LITERATURE REVIEW

International Migration

International migration occurs when people cross state boundaries and stay in the host state for
some minimum length of time.[1] Migration occurs for many reasons. Many people leave their
home countries in order to look for economic opportunities in another country. Others migrate to
be with family members who have migrated or because of political conditions in their countries.
Education is another reason for international migration, as students pursue their studies abroad.
[2] While there are several different potential systems for categorizing international migrants,
one system organizes them into nine groups: temporary labor migrants; irregular, illegal, or
undocumented migrants; highly skilled and business migrants; refugees; asylum seekers; forced
migration; family members; return migrants; and long-term, low-skilled migrants.[3] These
migrants can also be divided into two large groups, permanent and temporary. Permanent
migrants intend to establish their permanent residence in a new country and possibly obtain that
country's citizenship. Temporary migrants intend only to stay for a limited periods of time;
perhaps until the end of a particular program of study or for the duration of a their work contract
or a certain work season.[4] Both types of migrants have a significant effect on the economies
and societies of the chosen destination country and the country of origin.[5]

The Recent Trends of International Migration

The International Migration 2019 report by UN DESA’s Population Division examines the latest
migration levels and trends by geographic, development and income grouping, based on the 2019
revision of the International Migrant Stock, which found that the number of international
migrants globally reached an estimated 272 million in 2019. That represents an increase of 51
million since 2010 (). Currently, international migrants comprise 3.5 per cent of the global
population, compared to 2.8 per cent in the year 2000.

In 2019, regionally, Europe hosts the largest number of international migrants (82 million),
followed by Northern America (59 million) and Northern Africa and Western Asia (49 million)
().

At the country level, about half of all international migrants reside in just 10 countries, with the
United States of America hosting the largest number (51 million), equal to about 19 per cent of
the world’s total. Germany and Saudi Arabia host the second and third largest numbers of
migrants (13 million each), followed by the Russian Federation (12 million), the United
Kingdom (10 million), the United Arab Emirates (9 million), France, Canada and Australia
(around 8 million each) and Italy (6 million) ().

Concerning their place of birth, one-third of all international migrants originate from only ten
countries, with India as the lead country of origin, accounting for about 18 million persons living
abroad. Migrants from Mexico constituted the second largest “diaspora” (12 million), followed
by China (11 million), the Russian Federation (10 million) and the Syrian Arab Republic (8
million) ().

https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/latest-migration-trends-revealed.html

Five Phases of Migration to the Gulf

The first phase in the modern history of migration to the Gulf occurred in the period prior to the
1970s oil boom. During this phase, more than 80% of migrant workers were Arabs, mainly from
Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. There also were Asian workers, who were employed in
European companies and government agencies. The number of Asian workers was estimated to
be 247,700 in the entire Arab region in 1970 (). During this period, there were narrow wage
differentials between sending and receiving countries. Iraq and Oman were net exporters of
manpower. Thereafter, both became the major labor importing countries.

The second phase — the point at which migration to the Gulf began to intensify — was triggered
by the post-1973 oil price hike. During this phase, the number of Arab migrants, especially from
poorer countries such as Egypt and Yemen, rose considerably. About 1.3 million migrants were
estimated to be in the region in 1975 ().

The third phase spans the latter part of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Due to the second oil price
hike in 1979, government revenue rose sharply in the course of a single year. As a result, the
Gulf states launched more ambitious development plans, lavish projects, and even more generous
social welfare programs (). These initiatives caused a surge in demand for an additional 700,000
migrant workers in Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries in 1980. The number of migrant
workers in Iraq also increased to about 750,000.3 The number of Indian workers alone exceeded
500,000 by 1980.
Apart from the increasing number of workers, two other trends emerged during this period. First,
the share of Arab migrant workers declined from about 43% in 1975 to about 37% in 1980. This
was primarily due to the inflow of Indians, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, and other Asian workers to
the region (). This was perhaps the result of the policies of the Gulf countries that favored South
Asian workers (they were believed to be politically “safer” than their Arab counterparts).
Second, the demand for unskilled labor slowed as major infrastructure projects were completed,
while the demand for skilled workers increased.

The fourth phase began with the decline in oil prices in late 1982. With the contraction of oil
revenues, some development projects slowed and demand for foreign workers slackened.
However, the preference for skilled workers continued ().

The fifth phase began in the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, new migrant workers began to
arrive in the Gulf countries, particularly from China and the newly independent states of the
former Soviet Union. These migrant workers created additional competition in the labor market
(). The second Gulf War (1991) resulted in the displacement of about 1.5 million people,
including one million Yemenis (who were expelled from Saudi Arabia) and 200,000 Jordanians,
150,000 Palestinians, and 158,000 Egyptians (most of whom left Kuwait).4 This mass
displacement created job vacancies in the Gulf countries that were filled by South Asians
(particularly by Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis) ().

https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Migration%20Gulf_Viewpoints.pdf

The international politics of migration in the Gulf

Although a number of social science works have addressed the politics of cross-border mobility
in the Gulf (cf. Kamrava and Babar 2012; Jureidini 2019), few shed insights light onto the
interaction between labour migration and GCC foreign policy. A primary source of scholarly
research on the topic emerges out of political economy and demography, particularly in the
decades immediately following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the two oil crises (Birks and
Sinclair 1980; Seccombe 1985).1 This body of work tends to examine migration policymaking in
the Gulf through the lens of demographic imbalances between GCC nationals and non-nationals
(Kapiszewski 2001; Winckler 2009). By the early 1990s, migrant populations constituted over 70
percent of the total GCC workforce and, in some Gulf states, as much as 90 per cent (Fargues
2013; Malit and Al-Youha 2013). Not surprisingly, many scholars view the politics of Gulf
migration via a regime or security lens that identifies how domestic elites sought to maintain
control over the growing numbers of foreign workers (Baldwin-Edwards 2011), particularly in
the aftermath of migrant mobilisation during the 1950s and 1960s (Vitalis 2007; Chalcraft 2010;
Tsourapas 2018). In these analyses, the impact of the kafāla system for migrant groups across the
Gulf is central (Gardner 2010), as is the case with broader works that discuss migrant rights
(Ruhs 2013). While this line of research offers a clear understanding of the politicisation of
labour migration in the Gulf, it provides few insights into how cross-border mobility features in
the international politics of GCC states.

A second, smaller group of political economists offers an understanding of the foreign policy
dimension of Gulf migration. Identifying that oil-producing Arab states accrue a significant
amount of national revenue from unearned income, or rent (Beblawi 1987), these researchers
seek to understand policymaking through the prism of rent-seeking behaviour (Ayubi 1996, 224–
230; Hertog 2011). Shifts in the international politics of labour migration across the Gulf depend
on global market fluctuations: for instance, the massive immigration of labourers in the 1970s
during al-Tafra is linked to the influx of petrodollars (Korany 1986). Similarly, the subsequent
shift from Arab to Asian immigrant labour in the 1980s and, more recently, to processes of
labour market nationalisation and localisation has been driven by distinct political economy
rationales (Shah 2018). Throughout these developments, the GCC states have constituted
powerful actors that are contrasted with weaker, non-rentier countries of origin (Ibrahim 1982;
Korany and Dessouki 2008). These power imbalances are evident in scholarly studies of how
sending states’ diplomatic relations with the Gulf have shaped labour recruitment patterns – as in
the case of Egypt (Tsourapas 2019), Yemen (Okruhlik and Conge 1997), or Jordan (Brand
2013). While such research identifies the importance of labour immigration in GCC foreign
policymaking, the emphasis on oil-producing rentier states prioritises government actions,
ultimately obscuring any other domestic actors that might affect Gulf migration management.2

More specifically, in the case of the UAE, a sizeable body of work in social sciences has
examined migration processes, albeit primarily within sociology (Ali 2011; Sabban 2014),
anthropology (Vora 2013; Inhorn 2015), and geography (Walsh 2009). In terms of the politics of
UAE migration, work has focused primarily on the logistics of citizenship (Jamal 2015; Lori
2019), as well as political demography (De Bel-Air 2015). A small number of works also
examines how economic and socio-cultural considerations have contributed to the espousal of
‘Emiratisation’ policies (Fargues and Shah 2018). However, with few exceptions (Ulrichsen
2016), international relations scholars of the Emirates tend to not examine cross-border mobility:
although the foreign policy dimension of GCC labour migration falls within the scope of
international relations, mainstream work on the international politics of the Gulf does not
typically analyse cross-border mobility (see, for instance: Gause 2009; Hinnebusch 2013), as
migration was considered a ‘low politics’ issue for much of the twentieth century (Hollifield
2015).

Malit Jr, F.T. and Tsourapas, G., 2021. Migration diplomacy in the Gulf–non-state actors, cross-
border mobility, and the United Arab Emirates. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, pp.1-
22.
Foreign Aid and Migration

Bermeo, S.B. and Leblang, D., 2015. Migration and foreign aid. International
Organization, 69(3), pp.627-657.

http://www.sarahbermeo.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/BermeoLeblang_MigrationAid_IOfinal.pdf

The two arguments we advance—that foreign aid is used by policy-makers who wish to limit
immigration and that it is influenced by immigrant political pressure—both suggest a positive
association between the migrant population from an aid recipient living in a donor country and
the level of dyadic aid commitments (). They also suggest that the relationship between migrant
population and aid is not constant: it should vary over time as the preferences of policy-makers
in donor countries toward migration change and/or migrants' incentive and ability to mobilize
change.

Aid as a Tool of Immigration Policy

During the past two decades governments across developed democracies have implemented
policies designed to decrease immigration, particularly that of low-skilled mi grants coming from
developing countries.10 Although current levels of international migration are not
unprecedented, de Haas points out the rise of South-North migra tion in recent decades.11 A
primary driver of immigration is the existence of immi grant networks, created by past migration
of co-ethnics, friends, and family. This "chain migration" provides potential migrants with
information and social support that decrease the costs and risks associated with moving to a new
country.12 Thus, a good predictor of future migration is the number of migrants from a sending
country currently living in the host country. Policy-makers wishing to decrease future migration
with aid are likely to focus their efforts in geographic areas from which they have received large
numbers of migrants in the past.
Targeted Aid

Careful targeting of aid suggests that donors may also be skeptical of the ability of broad-based
development programs to stem migration. Indeed, there is evidence that donors focus on
programs designed to enhance well-being in aid-recipient com munities from which the donor
has received sizable inflows of migrants. Although this evidence is anecdotal, the precision of
the programs speaks to donor motivations. For example, the German development agency (GTZ)
initiated the Pilot Program to Promote Migrant Organization Projects, which offers a subsidy of
up to 100 percent for migrants' charitable investments in the social infrastructure of their country
of origin.32 If development assistance is targeting the poorest and most needy within a country,
this approach makes little sense: Why target aid funds to areas already receiving outside
assistance in the form of remittances, rather than using that money in more isolated areas with
less access to foreign funds? However, viewed through the lens of immigration policy the
rationale is clearer. Areas within a recipient state that have access to outside funds and are linked
to networks of existing migrants in the donor state have an increased likelihood of outmigration
(). To keep them from follow ing in their predecessors' footsteps, donor countries such as
Germany target aid at specific communities where emigration has been historically high, to
increase their current well-being and decrease the net benefits of migration. An additional
strategy that donors follow is to fund specific types of programs, such as job creation and wage
support initiatives, which may have a relatively short-term impact on the desire to emigrate.
These programs also focus on areas from which previous migration has been high. The European
Commission claims that "migration and development policies should ... focus much more on
economic reform and job creation and on improving the working conditions and the socioeco
nomic situation in low-income and middle-income countries, and in regions charac terised by
high emigration pressures."33 In the United States, a top destination for Armenian emigrants, the
US Agency for International Development (USAED) under stands "the importance of migration
and remittances for Armenia's development" and so is working "toward improving the internal
situation in the country [Armenia], in cluding labor market development and promotion of
Armenia's competitiveness so that there are enough competitive and well-paid jobs within the
country to support Armenian families."34 French aid is used to finance co-development
programs in Mali and Senegal where assistance is provided directly to migrants to help them
return to their country of origin.35 The targeting of aid to groups likely bound for a par ticular
donor may mitigate, although will unlikely completely eliminate, the ability of one donor to free-
ride off development assistance provided by other donors.

Policy Efforts to Facilitate (or Hinder) Migration

There are two categories of policy actions that developing country governments have taken to
facilitate international migration. The first consists of bilateral actions, which involve
cooperation with governments or employers in destination countries, leading to formal
agreements to allow labor migration of specified numbers and types of workers (). A leading
example of this type of policy action has been the Philippines, which has signed at least 49
bilateral migration agreements with 25 destination countries. Large migration flows have
occurred through some of these migration agreements. Given the importance of legal barriers in
regulating migration, it seems likely that such agreements have allowed more migration from the
signatory countries (). However, we are unaware of research that has identified how much of this
migration would have happened in the absence of such signed agreements; hence, there is a lack
of evidence on the causal effect of such policies.

One exception to this lack of research comes from bilateral migration policies negotiated
between New Zealand and several Pacific Island nations (including Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu)
to allow seasonal migration to New Zealand through the Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE)
program. Gibson and McKenzie (2014) examine the impacts of this program on households in
Tonga and Vanuatu. They find that individuals who participate in the program lack almost any
other opportunity to migrate internationally; therefore, the program generates new migration, and
this migration results in large increases in income and consumption for the participating
households. These authors use a matched difference-in-difference strategy to identify these
program impacts, arguing that the newness of the program and the limited availability of places
in the program facilitates finding comparable households to those selected to participate in the
program.
The second set of actions countries can take are unilateral actions, which do not require the
cooperation of other governments (). These actions are most evident when used to hinder
migration. For example, a number of countries restrict the rights of women to migrate (e.g.,
Gabon, Libya, Saudi Arabia), and others require all citizens to obtain government permission to
travel abroad (e.g., Cuba, Iran, North Korea). McKenzie (2007) shows in a linear regression that
countries with such restrictions have 5 to 6 percent fewer migrants per capita than countries with
similar income, population, and governance levels that do not have these restrictions. Countries
can also affect the ease of migration by imposing high passport fees and cumbersome procedures
for obtaining a passport. McKenzie (2007) shows that the cost of a passport exceeds 10 percent
of per capita income in some countries, and higher passport costs are associated with less
migration. This association continues to hold after controlling for population, per capita income,
and government effectiveness.

Governments can also take more positive unilateral actions to facilitate migration. Beam,
McKenzie, and Yang (2014) conducted a large-scale randomized experiment in the Philippine
province of Sorsogon to test the impact of unilaterally facilitating international labor migration.
Overall, the authors find no evidence that any of the individual interventions or combinations of
interventions led to increases in international migration. The most intensive treatment that
combined all these interventions led to increases in job search and doubled the rate of
international job offers, but it had no identifiable effect on international labor migration. The
authors conclude that unilateral migration facilitation will, at most, induce a trickle, not a flood,
of additional emigration.

A related study was conducted by Beam (2014), also in Sorsogon province, Philippines. The
study found that the information treatments improved knowledge about overseas wages and job
qualifications. Neither information treatments nor the job fair incentive treatment led to increases
in search activity for overseas jobs. Along with the previous study, this work suggests limits to
the ability of unilateral facilitation policies to foster more migration.
https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/30/2/155/1655090?
keytype=ref&ijkey=RUenzzCcknPEyrD&casa_token=DHUN4a_WHykAAAAA:oVdCuQLHuq
58x1vTkiPpPH567sFfmvG3oLc95DrRxIckHUhBCONLqlE3fYhTNu9M5aawqr9DOEoRym4

Qatar’s Legal Framework of Migration

The Permanent Constitution of Qatar was enacted in 2004 and replaced the constitution that had been
in effect since the country’s declaration of independence. In 2004, Qatar adopted a new law regulating
the entry, exit, residence, and sponsorship of expatriates. Under this new law, expatriates still require
the sponsorship of a Qatari national (typically their employer) (). They must work for their employer for
at least two years before they are allowed to find a new employer and transfer their sponsorship after
obtaining a clearance letter from their sponsor. The sponsor also has control over whether or not his/
her expatriate employee obtains an exit visa and whether or not they are banned from the country for
two years.

As recently as 2011, a new law on combating trafficking in persons that prohibits all forms of trafficking
and prescribes sufficiently stringent penalties, as well as improved identification of trafficking victims,
was adopted. The crime of trafficking in human beings is broadly defined to include activities within the
state territory and across its national borders and a wide range of forms of exploitation ().

Law No. 14 of 2004 (Labour Law) sets minimum standards for employment in areas such as working
hours, vacations and public holidays, health and safety, and termination of employment (). Employees
excluded from the application of the Labor Law include domestic workers, casual workers, and working
members of the employer’s family.

The new law promulgated in 2005 on Qatari nationality allows expatriates to apply for Qatari citizenship
if they have resided in the country for a minimum of 25 years, have a clean criminal record, good
knowledge of the Arabic language, and make a good living (). Under the new law, Qatari women may
sponsor their foreign spouse and children if they meet certain conditions but they may not transmit
Qatari nationality to them.

http://diana-n.iue.it:8080/bitstream/handle/1814/32154/GLMM%20ExpNote_02-2013.pdf?sequence=1