See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/329668216

What is populism? Who is the populist?

Article  in  Democratic Theory · December 2018

DOI: 10.3167/dt.2018.050201

CITATIONS READS

17 13,294

6 authors, including:

Jean-Paul Gagnon Emily Beausoleil

University of Canberra Victoria University of Wellington
76 PUBLICATIONS   179 CITATIONS    20 PUBLICATIONS   101 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Callum Johnston
University of Canberra
2 PUBLICATIONS   17 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Democratic Theorists in Conversation (3 Volumes) View project

PhD Dissertation View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Jean-Paul Gagnon on 19 February 2019.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Editorial
What is Populism?
Who is the Populist?
Jean-Paul Gagnon, Emily Beausoleil, Kyong-Min Son,
Cleve Arguelles, Pierrick Chalaye, Callum N Johnston

Both “populism” and “populist” have long been considered ill-defined

terms, and therefore are regularly misapplied in both scholarly and
popular discourses.1 This definitional difficulty is exacerbated by the Ba-
belian confusion of voices on populism, where the term’s meaning differs
within and between global regions (e.g. Latin America versus Western Eu-
rope); time periods (e.g. 1930s versus the present), and classifications (e.g. left/
right, authoritarian/libertarian, pluralist/antipluralist, as well as strains
that muddy these distinctions such as homonationalism, xenophobic
feminism and multicultural neonationalism). While useful efforts have
been made to navigate the vast and heterogeneous conceptual terrain
of populism,2 they rarely engage with each other. The result is a dizzy-
ing proliferation of different definitions unaccompanied by an under-
standing as to how they might speak to each other. And this conceptual
fragmentation reinforces, and is reinforced by, diverging assessments of
populism which tend to cast it as either “good” or “bad” for democracy
(e.g. Dzur and Hendriks 2018; Müller 2015).
To open this edition of Democratic Theory—one that takes the vagar-
ities, complexities, and implications of contemporary populism as its
focus—we wish to contribute to this effort to clarify core concepts by
offering an account of the six lines that have been drawn to distinguish
between different forms of populism within the literature on populism
and populists from 2008–2018 (what we heretofore refer to as “the cor-
pus”). While introducing these cleavages may not fully overcome the
conceptual challenges posed by populism, it has the benefit of allowing
us to approach populism less as a fixed entity that can be captured by a
single definition and more as a shape-shifting phenomenon which moves
along multiple, crosscutting cleavages. We suggest that the six cleavages
introduced here can serve as a heuristic through which we can come
to terms with diverse manifestations of populism. We also believe that

Democratic Theory Volume 5, Issue 2, Winter 2018: vi–xxvi

doi: 10.3167/dt.2018.050201 ISSN 2332-8894 (Print), ISSN 2332-8908 (Online)
this heuristic can help develop clearer interpretive grounds for making
more normative claims regarding forms of populism that prove “good”
or “bad” for democracy—among the most muddy and troubled waters in
this current political moment.
In the contemporary literature (2008–2018), populism is often di-
vided into left and right variants. Populism, particularly in postmillen-
nial politics, typically refers to right populism, which is characterized
by emotionally-charged political appeals to addressing crises through
neonationalism, masculinism, Othering, bordering, xenophobia, sex-
ism, racism, phantasmatic ethnic golden-ageism, a disregard for liberal
democratic norms, and so forth. Highlighting these features, a number
of observers describe (right) populism as a parasite of liberal democracy
which grows in times of crisis to ultimately endanger its host (Müller
2016; Urbinati 2014). Other thinkers dispute this description of populism,
however. Mouffe (2016) asserts that while populism “is usually used in a
negative [pejorative] way” through such descriptors, to account for all
populism in such terms “is a mistake.” Mouffe and others make the dis-
tinction of a second form of populism that might be reclaimed by pro-
gressives so that it can contest right populism in formal arena politics
today. Left populism, or progressive populism (Fraser 2017), is said to hold
the potential to address crises in a manner which secures the democratic
project (Canovan 1999; Dzur and Hendriks 2018; Tamás 2017; Tormey
2018) by deepening the legitimacy of real-existing democracies and up-
holding civic, political, and economic rights alongside material egalitari-
anism—typically through a stance open to immigration and refugees and
one that is adversarial to the power and privilege of financial capital, the
drivers of pollution, and natural systems destruction.
Populisms as they exist, however, do not neatly match this left-right
divide. Populism is ideologically ambiguous or “thin-centred,” that is, it
attaches itself to diverse (and sometimes even contradictory) ideological
projects depending on the political moment (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018).
This means, as Canovan (1982) observes, that different constituencies can
respond to disparate aspects of a populist movement, creating an alliance
defying conventional ideological lines (e.g., a xenophobic but economi-
cally progressive populist party). Equally important, the left-right dichot-
omy tends to generate a one-dimensional assessment of populism: it is
either “good” or “bad” for democracy. (It is not a coincidence that right
populism is largely a creation of populism’s liberal critics, and left popu-
lism a creation of its radical or progressive advocates.) It is our suggestion
that tracking populism’s movement along the cleavages we identify can
help us think beyond this binary, and permit a more nuanced evaluation
of populism’s perils and democratic possibilities (e.g. Babones 2018).

vi Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

 Because populism typically positions itself against democracy, for
better or worse, one’s assessment of populism is closely related to a per-
ception of the current state of democracy. We agree with the literature
suggesting that it is the crises of minimalist, electoral, representative,
and capitalist democracies (heretofore “real-existing democracies”) that
we have to thank for the rise of populism (e.g. Beyme 2011; Corduwener
2014; Fraser 2017; Norris and Ingleheart 2018: 6; Pasquino 2008), though
we also recognize that it can also be the success of such regimes in facil-
itating cultural change (e.g. globalization) that fuels populism’s more
“nostalgic” authoritarian variants (Diamond et al. 2016; Norris 2016).
The right, the left, and, as Tim Bale (2013) suggests, even the centre,
could adopt the style of populism to reap electoral rewards, because of
common perceptions that real-existing democracies are either dysfunc-
tional, corrupt, or hollowed-out (Bailey et. al. 2018; Crotty 2014; Fishman
2016; Fuentes 2013; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Mitchell 2009: 41;
Morlino et al. 2013; Qizilbash 2008). This has built a significant demo-
graphic of people—liberal and illiberal—who feel betrayed by the very
institutions that profess to serve them. But while deficiencies of real-ex-
isting democracies are widely recognized, there is uncertainty and dis-
agreement about how to respond to the populist surge. Should we try to
contain its extremism (Rummens and Abts 2010) or embrace it as long as
it does not engage in explicit violence (Müller 2016)? Or, instead of trying
to preserve liberal democracy, should we try to rectify its fundamental
limitations by promoting a “progressive populism” (Frazer 2017; Mouffe
2018)?
While “left” and “right” are perhaps the most common ways of clas-
sifying populism, those designations are actually a composite of multi-
ple cleavages. In the sharply divided debate, a particular mobilization
of cleavages is often reified as a permanent definition of populism, and
we are left with intellectual confusion whenever populism’s variety and
mercuriality inevitably elude that definition. For a more precise analy-
sis of patterns and tensions within and between populist movements,
we propose to disaggregate the broad definition of populism into the
following six cleavages: (1) authoritarian and democratic, (2) market fun-
damentalist (libertarian) and redistributive, (3) exclusionary and inclusionary
(antipluralist and pluralist), (4) xenophobic and cosmopolitan, (5) electoral
and participatory (thick) (6) nostalgic and aspirational. Below we will first
outline these cleavages and then illustrate how they might shed light
on seemingly infinite and bewilderingly various phenomena that are
characterized as “populist” and “populism” in the corpus. We will close
with some thoughts on populism’s challenges to democracy and how
we might address them.

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018vii

What is Populism?

As the name suggests, if populism has a single defining characteristic,

it may be the invocation of “the people” who are betrayed, wronged, or
otherwise left vulnerable to forces outside their control. In fact, we find
in the corpus that populism is typically a reaction to a deep crisis, real
or perceived, in diverse and large democracies.3 Of course, the culprit
of the crisis as well as the identity of the victimized people are highly
contested and vary widely. Mark Elchardus and Bram Spruyt (2016), for
instance, surveyed 2,230 Dutch-speaking Belgians and determined that
it was the declinism perceived by this group of Flemish people in Bel-
gium—the social discontent of their feeling unfairly treated by society
and their inability to address this through formal politics (Spruyt, Kep-
pens, and Droogenbroeck 2016)—which fueled their support for the
Vlaams Blok (VB), a radical right populist party in Flanders (Mudde 2012).
Another survey, this time from the USA during Trump’s campaign for
the presidency, shows that his style and rhetoric appealed to Americans
weary of expertise, elites, and critical nationalism (Oliver and Rahn 2016)
because Trump could connect with people that became “cultural outsid-
ers” (Smith and Hanley 2018) in an increasingly progressive American
society that “left them behind” (see Berezin 2017, who suggests certain
retired servicepersons of Viet Nam and their disadvantaged children,
persons without higher education, and those working in manufacturing
and the military, are among Trump supporters). A sense of crisis, then,
challenges the effectiveness of existing modes of democratic representa-
tion of “social interests, values and demands”, making conditions that are
more conducive for populist emergence (Roberts 2015).
The wide variety in the driving force as well as major agents and
supporters of populism makes it exceedingly difficult to attach general
properties or “logics” to populism, apart from the fact that it speaks in
the name of the people. Is populism necessarily antipluralist? Is it fated to
degenerate into authoritarianism? Is it axiomatically incompatible with
representation of any kind? Our review of the corpus suggests that one
is hard pressed to answer these questions definitively. Rather, populism
seems to move along different cleavages, finding a contingent, though
not random, position depending on the nature of the crisis it responds
to, the political and socioeconomic structure populists find themselves
in, and, of course, the populists’ actual political practice.
As just noted, populism is often animated by a crisis. The crises that
have contributed to what Benjamin Moffitt (2016) terms “the global rise
of populism” over the 2008–2018 period have been in the main about
the economy (i.e. financial crises, job losses, wage stagnation, affordable

viii Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

housing), sovereignty (i.e. missing corporate taxes, “mass illegal” immigra-
tion), and security (i.e. terrorism, climate change, dwindling social nets,
democratic decay). Each of these policy areas make good examples to
demonstrate populism’s reactive but also productive character as popu-
list actors subjectively construct and perform crisis as much as they react
to it (Moffitt 2015). And, considering competing conceptions of populism
in light of these examples illustrates why it is limited, if not misleading,
to explain populism by a single definition. Because populism reacts to
conditions that vary across different contexts, its working can be better
understood when we investigate how it groups and regroups different
cleavages. Here, we will work through the example of the economy for
reasons of concision. For populism’s relation to sovereignty see Daphne
Halikiopoulou, Kyriaki Nanou and Sofia Vasilopoulou (2012, EU-focused)
and for its relation to security see Christina Liang (2016, also EU-focused)
for a start.
Dani Rodrik (2018: 23) writes about how the success of globaliza-
tion—the rise of multi and transnational corporations, their investors,
banks, insurers, and the managerial and professional classes that power
them—came to drive a wedge between “capital and labor, skilled and un-
skilled workers, employers and employees, globally mobile professionals
and local producers, industries/regions with comparative advantage and
those without, cities and the countryside, cosmopolitans versus commu-
nitarians, elites and ordinary people.” The “cruel lottery of the market”
has economically benefitted some, writes Rodrik—like China’s formerly
agrarian poor—while leaving others in economic decline or destitution,
such as people in postindustrial parts of for instance the US, Canada,
Australia and the UK. “A dynamic of global economic development means
that many countries are experiencing uneven development and their cit-
izens are increasingly split between those who can access high-skill jobs
and those who cannot,” write Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker (2016: 372),
and “[a]s a result some citizens are living in cosmopolitan areas of growth
and others in backwater areas of decline.” As such, whether for or against
it, a generation of populists emerged and found relevance in represent-
ing diverse concerns about the increasing social, economic, and political
costs of globalization (Aytac and Öni 2014).
The populist responses to economic crises, such as the Global Finan-
cial Crisis (GFC), are widely known and still much discussed in both ac-
ademic and non-academic forums. The six cleavages we encountered in
the corpus help classify these responses to the GFC and we use them as a
heuristic to make some sense of populism. It should be noted that the lit-
erature associated with each cleavage is complex as several descriptions
of populism are arguably synonymous, so there is a degree of conceptual

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018ix

overlap between cleavages. There is, too, the difficulty of trying to make
sense of literature which claims to be discussing, say, progressive pop-
ulism in toto but that is actually working from an evidence base rooted
in, for instance, the European Union (EU) and therefore its findings will
likely confuse readers from different parts of the world. We recognize
that there is little chance of disentangling this knot of knots and there-
fore proceed with our heuristic which is attuned to these provisos.
(1) Authoritarian populism supports “transgressive strongman lead-
ers” who are “willing to express politically incorrect views” so long as this
defends “traditional values and beliefs” such as keeping jobs at home and
people in fairly paid work (Norris and Ingleheart 2018: 17). Authoritarian
populism tends to perceive legal rules and constitutional norms as obsta-
cles to the swift exercise of authority, and resort to illiberal tactics that
can lead to democratic deconsolidation if this approach is entertained
for too long by the political mainstream (Mietzner 2018). McCoy (2017)
even adds that “strongmen populists” may also occasionally resort to the
use of “performative violence” to demonstrate political will and domestic
strength. Democratic populism looks to grassroots, bottom-up, mobiliza-
tion of peoples to counteract the pathologies of the global neoliberal econ-
omy (see Morlino and Raniolo 2017: 69 for the southern European case).
(2) Market fundamentalist (libertarian) populism places blame on
what they perceive to be inefficient government, unaccountable experts,
and dependent welfare recipients, promoting the capitalist market where
unrestrained competition supposedly gives all individuals an equal and
fair opportunity for success (Frank 2001). In contrast, redistributive pop-
ulism looks to rein in global economic elites and redistribute wealth.
Redistributive populism can manifest in various ways, from progressive
attempts to regulate the market economy (Quaglia 2012) and to achieve
a just economic system in which “[e]verybody does better when everybody
does better” (Frazer 2017: 70) to protectionist measures against globaliza-
tion (Munck 2009, specifically in the Latin American context) and even to
ethnonationalist fantasies of returning to an economic golden age where
one earner was enough to sustain the household (Baum 2017).
(3) Exclusionary (antipluralist) populism asserts that it represents the
singular will of the authentic people, denying legitimate economic com-
petition and implying that “whoever does not support populist parties
might not be a proper part of the people” (Müller 2016: 3), whereas inclu-
sionary (pluralist) populism recognizes “the vital necessity of divisions
within the people” as a crucial link to the never-ending task of emanci-
pation (Stavrakakis 2014: 514) and tries to involve all groups, especially
those who feel threatened, “through radical political solutions [to eco-
nomic problems] in a democratic way” (Markou 2017: 55).

x Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

 (4) Xenophobic populism “privileges the organic understanding of
the ‘people’ as an ethnically or culturally homogeneous totality,” a to-
tality that is threatened by “the dissolution of their identity,” and who
confront such perceived threats “by excluding weaker groups” by for in-
stance resisting economic migrants (Filc 2011: 223) whereas cosmopolitan
populism tries to assert the transnational modernization project without
disparaging localities: it can be a mode of political “glocalism” in the pur-
suit of “social security, equality, and democratic accountability” (Brasset
2010) within, between and beyond states and their economies (Dryzek
2008).
(5) Electoral populism focuses on taking control of governmental in-
stitutions, ultimately through electoral politics as means to reformulate
economic policies. Participatory, or “thick,” populism is oriented toward
ordinary citizens’ self-organizing practices, everyday spaces of public ac-
tion, and the institutional reform of the economy with the government
as a potential partner in this process (Dzur 2010: 370). It often involves ef-
forts to protect and reinvigorate local communities, typically rural ones,
through “collective action on the part of relatively powerless organized
community interests” for equitable economic development (McDonagh
et al. 2009: 19).
(6) Nostalgic populism “embodies the legacy of romanticism: the im-
plicit, clairvoyant sense of the traditional and thus the natural wisdom
of the masses” which, William Epstein (2017: 46) argues, perpetuates
material inequalities whereas aspirational populism mobilizes “the as-
pirations of ordinary people to exercise power over their everyday lives
and their collective fate” (Grattan 2016: 10) to reverse their dwindling
economic conditions.
Although our demonstration of these six cleavages is a simplification
of populism’s discursive and semiotic complexities,4 identifying popu-
lism’s “field of movement,” as it were, is useful to understand concrete
political phenomena beyond the monolithic label of “populist” and as
what they actually are—a complex positioning in a field created by dispa-
rate yet intertwined cleavages. In the next section, we will try to illustrate
this point by analyzing some of the recent political events through the
lens of these cleavages.

Who is the Populist?

A populist can be an individual, a political party, or a social movement

Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015: 3–7; Lazaridis et al. 2016; Weyland 2001,
2003, 2013). Such agents are given the populist moniker because they

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xi

adopt a certain style of behavior, discursive frame, or thin ideology (e.g.
Aslanidis 2016; Moffit 2016; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013) in which
everyday citizens are framed as in need of regaining control over the po-
litical institutions that were meant to serve them, institutions which are
felt to be corrupted by elites to serve the interests of the opulent minor-
ity, the Other, the few hegemons near and far.5
Examples of populist individuals have, it feels, never been more
abundant. Hugo Chavez (PSUV), Alberto Fujimori (e.g. Cambio 90), Ted
Cruz (GOP), Carlos Menem (JP), Evo Morales (MAS), Marine Le Pen (FN),
Geert Wilders (PVV), Rodrigo Duterte (PDP-Laban), Silvio Berlusconi (FI),
Victor Orbàn (Fidesz), Recep Tayyip Erdogan (JDP), Jeremy Corbyn (La-
bour), Beppe Grillo (5 Star), Jörg Haider (BZO), Nigel Farage (UKIP), Donald
Trump (GOP), Sarah Palin (Tea Party), and Pauline Hanson (One Nation) all
either identify as, or have otherwise been labelled, populist.6
This promiscuous list of populists reflects the conceptual prolifera-
tion in the contemporary populism debate which verges on fragmenta-
tion. The cleavages we derived from the corpus can bring into focus a
number of crucial distinctions obscured by the totalizing label of pop-
ulism. For example, Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump are commonly
called populists. This is not exactly incorrect, but only in the broadest—
and not very helpful—sense that they both claim to be representing peo-
ple who have suffered in America’s “rigged” system. We may be able to
characterize them as left populist and right populist, except that those
terms, too, are used quite loosely to include everything “good” and every-
thing “bad” from the democratic standpoint. This is why, we suggest, it is
helpful to disaggregate populism into its different cleavages. Even in the
realm of economic policies, we can gain a more precise understanding
of Sanders and Trump when we deploy the market fundamentalist-redis-
tributive cleavage. Trump’s economic protectionism and anti-globalism,
the debate about its sincerity aside, can be considered at least to contain
redistributive thrusts. On the other hand, his crusade against economic
regulation and tax policies betray a strong market fundamentalist orien-
tation. Seen in this light, Trump is not simply right populist; he oscillates
between the market fundamentalist and redistributive poles, and some-
times simultaneously, if unevenly, assumes multiple positions in the
spectrum. Similarly, the authoritarian-democratic cleavage is helpful in
differentiating the two figures. Seen through the lens of this cleavage—
where authoritarian “leaders adopt policy positions which endorse the
values of tough security against threats from outsiders, xenophobic na-
tionalism rather than cosmopolitanism, strict adherence to conventional
moral norms, and intolerance of multiculturalism” and democrats, in
short, do the opposite (Norris and Ingleheart 2018)—Trump clearly veers

xii Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

to the pole of authoritarian populism and Sanders that of democratic
populism. Here we can recognize that, notwithstanding all these stark
contrasts, both Sanders and Trump largely remain electoral populists.
Parties and movements, like politicians, can also be analyzed more
precisely through the lens of crosscutting cleavages. Take the case of
homonationalism for example. Ann-Cathrine Jungar and Emil Edenborg
(2018) at the International Political Science Association’s world congress
in Brisbane, 2018, demonstrated that the “Danish People’s Party, Norway’s
Progress Party, the Sweden Democrats and the True Finns are positioning
themselves on issues of gay inclusion and trans rights” because of their
countries’ cultural reliance on being progressive—at least in terms of val-
orizing LGBTQIA+ acceptance and inclusion. Homonational parties try to
legitimize themselves through alliances with members of, for example,
the trans community who are in favor of hard borders and limiting im-
migration—specifically from Muslim countries due to their perception
of Muslims being intolerant around issues of gender and sexuality. Trans
people join with xenophobic nationalists out of fear, and nationalists join
with trans people to win votes. Whereas it is expected that these homona-
tionalist parties will turn on their trans allies (Puar 2017) if electoral suc-
cess is experienced, such assemblages still pose a difficult methodological
question for political scientists. If a party is both socially conservative but
also progressive, xenophobic but also pluralist, what is it?
A different example from this perspective is the recent success of
the coalition formed between the Five Star Movement (FSM) and the
Lega Nord (LN) in Italy’s 2018 general elections. The FSM promotes same
sex marriage, universal citizen’s (basic) income, a strong environmental
agenda and advocates direct democracy (Bouillaud 2016, Hermet 2017)
while being ambiguous on questions of immigration. LN is built on a xe-
nophobic and socially conservative line, originally targeting “corrupted”
South Italy and recently adopting a more direct anti-immigrant, anti-Is-
lam, and anti-European rhetoric while denouncing same-sex marriage
as a danger for “traditional” family values (Agnew & Shin 2017, Ivaldi &
Lanzone 2017). Despite these value differences both parties have formed
a coalition.
Or, observe the populist politics surrounding austerity measures in the
EU. A segment of northern Europeans may wish for the south of Europe to
pay their debts even when they are ideologically sympathetic to redistrib-
utive schemes proposed by some of the crisis-ridden southern European
countries, because they believe southern Europeans are not as hardworking
and frugal as they are, but without caring much about preserving the finan-
cial integrity of the EU. Likewise, those who protest against austerity pro-
grams may do so because they recognize those debts as imposed by the EU’s

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xiii

“foreign” authority or as a product of skewed market competition, even
when they are in large part committed to the EU project and are distrustful
of their national governments (Krastev 2012: 5). In the cases of homona-
tionalist parties , the FSM-LN coalition, and the contention over austerity
programs, all-inclusive categories such as left and right populism clearly
cannot account for multiple and at times conflicting allegiances animating
populism. But when we approach populism in terms of multiple cleavages,
encountering, say, an inclusive yet xenophobic or a xenophobic yet redis-
tributive populism as such does not have to land us in intellectual paralysis.
There may be affinities between poles of different cleavages. For exam-
ple, the exclusionary or xenophobic pole, where the issue of the “Other”
looms large, may be pulled to the authoritarian pole with more ease and
speed. For the xenophobic populist, immigrants, foreigners, those who
look different, act different, and speak different, to whatever the populist
expects to see as the “way of the nation” are scapegoated as job-stealers,
criminals, house gobblers, welfare burdens, nation breakers—corruptive
elements who must be ejected from the state and held back at hard bor-
ders. Therefore, the xenophobic populist takes “security” to be of para-
mount importance and supports decisive state action even at the expense
of the rule of law, justice, and sometimes common sense (e.g., the Trump
administration’s travel ban, border control, and crackdown on illegal im-
migrants).7 Also, the xenophobic pole might have a strong affinity with
the nostalgic pole (e.g., “make America great again”), as the latter envi-
sions a fantastical past “uncontaminated” by foreign elements.
Cross-regional comparisons are also made more productive when un-
dertaken through the lens of various cleavages. While Trump and Philip-
pine populist Rodrigo Duterte are commonly argued to have a “similar
political style” (Curato 2016), they have significant political differences
that are accidentally sidelined by this comparison. Trump and Duterte
converge on authoritarian, libertarian and electoral poles while at the
same time meaningfully diverging on the other cleavages. Trump de-
monized Muslims and other immigrants as the “American Other” while
Duterte repeatedly made public appeals to the majority Christian Filipi-
nos to address the enduring “historical injustices” faced by Muslim Fili-
pinos. The same can be extended to the case of comparisons being made
between Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra and Fujimori (Phongpaichit and
Baker 2008). Approaching populism from the perspective of a variety of
cleavages allows for fruitful comparisons without sacrificing context.
Disaggregating populism into different cleavages is also helpful in con-
fronting the challenges facing those who see populism as the opportunity
to deepen democracy. Despite the common aspiration to protect the peo-
ple and resist elites, their primary concerns and allegiances are diverse,

xiv Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

if not fragmented (Gomez et al. 2016)—perhaps because of the electoral
successes that radical right parties experienced after the fall of commu-
nism and because of how financial capital benefited under third way pol-
itics which loosened Marx’s posthumous grip (see March 2012 for several
explanations).8 As Luke March (2011) writes: the radical left parties, those
“left of left”, have only just “begun to recover from the collapse of commu-
nism” and are hoping to represent the kaleidoscope of progressive electors
once they are able to reconnect with them in formal politics (March 2012).
The corpus documents positions held by those populists who are trying
to secure the democratic project. Among them is a dominant rejection of
Othering and the power of financial capital (Harrison 2015) with at times
an environmental or “green” concern (Bomberg and Schlosberg 2008: 338–
339). Such populists also tend to be culturally progressive and therefore
less prone to nostalgic fantasies. There is, too, a hostility to polluting prac-
tices, material inequality, mainstream political institutions, hard borders,
and the privatization of national assets and services. These populists tend
to prefer thick (Dzur and Hendriks 2018), inclusive (Stavrakakis et al. 2016),
and in some groups more radical reform-oriented (March and Rommer-
skirchen 2015) modes of pluralistic democratic practice. While these are all
admirable commitments, the recognition of populism’s multiple cleavages
also reminds that those commitments will not naturally or easily cohere
into a viable political coalition simply for their individual virtue. It will
require creative and patient intellectual and political work.

“Populists” and Their “Populisms”:

What Heralds for Democracy?

While crises may be a proximate catalyst for populism, it bears emphasis

that the general dysfunction of institutions in real-existing democracies
are centrally to blame for “the global rise of populism” (Moffit 2016). Nu-
merous works in psychoanalysis (e.g. Oppenheim 2018), social theory (e.g.
Moffit and Tormey 2013), and ethnography (e.g. Arguelles 2017) lend sup-
port to the thesis that the roots of the recent populist surge are not shallow
but deep. The problem is not just the failure to prevent or “properly” deal
with the GFC. Rather, it is citizens’ perception that real-existing democra-
cies are performing poorly or outright failing in a long list of policy fields,
and that this is a chronic problem. Populism, regardless of its particular
position in the cleavages outlined above, poses a fundamental challenge to
the legitimacy of real-existing democracies: populists are saying that demo-
cratic institutions are not fulfilling their functions, so much so that citizens
are compelled to seek more direct forms of democratic influence.

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xv

 If the nature of populism’s challenge is clear, it is far from clear what
populism heralds for democracy and how we might respond to it. Our
review of the corpus suggests that any blanket judgment that populism
is either “good” or “bad” for democracy is difficult to sustain. Where a
particular populism is crystallized in the intersecting web of cleavages,
not its supposedly universal logics, is more important in understanding
its implications for democracy. Pace some liberal critics, therefore, we
should avoid a wholesale dismissal of populism and take representative
democracy’s limitations more seriously. When we put only the stabil-
ity of liberal democracy in the limelight, we risk obscuring—or worse,
reproducing—the very problems that gave rise to populist protests in
the first place. At the same time, pace radical admirers of populism, we
should be more alert to the tension between populism’s multiple cleav-
ages and the possibility that promoting one (say, redistributive) pole
does not necessarily entail—and perhaps does not even facilitate—the
movement toward other desirable poles (such as the inclusive or partic-
ipatory ones).
As we grapple with populism’s challenges, we need to be sensitive
to emotional volatilities engulfing many democracies today. Working
through the literature on populism, we found that people are drawn to
populism not simply because of the objective hardship caused by the
GFC, but because they are angry, disappointed, despondent, shocked,
and frustrated. As Martha Nussbaum (2018) carefully notes for the Amer-
ican case, it is understandable that fear becomes a powerful social mood
when a large section of a society experiences economic decline. Health
problems tend to increase, university degrees become harder to afford,
and the future—especially for one’s children—might not look as bright
anymore. This rocky emotional terrain poses a delicate challenge to an
array of projects intended to deepen democracy. It makes, for instance,
a long deliberative democratic process to establish an economic democ-
racy (Malleson 2014) feel intolerably slow and unrewarding, while mak-
ing blaming Others or the conspiring global elites look like an attractive
alternative—which is misplaced and reprehensible, to be sure, but prom-
ises a quick release of pent-up anger.
This does not mean that we have to give up the incontrovertibly im-
portant work of civic education, political mobilization, and public delib-
eration, or suspend the essential effort to enhance the legitimacy of still
operating institutions in real-existing democracies (e.g. Snyder 2017; Sun-
stein 2018). Despite the anxieties around populism, populist publics are
also hopeful (Curato 2017). In populism, they see possibilities of reclaim-
ing their esteem as democratic agents who can exercise control over their
lives. This does suggest, however, that we should not dismiss populism’s

xvi Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

yearning for more direct forms of political engagement merely as naïve
or reckless. (We would do well to remember that the current form of de-
mocracy is in large measure a product of struggles against precisely such
accusations.) We do not have to believe in a world fully at one with the
will of the monolithic people to think that the current chasm between
the entrenched mechanisms of democracy and most citizens is unsus-
tainably deep. And we may be able to narrow that chasm not simply by
mending conventional democratic institutions but, perhaps, also by ex-
panding the horizon of democracy beyond them.

This issue, as can be inferred from the preceding long-form editorial,

begins with a special section on populism and its relationship with de-
mocracy. Democratic Theory’s editors put together this section to pursue
several questions that came out of a workshop entitled “After Populism:
Can Democracy Survive and Renew Itself ?” held 7 April 2017, at the In-
stitute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra. Ben-
jamin Moffitt (in this issue) analyses the populism versus anti-populism
cleavage in Western Europe and arrives at the conclusion that there is
an agonistic struggle between on the one hand radical and popular de-
mocracy and on the other liberal democracy. Adherents to both populist
poles take concern with nationalism and nativism—it is these tenden-
cies, and not the struggle between models of democracy, that constitute
Western Europe’s “populist threat.” Adele Webb (in this issue) critiques
and defends the concept of democratic ambivalence where a citizen can
“say yes and no at the same time,” “vote and then judge,” and think
about democracy as an entity that exists outside of elections. “[A]mbiva-
lence can be a form of participation in democracy that is crucial to safe-
guarding its future,” writes Webb (this issue, p. 31), and it is dangerous
for people to shut the tendency to ambivalence down. A citizen’s ambiv-
alence toward democracy needs recognition, discussion, and resolution
lest it unnecessarily boil into the resentment of democracy. And Mary
Walsh (in this issue) crafts a defense of progressive populism by argu-
ing that it followed the financial successes of corporations and transna-
tional capitalist elites. Corporations, or “big businesses,” have refigured
liberal praxis into a paradoxical pantomime of itself in order to gain
freedom from democracy—to be unfettered from electors, to selfishly
benefit under parliamentary legislation and state regulation, to do what
they are legally obliged to do which is make as much profit as quickly
as possible. As Walsh demonstrates, progressive populists are deeply
antagonistic toward this state of affairs and that their politics are there-
fore inherently valuable to redistributive, socially-oriented, democratic
futures.

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xvii

 We are pleased to write that this issue offers a second special section.
In their article, Matthew Flinders and Matthew Wood seek to “contribute
new conceptual and theoretical depth” to existing frameworks of “every-
day politics.” Flinders and Wood critique instances of existing “everyday
politics” via Michel Maffesoli’s social theory “to posit a framework for de-
termining whether nontraditional forms of political engagement can be
defined as genuinely distinctive from traditional [political] participation.”
In response to their argument, Max Halupka demonstrates that Flinders
and Wood’s “take on intentionality lacks consideration of the complex-
ities that the online space attribute,” Sadiya Akram with David Marsh
state that the authors “misspecify the new forms of this participation,
so are unable to provide a more adequate theoretical frame for future
research,” and Pia Rowe also with David Marsh “highlight the importance
of the protopolitical sphere in particular in the digital environment.”
The issue rounds off with a practitioner’s note by Spencer McKay and
Peter MacLeod on Toronto-based MASS LBP—a private firm specializing in
designing and running citizen panels for governments and businesses; a
review essay by Greta Snyder (featuring David McIvor’s Mourning in Amer-
ica and Simon Stow’s American Mourning); and a book review by Anna Shön
(Kevin Olson’s Imagined Sovereignties: The Power of the People and Other Myths
of the Modern Age).

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Kyong-Min Son, Cleve Arguelles, Pierrick
Chalaye, and Callum N Johnston for co-authoring the state of the field
review (2008–2018) that prefaces this issue. Thanks also go to several pan-
els on populism held at the International Political Science Association’s
world congress in Brisbane, 2018, and the Alfred Deakin Institute’s work-
shop entitled “Contemporary Democracy and Its Critics” held in Mel-
bourne on 19 July 2018. (Special thanks to Zim Nwokora for organizing
the latter.) Papers presented at these gatherings were instrumental to the
development of this long-form editorial on the populisms and populists
of our contemporary political period.

Kyong-Min Son is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science

& International Relations, University of Delaware. E-mail: kmson@udel.edu

Cleve Arguelles is Assistant Professor and Chair of the Political Science Pro-
gram, University of the Philippines—Manilla. E-mail: cvarguelles@up.edu.ph

xviii Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

 Pierrick Chalaye is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Deliberative Democ-
racy and Global Governance, University of Canberra. E-mail: pierrick.chalaye@
canberra.edu.au

Callum N. Johnston is an Honours Dissertation Candidate at the School of Gov-

ernance & Policy, University of Canberra. E-mail: u3143046@uni.canberra.edu.au

Notes
  1. See Mudde 2004; Weyland 2001; Stoica 2017; Woods 2017; Pappas 2016; Jansen
2015: 159; Bale, Van Kessel and Taggart 2011; Canovan 1999: 3, 1982; Woods
and Wejnert 2014; Gidron and Bonikowski 2013: 1.
 2. See Stockemer 2019; de la Torre 2019; Norris and Ingleheart 2018; Müller
2016; Moffitt 2016; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Müller 2015; Moffitt and
Tormey 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Albertazzi and McDonnell
2008.
  3. The corpus deals mainly with “full-democracies” which brackets our observa-
tions and analysis. There is evidence, however, in the corpus for populism in
non-democracies as well. For populism in a “non-democracy” like China see
Lynch (2018).
  4. We view the six cleavages covered in this editorial as the “dominant” or “main-
stream” ones in the corpus. On the fringes are transnational populism versus
national populism, institutional populism versus anti-institutional populism,
popular populism versus unpopular populism, and liberal populism versus
illiberal populism. We also ran into the concepts of technocratic populism
(Buštíkovà and Guasti 2018), neoliberal populism (Bozkurt 2013), modernist
populism (particularly Latour 2017 in contra-distinction to terrestrialism),
penal populism (Dzur 2010), anti-EU populism (Grabbe and Groot 2014), anti-
Brussels populism (Krastev 2012), Islamist populism (Boduszyński and Pick-
ard 2013), religious populism (Filc 2009), Jewish populism (Filc 2009), white
populism (Ali 2010), and black populism (Ali 2010) but these variants were
not part of a pronounced polar pair (i.e. there was no obvious cleavage be-
tween a substantive body of literature) and therefore were not included in
our heuristic.
  5. Kurt Weyland (2001:1) writes that governments and policies can also be pop-
ulist but, as governments are formed by political parties and policies stem
from parties, it is, we feel, sufficient to limit populist agency to parties as
Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (2015) have done.
  6. The game of “spot the real populist” in the corpus was difficult due to uncer-
tainty around actor intentionality but also because the term “populist” has
for decades now been used as a pejorative jab in arena politics (it is arguable
that similar tactics were used in ancient Rome [e.g. populares] and Athens [e.g.
demagogos]). Need to score points on your opponent? Call them a populist!
There is also a problem of identifying the populist politician as some agents

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xix

 do not behave like traditional political elites and therefore have “populist
appeal” but do not (yet) attack hegemons in the name of the (vague) people
and so cannot conventionally be understood as populists.
  7. As Stavrakakis (2018) suggests through his reading of Lacan, the xenophobic
and the authoritarian poles may not simply be mutually attracted but actu-
ally feed each other. Yannis Stavrakakis observes how authoritarian populists
attempt to unite “the necessary with the impossible in a retroactive loop”
where “the real is always foundational in an always escaping and mystifying
way”. Reality’s marriage with the impossible will always lead to failure he
states and, when it does, the Other is there to be blamed so that such popu-
lists and their supporters can try again, fail again, and blame again in their
illogical but emotionally resonant attempts to get back to the future.
  8. Compared to the right’s striking influence in the shaping of recent populist
politics, the left seems to still be struggling to articulate its voice. Metadata
from Google Books, Google Scholar, and Microsoft Academic shows that
“right populism” is presently written about between three and five times
more than “left populism”. Google’s Ngram shows that for books written in
English the rise of “left populism” happened from the late 1980s to the mid-
1990s. But thereafter, “left populism” loses prominence and “right populism”
reaches its highest recorded frequency in the English language. The Ngram
shows that “authoritarian populism”, which shares close ties with “right pop-
ulism”, is far more prominent in frequency than “left populism” especially
from the late 1970s onward.

References
Agnew, John and Michael Shin. 2017. “Spatializing Populism: Taking Politics to the
People in Italy”. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 107 (4): 915-933.
Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. eds. 2008. Twenty-First Century Popu-
lism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. 2015. Populists in Power. Abingdon, UK:
Routledge.
Ali, Omar H. 2010. In the Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South, 1886-1900. Jack-
son: University Press of Mississippi.
Arguelles, Cleve. 2017. “Grounding Populism: Perspectives from the Populist Pub-
lics.” MA Thesis, Department of Political Science, Central European Univer-
sity. https://bit.ly/2LO6Rwl.
Aslanidis, Paris. 2016. “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspec-
tive”. Political Studies, 64 (1): 88-104.
Aytaç, Erdem and Ziya Öni. 2014. “Varieties of Populism in a Changing Global Con-
text: The Divergent Paths of Erdoðan and Kirchnerismo.” Comparative Politics
47 (1): 41-59.
Babones, Salvatore. 2018. The New Authoritarianism: Trump, Populism and the Tyranny
of Experts. London: Polity.
Bailey, David J., Mònica Clua-Losada, Nikolai Huke, Olatz Ribera-Almandoz, and
Kelly Rogers. 2018. “Challenging the Age of Austerity: Disruptive Agency after

xx Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

 the Global Economic Crisis.” Comparative European Politics 16 (1): 9–31. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41295-016-0072-8.
Bale, Tim. 2013. “Countering Populism: Snog, Marry, Avoid?” Policy Network, 24
April. https://bit.ly/2LtvcYe.
Bale, Tim, Stijn van Kessel, and Paul Taggart. 2011. “Thrown Around with Aban-
don? Popular Understandings of Populism as Conveyed by the Print Media: A
UK Case Study.” Acta Politica 46 (2): 111–131.
Baum, Bruce. 2017. “Music to Their Ears: Nancy Love’s Trendy Fascism, White Na-
tionalism, and the Future of Whiteness.” New Political Science 39 (2): 269–276.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2017.1301322.
Berezin, Mabel. 2017. “On the Construction Sites of History: Where Did Don-
ald Trump Come From?” American Journal of Cultural Sociology 17 (5): 322–337.
https://www.palgrave.com/it/journal/41290/volumes-issues/special-issues.
Beyme, Klaus von. 2011. “Representative Democracy and the Populist Tempta-
tion.” In The Future of Representative Democracy, eds. Sonia Alonso, John Keane
and Wolfgang Merkel, 50-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boduszyńsky, Mieczystaw P., and Duncan Pickard. 2013. “Libya Starts from
Scratch”. Journal of Democracy, 24 (4): 86-96.
Bomberg, Elizabeth, and David Schlosberg. 2008. “US Environmentalism in Com-
parative Perspective.” Environmental Politics 17 (2): 337–348.
Bouillaud, Christophe. 2016. “Le Mouvement Cinq Etoiles (M5S) de Beppe Grillo en
Perspective Historique (1944-2016).” Available online: https://bit.ly/2zWP8fJ.
Bozkurt, Umut. 2013. “Neoliberalism with a Human Face: Making Sense of the
Justice and Development Party’s Neoliberal Populism in Turkey.” Science &
Society, 77 (3): 372-396.
Brasset, James. 2010. Cosmopolitanism and Global Financial Reform: A Pragmatic Ap-
proach to the Tobin Tax. London: Routledge.
Buštíkovà, Lenka and Petra Guasti. 2018. “The State as a Firm: Understanding the
Autocratic Roots of Technocratic Populism”. East European Politics and Societies:
and Cultures, online first. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325418791723.
Canovan, Margaret. 1999. “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of De-
mocracy.” Political Studies 47 (1): 2–16. https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-9248.00184.
Canovan, Margaret. 1982. “Two Strategies for the Study of Populism.” Political Stud-
ies 30 (4): 544–552. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1982.tb00559.x.
Corduwener, Pepijn. 2014. “The Populist Conception of Democracy beyond Pop-
ular Sovereignty.” Journal of Contemporary European Research 10 (4): 423–437.
https://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/636.
Crotty, William, ed. 2014. Polarized Politics: The Impact of Divisiveness in the US Political
System. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Curato, Nicole. 2017. “Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and
the New Terms of Philippine Populism.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 47 (1):
142-153.
Curato, Nicole. 2016. “Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and
Duterte’s Rise to Power.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35 (3): 91-109.
de la Torre, Carlos (ed). 2019. Routledge Handbook of Global Populism. Abingdon:
Routledge.

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xxi

Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, and Christopher Walker, eds. 2016. Authoritarian-
ism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Dryzek, John. 2008. “Two Paths to Global Democracy.” Ethical Perspectives 15 (4):
469–486. DOI: 10.2143/EP.15.4.2034392.
Dzur, Albert W., and Carolyn M. Hendriks. 2018. “Thick Populism: Democracy-en-
hancing Popular Participation.” Policy Studies 334–351. https://doi.org/10.1080/
01442872.2018.1478408.
Dzur, Albert W. 2010. “The Myth of Penal Populism: Democracy, Citizen Participa-
tion, and American Hyperincarceration.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24
(4): 354–379. 10.1353/jsp.2010.0016.
Elchardus, Mark, and Bram Spruyt. 2016. “Populism, Persistent Republicanism
and Declinism: An Empirical Analysis of Populism as a Thin Ideology.” Govern-
ment and Opposition 51 (1): 111–133. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.27
Epstein, William M. 2017. The Masses are the Ruling Classes: Policy Romanticism, Demo-
cratic Populism, and American Social Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Filc, Dani. 2009. The Political Right in Israel: Different Faces of Jewish Populism. London:
Routledge.
Filc, Dani. 2011. “Post-Populism: Explaining Neoliberal Populism Through the Ha-
bitus.” Journal of Political Ideologies 16 (2): 221–238. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569
317.2011.575685.
Fishman, Robert M. 2016. “Rethinking Dimensions of Democracy for Empirical
Analysis: Authenticity, Quality, Depth, and Consolidation.” Annual Review of Po-
litical Science 19: 289–309. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042114-015910.
Frank, Thomas. 2001. One Market Under God. New York: Anchor Books.
Fraser, Nancy. 2017. “Against Progressive Neoliberalism, A New Progressive Popu-
lism.” Dissent, January 28. https://bit.ly/2OiGbm2.
Frazer, Phillip. 2017. “When Everybody Does Better: Building a Movement for
Change.” Griffith Review 57: 70–79.
Fuentes, Juan Francisco. 2013. “Totalitarian Language: Creating Symbols to De-
stroy Words.” Contributions to the History of Concepts 8 (2): 45–66.
Gidron, Noam, and Bart Bonikowski. 2013. “Varieties of Populism: Literature Re-
view and Research Agenda.” Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs,
Harvard University, Working Paper Series. https://bit.ly/2ghmb6G.
Gomez, Raul, Laura Morales, and Luis Ramiro. 2016. “Varieties of Radicalism: Ex-
amining the Diversity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe.”
West European Politics 39 (2): 351–379. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.106
4245.
Grabbe, Heather and Nadja Groot. 2014. “Populism in the European Parliament:
What Implications for the Open Society?” The International Spectator, 49 (4):
33-46.
Grattan, Laura. 2016. Populism’s Power. New York: Oxford University Press.
Halikiopoulou, Daphne, Kyriaki Nanou, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2012. “The Par-
adox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Rad-
ical Left Euroscepticism.” European Journal of Political Research 51 (4): 504–539.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02050.x.

xxii Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

Harrison, Trevor W. 2015. “Petroleum, Politics, and the Limits of Left Progressiv-
ism in Alberta.” In Alberta Oil and the Decline of Democracy in Canada, eds. Meenal
Shrivastava and Lorna Stefanick, 69-88. Edmonton: Athabasca University
Press.
Hermet, Guy. 2017. “Histoires des Populismes”. Studia Politica, 17 (4): 481-490. Avail-
able online: https://bit.ly/2ONQ51Q.
Ivaldi, Gilles and Maria Elisabetta Lanzone. 2017. “De l’Usage Politique du Peuple
Padano: La Construction d’Identité par la Ligue du Nord”. Cahiers d’Études Ro-
manes, 35: 505-520.
Jansen, Robert S. 2015. “Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to
Populism.” In The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives, ed. Carlos de
la Torre, Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. Pp. 159-188.
Jennings, Will, and Gerry Stoker. 2016. “The Bifurcation of Politics: Two Englands.”
The Political Quarterly 87 (3): 372–382. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12228.
Jungar, Ann-Cathrine, and Emil Edenborg. 2018. “Homonationalism in the Nordic
Region: PRR Parties and LGBTQ Rights.” Conference paper delivered at IPSA,
Brisbane, Monday 23 July. https://bit.ly/2mMuQOh.
Krastev, Ivan. 2012. “The Political Logic of Disintegration: Seven Lessons from the
Soviet Collapse.” Centre for European Policy Studies Essay, September. https://bit.
ly/2K7lRkd.
Latour, Bruno. 2017. Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime. Cambridge:
Polity.
Lazaridis, Gabriella, Giovanna Campani, and Annie Benveniste. eds. 2016. The Rise
of the Far Right in Europe: Populist ‘Shifts’ and Othering. London: Palgrave.
Liang, Christina Schori, ed. 2016. Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security
Policy of the Populist Radical Right. London: Routledge.
Lynch, Catherine. 2018. Liang Shuming and the Populist Alternative in China. Boston:
Brill.
Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2013. “Lessons from Latin
America: Democratic Breakdown and Survival.” Journal of Democ-
racy 34 (2): 123–137. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/
lessons-latin-america-democratic-breakdown-and-survival.
Malleson, Tom. 2014. After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
March, Luke, and Charlotte Rommerskirchen. 2015. “Out of Left Field? Explaining
the Variable Electoral Success of European Radical Left Parties.” Party Politics
21 (1): 40–53. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1354068812462929.
March, Luke. 2012. “Problems and Perspectives of Contemporary European Rad-
ical Left Parties: Chasing a Lost World or Still a World to Win?” International
Critical Thought 2 (3): 314–339. https://doi.org/10.1080/21598282.2012.706777.
March, Luke. 2011. Radical Left Parties in Europe. London: Routledge.
Markou, Grigoris. 2017. “The Rise of Inclusionary Populism in Europe: The Case of
SYRIZA.” Contemporary Southeastern Europe 4 (1): 54–71.
McCoy, Alfred. 2017. “Global Populism: A Lineage of Filipino Strongmen from Qu-
ezon to Marcos and Duterte.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies
32 (1-2): 7-54.

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xxiii

McDonagh, John, Tony Varley, and Sally Shortall, eds. 2009. A Living Countryside?:
The Politics of Sustainable Development in Rural Ireland. Farnham: Ashgate.
Mietzner, Marcus. 2018. “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism
and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia.” Pacific Affairs 91 (2): 261–282.
DOI: 10.5509/2018912261.
Mitchell, Lincoln A. 2009. Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose
Revolution. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Moffitt, Benjamin. 2016. The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and
Representation. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press.
Moffitt, Benjamin. 2015. “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the
Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism”. Government and Opposition 50
(2): 189-217.
Moffitt, Benjamin, and Simon Tormey. 2013. “Rethinking Populism: Politics,
Mediatisation and Political Style.” Political Studies 62 (2): 381–397. https://doi.
org/10.1111%2F1467-9248.12032.
Mouffe, Chantal. 2018. For a Left Populism. London: Verso.
Mouffe, Chantal. 2016. “In Defence of Left-Wing Populism.” The Conversation, 30
April. https://bit.ly/1TGUaie.
Morlino, Leonardo, and Francesco Raniolo. 2017. The Impact of the Economic Crisis on
South European Democracies. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Morlino, Leonardo, Daniela Pianna, and Francesco Raniolo. eds. 2013. La Qualità
Della Democrazia in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Mudde, Cas and Rovira Kaltwasser. 2018. “Studying Populism in Comparative Per-
spective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda”.
Comparative Political Studies: 1-27.
Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. “Populism.” In The Oxford Hand-
book of Political Ideologies, eds. Michael Freeden and Marc Steers, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. Pp. 1-23.
Mudde, Cas. 2012. “Flemish Nationalism: A New Landscape.” openDemocracy, 15 Oc-
tober. https://bit.ly/2LMH9Iz.
Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. eds. 2012. Populism in Europe and the
Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government & Opposition 39 (4): 541–563.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.
Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press.
Müller, Jan-Werner. 2015. “Parsing Populism: Who is and Who is Not a Populist These
Days?” Juncture 22 (2): 80–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2050-5876.2015.00842.x.
Munck, Gerardo L. 2009. “Democracy and Development in a Globalized World:
Thinking About Latin America from Within.” Studies in Comparative Interna-
tional Development 44 (4): 337–358.
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Ingleheart. 2018. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and the
Rise of Authoritarian Populism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa. 2016. “It’s Not Just Trump. Authoritarian Populism is Rising Across
the West. Here’s Why.” The Washington Post, 11 March. https://wapo.st/2JSGSio.

xxiv Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

Nussbaum, Martha. 2018. The Monarchy of Fear: A Philosopher Looks at Our Political
Crisis. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Oliver, Eric and Wendy Rahn. 2016. “Trump’s Voters Aren’t Authoritarians, New
Research Says. So What Are They?” Washington Post, March 9. https://wapo.
st/2xmk07m.
Oppenheim, Lois. 2018. “Making Us Great Again? A Psychoanalytic Discussion of
Populism.” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 54 (2): 247–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00107530.2018.1458277.
Pappas, Takis S. 2016. “Modern Populism: Research Advances, Conceptual and
Methodological Pitfalls, and the Minimal Definition.” Oxford Research Encyclo-
pedia of Politics. https://bit.ly/2lk32Ak.
Pasquino, Gianfranco. 2008. “Populism and Democracy.” In Twenty-First Century
Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, eds. Daniele Albertazzi and
Duncan McDonnell, 15–29. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Chris Baker. 2008. “Thaksin’s Populism.” Journal of Con-
temporary Asia 38 (1): 62-83.
Puar, Jasbir K. 2017. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham:
Duke University Press.
Qizilbash, Mozaffar. 2008. “Two Views of Corruption and Democracy.” Review of
Political Economy 20 (2): 275–291. https://doi.org/10.1080/09538250701819727.
Quaglia, Lucia. 2012. “The ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Politics of Financial Services Regu-
lation in the European Union.” New Political Economy 17 (4): 515–535. https://doi.
org/10.1080/13563467.2012.622360.
Roberts, Kenneth. 2015. “Populism, Political Mobilizations, and Crises of Political
Representation”. In The Promise and Perils of Populism, edited by Carlos de la
Torre. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 140-158.
Rodrik, Dani. 2018. “Populism and the Economics of Globalization.” Journal of Inter-
national Business Policy 1: 12–33. https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-018-0001-4.
Rummens, Stefan, and Koen Abts. 2010. “Defending Democracy: The Concentric
Containment of Political Extremism.” Political Studies 58 (4): 649–665. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00809.x.
Smith, David Norman, and Eric Hanley. 2018. “The Anger Games: Who Voted for
Donald Trump in the 2016 Election, and Why?” Critical Sociology 44 (2): 195–
212. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0896920517740615.
Snyder, Timothy. 2017. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New
York: Tim Duggan.
Spruyt, Bram, Gil Keppens, and Filip Van Droogenbroeck. 2016. “Who Supports
Populism and What Attracts People to It?” Political Research Quarterly 69 (2):
335–346. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1065912916639138.
Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2018. “Jacques Lacan: Negotiating the Psychosocial In and
Beyond Language”. In The Routledge Handbook of Language and Politics, eds. Ruth
Wodak and Bernhard Forchtner, London: Routledge. Pp. 82-95.
Stavrakakis, Yannis, Ioannis Andreadis, and Giorgos Katsambekis. 2016. “A New
Populism Index at Work: Identifying Populist Candidates and Parties in the
Contemporary Greek Context.” European Politics and Society 18 (4): 446–464.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1261434.

Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018xxv

 Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2014. “The Return of “The People”: Populism and Anti-Pop-
ulism in the Shadow of the European Crisis.” Constellations 21 (4): 505–517.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12127.
Stavrakakis, Yannis, and Panos Angelopoulos. 2013. “Peuple, Populisme et An-
ti-Populisme: Le Discours Politique Grec à l’Ombre de la Crise Européenne.”
Actuel Marx 54: 107–123. 10.3917/amx.054.0107.
Stockemer, Daniel (ed). 2019. Populism Around the World: A Comparative Perspective.
Cham: Springer Nature.
Stoica, Mihnea S. 2017. “Political Myths of the Populist Discourse.” Journal for the
Study of Religions & Ideologies 16 (46): 63–76.
Sunstein, Cass, ed. 2018. Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America. New York:
Dey Street Books.
Tamás, Gaspar Miklos. 2017. “The Mystery of ‘Populism’ Finally Unveiled.” openDe-
mocracy, 24 February. https://bit.ly/2m4r4RO.
Tormey, Simon. 2018. “Populism: Democracy’s Pharmakon?” Policy Studies 39 (3):
260-273. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2018.1475638.
Urbanati, Nadia. 2014. Democracy Disfigured. New York: Columbia University Press.
Weyland, Kurt. 2013. “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the
Populist Left.” Journal of Democracy 24 (3): 18–32.
Weyland, Kurt. 2003. “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How
Much Affinity?” Third World Quarterly 24 (6): 1095–1115.
Weyland, Kurt. 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of
Latin American Politics.” Comparative Politics 34 (1): 1–22. DOI: 10.2307/422412.
Woods, Dwayne. 2017. “Populism in Search of Its Model.” Chinese Political Science
Review 2 (3): 253–265.
Woods, Dwayne, and Barbara Wejnert. eds. 2014. Many Faces of Populism: Current
Perspectives. Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing.

xxvi Democratic Theory  �  Winter 2018

View publication stats