, “extremely
50
serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.”
As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied
either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and
present danger test to resolve free speech challenges.
More recently, we have concluded that we have51 generally
adhered to the clear and present danger test.
E.3. In Focus: Freedom of the Press

Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press
freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and
expression. Its practical importance, though, is more easily
grasped. It is the chief source of information on current
affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful
vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument
by which citizens keep their government informed of their
needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It is the
sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government
responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the
mistakes of every admini-
_______________
4 Phil. 599 (1905); People v. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455 (1933); People v.

Feleo, 57 Phil. 451 (1933).
49 This test was used by J. Ruiz-Castro in his Separate Opinion in
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 532-537; 27 SCRA 835, 899-902
(1969).
50 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957).
51 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794; 323
SCRA 811, 825 (2000).
489
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
stration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed.

52
As
Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government

demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of
clear conscience.
Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the

press deserving of extra protection. Indeed, the press
benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions of
writers are classified as intellectual and proprietary.
Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the
press or to maintain a periodical publication are liable for
damages, be they private individuals or public officials.
E.4. Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint,

ContentNeutral and Content-Based Regulations
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under
the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of
freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior
restraint; (2)
53
freedom from punishment subsequent to
publication; (3)
_______________
52 See U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

53 The aspect of freedom from liability subsequent to publication
precludes liability for completed publications of views traditionally held
innocent. Otherwise, the prohibition on prior restraint would be
meaningless, as the unrestrained threat of subsequent punishment, by
itself, would be an effective prior restraint. Thus, opinions on public issues

cannot be punished when published, merely because the opinions are
novel or controversial, or because they clash with current doctrines. This
fact does not imply that publishers and editors are never liable for what
they print. Such freedom gives no immunity from laws punishing
scandalous or obscene matter, seditious or disloyal writings, and libelous
or insulting
490

Chavez vs. Gonzales
54
freedom of 55access to information; and (4) freedom of
circulation.
_______________
words. As classically expressed, the freedom of the press embraces at

the very least the freedom to discuss truthfully and publicly matters of
public concern, without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment. For discussion to be innocent, it must be truthful, must
concern something in which people in general take a healthy interest, and
must not endanger some important social end that the government by law
protects. See JOAQUING.BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:ACOMMENTARY, 225 (2003
ed.).
54 Freedom of access to information regarding matters of public
interest is kept real in several ways. Official papers, reports and
documents, unless held confidential and secret by competent authority in
the public interest, are public records. As such, they are open and subject
to reasonable regulation, to the scrutiny of the inquiring reporter or
editor. Information obtained confidentially may be printed without
specification of the source; and that source is closed to official inquiry,
unless the revelation is deemed by the courts, or by a House or committee
of Congress, to be vital to the security of the State. Id.
55 Freedom of circulation refers to the unhampered distribution of
newspapers and other media among customers and among the general
public. It may be interfered with in several ways. The most important of
these is censorship. Other ways include requiring a permit or license for
the distribution of media and penalizing dissemination of copies made
without it;55 and requiring the payment of a fee or tax, imposed either on
the publisher or on the distributor, with the intent to limit or restrict
circulation. These modes of interfering with the freedom to circulate have
been constantly stricken down as unreasonable limitations on press
freedom. Thus, imposing a license tax measured by gross receipts for the
privilege of engaging in the business of advertising in any newspaper,or
charging license fees for the privilege of selling religious books are
impermissible restraints on the freedom of expression. Id. citing Grosjean

v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943), and American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil.
386 (1957). It has been held, however, even in the Philippines, that
publishers and distributors of newspapers and allied media
491
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents’

press statement constitutes a form of impermissible prior
restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order, as
well as its sub-specie of content-based (as distinguished
from content-neutral) regulations.
At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this
case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints. This
presents a unique tinge to the present challenge,
considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving
prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether
the governmental act or issuance actually constituted
prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always
about whether the restraint was justified by the
Constitution.
Be that as it may, the determination in every case of
whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom
of speech has always been based on the circumstances of
each case, including the nature of the restraint. And in its
application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of
this principle have been etched on a case-to-case
basis, always tested by scrutinizing the
governmental issuance or act against the
circumstances in which they operate, and then
determining the appropriate test with which to
evaluate.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression
56
in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom
from prior restraint is largely freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the form of
executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required
approval of a proposal to publish; licensing
_______________
cannot complain when required to pay ordinary taxes such as the sales
tax. The exaction is valid only when the obvious and immediate effect is to
restrict oppressively the distribution of printed matter.
56 Id.,at p. 225.
492

Chavez vs. Gonzales
or permits as prerequisites to publication including the

payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and
even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of
the business and printing offices of certain newspapers,
resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and
publication,57 are deemed as previous restraint or
censorship. Any law or official that requires some form of
permission to be had before publication can be made,
commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and
remedy can be had at the courts.
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is
the hostility against all prior restraints on speech,
58
and any
act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, and “any
act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption59 of
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,” it
is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted
by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful
evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate
test by which it should be measured against.
Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the
challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on
freedom of
_______________
57 Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 218 Phil. 754; 133 SCRA 800 (1984).
58 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471; 27 SCRA 835 (1969); ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 795; 323 SCRA 811,
825-826 (2000) (“Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the
freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption.”);
Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357
SCRA 496 (“[A]ny system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy
burden against its constitutionality. It is the government which must
show justification for enforcement of the restraint.”). See also Iglesia ni
Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893; 259 SCRA 529 (1996) (religious
speech falls within the protection of free speech).
59 Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893, 928; 259 SCRA
529, 544 (1996), citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931); Bantam
Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963); New York Times v. United
States, 403 US 713 (1971).
493
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint

is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the
60
time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based
61
on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the
restriction determines the test by which the challenged act
is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a
contentneutral regulation, only a substantial
62
governmental interest is required for its validity. Because
regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any
particular message, they are not subject to the strictest
form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach—
somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of
any other law and the
_______________
60 See J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 210 Phil. 457; 125 SCRA 553 (1983),
Navarro v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 730;
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956); Primicias v. Fugosa, 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
61 Determining if a restriction is content-based is not always obvious. A
regulation may be content-neutral on its face but partakes of a content-
based restriction in its application, as when it can be shown that the
government only enforces the restraint as to prohibit one type of content
or viewpoint. In this case, the restriction will be treated as a content-
based regulation. The most important part of the time, place, or manner
standard is the requirement that the regulation be content-neutral both
as written and applied. See NOWAK&ROTUNDA,CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §16.1, 1133 (7th ed. 2000).
62 See Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718; 288 SCRA 447, 477
(1998). The Court looked to Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103456, March
31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, which had cited a U.S. doctrine, viz. “A
governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is

unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”
494

Chavez vs. Gonzales
compelling 63interest standard applied to content-based

restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the
Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but
also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to
promote an important or significant governmental interest
that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The
intermediate approach has been formulated in this
manner:
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within

the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of
speech & expression] is no 64
greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts

freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and
invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and65
present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
_______________
63 NOWAK&ROTUNDA,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16.1, 1133 (7th ed.

2000). This was also called a “deferential standard of review” in Osmeña v.
COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718; 288 SCRA 447, 478 (1998). It was
explained that the clear and present danger rule is not a sovereign
remedy for all free speech problems, and its application to content-neutral
regulations would be tantamount to “using a sledgehammer to drive a nail
when a regular hammer is all that is needed.” Id., at p. 478.
64 Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 717; 288 SCRA 447, 476, citing
Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712. It
was noted that the test was actually formulated in United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which was deemed appropriate for
restrictions on speech which are content-neutral.
65 Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893; 259 SCRA 529
(1996). In this case, it was found that the act of respondent Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Television of rating a TV
495
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, 66

the content-based restraint will be struck down.
With respect to content-based restrictions, the
government must also show the type of harm the speech
sought to be restrained would bring about—especially the
gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm—
otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint
on speech based on its content cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive and
imminent 67
evil that has taken the life of a reality already on
ground.” As formulated, “the question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right68 to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.”
The regulation which restricts the speech content must
also serve an important or substantial government
interest, which
69
is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.
_______________
program with “X”—on the ground that it “offend[s] and constitute[s] an

attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law”—was
a form of prior restraint and required the application of the clear and
present danger rule.
(1996); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471; 27 SCRA 835 (1969); ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780; 323 SCRA 811
(2000); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5,
2001, 357 SCRA 496.
(1996).
68 Schenke v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (19191), cited in Cabansag
v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957); and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794; 323 SCRA 811, 825 (2000).
69 Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA
712, cited in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780,
795; 323 SCRA 811, 826 (2000).
496

Chavez vs. Gonzales
Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no

greater than
70
what is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses
more than what is required 71to satisfy the governmental
interest will be invalidated. The regulation, therefore,
must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the
regulatory 72
purpose, with the least restrictive means
undertaken.
Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a
contentneutral regulation, it is subjected to an 73
intermediate review. A content-based regulation,
however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule.
The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified
by a compelling reason, and74 the restrictions imposed are
neither overbroad nor vague.
Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged
acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear
and pre-
_______________
70 See Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207
SCRA 712, and Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471; 27 SCRA 835
(1969), cited in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil.
780, 795; 323 SCRA 811, 826 (2000).
71 See Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207
SCRA 712.
72 See Osmeña v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692; 288 SCRA 447 (1998).
73 Parenthetically, there are two types of content-based restrictions.
First, the government may be totally banning some type of speech for
content (total ban). Second, the government may be requiring individuals
who wish to put forth certain types of speech to certain times or places so
that the type of speech does not adversely affect its environment.See
NOWAK&ROTUNDA,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16.1, 1131 (7th
ed.2000). Both types of conten-based regulations are subject to strict
scrutiny and the clear and present danger rule.
(1996); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471; 27 SCRA 835 (1969); ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780; 323 SCRA 811
(2000); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5,
2001, 357 SCRA 496.
497
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
sent danger rule, as they are content-based

restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but
one object—a specific content—fixed as these were on the
alleged taped conversations between the President and a
COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely
provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the
dissemination of speech or expression.
E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

Finally, comes respondents’ argument that the challenged
act is valid on the ground that broadcast media enjoys free
speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print media.
We next explore and test the validity of this argument,
insofar as it has been invoked to validate a content-based
restriction on broadcast media.
The regimes presently in place for each type of
media differ from one other. Contrasted with the
regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and
traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video
have been subjected to regulatory schemes.
The dichotomy between print and broadcast media
traces its origins in the United States. There, broadcast
radio and television have75
been held to have limited First
Amendment protection, and U.S. Courts have excluded
broadcast media from the application of the “strict
scrutiny” standard that
_______________
75 This is based on a finding that “broadcast regulation involves unique

considerations,” and that “differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.”
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Federal Communications Commission [FCC], 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1969). See generally National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (noting that the public interest standard
denoted to the FCC is an expansive power).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
76
they would otherwise apply to content-based restrictions.
According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why
broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the
scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates
[i.e., airwaves are 77physically limited while print medium
may be limitless]; (b) its “pervasiveness”78 as a medium;
and (c) its unique accessibility to children. Because cases
involving
_______________
76 See Federal Communications Commission [FCC] v. Pacifica

Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115 (1989); and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 521 U.S.
844, 874 (1997). In these cases, U.S. courts disregarded the argument that
the offended listener or viewer could simply turn the dial and avoid the
unwanted broadcast [thereby putting print and broadcast media in the
same footing], reasoning that because the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot protect the listener from
unexpected program content.
77 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Red Lion
involved the application of the fairness doctrine and whether someone
personally attacked had the right to respond on the broadcast medium
within the purview of FCC regulation. The court sustained the regulation.
The Court in Red Lion reasoned that because there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies available,
this “scarcity of the spectrum” necessitates a stricter standard for
broadcast media, as opposed to newspapers and magazines. See generally
National Broadcasting v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (noting
that the public interest standard denoted to the FCC is an expansive
power).
78 See Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989);
and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 521 U.S. 844, 874
(1997). In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, involving an FCC decision to
require broadcasters to channel indecent programming away from times of
the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience, the U.S. Court found that the broadcast medium was an
intrusive and pervasive one. In reaffirming that this medium should
receive the most limited of First Amendment protections, the U.S. Court
held that the rights of the public to avoid indecent speech trump those of
the broadcaster to disseminate such speech. The justifications for this

ruling were two
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
broadcast media need not follow “precisely the same

approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media,”
nor go “so far as to demand that79such regulations serve
‘compelling’ government interests,” they are decided on
whether the “governmental restriction” is narrowly
tailored 80to further a substantial governmental
interest,” or the intermediate test.
As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence
has also echoed a differentiation in treatment between
broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a review of
Philippine case law on broadcast media will show
that—as we have deviated with 81
the American
conception of the Bill of Rights —we likewise did
not adopt en masse the U.S. conception of free speech
as it relates to broadcast
_______________
fold. First, the regulations were necessary because of the pervasive

presence of broadcast media in American life, capable of injecting
offensive material into the privacy of the home, where the right “to be left
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”
Second, the U.S. Court found that broadcasting “is uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read.” The Court dismissed the
argument that the offended listener or viewer could simply turn the dial
and avoid the unwanted broadcast, reasoning that because the broadcast
audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot protect
the listener from unexpected program content.
79 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984).
80 Id., at p. 380.
81 See Estrada v. Escritor (Resolution), A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22,
2006, 492 SCRA 1 (free exercise of religion); and Osmeña v. COMELEC,
351 Phil. 692, 718; 288 SCRA 447, 478 (1998) (speech restrictions to
promote voting rights). The Court in Osmeña v. COMELEC, for example,
noted that it is a foreign notion to the American Constitution that the
government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the
relative voice of others [the idea being that voting is a form of speech]. But
this Court then declared that the same does not hold true of the
Philippine Constitution, the notion “being in fact an animating principle of
that document.” 351 Phil. 692, 718; 288 SCRA 447, 478 (1998).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
media, particularly as to which test would govern

content-based prior restraints.
Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy.
First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is in the
regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not
imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined
to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography,
seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling
government interest that also has constitutional protection,
such as national security or the electoral process.
Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that
broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has consistently
held that the clear and present danger test applies to
contentbased restrictions on media, without making a
distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.
The distinction between broadcast and traditional print
media was first enunciated82 in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, wherein it was held that
“[a]ll forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of
expression
83
continues to be the clear and present danger
rule…”
Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio
station which had been summarily closed on grounds of
national security. Although the issue had become moot and
academic because the owners were no longer interested to
reopen, the Court still proceeded to do an analysis of the
case and made formulations to serve as guidelines for all
inferior courts and bodies exercising quasi-judicial
functions. Particularly, the Court made a detailed
exposition as to what needs 84be considered in cases
involving broadcast media. Thus:
_______________
82 G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 628.

83 Id.
84 Id., at pp. 634-637.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
“x x x x x x x x x
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled
to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule, that
words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his
Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions
which apply the test. More recently, the clear and present danger
test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition v. Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present danger test,
however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to
be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation
cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for
government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection
of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission
v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently
offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why
radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications,
receives the most limited protection from the free expression
clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented
over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in
the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters
may be prohibited from making certain material available to
children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or
television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in
and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and
current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the
poblaciones of
502

Chavez vs. Gonzales
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even

here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books,
newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic
needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere.
The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may
be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of
listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials
broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age,
persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of
different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to
inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or
predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and
immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience
has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the
utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The
supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through
selfregulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful,
intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and
television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the
start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a
right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason
for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or
pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most
convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on
public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United
States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing
that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with
the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too
thin-skinned with refer
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
ence to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to
all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.” [Citations omitted]
It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the

arguments found in U.S. jurisprudence to justify
differentiation of treatment (i.e., the scarcity,
pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but only
after categorically declaring that “the test for
limitations on freedom of expression continues to be
the clear and present danger rule,” for all forms of
media, whether print or broadcast. Indeed, a close
reading of the above-quoted provisions would show that the
differentiation that the Court in Dans referred to was
narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed as
“unprotected speech” (e.g., obscenity, national security,
seditious and inciting speech), or to validate a licensing or
regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited
broadcast frequencies, which is absent in print media.
Thus, when this Court declared in Dans that the freedom
given to broadcast media was “somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media,”
it was not as to what test should be applied, but the context
by which requirements of licensing, allocation of 85
airwaves,
and application of norms to unprotected speech.
_______________
85 There is another case wherein the Court had occasion to refer to the
differentiation between traditional print media and broadcast media, but
of limited application to the case at bar inasmuch as the issues did not
invoke a free-speech challenge, but due process and equal protection. See
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v.
COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153; 289 SCRA 337 (1998) (challenge to legislation
requiring broadcast stations to provide COMELEC Time free of charge).
504

Chavez vs. Gonzales
In the same year that the Dans case 86was decided, it was
reiterated in Gonzales v. Katigbak, that the test to
determine free expression challenges was the clear and 87
present danger, again without distinguishing the media.
Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of broadcast
media but motion pictures. Although the issue 88
involved
obscenity standards as applied to movies, the Court
concluded its decision with the following obiter dictum that
a less liberal approach would be used to resolve obscenity
issues in television as opposed to motion pictures:
“All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to

the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike
motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then
will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein
shown…..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young.”
More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of

exit polls and dissemination of the results by a broadcast
company, we reiterated that the clear and present danger
rule
_______________
86 G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985, 137 SCRA 717. In this case, the
classification of a movie as “For Adults Only” was challenged, with the
issue focused on obscenity as basis for the alleged invasion of the right to
freedom on artistic and literary expression embraced in the free speech
guarantees of the Constitution. The Court held that the test to determine
free expression was the clear and present danger rule. The Court found
there was an abuse of discretion, but did not get enough votes to rule it
was grave. The decision specifically stated that the ruling in the case was
limited to concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. Id., at pp.
723-729.
87 Id., at p. 725.
88 Id.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
is the test we unquestionably adhere 89

to issues that involve
freedoms of speech and of the press.
This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and
present danger rule has been applied to all cases
that involve the broadcast media. The rule applies to
all media, including broadcast, but only when the
challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes
on free speech, expression
90
and the press. Indeed, in
Osmeña v. COMELEC, which also involved broadcast
media, the Court refused to apply the clear and present
danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner
of advertising of political advertisements 91
because the
challenged restriction was contentneutral. And in a case
involving due process and equal protection issues, the
Court in Telecommunications and92 Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines v. COMELEC treated a restriction
imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable
_______________
89 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794; 323

SCRA 811, 825 (COMELEC Resolution restraining ABSCBN, a
corporation engaged in broadcast media of television and radio, from
conducting exit surveys after the 1998 elections). Although the decision
was rendered after the 1998 elections, the Court proceeded to rule on the
case to rule on the issue of the constitutionality of holding exit polls and
the dissemination of data derived therefrom. The Court ruled that
restriction on exit polls must be tested against the clear and present
danger rule, the rule we “unquestionably” adhere to. The framing of the
guidelines issued by the Court clearly showed that the issue involved not
only the conduct of the exit polls but also its dissemination by broadcast
media. And yet, the Court did not distinguish, and still applied the clear
and present danger rule.
90 351 Phil. 692; 288 SCRA 447 (1998) (challenge to legislation which
sought to equalize media access through regulation).
91 Id., at p. 718; p. 478.
92 Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153; 289 SCRA 337 (1998) (challenge to
legislation requiring broadcast stations to provide COMELEC Time free of
charge).
506

Chavez vs. Gonzales
condition for the grant of the media’s franchise, without

going into which test would apply.
That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime

absent in print media is observed also in other
jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over
broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation
by administrative bodies, and censorship. As explained by a
British author:
“The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently

from the print media differ in a number of respects, but have a
common historical basis. The stricter system of controls seems to
have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to their
particular impact on audiences, films, videos and
broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas it is
now accepted that books and other printed media do not. These
media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number 93
of
respects, but are also seen as possible sources of harm.”
Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of

debate. Historically, the scarcity of frequencies was
thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and
satellite television have enormously increased the
number of actual and potential channels. Digital
technology will further increase the number of channels
available. But still, the argument persists that
broadcasting is the most influential means of
communication, since it comes into the home, and so much
time is spent watching television. Since it has a unique
impact on people and affects children in a way that the
print media normally does not, that regulation is said to be
necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has been
argued further that a significant main threat to free
expression—in terms of diversity—comes not from
government, but from private corporate bodies. These
developments show a need for
_______________
93 HELENFENWICK,CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 296

(3rd ed. 2002).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
a reexamination of the traditional notions

94
of the scope and
extent of broadcast media regulation.
The emergence of digital technology—which has led to

the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and
the computer industry—has likewise led to the question of
whether the regulatory model for broadcasting will
continue to95 be appropriate in the converged
environment. Internet, for example, remains largely
unregulated, yet the
96
Internet and the broadcast media
share similarities, and the rationales used to 97 support
broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet. Thus,
it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the
government agencies regulating media must agree to
regulate both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory
framework98 and rationale to justify the differential
treatment.
_______________
94 Id.
95 Stephen J. Shapiro, How Internet Non-Regulation Undermines The
Rationales Used To Support Broadcast Regulation, 8FALLMEDIA
L.&POL’Y 1, 2 (1999).
96 Technological advances, such as software that facilitates the delivery
of live, or real-time, audio and video over the Internet, have enabled
Internet content providers to offer the same services as broadcasters.
Indeed, these advancements blur the distinction between a computer and
a television. Id., at p. 13.
97 Id.
98 The current rationales used to support regulation of the broadcast
media become unpersuasive in light of the fact that the unregulated
Internet and the regulated broadcast media share many of the same
features. Id. In other words, as the Internet and broadcast media become
identical, for all intents and purposes, it makes little sense to regulate one
but not the other in an effort to further First Amendment principles.
Indeed, as Internet technologies advance, broadcasters will have little
incentive to continue developing broadcast programming under the threat
of regulation when they can disseminate the same content in the same
format through the unregulated Internet. In conclusion, “the theory of
partial regulation, whatever its merits for the circumstances of the last
fifty years,
508

Chavez vs. Gonzales
F. The Case At Bar

Having settled the applicable standard to content-based

restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to its application
to the case at bar. To recapitulate, a governmental action
that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media.
This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases
like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test;
(b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to
discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence
necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar,
respondents who have the burden to show that these acts
do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to
hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that
the great evil which government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-
wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however,
are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls
short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.
Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary
obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording.
Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two
versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the
other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping
act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s
different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the
manner of its commission and other related and relevant
proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly,
given all these unsettled
_______________
will be unworkable in the media landscape of the future.” Id., at p. 23.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing

would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify

straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and
of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and
doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which
even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s
private comfort but does not endanger national security.
There are laws of great significance but their violation, by
itself and without more, cannot support suppression of
free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just
a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in
adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the
press. The totality of the injurious effects of the
violation to private and public interest must be calibrated
in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution
and by related international covenants protecting freedom
of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and
calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these
factors to determine compliance with the clear and present
danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of
law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they
breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need
to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the
exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred
right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the
clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but
to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There
is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security
of the State.
This is not all the faultline in the stance of the
respondents. We slide to the issue of whether the mere
press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the
NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In
resolving this is-
510

Chavez vs. Gonzales
sue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press

statements made by respondents were not reduced
in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It
is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his

statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued
its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act
done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by
the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act”
does not limit itself to acts already converted to a
formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at
bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free
speech and press.
There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the
complained acts on record. The warnings given to media
came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can
cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and
broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of
Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the
awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating
the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP
inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint
Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez
was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and
of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of
some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject
of misinterpretation.
The constitutional imperative for us to strike down
unconstitutional acts should always be exercised with care
and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there are
no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery
constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of
relative freedoms are
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must

be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the
peculiar shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases
where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a
constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in
striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon
struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.
In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The

writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued,
nullifying the official statements made by respondents on
June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the
alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and
other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., In the result and I join in the
Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Carpio.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Please see my Separate
Concurring Opinion.
Carpio, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., I also join in the Separate
Opinion of J. Carpio.
Corona, J., I join the dissent of Mr. Justice
Nachura.
Carpio-Morales, J., I join in the Separate
Concurring Opinion of J. Carpio.
Azcuna, J., I concur in a Separate Opinion.
Tinga, J., Please see Separate Opinion (Dissenting
and Concurring).
Chico-Nazario, J., Please see my Separate
Dissenting Opinion.
512

Chavez vs. Gonzales
Velasco, Jr., J., Please see Separate Concurring and

Dissenting Opinion.
Nachura, J., Please see my dissent.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the dissent of Justice
Nazario and Justice Nachura.
CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
“Where they have burned books,

they will end in burning human
beings.”
These are the prophetic words of the German Author

Heinrich Heine when the Nazis fed to the flames the books
written by Jewish authors. True enough, the mass
extermination of Jews followed a few years later. What
was first a severe form of book censorship ended up
as genocide.
Today, I vote to grant the writs of certiorari and
prohibition mindful of Heine’s prophecy. The issuance of
the Press Release by the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) is a form of censorship. To allow the
broadcast media to be burdened by it is the first misstep
leading to the strangling of our citizens. We must strike
this possibility while we still have a voice.
I fully concur with the well-written ponencia of Mr.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and that of Mr. Justice
Antonio T. Carpio.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees
that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression.” Accordingly, this right “includes the
freedom to hold opinions without interference and
impart information and ideas 1
through any media
regardless of frontiers.” At the same time, our
Constitution mandates
_______________
1 Article 19, Adopted on December 10, 1948.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
that “no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.”
These guarantees are testaments to the value that
humanity accords to the above-mentioned freedoms—
commonly summed up as freedom of expression. The
justifications for this high regard are specifically identified
by Justice Mclachlin of the Canadian 2
Supreme Court in
Her Majesty The Queen v. Keegstra, to wit: (1) Freedom of
expression promotes the free flow of ideas essential to
political democracy and democratic institutions, and limits
the ability of the State to subvert other rights and
freedoms; (2) it promotes a marketplace of ideas, which
includes, but is not limited to, the search for truth; (3) it is
intrinsically valuable as part of the selfactualization of

speakers and listeners; and (4) it is justified by the dangers
for good government of allowing its suppression.
These are the same justifications why censorship is
anathema to freedom of expression. Censorship is that
officious functionary of the repressive government who tells
the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and
no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on3
pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.
Censorship may come in the form of prior restraint or
subsequent punishment. Prior restraint means official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in4 advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Its most blatant form
_______________
2 3 S.C.R. 697 (1990)

3 Separate Opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. (ret.), in
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkasters sa Pilipinas, G.R. No. 102983. March 5,
1992, 207 SCRA 1.
4 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, 2003 ed., p. 225.
514

Chavez vs. Gonzales
is a system
5
of licensing administered by an executive
officer. Similar to this is judicial prior restraint which
6
takes the form of an injunction against publication. And
equally objectionable as prior restraint is the imposition of
license taxes7 that renders publication or advertising more
burdensome. On the other hand, subsequent
punishment is the imposition of liability to the individual
exercising his freedom. It may be in any form, such as
penal, civil or administrative penalty.
I The Issuance of the Press Release Constitutes Censorship

In the case at bar, the first issue is whether the Press
Release of the NTC constitutes censorship. Reference to its
pertinent portions is therefore imperative. Thus:

recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the

stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes
are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate
investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are
hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a
just cause for the suspension, revocation and /or cancel
_______________
5 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Freedman v.

Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
6 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
7 Supra, footnote 4, citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936), Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) and American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
515
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
lation of the licenses or authorizations issued to said

companies.
x x x x x x
The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the
provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying
sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their
owners/operators.
The threat of suspension, revocation and/or

cancellation of the licenses or authorization hurled
against radio and television stations should they air the
Garci Tape is definitely a form of prior restraint. The
license or authorization is the life of every media station. If
withheld from them, their very existence is lost. Surely, no
threat could be more discouraging to them than the
suspension or revocation8
of their licenses. In Far Eastern
Broadcasting v. Dans, while the need for licensing was
rightly defended, the defense was for the purpose, not of
regulation of broadcast content, but for the proper
allocation of airwaves. In the present case, what the NTC
intends to regulate are the contents of the Garci Tapes—
the alleged taped conversation involving the President of

the Philippines and a Commissioner of the Commission on
Election. The reason given is that it is a “false information
or willful misrepresentation.” As aptly stated by Mr.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio that “the NTC action in
restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based
prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the
Garci Tapes.”
History teaches us that licensing has been one of the
most potent tools of censorship. This powerful bureaucratic
system of censorship in Medieval Europe was the target of
John Milton’s speech Areopagita to the Parliament of
England in
_______________
8 137 SCRA 628 (1985).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
9
1644. Under the Licensing Act of 1643, all printing presses
and printers were licensed and nothing could be published
without the prior approval of the State or the Church
Authorities. Milton vigorously opposed it on the ground of
freedom of the press. His strong advocacy led to its collapse
in 1695. In the U.S., the first encounter with 10 a law
imposing a prior restraint is in Near v. Minnesota. Here,
the majority voided the law authorizing the permanent
enjoining of future violations by any newspaper or
periodical if found to have published or circulated an
“obscene, lewd and lascivious” or “malicious, scandalous
and defamatory” issue. While the dissenters maintained
that the injunction constituted no prior restraint, inasmuch
as that doctrine applied to prohibitions of publication
without advance approval of an executive official, the
majority deemed the difference of no consequence, since in
order to avoid a contempt citation, the newspaper would
have to clear future publications in advance with the judge.
In other similar cases, the doctrine of prior restraint was
frowned upon by the U.S. Court as it struck down loosely
drawn statutes and ordinances requiring licenses to hold
meetings and parades and to distribute literature, with
uncontrolled discretion in the licensor whether or not to
issue them, and as11 it voided other restrictions on First
Amendment rights. Then there came the doctrine that
prior licensing or permit systems were held to be

constitutionally valid so long as the discretion of the
issuing official
12
is limited to questions of times, places and
manners. And in New York Times Com-
_______________
9 http://www.beaconforfreedom.org/about_project/history.html,The Long
History of Censorship, p. 3.
10 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
11 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Nietmotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313
(1958).
12 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Paulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
13
pany v. United States, the same Court, applying the
doctrine of prior restraint from Near, considered the claims
that the publication of the Pentagon Papers concerning the
Vietnam War would interfere with foreign policy and
prolong the war too speculative. It held that such claim
could not overcome the strong presumption against prior
restraints. Clearly, content-based prior restraint is
highly abhorred in every jurisdiction.
Another objectionable portion of the NTC’s Press
Release is the warning that it will not hesitate to apply
with full force the provisions of the Circulars and
their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and
television stations and their owners/operators. This
is a threat of a subsequent punishment, an equally
abhorred form of censorship. This should not also be
countenanced. It must be stressed that the evils to be
prevented are not the censorship of the press merely, but
any action of the government by means of which it
might prevent such free and general discussion of
public matters as seems absolutely essential to
prepare the people for 14
an intelligent exercise of
their rights as citizens. There is logic in the proposition
that the liberty of the press will be rendered a “mockery
and a delusion” if, while every man is at liberty to
publish what he pleases, the public authorities might
nevertheless punish him for harmless publications. In this
regard, the fear of subsequent punishment has the same

effect as that of prior restraint.
It being settled that the NTC’s Press Release constitutes
censorship of broadcast media, the next issue is whether
such censorship is justified.
_______________
13 403 U.S. 713. 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971).

14 T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest
upon the Legislative powers of the States of the American Union 885-86
(8th ed. 1927).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
II The Issuance of the Press Release Constitutes an

Unjustified Form of Censorship
Settled is the doctrine that any system of prior restraint of
expression comes to this Court 15bearing a presumption
against its constitutional validity. The Government thus
carries a heavy burden of showing16
justification for the
enforcement of such a restraint.
Various tests have been made to fix a standard by which
to determine what degree of evil is sufficiently substantial
to justify a resort to abridgment of the freedom of
expression as a means of protection and how clear and
imminent and likely the danger is. Among these tests are
the Clear and Present Danger, Balancing, Dangerous
Tendency, Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Least Restrictive
Means.
Philippine jurisprudence shows that we have generally
adhered to the clear and present danger test. Chief Justice
Puno, in his ponencia, has concluded that the Government
has not hurdled this test. He cited four (4) reasons to which
I fully concur.
The justification advanced by the NTC in issuing the
Press Release is that “the taped Conversations have
not been duly authenticated nor could it be said at
this time that the tape contains an accurate and
truthful representation of what was recorded
therein” and that “its continuous airing or broadcast
is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law.”
To prevent the airing of the Garci Tapes on the premise

that their contents may or may not be true is not a valid 17
reason for its suppression. In New York Times v. Sullivan,
Jus-
_______________
15 Bantam Books, Inc. vs. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).

16 Supra, p. 228, footnote 4.
17 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
tice William Brennan, Jr. states that the authoritative

interpretation of the First Amendment guarantees have
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test
of truth—whether administered by judges, jurists, or
administrative officials—and especially not one that puts
the burden of proving truth on the speaker. He stressed
that “the constitutional protection does not turn
upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the
ideas and belief which are offered.” Moreover, the fact
that the tapes were obtained through violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law does not make the broadcast media privy
to the crime. It must be stressed that it was a
government official who initially released the Garci
Tapes, not the media.
In view of the presence of various competing interests, I
believe the present case must also be calibrated using the
balancing test. As 18held in American Communication
Association v. Douds, “when a particular conduct is
regulated in the interest of public order, and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of these two conflicting interests
demand the greater protection under the
circumstances presented.” In the present case, perched
at the one hand of the scale is the government’s interest to
maintain public order, while on the other hand is the
interest of the public to know the truth about the last
national election and to be fully informed. Which of these
interests should be advanced? I believe it should be that of
the people.
The right of the people to know matters
pertaining to the integrity of the election process is
of paramount importance. It cannot be sideswiped by

the mere speculation that a public disturbance will ensue.
Election is a sacred instrument of democracy.
Through it, we choose the people who will govern us.
We entrust to them our
_______________
18 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
520

Chavez vs. Gonzales
businesses, our welfare, our children, our lives.

Certainly, each one of us is entitled to know how it was
conducted. What could be more disheartening than to learn
that there exists a tape containing conversations that
compromised the integrity of the election process. The
doubt will forever hang over our heads, doubting whether
those who sit in government are legitimate officials. In
matters such as these, leaving the people in darkness is not
an alternative course. People ought to know the truth. Yes,
the airing of the Garci Tapes may have serious impact, but
this is not a valid basis for suppressing it. As Justice
Douglas explained in his concurring opinion in the New
York Times, “the dominant purpose of the First
Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice
of governmental suppression of embarrassing
information. A debate of large proportions goes in
the nation over our posture in Vietnam. Open debate
and discussion of public issues are vital to our
national health.”
More than ever, now is the time to uphold the right of
the Filipinos to information on matters of public concern.
As Chief Justice Hughes observed: “The administration of
government has become more complex, the opportunities
for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has
grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its
protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of
the fundamental security of life and liberty by criminal
alliances and official neglect, emphasize the primary need
of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great
cities. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused
by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any less
necessary the immunity of the press from previous 19
restraint in dealing with official misconduct.” Open
discussions of our political leaders, as well as their actions,

are essential for us to make informed judgments. Through
these, we can influence our government’s
_______________
19 Near v. Minnesota,179 Minn. 40; 228 N.W. 326.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
actions and policies. Indeed, no government can be

responsive to its citizens who have refrained from
voicing their discontent because of fear of
retribution.
III A free press is an indispensable component of a

democratic and free society.
Burke once called the Press the Fourth Estate in the
Parliament. This is because its ability to influence public
opinion made it an important source in the governance of a
nation. It is considered one of the foundations of a
democratic society. One sign of its importance is that when
a tyrant takes over a country, his first act is to muzzle the
press. Courts should therefore be wary in resolving
cases that has implication on the freedom of the
press—to the end that the freedom will never be curtailed
absent a recognized and valid justification.
In fine let it be said that the struggle for freedom of
expression is as ancient as the history of censorship. From
the ancient time when Socrates was poisoned for his
unorthodox views to the more recent Martial Law Regime
in our country, the lesson learned is that censorship is the
biggest obstacle to human progress. Let us not repeat our
sad history. Let us not be victims again now and in the
future.
WHEREFORE, I vote to CONCUR with the majority
opinion.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for the writs of certiorari and prohibition

to set aside “acts, issuances, and orders” of respondents
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez (respondent
Gonzales) and
522

Chavez vs. Gonzales
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC),

particularly an NTC “press release” dated 11 June 2005,
warning radio and television stations against airing taped
conversations allegedly between President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Commission on Elections
(COMELEC)1 Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
(Garcillano) under pain of suspension or revocation of their
airwave licenses.
The Facts
On 24 June 2004, Congress, acting as national board of
canvassers, proclaimed President
2
Arroyo winner in the
2004 presidential elections. President Arroyo received a
total of 12,905,808 votes, 1,123,576 more than the votes of
her nearest rival, Fernando Poe, Jr. Sometime before 6
June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes
where the parties to the conversation discussed “rigging”
the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo.
On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye
(Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang Palace,
where he played before the presidential press corps two
compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman
and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings
as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the
second compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear
that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated
that the woman’s voice in3 the compact discs was not
President Arroyo’s after all. Meanwhile, other individuals
went public,
_______________
1 The taped conversations are referred to here as the “Garci Tapes.”

2 Report of the Joint Committee on the Canvass of Votes for the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004
Elections, dated 23 June 2004.
3 In their Comment to the petition, the NTC and respondent Gonzalez

only mentioned Bunye’s press conference of 6 June 2005.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
4
claiming possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes.
Respondent Gonzalez ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation to investigate media organizations which
aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act
No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release
warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci
Tapes is a “cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation
5
of the licenses or authorizations” issued to
them. On 14 June
_______________
However, respondents do not deny petitioner’s assertion that the 9

June 2005 press conference also took place.
4 On 7 June 2005, Atty. Alan Paguia, counsel of former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, gave to a radio station two tapes, including the
Garci Tapes, which he claimed to be authentic. On 10 June 2005, Samuel
Ong, a high ranking official of the National Bureau of Investigation,
presented to the media the alleged “master tape” of the Garci Tapes.
5 The press release reads in its entirety:
NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION

OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW AND
PERTINENT NTC CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS
In view of the unusual situation the country is in today, The (sic) National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) calls for sobriety among the operators and
management of all radio and television stations in the country and reminds them,
especially all broadcasters, to be careful and circumspect in the handling of news
reportage, coverages [sic] of current affairs and discussion of public issues, by
strictly adhering to the pertinent laws of the country, the current program
standards embodied in radio and television codes and the existing circulars of the
NTC.
The NTC said that now, more than ever, the profession of broadcasting
demands a high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment of fairness and
honesty at all times among broadcasters amidst all these rumors of unrest,
destabilization attempts and controversies surrounding the alleged wiretapping of
President GMA (sic) telephone conversations.
524

Chavez vs. Gonzales
2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters

group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP),
to
_______________
Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to
unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television
networks owners/operators that the conditions of the authorizations and permits
issued to them by Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use its stations for the
broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation.
Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the Commission that certain
personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversation which they claim, (sic)
involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC
regarding their supposed violation of election laws. These personalities have
admitted that the taped conversations are product of illegal wiretapping
operations.
Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated
nor could it be said at this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful
representation of what was recorded therein, (sic) it is the position of the
Commission that the continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped
conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and television stations. If it has been
(sic) subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after
a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television
companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information
and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.
In addition to the above, the Commission reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars
on program standards to be observed by radio and television stations. NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 111-12-85 explicitly states, among others, that “all
radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast,
cut off from the air the speech play, act or scene
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint

6
press statement expressing commitment to press freedom.
_______________
or other matters being broadcast and/or telecast if the tendency thereof” is to

disseminate false information or such other willful misrepresentation, or to
propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition. The foregoing directive had
been reiterated in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89 which, in addition
thereto, prohibited radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their
stations to broadcast or telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false
information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in
subversive or treasonable acts.
The Commission will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due
process, to apply with full force the provisions of the said Circulars and their
accompanying sanctions or erring radio and television stations and their
owners/operators.
6 The joint press statement reads (Rollo, pp. 62-63):
JOINT PRESS STATEMENT: THE NTC AND KBP
1. Call for sobriety, responsible journalism, and of law, and the radio
and television Codes.
2. NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the
right to information on matters of public concern. KBP & its
members have always been committed to the exercise of press
freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment
of fairness and honesty.
3. NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order
constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship. The NTC
further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the interview
of members of the opposition or free expression of views.
4. What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom
is done responsibly.
5. KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in
the treatment of news and public affairs programs. These include
verification of sources, non-airing of materials that would
constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.
526

Chavez vs. Gonzales
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez

(petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the
“acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent
Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1)
respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and
the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and

(2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and
television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.
In their Comment to the petition, respondents raised
threshold objections that (1) petitioner has no standing to
litigate and (2) the petition fails to meet the case or
controversy requirement in constitutional adjudication. On
the merits, respondents claim that (1) the NTC’s press
release of 11 June 2005 is a mere “fair warning,” not
censorship, cautioning radio and television networks on the
lack of authentication of the Garci Tapes and of the
consequences of airing false or fraudulent material, and (2)
the NTC did not act ultra vires in issuing the warning to
radio and television stations.
In his Reply, petitioner belied respondents’ claim on his
lack of standing to litigate, contending that his status as a
citizen asserting the enforcement of a public right vested
him with sufficient interest to maintain this suit.
Petitioner also contests respondents’ claim that the NTC
press release of 11 June 2005 is a mere warning as it
already prejudged the Garci Tapes as inauthentic and
violative of the AntiWiretapping Law, making it a “cleverly
disguised x x x gag order.”
_______________
6. The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful

misrepresentation is made in the treatment of news or
commentaries.
7. The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity
and handled responsibly giving due consideration to the process
being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity and
actual content of the same.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Issue
The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC
warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of
expression.
I vote to (1) grant the petition, (2) declare the NTC
warning, embodied in its press release dated 11 June 2005,
an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression,

and (3) enjoin the NTC from enforcing the same.
1. Standing to File Petition

Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue
involves freedom of expression, as in the present case, any
citizen has the right to bring suit to question the
constitutionality of a government action in violation of
freedom of expression, whether or not the government
action is directed at such citizen. The government action
may chill into silence those to whom the action is directed.
Any citizen must be allowed to take up the cudgels for
those who have been cowed into inaction because freedom
of expression is a vital public right that must be defended
by everyone and anyone.
Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the
preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of
transcendental importance that must be defended by every
patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity. We have held
that any concerned citizen has standing to 7
raise an issue of
transcendental importance to the nation, and petitioner in
this present petition raises such issue.
_______________
7 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 1713396, 3 May 2006, 489

SCRA 160.
528

Chavez vs. Gonzales
2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and

Subsequent Punishment
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and
democratic society. Freedom
8
of expression is an
indispensable condition to the exercise of almost all other
civil and political rights. No society can remain free, open
and democratic without freedom of expression. Freedom of
expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious
discussion of all social, economic and political issues. To
survive, a free and democratic society must zealously
safeguard freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and
check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression
allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for
public office. Freedom of expression crystallizes important

public policy issues, and allows citizens to participate in
the discussion and resolution of such issues. Freedom of
expression allows the competition of ideas, the clash of
claims and counterclaims, from which the truth will likely
emerge. Freedom of expression allows the airing of social
grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from
marginalized groups who otherwise would not be heard by
government. Freedom of expression provides a civilized
way of engagement among political, ideological, religious or
ethnic opponents for if one cannot use his tongue to argue,
he might use his fist instead.
Freedom of expression is the freedom to disseminate
ideas and beliefs, whether competing, conforming or
otherwise. It is the freedom to express to others what one
likes or dislikes, as it is the freedom of others to express to
one and all what they favor or disfavor. It is the free
expression for the ideas we love, 9
as well as the free
expression for the ideas we hate.
_______________
8 In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Justice Benjamin

Cardozo wrote that freedom of expression is “the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”
9 See dissenting opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Indeed, the function of freedom of expression is to stir

disputes:
“[I]t may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and
have profound
10
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an
idea.”
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the

enactment of any law curtailing freedom of expression:
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior

restraint or censorship because the Constitution
commands that freedom of expression shall not be
abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out
narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of
necessity.
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to
prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to 11only four
categories of expression, namely:
12
pornography, false or
misleading
13
advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless
action,
_______________
10 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

11 Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak, No. L-69500, 22 July 1985, 137 SCRA
717.
12 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.
Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007.
Another fundamental ground for regulating false or misleading
advertisement is Section 11(2), Article XVI of the Constitution which
states: “The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and
shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the
promotion of the general welfare.”
13 Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, No. L-59329, 19 July
1985, 137 SCRA 628.
530

Chavez vs. Gonzales
14
and danger to national security. All other expression is
not subject to prior restraint. As stated in Turner
Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication
Commission, “[T]he First Amendment (Free Speech
Clause), subject only to narrow and well understood
exceptions, does not countenance governmental control
over the content
15
of messages expressed by private
individuals.”
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected
expression or high-value expression. Any content-based
prior restraint on protected expression is
unconstitutional without exception. A protected
expression means what it says—it is absolutely protected
from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on
public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing
laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of
new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the

Constitution.
Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the
restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression.
Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based
restraint. If the content-based prior restraint is directed at
protected expression, courts will strike down the restraint
as unconstitutional because there can be no content-based
prior restraint on protected expression. The analysis thus
turns on whether the prior restraint is content-based, and
if so, whether such restraint is directed at protected
expression, that is, those not falling under any of the
recognized categories of unprotected expression.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea
of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens
expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which
regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in
public
_______________
14 Id.
15 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994).
531
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
16
places without any restraint on the content of the
expression. Courts will 17subject content-neutral restraints
to intermediate scrutiny.
An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit
specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing
through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior
restraint on protected expression which does not touch on
the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of
validity18 and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the
courts. Courts will uphold time, place or manner
restraints if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest,19 and leave open
ample alternative channels of expression.
In content-neutral prior restraint on protected speech,
there should be no prior restraint on the content of the
expression itself. Thus, submission of movies or pre-taped
television programs to a government review board is
constitutional only if the review is for classification and not
for censoring any part of the content of the submitted
20
20
materials. However, failure to submit such materials to
the review board may be21 penalized without regard to the
content of the materials. The review board has no power
to reject the airing of the submitted materials. The review
board’s power is only to classify the materials, whether for
general patronage, for
_______________
16 Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v.

Ermita, G.R. Nos. 169838, 169848 and 156881, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA
226.
17 Constitutional Law, Erwin Chemerinsky, pp. 902, 936 (2nd Edition).
18 Ruiz v. Gordon, 211 Phil. 411; 126 SCRA 233 (1983).
19 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
20 Gonzalez v. Kalaw-Katigbak, see Note 11. The Court declared, “It is
the opinion of this Court, therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint
on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the
classification of films.”
21 Movie and Television Review and Classification Board v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 155282, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA
575.
532

Chavez vs. Gonzales
adults only, or for some other classification. The power to

classify expressions 22applies only to movies and pre-taped
television programs but not to live television programs.
Any classification of live television programs necessarily
entails prior restraint on expression.
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is
unprotected expression or low-value expression. By
definition, prior
23
restraint on unprotected expression is
content-based since the restraint is imposed because of
the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently
only four categories of unprotected expression that may be
subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or
misleading advertisement
24
as unprotected expression only
in October 2007.
Only unprotected expression may be subject to
prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on
unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First,
such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second,
the government bears a heavy burden 25

of proving the
constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Courts will subject to strict scrutiny any government 26
action imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression.
The government action will be sustained if there is a
compelling State interest, and prior restraint is necessary
to protect such State interest. In such a case, the prior
restraint shall be
_______________
22 A case may be made that only television programs akin to motion

pictures, like tele-novelas, are subject to the power of review and
classification by a government review board, and such power cannot
extend to other pre-taped programs like political shows.
23 Constitutional Law, Chemerinsky, see Note 17, p. 903.
24 See Note 12.
25 Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) v. Court of Appeals, Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Television, G.R. No. 119673, 26 July 1996, 259 SCRA
529; New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
26 Id.
533
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 533

Chavez vs. Gonzales
narrowly drawn—only to the extent necessary to protect

or attain the compelling State interest.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom
of expression than subsequent punishment. Although
subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the
ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint
prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected
expression, such
27
expression may be subject to subsequent
punishment, either civilly or criminally. Thus, the
publication
28
of election surveys cannot be subject to prior
restraint, but an aggrieved person can sue for redress of
injury if the survey turns out to be fabricated. Also, while
Article 201 (2)(b)(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing
“shows which offend any race or religion” cannot be used to
justify prior restraint on religious expression, this provision
can be invoked to justify subsequent 29
punishment of the
perpetrator of such offensive shows.
Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not
warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be
subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally.

Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser
restriction of subsequent punishment, logically it cannot
also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior
restraint. Thus, since profane language or “hate speech”
against a religious minority is30not subject to subsequent
punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be
subject to prior restraint.
_______________
27 Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L-82380, 29 April

1988, 160 SCRA 861.
28 Social Weather Station, et al. v. Commission on Elections,409 Phil.
571; 357 SCRA 496 (2001).
29 See Note 25.
30 MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc., 444 Phil. 230; 396 SCRA 210 (2003). In effect, this
534

Chavez vs. Gonzales
If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint,

necessarily the same expression is subject to subsequent
punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the
unprotected expression before prior restraint on such
expression can be justified. The legislature must punish
the unprotected expression because it creates a substantive
evil that the State must prevent. Otherwise, there will be
no legal basis for imposing a prior restraint on such
expression.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the
constitutionality of government action imposing prior
restraint on 31three categories of unprotected expression—
pornography, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national
32
security—is the clear and present
danger test. The expression restrained must present a
clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive
evil that the State has a right and duty33 to prevent, and
such danger must be grave and imminent.
_______________
makes “hate speech” against a religious or ethnic minority a protected

expression.
31 In pornography or obscenity cases, the ancillary test is the

contemporary community standards test enunciated in Roth v. United
States (354 U.S. 476 [1957]), which asks: whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. See Gonzalez v.
Kalaw-Katigbak, Note 11.
32 See notes 12 and 13. In false or misleading advertisement cases, no
test was enunciated in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Health Secretary (see Note 12) although the Concurring and
Separate Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno advocated the four-
part analysis in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
Commission (447 U.S. 557 [1980]), to wit: (1) the advertisement must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the asserted
governmental interest must be substantial; (3) the state regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) the
restriction is no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
33 Bayan v. Ermita, see Note 16. In the United States, the prevailing
test is the Brandenburg standard (Brandenburg v. Ohio, [395
535
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 535

Chavez vs. Gonzales
Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many

forms—it may be a law, administrative regulation, or
impermissible pressures34 like threats of revoking licenses or
withholding of benefits. The impermissible pressures need
not be embodied in a government agency regulation, but
may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of
officials of government agencies.
3. Government Action in the Present Case

The government action in the present case is a warning
by the NTC that the airing or broadcasting of the
Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a
“cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued
to radio and television stations. The NTC warning,
embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds. First,
the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued
to radio and TV stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have not
been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may
establish that the tapes contain false information or willful
misrepresentation.
Specifically, the NTC press release contains the

following categorical warning:
“Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in

order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all
radio stations and television networks owners/operators that the
_______________
U.S. 444 1969]) which refined the clear and present danger rule
articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Schenck v. United States
(249 U.S. 47 [1919]) by limiting its application to expressions where there
is “imminent lawless action.” See American Constitutional Law, Otis H.
Stephen, Jr. and John M. Scheb II, Vol. II, p. 133 (4th Edition).
34 Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
536

Chavez vs. Gonzales
conditions of the authorizations and permits issued to them by

Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use its
stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or
willful misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has come to the
attention of the Commission that certain personalities are in
possession of alleged taped conversation which they claim, (sic)
the COMELEC regarding their supposed violation of election
laws. These personalities have admitted that the taped
conversations are product of illegal wiretapping operations.
recorded therein, (sic) it is the position of the Commission
that the continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped
conversations by radio and television stations is a
continuing violation of the AntiWiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate
of Authority issued to these radio and television stations.
If it has been (sic) subsequently established that the said
tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and
television companies are hereby warned that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or

authorizations issued to the said companies.” (Boldfacing
and underscoring supplied)
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that may be
subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what
substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing
prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC
does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil,
of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right
and duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its
conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. At the
time of
537
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 537

Chavez vs. Gonzales
issuance of the NTC press release, and even up to now, the

parties to the conversations in the Garci Tapes have not
complained that the wire-tapping was without their
consent, an essential
35
element for violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.
It was even the Office of the President, through the
Press Secretary, that played and released to media the
Garci Tapes containing the alleged “spliced” conversation
between President Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano.
There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone
conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in
claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and
television stations were not even given an opportunity to be
heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due
process as36 mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations.
The NTC claims that the Garci Tapes, “after a
prosecution or the appropriate investigation,” may
constitute “false information and/or willful
misrepresentation.” However, the NTC does not claim that
such possible false information or willful misrepresentation
constitutes misleading commercial advertisement. In the
United States, false or deceptive commercial speech is
categorized as unprotected expression that may be subject

to prior restraint. Recently, this Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 6 of the Milk Code requiring the
submission to a government screening committee of
advertising materials for infant formula 37
milk to prevent
false or deceptive claims to the public. There is, however,
no claim here by respondents that the Garci Tapes
constitute false or misleading commercial advertisement.
The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been
authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC also
concedes
_______________
35 Section 1, Republic Act No. 4200.

36 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
37 See Note 12.
538

Chavez vs. Gonzales
that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation”

can it be established that the Garci Tapes constitute “false
information and/or willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the
NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci
Tapes contain false information or willful
misrepresentation.
4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is
a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the
message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the
Garci Tapes might contain “false information and/or willful
misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired,
is an admission that the restraint is content-based.
5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case

The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected
expression because it does not fall under any of the four
existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in
this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is
essentially a political expression because it exposes that a
presidential candidate had allegedly improper
conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after
the close of voting in the last presidential elections.
Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects

gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on
the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected
expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public
discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one
of the highest political expressions of any electorate, and
thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a
hierarchy of protected expressions,
38
political expression
would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds
of political expression, the
_______________
38 Some commentators, including Prof. Robert Bork, argue that political

expression is the only expression protected by the Free
539
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 539

Chavez vs. Gonzales
subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top. In

any event, public discussion on all political issues should
always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that
there can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC
press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the
courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping,
illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the
public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression
that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no
claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the
Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly39
airing
the tapes would endanger the security of the State.
The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not
in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing
of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly
prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes40 anti-
wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The
only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized
categories of unprotected expression. However, the content
of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these
categories of unprotected expression.
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right
to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a
matter of important public concern. The Constitution
guarantees the people’s right to information on matters of
41
41
public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by
the public airing of
_______________
Speech Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected this view.
Constitutional Law, Chemerinsky, see Note 17, p. 897.
39 See Commonwealth Act No. 616 and Article 117 of the Revised Penal
Code.
40 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). In this case, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that an anti-wiretapping law violates the First
Amendment if it prohibits disclosure of intercepted information that is of
significant public concern.
41 Section 7, Article III, Constitution.
540

Chavez vs. Gonzales
the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the

AntiWiretapping Law after the commission of the crime.
Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the
remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.
The present case involves a prior restraint on protected
expression. Prior restraint on protected expression differs
significantly from subsequent punishment of protected
expression. While there can be no prior restraint on
protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment
for protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In
the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint on
the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel
of radio and television stations for actual violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior

Restraint
The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior
restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does not
vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over
radio and television stations.
In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a
protected expression that can never be subject to prior
restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to
adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of whether the
airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present

danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State
has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior
restraint.
Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected
expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on
whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a
necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidity
of any prior restraint on unprotected expression. Unless
ruled by the courts as a valid prior restraint, government
agencies cannot imple-
541
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 541

Chavez vs. Gonzales
ment outright such prior restraint because such restraint is

presumed unconstitutional at inception.
As an agency that allocates frequencies or airwaves, the
NTC may regulate the bandwidth position, transmitter
wattage, and location of radio and television stations, but
not the content of the broadcasts. Such content-neutral
prior restraint may make operating radio and television
stations more costly. However, such content-neutral
restraint does not restrict the content of the broadcast.
7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of

Invalidity
Assuming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
unprotected expression, the NTC action imposing prior
restraint on the airing is presumed unconstitutional. The
Government bears a heavy burden to prove that the NTC
action is constitutional. The Government has failed to meet
this burden.
In their Comment, respondents did not invoke any
compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the
public airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim
that they merely “fairly warned” radio and television
stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and
pertinent NTC circulars on program standards.
Respondents have not explained how and why the
observance by radio and television stations of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes
a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the
public airing of the Garci Tapes.
Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation
of any criminal statute, can always be subject to criminal
prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents

have not explained why there is a need in the present case
to impose prior restraint just to prevent a possible future
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Respondents have
not explained how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent
lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State. To
allow such restraint is
542

Chavez vs. Gonzales
to allow prior restraint on all future broadcasts that may

possibly violate any of the existing criminal statutes. That
would be the dawn of sweeping and endless censorship on
broadcast media.
8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel
the airwave permits of radio and television stations
constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior
restraint on protected expression. Whether the threat is
made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the
chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and
television stations into deafening silence. Radio and
television stations that have invested substantial sums in
capital equipment and market development suddenly face
suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC
threat is thus real and potent. 42
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, this Court ruled that the
closure of the We Forum newspapers under a general
warrant “is in the nature of a previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law.” The NTC warning
to radio and television stations not to air the Garci Tapes
or else their permits will be suspended or cancelled has the
same effect—a prior restraint on constitutionally protected
expression. 43
In the recent case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this
Court declared unconstitutional government threats to
close down mass media establishments that refused to
comply with government prescribed “standards” on news
reporting following the declaration of a State of National
Emergency by President Arroyo on 24 February 2006. The
Court described these threats in this manner:
_______________
42 218 Phil. 754; 133 SCRA 800 (1984).

43 See Note 7.
543
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 543

Chavez vs. Gonzales
“Thereafter, a wave of warning[s] came from government

officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted
as saying that such raid was “meant to show a ‘strong presence,’
to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help
the rebels in bringing down this government.” Director General
Lomibao further stated that “if they do not follow the standards—
and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in
the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General
Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017—we will recommend a ‘takeover.’”
National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis
urged television and radio networks to “cooperate” with
the government for the duration of the state of national
emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to
recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that
violates rules set out for media coverage during 44
times
when the national security is threatened.” (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court struck down this “wave of warning[s]” as

impermissible restraint on freedom of expression. The
Court ruled that “the imposition of standards on media or
any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical
seizure of its articles for publication and
45
other materials,
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.”
The history of press freedom has been a constant
struggle against the censor whose weapon is the
suspension or cancellation of licenses to publish or
broadcast. The NTC warning resurrects the weapon of the
censor. The NTC warning is a classic form of prior
restraint on protected expression, which in the words
46
of
Near v. Minnesota is “the essence of censorship.” Long
before the American Declaration of Independence in 1776,
William Blackstone had already written in his
Commentaries on the Law of England, “The liberty of the
_______________
44 Id., at p. 268.
45 Id., at p. 275.
46 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
544

Chavez vs. Gonzales
press x x x consists47
in laying no previous restraints upon
publication x x x.”
Although couched in a press release and not in an
administrative regulation, the NTC threat to suspend or
cancel permits remains real and effective, for without
airwaves or frequencies, radio and television stations will
fall silent and die. The NTC press release does not seek to
advance a legitimate regulatory objective, but to suppress
through coercion information on a matter of vital public
concern.
9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression.
There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected
expression. This rule has no exception.
I therefore vote to (1) grant the petition, (2) declare the
NTC warning, embodied in its press release dated 11 June
2005, an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
expression, and (3) enjoin the NTC from enforcing the
same.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
I vote to GRANT the petition on the ground that the

challenged NTC and DOJ warnings violate Sec. 10, Art.
XVI of the Constitution which states:
“Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the
full development of Filipino capability and the emergency of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of
the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and
across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the
freedom of speech and of the press.”
_______________
47 American Constitutional Law, Ralph A. Rossum and G. Alan Tass,

vol. II, p. 183 (7th Edition).
545
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 545

Chavez vs. Gonzales
This provision was precisely crafted to meet the needs and

opportunities of the emerging new pathways of
communications, from radio and tv broadcast to the flow of
digital information via cables, satellites and the internet.
The purpose of this new statement of directed State
policy is to hold the State responsible for a policy
environment that provides for (1) the full development of
Filipino capability, (2) the emergence of communication
structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the
nation and the balanced flow of information, and (3) respect
for the freedom of speech and of the press.
The regulatory warnings involved in this case work
against a balanced flow of information in our
communication structures and do so without respecting
freedom of speech by casting a chilling effect on the media.
This is definitely not the policy environment contemplated
by the Constitution.
SEPARATE OPINION

(DISSENTING AND CONCURRING)
TINGA, J.:
This case, involving as it does the perennial clash between

fundamental individual freedoms and state power,
confronts the Court with a delicate and difficult balancing
task.
With all due respect with a little more forbearance, the
petition could have been conduced to a denouement of
congruity but without diminishing the level of scrutiny that
the crucial stakes demand. I trust though that future
iterations of this Court, more divorced from some irrational
aspects of the passions of these times, will further refine
the important doctrines laid down today.
Several considerations guide my vote to grant the
petition—to issue the quested writ against the
respondent Department of Justice Secretary Raul M.
Gonzalez (DOJ Secretary), but not as to respondent
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
546

Chavez vs. Gonzales
I.
I begin with some observations on the petition itself filed
by former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, brought
forth in his capacity “as a citizen, taxpayer and a law
practitioner” against the DOJ Secretary and the NTC. At a
crucial point during the deliberations on this case, much of
the focus within the Court was on the aspect of the case
concerning the NTC, to the exclusion of the aspect
concerning the DOJ Secretary. However, the petition itself
only minimally dwells on the powers of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
The petition was filed on 21 June 2005, less than a
month after the so-called Hello Garci tapes (Garci tapes)
hit the newstands. The petition narrates that a few days
after reports on the Garci tapes became public, respondent
DOJ Secretary “threatened that everyone found to be in
possession of the controversial audio tape, as well as those
broadcasting it or printing its contents,1
were liable for
violation of the AntiWiretapping Law,” and subsequently
he ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) “to
go after media organizations found to have caused the
spread, the playing and the printing of the contents” of the
said tape.
Then, a Press Release was issued by respondent NTC,
essentially warning broadcast stations, “[i]f it has been
subsequently established that the said tapes are false
and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate
investigation…[,] that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses2
or authorizations issued to the said
companies.” These essentially are the antecedent facts
raised in the petition.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 8.
2 Id., at pp. 10-11.
547
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
Petitioner presents two general arguments for our

determination: that respondents violated the constitutional3
provisions on the freedom of expression and of the press,
and of the right4 of the people to information on matters of
public concern; and that the NTC acted beyond its powers
as a regulatory body when it warned broadcast stations of
consequences if5 they continued to air the contents of the
disputed tapes.
Fifteen (15) pages are assigned to the first issue, while
four (4) pages are allotted to the second issue concerning
the NTC. In the context of arguing that there had been
prior restraint, petitioner manifests that “the threat of
crackdown on media and the public were calculated to sow
fear and terror in advance of actual publication and6
dissemination of the contents of the controversial tapes.”
Because of such “fear and terror,” the public was denied
free access 7 to information as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Only four (4) pages are devoted to whether the NTC
exceeded its discretion when it issued the Press Release.
About two (2) of the four (4) pages are utilized to cite the
statutory provisions delineating the powers and functions
of the NTC. The citations are geared toward the claim that
“NTC is independent in so far as8 its regulatory and quasi-
judicial functions are concerned.” Then the petition argues
that nothing in the functions of the NTC “warrants the pre-
emptive action it took on June 11, 2005 of declaring in a
Press Release that airing of the contents of the
controversial tape already constituted a
_______________
3 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 4.

4 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 7. The Decision however has properly refused
to dwell on the right to information as central to the case at bar. See
Decision, p. 9.
5 Rollo, p. 18.
6 Id., at p. 23.
7 Id., at p. 24.
8 Rollo, p. 34.
548
Chavez vs. Gonzales
9
violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law.” The petition also
states that “[w]orse, the judgment of NTC was outright,
without a hearing to determine the alleged commission of a
crime and violation of the certificate
10
of authority issued to
radio and television stations,” though this point is neither
followed up nor bolstered by appropriate citations which
should be plenty.
One relevant point of fact is raised in the Comment filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of
respondents. Three (3) days after the issuance of the Press
Release, the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa
Pilipinas (KBP) issued a Joint Statement crafted after a
dialogue between them. The Joint Statement declares:
“2. NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the

press and the right to information on matters of
public concern. KBP & its members have always
been committed to the exercise of press freedom
with high sense of responsibility and discerning
judgment of fairness and honesty.
3. NTC did not issue any Memorandum Circular or
Order constituting a restraint of press freedom or
censorship. The NTC further denies and does not
intend to limit or restrict the interview of members
of the opposition or free expression of views.
4. What is being asked by NTC is that 11
the exercise of
press freedom be done responsibly.”
II.
Based on the petition, the determinative questions appear
to be: (1) whether the DOJ Secretary may be enjoined from
prosecuting or threatening to prosecute any person for
possessing or broadcasting the contents of the Garci tapes,
an act which allegedly violates the free expression clause if
not also the right to information clause; and (2) whether
the NTC may be enjoined from sanctioning or threatening
to sanction any
_______________
9 Id., at p. 34.
10 Id., at p. 37.
11 Id., at p. 111.
549
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
broadcast media outlet for broadcasting the Garci tapes, an

action also alleged to infringe the aforementioned
constitutional rights.
It should be stressed that there are critical differences
between the factual and legal milieu of the assailed act of
the DOJ Secretary, on one hand, and that of the questioned
conduct of the NTC, on the other. The act complained of the
NTC consists in the issuance of a Press Release, while that
of the DOJ Secretary is not encapsulated in a piece of paper
but comprised in utterances which nonetheless were well
documented by the news reports at that time. There is an
element of caution raised in the Press Release in that it
does not precisely sanction or threaten to immediately
sanction the broadcast media for airing the Garci tapes,
but it raises that possibility on the condition that “it has
been subsequently established that the said tapes are false
investigation.” No such suspensive condition is embodied in
the assailed acts of the DOJ Secretary.
And most critical in my view is the distinction between
the NTC and the DOJ Secretary with respect to the
breadth and reach of their ability to infringe upon the right
to free expression. The NTC is a quasi-judicial regulatory
body attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications exercising regulatory jurisdiction over a
limited set of subjects: the broadcast media,
telecommunications companies, etc. In the scope of its
regulatory jurisdiction, it concededly has some capacity to
impose sanctions or otherwise perform acts that could
impinge on the right of its subjects of regulation to free
expression, although the precise parameters of its legal
authority to exercise such actions have not yet been fully
defined by this Court.
In contrast, the ability of the DOJ Secretary and the
office that he heads to infringe on the right to free
expression is quite capacious. Unlike the NTC whose power
of injunction and sanction is limited to its subjects of
regulation, the DOJ
550

Chavez vs. Gonzales
Secretary heads the department of government which has

the premier faculty to initiate and litigate the prosecution
of just about anybody.
III.
It should be assumed without controversy that the Garci
tapes fall within the protection of the free expression
clause.
Much has been said in homage to the right to free
expression. It is precisely the underlying reason I can write
this submission, and the reader can read this opinion or
any news account concerning the decision and its various
separate opinions. The revolutions we celebrate in our
history books were animated in part by an insistence
12
that
this right should be recognized as integral. The right
inheres in the first yawl of the newborn infant, and allows
a person to speak honestly in the throes of death.
In 20th century American jurisprudence, the right to
free speech and expression has been rightly linked to the 13
inalienable right to liberty under the due process clause.
Indeed,
_______________
12 “Freedom of expression was a concept unknown to Philippine

jurisprudence prior to 1900. It was one of the burning issues during the
Filipino campaign against Spain, first, in the writings of the Filipino
propagandists, and, finally, in the armed revolt against the mother
country. Spain’s refusal to recognize the right was, in fact, a prime cause
of the revolution.” J. BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:ACOMMENTARY (1996 ed.), at pp.
203-204.
13 Beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). “For
present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.” Id., at p. 666. “The incorporation of the other
First Amendment rights followed. In 1931, the Supreme Court held
squarely that the freedom of the press is within the protection of the
‘liberty’ guaranteed in the Fourteenth
551
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
liberty cannot be actualized unless it encompasses liberty

of speech and expression. As a consequence, the same
methodology as applied to due process and equal protection
cases may hold as well to free expression cases.
In my view, the operative principles that should govern
the adjudication of free expression cases are
uncomplicated. The infringement on the right by the State
can take the mode of a content-based regulation or a
content-neutral regulation. With respect to content-based
regulations, the only expressions that may be proscribed or
punished are the traditionally recognized unprotected
expressions—those that are obscene, pose danger to
national security
14
or incite imminent lawless action, or are
defamatory. In order that such unprotected expressions
may be restrained, it must be demonstrated that they pose
a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive
evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, such
danger being grave and imminent as well. But as to all
other protected expressions, there can be no content-based
regulation at all. No prior restraint, no subsequent
punishment.
For as long as the expression is not libelous or
slanderous, not obscene, or otherwise not dangerous to the
immediate well-being of the State and of any other’s, it is
guaranteed protection by the Constitution. I do not find it
material whether the protected expression is of a political,
religious,
_______________
Amendment (Near v. Minnesota, [283 U.S. 697 (1931)]; in 1937 the

right of peaceable assembly was included (DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353); and in 1940 the freedom-of-religion provision was used to invalidate
a Connecticut statute requiring a permit for all solicitors for religious and
charitable causes (Cantwell v. Connecticut, [310 U.S. 296 (1940)]” A.T
Mason & W. Beaney, American Constitutional Law (4th ed.), at pp. 496-
497.
14 The views of this writer on the proper interpretation of our libel laws
in light of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution were expressed in
Guingging v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, 30 September 2005, 471
SCRA 516.
552

Chavez vs. Gonzales
personal, humorous or trivial nature—they all find equal

comfort in the Constitution. Neither should it matter
through what medium the expression is conveyed, whether
through the print or broadcast media, through the Internet
or through interpretative dance. For as long as it does not
fall under the above-mentioned exceptions, it is accorded
the same degree of protection by the Constitution.
Still concerning the protection afforded to the tapes, I do
take issue with Justice Carpio’s view that “[t]he airing of
the Garci tapes is essentially a political expression because
it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly
improper conversations with a COMELEC
Commissioner…” and that the contents 15
of the tapes “affect
gravely the sanctity of the ballot.” These statements are
oriented towards the conclusion that “[i]f ever there is a
hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression
would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds
of political expression, the subject
16
of fair and honest
elections would be at the top.” Yet even the majority
opinion acknowledges that “the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect…” and “[t]he identity of the
wiretappers, the manner of its commission, and other
related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of
this case…given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is
even arguable whether
17
its airing would violate the anti-
wiretapping law.”
To be blunt, it would be downright pretentious for the
Court to attribute to the tapes any definitive character,
political or otherwise, because there is simply no basis for
us to make such conclusion at this point. But even if they
are not of a political character, they nonetheless find
protection under the free expression clause.
_______________
15 Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio, p. 16.

16 Id.
17 Decision, p. 34.
553
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
IV.
Given the constitutionally protected character of the tapes,
it still falls upon the petition to establish that there was an
actual infringement of the right to expression by the two

denominated respondents—the DOJ Secretary and the
NTC—in order that the reliefs sought may avail. There are
two distinct (though not necessarily exclusive) means by
which the infringement can be committed by either or both
of the respondents—through prior restraint or through an
act that creates a chilling effect on the exercise of such
right.
I turn first to the assailed acts of the NTC.
It is evident from the Decision and the concurring
opinion of Justice Carpio that they give primary
consideration to the aspect relating to the NTC,
notwithstanding the relative lack of attention devoted by
the petition to that issue. The impression they leave thus is
that the assailed acts of the NTC were somehow more
egregious than those of the DOJ Secretary. Worse, both the
Decision and the concurring opinion reach certain
conclusions on the nature of the Press Release which are,
with due respect, untenable.
IV-A.
As a means of nullifying the Press Release, the document
has been characterized as a form of prior restraint which is
generally impermissible under the free expression clause.
The concept of prior restraint is traceable to as far back as
Blackstone’s Commentaries from the 18th century. Its
application is integral to the development of the modern
democracy. “In the first place, the main purpose of such
constitutional provisions is ‘to prevent all such previous
restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments,’ and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be
554

Chavez vs. Gonzales
18
deemed contrary to the 19
public welfare.” In Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart, the United States Supreme Court
noted that “prior restraints on speech and publication are
the most serious and the20 least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights.”
Yet prior restraint “by contrast and21by definition, has an
immediate and irreversible sanction.” The assailed act of
the NTC, contained in what is after all an unenforceable
Press Release, hardly constitutes “an immediate and
irreversible sanction.” In fact, as earlier noted, the Press
Release does not say that it would immediately sanction a

broadcast station which airs the Garci tapes. What it does
say is that only “if it has been subsequently established
that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a
prosecution or appropriate investigation” that the stations
could be subjected to possible suspension. It is evident that
the issuance does not prohibit the airing of the Garci tapes
or require that the broadcast stations obtain permission
from the government or the NTC to air such tapes.
How then have my esteemed colleagues, the Chief
Justice and Justice Carpio, arrived at their conclusion that
the Press Release operated as a prior restraint? Justice
Carpio characterizes the Press Release as a “warning,” and
the document does use the word “warned,” yet a warning is
not “an immediate and irreversible sanction.” The warning
embodied in the Press Release is neither a legally
enforceable vehicle to impose sanction nor a legally binding
condition precedent that presages the actual sanction.
However one may react to the Press Release or the
perceived intent behind it, the issuance still does not
constitute “an immediate and irreversible sanction.”
_______________
18 See e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Near v.

Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
19 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
20 Id., at p. 559.
21 Id.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
On the other hand, the Decision discusses extensively what

prior restraint is, characterizing it, among others things, as
“official government restrictions on the press or other forms
of expression 22 in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.” The majority enumerates certain
governmental acts which constitute prior restraint, such as
the approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits
as prerequisites to publication including the payment of
license taxes for the privilege to publish; injunctions
against publication; the closure of the business or printing
offices of certain newspapers; or more generally, “[a]ny law
or official [act] that requires some form
23
of permission to be
had before publication can be made.”
The Press Release does not fit into any of the acts
described above in the majority opinion. Neither can it be
identified as an “official government restriction” as it
simply does not levy any actual restriction on the subjects
of NTC regulation. Still, without undertaking a
demonstration how the Press Release actually restrained
free expression, the majority surprisingly makes a leap of
logic, concluding as it does that such an informal act as a 24
press statement is covered by the prior restraint concept.
As with Justice Carpio, the majority does not precisely
explain how the Press Release could constitute an actual
restraint, worded as it was with nary a notion of restriction
and given its lack “of an immediate and irreversible
sanction.”
Absent prior restraint, no presumption of invalidity can
arise.
IV-B.
I fear that the majority especially has unduly fused the
concepts of “prior restraint” and “chilling effect.” There are
a
_______________
22 Decision, p. 19; citing J. BERNAS,THE1987CONSTITUTION OF

THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:ACOMMENTARY, 225 (2003
ed.)
23 Id.
24 Id., at p. 35.
556

Chavez vs. Gonzales
few similarities between the two concepts especially that

both come into operation before the actual speech or
expression finds light. At the same time, there are
significant differences.
A government act that has a chilling effect on the
exercise of free expression is an infringement within the
constitutional purview. As the liberal lion25Justice William
Brennan announced, in NAACP v. Button, “the threat of
restraint, as opposed to actual restraint itself, may
deter the exercise of the right to free expression
almost as 26 potently as the actual application of
sanctions.” Such threat of restraint is perhaps a more
insidious, if not sophisticated, means for the State to
trample on free speech. Protected expression is chilled

simply by speaking softly while carrying a big stick.
In distinguishing chilling effect from prior restraint,
Nebraska Press Association, citing Bickel, observed, “[i]f it
can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
publication ‘chills’ speech,
27
prior restraint “freezes” it at
least for the time.” An act of government that chills
expression is subject to nullification or injunction from the
courts, as it violates Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution. “Because government retaliation tends to
chill an individual’s exercise of his right to free expression,
public officials may not, as a general rule, respond to an
individual’s protected activity with conduct or speech even
though that conduct or speech28
would otherwise be a lawful
exercise of public authority.
On the one hand, Justice Carpio does not bother to
engage in any “chilling effect” analysis. On the other hand,
the major-
_______________
25 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

26 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). Emphasis supplied.
27 Supra note 19 at p. 559; citing A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT (1975).
28 The Baltimore Sun Company v. Ehrlich, No. 05-1297 (U.S. 4th
Circuit), 15 February 2006; citing Board of Country Commissioners v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996).
557
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 557

Chavez vs. Gonzales
ity does conclude that the acts of the NTC had a chilling
effect. Was there truly a chilling effect resulting from the
Press Release of the NTC?
While the act or issuance itself may evince the
impression of a chilling effect, there still must be factual
evidence to support the conclusion that a particular act of
government actually engendered a chilling effect. There
appears to be no case in American jurisprudence
where a First Amendment claim went forward in the
absence29 of evidence that speech was actually
chilled.
In a case30 decided just last year by a U.S. District Court
in Georgia, the following summary was provided on the
evidentiary requirement in claims of a chilling effect in the
exercise of First Amendment rights such as free speech and

association:
4. Proof of Chilling Effect
Defendants’ argue that Plaintiffs have failed to introduce evidence

of a chilling effect, which is required to maintain a First
Amendment claim. There is some uncertainty regarding the
extent of evidence required to sustain a First Amendment
challenge based on the chilling effect of compelled disclosure of
protected political activity. See In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842
F.2d 1229, 1235-36 (11th Cir.1988). The Supreme Court has
indicated on several occasions that some evidence of a chilling
effect is required.
In NAACP, for example, the Supreme Court accepted that a
chilling effect would result from the compelled disclosure of the
NAACP’s membership lists because of “uncontroverted evidence”
in the record that members of the NAACP had suffered past
adversity
_______________
29 “The Court notes, however, that it has found no case in which a First
Amendment claim went forward in the absence of allegations or evidence
that speech was actually chilled.” Zieper v. Metzinger, No. 00 Civ. 5595
(PKC), U.S. District Court, S.D. New York, 22 August 2005; citing Davis v.
Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d at p. 464.
30 Local 491, International Brotherhood of Police Officers v. Gwinnet
County, 510 F.Supp. 2d1271.
558

Chavez vs. Gonzales
as a result of their known membership in the group. 357 U.S. at

46465, 78 S.Ct. 1163. The Court in Buckley v. Valeo, however,
emphasized, in rejecting a challenge to campaign finance
disclosure laws based on its alleged chilling effect on political
association, that there was no record evidence of a chilling effect
proving a violation of the right to association. Buckley, 424 U.S. at
71-72, 96 S.Ct. 612 (noting that failure to tender evidence of
chilling effect lessened scrutiny applied to First Amendment
challenge to campaign donation disclosure laws).
Seizing on this apparent evidentiary requirement, several
lower courts have rejected right of association challenges for lack
of evidence of a chilling effect. See, e.g., Richey v. Tyson, 120
F.Supp.2d 1298, 1324 (S.D.Ala.2000) (requiring, in challenge of
campaign finance law, evidence of a “reasonable probability” of

threats, harassment, or reprisals “from sources such as specific
evidence of past or present harassment of members or of the
organization, a pattern of threats, specific manifestations of
public hostility, or conduct visited on organizations holding
similar views”); Alabama State Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO
v. James, 656 F.2d 193, 197 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept.17, 1981)
(rejecting right of association challenge for lack of evidence of
chilling effect); Int’l Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots,
575 F.2d 896, 905 (D.C.Cir.1978) (same).
But the Eleventh Circuit has drawn a distinction between
challenges to political campaign donation disclosure rules of the
sort at issue in Buckley and Richey and challenges to government
investigations into “particular political group or groups” of the
sort in NAACP and at issue in this case. See In re Grand Jury
Proceeding, 842 F.2d at 1236. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit
suggested that a “more lenient” showing applies to targeted
investigations because “the government investigation itself may
indicate the possibility of harassment.” Id.; see also Pollard v.
Roberts, 283 F.Supp. 248, 258 (D.C.Ark.1968), aff’d per curiam
393 U.S. 14, 89 S.Ct. 47, 21 L.Ed.2d 14 (1968) (finding
prosecutor’s attempt to subpoena the names of contributors to a
political campaign unconstitutional, despite “no evidence of record
in this case that any individuals have as yet been subjected to
reprisals on account of the contributions in question,” because “it
would be naive not to recognize that the disclosure of the
identities of contributors to campaign funds would subject at least
some of them to potential economic or political reprisals of greater
or lesser severity”); cf. also Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of
Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1366-67 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding,
without discuss
559
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
ing record evidence of chilling effect, that statute which required

disclosure of names of principal stockholders of adult
entertainment establishments was abridgement of First
Amendment).
In addition, concerns about the economic vulnerabilities of
public employees have led courts to more easily find the presence
of a chilling effect on disclosure rules imposed on public
employees. See, e.g., Local 1814, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-
CIO v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 667 F.2d 267,
271-72 (2d Cir.1981). Where the government has “pervasive
control over the economic livelihood” or “professional destiny” of
its employees, it may be obvious that compelling disclosure of

organizational affiliations under threat of discipline could create a
“substantial danger” of an “inevitable” chilling effect. Id. Thus,
when examining freedom of association challenges in the public
employment context, courts have applied a “common sense
approach.” Id. at 272; see also Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486, 81 S.Ct.
247 (noting, in finding questionnaire distributed to public
teachers inquiring into their organizational memberships
unconstitutional, that burden on teacher’s freedom to associate
was “conspicuously accented when the teacher serves at the
absolute will of those to whom the disclosure must be made,” and
not discussing evidence of chilling effect); Fraternal Order of
Police, 812 F.2d at 119-20 (“We recognize that the record contains
no evidence that would support a finding that a required response
to this question would chill the applicant’s or family member’s
associational activities. However, in light of the absence of any
legitimate interest asserted by the City to justify the inquiry, we
conclude that the question would not even withstand a more
relaxed scrutiny than that usually applied31
to questions which
seek disclosure of associational ties.”).”
It makes utter sense to impose even a minimal evidentiary

requirement before the Court can conclude that a
particular government action has had a chilling effect on
free speech. Without an evidentiary standard, judges will
be forced to rely on intuition and even personal or political
sentiments as the basis for determining whether or not a
chilling effect is present. That is a highly dangerous
precedent, and one that clearly has not been accepted in
the United States. In fact, in
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 1294-1296.
560

Chavez vs. Gonzales
32
Zieper v. Metzinger, the U.S. District Court of New York
found it relevant, in ruling against the petitioner, that
Zieper “has stated 33affirmatively that his speech was not
chilled in any way.” “Where a party can show no change in
his behavior, he has quite plainly shown34
no chilling of his
First Amendment right to free speech.”
In view of its regulatory jurisdiction over broadcast
media, the ability of the NTC to infringe the right to free
expression extends only to its subjects of regulation, not to

private persons such as petitioner. Thus, to consider at bar
whether or not the NTC Press Release had a chilling effect,
one must look into the evidence on record establishing the
broadcast media’s reaction to the Press Release.
The majority states that “[t]here is enough evidence of
chilling effect of the complained acts of record,” alluding to
“the warnings given to media [which] came from no less the
NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate
35
of
Authority of the radio and broadcast media.” With due
respect, I submit that what the record establishes is merely
the presence of the cause for chilling (the Press Release),
but not the actual chilling effect itself on the broadcast
media. In that respect, the Joint Statement of the NTC and
the KBP executed just three (3) days after the issuance of
the Press Release, becomes material.
In the employment of the “chilling effect mode of
analysis,” disregarding the actual effects would mean
dispensing with any evidentiary requirement for the
constitutional claim. That is a doctrine which does not bode
well for the Court’s future in constitutional adjudication,
and one I expect that will be significantly modified in due
time.
_______________
32 Supra note 18.

33 Id., at p. 526.
34 Id., citing Curly v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001), at p.
73.
35 Decision, p. 35.
561
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
In the Joint Statement, the KBP assented to the

manifestation that “NTC did not issue any [Memorandum
Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of press freedom
or censorship, as well as disavowed having acted or
intending “to limit or restrict the interview of36members of
the opposition or free expression of views.” The Joint
Statement can certainly be taken in favor of the NTC as
proof that its Press Release did not actually create a
chilling effect on the broadcast media. On its face, it
evinces the KBP’s contentment with the Press Release and
all other steps taken by the NTC with respect to the Garci
tapes, coupled with the acknowledgment that the NTC had

not infringed the right to free expression of its subjects of
regulation.
The majority casts aspersions on the KBP for
“inexplicably joining the NTC in issuing an ambivalent
Joint Press Statement” and on the perceived “silence on 37
the
sidelines on the part of some media practitioners.” Yet
these are derogatory conjectures that are not supported by
the record. It is quite easy to draw such negative inference,
but there is another inference that can be elicited from the
evidence on record—that the KBP was so satisfied with the
NTC’s actions it consented to the averments in the Joint
Statement. Since Independence, and outside of the Marcos
years, there is no tradition of cowardice on the part of the
Philippine media, even in the face of government
retribution. Indeed, it is false and incongruous to dilute
with aspersions of docility and inertness the true image of
the most robust, vigilant and strident media in Asia.
The best indication that the Philippine broadcast media
was cowered or chilled by the NTC Press Release, if ever,
would have been its initiation of a suit similar to that at
bar, or its participation herein. The fact that it did not can
lead to the reasonable assumption that the Press Release
did not
_______________
36 Rollo, p. 86.
37 Decision, pp. 35-36.
562

Chavez vs. Gonzales
instill fear in the members of the broadcast media, for they

have since then, commendably and in true-to-form fashion
challenged before the courts other NTC issuances which
they perceived
38
as actual threats to their right to free
expression.
It bears adding that I had proposed during the
deliberations of this case that the KBP or other large media
organizations be allowed to intervene should they be so
minded, if only to elicit their views for the record whether
the NTC by issuing the Press Release truly chilled the
exercise of their rights to expression, notwithstanding the
Joint Statement. After all, it would be paternalistic at
best, presumptuous at worst, for the Court to assume
that conclusion without affording the broadcast

media the opportunity to present its views on the
question. Yet a majority of the members of the Court
declined to take that step, thereby disallowing the
introduction of more sufficient evidence to warrant
a ruling against the NTC.
Thus, we are left with utter paucity of evidence that the
NTC had infringed the press freedom of its subjects of
regulation mainly because of the broadcast media’s
nonparticipation in the petition at bar. If only on that
account, I have to vote against the writ sought against the
NTC. To decide otherwise would simply set an injudicious
precedent that permits the affirmative relief to
constitutional claims without having to bother with the
need for evidence.
There is another point raised with respect to the NTC
aspect of this case, and that is the question of whether the
NTC actually has the statutory authority to enjoin or
sanction the broadcast of the tapes. The majority opinion
does not conclusively settle that question, and that is for
the best, given the absence of comprehensive arguments
offered by the petitioner
_______________
38 At least one case which has reached this Court challenges the
validity of certain issuances of the NTC which were promulgated or
reiterated shortly after the February 2006 declaration of a “state of
emergency.”
563
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 563

Chavez vs. Gonzales
on that issue. I reserve my right to offer an opinion on that

question in the appropriate case. Suffice it to say, there are
at least two other cases now pending with this Court which
raise precisely that question as the central issue and not
merely as an afterthought. Those cases, which do offer
more copious arguments on that issue than those presented
before us, would provide a more fortuitous venue for the
settlement of those questions.
IV-C.
The majority and concurring opinions hardly offer any
rebuke to the DOJ Secretary even as they vote to grant
affirmative relief against his actions. This ensued, I
suspect, due to the undue focus placed on the arguments

concerning the NTC, even though the petition itself was not
so oriented. But for my part, it is the unequivocal threats to
prosecute wouldbe-offenders, made no less by the head of
the principal law agency of the government charged39 with
the administration of the criminal justice system, that
constitute the violation of a fundamental freedom that in
turn warrants this Court’s intervention.
The particular acts complained of the40 DOJ Secretary are
explained41 in detail in the petition, narrated in the
decision, and corroborated by contemporary news
accounts published
_______________
39 See Section 1, Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV, Administrative Code of

1987, which contains the “Declaration of Policy” of the Department of
Justice. “It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government
with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional
system; x x x”
40 Rollo, pp. 8-10.
41 Decision, pp. 3-4.
564

Chavez vs. Gonzales
42
at that time. The threats are directed at anybody in
possession of, or intending to broadcast or disseminate, the
tapes. Unlike the NTC, the DOJ Secretary has the actual
capability to infringe the right to free expression of even
the petitioner, or of anybody for that matter, since his office
is empowered to initiate criminal prosecutions. Thus,
petitioner’s averments in his petition and other
submissions comprise the evidence of the DOJ Secretary’s
infringement of the freedom of speech and expression.
Was there an actual infringement of the right to free
expression committed by the DOJ Secretary? If so, how was
such accomplished? Quite clearly, the DOJ Secretary did
infringe on the right to43 free expression by employing “the
threat of restraint,” thus embodying “government
retaliation [that] tends to chill
44
an individual’s exercise of
his right to free expression.” The DOJ Secretary plainly
and directly threatened anyone in possession of the Garci
tapes, or anyone who aired or disseminated the same, with

the extreme sanction of criminal prosecution and possible
imprisonment. He reiterated the threats as he directed the
NBI to investigate the airing of the tapes. He even
extended the warning of sanction to the Executive Press
Secretary. These threats were evidently designed to stop
the airing or dissemination of the Garci tapes—a protected
expression which cannot be enjoined by executive fiat.
Tasked with undertaking the defense of the DOJ
Secretary, the OSG offered not even a ghost of a contest as
soon as the bell for the first round rang. In abject
surrender, it squeezed
_______________
42 See e.g., “DOJ warns media vs. playing tapes” (first published by
ABS-CBN News on 10 June 2005), at
http://www.abscbnnews.com/topofthehour.aspx?StoryId=7564 (last visited,
13 February 2008).
43 See note 26.
44 See note 28.
565
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
45
in just one paragraph in its 27-page Comment for that
purpose.
The arguments offered in that solitary paragraph are
meager. It avers that the media reports are without
probative value or, at best, inconclusive as the declarations
therein 46may have been quoted inaccurately or out of
context. Yet47
the OSG does not deny that the statements
were made, failing even to offer what may have been the
“accurate context.” The OSG also points out that the DOJ
Secretary has not actually “made any issuance, order or
instruction to the NBI to go after such media
organizations.” Yet the fact that the DOJ Secretary has yet
to make operational his threats does not dissuade from the
conclusion that the threats alone already chilled the
atmosphere of free speech or expression.
V.
By way of epilogue, I note
48
that the Garci tapes have found
shelter in the Internet after the broadcast media lost
interest in airing those tapes, after the newsprint that
contained the transcript had dissembled. The tapes are
widely available on the Internet and not only in websites

maintained by traditional media outfits, but also in such
media-sharing sites as Google-owned YouTube,
49
which has
at least 20 different files of the tapes. Internationally
popular websites such as the online encyclopedia Wikipedia
have linked to the tapes as
_______________
45 Rollo, p. 75.
46 Id.
47 See also note 42.
48 Already, the U.S. Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU , 521 U.S. 844 had
pronounced that the factors that justify the government regulation of the
broadcast medium are not present in cyberspace. It will be inevitable that
this Court will soon have to adjudicate a similar issue.
49 See http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Hello+Garci.
(“Search Results for “Hello Garci”).
566

Chavez vs. Gonzales
50
well. Then there is the fact that excerpts of the tapes were
remixed and widely distributed as a popular ringtone for
cellular phones.
Indeed, the dimensions of the issue have long extended
beyond the Philippine mass media companies and the NTC.
This issue was hardly limited to the right of Philippine
broadcast media to air the tapes without sanction from the
NTC. It involved the right of any person wherever in the
world situated to possess and disseminate copies of the
tape without fear of reprisal from the Philippine
government.
Still, the vitality of the right to free expression remains
the highlight of this case. Care and consideration should be
employed in presenting such claims before the courts, and
the hope is for a growing sophistication and specialization
in the litigation of free speech cases.
For all the above, I vote to GRANT the petition against
respondent DOJ Secretary and DISMISS the same insofar
as the NTC is concerned.
CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINIONS
VELASCO, JR., J.:

I concur in the results of the majority opinion penned by

Chief Justice Puno, but only insofar as the NTC aspect of
the case is concerned.
The opinion of the Chief Justice—upon which this
concurrence hinges—is to the effect that the warning
issued by the NTC, by way of a press release, that the
continuous airing or broadcast of the “Garci Tapes” is a
violation of the AntiWiretapping Law, restricts the freedom
of speech and of the press and constitutes a content-based
prior restraint impermissible under the Constitution. The
quality of impermissi-
_______________
50 See “Hello Garci scandal” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hello_Garci).
567
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
bility comes in owing to the convergence and combined

effects of the following postulates, to wit: the warning was
issued at the time when the “Garci Tapes” was newspaper
headline and radio/TV primetime material; it was given by
the agency empowered to issue, suspend, or altogether
cancel the certificate of authority of owners or operators of
radio or broadcast media; the chilling effect the warning
has on media owners, operators, or practitioners; and facts
are obtaining casting doubt on the proposition that airing
the controversial tape would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
I also agree with the Chief Justice’s observation that the
prior restraining warning need not be embodied in a formal
order or circular, it being sufficient that such warning was
made by a government agency, NTC in this case, in the
performance of its official duties. Press releases on a
certain subject can rightfully be treated as statements of
official position or policy, as the case may be, on such
subject.
To me, the facts on record are sufficient to support a
conclusion that the press release issued by NTC—with all
the unmistakable threat embodied in it of a possible
cancellation of licenses and/or the filing of criminal cases
against erring media owners and practitioners—constitutes
a clear instance of prior restraint. Not lost on this writer is
the fact that five (5) days after it made the press release in
question, NTC proceeded to issue jointly with the
Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP)

another press release to clarify that the earlier one issued
was not intended to limit or restrain press freedom. With
the view I take of the situation, the very fact that the KBP
agreed to come up with the joint press statement that
“NTC did not issue any [Memorandum Circular] or order
constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship”
tends to prove, rather than disprove, the threatening and
chilling tone of its June 11, 2005 press release. If there was
no prior restraint from the point of view of media, why was
there a need to hold a dialogue with KBP and then issue a
clarifying joint statement?
568

Chavez vs. Gonzales
Moreover, the fact that media owners, operators, and

practitioners appeared to have been frozen into inaction,
not making any visible effort to challenge the validity of
the NTC press statement, or at least join the petitioner in
his battle for press freedom, can only lead to the conclusion
that the chilling effect of the statement left them
threatened.
The full ventilation of the issues in an oral argument
would have been ideal, particularly so since TV and radio
operators and owners opted not to intervene nor were
asked to give their comment on the chilling effect of the
NTC press statement. Nonetheless, I find the admissions in
the pleadings and the attachments thereto to be more than
sufficient to judiciously resolve this particular issue. The
contents of the June 11, 2005 press release eloquently
spoke for themselves. The NTC “warning” is in reality a
threat to TV and radio station owners and operators not to
air or broadcast the “Garci Tapes” in any of their programs.
The four corners of the NTC’s press statement
unequivocally reveal that the “Garci Tapes” may not be
authentic as they have yet to be duly authenticated. It is a
statement of fact upon which the regulatory body
predicated its warning that its airing or broadcast will
constitute false or misleading dissemination of information
that could result in the suspension or cancellation of their
respective licenses or franchises. The press statement was
more than a mere notice of a possible suspension. Its
crafting and thrust made it more of a threat—a declaration
by the regulatory body that the operators or owners should
not air or broadcast the tapes. Otherwise, the menacing
portion on suspension or cancellation of their franchises to

operate TV/radio station will be implemented. Indeed, the
very press statement speaks eloquently on the chilling
effect on media. One has to consider likewise the fact that
the warning was not made in an official NTC circular but
in a press statement. The press statement was calculated
to immediately inform the affected sectors, unlike the
warning done in a circular which may not reach the
intended recipients as fast.
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
In all, the NTC statement coupled with other

circumstances convince this writer that there was indeed a
chilling effect on the TV/radio owners, in particular, and
media, in general.
While the Court has several pieces of evidence to fall
back on and judiciously resolve the NTC press release
issue, the situation is different with respect to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) warning issue. What is at
hand are mere allegations in the petition that, on June 8,
2005, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters in possession of copies of the compact disc
containing the alleged “Garci” wiretapped conversation and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents that they
could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act, adding
that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody who had personal knowledge of the crime
committed 1 or in whose presence the crime was being
committed.
There was no proof at all of the possible chilling effect
that the alleged statements of DOJ Secretary Gonzales had
on the reporters and media practitioners. The DOJ
Secretary, as head of the prosecution arm of the
government and lead administrator of the2 criminal justice
system under the Administrative Code is, to be sure,
impliedly empowered to issue reminders and warnings
against violations of penal statutes. And it is a known fact
that Secretary Gonzales had issued, and still issues, such
kind of warnings. Whether or not he exceeded his mandate
under premises is unclear. It is for this main reason that I
found the prior-restraint issue in the DOJ aspect of the
case not yet ripe for adjudication.
I, therefore, register my concurrence with the ponencia

of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno insofar as it nullifies the
official statement made by respondent NTC on June 11,
2005,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-9 & 59.

2 Sec. 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV.
570

Chavez vs. Gonzales
but dissent, with regrets, with respect to the nullification of

the June 8, 2005 official statement of respondent Secretary
of Justice.
SEPARATE OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
With all due respect, I vote to dismiss the present Petition

for the simple reason that the assailed press statements
made by the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) and the Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales
(Gonzales) do not constitute prior restraint that impair
freedom of speech. There being no restraint on free speech,
then there is even no need to apply any of the tests, i.e., the
dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interests
test, and the clear and present danger rule, to determine
whether such restraint is valid.
The assailed press statements must be understood and
interpreted in the proper perspective. The statements must
be read in their entirety, and interpreted in the context in
which they were made.
A scrutiny of the “fair warning” issued by the NTC on 11
June 2005 reveals that it is nothing more than that, a fair
warning, calling for sobriety, care, and circumspection in
the news reporting and current affairs coverage by radio
and television stations. It reminded the owners and
operators of the radio stations and television networks of
the provisions in NTC Memorandum Circulars No. 11-12-
85 and 22-89, which are also stated in the authorizations
and permits granted to them by the government, that they
shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or
telecasting of false information or willful

misrepresentation. It must be emphasized that the NTC is
merely reiterating the very same prohibition already
contained in its previous circulars, and even in the
authorizations and permits of radio and television stations.
The reason thus escapes me as to why said prohibition,
when it was
571
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
stated in the NTC Memorandum Circulars and in the

authorizations and permits, was valid and acceptable, but
when it was reiterated in a mere press statement
released by the NTC, had become a violation of the
Constitution as a prior restraint on free speech.
In the midst of the media frenzy that surrounded the
Garci tapes, the NTC, as the administrative body tasked
with the regulation of radio and television broadcasting
companies, cautioned against the airing of the
unauthenticated tapes. The warning of the NTC was
expressed in the following manner, “[i]f it has been (sic)
subsequently established that the said tapes are false
investigation, the concerned radio and television companies
are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
companies.” According to the foregoing sentence, before
any penalty could be imposed on a radio or television
company for airing the Garci tapes, the tapes must
have been established to be false and fraudulent after
prosecution and investigation. The warning is nothing
new for it only verbalizes and applies to the particular
situation at hand an existing prohibition against spreading
false information or willful misrepresentation by broadcast
companies. In fact, even without the contested “fair
warning” issued by the NTC, broadcast companies could
still face penalties if, after investigation and prosecution,
the Garci tapes are established to be false and fraudulent,
and the airing thereof was done to purposely spread false
information or misrepresentation, in violation of the
prohibition stated in the companies’ authorizations and
permits, as well as the pertinent NTC Memorandum
Circulars.
Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that just

three days after its issuance of its “fair warning,” or on 14
June 2005, the NTC again released another press
statement,
572

Chavez vs. Gonzales
this time, jointly made with the Kapisanan ng

Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to the effect that:
JOINT PRESS STATEMENT: NTC AND KBP
• CALL FOR SOBRIETY, RESPONSIBLE

JOURNALISM, AND OBSERVANCE OF LAW, AND
THE RADIO AND TELEVISION CODES.
• NTC RESPECTS AND WILL NOT HINDER
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC
CONCERN. KBP & ITS MEMBERS HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN COMMITTED TO THE EXERCISE (sic) PRESS
FREEDOM WITH HIGH SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND DISCERNING JUDGMENT OF FAIRNESS AND
HONESTY.
• NTC DID NOT ISSUE ANY MC OR ORDER
CONSTITUTING A RESTRAINT OF PRESS FREEDOM
OR CENSORSHIP. NTC FURTHER DENIES AND
DOES NOT INTEND TO LIMIT OR RESTRICT THE
INTERVIEW OF MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION OR
FREE EXPRESSION OF VIEWS.
• WHAT IS BEING ASKED BY NTC IS THAT THE
EXERCISE OF PRESS FREEDOM IS DONE
RESPONSIBLY.
• KBP HAS PROGRAM STANDARDS THAT KBP
MEMBERS WILL OBSERVE IN THE TREATMENT OF
NEWS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS. THESE
INCLUDE VERIFICATION OF SOURCES,
NONAIRING OF MATERIALS THAT WOULD
CONSTITUTE INCITING TO SEDITION AND/OR
REBELLION.
• THE KBP CODES ALSO REQUIRE THAT NO FALSE
STATEMENT OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION
IS MADE IN THE TREATMENT OF NEWS OR
COMMENTARIES.
• THE SUPPOSED WIRETAPPED (sic) TAPES
SHOULD BE TREATED WITH SENSITIVITY AND
HANDLED RESPONSIBLY GIVING DUE

CONSIDERATION TO THE PROCESSES BEING
UNDERTAKEN TO VERIFY
573
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 573

Chavez vs. Gonzales
AND VALIDATE THE AUTHENTICITY AND ACTUAL

CONTENT OF THE SAME.
The relevance of the afore-quoted press statement cannot

be downplayed. It already categorically settles what NTC
meant and how the KBP understood the 11 June 2005 NTC
press statement. We cannot insist to give a different and
more sinister interpretation to the first press statement,
when the second press statement had already particularly
defined the context by which it should be read.
Neither should we give much merit to the statements
made by Secretary Gonzales to the media that he had
already instructed the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to monitor all radio stations and television networks
for possible violations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Secretary Gonzales is one of media’s favorite political
personalities, hounded by reporters, and featured almost
daily in newspapers, radios, and televisions, for his
“quotable quotes,” some of which appeared to have been
uttered spontaneously and flippantly. There was no
showing that Secretary Gonzales had actually and officially
ordered the NBI to conduct said monitoring of radio and
television broadcasts, and that the NBI acted in accordance
with said order. Which leads me to my next point.
We should be judicious in giving too much weight and
credence to press statements. I believe that it would be a
dangerous precedent to rule that press statements should
be deemed an official act of the administrative agency or
public official concerned. Press statements, in general, can
be easily manufactured, prone to alteration or
misinterpretation as they are being reported by the media,
and may, during some instances, have to be made on the
spot without giving the source much time to discern the
ramifications of his statements. Hence, they cannot be
given the same weight and binding effect of official acts in
the form of, say, memorandum orders or circulars.
Even if we assume arguendo that the press statements
are official issuances of the NTC and Secretary Gonzales,
then
574

Chavez vs. Gonzales
the petitioner alleging their unconstitutionality must bear

the burden of proving first that the challenged press
statements did indeed constitute prior restraint, before the
presumption of invalidity of any system of prior restraint
on free speech could arise. Until and unless the petitioner
satisfactorily discharges the said burden of proof, then the
press statements must similarly enjoy the presumption of
validity and constitutionality accorded to statutes, having
been issued by officials of the executive branch, a co-equal.
The NTC and Secretary Gonzales must likewise be
accorded the presumption that they issued the questioned
press statements in the regular performance of their duties
as the regulatory body for the broadcasting industry and
the head of the principal law agency of the government,
respectively.
Significantly also, please allow me to observe that the
purported chilling effect of the assailed press statements
was belied by the fact that the owners and operators of
radio stations and television networks, who were supposed
to feel most threatened by the same, did not find it
necessary to go to court. They should have been the ones to
have felt and attested to the purported chilling effect of
said press statements. Their silence in all this speaks for
itself.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the denial of the
present petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
NACHURA, J.:
I respectfully register my dissent to the majority opinion

penned by the esteemed Chief Justice. The assailed press
releases and statements do not constitute a prior restraint
on free speech. It was not improper for the NTC to warn
the broadcast media that the airing of taped materials, if
subsequently shown to be false, would be a violation of law
and of the terms of their certificate of authority, and could
lead, after
575
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 575

Chavez vs. Gonzales
appropriate investigation, to the cancellation or revocation

of their license.
The Facts
This case arose from events that transpired a year after the
2004 national and local elections, a period marked by
disquiet and unrest; events that rocked the very
foundations of the present administration.
To recall, on June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye conveyed to reporters that the opposition was
planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an
audiotape of a bugged mobile phone conversation allegedly
between the President of the Republic of the Philippines
and a highranking
1
official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).
The following day, June 6, 2005, Secretary Bunye
presented and played two compact discs (CD’s) to the
Malacañan Press Corps, and explained that the first
contained the wiretap, while the second, the spliced,
doctored, and altered version which would suggest that
during the 2004 National and Local Elections the President
instructed the COMELEC 2
official to manipulate in her
favor the election results.
Atty. Alan Paguia, former counsel of then President
Joseph E. Estrada, subsequently released, on June 7, 2005,
the alleged authentic tape recordings of the wiretap.
Included, among others, in the tapes were purported
conversations of the President, First Gentleman Jose
Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner3 Virgilio
Garcillano, and the late Senator Robert Barbers.
On June 8, 2005, respondent Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), Raul Gonzalez, informed
news reporters that persons in possession of copies of the
wiretap and media
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 6-7.

2 Id., at pp. 7 and 58.
3 Id., at pp. 8 and 59.
576

Chavez vs. Gonzales
outlets broadcasting, or publishing the contents thereof,

could be held liable 4 under the Anti-Wiretapping Act
[Republic Act No. 4200 ]. He further told newsmen, on the
following day, that he had already instructed the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to monitor all radio stations
and 5television networks for possible violations of the said
law.
Then, on June 10, 2005, former NBI Deputy Director
Samuel Ong presented to the media the alleged master
tape recordings of the wiretap or the so-called “mother of
all tapes,” and disclosed that their contents were
wiretapped by T/Sgt. Vidal Doble of the Intelligence Service
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP).
6
Ong then
called for the resignation of the President.
On June 11, 2005, after several news reports,
respondent National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) issued the following press release:
Contact:
Office of the Commissioner
National Telecommunications
Commission

BIR Road, East Triangle, Diliman, Quezon City

Tel. 924-4048/924-4037
E-mail: commissioner@ntc.gov.ph
NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND

TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE
ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT NTC
CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS
In view of the unusual situation the country is in today, The (sic)

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) calls for
sobriety among the operators and management of all radio and
television stations in the country and reminds them, especially all
broadcast
_______________
4 Entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for Other
Purposes.”
5 Rollo, pp. 8-9 and 59.
6 Id., at pp. 10 and 59.
577
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 577

Chavez vs. Gonzales
ers, to be careful and circumspect in the handling of news

reportage, coverages of current affairs and discussion of public
issues, by strictly adhering to the pertinent laws of the country,
the current program standards embodied in radio and television
codes and the existing circulars of the NTC.
The NTC said that now, more than ever, the profession of
broadcasting demands a high sense of responsibility and
discerning judgment of fairness and honesty at all times among
broadcasters amidst all these rumors of unrest, destabilization
attempts and controversies surrounding the alleged wiretapping
of President GMA (sic) telephone conversations.
Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and
in order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns
all radio stations and television networks owners/operators that
the conditions of the authorizations and permits issued to them by
Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use its
stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or
willful misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has come to the
attention of the Commission that certain personalities are in
possession of alleged taped conversation which they claim, (sic)
the COMELEC regarding their supposed violation of election
laws. These personalities have admitted that the taped
conversations are product of illegal wiretapping operations.
recorded therein, (sic) it is the position of the Commission that the
stations. If it has been (sic) subsequently established that the said
tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television
companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.
578
Chavez vs. Gonzales
In addition to the above, the Commission reiterates the pertinent

NTC circulars on program standards to be observed by radio and
television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular No. 111-12-85
explicitly states, among others, that “all radio broadcasting and
television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off
from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other matters being
broadcast and/or telecast if the tendency thereof” is to
disseminate false information or such other willful
misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or
sedition. The foregoing directive had been reiterated in NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 22-89 which, in addition thereto,
prohibited radio, broadcasting and television stations from using
their stations to broadcast or telecast any speech, language or
scene disseminating false information or willful
misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in
subversive or treasonable acts.
The Commission will not hesitate, after observing the
provisions of the said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions
on erring radio 7
and television stations and their
owners/operators.
On June 14, 2005, respondent NTC held a dialogue with

the Officers and Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng
mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP) to clarify the said
press release. As a result, the 8NTC and the KBP issued a
joint press release which reads:
JOINT PRESS STATEMENT: NTC AND KBP
• CALL FOR SOBRIETY, RESPONSIBLE

JOURNALISM, AND OBSERVANCE OF LAW, AND
THE RADIO AND TELEVISION CODES.
• NTC RESPECTS AND WILL NOT HINDER
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC
CONCERN. KBP & ITS MEMBERS HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN COMMITTED TO THE EXERCISE (SIC) PRESS
FREEDOM WITH HIGH
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 109-110.

8 Id., at p. 116.
579
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DISCERNING

JUDGMENT OF FAIRNESS AND HONESTY.
• NTC DID NOT ISSUE ANY MC OR ORDER
CONSTITUTING A RESTRAINT OF PRESS FREEDOM
OR CENSORSHIP. NTC FURTHER DENIES AND
DOES NOT INTEND TO LIMIT OR RESTRICT THE
INTERVIEW OF MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION OR
FREE EXPRESSION OF VIEWS.
• WHAT IS BEING ASKED BY NTC IS THAT THE
EXERCISE OF PRESS FREEDOM IS DONE
RESPONSIBLY.
• KBP HAS PROGRAM STANDARDS THAT KBP
MEMBERS WILL OBSERVE IN THE TREATMENT OF
NEWS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS. THESE
INCLUDE VERIFICATION OF SOURCES, NON-
AIRING OF MATERIALS THAT WOULD
CONSTITUTE INCITING TO SEDITION AND/OR
REBELLION.
• THE KBP CODES ALSO REQUIRE THAT NO FALSE
STATEMENT OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION
IS MADE IN THE TREATMENT OF NEWS OR
COMMENTARIES.
• THE SUPPOSED WIRETAPPED (SIC) TAPES
SHOULD BE TREATED WITH SENSITIVITY AND
HANDLED RESPONSIBLY GIVING DUE
CONSIDERATION TO THE PROCESSES BEING
UNDERTAKEN TO VERIFY AND VALIDATE THE
AUTHENTICITY
9
AND ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE
SAME.
On June 21, 2005, petitioner Francisco Chavez, a Filipino

citizen, taxpayer and 10law practitioner, instituted the
instant Rule 65 Petition for certiorari and prohibition with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
on the following grounds:
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED BLATANT VIOLATIONS OF

THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS AND
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON
MATTERS
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 111-112.
10 Id., at pp. 3-42.
580

Chavez vs. Gonzales
OF PUBLIC CONCERN ENSHRINED IN ARTICLE III,

SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
RESPONDENT NTC ACTED BEYOND ITS POWERS AS A
REGULATORY BODY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 546 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7925 WHEN IT WARNED RADIO
BROADCAST AND TELEVISION STATIONS WITH DIRE
CONSEQUENCES IF THEY CONTINUED TO AIR CONTENTS
OF THE CONTROVERSIAL
11
TAPES OF THE PRESIDENT’S
CONVERSATION.
12
In their Comment to the petition, the respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
countered that: (1) the petitioner had no legal standing to
file, and had no clear case or cause of action to support,
13
the
instant petition as to warrant judicial review; (2) the
respondents did not violate petitioner’s and/or the public’s
fundamental liberties of speech, of expression and of the
press, and
14
their right to information on matters of public
concern; and (3) the respondent NTC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it “fairly warned” radio and television
owners/operators to observe the Anti-Wiretapping 15
Law and
pertinent NTC circulars on program standards.
The Issues
For the resolution, therefore, of the Court are the following
issues: (1) whether or not petitioner has locus standi; (2)
whether or not there exists an actual case or controversy
ripe for judicial review; and (3) whether or not the
respondents gravely abused their discretion to warrant
remedial action from the Court.
_______________
11 Id., at p. 18.
12 Id., at pp. 56-83.
13 Id., at pp. 64-67.
14 Id., at pp. 68-75.
15 Id., at pp. 75-82.
581
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
On the Procedural Issues
Petitioner has locus standi

Petitioner has standing to file the instant petition. The test
is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends
16
for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. When suing as a citizen,
the person complaining must allege that he has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties
17
by reason of the statute or act
complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, it
is sufficient that the petitioner is 18a citizen and has an
interest in the execution of the laws.
In the case at bench, petitioner Chavez justifies his
standing by alleging that the petition involves the
enforcement of the constitutional rights of freedom of
expression and of 19the press, and to information on matters
of public concern. As a citizen of the Republic and as a
taxpayer, petitioner has already satisfied the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. In any
case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural
technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it
has shown in a number20
of prior cases, climaxing in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo.
_______________
16 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429
SCRA 736, 755.
17 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 896;
415 SCRA 44, 136 (2003).
18 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485,
171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 223.
19 Rollo, p. 15.
20 Supra note 18.
582

Chavez vs. Gonzales
The main issues have been mooted, but the case should
nonetheless be resolved by the Court
The exercise by this Court of the power of judicial inquiry
is limited to21 the determination of actual cases and
controversies. An actual case or controversy means an
existing conflict that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, one that is not conjectural or anticipatory,
otherwise the decision of the court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power does not extend to
hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal 22 questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will
the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. Indeed, it is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical 23
legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
In the instant case, it is readily observable that the
subsequent joint statement of the respondent NTC and the
Officers and Board of Directors of the KBP after their24June
14, 2005 dialogue not only substantially diminished but,
in fact, obliterated the effects of the earlier press warnings,
thus render-
_______________
21 Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980, 95

SCRA 392, 401. This case explains the standards that have to be followed
in the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of
an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
22 La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860,
889-890; 421 SCRA 148, 178 (2004).
23 Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454
SCRA 130, 138.
24 See Multimedia Holdings Corporation v. Circuit Court of Florida, St.
John’s County, 544 U.S. 1301, 125 S.Ct. 1624, 1626 (2005).
583
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 583

Chavez vs. Gonzales
ing the case moot and academic. Notably, the joint press
statement acknowledged that “NTC did not issue any
memorandum circular or order constituting a restraint of

press freedom or censorship.”
A 25case becomes moot when its purpose has become
stale. Be that as it may, the Court should discuss and
resolve the fundamental issues raised herein, in observance
of the rule that courts shall decide a question otherwise
moot and 26academic if it is capable of repetition yet evasive
of review.
The Dissent
The assailed press statement does not infringe on the

constitutional right to free expression
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of respondents’
press release and statements warning radio stations and
television networks of the possible cancellation of their
licenses and of potential criminal prosecution that they
may face should they broadcast or publish the contents of
the tapes. Petitioner contends that the assailed press
release and statements infringe on the freedom of
expression and of the press.
I do not agree, for the following reasons:
1. The issuance of the press release was a valid exercise

of the NTC’s regulatory authority over broadcast
media.
Admittedly, freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place

in the hierarchy of constitutional rights. But it is also a
settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered
civil societies that the exercise of the right is not absolute
for it
_______________
25 Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496
SCRA 13, 46.
26 Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor, G.R. No. 128509, August 22, 2006,
499 SCRA 434, 447.
584

Chavez vs. Gonzales
may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the

equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not 27
injurious to the rights of the community or society.
Consistent with this principle, the exercise of the freedom

may be the subject of reasonable government regulation.
The broadcast media are no exception. In fact, in Federal
Communications Commission
28
(FCC) v. League of Women
Voters in America, it was held that—
“(W)e have long recognized that Congress, acting pursuant to the

Commerce Clause, has power to regulate the use of this scarce
and valuable national resource. The distinctive feature of
Congress’ efforts in this area has been to ensure through the
regulatory oversight of the FCC that only those who satisfy the
“public interest, convenience and necessity” are granted a license
to use radio and television broadcast frequencies.”
In the Philippines, it is the respondent NTC that has

regulatory powers over 29telecommunications networks. In
Republic Act No. 7925, the NTC is denominated as its
principal administrator, and as such shall take the
necessary measures to implement the policies and 30
objectives set forth in the Act. Under Executive Order 546,
the NTC is mandated, among others, to establish and
prescribe rules, regulations, standards and specifications in
all cases related to the issued Certificate of Public
Convenience, promulgate rules and regulations as public
safety and interest may require, and supervise and inspect
the operation of radio stations and telecom-
_______________
27 Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1980), quoted in Justice Azcuna’s

ponencia in Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA
226.
28 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
29 An Act to Promote and Govern the Development of Philippine
Telecommunications and the Delivery of Public Telecommunications.
30 Dated July 23, 1979.
585
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 585

Chavez vs. Gonzales
31
munications
32
facilities. The NTC exercises quasi-judicial
powers.
The issuance of the press release by NTC was well
within the scope of its regulatory and supervision
functions, part of which is to ensure that the radio and
television stations comply with the law and the terms of
their respective authority. Thus, it was not improper for

the NTC to warn the broadcast media that the airing of
taped materials, if subsequently shown to be false, would
be a violation of law and of the terms of their certificate of
authority, and could lead, after appropriate investigation,
to the cancellation or revocation of their license.
2. The press release was not in the nature of “prior

restraint” on freedom of expression
Courts have traditionally recognized two cognate and

complementary facets of freedom of expression, namely:
freedom from censorship or prior restraint and freedom
from subsequent punishment. The first guarantees
untrammeled right to expression, free from legislative,
administrative or judicial orders which would effectively
bar speech or publication even before it is made. The
second prohibits the imposition of any sanction or penalty
for the speech or publication after its occurrence. Freedom
from prior restraint has enjoyed the widest spectrum of
protection, but no real constitutional challenge has been
raised against the validity of laws that punish abuse of the
freedom, such as the laws on libel, sedition or obscenity.
“Prior restraint” is generally understood as an
imposition in advance
33
of a limit upon speech or other forms
of expression. In determining whether a restriction is a
prior restraint, one of the key factors considered is whether
the re-
_______________
31 Section 15(e), (g), (h), Executive Order No. 546.

32 Section 16, Executive Order No. 546.
33 State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 315 (1984).
586

Chavez vs. Gonzales
34
straint prevents the expression
35
of a message. In Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared:
“A prior restraint… by definition, has an immediate and

irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or
civil sanctions after publication “chills” speech, prior restraint
“freezes” it at least for the time.”
As an aspect of freedom of expression, prior restraint

should not be confused
36
with subsequent punishment. In
Alexander v. U.S., petitioner’s complaint was that the
RICO forfeiture provisions on businesses dealing in
expressive materials constituted “prior restraint” because
they may have an improper “chilling” effect on free
expression by deterring others from engaging in protected
speech. In rejecting the petitioner’s contention and ruling
that the forfeiture is a permissible criminal punishment
and not a prior restraint on speech, the U.S. Supreme
Court said:
“The term prior restraint is used “to describe administrative and

judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in
advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”
Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e.,
court orders that actually forbid speech activities—are classic
examples of prior restraints.
xxxx
Finally, petitioner’s proposed definition of the term “prior
restraint” would undermine the time-honored distinction between
barring speech in the future and penalizing past speech. The
doctrine of prior restraint originated in the common law of
England where prior restraints of the press were not permitted,
but punishment after publication was. This very limited
application of the principle of freedom of speech was held
inconsistent with our First
_______________
34 Murray v. Lawson, 138 N.J. 206, 222; 649 A.2d 1253, 1261 (1994).
35 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
36 510 U.S. 909, 114 S.Ct. 295, June 28, 1993.
587
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 587

Chavez vs. Gonzales
Amendment as long ago as Grosjean v. American Press Co. While

we may have given a broader definition to the term “prior
restraint” than was given to it in English common law, our
decisions have steadfastly preserved the distinction between prior
restraints and subsequent punishments. Though petitioner tries
to dismiss this distinction as “neither meaningful nor useful,” we
think it is critical to our First Amendment jurisprudence. Because
we have interpreted the First Amendment as providing greater
protection from prior restraints than from subsequent
punishments, it is important for us to delineate with some

precision the defining characteristics of a prior restraint. To hold
that the forfeiture order in this case constituted a prior restraint
would have the exact opposite effect. It would blur the line
separating prior restraints from subsequent punishments to such
a degree that it would be impossible to determine with any
certainty whether a particular measure is a prior restraint or
not.”
A survey of free speech cases in our jurisdiction reveals the

same disposition: there is prior restraint when the
government act forbids speech, prohibits the expression of
a message, or imposes onerous requirements or restrictions
for the publication or dissemination of ideas. In theses
cases, we did not hesitate to strike down the administrative
or judicial order for violating the free expression clause in
the Constitution. 37
Thus, in 38
Primicias v. Fugoso and in Reyes v.
Bagatsing, the refusal, without valid cause, of the City
Mayor of Manila to issue a permit for a public assembly
was held to have infringed 39
freedom of expression. In
Burgos40
v. Chief of Staff and in Eastern Broadcasting v.
Dans, the closure of the printing office of the newspapers,
We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, and of radio station
DYRE in Cebu, respectively, was ruled as violation of
freedom of the press.
_______________
37 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
38 No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 564.
39 No. L-64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800, 816.
40 137 SCRA 647.
588

Chavez vs. Gonzales
41
On election-related restrictions, Mutuc v. COMELEC
invalidated the respondent’s prohibition against the use of
taped jingles42 in mobile units of candidates; Adiong v.
COMELEC struck down the COMELEC’s resolution
limiting the posting of candidates’ decals and stickers only
in designated areas and not allowing them43 in private or
public vehicles; Sanidad v. COMELEC declared as
unconstitutional the COMELEC prohibition on newspaper
columnists and radio commentators to use their columns or
programs to campaign for or against the ratification of the

organic act establishing the Cordillera Autonomous Region; 44
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC
annulled the COMELEC resolution prohibiting the conduct 45
of exit polls; and Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC
nullified Section 5.4 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section
24(h) of COMELEC Resolution 3636 which prohibited the
publication of pre-election survey results within specified
periods.
On movies and television, the injunctive writs issued by
lower courts against the movie producers 46
in Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong 47
and in Viva
Productions v. Court of Appeals were 48
invalidated, while
in Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, the X-rating given
by MTRCB to the television show was ruled as grave abuse
of discretion.
But there is no parity between these cases and the case
at bench. Unlike the government acts in the above-cited
cases, what we have before us now is merely a press release
—not an order or a circular—warning broadcast media on
the airing of an alleged taped conversation, with the caveat
that should its
_______________
41 36 SCRA 228.
42 G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, 715.
43 G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 529, 534-535.
44 G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 811.
45 G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496, 506-507.
46 Nos. L-82380 and L-82398, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861.
47 G.R. No. 123881, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 664.
48 G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529.
589
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 589

Chavez vs. Gonzales
falsity be subsequently established, the act could lead to

the revocation or cancellation of their licenses, after
appropriate investigation. The warnings on possible license
revocation and criminal prosecution are simply what they
are, mere warnings. They have no compulsive effect, as
they do not impose a limit on speech or other forms of
expression nor do they prevent the expression of a message.
The judicial angle of vision in testing the validity of the
assailed press release against the prior restraint standard
is its operation and substance. The phrase “prior restraint”

is not a self-wielding sword, nor should it serve as a
talismanic test. What is needed is a practical assessment
49
of
its operation in specific or particular circumstances.
Significant are our own decisions in a number of cases
where we rejected the contention that there was
infringement 50of freedom of expression. In Lagunzad v. Vda.
de Gonzales, after balancing the right to privacy of
Padilla’s family with the right to free expression of the
movie producer, we did not deem the Licensing Agreement
for the movie depiction of the life of Moises Padilla as
imposition of an impermissible limit on free speech. In
Presidential Commission
51
on Good Government (PCGG) v.
Nepomuceno, we refused to consider the PCGG takeover of
radio station DWRN as an infringement on freedom52
of the
press. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, we did not
yield to the proposition of the press that the imposition of
value added tax (VAT) on the gross receipts of newspapers
from advertisements and on their acquisition of paper, ink
and services for publication was an abridgment of press
_______________
49 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441-442; 77 S.Ct. 1325,
1328 (1957).
50 181 Phil. 45.
51 G.R. No. 78750, April 20, 1990, 184 SCRA 449, 462-463.
52 G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852,
115873 and 115931, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630, 675682; see also
Court’s Resolution on the motions for reconsideration, October 30, 1995,
249 SCRA 628, 652-656.
590

Chavez vs. Gonzales
freedom. In Lagunzad, we said that while the License

Agreement allowed the producer to portray in a movie the
life of Moises Padilla, it did not confer poetic license to
incorporate fictional embellishments. The takeover in
PCGG was merely intended to preserve the assets, funds
and properties of the station while it maintained its
broadcasting operations. The VAT in Tolentino did not
inhibit or impede the circulation of the newspapers
concerned.
Similarly, in the instant case, the issuance of the press
release was simply part of the duties of the NTC in the
enforcement and administration of the laws which it is

tasked to implement. The press release did not actually or
directly prevent the expression of a message. The
respondents never issued instructions prohibiting or
stopping the publication of the alleged wiretapped
conversation. The warning or advisory in question did not
constitute suppression, and the possible in terrorem effect,
if any, is not prior restraint. It is not prior restraint
because, if at all, the feared license revocation and criminal
prosecution come after the publication, not before it, and
only after a determination by the proper authorities that
there was, indeed, a violation of law.
The press release does not have a “chilling effect”
because even without the press release, existing laws
—and rules and regulations—authorize the
revocation of licenses of broadcast stations if they
are found to have 53
violated penal laws or the terms of
their authority. The majority opinion emphasizes the
chilling effect of the challenged press releases—the fear of
prosecution, cancellation or revocation of license by virtue
of the said press state-
_______________
53 Republic Act No. 3846; Executive Order No. 546; see pertinent
memorandum circulars at
<http://portal.ntc.gov.ph/wps/portal/!ut/p/.cmd/cs/.ce/7_0_A/.s/7_0_MA/_s.7_0_A/7_0_MA>
(visited: January 3, 2008); see also terms and conditions of provisional
authority and/or certificate of authority granted to radio and television
stations, Rollo, pp. 119-128.
591
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Chavez vs. Gonzales
54
ments. With all due respect, the majority loses sight of the
fact that the press statements are not a prerequisite to
prosecution, neither does the petition demonstrate that
prosecution is any more likely because of them. If the
prosecutorial arm of the Government and the NTC deem a
media entity’s act to be violative of our penal laws or the
rules and regulations governing broadcaster’s licenses, they
are free to prosecute or to revoke the licenses of the erring
entities 55
with or without the challenged press
releases.
The petitioner likewise makes capital of the alleged
prior determination and conclusion made by the
respondents that the continuous airing of the tapes is a

violation of the AntiWiretapping Law and of the conditions
of the authority granted to the broadcast stations. The
assailed portion of the press release reads:
“Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly

recorded therein, it is the position of the commission that the
radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the anti-
wiretapping law and the conditions of the provisional authority
and/or certificate of authority issued to these radio and television
stations.”
However, that part of the press statement should not be

read in isolation, but in the context of the entire paragraph,
the rest of which reads:
If it has been subsequently established that the said tapes

are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television
companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just
cause for the
_______________
54 See Multimedia Holdings Corporation v. Circuit Court of Florida, St.

John’s County, supra note 24, at pp. 1626-1627.
55 Id.
592

Chavez vs. Gonzales
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or

authorizations issued to the said companies.”
Obviously, this latter portion qualifies the earlier part of

the paragraph. Only when it has been sufficiently
established, after a prosecution or appropriate
investigation, that the tapes are false or fraudulent may
there be a cancellation or revocation of the station’s license.
There is no gainsaying that the airing of false information
or willful misrepresentation constitutes a valid ground for
revocation of the license, and so is violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law which is a criminal offense. But that such
revocation of license can only be effected after an

appropriate investigation clearly shows that there are
adequate safeguards available to the radio and television
stations, and that there will be compliance with the due
process clause.
It is noteworthy that in the joint press statement issued
on June 14, 2005 by the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga
Broadcasters sa Pilipinas, there is an acknowledgement by
the parties that NTC “did not issue any MC (Memorandum
Circular) or order constituting a restraint of press freedom
or censorship.” If the broadcasters who should be the most
affected by the assailed NTC press release, by this
acknowledgement, do not feel aggrieved at all, we should be
guided accordingly. We cannot be more popish than the
pope.
Finally, we believe that the “clear and present danger
rule”—the universally-accepted norm for testing the
validity of governmental intervention in free speech—finds
no application in this case precisely because there is no
prior restraint.
3. The penal sanction in R.A. 4200 or the revocation of

the license for violation of the terms and conditions
of the provisional authority or certificate of
authority is permissible punishment and does not
infringe on freedom of expression.
593
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 593

Chavez vs. Gonzales
The Anti-Wiretapping Law (Republic Act 4200) is a penal

statute. Over the years, no successful challenge to its
validity has been sustained. Conviction under the law
should fittingly be a just cause for the revocation of the
license of the erring radio or television station.
Pursuant to its regulatory authority, the NTC has
issued memorandum circulars covering Program Standards
to be followed by radio stations and television networks, a
common provision of which reads:
“All radio broadcasting and television stations shall provide

adequate public service time, shall conform to the ethics of honest
enterprise; and shall not use its stations for the broadcasting or
telecasting of obscene or indecent language, speech and/or scene,
or for the dissemination of false information or willful
misrepresentation, or to the detriment of the public health56or to

incite, encourage or assist in subversive or treasonable acts.”
Accordingly, in the Provisional Authority or the Certificate

of Authority issued to all radio, television and cable TV
stations, which all licensees must faithfully abide with,
there is incorporated, among its terms and conditions, the
following clause:
“Applicant-Grantee shall provide free of charge, a minimum of

thirty (30) hours/month time or access channel thru its radio/
television station facilities to the National Government to enable
it to reach the population on important public issues; assist public
information and education; conform with the ethics of honest
enterprise; and shall not use its stations for the telecasting
of obscene or for dissemination of false information or
willful misrepresentation, or do any such act to the
detriment of public welfare, health, morals or to incite,
encourage, or assist in any treasonous, rebellious, or
subversive acts/ omissions.”
Undoubtedly, this is a reasonable standard of conduct

demanded of the media outlets. The sanction that may be
im-
_______________
56 NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89.
594

Chavez vs. Gonzales
posed for breach thereof—suspension, cancellation or

revocation of the station’s license after an appropriate
investigation has sufficiently established that there was a
breach—is also reasonable. It cannot be characterized as
impermissible punishment which violates freedom of
expression.
There is no transgression of the people’s right to information

on matters of public concern.
With the foregoing disquisition that there was no
infringement on freedom of expression, there is no case for
violation of the right to information on matters of public
concern. Indeed, in the context of the prevailing factual
milieu of the case at bench, the petitioner’s contention can
thrive only if there is a showing that the act of the

respondents constituted prior restraint.
There is, therefore, no further need to belabor the point.
NTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it

issued the press release
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary
57
and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. For grave abuse of discretion to be
present, petitioner must show that the respondents
violated or ignored
58
the Constitution, the laws or existing
jurisprudence.
_______________
57 Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, 359 Phil. 276, 304; 298 SCRA 756,

786 (1998).
58 Republic of the Philippines v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735, 774; 372
SCRA 462, 493 (2001); Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 340; 359 SCRA 698, 726 (2001).
595
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 595

Chavez vs. Gonzales
As discussed earlier, respondents, in making the

questioned press releases, did not violate or threaten to
violate the constitutional rights to free expression and to
information on matters of public concern. No grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed to them.
One final word. With the benefit of hindsight, it is noted
that from the time the assailed press releases were issued
and up to the present, the feared criminal prosecution and
license revocation never materialized. They remain
imagined concerns, even after the contents of the tapes had
been much talked about and publicized.
I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
Petition granted, writs of certiorari and prohibition
issued.
Notes.—The concept of privileged communications is

implicit in the freedom of the press. (Borjal vs. Court of
Appeals, 301 SCRA 1 [1999])
It must also be conceded that “television can work
profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses
on.” (Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Case against the Former
President Joseph E. Estrada, 360 SCRA 248 [2001])
When confronted with libel cases involving publications
which deal with public officials and the discharge of their
official functions, the Supreme Court is not confined within
the wordings of the libel statute—rather, the case should
likewise be examined under the constitutional precept of
freedom of the press. (Flor vs. People, 454 SCRA 440
[2005])
The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in
the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. (David vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
——o0o——
596
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11/10/21, 10:22 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 545

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 441

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M.

Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Where serious constitutional

aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. Gonzales

freedom of expression.The petition raises other issues like

freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 443

Chavez vs. Gonzales

Same; Freedom of the Press; To be truly meaningful, freedom

than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media,

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. Gonzales

for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational

will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 445

Chavez vs. Gonzales

grievances—it is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep

Same; Same; Prior Restraint; Words and Phrases; Prior

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. Gonzales

for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against

enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 447

Chavez vs. Gonzales

termediate approach—somewhere between the mere

unconstitutionality.—On the other hand, a governmental action

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. Gonzales

presently in place for each type of media differ from one

“governmental restriction” is narrowly tailored to further

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 449

Chavez vs. Gonzales

inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government interest

was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and satellite

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. Gonzales

led to the question of whether the regulatory model for

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 451

Chavez vs. Gonzales

status accorded by the Constitution and by related international

violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. Gonzales

faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of

statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 453

Chavez vs. Gonzales

Same; Judicial Review; In cases where the challenged acts are

and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone. Issues

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring Opinion:

Freedom of Expression; Freedom of the Press; Prior Restraint;

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. Gonzales

Same; Same; Same; Same; Content-Based Regulations;

England in 1644. Under the Licensing Act of 1643, all printing

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 15, 2008 455