Flight Safety

D I G E S T
SEPTEMBER 2003–FEBRUARY 2004

Waterproof
Flight Operations
 A comprehensive guide for corporate, fractional,
on-demand and commuter operators conducting
overwater flights

Airline Data
Included
 Con t e n t s

Flight Safety Foundation Flight Safety Digest

For Everyone Concerned With the Safety of Flight Vol. 22, No. 9–12 and Vol. 23, No. 1–2
www.flightsafety.org September 2003–February 2004
Officers and Staff US$240.00 (nonmembers)

In This Issue
Chairman, Board of Governors Hon. Carl W. Vogt
President and CEO Stuart Matthews S INCE 1947

Executive Vice President Robert H. Vandel

Treasurer James S. Waugh Jr.
Waterproof Flight Operations
Administrative A comprehensive guide for corporate, fractional, on-demand
Special Events and and commuter operators conducting overwater flights
Products Manager Ellen Plaugher
Manager, Support Services Linda Crowley Horger  Ditching
Financial 3 The Unthinkable Happens
Director of Finance
and Administration Crystal N. Phillips
5 Rationalize the Risk of Ditching:
It Won’t Happen to Me
Accountant Millicent Wheeler
9 Lessons From Another Era
Membership

Director, Membership 20 Prepare to Ditch

and Development Ann Hill
23 Assigning Seats to Flight Attendants


Membership Services
Coordinator Ahlam Wahdan
Requires Care in Business Aircraft 3
51 Studies Reveal Passenger Misconceptions
Publications About Brace Commands and Brace Positions
Director of Publications Roger Rozelle
55 Postaccident U.K. Research Yields Recommended
Senior Editor Mark Lacagnina Passenger Brace Position
Senior Editor Wayne Rosenkrans
Senior Editor Linda Werfelman 66 Ditching Certification: What Does It Mean?
Associate Editor Rick Darby
Web and Print 78 Accident Experience Influences Helicopter
Production Coordinator Karen K. Ehrlich Overwater Operations
Production Designer Ann L. Mullikin
Production Specialist Susan D. Reed 85 Imagine the Worst Helicopter Ditching — Now Get
Librarian, Jerry Lederer Ready for It
Aviation Safety Library Patricia Setze

Technical
95 Offshore Helicopter Operators’ Emergency Systems
Incorporate Rescue Planning
Director of Technical Programs James M. Burin
Technical Programs Specialist Joanne Anderson 103 Helicopter Hull-flotation Systems


Managing Director of
Internal Evaluation Programs Louis A. Sorrentino III
Reduce the Risk of Rapid Sinking
Q-Star Program Administrator Robert Feeler
Manager, Data Systems  Search and Rescue
and Analysis Robert Dodd, Ph.D.
Manager of Aviation 111 The Search-and-rescue System
Safety Audits Darol V. Holsman
Will Find You — If You Help
Founder Jerome Lederer 120 Foundation Pioneered Early
1902–2004
Overwater-safety Decisions
Flight Safety Foundation is an international membership organization
dedicated to the continuous improvement of aviation safety. Nonprofit
and independent, the Foundation was launched officially in 1947 in
130 A Signal for Help Is Heard, Help
response to the aviation industry’s need for a neutral clearinghouse to Arrives Too Late
disseminate objective safety information, and for a credible and knowl-
edgeable body that would identify threats to safety, analyze the problems 134 Truths About Beacon Signals and 111
and recommend practical solutions to them. Since its beginning, the Satellites Hidden in the Details
Foundation has acted in the public interest to produce positive influence
on aviation safety. Today, the Foundation provides leadership to more 139 Stay Tuned: A Guide to Emergency Radio Beacons
than 910 member organizations in more than 142 countries.
141 Tests of 406-MHz GPS Beacons Show Position Deficiencies

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 i
 Con t e n t s

 Survival  Regulations and Recommendations

149 Keeping Your Head 387 Regulations, Judgment

Above Water When Your Affect Overwater
Aircraft Isn’t Equipment Decisions
157 Don’t Leave the Aircraft 389 A Loophole Big Enough
Without It for a Life Raft to Fall
Through
163 Will to Live Is Essential in
Survival Situation, Specialists
Say 149 395 For Ditching Survival,
Start With Regulations,
177 ‘Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to
Drink …’
But Don’t Stop There
387
396 FAA Technical Standard
Order (TSO)-C70a, Life Rafts
179 Making Seawater Drinkable in Just a Few Strokes
(Reversible and Nonreversible)
182 With a Little Agitation, Desalting Kits Yield Drinkable
404 International Civil Aviation Organization
Water
406 European Joint Aviation Authorities
184 Water Maker Maintenance Interval Clarified
413 European Aviation Safety Agency
187 Is There a Doctor Aboard the Life Raft?
414 U.K. Civil Aviation Authority
211 What’s Eating You? It’s Probably Not a Shark 414 Transport Canada
416 Civil Aviation Safety Authority–Australia
225 Aviators and Sailors in the Water
Depend on the Same Rescue Resources 424 Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand
429 SAE International

 Equipment and Training 430 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

452 FAA Technical Standard Order
233 Life Raft Primer: Guidelines for Evaluation (TSO)-C13f, Life Preservers [Life Vests]
459 FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C72c,
258 Life Raft Evaluation: Pooling the Resources Individual Flotation Devices
293 Life Rafts: Ask the Person Who’s Tried One 462 FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C85a,
Survivor-locator Lights
323 All Aboard … Except Me

337 Physical Fitness for Life Rafts and Life Vests  Aviation Statistics
339 FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1B, Acceptable Methods,
Techniques and Practices — Aircraft Inspection and 469 About 75 Percent of
Repair Airplane Occupants
340 One Repair Station’s Standard Life Raft and More Than
Inspection Procedures 87 Percent of
Helicopter Occupants
346 Your Life Vest Can Save Your Life … If It Survived Ditchings,
Doesn’t Kill You First Data Show 469
357 Cold Outside, Warm Inside
361 JAA Proposes Standards
for Immersion Suits 233  References 631
365 HEED This 631 They’re Slippery
When Wet, Better
372 Train to Survive the Read Them Now
Unthinkable 659 Photo Credits
378 Train to Rise to the Top
382 If You Need It, They
Have It

ii Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Pr e f a c e

T
he work on this extraordinary are essential in the worldwide search- a Piper Chieftain during an on-demand
Flight Safety Digest was begun and-rescue system; a trend to reduce sightseeing flight in Hawaii; one of the
in 2001 by the Flight Safety the requirements for overwater survival eight passengers drowned. All seven
Foundation (FSF) publications staff in re- equipment based on the proven reliabil- occupants were killed after a dual-engine
sponse to queries from corporate aviation ity of turbine engines (although the role failure occurred on a Chieftain during a
managers who were initiating overwater of human factors cannot be overlooked); scheduled flight in Australia.
flights. They wanted additional guidance accidents involving fare-paying passengers
about how to ditch their aircraft, how to during near-shore operations in nontur- There were several close calls, too. For
select life rafts, how to use the required bine-powered airplanes; the utility of example, an Airbus A330, with 291 pas-
equipment and what might be expected long-range corporate jets that supports sengers, was on a chartered flight from
from search-and-rescue resources in vari- growth in overwater operations; and Canada to Portugal when an apparent
ous parts of the world. the dependence of the offshore-energy fuel leak resulted in both engines flam-
industry on helicopters, which has resulted ing out; the crew glided the airplane 85
The publications staff learned quickly that in considerable overwater experience to nautical miles (157 kilometers) to a land-
in-depth practical information was not share with other sectors. ing in the Azores. A chartered Douglas
readily available for corporate, fractional, DC-9 was on a flight to Mexico when a
air-taxi and commuter operators, and As the data were crunched, the publica- navigational problem took the airplane
that air carrier operators had resources tions staff recognized that other water- far off course in the Gulf of Mexico; the
and requirements that were not readily contact accidents involved evacuation crew diverted toward the nearest suitable
transferable to the other sectors. Moreover, and survival issues paralleling those in airport and glided the final 23 nautical
what information was available presumed ditchings. Moreover, they learned that miles (43 kilometers) to a forced landing
the unlikelihood of ditchings; therefore, while such accidents are relatively un- on a road near the airport; four of the 40
practical information about surviving a common, ditching remains a risk — even passengers received minor injuries during
ditching was minimal, leaving room for for modern airline jets — and is not a the evacuation.
myths and misconceptions. relic of an earlier era.
The unthinkable happens.
Roger Rozelle, FSF director of publica- Among ditchings that have been con-
tions, a pilot with overwater experience ducted in recent years are the following: The publications staff came to realize that
and a licensed merchant mariner with A Boeing 737 was ditched in a river in the sea is the great equalizer: Whether the
offshore experience, led his staff, whose Indonesia after both engines flamed out survivors arrive from a ditched aircraft or
senior editors are pilots, in assembling in heavy rain and hail during a sched- from an abandoned ship, once in the wa-
this issue. They studied the literature uled flight with 54 passengers; one flight ter, their survival issues are universal.
on ditching and post-ditching survival, attendant was killed. A businessman-pilot
helped conduct an in-the-water life raft ditched his CitationJet off the northwest The sheer volume of what has been written
evaluation, visited survival-equipment U.S. coast after an apparent pitch-trim would tax the confines of a book (although
manufacturers, and examined safety- problem; the two people aboard survived. this issue will be available as a printed
related equipment. They interviewed A Falcon 20 was ditched in a U.S. river book by special order from our Internet
specialists in safety, survival and train- during a cargo flight when both engines site <www.flightsafety.org>). Presenting
ing; manufacturers of aircraft and equip- flamed out on an instrument approach; the information on compact disc proved
ment; regulatory authorities; and many both pilots survived. Intake icing caused most practical and allowed liberal use of
others. As information was gathered, new both of a Shorts 360’s turboprop engines color in a fresh design. A built-in search
questions arose, topics were explored in to fail during an overwater departure for engine enables navigation of nearly 700
greater depth, page count multiplied and a scheduled mail flight in Scotland; both pages packed with facts, and links connect
the scheduled publication date became pilots died. Another Shorts 360 had a to a variety of relevant Internet sites.
a moving target. To ignore any of the dual-engine flameout on approach to
many interconnecting parts of the sub- an airport on the coast of Libya during Valuable safety information is here for all
ject would have failed to give the most an unscheduled passenger flight; 22 of our members.
affected aircraft operators the informa- the 41 occupants were killed. The pilot
tion that they needed. of a Cessna 402C was unable to main-
tain altitude after a power loss from one
Surrounding overwater operations are engine during a commuter flight to the Stuart Matthews
scheduled changes in requirements for Bahamas; two of the nine passengers President and CEO
emergency locator transmitters, which were killed. A similar accident involved Flight Safety Foundation

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 iii
Ditching
  Ditching

3 The Unthinkable Happens

5 Rationalize the Risk of Ditching:
It Won’t Happen to Me
9 Lessons From Another Era

20 Prepare to Ditch
23 Assigning Seats to Flight Attendants
Requires Care in Business Aircraft
51 Studies Reveal Passenger Misconceptions
About Brace Commands and Brace Positions
55 Postaccident U.K. Research Yields
Recommended Passenger Brace Position

66 Ditching Certification: What Does It Mean?

78 Accident Experience Influences Helicopter

Overwater Operations

85 Imagine the Worst Helicopter Ditching

— Now Get Ready for It

95 Offshore Helicopter Operators’ Emergency

Systems Incorporate Rescue Planning

103 Helicopter Hull-flotation Systems

Reduce the Risk of Rapid Sinking
 Di t c h i n g

The Unthinkable Happens

If you believe that ditching a transport category airplane
is a thing of the past, read on.

—FSF Editorial Staff

D
ata show that the probability is low ­ eparting from Sidney, British Columbia, Canada,
d Ebb tide reveals a
that the crew of a turbine-powered for a private flight to Boise, Idaho, U.S., when an Shorts 360 that broke
business airplane will have to ditch uncommanded change of pitch attitude — to about up during a ditching
— that is, to deliberately conduct an 45 degrees nose-down — occurred. A preliminary on rough water and
emergency landing on water. Nevertheless, as the report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety sank rapidly.
following examples indicate, the risk of ditch- Board (NTSB) said that the pilot disconnected the
ing is not absent in a transoceanic journey or a autopilot, moved the throttle levers to idle and
flight close to shore (see “Rationalize the Risk of attempted to retrim the airplane.
Ditching: It Won’t Happen to Me,” page 5).
“He reported that the [elevator] trim indicator was
On July 22, 2003, a Cessna CitationJet was be- in the full-forward (nose-down) position and that
ing flown on autopilot through 16,000 feet after neither the manual [trim actuator] nor the electric

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 3
 Di t c h i n g

trim actuator would respond to his inputs,” “Just before impact with the water, [the pilot] raised
the report said. “After numerous configuration the nose,” the NTSB preliminary report said. “The

T he
changes and unsuccessful attempts to regain
full pitch control, the pilot elected to ditch
the airplane.”
airplane skipped over the water and came to rest.”

The pilot received a minor injury when his head

occupants, who struck the windshield on impact, but none of the
The pilot told investigators that the wings were nine passengers was injured during the ditching.3
had not donned life level and airspeed was approximately 100 knots The pilot exited through the left cockpit window
when he ditched the airplane. The CitationJet and opened the cabin door. All the passengers exit-
vests, were rescued struck the water about 900 feet (275 meters) from ed through the cabin door before the airplane sank
shore in Penn Cove, Coupeville, Washington, U.S. in 15 feet to 30 feet (five meters to nine meters) of
from the water The pilot and his passenger were not injured, and water about 45 seconds after impact. The airplane
they exited through the main cabin door.1 The was equipped with life vests for all the occupants,
by boaters. airplane sank within 10 minutes in 60 feet (18 but only four of the occupants had donned life
meters) of water. The occupants, who had not vests. There was no life raft aboard the airplane;
donned life vests, were rescued from the water regulations did not require that a life raft be aboard
by boaters. the airplane during the accident flight.4

The flight had been conducted under visual flight

Engine Failure rules (VFR), and the pilot was not in radio contact
Cripples Piston Twin with air traffic control (ATC). Nevertheless, he de-
clared mayday, a distress condition, and his radio

U .S. regulations governing commuter and

on-demand operations require that a multi-
engine airplane flown over water with passengers
transmission was heard by the pilot of another Air
Sunshine aircraft that was airborne at the time.
The pilot relayed the message to ATC. The Miami
aboard must be able to climb at least 50 feet per (Florida) Air Route Traffic Control Center notified
minute (fpm) at 1,000 feet above the surface with the U.S. Coast Guard at 1541.
the critical engine inoperative.2 As the following
example indicates, however, a catastrophic en- The U.S. Coast Guard launched three aircraft: an
gine failure might render an airplane incapable HU-25 (military version of the Dassault Falcon
of meeting the single-engine climb performance 20) and an HH-65 Dolphin (Eurocopter Dauphin)
figures in the airplane flight manual (AFM). from Air Station Miami; and an HH-60 Jayhawk
(Sikorsky S-70B) from Andros Island, the Bahama
On July 13, 2003, a Cessna 402C operated as Flight Islands.5
502 by Air Sunshine on a commuter flight from
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, U.S., to Treasure Cay, “The Falcon was launched for its speed and be-
Abaco Island, Bahamas, was at 3,500 feet and about cause it could deploy life rafts,” said Petty Officer
20 nautical miles (37 kilometers) from the destina- Carleen Drummond of the public affairs office for
tion when the pilot observed oil leaking from the the U.S. Coast Guard Seventh District in Miami.6
right engine, heard a “pop” and observed engine “The Falcon crew provided communication with
parts exiting through the top of the cowling. the helicopters and the civilian aircraft, and tracked
the rescue process. The use of two helicopters was
The pilot said that although he feathered the based on the number of survivors in the water and
propeller on the right engine and increased left- the need for more assets to recover them faster.”
engine power to full, he was not able to maintain
altitude. With landing gear and flaps retracted, the The Falcon and the Dolphin were launched at
airplane descended about 200 fpm to 300 fpm un- 1555. The Falcon arrived at the ditching site at
til it struck the water approximately six nautical 1605, and the Dolphin arrived about 1657. The
miles (11 kilometers) west of Treasure Cay Airport Jayhawk arrived at the ditching site at 1702. The
(which is approximately 162 nautical miles [300 Air Sunshine pilot who had relayed the mayday call
kilometers] east-northeast of Fort Lauderdale). to ATC remained at the site until the U.S. Coast
The ditching occurred at 1530 local time, about Guard aircraft arrived.
65 minutes after departure. Continued on page 7

4 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Rationalize the Risk of Ditching: It Won’t Happen to Me

R
isk management might appear to space shuttle Columbia accident, the error — for example, incorrect operation
be an obscure academic process, U.S. National Aeronautics and Space of a flight control system component.
but it is exercised by everyone, ev- Administration (NASA) knew that the
ery day on an intuitive and informal level. shedding of insulation on external fuel The top-down method is called fault tree
An example is walking across a road. A tanks was a recurring problem during analysis. This method begins with the
cautious person might wait until the road launches; however, NASA underes- identification of a specific event (top-level
is clear of traffic before crossing. A person timated the consequences of debris event) and continues with the identifica-
willing to take more risk might wait only striking the orbiter.1 Accident investiga- tion of other events (sub-events) that had
until a suitable interval occurs between tors said that space shuttle program to have occurred. Generally, the top-level
vehicles. A daredevil might set off across managers “rationalized the danger [of] event is caused by the combined results
the road with little regard for the oncom- strikes on the orbiter’s thermal-protection or effects of two or more sub-events. A
ing traffic, rationalizing that because he system” and “treated [the problem] as common application of the top-down
has the right-of-way, drivers will take the a maintenance issue rather than a fatal method is the analysis of aircraft accidents
necessary actions to avoid striking him. flaw.” The Columbia accident report said and incidents.
that among the causes of the accident
Formal risk management includes realistic was NASA’s “reliance on past success The adequacy of either risk-analysis
analysis of both the likelihood of a hazard- as a substitute for sound engineering method is only as good as the ability of
ous event and the consequences of the practices (such as testing to understand the analyst to identify the failure event or
event, followed by action to eliminate or re- why systems were not performing in ac- the top-level event. An unknown, uniden-
duce to an acceptable level the likelihood cordance with requirements).”2 tified or unanticipated event can thwart
of the event or its consequences. Errors in effective risk management.
risk management can be introduced by in- Analysis Begins at the
adequate analysis of an event’s likelihood When both the likelihood and the con-
Bottom or the Top
or consequences, and by rationalization sequences of an event have been identi-
— basing one’s actions on seemingly fied, action to manage the risk can begin.
Formal risk management involves the use
credible but fallacious principles. Either the likelihood or the consequences
of two traditional methods of analysis. One
— or both — can be the target of risk
method is a “bottom-up” analysis of a fault
Rationalization in risk management management, which includes the follow-
and its consequences; the other method
can be present at all levels of program ing actions:
is a “top-down” analysis of an event and
management. For example, before the
the underlying events that are required for
• Remove the hazard;
the top-level event to occur.
• Protect from the hazard; or,
The bottom-up method often is called a
failure modes and effects analysis. A com- • Contain the hazard.
mon application involves the identification
of possible failures of an aircraft-system If the hazard is removed, the risk associ-
component and the evaluation of the ated with the hazard is removed as well.
results of those faults on the behavior This is the most effective action, but it is
of the system to which the component often the most difficult action to accom-
belongs. An example would be an analy- plish. Action to protect from the hazard
sis of how the failure of a hydraulic pump if it occurs requires the development of
would affect a flight control system. The mechanisms to minimize consequences
analysis would show whether the pump if the hazard is encountered. Containing
failure would lead to loss of functionality the hazard involves actions to localize the
of the flight control system and what that effects of the hazard. This is often the least
loss would mean for the safe conduct of effective action, but it is the action that
the flight. Calculating the probability of most easily is implemented.
a pump failure would complete the risk
assessment. Examples can be derived from the
Columbia accident report, which recom-
The bottom-up method also is used to an- mended that NASA take the following
alyze the consequences of an operational actions:

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 5
 Di t c h i n g

• Eliminate shedding of insulation from management process is only

external fuel tanks [i.e., remove the as good as the thoroughness
hazard]; of the analysis and the abil-
ity of the analyst to anticipate
• Increase the orbiter’s ability to sus- and identify the hazards. There
tain debris damage [protect from the must be some reserve capa-
hazard]; and, bility to handle unknown and
unanticipated problems. In the
• Develop the capability to inspect overwater-operations example,
the orbiter and make emergency risk management would in-
repairs — or, if repairs cannot be clude considerations such as
made, increase the orbiter’s ability life raft flotation redundancy
to re-enter the atmosphere with mi- and repair capabilities should
nor leading-edge damage [contain a leak develop, and evacuation
the hazard]. training that accounts for the
possible incapacitation of a
crewmember.
Likelihood of Ditching Is
Not Negligible Effective risk management
is the foundation of a strong
Applying the principles of formal risk safety culture. Nevertheless,
management to overwater operations the foundation can be weak-
begins with the understanding that the ened by complacency and
likelihood of having to ditch a multi- rationalization. The space
engine turbine airplane is very small — but shuttle example shows that any engineer of airplane safety technology de-
not negligible (see “The Unthinkable organization can fool itself: The Columbia velopment. Weener was chairman of the
Happens,” page 3) — and that the po- accident report said that although NASA FSF Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
tential consequences are significant. The believed that it had a strong safety cul- Steering Committee and is co-chairman,
analysis indicates that action is required to ture, it had in fact become “reactive, with FSF Executive Vice President Robert
reduce the risk. Possible actions include complacent and dominated by unjusti- Vandel, of the FSF Ground Accident
the following: fied optimism.” Prevention (GAP) program.]

• The hazards could be removed Obviously, preventing accidents and Notes

(eliminated) simply by not flying over incidents is preferable to dealing with
water. This would be an impractical the consequences. Successful accident 1. Columbia Accident Investigation
action for many operators; prevention is difficult. Hazards rarely can Board (CAIB). CAIB Report.
be eliminated. Therefore, success is Volume I. August 2003.
• The hazards could be protected achieved by a significant reduction of the
against by aircraft design features, events that initially brought attention to 2. The CAIB Report said that 82
proper maintenance of those design the hazard. Success often is temporary, seconds after launch on Jan. 16,
features and operational procedures however. Without continued attention to 2003, space shuttle Columbia
that minimize the likelihood of failures the hazard, after some period of time, the was at 65,820 feet and traveling at
that would lead to a ditching; or, events often begin to reoccur. Accident Mach 2.46 when a slab of insulat-
prevention typically is cyclical — when ing foam weighing less than two
• The hazards could be contained with you get good at it, the need for it seems pounds (one kilogram) was shed
adequate emergency equipment and to disappear — for a while.  from the external fuel tank and
survival equipment — and with crew struck the inboard leading edge
training and passenger preparation — Earl F. Weener, Ph.D., FSF Fellow of the orbiter’s left wing, causing
to properly use the equipment. a breach in the wing’s thermal-
[FSF editorial note: After earning a protection system. Soon after
In summary, the essence of risk manage- bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree the orbiter re-entered the Earth’s
ment is to understand both the likelihood and a doctorate in aerospace engineer- atmosphere on Feb. 1, 2003, the
and the consequences of an event and ing at the University of Michigan, Earl F. breach allowed superheated air to
to develop prevention strategies or inter- Weener was employed for 24 years by penetrate the wing’s leading-edge
vention strategies to eliminate, protect Boeing Commercial Airplanes in various insulation and melt the aluminum
from or contain the hazards resulting design, engineering and safety positions. spar. The orbiter then broke up,
from that event. Nevertheless, the risk He retired from Boeing in 1999 as chief killing all seven astronauts.

6 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

One passenger died before the U.S. Coast approximately 27 nautical miles (50 kilometers)
Guard aircraft arrived; her body was recovered south of the ditching site — to send a boat, said
by a Bahamian police officer who had com- Chris Lloyd, BASRA operations manager.8 The
mandeered a small powerboat to travel to the west side of Abaco Island, the closest shore to the
accident site. ditching site, is a barren, swampy area with few
people and no direct roads from the east side of
Drummond said that the Falcon crew saw two the island.
groups of survivors in the water, about 900 feet
(275 meters) apart. The crew dropped two life “We told them that the [local SAR] response time
rafts, and survivors from one group boarded one would be quite a while,” Lloyd said. “No [com-
of the life rafts. mercial] fishing boats were in the area north of
us because the lobster season had not started.
“The other group was just treading water,” One police officer [the one who retrieved the
Drummond said. “The main thing that helped dead passenger’s body] responded by comman-
was that our Falcon crew was able to locate the deering a civilian boat and going to the scene. I
scene [quickly] and then provided navigation do not know if more than one boat responded;
coordinates to direct the helicopters to the sur- we did not launch any other boats. If it had been
vivors. One rescue swimmer was deployed from lobster season, there would not have been a boat
each helicopter.” available at Moore’s Island. But with islands ev-
erywhere, rescuers usually can find someone to
The rescue swimmer from the Dolphin helped the provide a boat.”
four survivors in the life raft to be hoisted aboard
the helicopter. The rescue was completed in less BASRA, which is not unlike other organizations in
than 10 minutes. The helicopter then took the four
survivors to Freeport, Bahamas.
small countries around the world that have been
instrumental in rescuing occupants of downed
aircraft and maritime vessels in distress, consid-
“I na

The crew of the Jayhawk rescued the five survivors ers all aircraft water-contact accidents to be SAR ditching,
who were in the water. Three of the survivors — a cases that require the most rapid response possible.
child, an infant and the pilot — required medi- Paid employees of BASRA are on duty from 0900 everyone
cal attention. The rescue swimmer administered to 1700 seven days a week in a SAR control room
cardiopulmonary resuscitation to the infant. in Nassau, Bahamas. Trained volunteers answer responds with
The injured child died in a Freeport hospital. emergency calls from their homes at other times,
Preliminary information from NTSB and the U.S. and they can initiate a SAR response from any- no questions
Coast Guard did not indicate the causes of death where in the Bahama Islands.
of the child or of the woman who died before the asked.”
rescuers arrived. “In a ditching, everyone responds with no ques-
tions asked — unlike a boat running out of fuel,
“We are relieved that we were able to success- for example,” Lloyd said. “There is never anything
fully locate and recover eight survivors, thanks to good about an airplane going down.”
the quick notifications by the FAA [U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration] and the [pilot of the
Air Sunshine] aircraft reporting the mayday call,” Dual Flameouts Lead to
said Cmdr. Gerald Dean, chief of search and Ditching in River
rescue (SAR) for the U.S. Coast Guard Seventh
District.7

During the initial response to the SAR alert, the

A dual-engine failure led to the ditching of a
Falcon 20 in the Mississippi River on the
evening of April 8, 2003. The crew was conduct-
U.S. Coast Guard asked the Bahamas Air Sea ing a cargo flight from Del Rio, Texas, U.S., and
Rescue Association (BASRA), a nonprofit rescue had received vectors from ATC for the instrument
sub-center of the Seventh Coast Guard District, landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 30R at
to identify and brief available SAR resources. A Lambert–St. Louis (Missouri, U.S.) International
BASRA representative made a telephone call to ask Airport. Preliminary information from NTSB in-
the nearest police authorities — on Moore’s Island, dicated that the tower controller cleared the crew

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 7
 Di t c h i n g

to land; because of deteriorating weather condi-

tions and a developing traffic situation, however,
the controller later told the crew to fly the airplane
to 3,000 feet and to establish radio communication
with approach control.9

While being vectored for another approach, the

crew several times asked the approach controller
how far from the airport they were being taken.
When the Falcon was on base leg, the crew told
the controller that they had a “fuel limitation.” The
controller issued a vector to the final approach
course and cleared the crew to conduct the ILS
approach to Runway 30R.

“After being switched to the tower frequency, the

flight crew declared an emergency,” the prelimi-
nary report said. “The crew reported to the tower landings and takeoffs, then refuel the airplane,
controller that they ‘lost the [left] engine.’” swap crew positions and fly back to Seattle.11

The right engine then flamed out, and the crew After a full-stop landing at Everett, the captain told
ditched the airplane. Both pilots received serious the crew that they would conduct two takeoffs and
injuries. Weather conditions at the time of the ac- landings at the airport before refueling. On takeoff,
cident included a 1,000-foot overcast and seven however, the crew observed a momentary overspeed
statute miles (11 kilometers) visibility. of the propeller on the no. 3 (right, inboard) engine
and elected to fly the airplane back to Seattle.
“The airplane was recovered [the next day] in
two parts,” the preliminary report said. “The aft On approach over the bay, the crew observed an
fuselage structure, including the tail surfaces and indication that the left-main landing gear was not
engines, was separated at the trailing edge of the down and locked. They rejected the approach and
wing [and] remained attached to the forward fu- circled over Elliott Bay while the landing gear was
selage by cables, wiring and plumbing. extended manually, a procedure that required
seven minutes to complete.
“The fuel tanks were drained, and a large amount
of water was drained from each wing tank. No During the second approach, the Stratoliner was
measurable quantity of fuel was recovered during about six nautical miles (11 kilometers) from the
the draining process.” runway when the crew observed a decrease in fuel
pressure in the no. 3 engine. Selection of the fuel-
boost pump did not restore normal fuel pressure,
‘We’re Out of Fuel’ and a power loss occurred in the engine.

A nother recent ditching involved a 1940s-

vintage airliner that was landed in a bay dur-
ing a maintenance-check/crew-proficiency flight
The no. 4 (right, outboard) engine’s low-fuel-
pressure warning light then illuminated, and the
captain told the flight engineer to select another
on March 28, 2002. The airplane was a Boeing fuel tank.
Stratoliner that had been restored for the U.S.
National Air and Space Museum by The Boeing Co. “There is no other tank,” the flight engineer said.
and a group of volunteers working with Boeing.10 “We’re out of fuel.”

In its final report on the accident, NTSB said that The captain moved the throttles forward and
the flight crew planned to fly the airplane from called for the no. 3 engine to be shut down and
Seattle, Washington, U.S., to Everett, Washington, the propeller feathered.
about 20 minutes away, where they would conduct Continued on page 12

8 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Lessons From Another Era

T
raining and experience were the Ocean on the average of one every 90 • Radio failure — 3 percent;
keys to improving the survival minutes.
• Weather — 3 percent; and,
rate of airmen who were involved
in ditchings during World War II, said a The report said that 4,000 to 5,000 • Miscellaneous (e.g., “turbulence,
unique report issued by the U.S. Air Force ditchings occurred during World War II. collision, lightning”) — 2 percent.
in 1955.1 Analysis of 2,500 case histories indicated
that ditchings from 1943 to 1945 were Often, flight crews had to choose between
Ditchings were frequent during the war, caused by the following factors: ditching or bailing out.
when combat action took place over
• Combat damage — 45 percent;
water, crews of airplanes damaged “Most fliers preferred to take their chances
during combat over land often nursed • Engine failure or other mechanical with a hopelessly damaged aircraft rather
their airplanes toward the sea to avoid failure — 19 percent; than hit the silk,” the report said.
capture by the enemy, and transport • Fuel exhaustion — 17 percent;
airplanes and combat airplanes crossed Among the few conditions that made bail-
the Atlantic Ocean on the average of one • Navigational error — 7 percent; ing out more attractive than ditching were
every 13 minutes and crossed the Pacific • Instrument failure — 4 percent; insufficient time to regain control of the

Known as a ‘bad ditcher,’ the Consolidated B‑24 Liberator bomber did not have
safety belts for all 10 crewmembers, and a bulkhead tended to collapse on impact.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 9
 Di t c h i n g

airplane, fire, hung bombs, low surface

visibility, fuel exhaustion, and “when the
ditching characteristics of the aircraft were
known to be bad.”

The ditch/bail decision confronted

the pilots of 16 Chance-Vought F-4U
Corsairs that ran out of fuel during a
training mission over the Atlantic Ocean.
[The Corsair has a 41-foot (13-meter)
wingspan; is 33.3 feet (10.2 meters) long
and 16 feet (five meters) high; and has a
2,000-horsepower (1,492-kilowatt) radial
piston engine and a maximum takeoff
weight (MTOW) of 14,000 pounds (6,450
kilograms).]

“Although the F-4U was rated a good

ditcher and floated long enough to permit
an unhurried exit, it rarely gave time to in-
flate the life raft and to step into it dry from
the wing,” the report said. “[Nevertheless,]
Airman’s safety equipment included a life raft, a kit to mend bullet holes,
all of the 14 pilots who chose to ditch were
rescued. The only man lost was one of the a sea bucket, a life vest and a dye sack.
two who chose to bail.”
“The B-25 and B-26 were feared for their high sudden stop were thrown out. Extra
Most fighters, however, were not “good landing speeds and their tendency to sink bombs or gas were jettisoned, and all
ditchers.” rapidly when ditched,” the report said. exits were opened. The crew braced
themselves to resist the shock of impact
“The floating time of single-place aircraft One pilot described a ditching as fol- and the dragging deceleration forces. …
was always short; usually, they sank almost lows (the airplane was not identified in Plans provided for each man to leave
at once,” the report said. “Under the best of the report): through an assigned exit and for each to
sea conditions, fighter aircraft hit hard, fre- take a preassigned part of survival gear.
quently slewed, cartwheeled on one wing Just before we hit, I rang the alarm.
or nosed over while the pilot hung upside I never heard that bell. There was an “Perfection in this orderly procedure
down, helpless until he could release his ear-splitting racket as the tail of the was rarely achieved because of physical
safety belt and swim upward.” fuselage smacked the top of a wave, injuries received in ditching, structural
then a grinding, grating, thunderous damage to the aircraft on impact, fire or
The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress [65,500 crash when the nose hit one of those explosion on landing, high swamping seas
pounds (29,711 kilograms) MTOW] was mountains of sea full-force. The and attendant disorganization and panic.
known as a good ditcher. Three-quarters whole cockpit seemed to explode. Large planes often flooded quickly when
of the 112 B-17s ditched during the war Abruptly, the tumult ended, and there they ditched. The in-rushing water either
floated for more than one minute; half was nothing but the gurgle of water. covered the equipment laid out for salvage
floated for more than five minutes, said It had been like riding an eggshell or, as in B-25s and B-26s, washed it into
the report. into a concrete wall, then dropping to the tail, where it could not be recovered.
earth, a sodden mass of waste. … Equipment stored in the wings or fuse-
The Consolidated B-24 Liberator [71,200 lage and released on ditching was often
pounds (32,296 kilograms) MTOW], North Ditching drills were conducted, but ditch- all that the crew had.”
American B-25 Mitchell [35,000 pounds ings seldom went as planned.
(15,876 kilograms)] and the Martin B-26 A common factor in ditchings conducted
Marauder [38,200 pounds (17,328 kilo- “In preparation for ditching, [the] pilot in various climates and weather condi-
grams)] were known as bad ditchers. In and copilot fastened safety belts and tions was that survivors emerged from
41 ditchings of B-24s during the war, 140 shoulder harnesses to avoid crashing the aircraft injured and dazed.
of the 400 occupants (35 percent) either into the instrument board or through the
were killed on impact or drowned when [windshield],” the report said. “Loose ar- “Usually, the water revived them, but all
the airplanes sank. ticles that might become projectiles in the felt exhausted and found that their limbs

10 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

were slow to respond,” the report said. The report said that although improved was obtained from records of the
“Men in the water before boarding life rafts airplane performance and more direct U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy; the
were especially attracted to the wing and routings after the war reduced substan- publication also includes informa-
tail surfaces, which provided the only vis- tially the time required to cross oceans, tion from records of the air forces
ible handholds to keep from drifting away. the risk of ditching remained. of Australia, Britain, Canada,
This practice was dangerous in any but the Germany and New Zealand.
calmest sea, for the violent slapping of the “The likelihood of a forced descent at The report is based on informa-
wings and tail of large aircraft in a heavy sea must be reckoned as a hazard on all tion gathered from airmen who
sea often knocked men unconscious and overwater flights,” the report said.  survived ditching or bailing out
upset life rafts.” of airplanes, mostly during World
– FSF Editorial Staff War II and to a lesser extent dur-
Although most aircraft broke up on impact ing the Korean War and the early
and sank quickly, many survivors were Note 1950s. “The most valuable and
able to exit and swim free. informative material was found
1. Llano, George Albert. Airmen in the firsthand accounts written
“Men were sometimes trapped in the fu- Against the Sea. Arctic, Desert, by the survivors themselves,” the
selage, but unless they were completely Tropic Information Center report said.
immobile or held in the wreckage, they (ADTIC), Research Studies
could swim surfaceward through any exit Institute, U.S. Air Force. ADTIC
before the aircraft had sunk too far,” the Publication G-104. 1955. The
report said. “Time and again, crewmem- preface said that the report was
bers, even though poor swimmers, were “the fourth in a series of ADTIC
able to shoot upward from depths of 30 studies to determine how military
[feet] to 40 feet simply by inflating the life personnel survived under emer-
vest. They had to be careful to avoid jag- gency conditions in various parts
ged metal that might rip, pierce or snag of the world.” The series included Crewmembers
clothing or equipment.” 999 Survived (Southwest Pacific check their
tropics), Sun, Sand and Survival
When the war began, pilots generally did ‘Mae West’
(African deserts) and Down in the
not know how to ditch their airplanes. North (Arctic). Most of the infor- inflatable life vests
mation in Airmen Against the Sea before flight.
“Conflicting theories confused the prob-
lem of ditching, chiefly because of lack of
knowledge of how each type of aircraft
should be handled in ditching,” the report
said. “No one could be sure how long
each airplane would float or whether the
sinking hulk would suck men down [with
it]. Above all, men did not know what not
to do.”

Training and experience — in ditching

procedures and in search-and-rescue
procedures — improved substantially
the number of aircrew who survived ditch-
ings and were rescued during the war.
For example, only 6 percent of U.S. fliers
who ditched during the first half of 1942
were rescued, but of the 2,130 U.S. fliers
who ditched from March 1943 through
March 1944, 1,169 fliers (55 percent)
were rescued.

“The improvement in American rescue

figures was largely due to training and
practice,” the report said.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 11
 Di t c h i n g

The airplane broke out of the clouds at The airplane reached land, and the crew
about 8,000 feet. The crew ditched the conducted a “dead-stick” landing at Lajes

S ome passengers
airplane on the Bengawan Solo River
about 14 nautical miles (26 kilometers)
from the destination. A flight attendant
Field in visual meteorological conditions
just before dawn. The landing gear re-
portedly was damaged during the hard,
shouted and some seated in the rear cabin was killed when fast landing. Of the 306 occupants, nine
the rear section of the fuselage tore away occupants received minor injuries during
prayed. on impact. Five passengers were seriously an emergency evacuation conducted after
injured; eight crewmembers and 54 pas- the crew brought the airplane to a stop
sengers received minor injuries or no in- on the runway.
“When the throttles were pushed for- juries. The airplane came to rest in shallow
ward, multiple engine surges occurred,” water near the riverbank. The survivors At press time, Portuguese authorities
the report said. “Then, the surging were helped to shore by local villagers. had not issued their final report on the
stopped, and it appeared that the re- accident.13 A preliminary report by NTSB
maining engines had also lost power. said that the problem began with a fuel
The airplane was rapidly losing altitude,
Fuel Leak Turns leak and was made worse by the open
and the captain decided to ditch.” A330 Into a Glider crossfeed valve.

The airplane remained afloat after strik-

ing the water, and the crew evacuated. A fuel leak caused the flight crew of
an Airbus A330 to narrowly avoid
a ditching in the Atlantic Ocean on Aug.
“Both engines lost power as a result of
fuel starvation,” the preliminary report
said. “There had been a leak in the fuel
None of the four occupants received
serious injuries. The airplane was sub- 24, 2001. system near the right engine [causing the
stantially damaged. fuel imbalance], and an open crossfeed
The airplane was more than four hours valve allowed fuel to be lost from both
“They were quickly picked up by rescue into a charter flight from Toronto, wing tanks.”
boats,” the report said. “The airplane was Canada, to Lisbon, Portugal, and about
subsequently towed to shallower water … 39,000 feet above the water when the Media reports said that Portuguese
before it partially sank in the water just crew observed an imbalance of fuel in investigators found a crack in the low-
offshore.” the left main tank and the right main pressure fuel line on the right engine that
tank. They opened the crossfeed valve to might have been caused by contact with
NTSB said that the probable cause of the balance the fuel. an adjacent hydraulic line.14,15 The fuel
accident was “loss of all engine power due line had been replaced by the operator,
to fuel exhaustion that resulted from the The crew then observed that fuel quan- Air Transat, in compliance with Rolls-
flight crew’s failure to accurately deter- tity was lower than it should have been. Royce Service Bulletin 29-C625, but a
mine on-board fuel during the preflight They told ATC that they were diverting matching hydraulic line required by the
inspection.” the flight to Lajes Field, a U.S. Air Force service bulletin had not been installed.
base on Terceira Island in the Portuguese Both the fuel line and the hydraulic line
Azores. Soon thereafter, they declared an in the accident airplane’s left engine had
Rain, Hail emergency. been replaced in compliance with the
Strangle a Boeing service bulletin.
The airplane had been aloft about five

L oss of all engine power set the stage

for the ditching of a Boeing 737-300
on Jan. 16, 2002. Airclaims said that the
hours when the right engine flamed out.
About 13 minutes later, the left engine
flamed out. At this time, the airplane
Intake Contamination
Precedes Ditching in
airplane, operated by Garuda Indonesia, was at 34,000 feet and about 85 nautical Scotland
was flown through heavy rain and hail miles (157 kilometers) from Lajes Field.
during descent from about 32,000 feet
to 23,000 feet, inbound to Yogyakarta,
Jawa, Indonesia.12 Both engines flamed
The crew told ATC that they might have
to ditch the airplane. O n Feb. 27, 2001, a Shorts 360
was ditched in the Firth of Forth
after a power loss occurred in both en-
out, and the crew was unable to restart The cabin crew prepared the passengers gines after departure from Edinburgh
them. The crew also was unable to start for a ditching. Media reports said that (Scotland) Airport for a scheduled
the auxiliary power unit (APU), and a some passengers shouted and some pas- mail-delivery flight to Belfast, Northern
loss of all electrical power occurred. sengers prayed during the descent. Ireland.

12 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

The accident report by the U.K. Air in a water depth of about six meters [20 became entangled and had to unplug
Accidents Investigation Branch said feet].” the headset jacks before they could move
that the twin-turboprop airplane had from their seats. Water pressure on the
been parked, facing into the wind, for The airplane was destroyed, and both overwing emergency exit prevented its
17 hours without engine-intake plugs pilots drowned. use. The pilot and seven passengers ex-
installed.16 During this time, weather ited through the pilot door and the main
conditions included strong surface winds, cabin door. (The pilot, from outside the
light-to-moderate snow and freezing Low Flight Leaves Little airplane, and a passenger inside the air-
temperatures. Time for Preparation plane worked together to open the main
cabin door.)
“Tests showed that conditions were
ideal for a large buildup of ice, snow or
slush to occur in both [engine-intake]
A Piper Chieftain was being flown
1,000 feet over the Pacific during
a VFR sightseeing flight off the coast of
Several passengers inflated their life vests
after the airplane struck the water. One
plenum chambers, where it would not Hawaii, U.S., on Aug. 25, 2000, when a passenger made no apparent attempt to
have been readily visible to the crew loss of power occurred in the right engine. exit the airplane; she remained in the
during a normal preflight inspection,” After attempting unsuccessfully to restore cabin and drowned.
the report said. power, the pilot secured the engine and
feathered the propeller, the NTSB report “[Her husband] indicated that she ‘was
The airplane was at about 2,200 feet after said.17 The pilot told the eight passengers not a swimmer’ [and was frightened],”
takeoff when the commander [captain] that he would land the airplane at Hilo the report said. “Once he exited the air-
told the first officer to engage all anti- (Hawaii) International Airport, which was plane, he looked back and saw her sitting
icing systems. Four seconds after the 23 nautical miles (43 kilometers) away. still, with her seat belt still fastened and
engine-anti-icing vanes were engaged, her life vest inflated.”
both engines flamed out. The pilot declared an emergency when he
found that he was not able to maintain Another passenger, who had inflated her
“Interaction between the moving vanes altitude with full power from the left life vest in the airplane, said that the pres-
and the residual ice, snow or slush con- engine. When it was obvious that the sure of the water entering the cabin was
tamination in both intake systems is … airplane would not reach land, he told “enormous” and that the front exit was
the most likely cause of the engine fail- the passengers to don their life vests and under water by the time she reached it.
ures,” the report said. to assume the “crash position.” She momentarily became trapped in the
exit but “wiggled free.”
The report said that there were no recom- The passengers were wearing headsets to
mended procedures for rapid relight of listen to the pilot’s tour narration over The airplane descended below the surface
the engines. The commander turned the the public-address (PA) system. Some within 60 seconds of impact and sank in
airplane toward the coastline, began a de- passengers donned their life vests over 80 feet (24 meters) of water. Four passen-
scent and reduced airspeed to 110 knots. their headsets. gers were rescued by a fire-department
The crew did not extend the flaps. helicopter that arrived 15 minutes later;
The airplane was 250 feet above the water the other occupants were rescued by a
“The rate of descent stabilized at 2,800 and five nautical miles (nine kilometers)
feet per minute, and [the commander] from the airport when the pilot reduced
realized that the aircraft would have to airspeed, while maintaining full power on
the left engine, and extended full flaps.

T
be ditched in the water,” the report said.
“As the aircraft descended close to the The landing gear remained retracted.
water surface, the commander gradually he front
increased the pitch attitude of the aircraft “[The pilot] felt the tail of the airplane
and correspondingly reduced the speed. touch the water, followed by a jolt that exit was under water
momentarily stunned him,” the report
“The aircraft impacted the water in a said. “When he fully regained his senses, by the time she
6.8-degree nose-up attitude at an air- the water in the cockpit was already chest
speed of 86 knots. … It came to rest on high.” reached it.
the sea bottom in a nose-down attitude
with the forward section of the fuselage The passengers who had donned their
submerged, 65 meters [213 feet] offshore, life vests over their headsets momentarily

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 13
 Di t c h i n g

fire-department boat soon thereafter. miles (28 kilometers) from the shore of report said. “One passenger … and the
The survivors received minor injuries, Spencer Gulf. pilot suffered no major physical injuries
including skin burns from contact with [on impact].”
fuel that leaked from the airplane. Several The Australian Transport Safety Bureau
occupants were nauseated by the inges- (ATSB) said, in its final report on the ac- Personnel involved in the search for the
tion of salt water and fuel. cident, that fatigue cracking caused the airplane on the night of the accident said
crankshaft in the left engine to fracture. that cloud bases were from 2,000 feet to
NTSB said that the probable cause of the The pilot feathered the left propeller 2,500 feet, with patches of cloud below. A
accident was “deterioration and failure of and increased power on the right en- mariner involved in the search said that
the oil-filter-converter-plate gasket [in gine. Soon thereafter, the right engine the waves were 1.6 feet to 3.3 feet (0.5
the right reciprocating engine], which overheated, and a portion of a cylinder meter to 1.0 meter) high.
resulted in a loss of engine power and a head and piston melted. The right pro-
subsequent in-flight fire.” peller was not feathered. ATSB did not “Crews commented that there was a light
determine whether the right engine was southerly wind with no turbulence,” the
Five passengers completed NTSB ques- producing power when the airplane report said. “They also indicated that it
tionnaires after the accident. All said that struck the water. was a particularly dark night with no
the pilot’s preflight briefing was valuable moon.”
to them. Only one passenger said that he The crew of another aircraft heard an
read the safety-instruction card, which emergency locator transmitter (ELT) The airplane was in a shallow nose-
helped him locate the nearest emergency down attitude when it struck the water;
exit (the main cabin door) after the air- airspeed was not determined. The right

N
plane struck the water. wing separated, and both engines were
torn from the wings.
One passenger told investigators that the o life vests,
pilot’s safety instructions immediately “Contact with the water caused disin-
before the ditching were not thorough. life rafts or other tegration of the nose section and the
cockpit area,” the report said. “Rapid
“He thought that the pilot should have flotation devices were and forceful ingress of water is consid-
spent the last five minutes (before they hit ered to have further aggravated the initial
the ocean) giving the passengers detailed aboard the airplane. impact damage and contributed to rapid
safety instructions instead of talking to sinking.”
the control tower and flying the airplane,”
the report said. The passenger seats had seat belts but
signal for 10 seconds to 20 seconds no shoulder harnesses. No life vests,
soon after the accident pilot’s last ra- life rafts or other flotation devices were
Powerless on a Dark, dio transmission. The next morning, aboard the airplane. Australian regula-
Moonless Night SAR personnel found the bodies of two tions did not require this equipment
passengers and airplane debris floating in multi-engine airplanes with fewer

A t 1856 local time on May 31, 2000,

the pilot of a Whyalla Airlines
Piper Chieftain — en route on a sched-
near the last position reported by the
pilot. Several days later, the wreckage of
the airplane with the bodies of the pilot
than 10 passenger seats that are flown
within 50 nautical miles (93 kilometers)
of land.
uled flight from Adelaide to Whyalla and four passengers inside was found on
in South Australia — radioed that the the seabed. The body of one passenger “Almost all ditchings recorded on
airplane was 35 nautical miles (65 kilo- was not found. the ATSB incident/accident database
meters) from the destination and that he involved aircraft operating within 50
was beginning descent from 6,000 feet.18 The pilot and five passengers had nautical miles from land,” the report
Five minutes later, he declared mayday, drowned, and one passenger had died said. “Furthermore, many of those
a distress condition, and told Adelaide from multiple injuries. ditchings involved multi-engine aircraft.
Flight Information Service that both Although [regulations] did not require
reciprocating engines had failed and “Four of the passengers suffered injuries those aircraft to carry life jackets, past
that he would have to ditch the airplane that may have affected their ability to experience and research data indicate
with seven passengers aboard. He then egress from the aircraft and/or survive that life jackets significantly enhance
reported that the airplane was 15 nautical in the water for any length of time,” the survivability.

14 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

“It is highly likely that the chances of sur-

vival for the occupants would have been
enhanced if the passenger seats had been
fitted with upper body restraints and if
the aircraft had been carrying life jackets
or individual flotation devices.”

The report said that data indicate that

at least 13 other Chieftains and Piper
Navajos (from which the Chieftain was
derived) were ditched from 1984 through
2001. One ditching (discussed previously
in this article) involved fatalities.

“Available records worldwide of previous

Piper Chieftain engine-failure/ditching
events illustrate that, in most instances,
successful night ditchings occurred in bet-
ter visibility and weather conditions than
those confronting the pilot of [the Whyalla
Airlines Chieftain],” the report said. “The
relatively minor injuries suffered by the
occupants of the aircraft indicated that the
pilot demonstrated a high level of skill in
ditching the aircraft.”

Off-course
Excursion Results in
Close Call for DC-9

P reliminary information from NTSB

and from Airclaims indicates that on
the afternoon of May 14, 1996, loss of kilometers) from Tampico when the left Four Bizjets Ditched
power from both engines of an Allegro engine flamed out. About 23 nautical In 1964–2002
Airlines Douglas DC-9 occurred during miles (43 kilometers) from the airport,
a charter flight over the Gulf of Mexico the right engine flamed out. Airclaims
from Orlando, Florida, U.S., to Cancun,
Mexico.
said that the airplane’s fuel supply had
been exhausted.
R esearch on accidents involving
aircraft typically used in corporate/
business operations identified four jet
airplanes that were ditched between 1964
Airclaims said that the airplane was The NTSB preliminary report said, “The and 2002.20 Fuel exhaustion specifically
about 190 nautical miles (352 kilome- pilot elected to continue the approach was cited in three accidents, of which two
ters) from Cancun when the crew expe- and attempt to land at the Tampico air- apparently were precipitated by naviga-
rienced a navigational problem.19 About port. The airplane was reported to have tional errors by the crew.
60 minutes later, ATC told the crew that landed on a road, short of the airport.
the airplane was 300 nautical miles (556 During the landing roll, the nose land- Following are some available details
kilometers) off course and that the near- ing gear collapsed, resulting in structural about the accidents:
est airport was in Tampico, Mexico, 220 damage to the airframe.”
nautical miles (407 kilometers) west. • On Oct. 12, 1973, a Hawker Siddeley
Four passengers received minor injuries 125 of Mexican registry was de-
The crew diverted the flight to Tampico, during the emergency evacuation; 36 stroyed when it was ditched off the
which is on the east coast of Mexico. The passengers and the four crewmembers coast of Acapulco, Mexico. (No other
airplane was about 65 nautical miles (120 received no injuries. information was available.)

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 15
 Di t c h i n g

• On Jan. 14, 1976, a North American for four hours 30 minutes of flight. L-1011 that was en route from Miami
Sabreliner 40 of U.S. registry was ATC assigned FL 290 as the cruise to Nassau, Bahamas, May 5, 1983. The
ditched in the South Atlantic after altitude because of eastbound NTSB report said that the airplane was
fuel exhaustion during a govern- traffic at higher altitudes. At 1815 about 50 nautical miles (93 kilometers)
ment ferry flight from Ascension coordinated universal time (UTC) from Nassau when the crew shut down
Island, which is off the west coast — about three hours after departure the no. 2 engine because of a low-oil-
of Africa, to Recife, Brazil. One oc- — the crew declared an emergency pressure indication and turned back to
cupant was killed; two occupants re- and told ATC that the airplane was Miami because of deteriorating weather
ceived no injuries or minor injuries. “low on fuel.” The passengers conditions at Nassau.21
The crew had written an incorrect donned life vests, and one of the
course on a navigational chart. passengers, a maintenance techni- A few moments later, the low-oil-
cian, positioned the life raft near an pressure lights for the other two engines
• On Jan. 24, 1982, a Falcon 10 of U.S. emergency overwing exit, fastened illuminated, and the crew observed that
registry was ditched in a swamp in the life raft to the base of a seat the oil-quantity indications for all three
South America after fuel exhaus- and moved all loose items into the engines were zero. When the crew told
tion during a corporate flight from lavatory. At 1842 UTC, the crew told ATC about the indications, they said,
Houston, Texas, U.S. None of the five ATC that both engines had flamed “We believe [them] to be faulty indica-
occupants was injured; the airplane out. At 1852 UTC, the crew ditched tions since the chance of all three engines
was substantially damaged and was the Falcon in “fairly heavy seas” near having zero oil pressure and zero [oil]
recovered. While programming the a ship. The airplane touched down quantity is almost nil.”
airplane’s inertial navigation system, at about 90 knots. After the airplane
the crew had entered incorrectly the came to rest on the water, the two The airplane was about 80 nautical miles
coordinates for a navigational fix, pilots and four passengers boarded (148 kilometers) from Miami when the
designating the latitude/longitude a life raft deployed over the front of no. 3 engine failed. The flight engineer
coordinates for the fix as north, the left wing. The report said that called the senior flight attendant to the
rather than south. they had “little trouble” getting into cockpit, told her to prepare the cabin for
the life raft (water temperature a ditching and then closed the cockpit
• On Oct. 11, 1987, a Falcon 20D of was 40 degrees Fahrenheit [four door. The senior flight attendant received
Spanish registry was ditched about degrees Celsius]). An Icelandic no information about the nature of the
45 nautical miles (83 kilometers) Coast Guard airplane and a rescue emergency or how much time was avail-
from Keflavik, Iceland. The crew helicopter were overhead when able before ditching.
had requested Flight Level (FL) 350 the Falcon struck the water. The
(approximately 35,000 feet) as the helicopter crew deployed a sling Five minutes after the no. 3 engine failed,
cruising altitude for the unsched- and rescue swimmers but aborted the no. 1 engine failed. The airplane was
uled commercial flight to Keflavik the pick-up attempt because of the in a glide with all three engines silent.
from Gander, Newfoundland, rough sea conditions. The survivors
Canada. The flight plan included were taken aboard the ship at 2040 The flight attendants were instructing
an estimate of three hours 15 min- UTC. passengers how to don their life vests
utes en route, with fuel sufficient when the flight engineer announced
on the PA system that “ditching is im-
Passengers Near Panic minent.” The senior flight attendant
After Ditching Warning believed that this announcement meant

T
that the airplane was about to strike the

he crew A fter being told that a ditching was

imminent during a 1983 flight,
many passengers said that the appre-
water, and she told the passengers to as-
sume the brace position.

had written an hension that resulted from the flight at- “Generally, the passengers were close to
tendants’ lack of information about what panic, especially after the flight engineer
incorrect course on was happening was the most difficult part said that ditching was imminent,” the
of the emergency. report said. “Some passengers screamed
a navigational chart. throughout the emergency. However, only
They were among 162 passengers a few passengers were unable to respond
aboard an Eastern Air Lines Lockheed to instruction from the flight attendants;

16 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

these passengers were assisted by other The captain flew the airplane to a lower
passengers and the flight attendants. altitude to establish visual contact

“One flight attendant said that of the 15

persons in her section, one passenger
S ome passengers
with the sea. He called the purser to
the cockpit (the PA system was inop-
erative, a fact discovered by the crew
was incapable of functioning and three could not open the plastic before departure) and told him that
or four others were close to uncontrolled they were low on fuel and to prepare
panic because they were nonswimmers packages in which the the cabin for ditching.
and had had problems with their life
vests.” life vests were stored. There was no further communication
between the flight crew and cabin crew
Some passengers had difficulty retriev- before the airplane struck the water 10
ing their life vests from storage compart- minutes later. The captain said that he
ments under their seats. Some passengers for a normal landing,” the report said. flashed the “fasten-seat-belt/no-smok-
could not open the plastic packages in “Simultaneously, the captain made the ing” sign before impact.
which the life vests were stored. same announcement to the passengers.”
The report said that the captain demon-
“Many passengers had difficulty don- The crew had been able to restart the strated exceptional airmanship in ditch-
ning their life vests while seated with no. 2 engine. After the airplane was ing the airplane under extremely adverse
their lap belts fastened,” the report landed at Miami International Airport, conditions.
said. “Some flight attendants reported an inspection revealed that master chip
that they had to assist passengers into detectors had been installed in all three “The captain leveled off momentarily at
their life vests after the passengers had engines without oil seals, causing oil to 500 feet and positioned the aircraft over
become ‘tangled’ in the vests. At least leak from the engines. an established swell system,” the report
two flight attendants stood on seats to said. “He then descended in 100-foot
again demonstrate donning of the life increments, pausing momentarily to im-
vest, a technique which passengers said Inadequate Crew prove his depth perception. At approxi-
was helpful.” Coordination Lessens mately 20 feet, he lowered 15 degrees flaps
Chances for Survival and allowed the airspeed to decrease.
(The flight attendants told investigators
that they had demonstrated donning life
vests during the predeparture briefing
but that “as usual, many passengers did
V isibility was about two statute
miles (three kilometers) on the af-
ternoon of May 2, 1970, when the crew
“When the low-fuel-pressure lights
flickered, he selected full flaps. Shortly
after this, the engines flamed out, and
not watch the demonstration.” A postac- of a DC‑9, en route from New York, New he flew the aircraft onto the water at ap-
cident survey found that 46 passengers York, U.S., conducted an nondirectional proximately 90 knots while maintaining
[28 percent] had read the safety-briefing beacon (NDB) approach to the airport the aircraft body angle at five degrees to
card before takeoff.) at St. Maarten, Netherlands Antilles. The six degrees nose-up.”
NTSB accident report said that the crew
Although they were told not to inflate observed the runway too late to conduct The airplane remained “essentially in-
their life vests inside the cabin, some a landing and turned left to position the tact” after impact. Nevertheless, of the
passengers inflated their life vests. One airplane for a visual approach.22 63 occupants, 23 were killed, including
passenger explained to investigators that two infants and a flight attendant. The
he did not want to wait until he was in the The airplane was not aligned properly report provided no details on the causes
water to discover that the life vest would with the runway on the first visual ap- of death.
not inflate. proach and was too high and too close
to be landed on the runway during the “The probability of survival would have
Ten minutes after telling the passengers to second approach. The crew abandoned been increased substantially if there had
brace for impact, the senior flight atten- their attempt to land at St. Maarten been better crew coordination prior to
dant looked out a window and observed and headed for their filed alternate, St. and during the ditching,” the report said.
the city of Miami. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. A low-fuel-
quantity indication then compelled the The purser, flight attendants and sev-
“She opened the cockpit door, and captain to divert to St. Croix,U.S. Virgin eral passengers were standing, and some
the flight engineer told her to prepare Islands, which was closer. passengers did not have their seat belts

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 17
 Di t c h i n g

fastened when the airplane struck the water. Some U.S. military helicopters began recovering the sur-
passengers had not donned life vests. vivors 1.5 hours after the airplane was ditched.
Recovery was completed in an hour, in weather
None of the airplane’s five 25-person life rafts was conditions that included an overcast at 400 feet
deployed. Four crewmembers were removing gal- to 500 feet and visibility less than 0.4 statute mile
ley equipment that had spilled onto a life raft when (0.6 kilometer) in rain.
the life raft inflated, momentarily pinning the first
officer to the galley bulkhead. NTSB said that the probable cause of the acci-
dent was “fuel exhaustion, which resulted from
The airplane floated about 10 minutes, then sank
continued, unsuccessful attempts to land at St.
in 5,000 feet (1,525 meters) of water and was not
Maarten until insufficient fuel remained to reach
recovered.
an alternate airport.”
The navigator found an escape slide floating on the
water and inflated the slide. Many of the occupants The U.S. Coast Guard, which is responsible for
clung to the slide until they were rescued. SAR operations off the coasts of the United States
and in several large oceanic SAR regions, said
Rescue aircraft dropped four life rafts to the that of 337 SAR cases — that is, responses to
survivors. civil aircraft in distress — recorded during fiscal
years 2000, 2001 and 2002, 50 (15 percent) were
“[Two life rafts] fell too far away to be reached,” categorized as ditchings.23 Among the aircraft
the report said. “The captain swam to [the third] involved in the ditchings were 29 private/recre-
raft, and the navigator reached the [fourth raft], ational aircraft, 10 commercial passenger aircraft,
but neither was able to maneuver his raft back to three seaplanes, two cargo aircraft and six “other”
the main group.” aircraft. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• It happens — and not only to small general aviation airplanes. Recent ditchings have involved piston-
powered twins carrying fare-paying passengers, business jets, a vintage airliner on a test flight and a
modern airliner on a revenue flight.

• Fuel exhaustion is not the only cause. Transport category airplanes have splashed down after an apparent
flight-control problem and after flameouts from intake icing, rain and hail.

• Regulations are no substitute for common sense. Australian authorities found that almost all ditchings have
been conducted within 50 nautical miles (93 kilometers) of shore, where life vests are not required aboard
commercial multi-engine airplanes with fewer than 10 passenger seats.

• Lack of preparation is deadly. One pilot exhibited exceptional airmanship while ditching a jet transport in
adverse conditions; yet, the people in the cabin did not know what was happening, and many died.

• The count is down, but the risk remains. Almost 50 years ago, a study of 4,000 to 5,000 ditchings conducted
during World War II taught us that “the likelihood of a forced descent at sea must be reckoned as a hazard
on all overwater flights.”

• Believing that a ditching can’t happen or won’t happen is not supported by data.

18 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Notes 12. Airclaims. World Aircraft Accident Summary.

(Supplement 130): A02:2.
  1. Hogenson, Dennis; investigator-in-charge, U.S.
13. Stoss, Nick; acting director of air investigations,
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Transportation Safety Board of Canada. E-
Telephone interview by Lacagnina, Mark.
mail communications with Lacagnina, Mark.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Aug. 18, 2003. Flight Safety
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 16, 2003, and
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Sept. 5, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
  2. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Federal Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 135, Operating
Requirements: Commuter and On-demand Operations 14. Fiorino, Frances. “A330 Overwater Flameout Raises
and Rules Governing Persons On Board Such Aircraft. ETOPS Issues.” Aviation Week & Space Technology
Subpart C, Aircraft and Equipment. Part 135.183, Volume 155 (Sept. 3, 2001): 34–36.
“Performance requirements: Land aircraft operated
15. Dornheim, Michael A. “A330 Fuel System: How It
over water.”
Works and Pilot Choices.” Aviation Week & Space
  3. Yurman, Alan; investigator-in-charge, NTSB. Technology Volume 155 (Sept. 3, 2001): 36–37.
Telephone interview by Lacagnina, Mark.
16. U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Aircraft
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Aug. 12, 2003. Flight Safety
Accident Report No. 2/2003 (EW/C2001/2/6): Shorts
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
SD3-60, G-BNMT, near Edinburgh Airport on 27
  4. FAA. FARs Part 135. Subpart C. Part 135.167, February 2001. See also: FSF Editorial Staff. “Engine-
“Emergency equipment: Extended overwater intake Icing Sets Stage for Ditching of Shorts 360
operations.” The regulation requires life rafts and During Cargo Flight.” Accident Prevention Volume 60
other emergency equipment to be carried on airplanes (September 2003).
flown more than 50 nautical miles (93 kilometers)
from the nearest shoreline. Yurman said that the 17. NTSB. Report no. LAX00FA310.
accident flight was not conducted more than 50 18. Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Aviation Safety
nautical miles from shore. Report 200002157: Piper PA31-350 Chieftain VH-
  5. Dean, Gerald. “Coast Guard Rescues 9 from Bahamas MZK, Spencer Gulf SA, 31 May 2000. See also: FSF
Plane Crash.” News release 07-04, issued July 13, 2003, Editorial Staff. “Loss of Engine Power Sets Stage for
by Seventh Coast Guard District. U.S. Coast Guard, Ditching on a Moonless Night.” Accident Prevention
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Volume 61 (January 2004).

  6. Drummond, Carleen. Telephone interviews by 19. Airclaims. World Aircraft Accident Summary. (Issue
Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 131): A96:16.
July 17, 2003, and July 25, 2003. Flight Safety
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 20. Robert E. Breiling Associates. Business Turbine
Aircraft Accidents Involving Intentional In-water
  7. Dean. Ditching, 1964–2003. A special report prepared for
Flight Safety Foundation. February 2003.
  8. Lloyd, Chris. Telephone interview by Rosenkrans,
Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July 21, 2003. 21. NTSB. Accident Report: Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Lockheed L-1011, N334EA, Miami International
  9. Brannen, John; investigator-in-charge, NTSB. Airport, Miami, Florida, May 5, 1983. NTSB/AAR-84/
Telephone interview by Lacagnina, Mark. 04. March 9, 1984.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 23, 2003. Flight
22. NTSB. Aircraft Accident Report: Overseas National
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Airways, Inc., Douglas DC-9, N935F, Operating as
10. Golkin, Peter; media relations manager, U.S. Antilliaanse Luchtvaart Maatschappij Flight 980, Near
National Air and Space Museum. Telephone St. Croix, Virgin Islands, May 2, 1970. NTSB-AAR-
interview by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, 71-8. March 31, 1971.
U.S. Aug. 18, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
23. Schaefer, Richard; SAR planning team leader,
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Office of Search and Rescue, U.S. Coast Guard.
11. NTSB. Report no. SEA02FA060. See also: FSF E-mail communications with Rosenkrans, Wayne.
Editorial Staff. “Fuel-quantity Miscalculation Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 16, 2003, and
Cited in Ditching of Boeing Stratoliner.” Accident Sept. 5, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Prevention Volume 60 (August 2003). Virginia, U.S.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 19
 Di t c h i n g

Prepare to Ditch
When the unthinkable happens, surviving a ditching will require knowledge,
preparation and skill. Early recognition of a problem, prompt notification of air
traffic control and careful preparation of passengers are essential.

— FSF Editorial Staff

C
ruising at 41,000 feet over the ocean In an emergency, the best action is planned action,
in a corporate jet, the last thought and having a plan goes far beyond knowing where
on the flight crew’s mind might be to find the airplane’s ditching checklist.
that their airplane could be in that
cold blue water, rather than at the intended des- “You must have a plan,” said Lt. Andy Miller,
tination — which, in some of today’s long-range Lockheed P-3 Orion pilot training officer at the
corporate/business airplanes, could be several U.S. Naval Air Station in Jacksonville, Florida,
thousand miles away. Should something happen U.S.1 “That is the hardest thing for us to teach.
to make a ditching probable, there will be scarce We can teach the actual ditching techniques
time for contemplation; action will be required — that’s just piloting skills. The hardest part is
(see “The Unthinkable Happens,” page 3). getting the message across about having a plan

20 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

for when something unexpected starts What about your life raft? Did the boss signal and a homing signal when the ELT
happening.” opt for the most inexpensive life raft on antenna becomes submerged. Moreover,
the market? Think about spending hours the automatic fixed ELTs installed in
A good way to begin developing a ditch- or days on rough water in very close prox- most aircraft generally cannot be taken
ing plan is to make an inventory of your imity to your colleagues in something out of the aircraft for use in a life raft
resources. If you are flying a large air- that might not be more durable than a (see “Stay Tuned: A Guide to Emergency
plane (more than 12,500 pounds/5,700 floating kiddie pool. Radio Beacons,” page 139). Thus, if the
kilograms maximum certificated takeoff airplane sinks rapidly after a ditching, an
weight) or a turbine-powered airplane, The standard equipment and supplies pro- ELT signal might be broadcast only for a
the regulations require that you “become vided with even top-of-the-line life rafts few seconds.
familiar” with the emergency equipment are meager. Maybe you should specify
aboard the airplane and with the proce- more suitable equipment and assemble a “It is good to have a portable beacon as a
dures for using the equipment.2 waterproof “ditch bag” as a supplement. backup, be it a waterproof PLB [personal
The ditch bag should be capable of being locator beacon], an EPIRB [emergency
One definition of familiar is “thoroughly removed rapidly through an emergency position-indicating radio beacon] or a
conversant by use or study.” This typi- exit and should contain such items as backup ELT that is waterproof, floats
cally involves more than looking at the drinking water, emergency (“space”) blan- and can be carried into the life raft,”
equipment (e.g., life raft, life vests, first aid kets (made of laminated layers of polyes- Steward said.
kit) and reading the placards. Lt. Cmdr. ter film, such as Mylar, with a reflective
Keith Lane, assistant chief of Lockheed If one of your regular passengers is
Martin C‑130 Hercules crew training at the dependent on a medication, a week’s
U.S. Coast Guard Air Station in Clearwater, worth of that medication also should be

S
Florida, U.S., gave the following example:3 included in the ditch bag. A discussion
of the post-ditching survival at the next
upplies
“We have life raft-release handles in the flight-department meeting likely will
‘Herc,’ and anyone would think that they reveal other ditch-bag essentials.
provided with even
need to pull the handle out a little bit,”
he said. “The reality is that you have to Emergency/survival equipment (life
top-of-the-line life rafts
pull the handle out about 18 inches [46 vests, life rafts, etc.) usually has printed
centimeters].” are meager. instructions for proper use, but the crew
should determine whether the instruc-
Lane said that a thorough discussion of tions are legible and thorough — or
emergency equipment is part of peri- even applicable (the instructions may
odic in-flight ditching drills conducted not match the equipment).
by C‑130 crews. coating that can be used either to retain
body heat or to protect from sunlight),
sun block, waterproof flashlights and Flight Attendants
Taking Stock extra batteries, a handheld aviation very- Are Essential
high-frequency (VHF) radio, a handheld

T he inventory of resources should

include an evaluation of their suit-
ability and your ability to use them.
marine-band radio, a handheld satellite
telephone, plastic bags (useful for many
purposes), a spare strobe light, whistles
A n indispensable resource on over-
water flights is a trained cabin
crewmember — a flight attendant or an
and other items that will be worth their aviation maintenance technician who
The first aid kit aboard your multimil- weight in gold (see “Don’t Leave the periodically receives adequate cabin-
lion-dollar airplane might be suitable for Aircraft Without It,” page 155). safety training that is tailored to the
bandaging a cut finger or for relieving a operating environment (see “Assigning
headache, but how suitable will that first Among ditch-bag items that are indis- Seats to Flight Attendants Requires Care
aid kit be if fellow crewmembers or pas- pensable is a backup radio beacon, said in Business Aircraft,” page 23).
sengers require serious medical attention U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Paul Steward.4
after a ditching? Maybe you should carry Although the type of emergency locator U.S. regulations, however, do not require
a more comprehensive medical kit aboard transmitter (ELT) currently required flight attendants to be aboard general
the airplane and obtain appropriate medi- aboard airplanes likely will activate on aviation airplanes (including those used
cal training to use it — just in case. impact, it will stop transmitting a distress in corporate operations and fractional

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 21
 Di t c h i n g

taken along to provide only in-flight “hostess”

services.

Preparing the cabin and passengers for a ditching

should not be a task added to the flight crew’s
workload.

“There will be much to do in the cabin and in the

cockpit to prepare for a ditching,” Coley said. “The
best place for the cockpit crew is the cockpit.”

Just as a flight crewmember making his or her first

overwater flight in the airplane should be shown
where the emergency equipment is stowed and
thoroughly briefed on its use, a newly hired or
contract cabin crewmember should be prepared
similarly.
Professional ownership operations) carrying fewer than 20
flight attendants passengers or aboard aircraft with fewer than 20 “A flight attendant must prepare for every flight,”
know how to serve passenger seats used in on-demand operations; Coley said. “If I am going to be flying in an airplane
passengers … and how
furthermore, aircraft not certificated for two pilots that I have never been on before, then I need to go a
can be flown by one pilot in an on-demand opera- day or so ahead of time to talk to the chief pilot and
to save their lives.
tion if the aircraft is equipped with an approved learn about the airplane and the passengers.”
autopilot.5 Thus, fare-paying passengers often
are engaged in commercial flights conducted by
a single pilot, who, in a ditching situation, likely Get Ready and Set
would not be able to prepare them for the water Before You Go
landing or for evacuation.

Colette Coley, cabin/flight attendant program

manager for FlightSafety International (FSI),
S urviving a ditching largely will depend on the
flight crew’s knowledge and skill in flying the
airplane and the cabin crewmember’s knowledge
said that there are several reasons why professional and skill in preparing the passengers and the
flight attendants or trained maintenance techni- cabin.
cians should be assigned to overwater flights.6
The preflight briefing could be the crew’s last op-
“The flight attendant needs to be there to provide portunity to thoroughly prepare the passengers
passenger services, such as food and beverages, for a ditching. If a problem occurs while flying
on a long flight,” she said. “There is more to these low over water — or if a problem requires a rapid
basic services than most people imagine. The flight descent from altitude — the pilots will have their
attendant has to be concerned with food safety, hands full flying the airplane, and the flight at-
ensuring that the food is stored at the proper tendant might have sufficient time only to tell
temperature, for example. the passengers to don their life vests, secure their
restraints and brace for impact.
“More important are the variables that come into
play if a water landing becomes necessary. It is “The challenges to crew and passengers in water-
very important to have a trained person prepare related accidents are formidable, and the prepa-
the passengers and be with them during the water ration of crew and passengers for such events is
landing.” crucial if they are to survive,” said a 1998 report
by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
Trained is the key word: A professional flight at- (FAA) Civil Aeromedical Institute (now the Civil
tendant will be a far more valuable resource in an Aerospace Medical Institute).7
emergency situation than someone who has not
completed formal training in cabin safety and is Continued on page 30

22 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Assigning Seats to Flight Attendants Requires

Care in Business Aircraft

In the absence of regulations that require flight attendants, some operators of business aircraft have been
influenced by training organizations and pilots to reconsider long-held policies. Precedents set by airlines
may influence the resulting cabin-safety practices.

I
n many countries, operators of busi- required to sit in a jump seat locked be- inaccurate impression to employees
ness aircraft are not required by civil tween the pilot [seat] and copilot [seat], about work conducted by the chair-
aviation regulations to carry flight at- thus blocking egress from the cockpit in man on the company airplane);
tendants in general aviation operations. an emergency. … This operation is an ac-
Current standards and recommended cident waiting to happen.”1 • A flight attendant was deemed un-
practices of the International Civil Aviation necessary because the same pas-
Organization (ICAO) also provide limited In 1993, 31 U.S. operators of large sengers traveled on all trips in the
guidance that pertains directly to using business aircraft responded to ques- airplanes, and these passengers
flight attendants in business aircraft. As tions about their policies and practices were trained in cabin safety; and,
a result, significant variations in cabin- for utilization of flight attendants under
safety practices exist, and some practices FARs Part 91, General Operating and • Flight attendants were considered
— such as routinely assigning a flight at- Flight Rules.2 Principal findings from the helpful but not essential.
tendant to the cockpit-observer jump seat survey responses were that 71 percent
for takeoff and landing — show that there of the operators said that they assigned Three large U.S. airlines that also pro-
is no international consensus about them. flight attendants to domestic flights, and vided comments to researchers in the
Nevertheless, many operators of business 87 percent said that they assigned flight 1993 survey, however, said that a flight
aircraft voluntarily exceed official require- attendants to international flights. attendant in the cabin provides a shorter
ments based, in part, on the principles response time and a disciplined, knowl-
and precedents of air carriers. One-third of operators who used flight edge-based response to emergency
attendants said that they used mainte- conditions, such as initiating immediate
If an operator’s policies do not address nance technicians (called a “third crew- movement of passengers in an emergen-
cabin-safety issues adequately, cockpit member” or “flight mechanic”) who had cy evacuation to increase the probability
crews may object to the inconsistent received the same cabin-safety training of passenger survival. Actions that would
practices by citing safety concerns. For as flight attendants. Some operators said be instinctive to untrained passengers —
example, one U.S. pilot conducting flights that anecdotal experiences — in which such as opening the nearest exit — could
under U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations a flight attendant conducted emergency jeopardize safety, the airlines said. On the
(FARs) Part 135, Commuter and On- procedures and controlled the situation other hand, flight attendants frequently
demand Operations, submitted the follow- while passengers showed signs of panic helped to manage an in-flight medical
ing report to the U.S. National Aeronautics during incidents involving smoke, fire or emergency and helped the captain to
and Space Administration Aviation Safety emergency evacuation — had convinced distinguish minor health incidents from
Reporting System: “I do not believe that all the operators of the safety value of a flight those that required landing at the near-
the problems are companywide. For the attendant on business aircraft. Other op- est suitable location that had appropriate
most part, I feel they are [in] our individual erators said that flight attendants were medical care.
operation. There is a total disregard for used on all international flights but on no
training. [For example,] I have two [wom- domestic flights. Worldwide, national requirements for car-
en] who are carried as flight attendants. rying a flight attendant on commercial
Neither [flight attendant] has had a good The following reasons were cited by op- aircraft typically are based on the pas-
initial course, much less a recurrent train- erators that did not use a flight attendant senger-seating capacity (aircraft seats
ing program. Yet the airplane is operated on any aircraft: or passengers) of the aircraft, such as
[under] Part 135. The flight crew operates providing one flight attendant when
the majority of its flights internationally. … • Carrying a flight attendant would more than 19 passengers are carried,
On one of our last flights, we were required be inconsistent with the company’s said Donald Spruston, director general
to make an emergency return. Operations culture, style or employee morale. of the International Business Aviation
had stacked four computer-paper boxes of (For example, a corporate chairman Council (IBAC). 3 IBAC represents 11
catering in the main doorway, thus blocking believed that having a flight atten- national associations and regional asso-
emergency egress. Our flight attendant is dant on the aircraft would convey an ciations of business aircraft operators at

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 23
 Di t c h i n g

the international level, has ICAO observer included about whether a passenger is an IBAC standards board in response to
status and represents business aviation treated well in the back of the aircraft. the changing consensus on codes of
on most of the panels and the planning This reinforces our position that every practice and best practices, he said.
and implementation groups of ICAO. crewmember’s primary responsibility is
safety; therefore, anything else that a flight IBAC’s member associations — such
“Requirements for carrying flight atten- attendant may do in terms of customer as the U.S. National Business Aviation
dants are very similar; I am not aware of service is an add-on benefit.” Association (NBAA) — also consider
countries that vary significantly by requir- cabin-safety practices at the national
ing flight attendants in general aviation To be registered in the program, op- level or regional level. For example, NBAA
operations,” Spruston said. “Because erators must meet the requirements of emphasizes that the seating policy of op-
business aircraft are becoming larger, ICAO Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, erators of business aircraft should ensure
have longer range and are used in more Part II, International General Aviation that the flight attendant has access to
intercontinental operations, no doubt – Aeroplanes, and satisfy all the national passengers, can communicate with
there is an increasing safety requirement requirements of the state of registry for passengers and can conduct effectively
for the use of flight attendants. Good providing the nationally required number cabin emergency procedures, includ-
communication and management of the of cabin crewmembers, he said. ing emergency evacuation, said Joe A.
cockpit and cabin have become more Evans, NBAA director of operations and
important during the past 10 years.” staff liaison to the NBAA Flight Attendant
Committee.5

“
Although IBAC has been involved in
ICAO’s flight-crew-licensing panel and “Flight attendants should be seated
the recently reactivated operations panel, Good communication in a corporate aircraft so that they are
Spruston said, IBAC representatives have prepared to assist the pilot-in-command
not reported any recent committee dis- and management of in all cabin and passenger safety issues
cussion of issues or work-agenda items and security issues,” Evans said. “When a
related to flight attendants in business member company uses an assigned flight
the cockpit and cabin
aircraft. IBAC has developed a set of attendant on board a corporate aircraft,
performance-based standards for volun- that person should possess the proper
tary adoption by international operators have become more safety training and security training. We
of business aircraft that will influence have listed voluntary recommended train-
indirectly how flight attendants function important during the ing practices in the NBAA Management
on business aircraft. Guide.”
past 10 years.”
“Completed in 2002 and introduced No aircraft seat approved for occupancy
by a number of flight departments, our during takeoff and landing is considered
International Standard for Business inherently more safe than another, said
Aircraft Operations [IS–BAO] was devel- Nancy Claussen, a cabin safety in-
oped and tested by IBAC members during spector with the U.S. Federal Aviation
a two-year period,” Spruston said. “These “If operators decide to have a flight at- Administration (FAA).6 Nevertheless, a
standards require that flight departments tendant, they must have training for this seat equipped with a combined safety-
establish processes and documentation person; IS–BAO does not stipulate the belt and shoulder-harness unit — in a
using principles of ISO 9000-series quality exact requirement,” Spruston said. “The forward-facing seat or an aft-facing seat
management.”4 standards are not prescriptive in details rather than in a side-facing seat — would
of what has to be provided or the seat- be preferable for a crewmember who
Before issuing a voluntary certificate of ing assigned to a flight attendant, but has been assigned safety-related duties,
registration, the IS–BAO program requires are designed to ensure that the operator she said. This type of restraint system
that member operators have specific sets up the appropriate type of training, is required for flight attendants under
processes for duty-time limitations and requires that all crewmembers meet the FARs Part 121, Domestic, Flag and Air
training, including training standards and operator’s standard and demonstrates Carrier Operations, in transport category
recurrency training for flight attendants. that the operator has appropriate training aircraft.
for the cabin crew as well as the cockpit
“Essentially, we have used the principles crew. There must be more focus on the “Although FAA does not recognize the flight
of ISO 9000, but have included only safe- related training requirements and crew attendant as a required crewmember in
ty-related provisions in building an avia- resource management, which we have FARs Part 91 operations, protecting every
tion-oriented safety standard,” Spruston included as an important safety require- flight attendant is critical as a cabin-safety
said. “IS–BAO does not contain anything ment in the IS–BAO program.” Revisions factor,” Claussen said. “Our cabin-safety
as to level of cabin service — nothing is will be introduced annually in January by regulations were written prior to such new

24 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

industry dynamics as the increased use [General] and 25.562 [Emergency operators of business aircraft — FACTS
of business jets and fractional ownership. Landing Dynamic Conditions];”8 Training International and FlightSafety
FAA is working to address many issues in International — believe that these cabin-
these operations to ensure a high level of • “Each seat located in the passenger safety issues deserve greater attention.
safety. We have concluded from several compartment and designated for
reports of experimental research that when use during takeoff and landing by Clients’ cabin-safety practices often are
one or more flight attendants was present a flight attendant required by the discussed during procedures training that
in the cabin of a transport airplane, emer- operating rules of this section [of is specific to the operation of corporate/
gency egress times were significantly less the FARs] must be: near a required business aircraft, said Douglas B. Mykol,
than when passengers evacuated the floor-level emergency exit, except N.D. (doctor of naturopathic medicine),
aircraft without a flight attendant present. that another location is acceptable chief executive officer of FACTS Training
Some cabin-safety training organizations if the emergency egress of pas- International and AirCare International.11
are trying to take Part 121 requirements for sengers would be enhanced with
flight attendants as a guide and voluntarily that location. A flight attendant seat “I estimate that 50 percent of the cabin-
parallel them; I support their efforts to in- must be located adjacent to each class business jets and all of the heavy-
crease the level of safety by having trained Type A or [Type] B emergency exit. jet corporate aircraft currently provide a
crewmembers aboard the aircraft to assist Other flight attendant seats must be flight attendant for every flight,” Mykol
passengers in an emergency.” evenly distributed among the required said. “An additional 20 percent of busi-
floor-level emergency exits to the ex- ness-aircraft operators include a flight
One source of relevant safety principles is tent feasible; to the extent possible, attendant for their longer flights and for
the European Joint Aviation Requirements, without compromising proximity to a international flights. Over the years, there
which say that a civil aviation authority required floor-level emergency exit, has been a slow change of attitude in
may require an increased number of flight located to provide a direct view of regard to flight attendants in business
attendants in a transport airplane because the cabin area for which the flight aircraft. When practical for the size of the
of factors such as “the location of cabin attendant is responsible; positioned aircraft, a flight attendant should be con-
crew seats, taking into account cabin so that the seat will not interfere with sidered a ‘no go’ checklist item [that is,
crew duties in an emergency evacua- the use of a passageway or exit when the departure should not be conducted
tion.” Considerations for seat assignment the seat is not in use; located to mini- without a flight attendant] — similar to
to a flight attendant in European transport mize the probability that occupants a vital part of the aircraft’s emergency
aircraft also include the following factors: would suffer injury by being struck by equipment.
“When determining cabin crew seating items dislodged from service areas,
positions, the operator should ensure stowage compartments, or service “Many operators still consider assigning
that they are: close to a floor-level exit; equipment; either forward [facing] or the flight attendant in terms of service-
provided with a good view of the area(s) rearward facing with an energy-ab- related issues. It has been an uphill battle
of the passenger cabin for which the cabin sorbing rest that is designed to sup- for many years to get the flight attendant/
crewmember is responsible; and evenly port the arms, shoulders, head and third crewmember recognized as a valu-
distributed throughout the cabin, in the spine; [and,] equipped with a restraint able safety asset.”
above order of priority. [The same factors system consisting of a combined
apply to operators of helicopters in com- safety-belt and shoulder-harness unit Proper training of personnel who are as-
mercial air transportation.]”7 with a single-point release. There signed to perform flight attendant duties
must be a means to secure each is one of the most critical issues currently
Another source of relevant safety prin- restraint system when not in use to facing operators of business aircraft, he
ciples is the airworthiness requirements prevent interference with rapid egress said.
for transport category airplanes in the during an emergency;”and,9
following FARs: “There are still many operators putting
• “Each forward observer’s seat re- an untrained person aboard the aircraft
• “Each seat, berth, safety belt, quired by the operating rules must as a third crewmember,” he said. “We
harness and adjacent part of the be shown to be suitable for use in have been aware of examples of this
airplane at each station designated conducting the necessary en route practice such as using a pilot’s friend,
as occupiable during takeoff and inspection.”10 an executive’s secretary or a restaurant
landing must be designed so that employee who the pilot met the night be-
a person making proper use of the fore the flight. Obviously, a person acting
facilities will not suffer serious injury Trainers of Flight Attendants as a flight attendant creates an immense
in an emergency landing as a result Suggest Revised Practices liability — financially, ethically and mor-
of the inertia forces specified in [FARs ally because the passengers most likely
Part 25, Airworthiness Standards, Representatives of two U.S. training will view a person who acts like a cabin
Transport Category Airplanes] 25.561 companies that interact frequently with crewmember as a trained flight attendant.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 25
 Di t c h i n g

In an emergency, the passengers will look in problem-solving and to conduct rou- to be unfeasible or impractical primarily
to this crewmember for assistance.” tinely a preflight conference on unique because of limited cabin space or unsuit-
safety factors of each flight such as able cabin configuration, Coley said.
Although Mykol believes that most seating, emergency evacuation and crew
operators of business/corporate jets commands. “In the past, some operators who have
currently assign the cabin crewmem- used our training have placed the flight
ber to sit in the cockpit-observer jump “Most professional flight attendants and attendant on the cockpit-observer seat,
seat for takeoff and landing, FACTS training organizations would like to see which is not — in our opinion — the best
cabin safety specialists discourage this regulations for training and minimum position because the flight attendant is
practice, he said. qualifications for the flight attendant, but on board primarily for passenger safety,”
this concept causes much concern within she said. “Based on the types of busi-
“We estimate that 90 percent of U.S. NBAA and among some operators,” ness aircraft in which we have provided
cabin-class aircraft operators have the Mykol said. “While standards are usu- training, FlightSafety International does
flight attendant sit in the cockpit-observer ally good for the industry and for safety, not recommend the use of the cockpit-
jump seat for takeoff and landing,” Mykol aircraft operators would incur costs to observer seat. The best place for the flight
said. “We believe that this common prac- operate at this higher standard.” attendant is in the cabin with the passen-
tice should be avoided because the flight gers, functioning as the safety backup for
attendant primarily is on board for pas- A positive trend in recent years has been the cockpit crew.”
senger-safety reasons. It is very difficult improvement of procedures training on
for a flight attendant who is sitting in a cabin emergencies for pilots. The flight attendant should occupy the
forward-facing jump seat — facing away closest aft-facing seat or closest forward-
from the passengers — to assist in the “While emergency-procedures training is facing seat to the primary emergency exit;
event of an emergency.” required for every Part 135 crewmember, Coley said that she would not recommend
including pilots, I have seen many Part any side-facing seat, even if that is the
Some operators of business aircraft have 135 operators send their flight attendants seat closest to the primary emergency
established policies and procedures that to formal training, but conduct only a brief exit. Some operators currently provide a
assign the flight attendant to a specific in-house safety meeting to train pilots,” he combined seat-belt and shoulder-harness
seat in the cabin for takeoff and landing. said. “This is slowly changing. Currently, unit with a single-point release for all pas-
each of our cabin-safety classes typically senger seats.
“We highly recommend this policy and consists of about 30 percent pilots, 20
also recommend that the cabin crew- percent flight engineers/maintenance “Typically, with contract flight attendants,
member be seated in an aft-facing seat, technicians and 50 percent flight atten- discussion of seat assignment is done
which typically provides a view of the en- dants. About 20 percent of our clients during the preflight briefing,” she said. “If
tire cabin and passengers,” Mykol said. send their entire crews to cabin-emer- the flight attendant knows ahead of time
“From the cabin, the flight attendant can gency-procedures training. Usually, within about the trip, he or she should take time
observe, assess, correct and respond to the first two hours, pilots appreciate being to meet with the crew or the chief pilot
emergencies and safety issues in a much empowered with new skills.” and find out more about the operator’s
more timely fashion. standard operating procedures, what
Consciousness about these issues has type of emergency equipment is on the
“In a planned emergency, the aft-facing been raised partly by the participation of airplane and where it is located, where
brace position allows for both viewing the pilots in cabin-safety training, said Colette the flight attendant will be seated, the
cabin and issuing voice commands to the Coley, cabin/flight attendant program scope of responsibilities — for example,
passengers during impact. Most other manager for FlightSafety International.12 some operators require the cockpit crew
forward-facing brace positions require to conduct preflight checks of all cabin
the cabin crewmember to be bent over “Training provides pilots more hands-on emergency equipment — and passenger
to grab the ankles with the head down. experience with the equipment in the load and catering details. We encourage
This position results in the cabin crew- back of the airplane and what it is like flight attendants to learn as much as pos-
member not being able to see the cabin to talk passengers through a planned sible before the day of the flight — other-
or passengers, and any voice commands emergency landing,” Coley said. “Whether wise, they should meet the airplane earlier
will be directed toward the floor instead of the crewmember is in the cockpit or the in the day of the flight to be briefed by the
toward the passengers.” A flight attendant cabin, there is better understanding. On cockpit crew. Even if preflight equipment
seated in a cockpit-observer jump seat occasion, pilots have gone back to their checks are not delegated to a contract
similarly cannot issue voice commands companies and discussed the value of flight attendant, flight attendants are
directly toward the passengers. flight attendants on business aircraft.” trained to perform a preflight inspection
to familiarize themselves with everything
Ideally, pilots and flight attendants will On some business aircraft, however, op- on that airplane and where everything is
be trained to work together as a crew erators have found using a flight attendant located.”

26 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

The flight attendant must know from for TAG Aviation USA. “We rarely use flight advice is required, the presence of a cabin
experience what is required for safety; attendants on Raytheon Hawker-series crewmember enables the captain and first
for example, if the galley is aft, an aft fire airplanes or smaller aircraft.13 officer to focus first on safety of flight in
extinguisher and aft personal breathing handling the in-flight medical emergency,
equipment (PBE) will be required, she “One obstacle that we run into with some Holmes said.
said. Flight attendants also know that one aircraft owners is cost. Typically, they will
interior configuration may be significantly want a flight attendant in cabin-class air- If the operator is enrolled in MedAire’s
different than the interior of the same planes, but for other aircraft — the Falcon MedLink service, for example, and an
aircraft type that an operator has parked 50 and the Challenger 601, for example injury or illness occurs, the flight atten-
nearby — for example, fire extinguishers — they may not want a flight attendant dant can communicate directly with the
may be placed at the forward bulkhead on the airplane. Other owners or clients MedLink physician, provide information
and the aft bulkhead in one airplane, but ask for a flight attendant only for specific about the passenger, discuss with the
may be placed in a mid-cabin location and types of trips — such as for a long inter- pilots the physician’s recommendation
in the front of the cabin in another. Taking national trip, when entertaining guests or about landing as scheduled or diverting
nothing for granted about emergency- when providing an elaborate meal service. the flight for the nearest appropriate medi-
equipment stowage is critical because cal care, and apply the medical advice in
some operators select the most incon- the cabin while the cockpit crew conducts
spicuous cabin locations, Coley said. the diversion.

“We definitely are influenced by lessons

learned from Part 121 operations; there
is nothing wrong with applying them to
“ In an emergency
“Without a flight attendant, one of the pi-
lots would have to assess the passenger’s
symptoms and discuss with MedLink any
corporate aviation if it makes sense,” she situation, a properly recommendation to divert,” Holmes said.
said. “We have to consider every aspect “All TAG Aviation flight attendants have train-
of training based on its own merits but trained and qualified ing in cardiopulmonary resuscitation [CPR],
we are always watching and learning from use of the automated external defibrillator
other types of operations so that mistakes (AED) and first aid. All the aircraft that we
flight attendant will
are not duplicated just because a practice operate carry a basic first aid kit, and many
is not required by regulations in business carry an enhanced medical kit.”
aircraft. In an emergency situation, a prop- enhance the safety
erly trained and qualified flight attendant All cabin equipment must be used cor-
will enhance the safety of every individual of every individual on rectly and safely; otherwise, there could
on the airplane.” be significant risk of distraction to pilots
the airplane.” caused by a passenger’s unfamiliarity
with cabin equipment or the passenger’s
U.S. Operator Sets Policy, inability to resolve apparent malfunctions,
Provides Client Education McLeran said.

Cabin safety requires a continuing com- “This has been a significant issue among
mitment after basic policies have been Otherwise, the issue may be that some our customers because about 75 percent
established, such as when to use flight customers would prefer to have the cabin of the aircraft we use in on-demand op-
attendants in a business aircraft and how all to themselves.” erations are owned by private individuals,”
the seat will be assigned to the flight at- McLeran said. “The typical charter pas-
tendant for optimal safety. Factors such Some advantages of assigning a flight senger will not know how to operate these
as cost, resistance to change and clients’ attendant to a business aircraft are systems. Even aircraft owners sometimes
misunderstanding of crew roles and re- readily apparent, but others might not become confused about operating cabin
sponsibilities can affect implementation be obvious to operators, owners and equipment such as a satellite TV system
of the policies. passengers, said Ann Holmes, director, or wireless local-area-network system
cabin standards and services, for TAG for laptop computers, which may not
“We are using flight attendants on a Aviation USA. be intuitively easy to operate. Apparent
regular basis for the Boeing 727 and malfunctions often are operator-error is-
the Boeing Business Jet; the Dassault Operators of business aircraft — especial- sues. Moreover, if no flight attendant is
Falcon 50, Falcon 900 and Falcon ly cabin-class aircraft and large transport aboard, a passenger sometimes will go
2000; the Bombardier Global Express, aircraft with executive interiors — in- to the cockpit for such assistance at the
Challenger 601 and Challenger 604; and creasingly subscribe to medical advice same time that the crew might be enter-
the Gulfstream II, III, IV, V and 200,” said services that provide communication with ing a high-density traffic environment, for
Charles McLeran, chief operating officer a physician on the ground. When medical example. While one pilot might be able

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 27
 Di t c h i n g

to help a passenger with such problems “Although aviation professionals may joke ‘hear nothing, see nothing, say nothing.’
in cruise, we have learned from experi- about the pilots being first to arrive at an The basis for this includes the confidential-
ence that the flight attendant has a very accident scene, if they are incapacitated ity clause in their employment agreement,
important operational function aboard when the aircraft stops, the flight attendant screening by clients and pre-employment
these airplanes.” is critical to getting the passengers off the checks of their references, and the reputa-
airplane to a safe place on the ground. The tion that they must earn in this business
As to where the flight attendant should flight attendant also has been trained on for being discreet and for assuming the
be assigned to sit in a business aircraft, how to evacuate injured pilots. In safety demeanor of a trusted executive assistant
practices vary among operators, Holmes demonstrations, we have asked the aircraft and safety professional.”
said. owner or passengers to assist pilots who
are slumped over in the seat by getting Flight Safety Foundation has recognized
“The assumption among many operators the pilots out of their seats. Typically, they the following additional principles of cabin
is that the flight attendant will sit in the cannot figure out how to disconnect the safety, which have precedents in airline
cockpit-observer jump seat,” Holmes belts by rotating the release mechanism operations:
said. “We concur with FACTS and of the single-point harness.”
FlightSafety International, which highly • Flight attendants have provided a
recommend that the flight attendant sit In the current environment, operators of first line of defense for detecting and
in the cabin — not in the jump seat. On business aircraft have many reasons to enabling the cockpit crew to respond
many cabin-class airplanes such as the reassess their policies on flight attendants. to unsafe conditions (such as unusual
Falcon 900 series, Challenger series sounds, smoke, odors, fumes, vis-
and Gulfstream series, the main entry “TAG Aviation operates under a safety- ible equipment malfunctions, unsafe
door adjacent to the cockpit is not the policy memorandum that says that our stowage of bags or relocation of
primary emergency exit. Typically, the preference is that flight attendants maintain equipment by passengers that
primary emergency exit is an overwing a seating position in the cabin,” McLeran would block emergency exits or an
exit; therefore, a flight attendant seated said. “A new company flight attendant aisle, and securing loose articles);
at the cockpit is in a position farthest from manual also will say that the flight attendant
the overwing exit.” should occupy a cabin seat. With respect • Some emergency tasks can be
to aircraft owners, however, we are in a conducted most quickly when the
Positioning a flight attendant in the cock- safety-consulting position and some own- flight attendant has eye contact with
pit-observer jump seat also runs counter ers are opposed to this policy. When these passengers (for example, to observe
to the well-developed practice of airlines, owners are aboard the aircraft, they want nonverbal passenger behavior and
McLeran said. the flight attendant to occupy the cockpit- to determine that passengers are in
observer jump seat even for takeoff and the correct position after the brace
“When I began flying business aircraft, ex- landing. We say in print what our policy is command) to communicate with
perience in the airline industry caused me and follow this policy with clients other than voice commands and hand signals,
surprise to find that a vast majority of flight aircraft owners. If an aircraft owner over- and rapid access to stowed equip-
attendants ended up sitting on the jump rides this policy, we will attempt to explain ment (such as flashlights, medical kit,
seat,” McLeran said. “We changed this why this issue is so important — but the oxygen-related devices or life raft);
practice when TAG began conducting line situation puts the crew in a difficult situa-
observations. Now, the vast majority of our tion to resolve.” • The flight attendant should have ready
flight attendants are sitting in the cabin.” access to the galley at all times to
The most persistent issue in seating a flight stow items and/or to secure equip-
The possibility that an injured flight at- attendant on a business aircraft seems to ment under various flight conditions;
tendant inadvertently could block an be some passengers’ perceptions that
evacuation path also is a concern, comfort, cabin service and privacy are the • The flight attendant should be in
McLeran said. highest priorities, Holmes said. a position to help prevent an un-
necessary or hazardous evacuation
“A major problem could occur if during a “Many clients want to fly with the same initiated by a passenger, including
serious unplanned emergency — such as crewmembers on trips because they have inappropriate activation of equip-
a runway excursion — the flight attendant developed confidence in them as individu- ment such as an escape slide;
suddenly became a serious obstacle to als and in their expertise,” McLeran said.
the cockpit crew in completing the du- “Clients also should know that they can • In some aircraft, any cockpit-
ties they must perform,” McLeran said. discuss private matters or proprietary busi- observer jump seat or folding cockpit-
“That is a risk you take on a business jet ness information without regard to the flight observer seat and any harness must
— something to be concerned about 100 attendant’s presence or seat assignment in be stowed securely so that exit paths
percent of the time — when you routinely the cabin. When passengers have private are not blocked for the flight crew dur-
use the cockpit-observer jump seat. conversations, the flight attendant will ing an emergency; operators should

28 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

consider the extra time that would be geographic influences; and from many interactions. ISO 9000 provides
required to secure a folding seat, belt other factors. All of these potential in- generic quality-management sys-
and harness during an emergency fluences reduce the confidence that tem standards for organizational
evacuation; and, can be attached to statistical findings processes/activities that enhance
based on ASRS data. However, the and continually improve customer
• The comfort of the flight attendant’s proportions of consistently reported satisfaction by meeting customer
assigned seat should be considered incidents to ASRS, such as altitude requirements and by meeting ap-
in terms of fatigue, which might af- deviations, have been remarkably sta- plicable regulatory requirements.
fect a flight attendant’s performance ble over many years. Therefore, users
during an emergency. of ASRS may presume that incident   5. Evans, Joe A. Interview and e-mail
reports drawn from a time interval of communication with Rosenkrans,
Comparison of comments in the 1993 several or more years will reflect pat- Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
survey14 with comments in 2003 showed terns that are broadly representative March 12, 2003, and June 6, 2003.
that frequently mentioned issues have of the total universe of aviation-safety Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
changed little in deciding when and how incidents of that type.” Virginia, U.S.
to assign flight attendants to business
aircraft. If these issues continue receiving   2. Speas, R. Dixon; Becker, Otto   6. Claussen, Nancy. Interview and e-mail
attention from operators, training orga- A.; Conte, John L. “Utilization of communication with Rosenkrans,
nizations, regulators and safety special- Flight Attendants, Business Aircraft Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
ists in industry associations, greater Operations, Companies of Fortune March 12, 2003, and June 3, 2003.
consensus could reduce the degree of 50 Category.” Tucson, Arizona, Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
inconsistency in current practices.  U.S.: PRC Aviation, February 1993. Virginia, U.S.
This report was distributed to Flight
— FSF Editorial Staff Safety Foundation and to members   7. Joint Aviation Authorities. IEM OPS
of the U.S. National Business Aircraft 1.990, Number and Composition of
[FSF editorial note: This article has been Association (now National Business Cabin Crew, and IEM OPS 1.31(b),
reprinted from Cabin Crew Safety Volume Aviation Association). “Fortune 50” Cabin Crew Seating Positions.
38 (May–June 2003).] refers to the 50 largest U.S. com-
panies as rated annually by Fortune   8. U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations
Notes magazine. (FARs) 25.785(b).

  1. U.S. National Aeronautics and Space   3. Spruston, Donald D. Interview with   9. FARs 25.785(h).
Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, Vir-
Reporting System (ASRS). Report no. ginia, U.S. June 4, 2003. Flight Safety 10. FARs 25.785(l).
356743, January 1997. NASA ASRS Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
is a confidential incident-reporting Joint Aviation Requirements–Opera- 11. Mykol, Douglas B. E-mail commu-
system. The ASRS Program Overview tions (JAR–OPS) 1, Commercial Air nication with Rosenkrans, Wayne.
said, “Pilots, air traffic controllers, flight Transportation (Aeroplanes), Subpart Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., March
attendants, mechanics, ground per- O, Cabin Crew, 1.990, for example, 22, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
sonnel and others involved in aviation says, “An operator shall not operate Alexandria, Virginia. Mykol is a
operations submit reports to the ASRS an aeroplane with a maximum ap- member of the Flight Attendant
when they are involved in, or observe, proved passenger seating configura- Committee of the U.S. National
an incident or situation in which tion of more than 19, when carrying Business Aviation Association.
aviation safety was compromised. … one or more passengers, unless at
ASRS de-identifies reports before en- least one cabin crewmember is in- 12. Coley, Colette M. Interview with
tering them into the incident database. cluded in the crew for the purpose Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
All personal and organizational names of performing duties, specified in the Virginia, U.S. March 18, 2003.
are removed. Dates, times, and related operations manual, in the interests Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
information, which could be used to of the safety of passengers.” Virginia, U.S.
infer an identity, are either generalized
or eliminated.” ASRS acknowledges   4. The International Organization for 13. McLeran, Charles; Holmes, Ann.
that its data have certain limitations. Standardization (ISO) — a network Interview with Rosenkrans, Wayne.
ASRS Directline (December 1998) of national standards institutes in 146 Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., March
said, “Reporters to ASRS may intro- countries — developed ISO 9000- 21, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
duce biases that result from a greater series standards as a voluntary Alexandria, Virginia.
tendency to report serious events than international reference for quality re-
minor ones; from organizational and quirements in business-to-business 14. Speas et al.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 29
 Di t c h i n g

In an advisory circular on ditching, the “We simulate a ditching and go through “The procedures really do not vary much
U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) the basic procedures for all the crew from one aircraft to the next,” said Bill
recommends that passenger briefings positions: the pilots, flight engineer, Campbell, director of regulatory com-
before overwater flights include infor- the navigator, the radio operator and pliance for CAE SimuFlite.11 “Nobody
mation about the following:8 the drop-and-load master,” said Lane. really has any experience in conducting
“They all have different duties and their emergency landings on the water, and the
• “Contents and features found on the own checklists. manufacturers are careful to say, ‘This is
life [vest], including how to inflate our best guess — we have not demon-
it if the bottle [carbon-dioxide gas “Much of the drill involves discussion. strated this maneuver to anyone, so we
cartridge] fails; We discuss two different scenarios: one are not entirely sure.’”
in which you will have some time to
• “Location of the life raft(s); prepare for the ditching — for instance, A note at the top of the ditching check-
a situation in which you cannot get fuel list for the Citation X is typical. It says,
• “The order in which people should out of a tank; the other is that you will “Ditching was not conducted during cer-
vacate the aircraft in the event of a not have a lot of time — for example, if tification testing of the airplane. Should
ditching and who will be responsible you have a wing fire.” ditching be required, the following pro-
for taking the life raft with them; cedures are recommended.”
The ditching procedure recommended in
• “That life [vests] must not be inflated a flight crew operating manual (FCOM) The Hawker 800, Hawker 1000 and
until clear of the aircraft; for a turbine business airplane typically Citation X are not certificated for ditch-
is based on technical analysis by the ing (see “Ditching Certification — What
• “To remove headsets and [eye]glasses, manufacturer and the incorporation Does It Mean?” page 66). Nevertheless,
and to stow [eye]glasses on their per- of procedures recommended by other the recommended ditching procedures
son prior to touchdown; manufacturers. for business airplanes that have been
certificated for ditching also are based
• “Tighten seat straps/harnesses prior “Our engineering and flight-test people got largely on analysis.
to touchdown on the water and … together and worked out analytically what
assume a braced position; [and,] the ditching procedure for the Citation X For example, at the top of the ditching
would be and then submitted it for certi- checklist for the ditching-certificated
• “Reference points on the aircraft’s fication with the airplane flight manual,” Gulfstream V is this note: “No tests or
internal structure that they should said Michael Pierce, Citation marketing actual ditching have been made. The
reach for [to improve their orienta- manager for Cessna Aircraft Co.9 following procedures will improve the
tion] when exiting the aircraft, as chances of a successful ditching.”
well as any features which might Procedures for some airplanes are based
impede exit.” on ditching tests conducted with other
aircraft. The FCOMs for the Raytheon Thinking Outside the Box
Hawker 800, Hawker 800XP and Hawker
Time to Consider
‘What If?’
1000, for example, say that the recom-
mended ditching procedures are not A s the FSF editorial staff conducted re-
search for this article, it became clear
that some of the recommended procedures
based on ditching tests of the airplanes

A valuable exercise while monitoring — “no such tests have been carried developed by the airplane manufacturers
the flight control system during out” — but that the recommendations differ from procedures recommended by
cruise flight would be to discuss ditching “contain the best available advice, being specialists in water-survival instruction.
procedures and the location and use of the based largely on model ditching tests on
emergency equipment aboard the airplane. the [U.K. Royal Air Force] Dominie and The FSF Airplane Flight Crew Ditching
The discussion will help the crew to develop general procedures of other aircraft.” Checklist (page 31) is intended as a
their action plan and get them one step (The Dominie is a military version framework for discussion of ditching
ahead of any problem that might occur. of the de Havilland Dragon Rapide, a procedures.12 The procedures apply to
twin-engine biplane that first flew in transport category business jets operated
Such discussion is a key element of the 1934.)10 with cabin crewmembers and might not
ditching drills conducted by U.S. Coast be appropriate for other types of airplane
Guard C-130 crews during semiannual The basic procedures recommended by operations.
training flights. the airplane manufacturers are similar. Continued on page 32

30 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Flight Safety Foundation

Airplane Flight Crew Ditching Checklist
(Operations With Cabin Crew)
Fly the airplane.
Preliminary
 Notify air traffic control of the nature of the emergency and intentions to ditch.
 Select transponder code 7700.
 Activate emergency locator transmitter (ELT) (unless ELT signal interferes with radio
communication).
 Change course toward nearest land or vessel.
Preparation
 Notify cabin crew/passengers of the emergency and intentions to ditch, and provide an
estimate of time until water contact.
 Select “Seat Belts/No Smoking” light.
 Deactivate landing-gear-warning system and terrain awareness and warning system
(TAWS)/ground-proximity warning system (GPWS) to prevent unnecessary warnings
(unless TAWS/GPWS altitude callouts will be used during approach).
 Reduce fuel to minimum required for approach/landing.
Approach (at/below 2,000 feet)
 Set radio altimeter to signal 50 feet (if radio altimeter does not provide altitude callouts);
set barometric altimeter to indicated radio altitude or to TAWS/GPWS altitude callout.
 Evaluate sea conditions; plan to land parallel to swell or, if drift exceeds 10 degrees, into
wind on back side of swell.
 Depressurize cabin and ensure that main air valves and dump valves are closed.
 Close engine/auxiliary power unit bleed valves.
 Landing light, as required.
 Landing gear lever “UP.”
 Flaps/slats per flight crew operating manual (FCOM) (typically, “FULL”).
 Ensure ELT is activated.
Before Ditching
 Airspeed per FCOM (typically, slowest speed at which control can be maintained).
 Command/signal “brace.”
 Move throttle levers to “CUTOFF” or “STOP” position just before touchdown.
 Pitch attitude per FCOM (typically, slightly higher than normal landing attitude).
 Pilot flying: both hands on control yoke.
After Ditching
 Announce on radio frequency in use that airplane has been ditched and evacuation
has begun.
CHECKLIST

 Ensure that cabin is depressurized.

 Command evacuation.
 Secure flight deck; leave lights on.
 Evacuate flight deck and deploy life rafts.
Note: This information, which focuses on transport category turbine airplanes with flight attendants aboard during
overwater operations, was assembled for discussion of ditching procedures and is not intended to supersede operators’
or manufacturers’ requirements or recommended procedures.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 31
 Di t c h i n g

For example, ditching checklists A crew might react to a low-fuel indication, for
for transport category airplanes example, by concluding that the gauges are not
typically recommend that the functioning properly. By denying that they might
flaps be extended fully, to help have a serious problem, the crew robs themselves
achieve the slowest possible of precious time they need to gather information,
speed at which the airplane plan their actions and prepare themselves and
remains controllable on touch- their passengers for the likely outcome.
down. Some aviation-magazine
articles on ditching light general “It is really important to let people know that you
aviation airplanes, however, have have a problem as soon as you can,” said Paul D.
said that extending full flaps is Russell, a maritime safety specialist and accident
inadvisable because they could investigator, and a retired U.S. Coast Guard captain
cause the airplane to pitch down with more than 5,000 flight hours in fixed-wing and
excessively on contact with the rotary-wing aircraft.15
water.
“Don’t wait to let somebody know that you are
Another common recommenda- having a problem,” Russell said. “The sooner you
tion for light airplanes is to open let ATC know that you might end up in the water,
Prompt notification emergency exits and doors before ditching, to pre- the sooner they can begin mobilizing the rescue
of air traffic control vent them from being jammed shut by distortion coordination centers [RCCs]. It takes time for
is essential. of the fuselage during impact. U.S. certification them to come to your assistance; with early noti-
standards require transport category airplane fication, you lessen your time in the water.
manufacturers to minimize the probability that
emergency exits will become jammed during a “It is always better to alert people early than to
“minor crash landing.”13 Transport category air- wait. You can call and cancel if the problem goes
planes also are required to have “ditching emer- away. You do not want to be so proud that the first
gency exits” — that is, one exit above the waterline information [ATC and SAR personnel receive] is
on each side of the airplane. a signal from your ELT.”

Every Tick of the Try the Assigned

Clock Counts Frequency First

A n item that is at or near the top of every busi-

ness airplane ditching checklist is to notify air
traffic control (ATC).
T he flight crew should use the assigned radio
frequency to notify ATC that they have a
problem. The controller will want to know the
airplane’s position, the nature of the emergency
Early recognition of a problem that might require and the crew’s intentions.
a ditching and prompt notification of ATC that
a ditching is possible increase the likelihood of The controller also might want to know the
receiving assistance during the emergency and number of people aboard the airplane, airspeed,
of timely involvement and response by search- fuel remaining (in hours and minutes), weather
and-rescue (SAR) authorities (see “The Search- conditions and the types of emergency equipment
and-rescue System Will Find You — If You Help,” aboard the airplane (e.g., life rafts, life vests, ELTs,
page 111). signaling devices, etc.).

The most common reaction to an emergency situ- Steward said that limited time to communicate
ation, however, is denial. and the possibility of disruption of radio commu-
nication also are reasons to notify ATC of a prob-
“Usually in a crisis situation, 70 percent of lem as soon as the problem becomes apparent.
people will deny what is happening,” said the
FAA.14 “If critical decisions are delayed, loss of “In a ditching situation, pilots may not be able
life can occur.” to maintain radio communication very long, so

32 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

when putting out a distress call [‘mayday, mayday, ARINC radio operators relay messages between
mayday’] or an urgency call [‘pan-pan, pan-pan, the controller and the flight crew.
pan-pan’], they must include at least three criti-
cal things: the aircraft’s tail [registration] number, “Normally, the radio operator types the pilot’s
position and number of people aboard,” he said. voice message into a special computer program
“Heading, altitude, rate of descent, where they are that links us to the controllers,” said Richard “Ace”
going and/or where they anticipate ditching also Stutz, manager of air traffic communications
are valuable.” support for ARINC.17 “They type the message
in a special format, hit a button, and the message
Professional pilots typically do a good job in prompt- is sent to the controller who controls that sec-
ly notifying ATC about problems, Steward said. tor of the ocean. The message used to come out
on a printer behind the controller, but now the
“Pilots of commercial aircraft and business jets message comes up on a CRT [cathode ray tube].
are, relatively speaking, cool customers who get If it is a position report, it also activates another
out that information, knowing that any failure program in the FAA that moves a symbol on a
aboard the aircraft may affect communication [CRT] screen that is similar to a radar screen, so
systems,” he said. “For example, we have talked to the controller gets a graphic presentation of the
aircraft crews who reported a low-fuel status or aircraft’s position.”
an engine problem and basically said, ‘I am just
letting you know.’” Communication with ARINC typically is con-
ducted via HF single-
A flight crew departing from the United States sideband radio. The
typically will be in VHF radio contact and in ra- crew is assigned a
dar contact with ATC within about 200 nautical primary HF frequency
miles (370 kilometers) of shore. and a secondary HF
frequency that are se-
“Generally speaking, we ‘see’ about 200 miles out lected from a “family”
from wherever we have a radar antenna,” said of frequencies used in
Tony Ferrante, manager of the FAA Air Traffic the area in which the
Investigations Division.16 “For instance, we have airplane is being flown.
a radar system located on Bermuda, which gives
us the ability to look 200 miles in any direction “The frequencies are
of Bermuda. As far as radio coverage goes, that all published as a fam-
depends on where we have remote communication ily for each part of the
air-ground transmitter sites — we call them RAG ocean — for example
sites. Generally, VHF radio coverage is similar to Central West Pacific,
radar coverage, about 200 miles.” North Pacific, South
Pacific, North Atlantic
Beyond 200 miles in oceanic airspace con- A, North Atlantic E,
trolled by FAA — which includes much of the Caribbean A, Caribbean
Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea B,” Stutz said. “Each
— the crew likely will be communicating by high- part has a family of six
frequency (HF) radio with ATC through ARINC or seven HF frequencies assigned to it. For example, Pilots flying
(formerly Aeronautical Radio Inc.). North Atlantic A has 3016 kHz [kilohertz], 5598 over deep water
kHz, 8906 kHz, and a 13-meg [megahertz (MHz)], communicate with
“For example, if you are over the North Atlantic a 17-meg and a 21-meg frequency.”
ATC through ARINC
Ocean, 1,200 miles [2,222 kilometers] from the U.S.
radio operators.
shoreline, you will be talking with an ARINC radio The HF frequencies — as well as the VHF radio fre-
operator who is on a direct line to a controller at quencies and satellite-communication (SATCOM)
New York Center who is actually responsible for radio frequencies and telephone numbers used in
your aircraft separation,” Ferrante said. “The con- specific areas — are published by Jeppesen on its
troller has your flight plan and knows a lot about oceanic charts and by the U.S. National Imagery
you, including, in most cases, your fuel state.” and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in the Flight

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 33
 Di t c h i n g

Information Handbook (FIH), a supple- primary HF frequency, the flight crew was received] and move other aircraft off
ment to the NIMA oceanic charts. should try the assigned secondary HF the frequency,” Stutz said. “If we cannot
frequency. do that, we will try to move the crew to a
Stutz said that two HF radio frequen- different discrete frequency.”
cies are assigned by ATC to a flight In the unlikely event that ATC (through
crew because of HF signal-propagation ARINC) still does not reply, the pilot If a flight crew is communicating with ATC,
characteristics, which are affected by should select another frequency from they should insist upon remaining on the
several factors, primarily the time of an appropriate navigational chart or frequency in use. If ATC has no option but
day. HF signals “skip” off the ionosphere from the FIH. to assign a different frequency — especially
— the highest layer of the atmosphere an HF frequency — the crew should tell
— which varies in height according to ARINC operators do not monitor emer- ATC that if communication has not been
the time of day. gency radio frequencies; they do, how- established within 60 seconds, the crew will
ever, monitor all of the frequencies in the return to the previous radio frequency.
“The rule of thumb is: the higher the families for the areas they are working.
sun, the higher the frequency,” he said. Stutz said that the primary frequency is Stutz said that ARINC can set up a “phone
“As the sun comes up and starts heating channeled to one earpiece in the radio op- patch” to allow the crew to communicate
the troposphere [the lowest layer of the erator’s headset; the secondary frequency via radio directly with the controller and
atmosphere] and lifts the ionosphere, you and the other frequencies in the family are with personnel at the SAR coordination
need a higher frequency to get the same channeled into the other earpiece. center, if the controller requests SAR-
skip off the ionosphere.” coordination-center personnel to be
included in the phone patch.

A
Bill Roig, a professional pilot with 32,000
flight hours and more than 150 ocean Crews of SAR aircraft and SAR vessels
TC renders
crossings in general aviation aircraft, will be told which radio frequency is be-
said that the higher HF radio frequencies ing used by the flight crew in distress.
whatever assistance
generally are usable during the daytime
and the lower frequencies are usable at is possible to a crew
night.18 SAR Shepherds
in distress.
“HF usually works very well,” he said.
“About three years ago, I flew a single-
engine airplane to Japan. From the time
F errante said that ATC renders “what-
ever assistance is possible” to a crew
in distress.
I left Oakland [California] and arrived “So, if the pilot changes to one of the other
at Honolulu [Hawaii], the HF com- frequencies in the family, we should still Depending on the location and the
munication was as good as being on the hear him calling,” he said. “The pilot time available, a SAR aircraft might be
telephone. Then, from Honolulu over to should say which frequency he is using. dispatched to intercept and escort the
the Marshall Islands, Saipan and Japan, I This allows the radio operator to quickly crew. The International Aeronautical
had good radio contact the whole way.” identify which frequency the call is coming and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual
in on and to answer it rapidly. Otherwise, (IAMSAR Manual) said that assistance
Ferrante said that loss of HF communica- he would have to search all the frequencies available from an escort aircraft includes
tion with a flight crew occurs rarely. until he finds the caller. the following:19

“The likelihood of losing radio com- “When we receive an emergency call, we • “Guiding [the crew] to the vessel
munication with an aircraft over water follow up [the text message] with a phone alongside which it plans to ditch;
is very remote; it hardly ever happens,” he call to the controller, just in case they did
said. “Generally speaking, on the oceanic not read the text message.” • “Giving advice on ditching procedures;
tracks, we never have issues like that.”
In an emergency, the flight crew typically • “Evaluating the sea conditions and
will not be asked to establish radio com- recommending a ditching heading;
Anyone Out There? munication on another frequency.
• “Informing [the crew of] the vessel

I f a loss of radio communication does

happen, and no one answers on the
“We attempt to keep the crew on the
frequency [on which the emergency call
on how it can assist the ditching
aircraft;

34 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

• “Dropping survival [equipment]

and emergency equipment;

• “Informing the SMC [SAR mission

coordinator] of the location of the
ditching;

• “Directing [maritime] vessels to the

scene; and,

• “Providing illumination for a night

ditching if this cannot be done by
the vessel or if the ditching is taking
place away from vessels.”

The U.S. Coast Guard has launched

C‑130s and helicopters to intercept and
escort crews of distress aircraft.

“During an escort, our crews usually will Lat/lon coordinates can be obtained readily from A U.S. Coast Guard
not be able to do anything other than to monitor on-board equipment, such as the flight manage- C-130 may be launched
the distress aircraft, help during any communica- ment system (FMS) or a global positioning sys- to escort an aircraft
tion failure, let the RCC know the status of the tem (GPS) receiver. Nevertheless, the crew should in distress.
aircraft and be on site if a ditching does happen,” know the airplane’s location with respect to the
Steward said. nearest coast or island. Among the “what-ifs” to
consider is failure or malfunction of the naviga-
tion equipment.
Where Are You?
“The business aircraft being flown on overwater

A ssistance cannot be provided if no one knows

where you are. Thus, ATC’s first step toward
providing assistance is to get a precise fix on the
routes typically are equipped with FMSs and kind
of fly themselves,” said Allen Stanfield, director
of pilot training at the FlightSafety International
airplane’s location. Savannah (Georgia, U.S.) Learning Center. 21
“These airplanes will take off from New York and
“We would first do everything we could to de- get you to Paris in about six hours. If you let the
termine your position so that we could start airplane do its thing and an emergency causes you
search-and-rescue procedures and get all of those to lose your automation, you might not know ex-
notifications made based on your lat/lon [latitude/ actly where you are. So, it is important to have a
longitude] coordinates,” Ferrante said. chart out and to know where you are.”

One of the reasons why an accurate position report

is important is that ATC and SAR authorities will Calling Any Station
plot the airplane’s flight path to determine prob-
able future positions and where the airplane likely
will be ditched.20 S hould the crew have no success in establishing
radio communication with ATC on any of the
assigned or published frequencies, a distress call
“If pilots provide their position, altitude, course or an urgency call should be transmitted to “any
and speed, the U.S. Coast Guard can deduce ac- station” on 121.5 MHz, the VHF aeronautical
curately — working with ATC — their estimated emergency frequency, and the transponder should
point of ditching,” said Steward. “We want to be set to the emergency code, 7700.
know any changes in course, altitude or speed,
and we want information to be as current as we Most of the world’s SAR facilities continuously
can get.” monitor 121.5 MHz for distress calls from pilots

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 35
 Di t c h i n g

and for distress alerts from radio beacons. The as a coast radio station linked to an ATC facility
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or to an RCC.
requires pilots of all aircraft to monitor 121.5 MHz
during long overwater flights.22 Pilots should not dismiss as impractical the pos-
sibility of arranging through ATC — with an RCC
Stanfield said that transmitting an “any-station” working behind the scenes — to ditch an aircraft
call on 121.5 MHz is an alternative to trying to near a ship, said Dan Lemon, a U.S. Coast Guard
establish radio communication with someone on SAR coordination specialist.24
an HF frequency that is not among the published
family of frequencies for the area in which the “The ship’s crew can help the pilots before the
airplane is being flown. ditching with lighting and information about sea
state and direction of waves,” Lemon said.
“HF transmissions are very subject to environ-
mental conditions,” he said. “In an emergency
situation, I do not have time to mess around with Backup Communication
HF. There are so many aircraft crossing the oceans
right now that, if you cannot raise ATC, you likely
can talk to another aircraft on 121.5 and have them
relay a message to ATC.”
T he IAMSAR Manual says that a cellular tele-
phone could be used for backup emergency
communication.

The FAA Aeronautical Information Manual “The user must know or find the telephone num-
(AIM)23 and the IAMSAR Manual say that the ber for a SAR facility or ATC facility,” the manual
flight crew might be able to hail a ship on the said. “The caller should be prepared to provide the
international maritime distress frequency, 2182 SAR facility with the following information: cel-
kHz, or on 4125 kHz. lular telephone number, cellular service provider
(which might provide an approximate position
Nevertheless, trying to establish HF radio com- based on assessment of signal strength), roam
munication with a ship might require time, a number, other means of available communica-
scarce resource for a flight crew facing an im- tions and an alternate point of contact.
minent ditching.
“The cellular telephone then must be left on to
“Coast Guard vessels and cruise ships maintain receive further communication or turned on at a
a constant listening watch, but merchant ships specific schedule agreed by the caller and the SAR If no one
typically do not have a radio operator on duty facility [or ATC facility].” answers on radio,
at all times,” Russell said. “If I have an emergency try a cellular phone.
that is requiring me to ditch, and I am coming Over the ocean, however, a
down with a planeload of people, I would be satellite telephone would be
spending my time getting my equipment ready, much more useful than a cel-
the cabin ready, making sure people are touch- lular telephone. Steward said
ing things so they know how to get out of the that a satellite telephone could
airplane, and briefing for how we are going to be used for backup emergency
conduct the landing. communication with the U.S.
Coast Guard.
“I don’t want people trying to raise a ship on HF
to get a ditching heading. I want them to be flying “We can communicate directly
the airplane.” via satellite telephones from
several providers if the crew
ATC can arrange through an RCC for direct has the emergency line or can
emergency HF radio communication between a call an operator who can trans-
flight crew and the crew of a merchant ship. More fer the call to the U.S. Coast
commonly, messages are relayed by the crew of Guard,” he said. “We do not
a SAR aircraft, SAR maritime vessel or military particularly like text messages,
vessel, or by personnel at a ground station, such and we try to discourage their

36 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

use for distress communication. If text radio communication and deactivate the The best-glide speed typically is pub-
messages are a means of distress alert- ELT if necessary. lished in the emergency procedures sec-
ing that can be relayed to us in whatever tion of the FCOM that discusses power
fashion, however, we will take what we loss from all engines. The best-glide speed
can get and respond.” Ditching With Power results in the airplane traveling the great-
Increases Your Options est distance during descent.
Stanfield said that many business air-
planes capable of transoceanic flights are
equipped with other communication sys-
tems, such as an airborne flight informa-
T he compulsion to remain flying as
long as power is available will be
strong, but the crew should not wait until
The “Dual Engine Failure” checklist for
the Gulfstream IV, for example, indicates
that at best-glide speed, the glide ratio
tion system (AFIS), that can be used as a the fuel is exhausted before ditching the of the airplane is approximately 15-to-1,
backup for emergency communication. airplane. The consensus is that, if pos- said Stanfield. This means that the air-
sible, the ditching should be conducted plane will travel 15,000 feet (4,575 me-
“AFIS is almost like e-mail,” he said. with power. ters) — approximately 2.5 nautical miles
“Messages can be sent between the (4.6 kilometers) — for every 1,000 feet of
cockpit and the company or the flight- Having engine power available will altitude during descent.
planning resource through your FMS.” greatly increase the crew’s options and
improve the likelihood of conducting a Although best-glide speed would be
Lane recommends that flight crews carry a successful ditching. selected to get to, or closer to, shore or
handheld marine-band radio as a backup, a ship, in some circumstances the crew
so that they can try to summon help on “If all your engines are silent when you might want to maintain the airplane’s
Channel 16 (156.8 MHz FM [frequency get close to the water, you may be down to minimum-sink speed, to stay in the air
modulation]), the maritime hailing and standby instruments and have very poor as long as possible. For example, if a ship
distress frequency. Lane said that Channel lighting, which will affect your ability to is nearby, selection of the minimum-sink
16 is monitored by the U.S. Coast Guard fly the airplane,” Russell said. “You will speed will give the crew more time to pre-
and by most maritime vessels. have less capability of maneuvering the pare for ditching next to the ship.
airplane. You will be committed to land
Similar to transmitting an “any-station” and to accept whatever you hit.” The minimum-sink speed may or may
call on 121.5 MHz, the crew can try to es- not be published in the FCOM.
tablish radio communication on Channel With power available, the flight crew is
16 with a SAR facility or someone in the better able to observe the water and select “For minimum sink speed, the manuals
area who can provide assistance and/or a good site for the landing. for the G-IV and G-V both tell you to
relay a message to ATC. fly at 1.25 times the stall speed with gear
“A power-on ditching gives us the ability to up and flaps full down,” Stanfield said.
“I always carried a marine-band radio maneuver the aircraft, to circle the landing “That is the airspeed that will give you
when I went hiking or hunting in Alaska site to size up the sea conditions,” Stanfield minimum forward speed and minimum
because there always were a lot of ships said. “If the pilot does not like what he sees sink at impact.”
in the area and a lot of small planes with on the approach, he can take the aircraft
VHF FM radios,” Lane said. “I knew that around and do it again. Power gives us a
if there was an emergency, there were a lot chance to make a successful ditching.” Setting Up for the Splash
of people monitoring Channel 16.”

Several FCOMs recommend that the

ELT be activated while the airplane is
If, however, all engines become silent in
flight, the U.K. CAA recommends that the
crew maintain the airspeed for best glide
T he ditching checklists for most busi-
ness airplanes recommend that the
crew prepare the passengers and the cabin
airborne. Many ELTs, however, transmit a performance and turn toward the nearest for ditching, but the checklists provide no
distress signal on 121.5 MHz, and all ELTs coast or toward a maritime vessel. details or few details on how to accom-
transmit a homing signal on 121.5 MHz. plish this. Few FCOMs include ditching
The 121.5 MHz signal will interfere with “Remember that a medium-size vessel is checklists for cabin crewmembers.
voice communication conducted on that the best choice to ditch near, since a large
frequency and might interfere with voice ship may take many miles to slow down,” A ditching checklist is essential for cabin
communication on adjacent frequencies. CAA said. “In any event, avoid landing preparations. The first item on the FSF
Therefore, after activating the ELT, the immediately in front [of a ship]; landing Airplane Cabin Crew Ditching Checklist
crew should check for interference with alongside and slightly ahead is better.” (page 39) is to obtain information from

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 37
 Di t c h i n g

the flight crew about the nature of the passengers on what they need to do to in- be responsible for yourself and know
emergency, how much time is avail- crease the likelihood of their survival can what actions to take,’” Coley said.
able to prepare the passengers and the help reduce the passengers’ anxiety.
cabin, and what signals (e.g., flashing The flight attendant then should tell the
“Seat Belts/No Smoking” sign, public- “The range of emotions is going to be in- passengers to remove their neckwear
address [PA] system announcements) credible,” Coley said. “By giving the pas- (ties, scarves, etc.), loosen their collars
will be given to brace for impact and to sengers information about the situation and don additional clothing, such as
evacuate the cabin.25 and engaging them in a safety briefing, sweaters, jackets, coats and hats. Even
the flight attendant can help the pas- if the passengers do not have to get into
“The pilots will have a lot going on in the sengers become mentally prepared and the water while evacuating the airplane,
cockpit, and if they do not provide the reduce the levels of these emotions.” they likely will get wet in the life raft; the
information, the flight attendant must extra clothing will help delay the onset
ask the questions,” said Coley. of hypothermia (see “Is There a Doctor
This Time, the Aboard the Life Raft?” page 187).
Breaking the news to the passengers typi- Passengers Will Listen
cally is the flight crew’s duty. Ken Burton, Nevertheless, do not overdo the clothing,
president of STARK Survival Co. and an
experienced water-survival instructor,
said that when the flight crew makes a PA
I f time permits, passenger preparation
should include a thorough review of
the information that was presented dur-
said Burton. Too many layers of clothing
will restrict movement, possibly hindering
the ability to assume the brace position or
system announcement to inform the pas- ing the preflight briefing. to exit the airplane. If the clothing becomes
sengers of the situation, they should help saturated by water, it likely will hinder the
instill confidence in the flight attendant “The regulations require a preflight brief- person’s ability to board the life raft.
by telling the passengers that the flight ing before an overwater flight, but how
attendant has been trained for this type of well people pay attention to the briefing Anything in the passengers’ possession
emergency and is taking charge of cabin is questionable,” said Bob Cohen, staff in- that could cause injury on impact — such
preparations for ditching.26 structor and quality-assurance instructor as eyeglasses, jewelry (including earrings),
for CAE SimuFlite.29 hearing aids, dentures and sharp objects
FSI teaches flight attendants to read a pre- carried in pockets (e.g., pens, keys) —
pared announcement if the crew asks them The passenger-briefing cards, which likely should be collected and stowed. Essential
to break the news to the passengers. Before were ignored during the preflight brief- items can be placed in the ditch bag.
doing so, the flight attendant should ad- ing, should be removed from the storage Burton said that eyeglasses can be tucked
just the cabin lights to full bright, to help areas and handed to the passengers (see away in socks (you might lose your shoes
attract the passengers’ attention and to pictograms, page 40). on impact, but not your socks).
improve visibility in the cabin.
Coley said that while rebriefing the pas- Some ditching checklists recommend
How the passengers react to the situa- sengers, the flight attendant should don telling passengers to remove their shoes
tion will vary considerably. The flight a life vest. This will reinforce the dem- before ditching, to prevent damaging the
attendant can expect disorientation, onstration for the passengers and also life rafts during evacuation. This recom-
anxiety, fear, uncertainty and/or anger. ensure that the flight attendant does not mendation, however, may be a holdover
Some passengers may panic; others may forget to don a life vest. from days gone by when the material
be immobilized by their plight.27 from which life rafts were constructed
The briefing should be sufficiently thor- was not as tough as it is today (see “Life
“You cannot make a general statement ough to enable the passengers to fend for Raft Evaluation: Pooling the Resources,”
about the emotional climate that can be themselves. The flight attendant should page 258).
expected in the cabin,” said Nora Marshall, ensure that all passengers know where
chief of the Survival Factors Division of the emergency equipment and survival “If you have seen pictures of the interior
the U.S. National Transportation Safety equipment are located and how to use of an airplane after a survivable emergency
Board Office of System Safety.28 “Usually, the equipment. landing, think about getting out of that
however, the passengers will listen to the airplane with bare feet,” said Russell. “You
flight attendant.” “The flight attendant must lay it on the want to have your shoes on. Unless you are
line and tell the passengers that ‘yes, I wearing shoes with stiletto-type high heels,
Providing specific information about the am here for your safety, but if some- your shoes will not rip the life raft.”
nature of the emergency and briefing thing happens to me, then you have to Continued on page 40

38 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Flight Safety Foundation

Airplane Cabin Crew Ditching Checklist
Preparation
 Obtain information from flight crew, as necessary: nature of emergency, time available
for preparation, signals for brace and evacuation.
 Adjust cabin lights to bright.
 Distribute passenger-briefing cards.
 Conduct safety briefing.
 Instruct passengers to remove neckwear, loosen collars and don additional clothing, as
necessary.
 Collect and stow personal items.
 Reposition passengers and assign buddies, as necessary.
 Rebrief able-bodied passengers, as necessary.
 Show passengers which exits they are likely to use.
 Ensure that all passengers have donned life vests and caution them not to inflate their
life vests until they are outside the aircraft.
 Ensure that passenger seats are upright and seat belts are fastened correctly.
 Ensure that passengers understand instructions.
 Distribute anti-seasickness medication; ensure that all occupants take the medication.
 Prepare ditch bag.
 Stow loose items; secure doors/dividers.
 Ensure that emergency equipment is accessible and secured.
 Ensure that exits are unobstructed.
 Advise flight crew that cabin has been prepared for ditching; remind pilots to don life
vests.
 Prepare yourself; conduct silent review.
Before Ditching
 Shout “brace” upon receiving signal from flight crew.
After Ditching
 Upon receiving evacuation signal from flight crew or if no evacuation signal is received
after aircraft has come to a stop, check emergency exits, secure life raft mooring/
inflation lines at exits and organize passengers for evacuation.
 Open usable exits.
 Push life rafts onto wing and evacuate passengers; confirm deployment of life rafts.
 Confirm life vests inflated, board life rafts and conduct roll call. Coordinate with aircraft
captain to cut life raft mooring/inflation line, as appropriate.
 onfirm that life raft ELT is activated.
CHECKLIST

 If life rafts are unavailable, use line to connect all survivors in a single group.
Note: This information, which focuses on transport category turbine airplanes with flight attendants aboard during
overwater operations, was assembled for discussion of ditching procedures and is not intended to supersede
operators’ or manufacturers’ requirements or recommended procedures.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 39
 Di t c h i n g

Enlisting Able-bodied
1 2 Passengers

F light attendants are trained to select “able-

bodied passengers” (ABPs) to assist in emer-
gencies. In addition to providing assistance during
evacuation, if the crew is killed or incapacitated
during a ditching, the ABPs would have to take
charge of the evacuation, deploy the life rafts and
assist the passengers in getting into the life rafts.

Flight attendants aboard corporate/business

airplanes have a much greater opportunity than
3 4 airline flight attendants to know their passengers,
and they can use their knowledge of the passen-
gers’ backgrounds when selecting ABPs.

“Generally, the guidelines are to select those with

experience in the military, law enforcement, emer-
gency medical service or fire safety — experience
in any industry in which you are accustomed to
dealing with emergency situations,” Coley said.
“There is a small enough crowd in a corporate jet
that you can have conversations with the passen-
gers and get a feel for who is more likely to react in
5 6 a positive way in the event of an emergency.”

Although a person might appear to be a good can-

didate to assist in an emergency, he or she might
not be willing or able to help.

“You must ask people if they will help,” Coley said.

“And it is OK if someone says they do not want to,
because they are not going to be any good to you.”

The flight attendant should ask passengers seated

next to the emergency exits if they want to be
seated there and if they are capable of operating
7 8 the exits. If not, the seats should be reassigned to
ABPs, and the ABPs should be re-briefed on the
operation of the emergency exits and the location
and operation of the life rafts.

If other seats near the emergency exits are vacant,

passengers should be moved to them. Family mem-
bers — and others with emotional ties — should
be seated near each other.

Burton recommends that obese passengers be

seated in aft-facing seats, if possible, because they
A passenger-briefing card with pictorial instructions cannot bend over far enough to assume a proper
reinforces a verbal briefing. brace position. If obese passengers are seated in
forward-facing seats, they could receive internal

40 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

injuries when their torsos are compressed said FSI’s Stanfield. “So, we want to brief One item that is on none of the ditching
on impact. the passengers on the exits.” checklists reviewed for this article — but
should be on all of them — is an FAA
The flight attendant then should ensure recommendation to have all occupants
Who’s Your Buddy? that all passengers have properly donned take anti-seasickness medication (unless
their life vests, that they have their seat specifically medically inappropriate) be-

A ny passenger who might require

assistance during the evacuation
— nonswimmers, children, elderly pas-
belts fastened tightly across their laps and
that their seat backs are upright.
fore the airplane reaches the water.31
Anti-seasickness medications require
some time — typically, 30 minutes — to
sengers, handicapped passengers, etc. Some ditching checklists recommend take effect.
— should be paired with a “buddy” who that soft items — such as pillows, blan-
can render that assistance. kets, extra clothing, etc. — should be dis- “One thing that happens to almost ev-
tributed to passengers with instructions erybody who is in a life raft on anything
“If there are children aboard, I am going to place the items in front of their faces but calm seas is that they get sick,” Russell
to pair them with adults,” Coley said. “If and torsos when they are told to assume said.
there is a child aboard with his mother, the the brace position.
mother is, of course, going to be responsi- Anti-seasickness (anti-emetic) medi-
ble for the child, but I might ask [another] Burton said that this is especially im- cations are useless when taken after a
passenger to keep an eye on them during portant for obese passengers or disabled person becomes nauseated. Vomiting
the ditching and evacuation.” will cause dehydration, a hazard to
survival. One caveat to consider is that

K
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-70, most anti-emetic medications induce
Oceanic Operations, includes the fol- drowsiness; however, some sources say
nowledge
lowing recommendations for pairing that the body’s increased production of
passengers: “Older persons should be of the passengers’ adrenaline during a ditching will over-
paired with able-bodied men [any ABP come the drowsiness.
willing to help] to assist them. Children strengths and
and nonswimmers should be paired
with swimmers whenever possible; ex- weaknesses will help Scavenging the Cabin
perienced swimmers should be paired
in pairing them.
with more dependent persons.”

Knowledge of the passengers’ strengths

I f time permits, the flight attendant
should finish assembling the ditch
bag, adding essential items carried
and weaknesses will help in pairing them. passengers seated in forward-facing seats, aboard by the passengers, such as pre-
Nevertheless, questions might have to to limit compression of their torsos on scription medications, cash, credit cards,
be asked, such as: “Who cannot swim?” impact. passports and other personal identifi-
Those who cannot swim should be paired cation (which likely will be useful after
with those who can swim; however, the FAA, however, says that “pillows and being rescued and transported ashore
nonswimmers should be reassured that blankets provide little, if any, energy or to a ship).
their life vests will keep them afloat and absorption … increase the possibility of
that swimming skills are not necessary secondary impact injury [and] could cre- Blankets, extra clothing, soft drinks, food,
for evacuation. ate additional clutter in the aisles, which utensils, paper cups, plastic bags, soap,
could be a detriment in an emergency toilet paper, paper towels — anything that
After the passengers are seated and evacuation.”30 can be scavenged from the cabin, galley,
assigned buddies, they should be lockers and lavatory that might be useful
shown which exits they likely will use Before turning his/her attention to for survival — should be included in the
during evacuation, as well as alternate the cabin, the flight attendant should ditch bag.
exits. The primary exits likely are the ensure that the passengers have under-
overwing exits, with the cabin doors stood all of the instructions. The flight “The life rafts likely have rations and
as alternates. attendant should solicit questions other items, but why leave behind a good
and ask questions, such as “Where is first aid kit, bottled water and anything
“The bottoms of the front door and/or your alternate exit?” and “Who is your else that can supplement what’s aboard
rear door could be under the water line,” buddy?” the life raft?” said Stanfield.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 41
 Di t c h i n g

Preparing the Life Rafts

S ome ditching checklists recommend that

life rafts be removed from their storage
areas and secured with seat belts to empty
seats near the emergency exits, so that they
are readily available.

Burton said that this is a good procedure

because a life raft might be difficult to re-
move from its storage area. Normal cabin-
pressurization cycles tend to cause a life raft
to swell, he said. If the life raft is packed in
a nonflexible container, there should be no
problem; but if the life raft is packed in a
valise (“soft pack”), the swelling could cause
difficulty in extracting the life raft from its
storage compartment.

“It’s difficult enough to get a life raft out; it is

a tight fit as it is,” Burton said. “And over time,
the life raft swells. In many aircraft, life rafts
are carried in closets. If you close the door and
To remove or not The flight attendant should keep in mind, how- leave it in there, you’re not going to get it out.
to remove life rafts ever, that the ditch bag must fit through the
from storage before emergency exit and be able to float. Ken Burton “Someone will say, ‘Well, I could take the ‘crash
ditching — a subject of recommends that if a purpose-made ditch bag ax’ and chop the closet open.’ I would say, ‘Be
debate among safety
is not available, the items should be distributed my guest. The airplane is sinking.’ The average
among several small ditch bags. Durable (heavy- time for an aircraft to float after a ditching is six
specialists.
duty or industrial-grade) plastic trash bags that minutes.”
can be knotted or tied off in such a way that they
trap air and can float are suitable containers. Burton said that another reason to remove life
rafts from storage before ditching is that impact
Any loose items remaining in the cabin — and in damage might trap the life rafts inside the storage
the cockpit — should be collected and stowed in compartments.
the lavatory and storage compartments to pre-
vent them from becoming projectiles and injur- “Most life rafts fit so snugly into the areas where
ing the occupants during the ditching. Doors they are stored that, if the fuselage warps and
and dividers should be locked to prevent them compresses the storage area, there’s a great pos-
from opening. sibility that the life rafts cannot be extracted,” he
said. “The doors that enclose the life raft may not
Anything stowed in the lavatory and storage open.
compartments likely will not be accessible after
ditching. The doors and dividers may become “There was an issue with the Gulfstream III that
warped and immovable. Crews of large military went into Lac le Bourget in France about five years
airplanes ditched during World War II said that ago: The flight attendant could not get the life raft
equipment stowed in the rear of the airplanes out from under the seat.”33
often could not be retrieved because of in-
rushing water.32 They said that their airplanes Burton said that if all seats are occupied, the life
tended to flood quickly, and water either cov- rafts should be secured to the forward bulkhead,
ered equipment laid out for salvage or washed which is not likely to deform on impact. Ditch bags
it into the tail (see “Lessons From Another Era,” should be secured to empty seats, the bulkhead or
page 9). to the life raft mooring/inflation lines.

42 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

After the life rafts are removed from stor- taken and what safety procedures remain involve flying low over the water at an air-
age and secured, a common recommen- to be taken, said Coley. speed just above stall and making slight
dation is to secure the mooring/inflation heading changes to position the airplane
lines to the designated tethering points for touchdown parallel to a swell or on the
or to seat structures. Burton says that Cockpit Preparations back side of a swell.
the mooring/inflation lines should
not be secured until after the airplane
has been ditched, because the life rafts
might have to be moved to alternate exits,
S everal ditching checklists recommend
that the flight crew pull the circuit
breakers for the landing-gear-warning
The Learjet 55 FCOM says that having
minimum fuel remaining in the tanks af-
ter a ditching will improve the airplane’s
which will take precious seconds. He said system and the ground-proximity warn- buoyancy on the water.
that some mooring/inflation lines have ing system (GPWS) or terrain awareness
clips that can be secured quickly to the and warning system (TAWS)34 to reduce
tethering points. unnecessary warnings. Setting the Altimeter

Nevertheless, many inflation/mooring

lines do not have clips, and the end must
Nevertheless, the crew might want to
keep the GPWS/TAWS on line if it is the W hen the airplane is at or below
2,000 feet, the crew should set
the radar-altimeter “bug” to 50 feet, if the
be tied to a seat belt, a seat attachment or only system aboard that provides altitude
other tethering point, which will require callouts. radio altimeter does not provide altitude
time, manual dexterity and basic knot- callouts, to provide an additional indica-
tying skill to ensure that the line does not “GPWS and EGPWS [enhanced GPWS] tion that impact is imminent.
become loose when most needed. altitude callouts can be very helpful in a
ditching situation, especially in helping One useful tip for civilian pilots, who
Several safety specialists recommend you time the flare if you cannot see the likely will not be able to obtain a local
that life rafts not be removed from stor- water,” said Don Bateman, chief engineer, altimeter setting from ATC when over
age until after the airplane comes to a Flight Safety Systems, Honeywell.35 the deep ocean, is the method that U.S.
stop on the water. For example, Stanfield Navy P-3 pilots are taught for setting the
said that instructors at FSI’s Savannah Bateman said that GPWS/TAWS equip- barometric altimeter:
center adhere to the recommendation ment typically provides callouts at 500
on most Gulfstream ditching checklists feet, 100 feet, 50 feet, 40 feet, 30 feet and “One of the steps on our checklist is to
— that the life rafts be removed from 10 feet above the surface. With the land- match up our barometric altimeter to our
storage after the airplane has been ing gear retracted, the equipment also radio altimeter,” said Miller. “We have a
ditched. will provide continuous warnings such radio altimeter on both the pilot’s and
as “too low, gear” unless there is a mode copilot’s sides, and they begin working
“The reason we do not recommend re- selector that allows the crew to deselect at 5,000 feet.”
moving life rafts from their storage areas the gear warnings.
beforehand is that they might become The flight crew also can set the baromet-
flying objects inside the cabin,” Stanfield Most business-jet ditching checklists ric altimeter to a GPWS/TAWS altitude
said. “Removing the life rafts is a crew are predicated on the assumption that callout.
duty following ditching.” the crew is conducting a ditching with
power, and they recommend that the fuel
After preparations have been completed, load be reduced to a minimum before
the flight attendant should tell the captain
that the cabin and passengers are ready
for the ditching and evacuation. If the
ditching.

The Gulfstream V checklist, for example,

T he crew

pilots have not yet donned their life vests, says, “Plan the descent and ditching to should ensure that
the flight attendant should remind them ensure minimum fuel remaining but
to do so. ample fuel aboard to make a controlled, sufficient fuel remains to
power-on landing.”
The flight attendant then should prepare conduct the descent and
herself/himself for ditching (by remov- The crew should ensure that sufficient fuel
ing and stowing jewelry, etc.), take a seat, remains to conduct the descent and the the approach.
assume the brace position and conduct approach, and to maneuver the airplane
a silent review of what steps have been for landing. The maneuvering likely will

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 43
 Di t c h i n g

Some airplanes have specific equipment that

must be prepared before ditching. The following
are examples:

• The Airbus A319 has a “ditching pushbutton”

that closes the outflow valve, emergency ram
air inlet, skin air inlet/outlet valves and pack
flow-control valves.

• The no. 2 pressurization outflow valve in the

Bombardier Global Express must be closed
before any takeoff near a body of water
when the airplane is above maximum land-
ing weight.

• The Cessna Citation Excel, Citation Sovereign

and Citation X have a “water barrier” (photo,
right) that must be attached to the frame
around the bottom of the cabin door to
prevent water from entering the cabin if the
door is used for evacuation. (The ditching
checklists for the Citations say, “If possible,
the main cabin door should remain closed
and evacuation [should be] made through
the emergency [overwing] exit. However,
the water barrier will allow use of the cabin
door as an additional egress route.”)

• The Dassault Falcon 10 and Falcon 20 have

cabin-door ditching latches that must be en-
gaged; opening the cabin door on the water
is prohibited.

• The Falcon 50 has a “ditching handle” that

closes the auxiliary power unit (APU) air
inlet and prevents water from entering the
airplane.

Sizing Up the Sea Conditions

P ilots are accustomed to landing into the wind.

Before a ditching, however, there is a more im-
portant factor to consider — moving mountains
of water called swells.

The flight crew should observe swell movement

and select a ditching heading that will avoid strik-
ing a swell head-on.

“Selection of a good ditching heading may well To use the cabin door as an additional exit after a ditching in some Cessna
minimize damage and could save your life,” the Citations, the crew must remove a folded ‘water barrier’ (top) from storage
AIM says.36 “It can be extremely dangerous to and install it around the cabin door (middle and bottom).

44 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

land into the wind without regard to sea “At this altitude, the relatively regular pat- and the other three feet [one meter high],
conditions; the swell system or systems tern of the predominant system stands plan to land parallel to the primary sys-
must be taken into consideration.” out in clear relief,” says the FCOM for tem and on the downswell of the second-
the U.S. Coast Guard HU-25 (military ary system. If both systems are of equal
Sea conditions are the product of com- version of the Falcon 20).38 “Note the height, a compromise may be advisable
plex processes.37 A swell can be defined compass heading from which the swell — select an intermediate heading at 45
generally as a form of wave that is caused front approaches.” degrees downswell to both systems.”
by a distant disturbance, such as a storm.
A swell appears as an undulation of the The selected ditching heading should (The AIM should be consulted for a more
sea surface and does not “break” (topple) make it possible to land the airplane thorough discussion of the complex is-
until close to shore. Swells created by two parallel to a swell — or, when surface sues and techniques associated with
or more distant disturbances and travel- wind velocity is very strong, to land the ditching.)
ing in different directions can be present; airplane on the back side of a swell. (The
the largest and most dominant swells are AIM says that regardless of the direction The HU-25 manual says, “A formidable
called primary swells, and the smaller of swell movement, the back side of a secondary swell system may necessitate a
swells are called secondary swells. swell is the side that is away from the heading downswell and partially down-
observer.) wind.”
Sea conditions also might include “wind
waves” — that is, waves caused by winds The AIM says that the size of consecu- The flight crew should determine the direc-
from a local storm or from a passing tive swells can vary considerably, but that tion and velocity of the surface winds. Swell
weather front. Wind waves can be su- swells more than 25 feet (eight meters) movement will provide no clue to this.
perimposed on the crests of swells and high, from crest to trough, are not com-
appear as whitecaps when they break. mon. The manual also says that in the “Swells, once set in motion, tend to
Wind can cause the waves to break with likely event that more than one swell maintain their original direction for
sufficient force onto a ship or airplane to system exits, sea conditions can become as long as they continue in deep water,
cause considerable damage. confusing. regardless of changes in wind direction,”
the AIM says.
If flight visibility is sufficient, the flight “One of the most difficult situations oc-
crew can begin evaluating sea conditions curs when two swell systems are at right Clues to wind direction and wind speed
when the airplane is about 2,000 feet or angles,” the AIM says. “For example, if can be found by observation of whitecaps,
higher above the surface. one system is eight feet [two meters] high streaks of foam and spray on the water.

Direction of
Swell Movement

BEST

GOOD
FAIR
GOOD

Landing parallel to the major swell is the preferred technique.

GOOD BAD!

SI DE FACE
BACK

Very strong winds may require landing across and on the back side of the swell.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 45
 Di t c h i n g

Nevertheless, the crew should understand are overrun by the waves, thus producing Some ditching checklists include guide-
what they are looking at. the illusion that the foam is sliding back- lines for determining wind speed based
ward. Knowing this, and by observing the on observing the sea. If such guidelines
“Some [pilots] may have difficulty de- direction of the streaks, the wind direction are not provided, the flight crew might
termining wind direction after seeing is easily determined. Wind velocity can be want to carry a copy of the Beaufort Scale
the streaks on the water,” the AIM says. estimated by noting the appearance of the (Table 1). Developed in 1806 by Francis
“Whitecaps fall forward with the wind but whitecaps, foam and wind streaks.” Beaufort, a U.K. Royal Navy officer, the

Table 1
Beaufort Wind Scale With Corresponding Sea State Codes

Wind Speed World

Meteorological Average Maximum Estimating Wind Speed by Sea
Kilometers Organization Wave Height, Wave Height, Effect of Wind on Waves State
Force Knots per Hour Wind Description feet (meters) feet (meters) Observed Far From Land Code

 0 Under 1 Under 1 Calm 0 (0) 0 (0) Sea like mirror. Calm. 0

 1 1–3 1–5 Light air 0.25 (0.1) 0.25 (0.1) Ripples with appearance of scales; no
foam crests.
 2 4–6 6–11 Light breeze 0.5 (0.2) 1 (0.3) Small wavelets; crests of glassy 1
appearance, not breaking.
 3 7–10 12–19 Gentle breeze 2 (0.6) 3 (1.0) Large wavelets; crests begin to break; 2
scattered whitecaps.
 4 11–16 20–28 Moderate breeze 3 (1.0) 5 (1.5) Small waves, becoming longer; 3
numerous whitecaps.
 5 17–21 29–38 Fresh breeze 6 (2.0) 8 (2.5) Moderate waves, taking longer form; 4
many whitecaps; some spray.
 6 22–27 39–49 Strong breeze 10 (3.0) 13 (4.0) Large waves forming; whitecaps 5
everywhere; more spray. Rough.
 7 28–33 50–61 Near gale 14 (4.0) 18 (5.5) Sea heaps up; white foam from 6
breaking waves begins to be blown in
streaks. Very Rough.
 8 34–40 62–74 Gale 18 (5.5) 25 (7.5) Moderately high waves of greater 6
length; edges of crests begin to break
into spindrift; foam is blown in well-
marked streaks.
 9 41–47 75–88 Strong gale 23 (7.0) 33 (10.0) High waves; sea begins to roll; dense 6
streaks of foam; spray may reduce
visibility. Very Rough.
10 48–55 89–102 Storm 29 (9.0) 41 (12.5) Very high waves with overhanging 7
crests; sea takes white appearance as
foam is blown in very dense streaks;
rolling is heavy and visibility reduced.
11 56–63 103–117 Violent storm 37 (11.0) 53 (16.0) Exceptionally high waves; sea covered 8
with white foam patches; visibility still
more reduced.
12 64–71 118 and over Hurricane/typhoon 45 (14.0) — Air filled with foam; sea completely 9
white with driving spray; visibility
greatly reduced. Phenomenal Waves.

Note: Wave heights are significant wave heights (the average of the highest one-third of the waves), assuming open water with no current or other
complicating factors. Statistically, one wave in one thousand will be almost twice as high as the maximum wave height.

Source: American Practical Navigator: An Epitome of Navigation, Nathaniel Bowditch, LL. D., Volume I, 1984 Edition.

46 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

scale has been adapted slightly over the years to The IAMSAR Manual provides this advice: “Never If you were flying, what
provide estimates of wind speed and wave height land into the face (or within 35 degrees of the face) would you estimate as
based on the appearance of the sea. of a primary swell unless the surface winds are your height over the
an appreciable percentage of the aircraft stalling water? (Turn page for a
U.S. Coast Guard C-130 pilots are taught to land speed in the ditching configuration.” better view.)
into the wind when wind velocity exceeds 30
knots.
A Lost Art
“The ‘Herc’ manual says that in high winds, it is
recommended that ditching be conducted upwind,
on the back side of a swell, to take advantage of
lowered forward speed,” said Lane. “The manual
T he U.S. National Search and Rescue Committee
(NSRC) recommends that pilots practice eval-
uating sea conditions during overwater flights.39
also says: ‘However, it must be remembered that
the possibility of ramming nose-on into a wave is “This ensures a tentative ditching heading at all
increased, as is the possibility of striking the tail times and provides practice in identifying swell
on a wave crest and nosing in.’” systems,” NSRC said. “In some ocean areas, there
are prevailing swells from a fairly constant di-
U.S. Coast Guard HU-25 pilots are taught to select rection. These conditions should be recognized
a ditching heading that is a compromise between regularly by pilots flying certain routes.”
landing parallel to the primary swell and landing
directly into the wind. This recommendation, however, might be practi-
cal only for pilots who routinely fly low over water
“If the wind exceeds 20 knots, select an intermedi- — U.S. Coast Guard C-130 pilots, for example.
ate heading by taking into consideration the wind
and the primary swell,” the HU-25 manual says. “When we are out on patrol, we try to evaluate sea
“The stronger the wind, the more the ditching conditions,” said Lane. “To help us get better at it,
heading should be into the wind. The higher the we check our observations by hailing a cutter or a
swell, the more the ditching heading should be commercial vessel on [maritime] Channel 16 and
parallel to the swell.” asking what they have for seas.”

The most important point to remember is that you On a typical ocean crossing in a business jet,
do not want to land into the face of a swell. high above the water, the crew is not going to see
enough to practice evaluating sea conditions.
“The last thing in the world you want to do
is to land head-on into a swell,” said Russell. “Evaluating sea conditions is an art that no one in
“Unless you have very strong winds that will civilian aviation practices anymore, except people
substantially slow down your landing speed, flying floatplanes down low — and even they do
flying into a swell would be like running into not conduct a lot of open-water landings,” Russell
a brick wall.” said. “When we were conducting open-water

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 47
 Di t c h i n g

(See photo, page 47.) landings in P-5Ms [Martin Marlins] in the Coast “Last week, I was flying an airplane at 2,000 feet
Guard, it took 25 [minutes] to 30 minutes to do over the Atlantic,” he said. “At that altitude, you
a good evaluation of sea conditions, because we should be able to determine where you want to put
would begin at a high altitude to look at the pri- the airplane down. We were about 200 miles [370
mary swells and then drop down to look at the kilometers] offshore, and I got to thinking that if
secondary swells.” we had a dual flameout, we would probably end
up in the drink. So I started looking, just out of
Russell said that primary swells can be observed curiosity. That was the first time I have done that
from as high as 5,000 feet and that secondary swells in 20 years of flying.”
can be observed from at and below 2,000 feet.
The flight simulators at FSI and CAE SimuFlite
Miller said, “Too high, it all kind of blends to- do not replicate sea conditions.
gether. Too low, it is really hard to tell what is
going on. Probably, a couple thousand feet is the “You can train pilots to conduct the procedure
best to evaluate sea conditions because you can down to impact, but you cannot put the airplane
distinguish the primary swell patterns.” in the water,” said SimuFlite’s Cohen. “The surface
shown in the simulator looks like water but does
Stanfield agrees that evaluating sea conditions not act like water. If you land with the gear up, as is
is not something that business-airplane pilots recommended by most procedures, the simulator
practice. acts as if you are scraping the ground. We really

48 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

cannot simulate sea conditions — the swells, et around and landed. The fire never did go out. Had
cetera — because there is just no way to know what they been over water, they might not have been able
a crew may encounter during a ditching.” to ditch before the tail came off.”

Although flight simulators typically do not simu-

late sea conditions, they likely are the best tool for Gear Up, Flaps Down
ditching training.

Lt. Chris Buckridge, HU-25 standardization officer A fter evaluating sea conditions and selecting a
ditching heading, the flight crew should de-
pressurize the airplane. If the cabin remains pres-
at the U.S. Coast Guard Aviation Training Center
in Mobile, Alabama, U.S., said that although HU- surized after ditching, opening the emergency exits
25 pilots regularly conduct ditching drills in flight, and/or door could be impossible or dangerous.
the best practice they get is in the simulator.40
“If you try to open a door, especially one that
“The simulator gives them a realistic feel for a opens inward first and then out, you might be
ditching because we can fly them down to the trapped inside,” said SimuFlite’s Campbell. “If the
‘water,’ whereas when they do their ditching drills door opens outward, the air pressure just might
out in the field during recurrent training every six blow you out with it.”
months, they have to set a hard deck [i.e., go no
lower than] 2,000 feet or 3,000 feet,” he said. “The Miller said that another reason to depressurize the
simulator will ‘freeze’ when they hit the water, then airplane is to avoid an explosive decompression
we go through the post-ditching actions on the during the ditching.
emergency checklist, such as securing the engines,
pulling the T-handles to secure the flow of fuel and “Another step on the P-3 checklist has us close any
hydraulic fluid to the engines, deploying our ELT, of the holes that we opened to depressurize the
turning off our APU and batteries, and jumping aircraft before we hit,” he said.
out of the airplane.”
In a business airplane, the “holes” might include
Buckridge said that HU-25 pilots are presented ram-air valves, engine bleed valves and APU bleed
with several ditching scenarios in the simulator. valves.

“There are a variety of scenarios that instructor All the business-airplane ditching checklists reviewed
pilots can use, such as a dual engine flameout for this article recommend that the landing gear re-
because of bad fuel or bird ingestion, which re- main retracted. The FCOM for the Fanjet Falcon
quires a power-off ditching,” he said. “Among the provides the following explanation: “The landing
power-on ditching scenarios is that we develop a gear must be retracted because a landing-gear-down
fuel leak 400 miles [741 kilometers] from shore ditching would end [with] an abrupt dive.”
and we know that we do not have enough fuel to
get home. In this scenario, we have adequate time There are some specific exceptions to the use of
to set up for a good water entry. full flaps for ditching. The ditching checklist for
the Embraer Legacy, for example, says
“In other power-on ditching scenarios, we do not that in icing conditions, flaps should be

“T
have the luxury of time because of an electrical extended to 22 degrees, rather than the
fire or a cabin fire, and we must get the jet in the full 45 degrees.
water as quickly as possible.” he
Navy P-3 pilots are taught to use a partial
Buckridge said that flammable materials, such as flap setting if one engine or two engines simulator gives
smoke markers, are carried aboard HU-25s. on the same side of the airplane have
flamed out. them a realistic
“About two years ago, we had an airplane in the pat-
tern at Corpus Christi [Texas] International Airport “If we have all of our engines operating feel for a ditching.”
that had a rear-compartment-fire light illuminate,” and no unfavorable asymmetric condition,
he said. “The crew declared an emergency, came we would use full flaps,” Miller said. “If we

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 49
 Di t c h i n g

have any type of asymmetric handling problem, we hands below their buttocks or thighs (i.e., sit
will boost our speed a bit and stay a little cleaner by on them). He says that this reduces flailing of
using two-thirds flaps.” the arms during impact and the likelihood of
breaking bones. Burton stresses that the lap
The last item on the “Approach” section of the belt must be secured tightly across the hips, not
FSF ditching checklist is to ensure that the ELT across the abdomen, to avoid internal injury.
is activated.
Coley said that when the flight crew issues the sig-
nal to brace (verbal command or a flashing “Seat
Thirty-second Warning Belts/No Smoking” sign) or the flight attendant
observes that impact is imminent, the flight at-

A C 91-70 recommends that passengers be given a

two-minute warning before the ditching is con-
ducted. Stanfield says that passengers should not be
tendant should shout “brace.”

(In a ditching situation that involved very little

told to brace, however, until the airplane is 100 feet warning and time for preparation, “grab ankles”
above the water or about 30 seconds from impact. might be a more effective command than “brace”
if the procedure for taking a brace position was not
“A lot of us are not in the best physical explained or demonstrated to the passengers.)
shape these days,” he said. “When we take
a brace position, we are sitting down with

P a seat belt fastened and a life vest on; we

A Landing Like No Other
assengers are trying to hold a pillow over our face

should be told to
while bending over our knees. How long
can we stay in that position? The least
T he AIM recommends that when ditching with
power, the airplane should be flown low over
the water, about 10 knots above stall speed. Before
amount of time we have to be in that
touchdown, the wings should be trimmed to the
brace for at least position prior to impact, the better.”
surface of the water, rather than to the horizon,
two impacts.
to minimize the possibility of a wing striking the
Passengers should be told to brace for
water.
at least two impacts — the second of
which is likely to be more violent than
In an advisory publication on ditching, the Civil
the first — and that they should not
Aviation Safety Authority of Australia (CASA)
discontinue the brace position or release their seat
said, “Keep the wings parallel with the surface of
belts until the airplane has come to a stop.
the water on impact (i.e., wings level in calm con-
ditions). One wing tip striking the water first will
Various brace positions are recommended (see
cause a violent uncontrollable slewing action.”42
“Studies Reveal Passenger Misconceptions About
Brace Commands and Brace Positions,” page 51). The AIM says that a landing area 500 feet (153
The following are examples: meters) in length is sufficient for a ditching.

• FAA says that in airplanes with seats spaced “Select and touch down in any area … where shad-
relatively far apart (typical of business jets), ows and whitecaps are not so numerous,” the AIM
passengers in forward-facing seats should says. “Touchdown should be at the lowest speed
rest their heads and chests against their legs, and rate of descent which permit safe handling and
grasp their ankles or legs, or wrap their arms optimum nose-up attitude on impact.”
under their legs. Passengers in aft-facing seats
should rest their heads against the seat backs Several ditching checklists recommend that the
and either place their hands in their laps or pitch attitude be slightly higher than the normal
grasp the sides of their seats. Feet should be landing attitude. Some checklists recommend
placed flat on the floor and slightly ahead of specific nose-up pitch attitudes for touchdown.
the front edge of the seat.41 The Falcon 50 checklist, for example, says that
the pitch attitude should be between 11 degrees
• Burton recommends that passengers place their and 13 degrees.
arms (and elbows) inside the armrests and their Continued on page 56

50 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Studies Reveal Passenger Misconceptions

About Brace Commands and Brace Positions

Many study participants were unaware of what command to expect before assuming a brace position.
Some participants had inappropriate concepts of the proper brace position. These findings may be
related to the lack of specific communication provided to passengers in preflight oral and videotape
briefings, and on safety-information cards.

U
nanticipated survivable accidents improvements that have considerable Passengers hear various commands.
on landing or takeoff provide little or lifesaving potential, the ETSC recom- In a recent study,4 several airlines were
no time to give passengers special mended that three-point lap-and-shoulder asked what commands their crewmem-
instructions regarding brace positions. Yet harnesses, rather than standard lap belts, bers would give passengers before an
passengers who assume a correct protec- be provided for passengers. impending landing accident. Common
tive brace position have less likelihood of responses were: “brace”; “head down,
being injured during impact. The ETSC said, “If all passengers as- stay down”; and “grab your ankles.”
sumed the brace position prior to impact,
The U.S. National Transportation Safety the additional benefits of a three-point One airline said that the cockpit crew
Board (NTSB) identified several accidents shoulder harness would be small. would give the command “brace,” while
in which passengers who were in brace the cabin crew would give the command
positions sustained significantly less severe “In reality, however, for a variety of reasons, “head down, stay down.”
injuries than other passengers.1 occupants generally do not assume a
proper brace position, so a three-point lap- Commands that passengers expect to
One of the accidents involved a de and-shoulder harness would be likely to im- hear vary. In another study,4 a briefing
Havilland Canada Twin Otter, carrying 16 prove occupant protection substantially.” 3 card was shown to 84 adults and they
passengers and two crewmembers.2 The were asked what command they would
aircraft struck terrain during a nonprecision Two actions are needed to ensure that expect to hear when ordered to assume
instrument approach in instrument meteo- passengers will assume the best protec- one of the protective positions. The results
rological conditions. Most of the passengers tive position: are in Table 1.
were sleeping or reading and had no warn-
ing of the impending accident. One pas- • They must be told to assume a pro- Although “brace,” “head down, stay down”
senger, a 16-year-old male seated toward tective position; and, and “grab your ankles” are the only com-
the rear of the cabin, awoke, looked out mands the contacted airlines train their
a cabin window and saw that the aircraft • They must know the correct protec- crewmembers to give, only 24 percent of
was going to strike trees. tive position for their seat location. the 84 respondents said that they would

The passenger immediately lowered his Table 1

head and braced his arms and knees
against the seat back in front of him. He Expected Commands to Assume a
suffered a fractured leg and wrist, and a Protective Position in Aircraft Emergency
scalp wound when his seat broke loose
from the floor during the impact sequence. Expected Command Number (%)
He was the only survivor. “Get into an emergency [or crash] position” 44 (52)
“Head down” 14 (17)
One NTSB recommendation prompted by “Lean forward” or “crouch forward” 8 (10)
the accident was for air carrier-passenger “Brace” 6 (7)
preflight briefings to include reference to the “We’re going to crash” or “We’re going down” 4 (5)
appropriate emergency brace position. No idea what command to expect 3 (4)
“Assume proper position” 2 (2)
The value of proper bracing in accident
Other 3 (4)
survival recently was reaffirmed by the
Total 84
European Transport Safety Council (ETSC).
In a report identifying impact-protection Source: Daniel Johnson, Ph.D.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 51
 Di t c h i n g

expect to hear “head down” or “brace.” Table 2

None said that they would expect to hear
“grab your ankles.” Perceived Emergency Condition
Upon Hearing “Brace” Command
Thus, the commands that passengers
Experienced Inexperienced Total
expect to hear and the commands that
Expected Condition Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)*
crewmembers are trained to give appar-
ently are not the same. Crash landing 26 (76) 10 (59) 36 (71)
Turbulence 3 (9) 1 (6) 4 (8)
Passenger expectations vary when the Bumpy landing 2 (6) 1 (6) 3 (6)
command “brace” is given. Another study Unsure/other 3 (9) 5 (29) 8 (16)
explored what emergency condition pas-
Total 34 17 51
sengers would believe existed if crewmem-
bers told them to “brace.” Two interviewers *Percentages do not total 100 because of rounding.
questioned a total of 51 people. Source: Daniel Johnson, Ph.D.

Among the 51 respondents, 34 (67 Knowledge of appropriate brace positions other SAE position shows the adult’s
percent) flew regularly as passengers. varies. The 51 respondents then were head against the arms and the arms
These relatively experienced passengers shown a side view of three empty seats against a seat back or bulkhead.
had flown an average of five flights in placed front to back, with a bulkhead in (There was no requirement for the
the two years preceding the survey. The front of the most-forward seat. They were drawing to show a seat belt.)
experienced group included 21 men (62 asked to imagine that they had boarded
percent) and 13 women (38 percent), with an aircraft and had not looked recently at a • A drawing was judged to be inappro-
an average age of 32 years. safety video or briefing card showing protec- priate if the figure was sitting upright
tive positions. They were asked to draw the or had the arms and/or legs extended
The 17 respondents (33 percent) who positions that they would try to assume if straight out (Figure 3, page 54). Some
were relatively inexperienced airline pas- they were in the front seat with the bulkhead respondents drew figures crouching
sengers included 14 men (82 percent) and directly in front of them; in a seat with another on the floor or kneeling on the seat
three women (18 percent), and had an seat directly in front; and in any of the seats facing aft; these drawings also were
average age of 45 years. and holding an infant. judged to be inappropriate.

An interviewer told each respondent the The respondents were told that drawing a • For drawings of an adult hold-
following: stick figure — showing head, arms, trunk ing an infant, a position judged
and legs — would be adequate. The inter- appropriate for purposes of this
“Assume that you are in an aircraft com- viewers discussed the completed draw- study required only that the adult
ing in for a landing. It’s nighttime, and ings with each respondent to ensure that be bent forward and that the infant
you can’t see anything outside. There the interviewers understood what was be held on the adult’s lap (Figure
are other passengers aboard, but you depicted. 4, page 54). Acceptable variations
are not traveling with any friends or rela- included having the adult’s arms
tives. You are near the ground but still in The appropriateness of the brace posi- around the infant, under the adult’s
the air when you suddenly hear over the tions depicted in the drawings then was legs or folded over the adult’s head.
loudspeaker the command ‘brace, brace!’ judged using the following criteria: (An unrestrained infant cannot be held
Describe what you think is happening.” safely in many accidents. Because
• A drawing was judged appropriate if infants are allowed to travel unre-
As shown in Table 2, about 70 percent of the depicted position corresponded strained in air carrier aircraft, however,
the respondents said that they thought a with one of the two brace positions some positions are safer — at least
crash landing was about to occur. Among included in an industry standard for the adult — than others.)
the other respondents, about half said that developed by SAE International.5
they thought either turbulence or a bumpy One of these positions shows an The results are shown in Table 3, page
landing was about to occur, and half said that adult bent forward at the waist, with 54.
they were not sure what was happening. hands around or under the legs,
and feet planted firmly on the floor A greater proportion of the experienced
Thus, approximately 30 percent of the beneath the knees (Figure 1, page passengers among the respondents drew
respondents would not have realized, if 53). Acceptable variations for this positions for the three seat conditions that
the command “brace” were given, that study included having the hands in were judged appropriate than did the
an emergency landing or an accident was front of the legs, or over or in front respondents who were inexperienced
about to occur. of the head (Figure 2, page 53). The passengers.

52 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Figure 1 not significant. Thus, the • Crew commands to assume a brace

experienced passengers position during an unanticipated ac-
SAE Recommended Brace Positions apparently did not learn more cident on landing or takeoff are not
or remember more than the always the commands passengers
4 inexperienced passengers would expect to hear. Expected
about the appropriate brace commands are probably more
3 1 position for any of the seat easily understood than unexpected
1 conditions. commands;
3
4
Only about half of the re- • One-third of the respondents indi-
2 2 spondents drew an appro- cated that the command “brace”
5 priate brace position for any does not communicate the message
of the three conditions. that an accident with possible impact
5
6 forces is imminent. Whether other
If Seatback or Bulkhead One limitation of these stud-
If Seatback or Bulkhead commands such as “head down, stay
Is Beyond Reach Is Within Reach
ies is that what people say down” or “grab your ankles” would be
1 Push back into seat 1 Push back into seat
they would do in a situation more effective is questionable; and,
2 Tighten safety belt 2 Tighten safety belt
3 Lean forward, 3 Fold arms together, is not necessarily what they
chest against legs lean forward, arms
4 Head down against seat back actually would do, espe- • Only about half of the protective
5 Arms around or 4 Head against arms cially if there are physical positions drawn by respondents
behind legs 5 Feet firmly on the floor
6 Feet firmly on the floor or time constraints limiting were judged to be appropriate.
their intended actions. A Some of the other drawings de-
Source: SAE International
few respondents said that picted positions — such as get-
they would huddle on the ting out of the seat — that would
The percentages of experienced pas- floor or kneel over an infant put the passengers at greater risk.
sengers’ drawings judged appropriate on the seat — actions that time probably The most common unsafe position
were: front seat, 53 percent; other seat, would prohibit. depicted was sitting upright rather
59 percent; and infant-in-arms, 44 per- than bent forward. One person
cent. The percentages of inexperienced The study did not account for the effect of stated emphatically that placing
passengers’ drawings judged appropri- actions by others on an individual’s behavior. one’s head against a stationary ob-
ate were: front seat, 29 percent; other For example, respondents who said that ject such as a bulkhead or seat back
seat, 41 percent; and infant-in-arms, they would do nothing after hearing the would be unsafe. The reason for this
18 percent. command “brace” actually might imitate misconception is not clear; perhaps
passengers who were in a brace position. it arises from equating aircraft travel
Statistical (chi-square) analysis showed to motor-vehicle travel, where sitting
that the difference in the proportions of After taking these limitations into account, upright is an approved behavior. This
appropriate drawings by the experienced however, the following conclusions may body position, however, is unsuitable
and the inexperienced passengers was still be drawn: for air carrier travel because of the

Figure 2
Representations of Test Subjects’ Illustrations of Brace Positions Judged to Be Appropriate

Source: Daniel Johnson, Ph.D.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 53
 Di t c h i n g

Figure 3
Representations of Test Subjects’ Illustrations of Brace Positions Judged to Be Inappropriate

Source: Daniel Johnson, Ph.D.

Figure 4 command that passengers will hear;

and,
Representations of Test Subjects’ Illustrations of
Brace Positions of Adult Holding Infant • Although most passenger-safety-
information cards show at least one
protective position, they do not tell
passengers what command they will
hear.

An industry-wide effort should be made

to increase passenger understanding of
when and how to assume effective pro-
tective positions.

The first task is to standardize a pro-

tective-position command that is read-
ily understandable and easy to follow.
Commands such as “grab your ankles”
may be easy to understand but difficult
Note: An unrestrained infant cannot be held safely in many accidents. For test purposes, the to follow because of cabin space limita-
illustration at left was judged appropriate because it provides some protection for the adult; tions. The command “brace” is ambigu-
the illustration on the right was judged inappropriate. ous. The command should be directive
Source: Daniel Johnson, Ph.D. (“lean forward, head down, stay down,”
for example). The command should be
lack of shoulder harnesses and air
bags in aircraft cabins.
Table 3
Uncertainty regarding the appropriate
brace position may result from the fol- Correctness of Brace Position Drawings
lowing communication problems: Front Seat Other Seat Infant-in-arms
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
• Flight attendants generally do not
Correct 23 (45) 27 (53) 18 (35)
refer to the brace position in their
preflight briefings; Upright (incorrect) 15 (29) 19 (37) 21 (41)
Other (incorrect) 2 (18) 1 (2) 2 (4)
• Some preflight safety videos do No idea (incorrect) 4 (8) 4 (8) 10 (20)
not depict the protective positions.
Total 51 51 51
Videos that do show the appropri-
ate positions often fail to mention the Source: Daniel Johnson, Ph.D.

54 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Postaccident U.K. Research Yields Recommended Passenger Brace Position

C
abin Crew Safety presented a Air Accidents Investigation Branch following description of the recom-
1995 report by the U.K. Civil (AAIB). “The no. 1 engine operated mended brace position for passen-
Aviation Authority (CAA) that apparently normally after the initial gers in forward-facing seats aboard
recommended a brace position that re- period of severe vibration and during large airplanes:
duces the potential for the passenger’s the subsequent descent.”
arms and legs to flail during impact.6 • “UPPER BODY: Should be bent
The recommended brace position The B-737 was 2.4 miles (3.8 kilo- forward as far as possible with
came from research commissioned meters) from the runway when the the chest close to the thighs
by the CAA after an accident involving no. 1 engine lost power. The aircraft and knees, with the head touch-
a Boeing 737-400 on Jan. 8, 1989. struck the ground short of the runway ing the seat-back in front. The
and then underwent a second, major hands should be placed one
The B-737, operated by British impact on a highway embankment. on top of the other and on top
Midland Airways on a scheduled Of the 126 occupants, 39 were killed of the head, with the forearms
flight from London to Belfast, was in the accident, eight died later from tucked in against each side of
climbing through 28,300 feet when their injuries, 74 survived with serious the face. Fingers should not be
one fan blade in the no. 1 engine injuries and five sustained minor or interlocked.
separated and damaged the engine. no injuries.
The engine began to surge and • “LEGS: The lower legs should be
vibrate. The flight crew mistakenly The investigation revealed that the po- inclined aft of the vertical [that is,
shut down the no. 2 engine and then sitions the passengers were in during angled behind the knee joints]
diverted to East Midlands Airport in the initial impact appeared to have had with the feet placed flat on the
Kegworth, England. a significant effect on the type and floor.”
severity of their injuries. Many pas-
“The shuddering caused by the sengers were seriously injured when The CAA also recommended that pas-
surging of the no. 1 engine ceased their legs flailed against seat backs sengers wear their seat belts as tight
as soon as the no. 2 engine was and luggage-restraint bars. as possible and as low on the torso
throttled back, which persuaded the as possible. 
crew that they had dealt correctly Based on research performed after
with the emergency,” said the U.K. the accident, the CAA provided the — FSF Editorial Staff

tested to determine whether passengers to the company, which designs, tests and Rate in Aircraft Accidents: Impact
will understand it. produces safety cards for corporate, do- Protection, Fire Survivability and
mestic and international operators.] Evacuation. Brussels, Belgium,
The command should be printed on December 1996, as reported in
safety-information cards and presented References Cabin Crew Safety Volume 33
in passenger-safety videos. (January-February 1998).
1. U.S. National Transportation Safety
Finally, flight attendants should instruct Board. Safety Recommendations 4. Study was performed by the author.
passengers to read the passenger-safety A-79-76 through A-79-78.
cards and the information on protective Recommendations to the U.S. 5. SAE International. Recommended
positions, as recommended nearly two Federal Aviation Administration. Brace Positions. Aerospace
decades ago by the NTSB.  October 1979. Information Report 4771. 1995.

— Daniel Johnson, Ph.D. 2. U.S. National Transportation Safety 6. Koenig, Robert L. “U.K. Studies
Board. Downeast Airlines, Inc. De Find that ‘Legs-back’ Brace
[FSF editorial note: This article has been Havilland DHC-6-200, N68DE, Position Is Optimal for Forward-
reprinted from Cabin Crew Safety Volume Rockland, Maine [U.S.], May 30, facing Passengers.” Cabin Crew
33 (May–June 1998). Daniel Johnson, 1979. NTSB-AAR-80-5. May 12, Safety Volume 30 (November-
Ph.D., is a licensed psychologist and a 1980. December 1995): 1–4.
certified professional ergonomist. He has
retired as president of Interaction Research 3. European Transport Safety
Corp. and currently serves as an advisor Council. Increasing the Survival

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 55
 Di t c h i n g

The sight picture during approach to a water land- out the windshield, the pilot will see vital infor-
ing will be much different than the sight picture mation on the HUD, such as airspeed and radio
during an approach to a runway. altitude, and symbology that will help him or
her to fly a three-degree glide path to the water.
“Most people will not have experienced many An enhanced vision system (EVS) might be an
landings without an undercarriage,” CASA said. additional benefit in providing an infrared im-
“Thus, you will be used to seeing a particular at- age of the sea.
titude at the round-out [flare]. In the ditching case,
that attitude will be a little different because the Without these enhancements, the crew’s best option
aeroplane should be a little bit closer to the surface is to maintain a power setting and a pitch attitude
to [compensate] for the lack of an undercarriage. that result in the slowest possible rate of descent and
You will need to make some allowance for that. airspeed — and fly the airplane onto the water.
This is where a powered approach can be most
beneficial, because you can use power to control “Glassy seas are almost as bad as — maybe even
that final descent onto the water.” worse than — rough seas, because it is so difficult
to judge your altitude,” said Russell. “On a dark
For most pilots, a ditching will be a landing like night, you are not going to see anything. You have
no other they have conducted. The landing surface to fly the last stage off the radio altimeter, because
will be moving. that is your best indication of altitude.

“It is going to be an experience that the pilot has “With a glassy sea below or on a dark night, what
never had before,” Russell said. “If there is any you want to do is to set up a minimum rate of
wave action, the landing surface will appear to be descent at the slowest possible airspeed — you do
moving; the normal sight picture on approach [to not want to stall in, you want to stay just on the
a runway] is that the landing surface is stable. It is edge of a stall — and just fly it into the water.”
a different visual picture.”
Lane said that the U.S. Coast Guard C-130 manual
The AIM recommends that if no power is available, recommends the following procedures for a night-
the crew should maintain an airspeed on approach time ditching:
that is higher than the normal approach speed.
• “Make an instrument approach, holding
“This speed margin will allow the glide to be airspeed 20 knots above stall speed;
broken early and more gradually, thereby giving
the pilot time and distance to feel for the surface • “At 500 [feet] to 700 feet above the water (use
— decreasing the possibility of stalling radio altimeter if available), set up approxi-
high or flying into the water.” mately a 200-feet-per-minute rate of descent
and establish an airspeed 10 knots above stall

T he landing
Depth perception will be impaired during
an approach in instrument meteorologi-
cal conditions or nighttime conditions
speed with gear up and wing flaps 100 percent
[fully extended];

surface will — or during an approach to a calm sea. • “Use landing lights as necessary;
These conditions will increase the risk of
be moving. flying the airplane into the water at too • “Hold wings level to avoid digging a wing
great a speed or descent rate, or stalling into the water and cartwheeling the airplane;
the airplane too high above the surface. [and,]

“Over glassy smooth water, or at night without • “Land at 10 knots above power-off stall speed
sufficient light, it is very easy for even the most with gear up and 100 percent flaps.”
experienced pilots to misjudge altitude by 50 feet
or more,” the AIM says. Recommendations vary on the use of landing
lights at night. Most business-jet FCOMs say that
If the airplane is equipped with a head-up display landing lights should be used at night. The Hawker
(HUD), the crew should use it. While looking FCOMs include a caveat that landing lights should

56 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

be used unless mist causes reflected glare. This is the wings to the indicated artificial
similar to what Lane’s C-130 pilots are taught. horizon.”

“On a clear night, use the landing lights because

they will help your depth perception and help you
This mirrors recommendations in
the IAMSAR Manual — to maintain
A ditching

judge your rate of descent — but it won’t be until a descent rate of 300 feet per minute at night or in low-
you get real close that you will see your lights on or less and a pitch attitude of about
the surface,” Lane said. “If you are in the clouds, 10 degrees nose-up. visibility conditions
the lights could become more of a hindrance than
a help, so I would turn them off.” “Over smooth water or at night, [this is a ‘worst-case
procedure] minimizes the chance of
Russell said that some pilots have become disori- misjudging the altitude, stalling the scenario.’
ented while using landing lights during a night aircraft and entering the water in a
approach to a sea that is not calm. disastrous nose-down attitude,” the
manual said.
“Some people say it is disorienting because you
suddenly see the landing surface moving up and If automatic callouts are not provided by a GPWS/
down, which tends to add an element of fear.” TAWS, a “talking altimeter” or other device, the pilot
not flying should call out radio altitude every 100
The crew should consider using their taxi lights, feet from 1,000 feet to 100 feet, then every 10 feet.
rather than their landing lights, says Australia’s
CASA. Most FCOMs recommend closing the throttles just
before landing; some say that the throttle levers
“The very directional nature of landing lights should be moved to the “cut-off ” position. The
could cause confusion for the pilot, whereas the pilot flying then should place both hands on the
more general light provided by taxi lights may control yoke to avoid injury from uncommanded
prove more satisfactory,” CASA said. “If the air movement of the engine/propeller levers and to
is misty (a serious probability if there is blowing help maintain positive back pressure on the yoke
spray), the glare of external lights could upset to try to keep the nose up until the airplane has
your night vision and prove more of a hindrance come to a stop.
than a help.”
“One thing that we learned from [actual P-3]
ditchings is to let go of the power levers before
Worst-case Scenario impact,” Miller said. “We found that when the pro-
pellers hit the water, the control linkage causes the

M iller said that a ditching at night or in

low-visibility conditions is a “worst-case
scenario” that Navy P-3 pilots learn to deal with
power levers to go flying everywhere, and if you
have your hand on them, there’s the potential for
injury. So, we train that in the last 50 feet, when
in training. you are getting ready for impact, to have both
hands on the yoke.”
“We do simulated ditchings on at least half the
training flights,” he said. “We set a simulated hard Besides maintaining back pressure to keep the nose
deck for the water, typically no lower than 4,000 up, there is little the flight crew can do to control
feet because we are very near the stall region, the airplane after the first impact.
and we practice a visual technique, in which you
visually acquire the waves and the swells, and the “There will often be one or two minor touches
worst-case scenario, which is at night or in the — ‘skips’ — before the main impact with the wa-
clouds and you cannot see the swells. ter,” the CAA said. “This main impact will usually
result in considerable deceleration with the nose
“In the worst-case scenario, we practice an instru- bobbing downward and water rushing over the
ment technique. Basically, we slow down to about cowling and windshield. It may even smash the
10 knots above stall speed, minimize our rate of windshield, leading you to think that the aircraft
descent to about 100 feet per minute and level has submerged.”

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 57
 Di t c h i n g

Orderly, Organized and “If the aircraft floats for a while or sinks in shal-
Expeditious low water, the lights may continue operating and
provide a further sign of your position,” the CAA
said.
A fter the airplane comes to a stop on the water,
the most important task — for everyone — is
to get out of the airplane. The crew should assume Continued operation of the airplane’s electrical
that the airplane is sinking and get everyone out system and exterior lights, however, introduces
of the airplane before water begins to enter the the risk of inducing electrical current into the
cabin or cockpit. water — a condition that could be hazardous to
survivors during the evacuation.
“Once water begins rushing in, you are not going
to get out,” Burton said. “You will have to wait “Leaving the exterior lights on obviously would help
until the cabin is full of water to get out the exit. rescuers find the aircraft, but there is always the risk
Even with specialized training, this is likely to be that if the airplane has been damaged and you’ve
difficult or impossible for the typical corporate or got broken wires out there in the water, someone
Part 135 passenger.” could be electrocuted,” said Cohen. “And if a broken
wire is shorting out to the airframe somewhere and
If possible, the flight crew should there are sparks being produced, they might set fire
announce on the radio frequency in to any jet fuel that might be leaking.”

T
use that the airplane is on the water
and that the evacuation has begun. Richard Hill, program manager for aircraft cabin
he crew and fire safety at the FAA William J. Hughes
This will be useful information for
ATC and SAR personnel; but, again, Technical Center, said that the risk of jet fuel
should assume being ignited by an electrical arc is low but not
time is of the essence — the crew
should make one call and not wait nonexistent.43
that the airplane
for acknowledgement.
“Jet fuel is more difficult to ignite than a more
is sinking and get
Some checklists for turbine business volatile fuel such as aviation-grade gasoline,” Hill
airplanes include only one after- said. “It depends on several factors, such as the
everyone out.
ditching task for the flight crew: strength of the ignition source, the temperature of
evacuate. Others list a few tasks that the fuel and the proximity of the ignition source
the flight crew should perform, if pos- to the fuel. The ignition source could heat the jet
sible, before evacuating the airplane. They include fuel enough to produce vapor that could ignite.
the following: The odds are against the jet fuel igniting easily,
but it’s not impossible.”
• Ensure that the airplane is depressurized
before the emergency exits are opened. The
Boeing Business Jet checklist, for example, Don’t Count on Staying Afloat
says that this can be done by opening a cockpit
window;
I f the flight attendant does not receive a verbal
signal or a visual signal from the flight crew
to evacuate the airplane immediately after the
• Select the emergency-exit lights (which usu-
ally are powered by the emergency batteries) airplane comes to a stop, he or she should initiate
and command the evacuation; the evacuation.

• Pull the engine/APU fire handles, or push the Several ditching checklists say that the airplane, if
fire switches; and, not seriously damaged during the ditching, likely
will remain afloat long enough for evacuation
• Turn off the battery switches. to be completed. For example, the checklists for
several Citation models say, “Under reasonable
To increase the airplane’s conspicuity, however, the ditching conditions, the aircraft should remain
U.K. CAA recommends that the master switch and afloat an adequate time to launch and board life
external lights remain on. rafts in an orderly manner.”

58 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

The Boeing Business Jet ditching checklist says, airplane, then exit the airplane, too, and make
“The airplane may remain afloat indefinitely if certain everyone’s life vest is inflated.
fuel load is minimal and no serious damage was
sustained during landing.” The ditching checklists for the Gulfstream IV and
Gulfstream V, which have two overwing emergency
The FCOM for the Airbus A319 is more specific; it exits on each side of the cabin, recommend spe-
says that at a landing weight of 62,500 kilograms cific tasks for the captain, first officer and cabin
(137,788 pounds) and with the center of gravity at crewmember. The checklists say that the captain
40 percent mean aerodynamic chord, the airplane should do the following:
will float for six minutes, six seconds.
• Select all emergency lights;
Nevertheless, the crew should not count on the
airplane staying afloat. When the airplane begins • Remove life raft no. 1 from its stowed position,
to take on water, it will sink rapidly, and occupants secure the mooring/inflation
will not be able to evacuate with water gushing line to a seat belt and get the

O
through the emergency exits. life raft ready to be used;

“It is best to assume that you will have little time • Remove the forward emergency- ccupants
[and] evacuate the aeroplane quickly but in an exit window and deploy life raft
orderly and organized manner,” CASA says. “This no. 1 out the window; will not be able to
is best achieved if all the passengers and crew
evacuate with water
have been comprehensively briefed during the • Exit the airplane, follow the
descent phase prior to impact, so that everyone mooring/inflation line to the
gushing through the
knows what they have to do and what their life raft and board the life raft;
responsibilities are.” and,
emergency exits.

The flight attendant should look out windows on • Direct the passengers to follow
each side of the airplane to determine where the the mooring/inflation line to
life rafts should be deployed. the life raft and assist the pas-
sengers into the life raft.
“Typically, evacuation from corporate airplanes is
conducted through an overwing exit,” Coley said. The Gulfstream checklists say that the first officer
“Other options have to be considered. We coun- should do the following:
sel flight attendants to assess dangers outside the
cabin before they open any exit after a ditching. • Ensure that the emergency lights are on and
There might be wreckage outside an overwing exit that the ELT has been activated;
that could damage the life raft, so an alternate exit
would be selected.” • Remove life raft no. 2 from the stowed posi-
tion;
Other factors to consider are wind conditions
and water conditions. If possible, the evacuation • Remove the aft exit window and deploy life
should be conducted on the side of the airplane raft no. 2 out that window;
that has the least wind/water activity.
• Exit the airplane, follow the mooring/
inflation line to the life raft and board the
Crew Duties After Ditching life raft; and,

S ome ditching checklists include specific crew

duties following a ditching. The Hawker 1000
checklist, for example, says that the first officer
• Direct the passengers to follow the mooring/
inflation line to the life raft and assist the pas-
sengers into the life raft.
should remove the emergency-exit hatch, exit the
airplane and assist the passengers in exiting; the The Gulfstream checklists say that the cabin crew-
captain should ensure that all passengers exit the member should do the following:

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 59
 Di t c h i n g

• Assist the captain and the first officer in re- After assisting passengers who are able to evacuate,
moving the life rafts from storage; the flight attendant should exit the airplane.

• Assist the captain and the first officer in secur-

ing the life rafts; and, Difficult Decisions

• “Direct” the captain and the first officer to open

the exit windows and deploy the life rafts. T here may be some difficult decisions to be
made about trying to help passengers who
are injured severely or are otherwise physically
The checklists recommend that occupants evacuate incapable of evacuating. Crewmembers and/or
through exits on the same side of the airplane. ABPs also may have to deal with passengers ex-
hibiting behaviors that could hinder or prevent
“For passenger accountability, we send them all others from evacuating.
out the same side of the aircraft,” Stanfield said.
“Then we can get our life rafts together and stay A study of emergency evacuations identified sev-
together as a group.” eral behaviors that could impede an organized,
orderly and expeditious evacuation.44 The behav-
iors include the following:
Developing an
Evacuation Plan • Disorientation and brief immobility;

• Inaction (sustained immobility);

M ost ditching checklists do not include spe-
cific crew duties for evacuation, and it is up
to the crewmembers to have a prearranged plan.
• Anxiety that can cause difficulty in perform-
ing simple tasks (e.g., releasing a seat belt);

Burton recommends that a flight crewmember • “Social bonding,” in which a person seeks
should be the first person out of the airplane. As traveling companions from whom he/she
a time-saving measure, however, he recommends has been separated;
that while the flight crew is completing their after-
ditching cockpit tasks, the flight attendant should • “Affiliative behavior,” in which a person seeks
secure the life raft mooring/inflation lines near the familiar (e.g., attempting to retrieve carry-
the emergency exit, open the emergency exit and, on baggage);
with the assistance of ABPs if necessary, place the
life rafts outside on the wing. • “Fear flight,” in which a person attempts to
flee;
Burton said that the first officer should exit the
• Excessive altruism, in which a person jeopar-
airplane and deploy the life raft. The captain
dizes his/her life while attempting to assist a
should ensure that cabin preparations are com-
fellow passenger; and,
plete before exiting the airplane
and deploying the second life • Panic, in which the person acts irrationally and
raft, if there is one. destructively (e.g., fighting a fellow passenger

A
or crewmember).
If there are more than two life
ll life rafts rafts aboard the airplane, ABPs Crewmembers and ABPs should try to render
should deploy any life rafts assistance to passengers who cannot or will not
should be deployed, remaining after the flight crew evacuate promptly, but they should not jeopar-
deploys the first two. All life dize their own lives, says Deborah Kasman, M.D.,
to give survivors
rafts should be deployed, to give assistant professor at the Georgetown University
survivors more room and more Medical Center Department of Internal Medicine
more room and more
supplies, and, when the life rafts and Center for Clinical Bioethics.45
are tied together, to provide a
supplies.
larger “target” on the water for “Your responsibility is to do what you can with your
SAR personnel to find. knowledge and ability,” she said. “Nevertheless, you

60 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

don’t need to sacrifice yourself just from a wing without jeopardizing the life raft, that
because you’re a pilot or a flight is what you want to do. The general rule is to stay

“A ny time
attendant.

“If you have time to take care of

out of the water. Any time you put people in the
water, you have more problems.”

you put people in the one person, you want to pick the Other sources, including FAA,47 say that to get into
one you are most likely to have suc- the life rafts, you must get wet; pulling the life rafts
water, you have more cess with. That might be whoever close to the airplane in an attempt to stay dry risks
is closest to the exit. … If someone puncturing the life rafts. (This occurred after a
problems.” is fighting you or is unconscious Scandinavian Airlines System Douglas DC-8 inad-
and bleeding heavily — you’re not vertently was flown into a bay during an approach
going to pick that person.” in instrument meteorological conditions to Los
Angeles [California, U.S.] International Airport
A person who is conscious and severely injured, or on Jan. 13, 1969. The impact broke the airplane
trapped by wreckage, usually realizes that he/she into three pieces, and jagged metal punctured two
cannot be saved and does not delay the would-be of the three life rafts deployed.)48
rescuer. Nevertheless, a person might beg for as-
sistance despite a futile situation. “You must protect the life rafts,” said Burton. “You
simply cannot risk damaging the life rafts. If you
“The ethical thing to do is to recognize the futility do, you are lost. You are in the water with just a
of the situation and save yourself,” Kasman said. life vest. If you are in cold water, your chances of
“If the person is panicking and saying ‘don’t let me survival are not good.”
die,’ you have to let that person die, you have to go.
Something like that is horrible, and there’s nothing Another consideration is that the pilots might
good to say about it except that you did your best not be able physically to pull the life rafts to the
and made sure that two people did not die.” airplane if the wind and current are working
against them. When a life raft inflates, ballast bags
Even for people who are rational and have survived (which provide stability for the life raft) deploy
the ditching without a scratch, getting out of the automatically. Sea anchors (which reduce drift)
airplane might not be as easy as stepping through often deploy automatically, also (although some
the exit onto the wing. The crew should be pre- require manual deployment). Ballast bags and
pared to show passengers how to get through the sea anchors fill with water and create significant
emergency exits. drag.

For example, a certain amount of finesse is re- “Try holding a life raft that has a 35-foot [11-me-
quired to leave through an overwing exit located ter] mooring line and a fixed canopy against a 20-
above a credenza in the Gulfstream V. This is how knot or 30-knot wind and a running sea,” Burton
it is done: “Sit on the credenza. Swing your legs up said. “It will yank you right out of your boots. The
and out the window. Roll over onto your stomach. life raft will move faster than the aircraft, even if
Push your body out of the window and step onto they are traveling in the same direction.”
the wing.”46
Burton said that deploying a life raft on the wing,
as recommended by some specialists, almost guar-
To Get Wet, or Not to Get Wet antees that the life raft will be damaged.

S everal water-survival specialists say that after

the life rafts are deployed, they should be pulled
close to the airplane, if there is no risk of damaging
“If you choose that option, you take the chance
of destroying the bottom of the life-raft floor and
possibly not having a life raft when you do get
the life rafts, so that survivors can board the life rafts in the water,” he said. “Many wings have vortex
directly from the wing, without getting wet. generators, which are like razor blades.”

“You do not want to get wet if you don’t have to,” Burton recommends deploying life rafts from the
said Paul Russell. “If you can step into the life raft trailing edge of the wing. Before deployment, the

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 61
 Di t c h i n g

pilot should ensure that the mooring/inflation line To expedite the evacuation, Burton recommends
is attached to the designated tethering point on the that ABPs follow the pilots to the life rafts, so that
airplane or tied to a seat belt or another suitable they can assist the pilots in helping other passen-
fixture on the airplane. The airplane likely will gers board the life rafts. The pilots should conduct
have weathercocked into the wind, and the wind a head-count to ensure that everyone who was
will blow the life raft safely away from the airplane. capable of evacuating the airplane is aboard the life
A sharp tug on the mooring/inflation line inflates rafts. The life rafts then should be tied together to
the life raft. improve their stability and visibility on the water,
and to keep everyone together.
Burton recommends the following technique for
getting from the airplane to the life raft: A hazard reported by crewmembers involved in
ditchings during World War II was the tendency
• Enter the water with the mooring/inflation of the wings and tails of large airplanes to rise and
line under one arm; fall in rough water.49 Before boarding life rafts,
survivors in the water tended to seek handholds
• Wrap that arm around the mooring/inflation on the wings or tail to avoid drifting away from
line and firmly grasp the waistband on your the airplane, and life rafts tended to move be-
life vest (forming with your arm a “loop” neath a wing rising from the water. The slapping
With the
through which the mooring/inflation line of wings and tails often knocked crewmembers
mooring/inflation line
passes); and, unconscious and upset life rafts.
under one arm, the
other hand is used to • Use your other hand to pull on the mooring/ Survivors should resist the impulse to return to a
pull oneself toward inflation line and propel yourself toward the still-floating airplane to try again to assist someone
the life raft. life raft. left behind or to retrieve supplies, personal belong-
ings, etc. The airplane could continue floating for
The hand that is pulling on hours or days. On the other hand, it could sink
the mooring/inflation line in seconds.
also can be used to push
a ditch bag ahead of you, “Do not, under any circumstances, return to a
toward the life raft. Burton floating aircraft,” the Gulfstream III and IV ditch-
says, however, that if the ing checklists say. “Should the aircraft begin to
ditch bag impedes your sink, the onrush of water may prevent escape.”
progress or begins to sink,
let it go. Now Comes the Hard Part
“The most important thing
is to get out of the airplane
and into the life rafts as
D ata show that the chances of surviving a
ditching are good. The CAA said that U.K.
data and U.S. data on ditchings, including those
quickly as possible,” he said. conducted by pilots of light general aviation air-
“Do whatever it takes to get craft, indicate that 88 percent of ditchings involve
in the life raft. Clothing will few injuries to the occupants.50
be wet, and most people are
going to require assistance in “It appears that the ditching itself is generally suc-
getting into the raft. That is cessful, although subsequent survival and rescue
why getting a crewmember do not necessarily follow,” the CAA said.
or an able-bodied passenger
into the life raft first is so Surviving a ditching, therefore, will be a prelude to
important.” the next challenge: staying alive until help arrives. 

62 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• When a ditching is the only option, there will be no time to train for survival.

• Flying the airplane is a full-time job. Given a choice, the operator of a multimillion-dollar corporate
airplane carrying passengers should dispatch all flights with a flight attendant, an aviation mainte-
nance technician or even a passenger trained in cabin safety.

• Coordination is critical. Flight crew and cabin crew must receive joint training on evacuation proce-
dures and the location and proper use of emergency equipment.

• At the first indication of a problem that might require ditching, immediately tell ATC so that search-
and-rescue resources can begin mobilizing.

• Ditch with power. Pressing on until the engines are silent will leave few options for selecting a landing
site and increase the difficulty of ditching.

• Do not land into the face of a swell.

• Don’t count on your airplane floating. Assume that it is sinking, and get out!

Notes   7. Cosper, Donna K.; McLean, Garnet A. Analysis of

Ditching and Water Survival Training Programs of
  1. Miller, Andy. Telephone interview by Lacagnina, Major Airframe Manufacturers and Airlines. FAA
Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July 7, 2003. Flight Civil Aeromedical Institute. DOT/FAA/AM-98/19.
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July 1998.
  2. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Federal   8. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). “Ditching.”
Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 91, General Operating General Aviation Safety Sense Leaflet 21A.
and Flight Rules. Subpart F, Large and Turbine-powered Feb. 9, 2001.
Multiengine Airplanes. Part 91.505, “Familiarity with
operating limitations and emergency equipment.”   9. Pierce, Michael. Telephone interview by
Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
  3. Lane, Keith. Telephone interview by Lacagnina, May 22, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July 8, 2003. Flight Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
10. Donald, David; general editor. The Encyclopedia of
  4. Steward, Paul; liaison officer to the Cospas-Sarsat Civil Aircraft. San Diego, California, United States:
International Satellite System for Search and Rescue Thunder Bay Press, 1999.
and implementation officer for the Distress Alerting
Satellite System, Office of Search and Rescue, U.S. 11. Campbell, Bill. Telephone interview by
Coast Guard. Interview by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Suitland, Maryland, U.S. April 9, 2003. Flight Safety Oct. 11, 2002. Flight Safety Foundation,
Foundation, Alexandria, U.S. Steward retired from Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
the Coast Guard in June 2003.
12. The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Flight Crew
  5. FAA. FARs Part 91.533, “Flight attendant require- Ditching Checklist is a composite/generic checklist
ments.” FARs Part 135, Operating Requirements: assembled from the basic procedures recommended
Commuter and On-demand Operations and Rules for several business airplanes, procedures recom-
Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft. Part mended by water-survival specialists and from
135.107, “Flight attendant crewmember requirement.” other sources. The information is not intended to
Part 135.105, “Exception to second-in-command supersede operators’ or manufacturers’ requirements
requirement: Approval for use of autopilot system.” or recommended procedures.

  6. Coley, Colette. Telephone interview by Lacagnina, 13. FAA. FARs Part 25, Airworthiness Standards:
Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July 2, 2003. Flight Transport Category Airplanes. Part 23.809,
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. “Emergency exit arrangement.”

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 63
 Di t c h i n g

14. FAA. Water Survival: The Skills You Never and assurance of communications.” 1998, when the airplane struck the water
Want to Use. Videotape produced for FAA 5.2.2.1.1.1 says, “Aircraft on long over- about 0.6 nautical mile (1.1 kilometers)
National Aviation Safety Program, 1998. water flights, or on flights over desig- from the runway. None of the five occu-
nated areas over which the carriage of pants was seriously injured. The occupants
15. Russell, Paul D. Interview by FSF edito- an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) exited the airplane before it sank in 90 feet
rial staff. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. May is required, shall continuously guard the (28 meters) of water.
1, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, [very-high-frequency] VHF emergency
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. In the U.S. frequency 121.5 MHz [megahertz], except 34. Terrain awareness and warning system
Coast Guard, Russell conducted more for those periods when aircraft are carry- (TAWS) is the term used by the European
than 200 water landings and served in ing out communications on other VHF Joint Aviation Authorities and FAA to de-
various positions, including commander channels or when airborne equipment scribe equipment meeting ICAO standards
of two air stations, chief of the Aviation limitations or cockpit duties do not permit and recommendations for ground-prox-
Training Center Training Division and simultaneous guarding of two channels.” imity warning system (GPWS) equipment
chief of search-and-rescue operations in that provides predictive terrain-hazard
the Northwest Region, before retiring in 23. FAA. Aeronautical Information Manual warnings; enhanced GPWS and ground
1984 with the rank of captain. He is chief (AIM). Paragraph 6.3.1, “Distress and collision avoidance system are other terms
engineer, aviation system safety, Boeing Urgency Communications.” used to describe TAWS equipment.
Commercial Airplanes, and a maritime 24. Lemon, Dan. Interview by Rosenkrans,
safety and accident investigator for Safety 35. Bateman, Don. Telephone interview by
Wayne. Washington, D.C., U.S. June Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia,
Services International. 24, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, U.S. July 2, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
16. Ferrante, Tony. Telephone interview by Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, 25. The FSF Cabin Crew Ditching Checklist
U.S. June 30, 2003. Flight Safety 36. FAA. AIM. Paragraph 6.3.3, “Ditching
was assembled from basic procedures
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Procedures.”
recommended by cabin-crew instructors
and from other sources. This information 37. Gill, Stephen; oceanographer, U.S.
17. Stutz, Richard. Telephone interview by
is not intended to supersede operators’ or National Ocean Survey. Telephone in-
Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia,
manufacturers’ requirements or recom- terview by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
U.S. July 8, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
mended procedures. Virginia, U.S. Aug. 13, 2003. Flight Safety
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
26. Burton, Ken. Telephone interview by Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
18. Roig, Bill; director of operations, Catalina Rozelle, Roger. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Aerospace. Telephone interview by 38. Buckridge, Chris; HU-25 standardization
Aug. 27, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, officer, U.S. Coast Guard Aviation Training
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
U.S. July 1, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Center. Telephone interview by Lacagnina,
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 27. Cosper and McLean. Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July
16, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
28. Marshall, Nora. Telephone inter-
19. International Maritime Organization; Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
view by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
International Civil Aviation Organization
Virginia, U.S. June 30, 2003. Flight Safety 39. U.S. National Search and Rescue Committee.
(ICAO). IAMSAR Manual (International
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. United States National Search and Rescue
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue Manual), Volume III, “Mobile 29. Cohen, Bob. Telephone interviews by Supplement to the International Aeronautical
Facilities.” 1998. Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual.
U.S. May 5, 2003, and Oct. 7, 2003. Flight Washington, D.C. May 2000.
20. ICAO. International Standards and Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
Recommended Practices. Annex 11 to the 40. Buckridge.
U.S.
Convention on International Civil Aviation: 41. FAA Air Carrier Operations Bulletin,
Air Traffic Services. 30. FAA. Advisory Circular 121-24C, Passenger
“Brace for Impact Positions.” 1-94-17.
Safety Information Briefing and Briefing
21. Stanfield, Allen. Telephone interview by Cards. Appendix 4, “Brace-for-Impact 42. Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Australia.
Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, Position.” July 23, 2003. Ditching. Civil Aviation Advisory
U.S. April 30, 2003. Flight Safety Publication 253-1(0). April 2003.
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 31. FAA, 1998.
32. Llano, George Albert. Airmen Against the 43. Hill, Richard. Telephone interview
22. ICAO. International Standards and by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
Sea. Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information
Recommended Practices and Procedures Virginia, U.S. Oct. 7, 2003. Flight Safety
Center (ADTIC), Research Studies
for Air Navigation Services (PANS). Annex Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Institute, U.S. Air Force. ADTIC
10 to the Convention on International Civil
Publication G-104.
Aviation: Aeronautical Telecommunications. 44. Galea, Ed. “Passenger Behaviour in
Volume II: Communication Procedures 33. Airclaims — in World Aircraft Accident Emergency Situations.” In Passenger
including those with PANS status. Chapter Summary, Issue 131, A98:5 — said that the Behaviour, edited by Bor, Robert.
5, Aeronautical Mobile Service — Voice crew was conducting a visual approach to Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate
Communications. 5.2.2, “Establishment the Chambery (France) airport on Feb. 6, Publishing, 2003.

64 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

45. Kasman, Deborah. Telephone inter- Crew Safety Volume 38 (January– FSF Editorial Staff. “Double Engine
view by Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, February 2003). Failure Leads to Ditching of Cessna
Virginia, U.S. Aug. 22, 2003. Flight Safety 402C.” Accident Prevention Volume 56
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
FSF Editorial Staff. “Head-up Displays (August 1999).
46. Gulfstream Aerospace. Gulfstream Cabin in Civil Aviation: A Status Report.”
Management Systems Gulfstream V safety Flight Safety Digest Volume 21 FSF Editorial Staff. “Flight Attendants
features videotape. (December 2002). Who Work Alone Need Specialized
47. FAA, 1998. Training at Regional Airlines.” Cabin
FSF Editorial Staff. “Recommendations Crew Safety Volume 34 (May–June
48. U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) accident report no. DCA91A0012 Warn Against Opening Cabin Doors 1999).
said that 15 occupants were killed, 17 were While Airplanes Are Pressurized.” Cabin
seriously injured and 13 received minor Crew Safety Volume 37 (November– Sumwalt, Robert L. “Enhancing Flight-
injuries or no injuries. NTSB said that the December 2002). crew Monitoring Skills Can Increase
probable causes of the accident were the Flight Safety.” Flight Safety Digest
pilot-in-command’s improper IFR (instru- FSF Editorial Staff. “Consistent Use of Volume 18 (March 1999).
ment flight rules) operation, poor crew
‘Silent Review’ Supports Quick, Correct
coordination and the flight crew’s misread-
Actions.” Cabin Crew Safety Volume 37 FSF Editorial Staff. “Analysis of
ing of, or failure to read, their instruments.
(March–April 2002). Training for Emergency Water
49. Llano. Landings Questions Assumptions,
50. U.K. CAA, Feb. 9, 2001. FSF Editorial Staff. “Enhanced Inconsistencies.” Cabin Crew Safety
Emergency Medical Kits Increase In- Volume 33 (November–December
Further Reading flight Care Options.” Cabin Crew Safety 1998).
From FSF Publications Volume 36 (November–December
2001). Koenig, Robert L. “Exit-locat-
FSF Editorial Staff. “Loss of Engine ing Devices, Aircraft Structural
Power Sets Stage for Ditching on FSF Editorial Staff. “Many Passengers Strengthening and Improved Crew
Moonless Night.” Accident Prevention in Exit Seats Benefit From Additional Drills Called ‘Most Practicable’
Volume 61 (January 2004). Briefings.” Cabin Crew Safety Volume Accident-survivability Factors.” Cabin
36 (May–June 2001). Crew Safety Volume 32 (January–
FSF Editorial Staff. “Engine-intake February 1997).
Icing Sets Stage for Ditching of Shorts U.S. National Transportation Safety
360 During Cargo Flight.” Accident Board. “Safety Study: Emergency Koenig, Robert L. “U.K. Studies
Prevention Volume 60 (September 2003). Evacuation of Commercial Airplanes.” Find That ‘Legs-back’ Brace Position
Flight Safety Digest Volume 19 Is Optimal for Forward-facing
FSF Editorial Staff. “Fuel-quantity (December 2000). Passengers.” Cabin Crew Safety Volume
Miscalculation Cited in Ditching of 30 (November–December 1995).
Boeing Stratoliner.” Accident Prevention FSF Editorial Staff. “Cabin Crews
Volume 60 (August 2003). Must Capture Passengers’ Attention in Pope, John A. “Developing a Corporate
Predeparture Safety Briefings.” Cabin Aviation Department Operations
FSF Editorial Staff. “Inflatable Crew Safety Volume 35 (July–August Manual Reinforces Standard — and
Restraints Installed on Some Transport 2000). Safe — Operating Procedures.” Flight
Aircraft.” Cabin Crew Safety Volume 38 Safety Digest Volume 14 (April 1995).
(July–August 2003). Wilson, Dale R. “Darkness Increases Risks
of Flight.” Human Factors & Aviation Barthelmess, Sharon. “Positions Brace
FSF Editorial Staff. “Loss of Control Medicine Volume 46 (November– Passengers for Impact to Reduce
Occurs During Pilot’s Attempt to December 1999). Injuries and Fatalities.” Cabin Crew
Return to Departure Airport.” Accident Safety Volume 23 (January–February
Prevention Volume 60 (May 2003). Sallee, G.P.; Gibbons, D.M. “Propulsion 1988).
System Malfunction Plus Inappropriate
FSF Editorial Staff. “Able-bodied Crew Response (PSM+ICR).” Flight
Passengers Extend Crew Capabilities Safety Digest Volume 18 (November–
During In-flight Emergencies.” Cabin December 1999).

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 65
 Di t c h i n g

?
Ditching Certification:
Dassault used
a computer program

What Does It Mean?

to explore the ditching
behavior of the
Falcon 900.

Transport category airplanes used for business and corporate travel are
not required to be certificated for ditching, but several are. Computer-aided
analysis is the basis for most certifications.

— FSF Editorial Staff

P
rovisions for ditching certification are “extended overwater operations” (i.e., more than
included in U.S. certification standards 50 nautical miles [93 kilometers] from the nearest
for transport category airplanes1 and shoreline).3
in European certification standards for
large turbine-powered airplanes.2 The European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)
requires ditching certification for large turbine-
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) powered airplanes with more than 30 passenger
requires ditching certification for transport cat- seats flown by commercial operators either 120
egory airplanes flown by air carrier operators in minutes at cruising speed or 400 nautical miles

66 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

[741 kilometers] from land suitable for an emer- Robert Baugniet, director of corporate commu-
gency landing.4 nications for Gulfstream Aerospace, said that the
company sees ditching certification as a desirable
Ditching certification is not required for airplanes product enhancement.8
used in business/corporate flight operations.
Nevertheless, several business jets have been “Because of the long-range, overwater capabilities
certificated for ditching. Among those in current of Gulfstream aircraft and their frequent use in
production are the Airbus A319; Boeing Business that role, Gulfstream long ago determined it to be
Jet and Boeing Business Jet 2; Bombardier of advantage both to the commercial potential of
Challenger 604 and Global Express; Dassault the product line and to our operators to establish
Falcon 50EX, Falcon 900C, Falcon 900EX, Falcon a means of compliance with ditching require-
2000 and Falcon 2000EX; and Gulfstream G100, ments,” he said.
Gulfstream G200, Gulfstream IV, Gulfstream V
and Gulfstream V-SP. Georges Pellegrini, director of customer ser-
vice and engineering support for Dassault
Among current-production business/corporate International, said that experience has shown that
jets that are not certificated for ditching are the the company took the correct decision to certify its
Bombardier Learjet 31A, Learjet 45 and Learjet business/corporate airplanes for ditching.9
60; Cessna Citation Bravo, Citation Encore,
Citation Excel and Citation X; Embraer Legacy; “Ditching certification is not mandatory for this
and Raytheon Beechjet 400A and Hawker type of aircraft; however, it has been Dassault’s
800XP. choice to make the extra effort,” he said. “Falcons
are designed with the objective of maximum safety
in all phases of flight, and ditching is not to be
What’s the Payback? neglected. Experience has shown at least twice that
Dassault was right; there are at least 14 people

“D itching certification is a complex and ex-

pensive effort,” said Tim Travis, manager
of executive and corporate communications for
today who can confirm it.”

The experience Pellegrini referred to

Raytheon Aircraft Co.5 “Ditching certification has

“D
involved two water-contact accidents. A
not been requested by customers.” Falcon 20 with six people aboard remained
afloat for 25 minutes after being ditched itching
Michael Pierce, marketing product manager for in rough seas off the coast of Iceland on
Cessna Aircraft Co., said that the company believes Oct. 11, 1987, and a Falcon 200 with eight certification
that ditching certification is not worth the effort people aboard overran the runway dur-
and expense.6 ing takeoff from New Orleans, Louisiana, is a complex
U.S., and floated for about one hour before
“Ditching certification is a pretty involved pro- sinking in Lake Pontchartrain. None of the and expensive
cess,” he said. “For the cost and for what is involved occupants was seriously injured, and all
in ditching certification, we just don’t see a lot of exited the airplanes before they sank. effort.”
benefit for our customers.”
“These examples show that Falcons are re-
Pierce said that Cessna conducted analyses using ally engineered for ditching, giving plenty
computer modeling to show compliance with of time for the occupants to exit the aircraft safely,”
Part 25 certification standards, including those Pellegrini said.
for “ditching emergency exits,” which are required
for all transport category airplanes.7 (On April 8, 2003, during a cargo flight, a Falcon
20 with two pilots aboard was ditched in the
“We can prove analytically what the airplane is Mississippi River after both engines flamed out
capable of to meet Part 25 regulations, but we on approach to Lambert–St. Louis [Missouri,
don’t take the extra step to certify the airplane U.S.] International Airport. Both pilots received
for ditching,” he said. “We just don’t see that it’s a serious injuries [see “The Unthinkable Happens,”
good use of resources.” page 3].)

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 67
 Di t c h i n g

Standards Reflect a If a manufacturer requests ditching certification

More Dangerous Time for an airplane, Part 25.801 requires the manufac-

T he current
S tandards for ditching certification were adopted
by FAA in the early 1950s, when airplanes were
turer to do the following:

• Incorporate “practicable design measure[s]

standards ditched more frequently than they are today. … to minimize the probability that in an
emergency landing on water, the behavior of
basically are “Although ditchings are virtually unheard of today, the airplane would cause immediate injury to
they were not uncommon prior to the introduc- the occupants or would make it impossible
the same as tion of the modern turbine-engine aircraft,” said for them to escape”;
Mike Fergus, public affairs specialist for the FAA’s
those adopted Western–Pacific Region.10 “As far back as 1949, the • Investigate “the probable behavior of the
Civil Aeronautics Administration (the predecessor airplane in a water landing … by model tests
… in 1953. organization to the FAA) recognized the need to ad- or by comparison with airplanes of similar
dress ditching requirements. Civil Air Regulations configuration for which the ditching charac-
defined requirements for obtaining overwater- teristics are known.” The investigation must
operation certification and identified the need for include the effects on the airplane’s hydrody-
survival equipment following a water landing. namic characteristics of projections such as
scoops and flaps;
“Even though the reliability of transport category
aircraft has greatly improved, the FAA still requires • Show that “under reasonably probable water
emergency survival equipment to be installed on conditions, the flotation time and trim of the
aircraft approved for extended overwater opera- airplane will allow the occupants to leave the
tions. We recognize that while the probability of a airplane and enter [life rafts]”; and,
water landing is very low, it may still occur.”
Simulations indicated • Either include “the effects of the collapse of
that the Embraer The European ditching-certification standards are external doors and windows” in the investi-
Legacy’s emergency almost identical to those in U.S. Federal Aviation gation of the airplane’s probable behavior in
Regulations (FARs) Part 25.801 (see “For Ditching a water landing or ensure that “the external
exits will stay above
Survival, Start With Regulations, But Don’t doors and windows [will] withstand the prob-
the waterline long
Stop There,” page 395). The current standards able maximum local pressures.”
enough to conduct
basically are the same as those adopted by the Civil
an evacuation. Aeronautics Administration in 1953.11
In addition to Part 25.801, the manufacturer also
must comply with three other sections of Part
25: Part 25.807(e), which requires uniform dis-
tribution of emergency exits in the airplane; and
Part 25.1411 and Part 25.1415(a), which include
requirements for safety equipment to be carried
aboard the airplane, such as life rafts, life vests,
signaling devices and lifelines (which are attached
to the fuselage to enable the occupants to stay on
the wing after ditching).

Ready or Not,
the Standards Apply

I nformation on ditching certification is in-

cluded in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-17,
Transport Airplane Cabin Interiors Crashworthiness
Handbook. The AC says that two ditching condi-
tions are examined during certification.

68 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

“The first condition is the ‘planned ditching’ case in modeling — for example, the buoyancy capabili-
which there is sufficient time to prepare the airplane ties that some compartments might provide were Five minutes
for ditching, and adjustments have been made to not taken into consideration. is an ‘appropriate
airplane weight and CG [center of gravity],” the cir- flotation time’
cular said. “The other condition is the ‘unplanned “The simulations demonstrated that the Legacy’s to evacuate a
ditching’ case in which the airplane enters the water emergency exits would be above the waterline in Global Express.
with insufficient time to prepare for ditching.” a ditching scenario, thus assuring effective means
for passenger evacuation.”
Andrea Bottcher, a corporate communications spe-
cialist for Embraer, said that the company conducted Like several other manufacturers, however,
computer modeling of an unplanned ditching Embraer did not seek ditching certification.
situation to analyze the effectiveness of the Legacy’s
emergency exits as ditching emergency exits.12 “Ditching certification is required for extended-
overwater operations under Part 121 [the re-
“The basic scenario considered for the analysis quirements for domestic, flag and supplemental
performed was an aborted takeoff followed by operations], which is not applicable to the Legacy,”
an unplanned ditching, with the aircraft in the Bottcher said.
MTOW [maximum-takeoff-weight] condition,”
she said. “These studies took the various airframe AC 25-17 says that some terms in Part 25.801 are not
characteristics into consideration, such as land- defined by FAA and that application of the terms is
ing-gear-wheel position and size, use of the doors, left to the manufacturer’s judgment. One example
volume of the compartments, etc. is “reasonably probable water conditions.”

“In addition, in order to have the outcome of “The expression ‘reasonably probable water con-
the analysis fall on the conservative side, certain ditions’ is considered judgmental in application
assumptions were incorporated into the computer to compliance for ditching and has never been

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 69
 Di t c h i n g

ditching, plus the number of exits available

for occupants to disembark, is another factor.
The weight relief due to occupants leaving the
aircraft and its effect on the overall CG of the
aircraft also affect flotation time.”

The airplane’s “trim” in the water is another

factor that affects evacuation.

“‘Trim of the airplane’ is the flotation at-

titude — that is, nose-up versus nose-down
and the ‘roll’ of the aircraft while sitting in the
water,” Fergus said. “If the aircraft floats with
a 45-degree nose-up attitude, it may not be
possible for the occupants to evacuate; thus,
considerations of trim are necessary.”

Fergus provided some examples of “practicable

design measures” to prevent injury and facili-
Raytheon Aircraft specifically defined as to sea-state force or wave tate evacuation.
says ditching height,” the AC said.
certification is not “Practicable design measures would include
An example of what an air carrier aircraft manu- ensuring that the required emergency exits can
on Hawker 800XP
facturer, Lockheed-California Co., considered as be opened after a ditching,” he said. “Practicable
customers’
reasonably probable water conditions is provided design measures would also include sufficient
shopping lists.
in a U.S. National Transportation Safety Board ac- fuselage structural capability to withstand a con-
cident report.13 The report said that a ditching trolled water landing. The airplane design and
study conducted by Lockheed during certifica- [the manufacturer’s recommended] landing pro-
tion of the L-1011 assumed “a moderate sea state cedures must also limit the ditching load factors
(three-[foot] to five-foot waves).” such that they do not exceed the emergency land-
ing loads defined in [Part] 25.561(b). This ensures
FAA does not specify a minimum flotation time that interior structural items will not break loose,
suitable for evacuation of an airplane after a resulting in injury to the airplane’s occupants or
ditching. AC 25-17 says that flotation time must the blocking of emergency exits.”
exceed the manufacturer’s “most-conservative
estimate of time required to completely evacuate Part 25.561(b) requires that the structure of a
the airplane.” transport category airplane be designed “to give
each occupant every reasonable chance of escaping
“The length of flotation time depends on each serious injury in a minor crash landing,” when the
aircraft,” said Leo Knaapen, communications occupants, with seat restraints fastened, experience
manager for Bombardier Aerospace.14 “Usually, for specific inertia forces — for example, 9 g (i.e., nine
our aircraft [e.g., Challenger 604, Global Express], times standard gravitational acceleration) forward
300 seconds (five minutes) is considered to be ap-
propriate flotation time for the occupants to leave
the aircraft.”

Knaapen said that several factors affect an air-

plane’s flotation time. “T he length of

flotation time depends on

“We always analyze the worst case; therefore,
maximum takeoff weight and forward and aft
each aircraft.”
CG limits are one main factor,” he said. “The
amount of water coming into the aircraft after

70 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Scale models were and 6 g downward. AC 25-17 says that “load factors Dassault has used both scale-model tests and
launched to strike the above these are considered to expose occupants to engineering analyses in certifying its business/
water at a specific injurious loads.” corporate airplanes for ditching.
airspeed and in a
specific attitude.
“The way we have studied ditching capability has
Computer Simulations evolved over the years with the development of
Make Model Tests Obsolete new tools,” Pellegrini said. “For example, for the
Falcon 20 and Falcon 10, Dassault built a one-

M anufacturers investigate the probable ditch-

ing behavior of an airplane either by test-
ing scale models of the airplane or by conducting
tenth-scale mock-up and simulated landings on
water in a pool to determine that the behavior of
the airplane was safe.”
engineering analyses and comparing the results
with the findings of investigations of the “known” Among the findings of the scale-model tests was
ditching behavior of similar airplanes. that the lower sills of the main doors on both air-
planes would be under the waterline after ditching.
“The model tests are much like scale-model As a result, Dassault included in its recommended
wind-tunnel tests,” Fergus said. “Whereas a ditching procedures a prohibition against the use
wind-tunnel test seeks to evaluate the aerody- of the Falcon 20’s one-piece door for evacuation;
namic performance of an aircraft, a ditching the company also installed an emergency exit on
scale-model test seeks to evaluate the hydro- the left side of the fuselage. The Falcon 10 has a
dynamic characteristics of the airplane when two-piece (clamshell-type) main door; the rec-
landing on water.” ommended ditching procedures allow use of the

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 71
 Di t c h i n g

upper part of the door but prohibit use of Paul Russell, chief engineer, aviation system safety,
the lower part of the door for evacuation. for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, said that be-

“W hether Ditching certification of the Falcon 50

was based on comparing the results of
cause of the multitude of factors involved, the re-
sults of ditching-certification analyses might not
be the same as the actual results of a ditching.15
or not an airplane engineering analyses with the results of the
scale-model tests of the Falcon 20, which has “Ditching certification is a computer-assisted
is ditch-certified, a similar fuselage. wild-ass guess,” he said.

how you put it in “The next model was the Falcon 900,” Bob Cohen, staff instructor and quality-assurance
Pellegrini said. “At that time, Dassault had instructor for CAE SimuFlite, said that how an air-
the water is going developed a very powerful tool — CATIA plane behaves during a ditching depends to a great
[computer-assisted three-dimensional in- extent on how the flight crew lands the airplane.16
to make a big teractive application] — that allowed us to
simulate aerodynamic and hydrodynamic “Whether or not an airplane is ditch-certified, how
difference.” behavior, and to exactly determine shapes, you put it in the water is going to make a big differ-
volumes, weight and balance well before the ence,” he said. “It is just my opinion that ditching
first airplane was ever flown. certification is … how can I put it in a nice way? …
It makes you feel good. When you spend twenty-
“This was how we determined that the main door four million dollars on an airplane, I guess it makes
on the Falcon 900 — and later the Falcon 2000 you feel better if it has been ditch-certified.”
— stands over the waterline and can be used for
evacuation, eliminating the need for an emergency
exit on the left side of the fuselage.” No Airplane Can Be
Designed for a Safe Ditching
Pellegrini said that during ditching-certification

A 1/25-scale
studies, Dassault calculated that all the Falcon
models will remain afloat at least 20 minutes. A 1956 report by the U.S. National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA, prede-
cessor of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
model constructed
“This calculation has always taken into account Administration [NASA]) said that the establish-
of cardboard, wood,
unfavorable conditions, such as an open main ment of proper approach procedures, the incor-
tinfoil, fiberglass
door (if allowed) and a certain height of waves,” poration of adequate facilities for evacuation and
and plastic was used he said. “However, flotation time is subject to many early rescue are among the most effective means of
to investigate rough- parameters and is a rough estimate. The best in- increasing the likelihood of survival in a ditching
water ditchings. formation we get is from experience.” situation.17

“Performance requirements and the relatively low

frequency of emergency landings even in wartime
make it unlikely that airplanes will ever be de-
signed specifically for ‘safe’ ditchings,” the report
said. “It appears possible, however, to reduce the
hazards by some attention to the effects of the
design parameters.”

The report included the findings from ditch-

ing tests conducted at the Langley (Virginia,
U.S.) Aeronautical Laboratory (now the NASA
Langley Research Center) with scale models of
37 airplanes, including 18 military bombers,
seven military fighters and 12 military/civilian
transports. The airplanes were not identified in
the report, but drawings of the airplanes included
with summaries of the findings of the ditching

72 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

tests provide clues to their identities (Table 1; Table which failed during the test, or by a combination
2, page 74; Table 3, page 75; Table 4, page 76). of these methods,” the report said.

The models, whose scales ranged from 1/8 to 1/25, AC 25-17 said that the results of the NACA ditch-
Investigators said that were launched into a pool of water in such a man- ing tests have been the basis for the ditching certi-
ner that they would strike the water at a specific fication of early transport category airplanes and
damage sustained
speed and in a specific attitude. modern transport category airplanes.
by this model during
ditching tests might be
“Damage which was likely to occur in a full-scale “It became an acceptable practice for designers to
eliminated by installing ditching was simulated in the models either by the substantiate the ditching behavior of a proposed
hydro-skis on the removal of parts, by the installation of simulated airplane design by comparisons in basic geomet-
airplane’s belly. crumpled sections or aluminum-foil coverings ric configuration to airplane designs approved for
ditching by the models tested at Langley Field,”
the AC said.
Table 1
Summary of Model-ditching Investigation of Transport I
The Bigger, the Better

T he NACA report included the following gen-

eral findings from the ditching tests:

• Wings — “From a ditching standpoint, the

vertical location of the wing with respect to
the fuselage is a compromise between having
the wing low enough to provide buoyancy to
help keep the airplane afloat after ditching
and having the wing high enough so that the
landing flaps and engine installations … do
not seriously impair ditching behavior. It is
generally considered that the most favorable
position of the wing is slightly above the
bottom of the fuselage or in a low midwing
position. The thickness and size of the wing
had little effect on ditching behavior other
than the obvious effect on buoyancy.”

• Landing gear — “It is considered advisable

that ditchings be made with the landing gear
retracted because an extended gear usually
causes diving.”

• Flaps — “For most of the models, there was

only a slight nose-down moment observed
[with flaps extended], and in no test was a
flaps-up condition preferable. For certain
models, … a flaps-down condition caused
diving; but with the flaps retracted and with
the corresponding increase in speed, the dam-
age and deceleration were even more severe
than in the dives. It is therefore preferable to
have flaps down in a ditching in order to ob-
Source: U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
tain a low forward speed and thus to decrease
fuselage damage; however, the flaps should

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 73
 Di t c h i n g

be weak enough to fail before producing an

undesirable diving moment.” Table 2
Summary of Model-ditching Investigation of Transport A
• Engine installation — “In general, [jet-engine]
wing-root nacelles have very little effect on dy-
namic behavior and will have little influence
on structural damage. The strut-mounted
nacelles … will probably be torn off in a
ditching but will have little effect on dynamic
behavior. With engine nacelles mounted under
the fuselage, various effects can be expected,
depending on the rigidity and the fore and aft
location of the installation. If the engines are
too far aft, a dive may be produced; a forward
location may cause porpoising, but generally
an intermediate position can be found that will
produce a smooth run. Side-mounted engine
nacelles will probably require the horizontal
tail to be mounted high on the vertical tail.
Generally, with a high tail, the rear part of
the fuselage runs deeply in the water, and the
nacelles cause considerable spray and drag as
they enter the water. If the nacelles tear away
during a ditching, extensive structural damage
may result, and possibly the aft portion of the
fuselage will be torn away.”

• Horizontal stabilizer — “The horizontal-tail

location can affect the attitude at which the
airplane will run on the water. When the
horizontal tail is located very high on the
vertical tail, the model will … trim higher
than when the horizontal tail is in a low
position. Occasionally, a horizontal tail was
partially torn away in the scale-model tests,
but no appreciable change in behavior due to
this damage was noted.”

• Fuselage strength — “Most airplanes could

be ditched with relative safety if extensive
damage to the fuselage could be avoided;
therefore, the strength of the fuselage bottom Source: U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
is probably the most important parameter in-
fluencing ditching behavior. It is impractical
to consider designing fuselages which will not cause the behavior in transports to be violent, Engine nacelles
fail in ditching, but damage may be reduced but water flooding into the fuselage through mounted on underwing
by using ditching aids [e.g., a ‘hydroflap’ or damaged sections is a hazard.” struts were torn off
‘hydro-ski’ on the bottom of the fuselage to when the model
prevent the airplane from diving]. Transport • Fuselage shape — “A high degree of longitu- struck the water.
airplanes have marginal-strength fuselages dinal curvature [of the bottom, rear surface
— the lower part of the fuselage sustains of the fuselage] results in a suction which
some damage when ditching but usually is causes the models to trim up in the water. …
not demolished. … Damage usually does not Trimming up is not necessarily detrimental

74 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

indications that flattened cross sections in

Table 3 combination with high longitudinal curva-
Summary of Model-ditching Investigation of Fighter C ture tend to cause skipping. … Moderately
curved sections rearward of the center of
gravity are desirable with respect to stabil-
ity and water loads. … Curvature at the nose
also has an influence on ditching behavior.
A fuselage that is more or less straight on
the bottom but curves up abruptly at the
nose offers less nose-up moment and thus
is more likely to dive than one that curves
up gradually.”

• Airplane size — “The physical magnitude

of airplanes appears to affect the degree of
violence of ditching behavior. … As the size
of airplanes increases, the ditching behavior
becomes less violent.”

• Protuberances — “Protuberances under the

wing or the fuselage of the airplane may cause
undesirable ditching behavior and high longi-
tudinal decelerations. Protuberances located
rearward of the center of gravity are the most
undesirable and may cause diving.”

AC 25-17 said that all the NACA model tests were

conducted in calm water “with the supposition
that rough-water landings of particular models
that were made parallel to waves or swells would
exhibit the same general type of performance.”

In 1959, NASA reported the results of rough-

water ditching investigations conducted at the
Langley facility with a 0.043-scale (approximately
1/25 scale) model of a 225,000-pound (102,060-
kilogram) jet airplane that was launched into the

Source: U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

Wing-tip tanks were but could contribute to undesirable results

not a detriment to such as skipping and subsequent diving.
ditching behavior. A fuselage bottom with little longitudinal
and lateral curvature tends to decrease trim-
ming up but is undesirable because of the
accompanying high water loads. There are

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 75
 Di t c h i n g

struck the waves head-on. Data were obtained

Table 4 from visual observations, recorded accelerations
Summary of Model-ditching Investigation of Bomber I and motion pictures.

“[The data indicated that] a rough-water ditching

with the landing gear retracted will likely result
in most of the fuselage bottom being torn away
and the airplane sinking in a very short time,”
the report said. “Ditching with the landing gear
extended will likely result in a dive if the main
gear does not fail or in a deep run [in which the
airplane moves through the water partially sub-
merged] with appreciable damage throughout the
fuselage bottom if the main gear fails.”

These findings likely are one reason why the con-

sensus among current recommended ditching
procedures is that the flight crew should avoid
ditching an airplane into the face of a swell (see
“Prepare to Ditch,” page 20). 

Most of the lower

fuselage was
torn away when
the model was
‘ditched’ into the
face of four-foot
(one-meter) waves.

Source: U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

The flying wing face of four-foot (one-meter) waves (see photo,

showed ‘reasonably right).18
good ditching
characteristics.’ The report said that the model — which was 5.5
feet (1.7 meters) long and constructed with card-
board, wood, tinfoil, fiberglass and plastic — was
“representative of the current high-speed multi-
engine jet transport designs.”

Simulated airspeed was 120 knots, and the landing

attitude was 12-degrees nose-up when the model

76 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

The bottom line, in our opinion … • It does not mean that an airplane actually was
ditched; scale models have been tested in the past,
• Ditching certification is an expensive and time- but ditching certification today is achieved mostly
consuming process that some business-jet manu- through computer analyses.
facturers have chosen not to pursue.

• Lack of ditching certification does not necessarily mean • Ultimately, the success of a ditching will depend
that an airplane will be unsafe in a ditching; there are largely on weather conditions and sea conditions,
requirements for structural strength and emergency and the skill with which the flight crew lands the
exits that all transport category airplanes must meet. airplane.

• Ditching certification means, in part, that the • Rough-water ditching tests have shown that land-
airplane’s probable behavior on impact has been inves- ing into the face of a swell likely will result in the
tigated and that design measures may have been taken bottom fuselage being torn away and the airplane
to protect passengers and to facilitate their escape. sinking rapidly.

Notes be provided.” The requirements include the 14. Knaapen, Leo. E-mail communication
following: An airplane with fewer than 10 with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
  1. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration passenger seats must have one exit above Virginia, U.S. July 3, 2003. Flight Safety
(FAA). Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) the waterline on each side of the airplane; Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Part 25, Airworthiness Standards: Transport an airplane with 10 or more passenger seats
Category Airplanes. Subpart D, Design and must have one exit above the waterline for 15 Russell, Paul. Interview by FSF editorial staff.
Construction. Part 25.801, “Ditching.” each 35 passenger seats and at least two Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. May 1, 2003. Flight
exits, with one on each side of the airplane. Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
  2. Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). Joint U.S. As a U.S. Coast Guard officer, Russell
Aviation Requirements (JARs) 25, Large   8. Baugniet, Robert. E-mail communica- conducted more than 200 water landings
Aeroplanes. Emergency Provisions. JARs tion with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, and served in various positions, including
25.801, “Ditching.” JAA defines a large Virginia, U.S. Aug. 11, 2003. Flight Safety commander of two air stations, chief of the
airplane as having a maximum takeoff Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Aviation Training Center Training Division
weight of more than 5,700 kilograms/ and chief of search-and-rescue operations
12,500 pounds.   9. Pellegrini, Georges. Facsimile communica-
in the Northwest Region, before retiring in
tion with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
1984 with the rank of captain and beginning
  3. FAA. FARs Part 121, Operating Virginia, U.S. April 29, 2003. Flight Safety
his career with The Boeing Co. Russell also is
Requirements: Domestic, Flag and Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
a maritime safety and accident investigator
Supplemental Operations. Subpart H,
10. Fergus, Mike. E-mail communication for Safety Services International.
Aircraft Requirements. Part 121.161,
“Airplane limitations: Type of route.” with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
16. Cohen, Bob. Interview by Lacagnina,
Virginia, U.S. April 16, 2003. Flight Safety
Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
  4. JAA. JARs — Operations 1, Commercial Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
May 5, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
Air Transportation (Aeroplanes). Subpart B,
11. U.S. Civil Aeronautics Administration. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
General. JAR-OPS 1.060, “Ditching.”
Civil Air Regulations Part 4b, Airplane
  5. Travis, Tim. E-mail communication 17. Fisher, Lloyd J.; Hoffman, Edward L.
Airworthiness; Transport Categories.
with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, U.S. National Advisory Committee
Subpart D, Design and Construction. Part
Virginia, U.S. April 17, 2003. Flight Safety for Aeronautics Report 1347, Ditching
4b.361, “Ditching.”
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Investigations of Dynamic Models and
12. Bottcher, Andrea. E-mail communication Effects of Design Parameters on Ditching
  6. Pierce, Michael. Telephone inter- with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Characteristics. November 1956.
view by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. June 19, 2003. Flight Safety
Virginia, U.S. May 22, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 18. Thompson, William C. U.S. National
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Aeronautics and Space Administration
13. U.S. National Transportation Safety Technical Note D-101, Rough-water
  7. FAA. FARs Part 25. Subpart D. Part 25.807, Board. Accident Report, Eastern Air Lines, Ditching Investigation of a Model of a Jet
“Emergency exits.” Part 25.807(d) says, Inc., Lockheed L-1011, N334EA, Miami Transport With the Landing Gear Extended
“Whether or not ditching certification is International Airport, Miami, Florida, May and With Various Ditching Aids. October
requested, ditching emergency exits must 5, 1983. NTSB/AAR-84/04. 1959.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 77
 Di t c h i n g

Accident Experience Influences

Helicopter Overwater Operations
Real-life experiences in the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico
show the value of appropriate equipment and realistic training.

— FSF Editorial Staff

V
arious helicopter water-contact accidents have revealed lessons
learned about survival — or nonsurvival — of passengers and
crewmembers (see “Imagine the Worst Helicopter Ditching
— Now Get Ready for It,” page 85).

For example, a March 1992 accident in the North Sea involved an

Aerospatiale (now Eurocopter) AS 332L Super Puma equipped with
headsets with quick-release jack-plugs for each passenger; windows
modified for use as emergency exits; emergency exit illumination system
(EXIS) lights around every door; two 14-person life rafts (one in a valise
mounted across the right door frame, one in a box structure beneath
two seats); a manually activated emergency flotation system compris-
ing four flotation bags; and an automatic deployable emergency locator
transmitter (ADELT).1

78 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

The helicopter struck the sea following a survivors who had been clinging to the life right-front escape window; S1 [sur-
takeoff from an oil platform in winds gust- raft said that it had received considerable vivor no. 1] and S5 exited through
ing 50 knots to 58 knots, heavy showers of damage, especially to the floor, during the the escape window apertures nearest
hail and snow, temperature of zero degrees initial deployment. their seats; S2 removed the left-front
Celsius (32 degrees Fahrenheit) and verti- escape window and exited through
cal visibility of 1,200 feet (366 meters). The it, and S4 removed and exited
sea temperature was 7 degrees Celsius (45 All Deaths through the escape window next
degrees Fahrenheit) and the wave height Attributed to Drowning to his seat on the left side. NS2
was estimated to be eight meters to 11 [nonsurvivor no. 2] was seen by S5
meters (26 feet to 36 feet). One of the
two pilots and five of the 15 passengers
survived; the aircraft was destroyed.
T he report said that all deaths oc-
curred as a result of drowning and
that, in some cases, drowning occurred
to leave through the escape-window
aperture just behind his seat. Positive
identification of the escape route of
after the onset of hypothermia (see “Is the other four [nonsurviving] pas-
Causal factors were: “The [commander’s] There a Doctor Aboard the Life Raft?” sengers was not possible. … Five
failure to recognize the rapidly chang- page 187). occupants did not escape from the
ing relationship between airspeed and cabin and were later recovered from
groundspeed, which is a fundamental “All the injuries, both for survivors the seabed. … All five occupants had
problem associated with turning down- and the deceased, were superficial released their seat belts and appeared
wind in significant wind strengths. The and slight to the extent that they to be in the process of escaping. The
commander, who was the handling pilot should not have affected the ability five passengers who did not escape
at the time … inadvertently allowed the of an individual to escape from the were probably conscious after the
airspeed and then the height to decrease helicopter,” the report said. “After impact because they had released
while turning away from a strong gusting impact, the helicopter rapidly ad- their seat belts. … However, the
wind. Despite the application of maxi- opted a right-side-down attitude predicted breath-holding time in
mum power, the helicopter was incapable and then became fully inverted the conditions prevailing was less
of arresting its established descent within before it sank. It was not possible than 20 seconds; this was probably
the height available. Incipient vortex-ring to determine a precise time for this, the limiting factor in the case of
state and downdrafts may have contrib- but it is thought to have taken only the four occupants who were not
uted to this problem, as may the height a minute or two. The flight deck and apparently physically impeded in
of the wave crests. Several human factors, cabin suffered relatively minor dis- their attempt to escape.
including possibly some fatigue and frus- ruption in the impact with the sea,
tration, exacerbated by a demanding fly- but all of the escape windows on the “One, NS5 … was found with
ing program in which the commander right side of the cabin were ejected the cord of an acoustical headset
was managerially responsible, may have and the right cabin door suffered wrapped tightly around his neck.
degraded the crew’s performance to an distortion, which caused it to detach. The quick-release jack-plug had
extent that the normal safeguards of two- The escape windows and the cabin failed to separate because it had
crew operation failed.” door on the left side remained in been jammed into the seatback by
position. The impact came without the seat-headrest support. At what
The report said that wreckage indicated warning, and there was no evidence stage this entanglement occurred
that the mounted life raft probably had to suggest that all the occupants could not be determined. The life
been released manually by a passenger; were other than in their seats with raft in the right cabin door was
the emergency flotation system had been their harnesses properly fastened. released from its stowage, probably
armed but the flotation bags were not The commander escaped from the by a passenger, shortly after the door
inflated by the crew before impact. The aircraft via the right flight deck door had opened on impact; it started to
ADELT deployed and activated (see “The window and came to the surface to inflate almost immediately, the in-
Search-and-rescue System Will Find You see the copilot close by; it was not flation probably being initiated by
— If You Help,” page 111). Although the possible to determine how the lat- the short [mooring/inflation line].
EXIS lights were serviceable, “most of the ter had escaped. Water ingress to the It suffered major damage, particu-
survivors had not noticed the EXIS lights cabin was rapid and, although the larly to the floor, as a result of contact
around the cabin exits,” the report said. The survivors who had been seated to with parts of the helicopter. It did,
one life raft that was deployed ­apparently the rear reported that they had time however, inflate at least partially
inflated satisfactorily, but severe damage to take a deep breath of air, those at and provided support for some of
occurred before and after rescue. Several the front did not escape through the the survivors.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 79
 Di t c h i n g

“Both crew and passengers S1, S3, S5 and NS6 chamber, and NS1 and NS2 were floating up-
were known to have been at, or in the vicinity right with the inflated [life vest] having ridden
of this life raft. At an early stage, S1 attempted up to such a degree that their faces were under
to assist NS6 into the life raft; the attempt was the water. Of those who failed to escape, none
unsuccessful, and NS6 drifted away from the had inflated their life [vests].
area. Because it was so badly damaged, the
life raft was extremely unstable in the water “The crew wore … crew [cold-water immer-
and overturned on several occasions. On one sion] suits which appeared to have performed
[occasion], S3 was thrown into the sea and satisfactorily. The copilot’s suit was [past] its
was unable to swim back to [the life raft]; servicing date, but there was no evidence to
the cord which retained the life raft survival suggest that this in any way contributed to his
[equipment] pack had wrapped around his nonsurvival, but inadequate clothing worn
leg and consequently became detached from under the suit may have contributed to the
the life raft and drifted away with him. eventual onset of hypothermia. The … pas-
senger [immersion] suit was worn by all the
“Shortly after escaping on the left side, S4 found passengers. The majority appear to have been
that he was very close to two other passengers; correctly fitted, with the central zip up to at
one, apparently dead. He later identified him as least three inches [eight centimeters] from the
NS4, and he linked himself with the other, NS3. top. Evidence suggested that a majority also
He could see the life raft inflated on the far side had the hood up when the accident occurred.
of the helicopter but was unable to get into it. “None of the survivors reported feeling par-
The life raft stowed under seats … adjacent to ticularly cold, nor did any report difficulties
the left cabin door was not deployed, and those with water entering the suit. None managed
who escaped from the left side were unable to to extract and put on the gloves, and, although
get to the other life raft mainly because of the some managed to fit it, the strobe light kept
prevailing weather conditions and the fact that falling off its Velcro attachment on top of the
the fuselage was initially between them and it. hood. The suit worn by NS2 was the only
… On this occasion, the standby vessel [which one which was positively identified as having
is required to be within five nautical miles (nine taken in a significant amount of water; the
kilometers) of a manned offshore installation suit was partially unzipped, but it was not
and normally moves close to the platform possible to determine if it had been like this
during helicopter takeoffs] was standing off at the time of impact.
by about 1.5 nautical miles [2.8 kilometers]
and was unaware of the [accident] helicopter “The copilot was known to have survived
movement. … None of the survivors reported for a considerable time, during which he
any problem with [life vest] operation al- was reported to have made every effort to
though it was noted that maintain the morale of his fellow survivors.
[the life vests] tended to He eventually drifted away from the life raft;
ride up the body, even it is probable that he had succumbed to hy-

“T heir survival
when [they] had been
correctly fitted. All the
survivors reported dif-
pothermia and subsequently drowned. The
five passengers who survived were in the
water for between 40 minutes and one hour,
equipment … functioned ficulty deploying the 25 minutes. Their survival equipment must
spray screen [face shield]. be considered, in general, to have functioned
effectively for them to … Of the five passengers effectively for them to have remained alive and
who escaped but did not conscious in the prevailing conditions. One of
have remained alive survive, NS4 and NS3 the major problems experienced by the survi-
appeared to be floating vors, and no doubt by those who did not sur-
and conscious in the normally with their [life vive, was being swamped by water breaking
vests] inflated; NS5 was over their heads. The effectiveness of the [life
prevailing conditions.” floating face-down with vest] spray hood in alleviating the problem
his [life vest] deflated due cannot be assessed [in this accident] as none
to a tear in the buoyancy of the survivors managed to deploy it.”

80 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Survivors Recall Experiences themselves evenly around its cir-

“H
cumference, rendering it fairly

T he following excerpts from interviews with

two of the passengers who survived this ac-
cident show some of the specific difficulties that
stable in the heavy sea. Survivor
B managed to climb onto the in-
flated [life raft] and clung there
… is

have been experienced in surviving a helicopter until rescued; hands were numb
accident involving uncontrolled/inadvertent im-
pact with cold water:2 • “Back in the water, [Survivor A] and he was obliged
found that the [life vest], which
• “Survivor A had been sitting in the foremost had no crotch strap, tended to to cling to the [life]
starboard seat in the cabin and had been ride up until it was tight under
aware shortly before impact that the aircraft his chin and armpits. He was raft with his arms.”
was going to hit the sea. … Survivor B was in obliged to maintain a continu-
seat 12, aft of the door, and had no sensation ous paddling motion with his
of descending until the aircraft hit the sea. arms in order to keep his head
… In the event, the force of impact burst the above water. [He] had the clear impression
window inwards, and after releasing his har- that if at any time he raised his arms, the [life
ness without difficulty, [Survivor A] was able vest] would have slipped up over his head and
to grasp the outside of the aircraft through been lost. He managed to place the strobe light
the window aperture and lever himself out. on his head, where it remained secure until
… The first indication [to Survivor B] was a his rescue. Survivor B did not experience the
bang and the ingress of water at the rear of same difficulty with his [life vest], as he was not
the cabin. The water was up to his chest in a dependent on it for buoyancy. His strobe light
matter of seconds, but he had time to take a was serviceable, but … it was washed away by
couple of deep breaths before becoming im- the first wave;
mersed. He lunged for the nearest exit, which
had fortunately blown in, but was restrained • “Although he had not been aware of cold
by his seat belt, which he had forgotten to during his escape from the aircraft, once
release. While he was undoing [the seat-belt back in the water, Survivor A began to suf-
release], two others went out of the same exit, fer badly from the cold. His hands became
and he then followed them. He did not see any numb and useless, and he was unable to put
[exit] lighting, but it was reasonably bright on the gloves from his [immersion] suit. He
under water and he was wearing safety glasses found that he was facing downwind and had
(which he lost going through the exit); to battle constantly to surmount the waves
which approached him from behind, often
• “Having reached the surface, Survivor B without warning. His vision was restricted to
inflated his [life vest] and initially went to a narrow slit between the bottom of his hood
the undercarriage of the inverted helicopter, and the top of his [life vest] and [immersion]
which was still protruding above the surface. suit. He smelled and saw a [rescue] helicopter,
Fearing that he would be trapped under it, he which then departed, and was occasionally able
then made his way to the damaged and par- to see other survivors downwind when they
tially inflated life raft, which Survivor A had happened to be at the top of a swell; [and,]
already boarded. … Very soon, the [life] raft
was overturned by a wave, and [Survivor A] • “Survivor B was not aware of being cold for the
found himself back in the water with his leg first half hour, but his hands were numb and
entangled with the rope securing the [life raft] he was obliged to cling to the [life] raft with
survival [equipment] pack. He was freed from his arms. He and his companions experienced
this by Survivor B but then lost contact with increasing distress at the apparent lack of rescue
the [life] raft and the other survivors. Survivor efforts, and this had a particularly adverse effect
B, together with three others (the two aircrew on one of the aircrew who was still in the water
and another passenger) remained with the [life and who eventually died. The other passenger
raft] and, after [the mooring/inflation line] had was swept away (but survived). For the last
been released from the helicopter, they spaced 10 or 15 minutes, Survivor B was on his own

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 81
 Di t c h i n g

The two crewmembers

and all six passengers
— wearing immer-
sion suits and life vests
— were able to evacu-
ate the helicopter. They
inflated their life vests
and initially climbed
onto the belly of the he-
licopter. The helicopter
sank about 10 minutes
after it struck the wa-
ter. All occupants then
stayed together while
waiting approximately
one hour for rescue.
Water entered their
immersion suits during
the wait. One passenger
was unconscious when
rescued by the crew of
a supply vessel, which
was guided by helicop-
In some water-contact and was beginning to get very demoralized; he
ters circling the survivors. The passenger later
accidents during
sensed the onset of hypothermia [Survivor A
died. The emergency flotation system was not
was hauled aboard a vessel with ropes; Survivor
takeoff or approach to armed when the helicopter struck the water,
B was winched into a helicopter]. Both [had
an offshore oil platform, the accident report said. “The helicopter hit
been] fortunate enough to be close to open
helicopter occupants the water unexpectedly,” the report said. “It
escape hatches through which they were able
had less than a is therefore doubtful if in this case — even
to make their exit within a few seconds of im-
if the ‘Floats Armed’ switch had been in the
one-minute warning pact. It is significant that both [were] strong and
‘ARMED’ position — the crew would have
before impact. confident swimmers who were able to remain
come to the point to activate the [emergency
clear-headed and in control of their breathing
flotation system]. … It is understandable that
when under water, both in the initial evacuation
the helirafts [life rafts that can be used with
from the aircraft and subsequently during their
either side up in the water] were not used, given
frequent immersion under heavy waves.”
the time available and the necessary and rather
cumbersome actions required to get the life
Speed of Capsizing Allows rafts outside the helicopter. … In this case, a
Moments to Take Action greater awareness of the existence and use of
available survival assets could have shortened
The following accidents also illustrate the survival the time of immersion in the water, and better
challenges: knowledge and use of the available personal
survival equipment could have decreased the
• In 1997, the crew of a Sikorsky S‑76B had be- amount of body cooling”;3 and,
gun a second approach to a North Sea produc-
tion platform when the helicopter “lost almost • During a flight to an offshore oil platform
all forward speed and entered a steep descent in the Gulf of Mexico, a pilot encountered
towards the sea.” The pilot’s application of col- deteriorating weather and conducted a series
lective control and power could not prevent the of orbits to wait for the thunderstorms and
helicopter from entering the water. The heli- squalls to pass. During one orbit at about
copter almost immediately rolled right to an 1015 local time, the aircraft was struck by
inverted attitude, and water entering through a 15-foot [five-meter] swell and rolled into
a broken door window rapidly filled the cabin. the water. The accident report said, “All three

82 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

occupants were able to extricate example, European offshore helicopter half of the total fatalities], representing
themselves, swim to the surface and accidents from January 1968 to December a fatality rate of 3.86 per 100,000 flying
inflate their life vests. The passengers 2000 included 19 fatal accidents, of which hours,” the report said. “The total of 19
stated [that] they all signaled to each 13 were accidents other than ditchings and deaths in the four survivable accidents
other that they were not seriously in- one — in 1973 — was a ditching. The other represents a theoretical maximum num-
jured; they then joined up and stayed water-contact accidents involved striking ber of lives that might possibly have been
together. … According to the passen- the water in the following circumstances: saved through the perfect functioning of
gers, the aircraft continued to float loss of control after mechanical failure, un- the safety and survival system. … This
for about five to six hours, during commanded descent into water in adverse would equate to an average of about
which time one of them attempted weather, in-flight collision with structure, one life per year. … Of greatest interest
unsuccessfully three times to retrieve failure of main-rotor transmission, failure to [this study] are the seven survivable
the life raft from inside the aircraft. of tail-rotor transmission and tail rotor, impacts with water [four resulting in
The passenger did retrieve another loss of power, pilot disorientation in low- deaths] and 11 ditchings [in which all
life vest which he gave to the pilot for visibility conditions, fracture of main-ro- occupants survived], representing event
additional [flotation] support. The tor blade and tail-rotor failure.5 rates of 0.29 and 0.46 per 100,000 fly-
passengers stated that it was during ing hours. One conclusion that can be
this time that the pilot stated, ‘I’m The report by the U.K. Health and Safety drawn from this is that, since there is no
sorry, fellas, we had a chance to land Executive said, “One hundred nineteen vast difference in the likelihood of either
and we didn’t.’ He also said that he people died on their way to or from eventuality, it would not be reasonable
thought everything was ‘all over for installations in 11 [of the 19 accidents] to optimize safety measures entirely in
[him] anyway.’ The passengers told that occurred during the cruise phase. favor of one at the expense of the other,
him that they were all ‘OK’ and that The helicopter crashed into the sea in all for example, in the cases of helicopter
they needed to concentrate on sur- but one case [that occurred over land].” flotation [only manual deployment vs.
vival. After the aircraft sank, one of The same cruise-phase data showed 30 manual/automatic deployment] and life
the passengers decided to attempt survivors among the 119 people on these raft deployment [interior stowage vs.
to swim to the … platform, which helicopters. exterior stowage].”
was estimated as being about two
miles away. Shortly thereafter, the “There have been 24 deaths from seven An analysis of U.S. civil rotorcraft ac-
second passenger began swimming fatal accidents offshore at an installation cidents from 1963 through 1997 found
toward the platform; however, the or within the 500-meter [1,641-foot safe- that 3.5 percent of autorotative-accident
pilot elected to float and await res- ty] zone,” the report said. The same near- landings involved ditching.7
cue. The first passenger reached the installation data showed that three of the
unmanned platform about three fatalities were helideck crewmembers and In 1998, about 8,300 offshore helicopter
hours after setting out and was able that there were 22 survivors among the flights per day were being conducted in
to [call] his office. The passenger on 43 people on these helicopters. the oil and gas industry, with an average
the platform was rescued by a [U.S.] length of 20 minutes, representing 87
Coast Guard cutter about 1926, and A 1995 report by the U.K. Civil Aviation percent of all helicopter hours flown
the second passenger was recovered Authority said that water-contact ac- worldwide. Industry data showed that 11
[rescued] by a work boat about cidents in the U.K. sector of the North accidents (including six fatal accidents)
1935. The same work boat spotted Sea during an 18-year period gener- and 35 fatalities (22 fatalities in one mid-
the unconscious pilot face down in ally involved either ditchings in which air collision involving two helicopters)
the water about 0128 the following all helicopter occupants survived, occurred in 1998 in offshore operations,
morning. During the attempted re- uncontrolled/inadvertent impacts with representing 1.07 accidents per 100,000
covery, the pilot’s life vest came off water, controlled descents into a rough flight hours.8
and he sank below the surface.”4 sea or helicopters falling off a helideck.6
A review of U.S. National Transportation
“From 1976 to 1993, the [U.K.] offshore Safety Board reports on 24 water-contact
Time Until Rescue Varies industry has generated 2.2 million heli- helicopter accidents in the Gulf of Mexico
From Minutes to Hours copter operating hours in the carriage of from January 1993 to August 2003 found
some 38 million passengers, for the loss a variety of probable causes. These in-

M any different causes of helicop-

ter water-contact accidents have
been determined in accident reports. For
of 85 lives in eight fatal accidents [four of
which were considered nonsurvivable and
one of which accounted for more than
cluded the pilot’s failure to maintain
clearance from the ocean for unknown
reasons; entanglement of part of a skid

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 83
 Di t c h i n g

with a helideck hatch-door handle; inad- control, loss of engine power, collision Helicopters rolled to an inverted position
equate maintenance leading to in-flight with water during a course reversal (or struck the water while inverted) in 19
loss of control; loss of engine power; and striking an object on an oil plat- of the accidents and sank in nine of the
loss of tail-rotor effectiveness during form. accidents. In three accidents, the force
a low-speed right-turn maneuver; in- of impact damaged or deflated part of
ternal engine fire; fuel exhaustion; fuel Among all 31 accidents, reported alti- the flotation system. Life rafts were used
contamination; fuel starvation; failure to tudes above the water at the beginning by occupants in four accidents, and an
maintain yaw control; failure of the rotor- of the accident sequences ranged from emergency breathing device was used by
tachometer generator; failure to maintain 150 feet to 2,000 feet. Helicopters struck a pilot in one accident.
proper main-rotor speed; tail-rotor-blade the ocean in uncontrolled descents, con-
strikes that severed the aft portion of a trolled flight or falls from platforms in When reported, the elapsed time for
tail boom; in-flight collision with another eight of the accidents. The pilot con- survivors to be rescued ranged from
helicopter; tail-rotor-blade separation; ducted an autorotation in 17 accidents “immediately” to nine hours. In one
and failure to release tiedowns before and deployed the emergency flotation accident, a 26-hour search was sus-
takeoff. system in 10 accidents. In another pended when the accident site could
accident, the tail rotor struck a five- not be found. In another accident, the
Preliminary information for seven other foot [two-meter] wave after the pilot search was suspended after six days, and
helicopter accidents for which final re- conducted a precautionary landing on the aircraft wreckage was found 18 days
ports were not available indicated that the water, resulting in separation of the later when it became entangled in the
they involved factors such as loss of tail-rotor drive shaft. shrimp net of a boat. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Get your first underwater-escape experience in training — not in an accident.

• Every second counts if underwater escape is required: Predicted breath-holding time in frigid water is less
than 20 seconds.

• Even while floating in a cold-water immersion suit and/or life vest, breathing will be difficult during immer-
sion by heavy waves.

• Make decisions about equipment and training based on how frequently people fly over water.

Notes   3. FSF Editorial Staff. “Helicopter Downed   6. U.K. CAA. Report of the Review of Helicopter
in North Sea After Lightning Strike Offshore Safety and Survival. CAP 641.
  1. U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Exceeds Lightning-protection System
Report on the Accident to AS 332L Super Capabilities.” Helicopter Safety, Volume   7. Harris, Franklin D.; Kasper, Eugene F.;
Puma, G–TIGH, Near the Cormorant 24 (January–February 1998). Iseler, Laura E. “U.S. Civil Rotorcraft
‘A’ Platform, East Shetland Basin, on 14 Accidents 1963 Through 1997.” U.S.
March 1992. April 26, 1993.   4. U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. National Aeronautics and Space
Accident report no. FTW94LA021. Oct. Administration Report no. NASA/TM–
  2. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 29, 1993. 2000–209597. December 2000.
Report of the Review of Helicopter Offshore
Safety and Survival. Annex D, “Evidence   5. Morrison, Graham. Helicopter Safety   8. International Association of Oil and Gas
From Cormorant Alpha Survivors.” Civil Offshore. U.K. Health and Safety Producers. “Safety Performance of Helicopter
Aviation Publication (CAP) 641. February Executive Offshore Technology Report Operations in the Oil and Gas Industry,
1995 (reprinted May 2002). 2000/089. 2001. 1998.” Report no. 6.83/300, December 1999.

84 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Imagine the Worst Helicopter
Ditching — Now Get Ready for It
You’re upside down, it’s dark, the helicopter is full of water and you’re
holding your breath. Not all helicopter ditchings result in this demanding
scenario, but to maximize the odds of your survival, you must be prepared.

— FSF Editorial Staff

E
ven helicopter operators that do not coastal areas, international specialists said. Most
fly routinely over open water should overwater-survival systems for helicopter opera-
ensure that crews are current in air- tions are designed for the known threats of a
craft-specific methods for ditching ditching — in which physical forces and human
with an emergency flotation system and for behavior are relatively predictable — but may
ditching without an emergency flotation sys- not be adequate for uncontrolled/inadvertent
tem, and for surviving an uncontrolled descent impact with water or controlled descent into
into water during flight over rivers, lakes and a rough sea.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 85
 Di t c h i n g

The U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has de- When conducted correctly, a ditching with
fined ditching as “a deliberate emergency landing an emergency flotation system — with power
on water.” A helicopter ditching could be required or without power — presents the least risk of
for various reasons, including engine failure or a drowning or other injury to aircraft occupants
catastrophic in-flight problem — such as very low who have been equipped and trained for this sce-
fuel or impending main-rotor transmission failure nario. Occupants of the helicopter typically would
— that makes continued flight too hazardous. deploy and directly board a life raft to wait for as-
sistance. A power-off ditching and an emergency
Training prepares pilots to complete ditching flotation system that cannot be activated or fails
procedures that enable all occupants to evacuate to activate properly typically presents the greatest
directly from an upright cabin to a life raft in many risk of drowning or injury to aircraft occupants,
situations. Some scenarios after touchdown can even when they have been equipped and trained
be panic provoking, especially among untrained for ditching.
occupants who must hold their
breath in an inverted helicopter, “U.S. commercial helicopters beyond gliding range

S
wait for the cabin to flood, release of shore are required to have emergency flotation
restraints and find and operate systems, life vests and life rafts; in an emergency,
ome
exits using memorized handholds pilots normally would inflate the flotation bags
and a few rows of lights in total and try to land on the water — either a normal
scenarios
darkness. landing or an autorotative landing,” said Joel
after touchdown
Harris, assistant director of standards for quality
Complicating all ditching sce- assurance, FlightSafety International. “When this
can be panic narios in helicopters are two con- has happened in the Gulf of Mexico, the system
tradictory survival requirements: typically keeps the aircraft out of the water for a
provoking. evacuating as quickly as possible time while the U.S. Coast Guard sends a boat. If
because of the tendency of heli- the aircraft does not have this system or the flota-
copters to roll, capsize and rapidly tion bags do not inflate, the pilot first wants the
sink; and waiting inside the cabin rotors to stop turning — which requires rolling
until rotors have been stopped so that the blades do the aircraft so that the blades stop or break off.”3
not strike and kill survivors. The risk to survivors Harris holds an airline transport pilot certificate
also increases in a water-contact accident in which and a flight instructor certificate with ratings in
neither the aircraft emergency flotation system nor helicopters and airplanes. He has served as a U.S.
life rafts are deployed, one accident report said.1 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) designated
Because of these unpredictable risks, pilots must pilot proficiency examiner, a U.S. Federal Aviation
control as many of the variables as possible. Regulations (FARs) Part 135 check airman and a
safety counselor. He has administered more than
“It is difficult to explain the apparent reluctance 10,000 hours of flight, simulator and ground
of some pilots to ditch their helicopter in case school training to professional pilots.
of emergency,” said a U.S. Army training docu-
ment. “It may [result from] the subconscious Survival in helicopter water-contact accidents often
knowledge that the aircraft will most likely be is possible because of the relatively low speed of
a total loss, or fear of getting trapped. Based on impact and the occupant protection provided by
actual experience, the ditching of a helicopter seats and restraint systems. Nevertheless, crewmem-
definitely presents much less of a problem, im- bers and passengers expect that after surviving the
pact-wise, than a landing on very rough terrain impact, they could face other life-threatening chal-
or in high trees. If there are any problems, they lenges. In some operating environments, the risks
are mainly self-imposed ones in the form of a of hypothermia and drowning must be managed
premature evacuation of the occupants (before by wearing cold-water immersion suits (also known
the main rotor has stopped) and failure to have as survival suits, exposure suits, helicopter passen-
all doors open at the time of water entry. … If it ger suits, aircrew immersion suits and helicopter
becomes absolutely necessary to make a landing offshore transport suits; see “Is There a Doctor
over water, the pilot should make every effort to Aboard the Life Raft?” page 187). Transport Canada
land as close to the shore as possible.”2 said that “[an immersion suit] system reduces

86 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

thermal shock upon entry into cold water, delays problem such as fuel exhaustion or transmis-
onset of hypothermia during immersion in cold sion failure. The pilot lands the helicopter,
water and provides some flotation to minimize which remains afloat and upright. The crew
risk of drowning, while not impairing the wearer’s deploys the life raft, and all occupants evacu-
ability to evacuate from a ditched helicopter.”4 (See ate directly into the life raft as soon as the
“Cold Outside, Warm Inside,” page 357.) rotors stop turning; or,

• A helicopter with hull-flotation equipment

Stopping Rotor Blades has inadequate engine power for continued
Precedes Evacuation flight. The pilot conducts an autorotative
landing, and the helicopter remains afloat

“D itching a helicopter can be done with

little or no groundspeed, which should
decrease the resultant decelerative violence,” said
and upright. The crew deploys the life raft
and all occupants evacuate directly into the
life raft as soon as the rotors stop turning.
the U.S. National Search and Rescue Committee.
“However, without built-in flotation, the heli- The pre-takeoff briefing, typically conducted by the
copter will sink so rapidly that timely evacua- pilot, should include the exact method of fastening
tion becomes a major problem. The danger is and unfastening restraints, the location and use of
compounded because the evacuation cannot be flotation equipment and survival equipment such
started until rotating components have come to a as pyrotechnic signaling devices, how and when
stop, by which time cabin spaces are filling or are the aircraft would be evacuated in a ditching, the
filled with water.”5 location of normal exits and emergency exits, and
the methods of opening the exits.
Ditching scenarios might include any combina-
tion of the following: “For FARs Part 135 [commuter and on-demand
operations], the rules require the pilot to conduct a
• A helicopter without hull-flotation equipment briefing of passengers prior to flight, demonstrat-
has engine power, but the pilot anticipates a ing and explaining the use of all safety devices and
problem such as fuel exhaustion or transmis- equipment such as shoulder harnesses, emergency
sion failure. Life rafts are deployed, and all oc- exits, life vests and life rafts,” said Sharon Miles,
cupants (except the pilot flying) enter the water an aviation safety engineer in the FAA Rotorcraft
as the helicopter is flown in a normal hover at Directorate. 6 “FARs Part 91
three feet to five feet (1 meter to 1.5 meters). [general operating rules] also
Those in the water inflate their life vests and requires a passenger safety brief-
board the life rafts. The pilot hover-taxis ap-
proximately 50 yards [46 meters] downwind
and ditches the helicopter, a scenario that
ing by the pilot.”

Because installed equipment can

“T he evacuation

creates a risk that the pilot will be unable to vary even among similar models cannot be started
reunite with other survivors. Ditching the in an operator’s fleet, each brief-
helicopter away from other survivors in the ing should be tailored to provide until rotating
water reduces the risk of injury to the other thorough information on the
survivors from rotor blades and capsizing; specific equipment available for components have
the helicopter that will be flown.
• A helicopter without hull-flotation equip- come to a stop.”
ment has inadequate engine power for contin- “Typically, when life rafts are
ued flight. The pilot conducts an autorotative part of the overwater emergency
landing; the rotor blades are stopped; the crew equipment, they are stored in-
deploys the life raft; the occupants evacuate side the helicopter in the United States,” Miles
after the cabin has filled with water; and all said. “FAA also has approved some life rafts that
occupants board the life raft; are installed on the skids and can be deployed
from inside the cabin.” Door compartments and
• A helicopter with hull-flotation equipment storage pods attached to the side or underside of
has engine power, but the pilot anticipates a the fuselage also are used, and FAA requires all

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 87
 Di t c h i n g

types to be deployable from inside the aircraft, • “Main-rotor brake (when available) should be
she said. applied and the aircraft kept level while rotor
[revolutions per minute (rpm)] decreases. As
Beyond preflight briefings, specialized training the fuselage settles in the water, [collective]
can improve the likelihood that passengers will pitch should be pulled until the aircraft tends
survive a ditching. Some helicopter to roll. At [that same] time, cyclic should be
operators require passengers to re- applied in the same direction so water contact
ceive emergency training, although will stop the main rotor without violent reac-

“A
this is not required by some civil tions or flipping the aircraft in the opposite
aviation authorities such as FAA, direction. If one side of the aircraft provides
ll
Transport Canada and U.K. CAA. better exits, the helicopter should be rolled
in the opposite direction [away from the side
occupants remain
“For example, when Gulf Coast em- with better exits] before effective rotor control
strapped in their ployees of an oil company fly regu- is completely lost; and,
larly as helicopter passengers, the
seats until cabin company often requires helicopter • “It is important that all occupants remain
overwater-safety training for the strapped in their seats until cabin spaces have
spaces have filled employees,” Miles said (see “Train filled with water. This prevents being swept
to Rise to the Top,” page 378). around inside the cabin with in-rushing wa-
with water.” ter. Each occupant must identify and hold on
U.S. Army safety-training docu- to a reference until the aircraft has submerged.
ments contain the following gen- This minimizes disorientation with respect to
eral ditching procedures, which are based on actual the nearest exit, regardless of aircraft attitude
ditching experience in single-main-rotor helicop- after submersion. [Life vests] should not be
ters without emergency flotation systems.7 inflated until positively clear of the aircraft.”

• “If possible, prior to water contact, jettison The FSF Helicopter Flight Crew Ditching Checklist
doors that open outward. Cabin doors that (page 89) is intended as a framework for further
slide should be opened or windows removed. discussion of ditching procedures. The checklist
Care must be taken when jettisoning doors to was assembled from basic procedures recom-
preclude damage to the main-[rotor blades] mended by several helicopter operators, training
or tail-rotor blades; specialists and water-survival specialists. The focus
of the checklist is on float-equipped helicopters
• “A normal landing should be made at zero that remain afloat following ditchings during
groundspeed into the wind and [at a] mini- offshore operations, but the information also is
mum rate of sink. Excessive tail flare should be useful to corporate operators, on-demand opera-
avoided; premature water contact of the tail tors and others who conduct overwater flights in
rotor may result in loss of anti-torque control helicopters.
before the main fuselage settles in the water. In
the event of ditching due to anticipated fuel
starvation or for any reason when ditching is
Passengers Must
imminent but not immediate, much can be Prepare Themselves
done to protect personnel and survival gear
if planned ditching procedures are estab-
lished and followed. In a planned ditching, T he time available to prepare for helicopter
impact was longer than five minutes in some
ditchings, but was less than one minute in others.
the helicopter should be hover-taxied ap-
proximately 50 yards [46 meters] downwind Because helicopter overwater operations typically
after the [passengers,] crew and equipment are conducted without a flight attendant aboard,
have been evacuated. A hovering autorota- passengers must prepare themselves for a ditching.
tion should then be accomplished to attain The FSF Helicopter Passenger Ditching Checklist
minimum rotor speed upon contact with the (page 90) is intended as a framework for discus-
water. Under any ditching conditions, water sion of procedures that will help passengers fend
spray may reduce visibility; Continued on page 91

88 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Flight Safety Foundation

Helicopter Flight Crew Ditching Checklist
(Offshore Operations)

Fly the aircraft.

Preliminary
• Transmit a “mayday” and intentions to ditch; select transponder code 7700.
• Maintain the minimum specified torque value.
• Turn into the wind.
• Select the landing area.
• Maintain airspeed for minimum rate of descent.
• Maintain the landing gear up.
Preparation
• Arm the emergency flotation system per flight crew operating manual (FCOM).
• Landing light, as required.
• Emergency lights, as required.
• Tell passengers not to inflate life vests until clear of the aircraft.
Before Ditching
• Manually deploy the emergency flotation system per FCOM.
• Command/signal “brace.”
• Reduce groundspeed, drift and rate of descent to a minimum.
• Gently lower the collective after touchdown.
After Ditching
• Shut down the engine(s).
• Apply the rotor brake with great caution (if equipped).
• Announce on the radio frequency in use that the helicopter has been ditched and
evacuation has begun.
• Deploy and/or confirm activation of the automatic deployable emergency locator
transmitter (if equipped).
• Jettison the doors (if equipped).
• Arm and deploy life rafts when main-rotor blades have stopped.
• Confirm life raft deployment.
• Evacuate passengers, and exit with specified emergency equipment.
• Conduct roll call.
• Cut the mooring/inflation line, as appropriate.
CHECKLIST

• Confirm that the life raft emergency locator transmitter is activated (if equipped).
• Initiate survival procedures with life rafts or without life rafts as required by conditions.

Note: This information, which focuses on helicopters with emergency flotation systems during offshore operations,
was assembled for discussion of ditching procedures and is not intended to supersede operators’ or manufacturers’
requirements or recommended procedures.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 89
 Di t c h i n g

Flight Safety Foundation

Helicopter Passenger Ditching Checklist
(Offshore Operations)

Preliminary
• Obey the pilot’s instructions.

• Do not distract the pilot.

• Do not inflate the life vest inside the helicopter; prepare the immersion suit
for use.

• Secure helmet, if provided.

• Review the location and operation of doors and emergency exits.

• Establish the reference position (handhold).

• Review the location and operation of the emergency locator transmitter and life raft.

Preparation
• Secure all loose equipment.

• Remove eyeglasses if they are not secured in the helmet and secure them in
a closed pocket.

• Fasten the seat belt correctly and review release procedures.

Before Ditching
• Confirm the reference position (handhold); be prepared for escape if the
helicopter capsizes.

• When commanded by the pilot, assume the brace position; maintain the brace position
until landing motion has ceased.

After Ditching
• Obey the pilot’s instructions on opening exits, evacuating cabin and boarding life raft(s).

• If pilot is incapacitated, open exits and evacuate after main-rotor blades stop turning.

• Inflate life vest, board the life raft and conduct roll call.

• If life rafts are unavailable, use line to connect all survivors in a single group.

Note: This information, which focuses on helicopters with emergency flotation systems during offshore operations,
CHECKLIST

was assembled for discussion of ditching procedures and is not intended to supersede operators’ or manufacturers’
requirements or recommended procedures.

90 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

for themselves before and after impact. The focus “The weather over the sea can be very different from
of the checklist is offshore operations, but the the land (e.g., sea fog),” U.K. CAA said. “The water
information also is useful to corporate operators, around the U.K. coast is cold even in summer, and
on-demand operators and others who conduct survival time may be only 15 minutes (about the
overwater flights in helicopters. time needed to scramble a [search-and-rescue
(SAR)] helicopter). A good-quality insulated [im-
The first item on the checklist is to obey the pilot’s mersion] suit, with warm clothing underneath and
instructions; other checklist items help passengers the hood up and well sealed, should provide over
to be prepared. three hours survival time. … In addition, take a life
raft; it’s heavy, so recheck weight and balance. … It
Surviving the impact requires proper restraint should be properly secured but easily accessible, as a
at all times, and is enhanced by a timely brace helicopter will sink faster than an airplane. … You
command if the occupants have been briefed on are strongly urged to carry a personal locator beacon
the brace command or by a command to “grab [see “The Search-and-rescue System Will Find You
your ankles.” Some helicopter operators brief pas- — If You Help,” page 111] and flares. Remain on an
sengers on the following brace positions: With appropriate aeronautical radio station [frequency].
shoulder straps, tighten your seat belt and shoul- … If the helicopter is fitted with [emergency hull-]
der strap and sit upright, knees together, arms flotation equipment, make sure you are familiar with
folded across your chest; without shoulder straps, its operation. Minimize overwater time in single-
bend forward so that your chest is on your lap, [engine] helicopters. (Public transport helicopters
head on knees and arms folded under your thighs are limited to 10 minutes over
(see “Studies Reveal Passenger Misconceptions water when crossing sea areas
About Brace Commands and Brace Positions,” around the United Kingdom.)”9

H
page 51).
Some helicopters used in com-
e had
Upon water contact, egress from the helicopter is mercial offshore transport in the
the next step in the survival process — but prob- North Sea have public-address difficulty
ability of escape depends on how long the aircraft systems that are used for briefings
floats and whether the aircraft remains upright and for communication during remembering to
at the surface. Accident experience has shown emergencies. Because passengers
that even among trained passengers and crew- typically wear the hood of their unfasten restraints
members, the procedures for taking and hold- immersion suit covering their
ing a breath, unfastening seat belts/harnesses, ears during takeoffs and landings, while submerged in
removing headsets or operating an emergency methods of emergency commu-
exit under water can be difficult to remember nication have to be provided that a dark cockpit.
and difficult to accomplish. compensate for reduced ability
to hear. In some systems, cordless
One U.S. Army helicopter pilot said that after headsets or headsets with snag-
a ditching following engine failure at 30 feet resistant safety features have been implemented.
above the water, he was stunned temporarily by the
sudden immersion and a blow to the face. Despite Because of the variability of accident conditions,
having completed helicopter underwater-escape some elements of any survival system may prove to
training, he said that he had difficulty remember- be unsatisfactory for the actual circumstances. For
ing to unfasten restraints while submerged in a example, deploying life rafts stowed on the exterior
dark cockpit and that his emergency underwater- of the helicopter may be preferable in a sudden col-
breathing device (see “HEED This,” page 365) was lision with water, but deploying life rafts stowed
nearly depleted before he could egress, inflate his inside the cabin may be preferable in a ditching with
life vest and reach the water surface.8 an emergency flotation system deployed.

In addition to helicopter-specific ditching pro- A U.K. CAA report said,“We endorse the view … that
cedures, U.K. CAA has published the following an externally mounted [life] raft is more likely to be
broad recommendations about planning and of use in the case of an unexpected and/or violent
conducting overwater helicopter flights. impact with the sea; under such circumstances, it is

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 91
 Di t c h i n g

highly desirable that the life raft should be released wind] is the direction of choice, followed by dry
automatically without the need for any action by leeward [the side or direction facing away from the
crew or passengers.” Methods could be provided to wind],” the report said. (Deploying the life raft so
manually release external life rafts from the cockpit, that the wind blows it toward the helicopter can
the cabin or outside the aircraft as required by cir- assist the boarding process but increase the risk
cumstances, and to enable the crew to drop one of that the life raft will be lifted from the water and
its life rafts to survivors of another helicopter that pressed against the aircraft.)
has been ditched or otherwise has entered the water,
the report said. “A wet evacuation should be avoided if possible,
but if inevitable, the windward side is again prefer-
able. A wet evacuation presents a number of prob-
Sea Conditions Dictate lems made worse by a high sea state and darkness.
How to Board Life Rafts These include difficulties in gripping the [mooring/
inflation line], swimming away on the leeward side,

P reventing damage to life rafts launched from

helicopters requires a strategy for life raft
boarding that matches the emergency conditions.
navigating to the safe zone, communication in the
water and, after an exhausting swim, climbing into
the life raft. … Given the variable nature of heli-
copter ditching accidents, the pilot and crew may
“Traditionally, the dry-shod method (or dry have very little choice concerning which method
method) has been taught to evacuate the fuselage to use. Their training must include the options,
and enter the life raft,” said a 1995 U.K. research as well as the advantages and disadvantages and
report. “The crew and passengers enter the inflated include practice of each [method].”
life raft directly from the fuselage, without getting
wet. Throughout the evacuation procedure, the Significant improvements in emergency exit light-
life raft is tethered on a short [mooring/inflation ing and life rafts occurred during the 1990s, U.K.
line] against the fuselage. Thus, the survivor is not CAA said.
exposed to the attendant dangers of cold-water
immersion and drowning; and there is a low risk of “All helicopters being used in support of offshore
separation from the [life] raft. The disadvantages energy exploitation [require] emergency-exit illu-
of the dry-shod method are: The [life] raft may be mination to be adequate for its purpose when the
damaged by contact with the helicopter, lost if the aircraft is capsized and the cabin partially or com-
helicopter capsizes, or be difficult to enter.”10 pletely submerged,” U.K. CAA said.11 “Additionally,
some cabin windows are of a suitable size to pro-
In contrast, during a wet evacuation (also called vide an additional escape route and as required
the swim-away method), one survivor attaches a … must be made openable. … Although not a
line to the life raft container, pushes the life raft requirement, lighting for these ‘escape windows’
container to a safe zone (outside the rotor-strike can be installed, provided it does not reduce the
area if the helicopter capsizes), deploys and boards effectiveness of the emergency exit illumination.
the life raft. Other survivors enter the water, then
move along the line to the life raft and board the “In principle, at least two separate means of [emer-
life raft in the safe zone. gency-exit lighting] activation should be provided:
With this method, survi- by flight crew action, to switch all exit light systems
vors leave the helicopter simultaneously; and automatically, when the cabin

“A wet
more quickly, but time to
life raft boarding is longer
because of the swimming
becomes more than half submerged in water, each
emergency exit being provided with its own auto-
matic switch. Where it is impracticable to provide
evacuation required. for remote activation of an individual exit lighting
— for example, where the emergency exit is inset
should be avoided “The current results con- into a door — a self-contained automatic activation
firm that dry [evacuation] alone will be acceptable. Flight crew compartment
if possible.” is the evacuation of choice emergency-exit lights should only be activated
and windward [the side or automatically, unless it can be shown that reflec-
direction facing toward the tions or dazzle will not be a hazard to the flight

92 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

crew. Lights should operate at their full brightness securing [the life raft] to the

“A
level for a minimum of 10 minutes after activation. helicopter cut by a sharp
Battery capacity should take account of the need edge, and [the life raft be-
for routine testing of the light system. The system ing] difficult or impossible helicopter
should remain fully operational when submerged to launch.”13
to a depth of at least 50 feet [15 meters]. is inherently unstable
Extreme caution is required
“For passenger-compartment exits, there must be to prevent accidental snag- whether or not
sufficient light to locate the means of release of the ging of a life raft mooring/
it has a flotation
exit. This will normally entail the provision of a inflation line that could
discrete locator light adjacent to the exit-release cause inflation inside the
system.”
means. Brightness should be such that the exits cabin and/or entanglement
can be identified as such from a distance of at least with the aircraft interior,
20 feet [six meters] in clear water, without any the report said.
additional light from other sources. … Activation
[of escape-window lighting] should be in a similar Two major factors influence the equipment and
manner to emergency-lighting activation, except training helicopter operators provide to crews and
that no manual control need be provided, and each passengers to survive water-contact accidents: the
window-lighting system should be completely in- threat of cold shock and hypothermia, and the
dependent wherever possible. amount of time that probably would be required
for search and rescue.
“Underwater escape through a rectangular aperture
of 17 inches by 14 inches (432 millimeters by 355 Survival-related technologies and methods used
millimeters) has been satisfactorily demonstrated by European helicopter operators in the North Sea
by persons of a size believed to cover 95 percent (most flying between offshore oil-production plat-
of male persons wearing representative survival forms and Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and
clothing and uninflated [life vests]. … For windows the United Kingdom) and in the North Atlantic
smaller than approximately 19 inches by 17 inches (most flying between offshore oil-production plat-
(483 millimeters by 432 millimeters), down to the forms and Canada) are applicable to most of the
minimum acceptable size of 17 inches by 14 inches, world’s cold-water environments. After surviving
placarding and passenger briefing will be necessary to the aircraft impact with water and evacuating the
ensure that larger persons do not occupy the adjacent helicopter, passengers and crewmembers floating
seats. It is recommended that placards should be of in open water would be expected to withstand
the pictorial ‘fat man/thin man’ type.”12 the risks of drowning and hypothermia for a
time ranging from 30 minutes to a few hours if
During the 1990s, some civil aviation authorities they have appropriate immersion suits, life vests
and manufacturers attempted to provide life rafts and training. Boarding a life raft could extend
for helicopters that could be deployed easily and significantly survival times.
would be resistant to punctures caused by sharp
edges and protrusions of a floating helicopter. Survival-related technologies and methods of U.S.
helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico (most
“After ditching into water, a helicopter is inherently flying between offshore oil-production platforms
unstable whether or not it has a flotation system; and Texas or Louisiana) are applicable to other
even a moderate-sized breaking wave may capsize areas of the world where water temperatures are
or sink it,” one U.K. research report said. “Thus, the warmer. After surviving the aircraft impact with
potential for loss of life is very real. … The vari- water and evacuating from the helicopter, pas-
ous problems involved in escape from a ditched sengers and crewmembers floating in open water
helicopter include: total loss of the raft because the would be expected to withstand the threats of
helicopter rolled on top of it, puncture through drowning and hypothermia for a period of time
friction on the fuselage or a tail-rotor strike, being ranging from a few hours to several days, if they
blown onto its side against the side of the fuselage have appropriate life vests and training. Boarding
and [being] impossible to right, survivors having a life raft could extend to weeks the time available
difficulty in boarding, the [mooring/inflation line] for search and rescue. 

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 93
 Di t c h i n g

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Properly wearing restraints counteracts the effects of in-rushing water that could cause occupants to strike
objects, ingest water or become too disoriented to evacuate.

• Every crewmember and passenger must know how to brace for impact, to find the primary/secondary exits by
touch and to operate the exits.

• Never inflate a life vest inside the helicopter because the bulk and buoyancy can prevent escape, and the vest
could be punctured.

• Procedures for helicopter ditching must protect cockpit/cabin occupants from turning main-rotor blades yet
enable evacuation as quickly as possible.

• Correctly wearing cold-water immersion suits and boarding life rafts significantly extends survival time.

Notes Fort Wolters, Texas, U.S. File no. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
1–403–2. <users.adelphia.net/~luv2hang/
  7. U.S. Army. “Basic Ditching Techniques
crash.htm>
  1. Dutch Transport Safety Board. Final and Procedures.” Flightfax Army Aviation
Report 97–74/A–25 PH–KHB, Sikorsky S-   3. Harris, Joel. Telephone interview Risk-management Information. Volume
76B, 20 December 1997, Near Den Helder. by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, 27 (February 1999).
During final approach to an oil-produc- Virginia, U.S. March 13, 2003. Flight
tion platform in the North Sea in dark-   8. Whalen, David B. “Ditching at Sea.”
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
night conditions, the helicopter entered a Excerpted in Flightfax Army Aviation
U.S.
steep descent that was not recognized im- Risk-management Information. Volume
mediately by the crew. The aircraft struck   4. Transport Canada. Airworthiness Manual, 27 (February 1999). (The original
the water, inverted, rapidly filled with Chapter 537, “Airworthiness Standards, article was published in Flightfax in
seawater and began to sink about 10 min- Appliances,” Section 537.205, “Helicopter May 1992.)
utes later. The aircraft emergency flotation Passenger Transportation Suit Systems.” 9. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
system was not activated and life rafts Oct. 29, 1998. The standards are applicable Helicopter Airmanship. General Aviation
were not deployed. The two pilots and six to “an operations specification for hypo- Safety Sense Leaflet 17B. 2000.
passengers evacuated. Both pilots and five thermia protection of rotorcraft occupants
passengers received no injuries or minor engaged in certain offshore operations.” 10. Brooks, C.J.; Potter, P.L.; Hognestad, B.;
injuries; one passenger died. Rescue by the The standards were published in 1988 by Baranski, J. “Liferaft Evacuation From a
crew of a supply vessel was completed af- the Canadian General Standards Board Ditched Helicopter: Dry Shod vs. Swim
ter approximately one hour. The accident as Standard CAN/CGSB–65.17–M88, Away Method.” Aviation, Space, and
report said, “The accident most probably “Helicopter Passenger Transportation Suit Environmental Medicine. Volume 68,
was initiated by a large power reduction Systems.” January 1997.
during the turn to final to platform L-7A
  5. U.S. National Search and Rescue 11. Safety Regulation Group, U.K. CAA.
thereby creating the onset for a high rate
Committee. United States National “Helicopter Emergency Escape Facilities.”
of descent, which went unnoticed by the
Search and Rescue Supplement to the Airworthiness Information Leaflet AIL/
crew. When the crew realized the situa-
International Aeronautical and Maritime 0124, Issue 2. July 18, 2002.
tion, the application of collective power
reduced the sink rate but came too late to Search and Rescue Manual. Appendix D, 12. U.K. CAA. Report of the Review of
prevent the helicopter hitting the water. “Emergency Assistance to Aircraft Other Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survival.
… A number of passengers reported that Than Search and Rescue.” D–9, D–10. Civil Aviation Publication 641. February
the [helicopter underwater-escape training May 2000. 1995 (reprinted May 2002).
(HUET)] had helped in evacuating the
  6. Miles, Sharon. Interview by Rosenkrans, 13. Tipton, M.J. “Immersion Fatalities:
helicopter.”
Wayne, and e-mail communication. Hazardous Responses and Dangerous
  2. U.S. Army. “How to Crash a Helicopter.” Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 24, Discrepancies.” Journal of the Royal Navy
U.S. Army Primary Helicopter Center, 2003, and Dec. 10, 2003. Flight Safety Medical Service. Volume 81, 1995.

94 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Offshore Helicopter Operators’

Emergency Systems
Incorporate Rescue Planning
Flotation, location and communication drive operational decisions
in environments where up to 95 percent of flight time occurs over water.

— FSF Editorial Staff

P
reparations by some helicopter op- and water-survival training for use of life vests,
erators for overwater operations have cold-water immersion suits (also known as sur-
evolved to include improved aircraft vival suits, exposure suits, helicopter passenger
equipment, emergency flotation sys- suits, aircrew immersion suits and helicopter
tems, methods of aircraft/engine maintenance, offshore transport suits) and life rafts.
satellite-based methods of flight tracking, com-
munication and distress reporting via commercial Ditching should be a last resort for a helicopter
satellite, regular simulator training for ditching, crew, said Colin Brown, head of quality and safety
periodic helicopter underwater-escape training, for CHC Scotia, and Peter Cork, flight safety

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 95
 Di t c h i n g

officer for CHC Scotia, a North air traffic control center staff invariably is the
Sea helicopter operator.1

“O
first to know about an aircraft in distress, and
they would activate the appropriate emergency
ur “Many advances currently help procedures. As part of the overall response to
us to avoid going down that an aircraft emergency, company helicopters
regulatory route of a ditching,” Brown — if they are being flown in the general area
said. “We first have to take — also can be tasked to conduct a preliminary
responsibility is into consideration reliability search. This search initially would be centered
— monitoring what the pilots on the last known position, with the area of the
to provide life [vests]
and the aircraft are doing — to search expanded concentrically from that posi-
maintain the high reliability tion. The U.K. Maritime and Coastguard Agency
and life rafts.”
that we have had in the last 20 coordinates all rescue operations using whatever
years in North Sea operations. resources are available.”
For example, health and usage
monitoring system [HUMS] Operators of North Sea helicopters work together
and helicopter operations and with search-and-rescue (SAR) authorities to
monitoring programs [HOMP] enable us to look be prepared for overwater emergencies and to
at operational data on a daily basis so that we can respond to ditchings and other life-threatening
pinpoint engineering issues or operational mat- water emergencies, he said.
ters that ordinarily may go unnoticed or may be
unreported by the crew.” “We are well covered by our national SAR services
— invariably, less than an hour passes before re-
Helicopter operators meet regulatory require- covery operations begin, and recovery times in
ments, but oil companies are included in safety the U.K. sectors of the North Sea are rarely longer
decisions, too. than one hour,” Brown said. “By tradition, emer-
gency services from other helicopter operators are
“We look after our crews and guarantee the safety also mutually available when required. We have
of passengers in providing the air transport ser- to think about 24-hour SAR capabilities when
vice while the oil companies increasingly take the we conduct all flight operations, and all of our
initiative in specifying safety equipment for their corporate customers must produce safety cases
own passengers,” Brown said. “Our regulatory that factor in these SAR capabilities. If we must
responsibility is to provide life [vests] and life ditch an aircraft near an offshore installation, we
rafts. Our clients move in their own ways, such know that SAR authorities or oil companies will
as providing personal locator beacons [PLBs; see have safety vessels that are equipped for sea rescue
“The Search-and-rescue System Will Find You within one nautical mile or two nautical miles [two
— If You Help,” page 111] and rebreather systems kilometers or four kilometers] of the landing site.
[see “HEED This,” page 365]. They can put in Many changes came into effect after the helicopter
different sorts of survival equipment, provided accident at the Cormorant Alpha oil platform.”
that the equipment does not impede escape from (See “Accident Experience Influences Helicopter
the aircraft.” Overwater Operations,” page 78.)

CHC Scotia flights are coordinated and moni-

tored by an operations control center that would Brightly Colored Chevrons
assist in a distress alert for any overdue aircraft, Help Searchers Find Aircraft
he said.

“We would realize that we have an aircraft down

somewhere if either an emergency call had been
O ne aspect of SAR responders’ ability to visu-
ally find a helicopter in the water depends
to some extent on the contrast provided by its
made or arrival of the aircraft at the landing site color scheme.
was overdue by 20 minutes,” Cork said. “Even
if the crew fails to get out a distress message, “A dark-colored aircraft is very difficult to see on a
we have emergency procedures that are initi- bright sunny day even when upright, and because
ated after specified periods of time. The local of the helicopter’s predisposition to roll over on its

96 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

side or to invert when ditched, the operator also aircraft committees of the U.K. Offshore Operators
needs to consider high-visibility paint schemes Association, U.K. Defence Evaluation and
for the underside of aircraft as an important aid Research Agency (DERA), Cranfield University
to location,” Cork said. “Marking the helicopter (Bedfordshire, England) and other organizations.
with large chevrons in white, orange, red or lime Ditching survivability has been a major subject of
green is recommended as a best practice. The shared interest, Brown said.
company scheme used by each operator should
be common knowledge among operators and “We have been involved in underwater-escape
SAR authorities.” trials prior to the introduction of new immer-
sion suits and in one trial that required getting
Reflective areas on the aircraft exterior — com- out of the smallest aperture — called an opera
bined with retroreflective tape on all life vests, im- window — in the rear passenger compartment of
mersion suits and life rafts — significantly increase the Sikorsky S-76,” he said. “This review has ben-
conspicuity when SAR responders use searchlights efited escape capability from that type of aircraft.
in darkness and low visibility. (Retroreflective ma- The S-76 recently has gone through modification
terials are engineered to reflect light in the direc- of the opera window with a new removable-seal
tion of its source and are most effective when the window. The passenger removes the seal, then
ambient light is low.) pushes out the window.

“Our aircraft also carry an [automatic deployable “Another industry policy of U.K. operators in
emergency locator transmitter (ADELT)] that is the North Sea is not to allow any occupant to
mounted externally in the tail area,” Brown said. be more than one [seat] away
“The ADELT can be deployed automatically or from an escape point; that is,
manually and is designed to automatically trans- a person cannot be two [or
mit a distress alert on 406 MHz [megahertz],
121.5 MHz and 243.0 MHz. Each aircraft also
has, mounted on the cockpit voice recorder, a
more] seats from a window.
This means that some aircraft
[configurations] of five pas-
… “A person

sonar beacon [pinger] that would be used to find sengers abreast would not be cannot be two
the aircraft if it came to rest at the bottom of the used in the North Sea.”
sea. The ping is emitted about every three seconds [or more] seats
for 30 days.” The company uses a variety of
aircraft equipment and sur- from a window.”
All aircraft have been equipped with the emer- vival equipment during North
gency-exit-illumination system (EXIS) to help Sea operations. The immersion
survivors to identify all exits in darkness and suits worn by crewmembers
during underwater egress, he said. are constructed of relatively lightweight, Gore-
Tex fabric that is suitable for daily wear while
At CHC Scotia, crews receive annual refresher working in the cockpit and for extending survival
training in aircraft-specific emergency drills time in cold water. Each pilot’s life vest also has
and safety equipment carried. Underwater been equipped with a small, manually activated
escape and survival training using third-party emergency radio beacon to broadcast distress sig-
expertise in aircraft/simulator ditching drills nals on 121.5 MHz and 243.0 MHz — and with a
and practice in underwater escape is provided 406-MHz PLB, which incorporates a 121.5-MHz
every three years. Passengers typically receive signal for homing.
training from their employer or a third party
that has survival expertise on properly wear- U.K. helicopters over the North Sea are required to
ing the immersion suit (equipped with a life carry two life rafts per aircraft, each with the capac-
vest, rebreather, light and whistle), underwater ity to carry all crewmembers and passengers.
escape and water survival.
In Denmark’s Faroe Islands, 96 percent of heli-
Best practices have been shared and safety initia- copter operations by Atlantic Airways are con-
tives have been launched through collaboration ducted over water, and these operations include
of the oil-company committees and the marine- inspection of North Sea fisheries at distances

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 97
 Di t c h i n g

up to 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) from “We all go through underwater-escape training
shore, said Hans Erik Jacobsen, manager of the through [Norwegian Underwater Technology
Helicopter Department of Atlantic Airways. 2 Center (NUTEC)] every second year,” he said.
The department also has equipment, procedures “We train for underwater escape without an
and trained personnel to provide offshore SAR emergency breathing device, and do wet drills
services. using lifeboats and life rafts at the same time.
NUTEC also provides in the Faroe Islands one
The Faroe Islands are situated in a very narrow week of recurrent SAR training and emergency
current of the Gulf Stream with average ocean- medical training for our rescuers annually or ev-
surface temperatures of 6 degrees Celsius (C, 43 ery six months. This covers how to rescue people
degrees Fahrenheit [F]) to 9 degrees C (48 degrees from the water.”
F) — not as cold as ocean areas closer to Iceland
or Scandinavian countries, he said. Nevertheless,
the water is cold enough to challenge rescuers who Helicopter Simulators Enable
typically enter the water to assist survivors. Autorotations to Sea Surface

“Most common for rescuers are thick-fabric

dry suits so that the rescuer is able to survive in
cold water for several hours without problems,”
A tlantic Airways helicopter pilots receive
recurrent flight training and instru-
ment flight rules training in simulators at the
Jacobsen said. “We use these just in case we have FlightSafety International center in Hurst, Texas,
to leave the rescuer at sea to wait to return to U.S. The training includes ditching procedures
shore in another helicopter. Attached to each and practice (see “Imagine the Worst Helicopter
crewmember life vest are a beacon, signal rock- Ditching — Now Get Ready for It,” page 85.)
ets and a handheld radio transceiver for voice
communication on 121.5 MHz and 243.0 MHz. “Part of this is a lot of training on how to enter
Based primarily on recent discussion among our autorotation down to land on the sea surface,”
rescuers, our plan is to implement 406-MHz Jacobsen said. “Visibility in clouds, in daylight
personal locator beacons and dark-night conditions can be manipulated
for all crewmembers and by instructors so the crew either breaks out

“T
for everyone who is flying of clouds just before impact or does not see
offshore with us.” anything down to the sea. It is very difficult
he pilot must to autorotate to a successful ditching in these
Crew training comprises conditions. The pilot must control the aircraft
control the aircraft
both SAR training as rescu- all the way down — which is much easier said
ers and training to survive than done — while remembering to make the
all the way down —
a ditching or other water- mayday call, to deploy the emergency flotation
which is much easier
contact accident. system and to complete other emergency-check-
list procedures. Pilots also practice overwater
said than done.” “Training includes simu- hoist operations and approaches, landings and
lated rescues at sea with takeoffs from vessels and oil platforms in the
pickups out of the sea and simulator. All this training is very good for
taking people off vessels,” pilots and very important for safe conduct of
he said. “Our number-one fear is hypothermia, so our flights.”
when we discussed survival equipment, we decided
to provide to the hoist [winch] operator the same The department operates one Bell Helicopter
equipment that was chosen as good enough for Textron 212 — used primarily for transport-
the rescuer to use in the water.” (See “Is There a ing passengers to and from remote islands and
Doctor Aboard the Life Raft?” page 187.) villages, and for sling work [i.e., lifting loads
with a hook or sling on an external line] — and
Typically, a company SAR helicopter has two one Bell Helicopter Textron 412, primarily used
pilots, one rescue swimmer or open-sea diver in SAR operations for the Maritime Rescue
and one winch operator who is cross-trained as a Coordination Center Faroe Islands. The SAR
rescue swimmer. aircraft has a four-axis autopilot with hover-

98 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

lock, which assists the crew in remaining over a window and step over into the life raft that
SAR scene and in using automation to conduct has been inflated outside the window. We also
approaches to targets. cover how to remove the emergency windows
for underwater escape. Briefings also cover how
“The reason for selecting this configuration was to enter a life raft.”
to increase safety during night-rescue operations,”
he said. “The crew is capable of hanging still in the Public-address systems, which are mandatory,
air using the autopilot.” have been installed in each helicopter to enable
pilots to give loud-volume commands to pas-
On both helicopters, the emergency flotation sengers during an emergency, he said.
systems are armed for automatic inflation or
manual inflation by the pilots whenever the “We do a lot of island-hopping and all these pas-
helicopter is flying over water at an airspeed less sengers are frequent fliers,” he said. “Although
than 60 knots. there is no oil industry within the Faroe
Islands, if we have seismic-ship stations or oil-
“If the aircraft ends up on the water surface, and exploration rigs that are stationary for eight
the crew has not manually deployed the flotation weeks or 10 weeks, we transport the same off-
system, saline switches on the belly automati- shore passengers back and forth and land on
cally will inflate the flotation bags,” he said. “The the same ships in our waters for a few weeks at a
likelihood of ending up in the water is remote. time. The employers normally
If we fly an overwater distance that is more than provide safety training to their

“S
10 minutes offshore — typically to an offshore offshore employees. For our
destination or for fishery inspection or fish sur- local passengers who do the
veillance — all passengers wear waterproof im- fishery inspections, the coast … lim are the
mersion suits of Gore-Tex material, which require guard and other authori-
a separate life vest, or immersion suits in which ties here provide additional chances to survive
the life vest is included. For flights only between training.
islands — which are about three minutes apart if … they have
— passengers do not use immersion suits because “We try to encourage fishery
not been trained
24-hour shore-based lifeboat services are in close inspectors to take helicopter
proximity and have the ability to launch quickly underwater-escape training
to escape from
their rescue vessels.” to increase their chances of
survival — but when we deal the helicopter.”
At Atlantic Airways, one of the pilots is respon- with people outside the heli-
sible for conducting the passenger pre-takeoff copter business, it is not easy to
safety briefing, he said. Nevertheless, how much convince them of the necessity
attention helicopter passengers give to the brief- of this training. They do not understand how slim
ing can vary as much as passenger attention to are the chances to survive if they end up in the
the safety briefing on transport jets. Jacobsen water and they have not been trained to escape
said that the problem can occur regardless of from the helicopter.”
whether crewmembers conduct the briefing or
use a video briefing. In the 1970s, rapid growth of helicopter trans-
port to support offshore-oil activities in the Gulf
“I noticed while visiting another operator of Mexico — and various accidents involving
that most passengers were sleeping during the water landings — prompted U.S. helicopter
briefing — and I was told that passengers who operators to address a variety of risks that were
travel routinely often say that they are tired of being identified, said Mark Fontenot, director
the briefing,” he said. “When the helicopter is of training for Air Logistics in New Iberia,
floating on the water, the most important mes- Louisiana, U.S.3
sages for passengers are where the emergency
exits are located, not to open the cabin door “In the early days, we developed our own train-
[as required by procedures for a specific air- ing with videos from the U.S. Coast Guard,”
craft] and how to push out the emergency-exit Fontenot said. “Soon we had to start looking

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 99
 Di t c h i n g

at the survival aspects for “The flotation system enables the pilot to land the

“D
the crew and passengers in a helicopter upright in the water, allowing time to
ditching, and we started doing stop the rotor and to egress into the life raft,” he
itchings helicopter underwater-escape said. “If seas are not very high and the pilot lands
training in the mid-1970s to correctly, the helicopter does not roll over. Usually,
happen more the late 1970s. We made our people board the life raft and are recovered by a
own small dunkers [mechani- vessel.”
often than cal devices that enable pilots to
practice holding their breath, Upright helicopters most often are towed to an
we would like.”
releasing restraints, operating oil platform, where a crane is used to hoist the
exits and escaping from a he- aircraft either to the platform or to the deck of
licopter-cockpit mock-up after a ship. In some situations, the helicopter may be
the device has been inverted in towed to shore or a larger helicopter may trans-
a swimming pool]. Over a pe- port the ditched aircraft from the water surface
riod of about 15 years, we got away from doing to shore, he said.
this training on our own.”
Every day, pilots conduct a flotation-system
Currently, Air Logistics and other operators in the check that includes a test of electrical circuits.
Gulf of Mexico typically use underwater-escape Maintenance technicians periodically inspect
training provided by other organizations. other components. They do not fire the squib,
but they unpack and inflate the flotation bags
“This helicopter-specific emergency-evacuation with compressed air, check their serviceability
program begins with water safety and water and then deflate and repack the flotation bags.
survival information and practice in a small-
scale device,” he said. “Then trainers use a very Each crewmember uses a constant-wear life
large helicopter underwater-escape trainer with vest equipped with a 121.5-MHz beacon, a
the front end configured as a pilot station and 121.5-MHz radio transceiver, a strobe-type
the back of the cabin configured for passengers survivor-locator light, sea-dye marker and a
as a specific type of aircraft.” large yellow plastic trash bag to make a person
less conspicuous to sharks while floating in the
water (some specialists said that the color yel-
Variations in regulatory requirements and client
low is attractive to sharks, however, because its
requirements influence some decisions about
brightness contrasts with the dark ocean; see
safety equipment used, Fontenot said.
“What’s Eating You? It’s Probably Not a Shark,”
page 211). Each passenger wears during flight a
“Ditchings happen more often than we would life vest approved by the U.S. Federal Aviation
like,” he said. “Much about the equipment choices Administration (FAA). Each life raft has a vari-
is economically driven — involving factors of extra ety of signaling devices, such as smoke devices,
weight and expense — or is federally required. For flares and mirror, he said.
example, in the Gulf of Mexico, operators typi-
cally do not have EXIS lighting — which is now “Our area of operations is over water 95 percent
required in the North Sea — unless a contract of the time, and one aspect of our pilot training is
specifies this lighting. If the client wants it, we put specific to our environment,” Fontenot said. “Like
it in the aircraft.” one other operator on the Gulf Coast, we require,
for new-hire pilots and on a recurrent-training ba-
Air Logistics helicopters have a standardized sis, that pilots complete our engine-out autorota-
emergency flotation system installed on the tion training to the water in one of two aircraft that
outside of the skids. The majority of systems are have fixed utility flotation systems. Even though
inflated from a nitrogen cylinder in the aircraft. these aircraft have fixed utility flotation systems,
The pilot arms the system during specified phases pilots can practice arming a system simulating
of flight, and pulls a trigger or pushes a button deployment and getting correct indicator lights.
to fire a squib (pyrotechnic charge) to open the We teach techniques of ditching into the wind,
inflation valve. as over land, and practice arming the system and

100 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

inflating the flotation bags. We have done this for Commercial Satellite-based
about 20 years because we have benefited from Flight Following Speeds
this training.”
Rescue of Survivors
Offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of
Mexico typically are based near the coast and
conduct flights at altitudes between 500 feet and
T echnological advances being adopted by Air
Logistics and other helicopter operators in the
Gulf of Mexico simplify the process of tracking and
5,000 feet.
responding to a ditched aircraft, and determining
that an aircraft has lost communication but has
The majority of flights involve operating under
continued the flight as planned. They integrate
visual flight rules in uncontrolled airspace below
global positioning system (GPS) positions with
1,200 feet with no air traffic control radar cover-
automated satellite-based communication and
age unless the aircraft at this altitude is within 20
reporting.
miles to 40 miles (37 kilometers to 74 kilometers)
of Houston, Texas, or Galveston, Texas, Fontenot
said. Helicopter operators typically provide their “Our company and another operator have begun
own local weather observations to each other, he installing the satellite-based flight-tracking sys-
said. tem on some aircraft,” he said. “The system uses a
satellite transmitter/receiver on the aircraft and a
“Currently, about 8,000 people and 500 to 600 GPS receiver, and automatically transmits position
helicopters work in the Gulf of Mexico every and altitude to a commercial satellite. The satellite
day,” Fontenot said. downloads this data to a communication center
in Delaware, U.S., which then transmits the data
Air Logistics maintains a private flight-following over the Internet to a host computer in our flight-
facility based on a combination of very high following facility, where we can view the flight
frequency amplitude modulation (VHF AM) information plotted on a computer-screen map
aeronautical voice communication, manual of the Gulf of Mexico. We have set up our flight-
position logging by flight-following staff, a sat- following system to receive GPS position updates
ellite-based tracking service, position-reporting every three minutes.”
procedures and coastline-crossing procedures.
Aircraft often are beyond and/or below FAA The map is divided into
radar surveillance.

“For many years, we have required our pilots to

numbered blocks measur-
ing three nautical miles
(six kilometers) by three
“C urrently, about

report crossing coastlines and to make a posi- nautical miles, and depicts 8,000 people and
tion report every 15 minutes along the route of the flight-planned route of
flight,” Fontenot said. “We learned the hard way each aircraft. Position re- 500 to 600 helicopters
to do this so that we could narrow the search ports by voice are required
area in the event of an accident. Before pilots of pilots flying aircraft with work in the Gulf of
take off from bases that are 10 minutes from the the automatic tracking
coastline, for example, they type into our system system. One reason is that Mexico every day.”
a flight plan and activate the flight following with cessation of the automatic
their base staff before crossing the coastline. We burst of data from the
have radio operators in strategic areas to track aircraft triggers an alarm,
the flight so that the majority of aircraft appear and pilots must be able to report that a false alert
on a log that shows times, positions and miles to has occurred and enable flight-following person-
the destination. nel to continue monitoring the flight without
automation.
“We used to have to search along the whole route
of a 100-mile flight. When the pilot makes 15- “If a pilot has an in-flight malfunction, an emer-
minute position reports at a typical 120-knot air- gency button can be used to transmit the aircraft
speed, we have a 30-nautical-mile [56-kilometer] location while the pilot also makes a radio call,”
segment of the route to search.” Fontenot said.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 101
 Di t c h i n g

Helicopter operators in the region antici- Helicopter operators work closely with fuel, and we get out of the way when the
pate that FAA will implement automatic the Coast Guard to report when one of Coast Guard is on scene. People in the
dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS- their aircraft has been ditched in the Gulf water usually cannot communicate with
B) as a method of separating helicopter of Mexico; nevertheless, company heli- us by two-way radio.”
traffic over the Gulf of Mexico. ADS-B copters usually can reach the scene more
uses avionics on the aircraft flight deck quickly than Coast Guard helicopters or When another operator’s aircraft is miss-
and electronic equipment on the ground vessels, he said. ing in the Gulf of Mexico, helicopter crews
for airborne separation assurance and in the area typically maintain a lookout
ground-based surveillance of airspace “Typically, there is not much we can do — and may divert from their route to con-
without radar. They also have supported at the scene, however, before the Coast duct a preliminary search — but they do
research leading to improvements in air Guard arrives,” Fontenot said. “We do not not become involved in the official search
traffic surveillance, radio communica- have equipment or training to conduct unless requested, he said.
tion and weather reporting — including the rescue, but we typically can report
automated weather-observation stations to our flight-following facility the block Based on experience shared by many heli-
and communications facilities that would number of lost contact, whether the air- copter operators in the Gulf of Mexico in
be installed by FAA on privately owned craft has landed OK and whether people recent years, the time required to find crew-
oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, he are in the aircraft or in a life raft. Our air- members and passengers after a ditching
said. craft will stay over the scene until it needs averages one hour to two hours, he said. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Completing checklist procedures during an autorotative landing to the sea surface — even in darkness and
low visibility — can be experienced effectively in a simulator.

• Large chevrons in white, orange, red or lime green help searchers to see helicopters whether they are upright
or inverted in the water.

• Seating configurations must provide rapid accessibility of an exit to each occupant under the most difficult
evacuation conditions.

• Collective efforts of helicopter operators can shorten SAR-response time and contribute to improved over-
water safety through research.

Notes
  1. Brown, Colin; Cork, Peter. Telephone in-   2. Jacobsen, Hans Erik. Telephone inter-   3. Fontenot, Mark. Telephone interview
terview by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, view by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
Virginia, U.S. April 30, 2003. Flight Safety Virginia, U.S. May 2, 2003. Flight Safety Virginia, U.S. April 17, 2003. Flight Safety
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

102 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

Helicopter Hull-flotation Systems

Reduce the Risk of Rapid Sinking
In benign conditions, pilots can conduct a ditching with low risk of
aircraft damage. Some emergency flotation systems also make possible
a precautionary water landing and a water takeoff.

— FSF Editorial Staff

O
ptional ditching certification for he- to provide occupants enough time near the surface
licopters and separate certification to exit to a life raft. In its report on one helicopter
for helicopter flotation systems help water-contact accident, for example, the U.K. Air
to make aircraft performance during Accidents Investigation Branch said in 1992 that
descent and after water contact as predictable as hull flotation is so important in survival that au-
possible. Essentially, both processes are intended tomatic systems should be considered despite the

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 103
 Di t c h i n g

slight risk of inadvertent in-flight deploy- to be ditching-certificated, but contain seating capacity of more than 44 passen-
ment.1 Absence or failure of a flotation specific requirements for helicopters gers, however, or a seating capacity of 10
system — or insufficient time to deploy that are operated over water, she said. or more passengers per emergency exit,
the system as in this accident — increases Consequently, helicopters may be or no main aisle per specific require-
the risk that occupants will not be able to equipped with emergency flotation sys- ments, transport category certification
exit before the helicopter sinks. tems but not be ditching-certificated. standards (Part 29) require a test to
demonstrate emergency evacuation of
“Although they are primarily designed Some small helicopters that operate the helicopter within 90 seconds, Miles
to provide flotation following an in- under U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations said. Ditching certification does not
tentional ditching, [flotation bags] (FARs) Part 27, Airworthiness Standards override the certification requirements
must also be useful as additional – Normal Category Rotorcraft, are not for those helicopters.
buoyancy following a collision with certificated for ditching but comply with
the sea,” the report said. “According specific portions of the ditching-certification “Safety of occupants is the primary
to witnesses, [the accident helicopter] requirements to install emergency flota- concern of these regulations,” Miles
remained at the surface for one or two tion systems for use in an emergency said. “Some helicopter manufacturers
minutes, generally inverted and awash. landing on water and to allow an evacu- also want to maximize the opportunity
Inflated hull-flotation bags would have ation of the occupants after an emergency to recover the aircraft, but regulations
extended this time and, perhaps more landing on water, Miles said. do not consider the aircraft recovery
significantly, [would] have caused the aspect, only occupant safety. Ditching-
hull to float higher in the water, thus For certification purposes, FAA defines certification requirements include
aiding the escape by occupants. Escape ditching as “an emergency landing on emergency exits above the helicopter
is only feasible within a few meters of the water, deliberately executed, with water line; emergency exits on each side
the surface, and therefore any delay in the intent of abandoning the rotorcraft of the helicopter; and enough openings
the sinking of the cabin is bound to be as soon as practical.” During testing of in the top, bottom or end of the heli-
beneficial. In an accident scenario, it ditching performance, FAA assumes that copter to enable occupants to evacuate
is unreasonable to rely on flight crew the helicopter “will be intact prior to water the helicopter in the event of a rollover
[deployment] of the emergency [flo- entry with all controls and essential systems, — unless the manufacturer can show that
tation system], and therefore an auto- except engines, functioning properly.” The a rollover will not occur in the required
matic system is highly desirable. The demonstration of compliance with flota- sea-state conditions.
manufacturers remain concerned at the tion and trim requirements must reflect
possible hazard of inadvertent deploy- “reasonably probable water conditions” of “FAA/JAA regulations for ditching certi-
ment and would wish to incorporate sea state 4, a moderate sea with significant fication do not explicitly specify the sea
adequate safeguards.” wave heights of four feet to eight feet (one state, but as part of compliance prin-
meter to two meters). U.K. CAA has ad- ciples, FAA has a policy about sea state,
In response, a 1995 report by the U.K. ditional requirements related to sea state wind and temperature conditions that is
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) said that because of North Sea operations, which in- used during the certification demonstra-
the best compromise is to provide an au- volve a more severe operating environment tion. Compliance can be demonstrated
tomatic system that would activate upon than the typical water environment for U.S. through model testing or by FAA ac-
water contact when armed but would helicopter operations, Miles said. ceptance of results of computer-based
alleviate concern about inadvertent in- modeling, on a case-by-case basis, when
flight deployment by incorporating an the manufacturer can demonstrate that
arming switch as used on manual-only Standards Do Not Specify the model is accurate.”
systems.2 Minimum Flotation Time
Most helicopter ditchings involve auto-
Certification helps to ensure that after
landing on water in specified conditions,
the helicopter will stay afloat for a suffi-
H elicopter-ditching certification
standards — which have been
harmonized by FAA and the European
rotation; in some events, autorotation
is not an option because of the circum-
stances of the emergency, such as insuffi-
cient period of time for all occupants to Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) in cient time for the pilot to respond to the
be evacuated safely, said Sharon Miles, an most regulations — do not contain a emergency, Miles said. Pilots are trained
aviation safety engineer in the Rotorcraft specific length of time that a helicopter in the use of the flotation systems, the
Directorate of the U.S. Federal Aviation must remain afloat but require that the emergency procedures for a ditching
Administration (FAA).3 Current FAA time be sufficient for all occupants to scenario and the optimal method of
regulations do not require helicopters be evacuated safely. If a helicopter has a ditching the specific helicopter.

104 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

“The typical intact airplane has a

lot of under-body structure and
built-in buoyancy — factors that
are just not present for helicopters,”
Miles said. “Nevertheless, helicopter
operators generally have had good
results during overwater emergen-
cies in which the emergency flota-
tion system was activated properly.
Even when rollovers have occurred,
most helicopters remained upright
long enough for the occupants to
evacuate safely because buoyancy
in various sea states has met the
certification requirements. In other
cases, however, the emergency flota-
tion system has not been activated
prior to entering the water, and this
has caused a catastrophic event.
Some of these accidents involved
failure of the pilot to activate the
system because of insufficient time
for response.”

The high vertical center of grav-

ity (CG) of the typical helicopter
is an important determinant of
what occurs on the water surface,
she said.

“Most of the aircraft mass is above waves — and some swells — could act differently The skid-mounted
the water, and with this relatively high vertical in causing rollover in that the helicopter may ‘ride flotation bags of
CG and no stabilizing help from wide-span wing the waves’ until the critical vertical CG is exceeded emergency flotation
structure, helicopters tend to be less stable than and the helicopter subsequently rolls over. Testing is systems are packed
airplanes in the water,” said Miles. “The problem is generally associated with waves to certain specified in covers so that
not necessarily how the pilot landed the helicopter heights, and certification of the flotation system is
they create little
or where the pilot landed the helicopter.” based on stability for those wave heights.”
aerodynamic drag.

Various conditions affect the helicopter’s resistance The manufacturer typically demonstrates evacu-
to rollover following a ditching, she said. ation of the helicopter in a calm-seas environ-
ment; variations of sea state are not included,
“Generally, on a calm sea, the helicopter can be rela- said Miles.
tively stable on the water, and the idea is to keep
the aircraft as stable as possible,” said Miles. “With “In model testing, we look for the aircraft to stay
wave action, the helicopter is more susceptible to upright in the water, and the manufacturer must
rollover. Mainly, wave action — waves and breaking demonstrate that the aircraft will stay afloat for
waves— is responsible for rollover. Breaking waves some period of time,” Miles said. “If the manu-
are created when a wave is too heavy to support facturer provides a flotation system as standard
itself and the top of the wave falls toward the up- equipment or as emergency equipment, informa-
stream side. In a scenario where wave action and tion about occupant egress must be included in
wind overtake the helicopter, the helicopter may be the flight manual, preflight passenger briefings for
overcome by the wave action and subsequently roll specific flights and maintenance-manual instruc-
over on its side or upside down. Waves and breaking tions for the flotation systems installed on the

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004 105
 Di t c h i n g

helicopter. Part of the design Helicopters used in overwater operations gener-

“M
requirements is an in-flight ally have one of two basic categories of inflatable
evaluation of aircraft perfor- flotation systems: fixed utility flotation systems or
ost of mance by a flight test pilot emergency flotation systems (also called ditching
and a design engineer when floats or popout floats by some aircraft operators).
the U.S. helicopters the emergency flotation Typically, fixed utility flotation systems are used
system is added for the first not only as emergency/ditching systems but also in
with fixed utility time. Each flight test varies amphibian-type operations. Helicopter operators
according to the approvals that select fixed utility flotation systems typically
flotation systems sought by the applicant. use these systems at all times because they rou-
Performance capability and tinely conduct takeoffs and landings from water, or
are operated handling qualities with the they otherwise require this capability to anticipate
system installed must be possible offshore landings, such as during fishing
in Alaska.” demonstrated during actual operations off ships.
flight testing and approved
by FAA through the ap- “Most of the U.S. helicopters with fixed utility flo-
proval of the aircraft flight tation systems are operated in Alaska,” Miles said.
manual. On the operating “Many helicopters operating in or from the lower 48
side of regulatory oversight, each pilot then must states carry inflatable emergency flotation systems
be trained in every aspect of flight, including the only for use during an overwater emergency.”
correct use of the emergency flotation system.”
Flotation systems for current models of helicopters
FARs and Joint Aviation Requirements include the typically have an inflatable design whether they are
following airworthiness requirements for ditching the fixed utility type or the emergency type, said
certification of a helicopter as an optional standard Dave Parrott, director of engineering for Apical
for manufacturers: Industries, a U.S. manufacturer of flotation sys-
tems for several types of helicopters.4
• Ability to land and remain upright after water
contact with a forward velocity of zero knots “Fixed utility flotation systems are based on a simple
to 30 knots in specified wave conditions and system that is always inflated in flight; their flotation
in likely roll attitudes and yaw attitudes; with bags are thicker and more durable than emergency
the rotorcraft pitch attitude in autorotation in flotation systems,” Parrott said. “Bolted onto the
specified side-wind conditions; after asymmet- skid gear, fixed flotation systems are inflated from
rical rotorcraft landing; with immersion before a maintenance-shop air compressor before flight
and after full inflation of the emergency flota- and have no integral inflation system. Fixed utility
tion system; with the most severe wave heights flotation systems might be used, for example, by op-
for which approval is desired (a minimum of erators of tuna-fishing vessels where the helicopter
sea state 4 should be considered); always lands on the deck of a ship and the operator
is not concerned about achieving the maximum
• Demonstration of auxiliary-float loads or emer- forward speed. Other advantages are less initial cost
gency-float loads should be determined by full and maintenance cost.
immersion or specified methods of counteract-
ing side wind, asymmetrical rotorcraft landing, “Emergency flotation systems use a thinner in-
water-wave action, rotorcraft inertia, and prob- flatable material that is rolled and packed into
able structure damage and punctures; an aerodynamic cover on each skid. Many dif-
ferent types are available, but normally this is a
• Demonstration of rotorcraft water entry, ad- ‘nontakeoff ’ set of floats to be used only during
equate flotation and trim, and upright posi- an emergency situation. Over the years, several
tion for safe and orderly occupant egress and ‘takeoff systems’ that also can be deployed for
occupant survival; and, normal landing on water and normal takeoff
from water also have been developed, so opera-
• Provision of emergency exits for egress when tors currently use the terms ‘nontakeoff system’
upright and for egress when inverted. or ‘takeoff system.’”

106 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
 Di t c h i n g

The company designs most current emergency designs use 1.5 times maximum gross weight as
flotation systems to remain inflated with helium the required buoyancy to keep the fuselage higher
or nitrogen until a vessel can tow the floating above the water, Parrott said.
helicopter or another helicopter can pick up the
floating helicopter, he said. Approved operating speeds of helicopters with
flotation systems depend on several factors.
“Under the most common circumstances — an Helicopters with fixed utility flotation systems
autorotation to landing with the flotation bags installed have lower speeds because of additional
inflated — the helicopter essentially could stay aerodynamic drag, but the flotation bags of emer-
afloat for weeks,” Parrott said. “Emergency flota- gency flotation systems are packed so that they
tion systems can be lighter in construction if their produce little aerodynamic drag. Safe speeds for
only purpose is to give the occupants enough time deploying emergency flotation systems and for op-
to egress into a life boat or a life raft. After ditch- erating with the system deployed are determined
ing, however, a majority of helicopters are towed by flight testing.
by boat — typically for about 30 nautical miles
[56 kilometers].” “For each helicopter type, a never-exceed speed
(VNE) normally applies to the flotation-system
deployment — such as do not inflate above 60
Multiple Flotation Chambers knots or 90 knots — then the helicopter can be
Help Prevent Sinking flown with the system deployed at a higher speed,”
Parrott said. “Emergency flotation systems really

T he design of an inflatable helicopter flotation

system begins with calculation of the full for-
ward CG location and the full-aft CG location.
are not designed for sustained high forward speed.
They are designed to get the aircraft onto water
and to float there safely.”
These data help to determine the basic design
and the number of isolated flotation chambers
When seeking regulatory approval of a new flota-
required for buoyancy and stability. Multiple
tion-system design, the company uses a helicopter
chambers protect against sinking if one chamber
of the required type to conduct in-flight testing of
is punctured.
inflation, autorotation with the system deployed
and landing on water.
“We deflate the largest compartment of the
emergency flotation system with the helicopter
at maximum gross weight, and verify that the “Most of our designs are ap-
helicopter does not roll over in the resulting at- proved to allow takeoff after a

“E
titude,” Parrott said. “We design flotation bags water landing because of cus-
ideally to keep the fuselage a few inches out of tomer requirements,” Parrott
water. Otherwise, the more water entering the fu- said. “With this system, the pi- mergency
selage, the tougher it will be to recover the aircraft lot may land in water because a
warning light came on, but after flotation systems
— and if salt water enters electrical components,
they will be pretty well unsalvageable. Keeping investigation of the problem,
the helicopter could be flown really are not
the fuselage out of the water is not a regulatory
requirement but is a capability driven by op- to the nearest repair station.”
designed for
erator requirements. FAA, for example, wants
to see a system that keeps the helicopter upright Intervals for required operator
sustained high
even if close to the water surface, so the system inspections of flotation bags,
is designed first to keep the helicopter upright, gas hoses and gas-cylinder forward speed.”
then to help the operator to retrieve the ditched gauge pressures typically are six
helicopter in usable condition.” months or 12 months; typically
this involves unsnapping the
In the United States, FAA requires a minimum aerodynamic cover, checking
buoyancy of 1.25 times the gross weight of the the condition of the packed flotation bags and
helicopter and demonstration of sufficient buoy- replacing the cover as specified in the flight man-
ancy and stability after ditching. The company’s ual supplement. Usually, disassembly of the entire

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–february 2004 107
 Di t c h i n g

system — unpacking, checking and system in containers that are mounted such as whether the helicopter is oper-
repacking flotation bags, hydrostati- on the skids. ated regularly over water.
cally testing the cylinder and rebuild-
ing valves — and reassembly will be “The pilot inflates the system, lands on “Typically, the emergency flotation
conducted every three years during the water, shuts down the aircraft and re- system installed on the skids forms part
manufacturer’s system-­recertification motely inflates the life rafts outside the of the normal helicopter configuration
inspection, he said. cabin from a separate activation system — especially where a lot of operation is
and gas reservoir,” Parrott said. over water as in coastal areas of Texas
One customer’s requirement led Apical and Louisiana; in the central part of
to design and obtain certification for Generalizations about how and when the United States, many helicopters
a new system for some helicopters in helicopter operators carry emergency are equipped with this kit consider-
which a life raft is packed on the ­exterior flotation systems are difficult because ing the typical operational use,” Miles
surface of the emergency flotation practices depend on many variables, said. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• An emergency flotation system keeps the helicopter upright to provide occupants the best configuration for
evacuation; recovering the aircraft will be secondary.

• Absence of an emergency flotation system dramatically increases the risk that occupants will be unable to
evacuate before the helicopter sinks.

• Some emergency flotation systems can be used for normal landing on water and normal takeoff from water.

• Ditching certification of the helicopter typically requires emergency exits above its water line and on each
side, and openings in the top, bottom or end that enable occupants to escape after a rollover.

Notes with turning downwind in significant wind extent that the normal safeguards of two-
strengths. The commander, who was the crew operation failed.”
1. U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch. handling pilot at the time … inadvertently
Report on the Accident to AS 332L Super allowed the airspeed and then the height to 2. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority. Report of the
Puma, G–TIGH, Near the Cormorant ‘A’ decrease while turning away from a strong Review of Helicopter Offshore Safety and
Platform, East Shetland Basin, on 14 March gusting wind. Despite the application of Survival. Civil Aviation Publication 641.
1992. April 26, 1993. The helicopter struck maximum power, the helicopter was inca- February 1995 (reprinted May 2002).
the sea following a takeoff from an oil plat- pable of arresting its established descent 3. Miles, Sharon. Interview by Rosenkrans,
form. One crewmember and 10 passengers within the height available. Incipient Wayne, and e-mail communication.
were killed; one passenger was seriously vortex-ring state and downdrafts may have Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 24,
injured; and one crewmember and four contributed to this problem, as may the 2003, and Dec. 10, 2003. Flight Safety
passengers received minor injuries or no height of the wave crests. Several human Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. Causal factors, including possibly some fatigue and
factors were: “The [commander’s] failure to frustration, exacerbated by a demanding 4. Parrott, Dave. Interview by Rosenkrans,
recognize the rapidly changing relation- flying program in which the commander Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April
ship between airspeed and groundspeed, was managerially responsible, may have 25, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
which is a fundamental problem associated degraded the crew’s performance to an Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

108 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–february 2004
Search and Rescue
  Search and Rescue

111 The Search-and-rescue System

Will Find You — If You Help
120 Foundation Pioneered Early
Overwater-safety Decisions

130 A Signal for Help Is Heard, Help

Arrives Too Late
134 Truths About Beacon Signals and
Satellites Hidden in the Details

139 Stay Tuned: A Guide to Emergency

Radio Beacons
141 Tests of 406-MHz GPS Beacons Show
Position Deficiencies
 A red flare is
an international
signal of
distress.

The Search-and-rescue System

Will Find You — If You Help
A complex array of resources can be marshaled for SAR. Just as important
— long before anyone becomes a survivor — will be the prepared aircraft
operator and aircraft crew.

— FSF Editorial Staff

F
or a rescue coordination center (RCC), a and the working assumption that survivors of an
ditching or other aircraft water-contact aircraft accident require rapid medical assistance,
accident is a life-threatening emergency said Lt. Cmdr. Paul Steward, liaison officer to the
of the highest priority. Key differences in Cospas–Sarsat International Satellite System for
responding to an aircraft in distress1 vs. a marine Search and Rescue and implementation officer
vessel in distress are the source of the distress alert for the Distress Alerting Satellite System (DASS),

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 111
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Office of Search and Rescue, U.S. Coast locate survivors of a ditching or other of Oct. 30, 2003, 27 other Cospas–Sarsat
Guard.2,3 water-contact accident in areas where MCCs are operated by Algeria, Argentina,
ATC facilities do not have radar cover- Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
(“Distress alert” refers to any notification age. Basic familiarity with Cospas–Sarsat France, Hong Kong (China), India,
received by search-and-rescue [SAR] au- helps aircraft operators to conduct flight Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Norway,
thorities, such as a pilot declaring mayday planning, to select optimal types of sur- Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
to air traffic control [ATC] or the signal vival equipment, to prepare ground per- Singapore, South Africa, South Korea,
from an emergency radio beacon. An sonnel for overwater emergencies and to Spain, Taiwan (China), Thailand, United
RCC is an organization — established know what to expect from the RCC while Kingdom and Vietnam. The U.S. National
by a country or a group of countries in awaiting rescue. Aeronautics and Space Administration
the same geographic area — that takes (NASA) provides technical support to
responsibility for organization of SAR Using a worldwide data-distribution Cospas–Sarsat by launching satellites,
services and for coordinating SAR op- plan, Cospas–Sarsat automatically sends investigating system problems and de-
erations within a specific region.) distress alerts based on beacon signals veloping technological improvements.
via computer network to the respon-
“RCC personnel understand that an sible RCC according to the geographic The underlying satellite-system technol-
aircraft does not float indefi- ogy was developed in 1979
nitely, that survivors will be in under a memorandum of un-
the water, and that survivors derstanding among agencies
are likely to be exposed to a of Canada, France, the Union
lot more trauma and injuries of Soviet Socialist Republics
than people aboard a marine (now the Commonwealth of
vessel that is sinking,” Steward Independent States) and the
said. “The longer that people United States; 37 countries
are exposed to the elements, and two independent SAR
the greater the likelihood that organizations currently par-
injury or death will ensue. So ticipate in the program. In
there is a greater emphasis on October 2003, Cospas–Sarsat
the time factor compared with points of contact worldwide5
a marine vessel that has broken included MCCs, RCCs, re-
down or that is taking on water, gional joint search-and-rescue
for example.” centers, rescue sub-centers
and other organizations. 6
Beacons are designed to enable location of the distress. If the position (Proprietary real-time flight-
global communication of distress and of a 406-megahertz (MHz) 4 beacon following systems currently used by some
determination of the survivors’ position. cannot be determined immediately, aircraft operators — combining GPS re-
In the absence of a “mayday” or a report the first distress alert is sent to the SAR ceivers and satellite-based communica-
of an overdue aircraft, the difficulty of authorities of the country in which the tion equipment — also may incorporate
finding survivors in the ocean can be beacon has been registered. A 406-MHz ­distress-alerting capabilities independent
insurmountable if no beacon has been GPS (global positioning system) beacon of Cospas–Sarsat.)
deployed, the beacon has not been acti- is designed to incorporate position data
vated or the beacon has malfunctioned. in its signal. The source of position data While Cospas–Sarsat helps to save lives,
The probability that SAR authorities may be an internal GPS receiver or exter- the system also delivers an avalanche of
will receive the signal from a beacon, nal navigation equipment (for example, false alerts7 every day to the world’s RCCs.
however, was increased dramatically by an aircraft GPS navigation receiver or a Responding to a false alert with unneces-
Cospas–Sarsat, which was declared to be flight-­management computer). sary deployment of SAR resources has the
operational in 1985 (see “Truths About following effects, Steward said:
Beacon Signals and Satellites Hidden in The U.S. National Oceanic and
the Details,” page 134). Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), • SAR professionals are placed at un-
the Coast Guard and the U.S. Air Force necessary risk of harm;
Cospas–Sarsat is important to civil operate Cospas–Sarsat, and NOAA op-
aircraft operations over water because erates the U.S. Mission Control Center • SAR professionals and assets, such
the system enables SAR authorities to (MCC) in Suitland, Maryland, U.S. As as SAR aircraft and SAR marine

112 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

A U.S. Coast Guard

52-foot (16-meter)
motor lifeboat
in a wave in
the northwest
Pacific Ocean.

vessels, that are launched or diverted are • A patrol boat costs $1,200 per hour; and,
not available to respond to other distress
alerts; and, • A small boat costs $500–1,500 per hour.

• Expenditure of funds while responding to Although beacons are important survival tools,
false alerts affects every SAR authority’s abil- SAR authorities recommend that aircraft opera-
ity to pay for operations in life-threatening tors avoid complete reliance on any one method
emergencies. of communicating distress; develop realistic ex-
pectations by becoming aware of SAR limitations;
In 2001, the Coast Guard estimated the following provide optimal survival equipment, procedures
aircraft/vessel operating costs, not including the and training; and compensate with ground per-
costs of personnel:8 sonnel and backup plans wherever failures could
occur. Immediate, proactive intervention by the
aircraft operator’s ground personnel is an essential
• A Lockheed Martin HC-130 Hercules airplane
element in a successful SAR response (see “A Signal
costs US$9,332 per hour;
for Help Is Heard, Help Arrives Too Late,” page
130). Such preparations should include readiness
• A Dassault HU-25 Falcon airplane costs
to identify and to assist the RCC, and to closely
$6,174 per hour;
monitor its response.

• A Sikorsky HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter costs In recent years, relatively few ditchings involving
$7,885 per hour; professional flight crews and large aircraft have
required a SAR response by the Coast Guard
• A Eurocopter HH-65 Dolphin helicopter costs compared with ditchings involving nonprofes-
$5,173 per hour; sional pilots and small aircraft, said Dan Lemon,
chief of the Coordination Division, Coast Guard
• A cutter costs $3,000–7,000 per hour; Office of Search and Rescue.9

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 113
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

“An accident in which a business aircraft alert. Deaths of seven Coast Guard rescu- conduct every offshore rescue. In reality,
ditches and becomes a Coast Guard SAR ers while conducting two SAR operations the response will involve a SAR helicopter
case has occurred every two years or three during the past six years underscore the only when the accident occurs relatively
years,” he said. Coast Guard SAR-case risks, Steward said. close to shore (within the helicopter’s ra-
data, which are collected for purposes of dius of action) and when it is available.
operational analysis rather than aviation ATC and SAR authorities typically work
safety analysis, do not contain separate together closely. The Coast Guard, for example, does not
categories for business/corporate air- operate air-refuelable aircraft but, in
craft, commuter/on-demand aircraft or “We will be feeding back to ATC what we some scenarios, may request assistance
helicopters. are doing for a number of reasons — first from similar air-refuelable military air-
for air traffic separation because we will craft, crewed by personnel trained for
To be realistic, aircraft operators should have our aircraft in the air searching,” SAR operations. When greater distances
assume — for safety planning — that up said Lt. Cmdr. Jay Dell, who replaced are involved, the response may require use
to 24 hours could elapse before rescuers Steward as Cospas–Sarsat liaison officer of fixed-wing search aircraft and a Coast
arrive at the scene of a water-contact ac- and DASS implementation officer in the Guard cutter. For open-ocean searches at
cident in areas of the world where RCCs Coast Guard Office of Search and Rescue. very long distances from shore, divert-
have well-developed SAR systems. “The SAR aircraft, the SAR mission co- ing a commercial ship may be the fastest
ordinator or the air station of the search method or the only method of rescuing
“It is hard to imagine taking longer than aircraft will keep ATC informed about survivors. In addition to distance from
24 hours — in most cases, survivors search activities and the positions and shore, adverse weather conditions can
would be rescued a lot more quickly,” altitudes of SAR aircraft. ATC then will is- delay any rescue by hours or days.
Lemon said. “If the aircraft is ditched in sue an advisory to all other aircraft in the
a remote area, the time to rescue might area to assist, to provide information on
be longer than 24 hours.” sightings of survivors or to remain clear Data Show Dimensions
of the SAR operations area, as required of Challenges to SAR
Some aircraft operators should visual- by circumstances.”11 Authorities
ize how they would cope with a rescue
delay of up to a week, however, said Paul
D. Russell, a maritime safety specialist
and accident investigator, and a retired
Because of their unique capabilities,
SAR helicopters may be used to rescue
survivors of an aircraft water-contact
T he following data reflect the scope of
international SAR activity:

Coast Guard captain with more than accident. Their relatively limited endur- • From 1982 through 2002, Cospas–
5,000 flight hours in fixed-wing and ance and speed, however, reduce their Sarsat assisted in the rescue of more
rotary-wing aircraft.10 radius of action. Radius of action means than 15,700 people in about 4,500
the maximum distance that the SAR maritime, aviation and inland SAR
Coast Guard training and procedures aircraft or SAR marine vessel can travel cases worldwide;12
consider the risks to the survivors and away from its base along a given course
the risks to SAR personnel in determining with a normal mission load and return • In 2002, Cospas–Sarsat was the only
when and how to respond to a distress without refueling, allowing for all safety source of the distress alert and position
and operating factors. Helicopters usually in 372 maritime, aviation and inland
arrive at the distress scene before marine SAR cases worldwide, in which 1,411

A
vessels that must travel the same distance, people were rescued (approximately
and can be operated above heavy seas and one SAR case per day);
dverse in rough weather conditions. Their low-
speed maneuverability and hovering ca- • Data from 337 SAR cases — in which
weather conditions pability enable rescuers to quickly recover the Coast Guard responded to civil
survivors. While on scene, rescuers typi- aircraft in distress during fiscal years
can delay cally can raise survivors with a winch to 2000, 2001 and 2002 — showed that
the helicopter, and some helicopters can 50 cases (14.8 percent) were catego-
any rescue be used to conduct amphibious landings rized as ditchings and 143 cases (42.4
and takeoffs. percent) were categorized as other
by hours or days. aircraft water-contact accidents. Of
One of many pervasive myths about SAR the 337 cases, 15 (4.5 percent) oc-
response is that helicopters will be used to curred more than 50 nautical miles

114 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

(93 kilometers) from shore, 124 will be smallest when a 406-MHz GPS

S
(36.8 percent) occurred on inland beacon has been activated and largest
waterways and 86 (25.5 percent) when a 121.5-MHz beacon has been
occurred on land. Use of a beacon to activated (Figure 1, page 116). AR response
communicate distress was recorded
in 12 of the 337 cases. These data, One example of differences in search to the distress alert
which are collected for purposes of policies is that the absence of confirming
SAR operational analysis rather than information directly influences the deci- from a 121.5-MHz
aviation safety analysis, do not con- sion by the SAR mission coordinator at a
tain separate categories for business/ Coast Guard RCC to conduct a search. beacon may be
corporate aircraft, commuter/on-
demand operations or helicopters. “In any scenario involving only a dis- minimal.
The Coast Guard annually reports tress alert from a 121.5-MHz beacon,
about 40,000 incidents in which its we will not launch a visual search based
resources are “used to aid any person on the first satellite pass,” Steward said.
and property.”;13 “We will not launch a visual search to
the first composite position — which when the 406-MHz signal was received,
• The Coast Guard requests 200 times is calculated from the second satellite where along that path the aircraft may
to 400 times a year that commercial pass over the beacon — unless we have be located,” Steward said. “By knowing
ships — usually among the 13,000 other indications of distress: the report the type of aircraft and average speed,
ships that participate in Amver (the of a ‘mayday,’ the report of an overdue we can begin a search at that point with
acronym for Automated Mutual- aircraft, a flare sighting, etc. It will not the knowledge that we will get position
­assistance Vessel Rescue), a voluntary be until the second composite position confirmation from the second pass of a
worldwide ship-reporting system is known — based on the third satellite polar-orbiting satellite.”
— search/rescue people at sea; pass — that we will launch our SAR
response.” Policies on conducting visual searches
• In 2002, Amver tracked an average in response to distress alerts from 121.5-
of 2,760 ships per day, participated SAR response to the distress alert from a MHz beacons vs. 406-MHz beacons
in 349 SAR cases and diverted 243 121.5-MHz beacon may be minimal. vary among RCCs in different parts of
ships from 37 countries to conduct the world, however.
searches for 115 ships, to rescue 191 “For the distress alert from a 121.5-MHz
survivors and to assist 28 marine beacon far out in the Pacific Ocean, we “We have chosen to respond to the first
vessels; and, would not necessarily send an aircraft to signal from 406-MHz beacons despite the
search, but we would send a notice to all high false-alert rate, but there is no inter-
• No assistance by Amver ships to Amver ships passing through the area to national requirement that this be done,”
survivors of ditched aircraft was re- keep a lookout,” said Lemon. “Crews of Lemon said. “For whatever reasons, not
ported in 2002; Amver data showed these ships would not necessarily conduct all countries do this. Our normal proce-
assistance to three ditched aircraft in a search, they would just tell us if they dure — if the scenario involved a signal
1996, two ditched aircraft in 1997, see anything.” from a 406-MHz beacon far out in the
no ditched aircraft in 1998 and two Pacific Ocean — is that an Amver vessel
ditched aircraft in 1999. In contrast, the Coast Guard policy is to probably would be diverted to go to the
respond to the first distress alert received location and look around. If we did not
from any 406-MHz beacon by beginning find an Amver ship nearby, we probably
Type of Beacon search preparations and, when the beacon would launch an aircraft and at least as-
Influences Response position is confirmed, by initiating the sess the situation.”
by Rescuers search without delay unless the distress
alert has been confirmed to be false. To find survivors after arriving in the

A mong the most important incen-

tives for providing 406-MHz beacon
technology for overwater operations are
“From information provided by a per-
son listed as an emergency contact in
search area, crews of SAR aircraft typi-
cally use direction-finding equipment
to home to the beacon. SAR equipment,
the differences in the size of the typical an owner-registration database of 406- training and capabilities vary widely, how-
search area and the differences in RCC MHz beacons, we can create a track line ever. The Coast Guard, for example, has a
search policies. The required search area to search and estimate by time, based on wide array of advanced-technology SAR

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 115
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Figure 1
Search Areas Determined by Technology of Emergency Radio Beacons1

121.5-megahertz Emergency Locator Transmitter

Search-area radius: 12.0 nautical miles (22.2 kilometers)
Search area: 453 square nautical miles (1,549 square kilometers)
Average search-and-rescue notification: 6 hours

406-megahertz Emergency Locator Transmitter

Search-area radius: 2.0 nautical miles (3.7 kilometers)
Search area: 12.6 square nautical miles (43.1 square kilometers)
Average search-and-rescue notification: 1 hour

2
406-megahertz Emergency Locator Transmitter with GPS
Search-area radius: 0.05 nautical mile (0.09 kilometer)
Search area: 0.008 square nautical mile (0.027 square kilometer)
Average search-and-rescue notification: 5 minutes

Cospas = Cosmicheskaya Sistyema Poiska Avariynich Sudov (Russian words that mean “space system to search for marine vessels in distress”)
GPS = Global positioning system SAR = Search and rescue Sarsat = Search and Rescue Satellite-aided Tracking
1Emergency radio beacons include emergency locator transmitters (ELTs), emergency position-indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) and personal

locator beacons (PLBs). Signals from these beacons are detected by the Cospas–Sarsat International Satellite System for Search and Rescue and
are relayed to rescue coordination centers. Cospas refers to a SAR-instrument package built by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and carried
on participating Russian satellites that are operated now by the Commonwealth of Independent States. Sarsat refers to Canadian/French-built
SAR-instrument packages carried on participating satellites that are operated currently by the United States. Cospas–Sarsat also receives distress
alerts from SAR instruments aboard satellites operated by India and by the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
(EUMETSAT) with the European Space Agency.
2Some 406-megahertz (MHz) EPIRBs and 406-MHz PLBs use position information from GPS receivers. Some 406-MHz ELTs use position information

from a GPS receiver or other aircraft navigation equipment.

Source: U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

equipment — such as vision-enhancement devices and starlight); the speed of the SAR aircraft or SAR
— but aircraft operators should not assume that all marine vessel; the height of observers above the
SAR authorities have similar equipment. Among water; sea state and size; illumination and reflectiv-
advanced equipment, forward-looking infrared ity of the search object (e.g., retroreflective tape
cameras are passive systems that detect thermal on survivors and life rafts significantly increases
radiation — such as the body heat of survivors the chances of detection by reflecting light toward
— and generate live video images. They normally the source so that the materials appear to be much
are preferred for night use. brighter than their surroundings); and use of lights
and pyrotechnics by survivors when searchers are
Night-vision goggles also may be used by crew- within visual range.
members of SAR aircraft or SAR marine vessels.
The effectiveness of these devices depends, in part, When the crew of a SAR aircraft has the survivors
on ambient light sources (including moonlight in sight but is not in radio communication with

116 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

them, procedures call for the crew to indicate to “The first thing that the crew of the responding
survivors that they have been sighted by flashing aircraft will try to do is establish communication
a signaling lamp or a searchlight, or by firing and determine the overall situation. Using a ra-
two signal flares (usually green) a few seconds dio transceiver dropped to survivors, they will tell
apart. Another method to confirm the sighting survivors what is contained in packages that have
of survivors is for the crew of a SAR airplane to fly been dropped and how to use specific equipment.
over them at a lower altitude with landing lights Even if the crew of the first search aircraft to arrive
illuminated or with wings rocking. cannot establish communication with survivors
in a life raft, they will attempt to maintain ‘top
Policies and procedures for dropping survival cover’ over the scene to keep track of position
equipment vary among rescue organizations, and reassure survivors that they are working to
and may affect what, if anything, is dropped. assist them.”
Factors in the decision include whether other life
rafts have been launched successfully and without The fixed-wing SAR aircraft typically will keep the
significant damage; whether the survivors’ life raft distress scene in sight; survey the distress scene;
has become unserviceable; whether survivors in plot the location; communicate to the RCC’s
the life raft are overcrowded; and whether any SAR mission coordinator details of the location,
survivors are in the water. visible survivors, rescue risks/opportunities,
actions taken, further requirements and over-
“Most often, these drops occur when survivors are all situation; and mark the distress scene with
far from an initial response by the Coast Guard a sea-dye marker, smoke float and/or datum
An HC-130
or other resources and we have to use an HC-130 marker buoy, which measures current and wind
Hercules aircraft,” said Dell. “Survivors absolutely drift and transmits these data to SAR authori- has the range to
should not make assumptions about how much ties, as appropriate. With the crew of a fixed-wing conduct a search
longer they must wait for rescue. SAR aircraft coordinating on-scene activities and far offshore.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 117
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

By staying together,
survivors provide
a bigger search
object on the water.

SAR helicopters ­conducting rescues of survivors “Even if our aircraft fly over the entire search area,
in daylight conditions and good visibility, mark- the probability of detecting the survivors still is
ing the distress scene may be unnecessary. not close to 100 percent without a beacon homing
signal,” Lemon said. “Nevertheless, we have found
The International Aeronautical and Maritime people when conditions were remarkable because
SAR (IAMSAR) Manual says that the SAR mis- the search area was so big and the search object
sion coordinator may direct the SAR aircraft crew was so small.”
that finds the survivors to remain on scene until
relieved by another SAR aircraft or marine ves- The IAMSAR Manual said, “Having a very precise
sel, forced to return to base (e.g., by weather or search-object position is useful but does not elimi-
low-fuel condition) or the rescue has been com- nate the need for SAR unit homing capabilities.
pleted.14 While on scene, SAR airplanes function This is especially true if the SAR unit does not
as a radio communication center and airborne have precise navigation equipment or if opera-
radar beacon/target, and provide radio signals tions take place at night or in other low-visibility
for direction-finding and homing15 by other SAR conditions.”
aircraft and SAR marine vessels.
The size of a SAR search area depends on many
factors, including the accuracy of the beacon
Many Factors Challenge position, the time elapsed before searchers ar-
Searchers at Distress Scene rive on scene and environmental factors such as
ocean currents, waves and winds. The amount of

C omputer-aided search-planning software

enables the SAR mission coordinator of an
RCC to quickly establish an initial search area and
time that searchers will require to conduct an air
search of an open-ocean area depends largely on
the sweep width (i.e., how far the search crew can
to expand the search area, based on objective cri- see objects in the water from one side to the other
teria. Nevertheless, any time that SAR authorities side of the search aircraft).
conduct an open-ocean search, visually identify-
ing a life raft or a person in the water is extremely The choice of sweep width will be based partly
difficult. on the search target that searchers expect. The

118 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

number of sweeps required to cover the area us- try to ascertain where the aircraft is and who the
ing an appropriate search pattern, multiplied by owner is in response to the distress alert,” Steward
the time required to fly each sweep at the SAR said. If the U.S. Air Force RCC determines that the
aircraft speed, gives the time required to conduct distress aircraft is in a maritime SAR region, the dis-
a search one time. tress alert will be forwarded to the Coast Guard.

“If we have a fixed-wing search aircraft in good “If an EPIRB is activated and the location initially
visibility conditions, the crew typically would not is not known, the distress alert will go directly
take time to fly a search pattern on arrival because — with no delay — to a Coast Guard RCC that
the crew often can see the whole area in one fly- is responsible for maritime SAR,” Steward said.
over — unless they are looking for one person in “We coordinate very closely with the U.S. Air Force
the water without a life raft, which would require RCC, but there will be an extra step until they real-
searching at a lower altitude,” Lemon said. “With ize that the distress alert is from an aircraft over
a cutter or a helicopter at a normal search altitude water and that they need to send the distress alert
of 500 feet, we would start from the best position to a Coast Guard RCC. That may mean a delay
we have. Searching from a known position is very of two minutes to half an hour, but when we are
fast unless we have low visibility. At night or in talking about life saving, minutes matter.”
foggy conditions, searching is a whole different
ballgame — this is when a homing signal can be Similar delays can occur when the distress aircraft
very valuable even when we have an updated GPS has been ditched in an inland body of water and
position from a 406-MHz GPS beacon. a Coast Guard RCC is first to receive the distress
alert from a 406-MHz EPIRB, he said. Differences
“With a 406-MHz GPS beacon and GPS-equipped in 406-MHz beacon-type encoding do not affect
search aircraft, searchers can go right to the bea- the significance attached to the distress alert by
con, except that they have to take into account that the Coast Guard or the U.S. Air Force, however,
if a half hour elapsed in transit, the target could said Dell.
have drifted. If searchers do not have an updated
GPS position when they arrive, they could be a “For example, a PLB could be activated in the
little bit off the actual location. Although the crews middle of the Pacific Ocean, but just because PLBs
of our SAR aircraft probably would see survivors currently are encoded for land use does not mean
of a ditched aircraft, searchers on the bridge of a that we will respond differently,” Dell said.
ship could require a few passes in a shallow-circle
pattern to see survivors. For the crew of a ship, a The cessation of a beacon’s signal after the first dis-
search area based on a 406-MHz GPS beacon posi- tress alert has been received from survivors of a wa-
tion is much better than a search area based on a ter-contact accident would not affect a search that has
406-MHz beacon without position data.” been launched by the Coast Guard, Lemon said.

In the United States, the beacon type encoded in a “Typically, that the signals stopped would not
406-MHz signal determines which SAR organiza- change our response, because
tion is first to receive the distress alert. Any distress people inadvertently turn off bea-
alert from an emergency position-indicating radio cons and beacons stop transmit-

“W
beacon (EPIRB) automatically goes to a maritime ting for various reasons,” Lemon
RCC operated by the Coast Guard. Any distress alert said. “For example, aircraft can
from a 406-MHz ELT or personal locator beacon sink with the ELT, beacons can hen we
(PLB; a compact beacon designed to be carried be damaged by fires, and anten-
by an individual on land, but also used on water) nas easily can get broken off on are talking
automatically goes to the U.S. Air Force RCC, which impact. If one of the RCCs got
coordinates all U.S. inland SAR cases (except air- two or three distress alerts and about life saving,
craft water-contact accidents in a few inland bodies then the alerts stopped, we still
of water, to which the Coast Guard responds). would investigate the distress minutes matter.”
alert.”
“If the location initially is not known, the U.S. Air
Force will look at the owner registration data and Continued on page 122

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 119
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Foundation Pioneered Early Overwater-safety Decisions

I
nternational safety systems for trans- term,” Heath said. “I asked then what stations since the 1970s,” said Lt. Cmdr.
oceanic flight and other overwater Flight Safety Foundation was going to Jay Dell of the Coast Guard. “They
operations received significant atten- do to lead in this situation, and I took were replaced by better capability to
tion in the 1950s, said Gloria W. Heath, the initiative by getting in touch with respond.”)2
an aerospace consultant who has been the U.S. Coast Guard. I asked them
involved with many aspects of overwater to start a training program for former Heath also pursued methods of safe
safety in aviation.1 In the early 1950s, military pilots and nonmilitary pilots who ditching by interaction with the U.S.
Heath recognized that differences in would be flying land airplanes over the National Advisory Committee for
civil aircraft pilot training, technology ocean. Coast Guard seaplane instruc- Aeronautics (NACA, predecessor of the
and search-and-rescue (SAR) systems tors took these pilots out over the water U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
— compared with prewar operations to educate them about how they could Administration). NACA built scale mod-
— warranted attention by airlines, manu- gauge swells, currents and the speed els of airplanes that would be flying over
facturers, pilots and regulators. and direction of wind on the water, oceans and tested the ditching perfor-
enabling them to evaluate the factors mance of the models in water tanks (see
“There was not much civil transoce- required to conduct a ditching with the “Ditching Certification — What Does It
anic travel by airplane until the 1950s,” least damage to the airplane.” Mean?” page 66).
Heath said. “Before World War II, the
only airplanes used for transoceanic During this period, SAR capabilities at “NACA worked to determine the best
commercial passenger service had sea were enhanced by Coast Guard landing configurations for ditching and
been seaplanes. Pilots in the 1950s ocean stations, marine vessels posi- how manufacturers could make design
knew that under some circumstances tioned at sea for routine communication modifications and hull reinforcements,”
they would have to ‘alight’ on the with crews of aircraft on transoce- she said. “NACA published several re-
water — ditching was the well-known anic flights. (“We have not had ocean ports on results of testing models that

Gloria Heath, in winter flying gear, before a 1943 primary training flight in a Boeing Stearman for the
U.S. Women Airforce Service Pilots.

120 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

As director of SAR-ASSIST after leaving served as a member of the FSF

the Foundation, she was a pioneer in Board of Governors. Currently,
developing survival equipment, locating she is actively involved in the
survivors, advocating acoustic beacons Foundation as an FSF governor,
for underwater location of flight data emeritus. Heath influenced many
recorders and cockpit voice recorders, systems that enable survival
and using chemical-luminescence strips in water-contact accidents. As
to mark emergency-exit pathways in assistant director of the Cornell-
transport aircraft. She also was chairman Guggenheim Aviation Safety
of the Committee on Safety and Rescue Center and as director of
Studies of the International Academy of SAR-ASSIST, Heath has been
Astronautics, which — in the course of an aerospace scientist and con-
studying satellite-based rescue systems sultant. Her career began as a pi-
for astronauts and cosmonauts — rec- lot in the Women Airforce Service
ognized the potential use of satellites to Pilots, U.S. Army Air Force, in
send all kinds of distress/disaster alerts World War II.
from anywhere on Earth to international
authorities.   2. Dell, Jay; Cospas–Sarsat liaison
officer and Distress Alerting
The committee’s SAR-related recom- Satellite System (DASS) of-
mendations — which became reality in ficer, Office of Search and
Gloria Heath
the Cospas–Sarsat International Satellite Rescue, U.S. Coast Guard,
System for Search and Rescue — also U.S. Department of Homeland
were ditched with flaps down, flaps up, inspired United Nations conferences Security. Interview by
wheels down, wheels up, etc. There was on peaceful methods of using remote- Rosenkrans, Wayne. Washington,
a question of the validity of scale-model sensing satellites, weather satellites and D.C., U.S. July 2, 2003. Flight
tests against real-world performance, but communication satellites to predict and Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
there also were a number of ditchings to mitigate natural disasters through bet- Virginia, U.S. The Cospas–Sarsat
study.” ter infrastructure, warning systems and International Satellite System
response capabilities, she said.  for Search and Rescue currently
In the following decades, Heath led or includes satellites provided by
participated in several initiatives that be- — FSF Editorial Staff the European Organization for
came the basis of the current SAR system the Exploitation of Meteorological
worldwide. These included Amver (the ac- Satellites (EUMETSAT) with the
Notes European Space Agency, India,
ronym for Automated Mutual-assistance
Vessel Rescue, a voluntary worldwide Russia and the United States.
  1. Heath, Gloria. Telephone inter- Cospas is the acronym for the
ship-reporting system operated by the view by Rosenkrans, Wayne.
Coast Guard), and the International Russian words Cosmicheskaya
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 24, Sistyema Poiska Avariynich
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
(SOLAS), which includes common safety Sudov, which means “space
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Heath system to search for marine
standards and procedures for marine was the first employee of Aircraft
vessels. vessels in distress,” and refers
Engineering for Safety (AES), and to a SAR-­instrument package
she helped Jerome F. “Jerry” carried on Russia’s polar-orbiting
She was an early advocate of the use of Lederer (FSF president, emeri- satellites. Sarsat, the acronym for
emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) in tus, until his death Feb. 6, 2004) Search and Rescue Satellite-aid-
general aviation and worked to interest merge AES with Flight Safety ed Tracking, refers to Canadian/
owners in equipping their aircraft with Foundation in 1947. In 1948, French-built SAR-­instrument
ELTs. she was FSF project manager of packages carried on U.S. polar-
the first formal course in aircraft orbiting satellites.
“The Foundation was very instrumental accident investigation to be
in getting the first ELT requirement into conducted in the United States,
effect through the U.S. Federal Aviation Lederer said. In 1965, she left the
Administration, which greatly simplified Foundation to become a consul-
searching for aircraft at the time,” she tant to the Cornell-Guggenheim
said. Aviation Safety Center. She later

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 121
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Regarding circumstances in which sus- Coast Guard cutters or Coast Guard heli- “Crews of participating ships log into
pension of search operations must be copters,” Lemon said. “A commercial ship the Amver system when they depart a
considered, the IAMSAR Manual said, would take more than 16 hours to travel port,” Steward said. “They submit sail
“The decision to suspend a search involves 200 nautical miles [370 kilometers] to get plans, position reports, arrival reports
humanitarian considerations, but there is to the scene at 12 knots.” and deviation reports so we know where
a limit to the time and effort that can be Amver ships are or will be in the next
devoted to each SAR case. … The decision In practice, using commercial ships to two-hour period. We typically contact a
to suspend operations should be based on assist survivors of a ditching has been nearby Amver ship via high-frequency
an evaluation of the probability that there rare, said Dell. The reason is that most (HF) radio or satellite communication.
were survivors from the initial incident, the water-contact accidents have occurred In seven years, I have never known an
probability of survival after the incident, the relatively close to shore. Amver vessel to say no to a Coast Guard
probability that any survivors were within request to respond to a distress scene.”
the computed search area, and the effec- As the world’s only voluntary ship-
tiveness of the search effort as measured ­reporting system operated exclusively RCCs also can call upon captains of
by the cumulative probability of success.” for SAR on a global basis, Amver enables Amver ships if survivors of a water-
Some RCCs use computer software to the SAR mission coordinator of an RCC ­contact accident require emergency
assist in determining the probability of to identify participating ships in the medical treatment far from land.
survival based on factors such as the sur- area of distress and request assistance
vivor’s age, weight, height, clothing with/ from the crews of the best-suited ship or “A lot of merchant ships have physi-
without a survival suit, type of survival suit, cians,” Steward said. “If we are on a
air temperature, water temperature and cutter in the middle of the ocean or
the height of seas (see “Is There a Doctor our SAR-helicopter crew has picked up
Aboard the Life Raft?” page 187).

Amver System Enables

“T he primary
someone who needs immediate medical
attention, we also may divert one of the
Amver ships with a physician to provide
rescue units medical assistance.”
SAR Response From
Marine Vessels in the middle of Any RCC in the world can use Amver, and
use of the system increased during the

I f SAR authorities believe that a ship is

the best rescue option, they may turn to
Amver. For example, if the crew of a busi-
the ocean are

commercial ships.”
1990s so that diverting an Amver vessel
to aid vessels in distress became routine,
Lemon said.
ness aircraft ditches in the South Atlantic
Ocean or the South Pacific Ocean, the Amver also exchanges ship-reporting data
closest ship might be only 250 nautical with several similar systems operating in
miles (463 kilometers) away, Lemon said. ships. Participation has been limited to specific nations or specific areas of the
Coast Guard fixed-wing aircraft can drop ships of more than 1,000 gross tons on world, such as SECOSENA in Argentina,
emergency supplies but cannot conduct a voyage of 24 hours or longer, said the AUSREP in Australia, SISTRAM in Brazil,
the rescue. The Dassault HU-25 Falcon Coast Guard, which operates Amver. In ECAREG and NORDREG in Canada,
can search using a radius of action of 800 recent years, cruise ships, research ves- U.S./Canada Vessel Traffic Services Area
nautical miles (1,482 kilometers), and the sels and fish-processing vessels also have (CVTS Offshore), CHILREP in Chile,
Lockheed Martin HC-130 Hercules has a participated. SHIPPOS in Denmark, GREENPOS and
radius of action of 1,600 nautical miles KYSTKONTROL in Greenland, INSPIRES
(2,963 kilometers). Movements of participating ships from in India, AREA in Italy, JASREP in Japan
more than 140 nations are plotted and SINGREP in Singapore.
The Sikorsky HH-60 helicopter has a ra- continuously with a computer system,
dius of action of 300 nautical miles (556 using plans and reports sent by vessel
kilometers) and the Eurocopter HH-65 operators. Position data are displayed RCCs Swap
helicopter has a radius of action of 150 graphically as a “surface picture” on Information but
nautical miles (278 kilometers). computer terminals in some RCCs Operate Autonomously
— or sent by Internet e-mail or faxed
“The primary rescue units in the middle
of the ocean are commercial ships — not
by request to SAR mission coordinators
in other RCCs. I n many countries, the entity respon-
sible for the RCC and maritime SAR

122 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

response is a ministry of transportation, SAR community can be compared for a — or anywhere there may not be the best
navy, air force or coast guard. No RCC general impression of the SAR environ- SAR response — the aircraft operator
has authority to oversee or to direct the ment along a specific route. may need additional survival equipment,
decisions of the RCC in another country, including drinking water, warm clothing
however, Steward said. “We strive constantly to keep valid lines and hats, and food because of the rescue
of communication and points of contact time factor.”
“RCCs are not reporting to any higher within all countries,” said Dell. “That is a
central authority that is monitoring eve­ very difficult task and very indefinite in Several noncommercial information
rything,” Lemon said. Rather, relation- terms of ensuring that a timely, appro- sources are available — in addition to
ships among the staffs of RCCs around priate response can be initiated by any commercial flight-planning services
the world are based on the principles given country.” — for learning about the SAR capabilities
of SAR information exchange among of nations along an overwater route. SAR
equals and on professional courtesy, Aircraft operators should expect the regions, and the nation that has accepted
he said. SAR response to a water-contact ac- SAR-coordination responsibility for each
cident to be based on procedures and SAR region, can be identified on charts in
Global SAR principles and methods have methods in the IAMSAR Manual and in regional ICAO air navigation plans. Some
become simpler to understand during the regional/national supplements published RCCs cannot coordinate open-ocean
past five years. SAR authorities worldwide searches and do not have access to SAR
have been adopting common standards aircraft or SAR marine vessels that can
and procedures jointly developed by the conduct open-ocean rescues, however.
International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) and published in the
S AR “The SAR sections of the air navigation
plans should be understood as plans and
IAMSAR Manual. authorities not reality,” said Brian Day, technical of-
ficer, Air Traffic Management Section,
The IAMSAR Manual says, “A basic, worldwide have ICAO. “It is beyond ICAO’s resource
practical and humanitarian charac- capacity to maintain a current list of all
teristic of having a global SAR system been adopting 189 member states’ assets. The usefulness
is that it eliminates the need for each of air navigation plans is very limited in
[nation] to provide SAR services for its common standards showing the extent of these SAR assets to
own citizens wherever they travel world- operators that are determining how they
wide. Instead, the globe is divided into and procedures. should support their operations from a
SAR regions, each with [an RCC] and SAR perspective.”17
associated SAR services, which assist
anyone in distress within the SAR region For general research by aircraft opera-
without regard to nationality or circum- by SAR authorities. The Coast Guard tors, Day directs attention to an Internet
stances.”16 ICAO Annex 12, Search and recommends that aircraft operators use site — <http://www.sarcontacts.com>
Rescue, defines a SAR region as “an area the IAMSAR Manual, Volume 3, and — created and maintained by RCC
of defined dimensions, associated with provide to pilots quick-reference proce- Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, and EMS
an RCC, within which SAR services are dures that incorporate IAMSAR Manual Technologies with support and funding
provided.” information. from the Canadian Coast Guard and the
Canadian National SAR Secretariat.
Many nations and regions with advanced “Volume 3 would give any aircraft opera-
SAR capabilities provide detailed infor- tor a good overview and a very good start “Operators may find this database of
mation to aircraft operators through pub- in what they need to know to develop international SAR agencies and RCCs
lications and Internet sites. Some nations overwater-safety procedures,” Steward useful as a tool in safety planning,” Day
where SAR capabilities are minimal may said. “It gets everybody — not just the said.
provide information to aircraft operators rescuers — on the same page, including
only by request. ICAO recommends that what survivors can expect. It is a good For emergency planning by aircraft
aircraft operators communicate directly idea for aircraft operators to check out operators, charts in the SAR sections of
with SAR authorities for the most cur- the route and know who will be respon- ICAO air navigation plans also show the
rent information. Nevertheless, other sible for SAR response on the overwater short-range search areas over oceans that
information sources used within the segments. When flying well off a coast can be covered by SAR helicopters and

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 123
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

The first RCC

to receive a distress
alert either must
respond or hand off
the case to an RCC
that’s better suited
to respond.

Source: European Space Agency

the extra-long-range search areas over oceans that United States. Another 22 SAR regions of other
can be covered by SAR fixed-wing aircraft from countries border those of the United States. In
various points on land. “These are purely ICAO our oceanic SAR regions, we handle three-fourths
plans for maritime search capability — not rescue of the North Pacific Ocean and about half of the
capability,” said Lemon. North Atlantic Ocean. The Coast Guard handles
all maritime SAR cases and aeronautical SAR cases
IMO has been developing a database of the re- that occur over water in these regions.”
sources available to the world’s RCCs, Lemon
said. To help aircraft operators plan overwater More maritime SAR regions exist worldwide than
operations, he recommended the IMO Internet aeronautical SAR regions because aeronautical
site <www.imo.org> for updates about global SAR regions have been combined for efficiency,
SAR plans. which was made possible by the increasing range
of aeronautical radio communication. A number
Nations with relatively advanced SAR capabilities of nations with well-developed RCCs and exten-
benefit from the trend toward cooperative meth- sive experience routinely provide SAR coordina-
ods. For example, Canada, the United Kingdom tion — sometimes far from their SAR regions
and the United States collectively have defined — and help to identify SAR resources from outside
methods of responding to SAR cases where SAR the region where the distress alert occurs.
regions and responsibilities meet in large expanses
of the Atlantic Ocean. “For example, Norway coordinates many of the
maritime SAR responses in the Indian Ocean,
“The United States has 15 SAR agreements with France coordinates many responses off the coasts
other countries,” Lemon said. “U.S. responsibilities of Africa, and the United Kingdom coordinates
comprise 10 maritime SAR regions, one SAR region some SAR cases in the South Atlantic Ocean,”
for the State of Alaska and one for the continental Lemon said. “The South Atlantic Ocean is a vast

124 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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expanse of ocean with practically no land areas. leave an aircraft operator unprepared for scenarios
Some countries in South America and Africa have that can occur after a water-contact accident. The
limited resources to respond to an aircraft ditching reason is that extreme disparities exist among SAR
or distant maritime SAR case.” capabilities despite the universal intention to ren-
der humanitarian assistance.
International flight operations often are con-
ducted through maritime SAR regions. IMO has “Currently, maritime SAR is not fully imple-
divided the world’s oceans into 13 maritime SAR mented around the world — some maritime SAR
areas, in which nearby countries have defined and systems exist on paper only,” said Lemon. “This is
accepted responsibility for maritime SAR regions. mainly a problem among developing nations that
ICAO regional air navigation plans show the aero- have limited resources. The reality is that there
nautical SAR regions and maritime SAR regions are fewer resources in the southern hemisphere,
for most of the world. for example, than in the northern hemisphere
— fewer countries, fewer commercial ships and
Complex relationships and agreements govern fewer aircraft. Survivors of an aircraft ditching
operations by SAR authorities of one country in probably would have to wait longer to be rescued
the territorial waters of another country. Typically, in the southern hemisphere. The Coast Guard can
the humanitarian nature of the work is recognized contact quickly just about any RCC — but not
and provisions have been made for immediate ac- all of them, such as those in nations that have
tion when the distress scene is known and lives not developed their SAR capabilities very well.
are at stake. We are working with IMO to do assessments and
to find at least enough funding to get the RCC
“Searching and rescuing are totally different ball- functions going.”
games when the situation involves territorial wa-
ters where another country has sovereign control,” Many international organizations have been
Lemon said. “In a purely rescue situation — when working to improve SAR capabilities in some
we know that if we do not go in, nobody else will, of the least-capable SAR regions, however. The
and people will die — we notify the country but relevance of this work to any particular aircraft
do not waste time requesting permission to save operator depends on the geographic location of
survivors. We balance the concern for sovereignty its overwater flight operations.
and the concern for lifesaving.
“Some aircraft are in radar range and radio range
“On the other hand, if the situation is an overdue all the time and are monitored by air traffic
aircraft that may be in distress, but a search is control,” Day said. “Other aircraft are likely to
required because we are not sure where the air- conduct flights in environments that are less well
craft is, we normally request permission to search monitored. Operators faced with a paucity of
another country’s territorial waters because we do navigation aids and/or ordinary communication
not know whether people actually are in distress facilities are most at risk.”
or whether we could help them.”
Africa currently is the primary focus of inter-
This general practice is based on U.S. interpreta- national SAR improvement
tions of international law; explicit agreements with through combined efforts of

“S
some countries enable many searches for SAR African nations, non-African
purposes to be conducted in another country’s nations, ICAO, IMO and the
territorial waters without requesting permission. Cospas–Sarsat Secretariat. Some ome
African SAR regions have had se-
rious deficits for decades, a situa- maritime SAR
Planning Compensates tion that has prompted external
For Extreme Disparities in financial support and technical systems exist on
SAR Capabilities assistance in recent years.
paper only.”

F ailure to consider SAR capabilities along over-

water routes in some areas of the world can
“Various authorities currently are
focusing on the improvement of

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 125
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

in addition to an ATC facility’s national “The ‘first RCC’ principle holds that the

“U
language. first RCC to receive a distress alert is
­responsible for responding to the SAR
nlike the “Aeronautical voice telephony is the case until it can arrange for response
primary means of communication, even by an RCC that is closer or better suited
provision of with the introduction of controller-­pilot to take over the SAR case,” said Lemon.
data link communication,” Day said. “If there is none, the first RCC keeps
air traffic services, “Improving proficiency in English will the SAR case even though the distress
place a huge economic demand on na- alert might have come from outside its
SAR is perceived tions and airlines, but the benefits will be SAR region. When this principle is fol-
extremely positive. RCCs indirectly will lowed, a SAR case does not fall through
to cost money, have a requirement to communicate rap- the cracks [i.e., fail to receive a response
idly and reliably with ATC and, in some because of confusion about which RCC
not make money.” cases, with pilots. is responsible].”

“ICAO cannot impose the same degree Clear communication from one RCC
of requirement on the SAR domain as on to another is essential in the handoff
SAR services in areas of the world that are the ATC domain. But it stands to reason process.
either historically ­deficient or ­presently that the same imperative for improved
critical,” Day said. “But absence of ad- communication in English rests with “Some nations have chosen to use SAR-
equate investment in SAR services by RCCs during communication between region boundaries as indicators of sover-
some governments sometimes reflects RCCs, during communication between eign right — which is a complete misap-
long-held beliefs. an RCC and ATC and during communi- plication of the concept of SAR regions,”
cation between an RCC and a pilot.” Day said. “The most operationally en-
“Unlike the provision of air traffic ser- lightened view is that SAR regions would
vices, SAR is perceived to cost money, become invisible to aircraft operators and
not make money. The economic im- Behind the Scenes, would not limit the SAR response.”
plications deserve closer consideration, Local Policies Govern
however. Historically, conducting an Searches
open-ocean search was the major cost Next-generation
GPS Satellites Integrate
factor. Extensive research has shown
that the value of lives and equipment
saved over time far exceeds the cost of
U nder international SAR conven-
tions, any nation that assumes
responsibility for a SAR region com-
New SAR Functions

the SAR services that reclaimed them.

Some intangible benefits largely defy
quantification; these include benefits to
mits in principle to providing a fully
capable RCC or equivalent services. In
some cases, nations establish rescue sub-
N ew U.S. satellite technology for
detecting signals from 406-MHz
beacons — called the Distress Alerting
tourism, trade and commerce and the ­centers under the RCC of another nation Satellite System — has been designed
goodwill that arises from obvious atten- to provide SAR services within their SAR to add SAR-instrument packages to
tion to humanitarian issues.” regions, the IAMSAR Manual said. future constellations of GPS satellites
in medium-Earth orbits. The European
Recent international consensus about The manual says that governments will Commission/European Space Agency,
improving English-language profi- delegate to their RCCs the authority to Russia and the United States all are
ciency in aeronautical communication directly coordinate SAR responses with working with Cospas–Sarsat on similar
— including distress situations — also RCCs of other regions and nations. technology. In the United States, for ex-
is expected to positively influence SAR Usually, delays that would be caused ample, two DASS-equipped GPS satellites
capabilities. ICAO will require, begin- by communicating through diplomatic are in a demonstration and evaluation
ning in November 2008, a specified channels can be avoided, Lemon said. phase. If DASS is fully implemented as
level of English-language proficiency Sometimes an RCC receives a distress planned, a 406-MHz beacon anywhere
for air traffic controllers and for flight alert and retains the coordination func- on Earth’s surface will be in view of four
crews that operate internationally. The tion after determining that there is no satellites, and within 10 minutes, SAR au-
requirements are based on international suitable RCC for handing off the SAR thorities will be able to determine twice
recognition of the value of a language for case in the SAR region where the distress as accurately as with current technology
ATC communication that can be used has occurred, he said. the location of all types of 406-MHz

126 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

beacons. DASS also may enable RCCs to demonstrate that this technology works “The problem with an aircraft going
confirm that a distress alert is genuine, globally.” down just off an airport is how to
to know the circumstances of survivors know immediately that it went down
and to tell survivors the status of SAR The Coast Guard also is among SAR and its position,” Lemon said. “If all
assistance, Lemon said. authorities seeking improvements in ATC knows is that the aircraft went
worldwide SAR response to aircraft in- off radar, it could take ARFF and the
“Technically, there is no reason that we volved in a ditching or other water-con- Coast Guard a relatively long time to
cannot have two-way text communica- tact accident that occurs in the vicinity find it. At the request of the Air Line
tion between an RCC and survivors of an airport (as well as accidents on Pilots Association, International, the
except that beacons will have to be de- land). Airports currently do not receive U.S. National SAR Committee is con-
signed to take advantage of this capabil- directly distress alerts from ELTs, and the sidering the potential role of 406-MHz
ity,” he said. “The advertised time frame nine-minute time for processing distress ELTs with position encoding and other
for fully operational DASS is 2015, but I signals detected by satellite significantly technologies so that distress alerts not
believe the change could be quicker. For exceeds current standards for on-airport only go through satellites to an RCC but
Cospas–Sarsat to agree to let DASS be- response by aircraft rescue and fire fight- instantly go to ATC and ARFF authorities
come part of its system, test results must ing (ARFF) services. at the local airport.” 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Some SAR systems exist on paper only. Others vary widely in the resources available to conduct visual
searches from aircraft and to conduct open-ocean rescues.

• Aircraft operators should have familiarity with the RCCs that might become responsible for coordinating
efforts to find and rescue survivors of a ditching along their overwater routes.

• Automated systems forward satellite-detected distress alerts to the appropriate RCC, where people become
responsible for whatever action is — or is not — taken.

• Finding survivors in the open ocean usually is less difficult than conducting the rescue.

• Aircraft operators have a vital interest in globally harmonized SAR procedures and in international
initiatives to upgrade substandard resources.

Notes rockets, shells, rocket-launched red flares rial resources and close proximity to Coast
or cartridge-launched red flares (fired one Guard personnel were the primary reasons
  1. The term “declaring an emergency” at a time at short intervals) or a red para- that the staff focused on the policies
— while not part of the official phraseol- chute flare (ICAO Annex 10, Aeronautical and practices of the Coast Guard, which
ogy of the International Civil Aviation Telecommunications, Volume 2, 5.3, has headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
Organization (ICAO) — is widely “Distress and Urgency Radiotelephony U.S. The Coast Guard is part of the U.S.
understood to mean that a pilot (or air Communication Procedures”). Department of Homeland Security. SAR
traffic controller or aircraft operator) authorities in many other countries also
is formally notifying air traffic control   2. Steward, Paul. Interview by Rosenkrans, share expertise and conduct humanitar-
that an aircraft is in distress. “Distress” in Wayne. Suitland, Maryland, U.S. April ian activities that are essential to global
ICAO phraseology means “a condition of 9, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, SAR efforts, and aircraft operators should
being threatened by serious and/or immi- Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Steward retired contact SAR authorities in their respective
nent danger and of requiring immediate from the U.S. Coast Guard in June 2003. countries for more information.
assistance.” Distress is communicated by Although search-and-rescue (SAR)
the word “mayday” repeated three times authorities of other countries also play   3. The Cospas–Sarsat International Satellite
in voice radio communication; the letter an essential role in responding to aircraft System for Search and Rescue currently in-
group “SOS” telegraphed in Morse code; water-contact accidents, limited FSF edito- cludes satellites provided by the European

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 127
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Organization for the Exploitation of Cocos [Keeling] Island, St. Paul and National Disaster Management
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) Amsterdam), RCC Kabul (Afghanistan), Organization (Ghana), RCC Piraeus
with the European Space Agency, Algeria MCC, Luanda RCC (Angola), (Greece), RCC Conakry (Guinea), RSC
India, Russia and the United States. MRCC Fort de France (Anguilla, Antigua, Bissau (Guinea-Bissau), Civil Aviation
Cospas is the acronym for the Russian Dominica, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Department (Guyana), Budapest Air
words Cosmicheskaya Sistyema Poiska Martinique, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Traffic Control Center (Hungary),
Avariynich Sudov, which means “space Nevis, Saint Lucia), Argentina MCC, RCC GUFUNES Telecommunication Center
system to search for marine vessels in Vienna (Austria), Radiocommunication (Iceland), India MCC, Indonesia MCC,
distress,” and refers to a SAR-instrument Center (Azerbaijan), MRCC Lisboa RCC Tehran (Iran), RCC Baghdad (Iraq),
package carried on Russia’s polar-orbiting (Azores, Madeira, Portugal), Civil Irish Coastguard (Ireland), Tel Aviv
satellites. Sarsat, the acronym for Search Aviation Authorities (Bangladesh), Ben-Gurion Airport (Israel), Italy MCC,
and Rescue Satellite-aided Tracking, refers Central American Corporation for Air Japan MCC, RCC Amman (Jordan),
to Canadian/French-built SAR-instrument Navigation Services (COCESNA; Belize, Nairobi RCC (Kenya), Marine Guard
packages carried on U.S. polar-orbiting Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, (Kiribati), Republic of Korea MCC,
satellites. Honduras and Nicaragua), San Juan RCC Kuwait, MRCC Riga (Latvia),
RSC (British Virgin Islands, Dominican RCC Roberts (Liberia), RCC Zurich
  4. Cospas–Sarsat Secretariat. “Cospas–Sarsat Republic, Grenada, Netherlands Antilles, (Liechtenstein and Switzerland), ARCC
Data Distribution Plan.” Issue 4, Revision Puerto Rico, Saint Vincent and the Vilnius (Lithuania), RSC Luxembourg,
5. October 2002. 3–8. Frequencies in the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Macao Marine Department (Macao),
range of 406.0 MHz to 406.1 MHz are and U.S. Virgin Islands), Miami RCC RCC Antananarivo (Madagascar),
reserved for beacons designed to transmit (Bahamas, Barbados, Cayman Islands, Lilongue RCC (Malawi), Maldives
distress alerts in the Cospas–Sarsat Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, Turks and Caicos Airports Authority, RSC Bamako
program. Most current 406-MHz distress Islands, United States), RCC Bahrain, (Mali), Malta RCC, RCC Honolulu
beacons operate on 406.025 MHz or Brazil MCC, RCC Bruxelles (Belgium), (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Northern
406.028 MHz. In 2004, radio beacons that Cotonou Airport (Benin), Bermuda RCC, Mariana Islands and Palau), Civil
use an additional channel — 406.037 MHz La Paz RCC (Bolivia), Banja Luka RCC Aviation (Mauritania), RCC Mauritius,
— will be available. (Bosnia and Herzegovina), MRCC Varna Mexican Navy (Mexico), MRCC Gris
  5. The following countries are formally (Bulgaria), MRCC Cape Town (Botswana, Nez (Monaco), ARCC Mongolia, RCC
associated with the Cospas–Sarsat Burundi, Lesotho, South Africa), Brazil Casablanca (Morocco), Maputu RCC
program as providers of ground receiv- MCC, RSC Ouagadougou (Burkina (Mozambique), NAMSAR (Namibia),
ing stations or as user nations: Algeria, Faso), RSC Douala (Cameroon), Canada RCC Nauru, Department of Civil
Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, MCC, RCC Sal (Cape Verde), RSC Bangui Aviation (Nepal), Netherlands Coast
Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, (Central African Republic), Department Guard (Netherlands), Norway MCC, RCC
Japan, Madagascar, Netherlands, New of Civil Aviation (Bhutan), RCC Nouméa (New Caledonia, Wallis and
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, N’Djamena (Chad), Chile MCC, China Futuna), RCC Niamey (Niger), Nigeria
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, South MCC, Hong Kong MCC (China), Office MCC, Norway MCC and JRCC Stavanger
Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, of Search and Rescue Group (Colombia), (Norway), RCC Muscat (Oman), Pakistan
Thailand, Tunisia and United Kingdom. MRCC La Réunion (Comoros, Crozet MCC, Aeronáutica Civil (Panama), Peru
Independent organizations in Hong Archipelago, Kerguelen Islands, Mayotte, MCC, RCC Port Mooresby (Papua New
Kong and Taiwan, China, also provide La Réunion), ACC Brazzaville (Congo), Guinea), Asunción RCC (Paraguay), Peru
ground receiving stations. Three special- RCC Wellington (Cook Islands and MCC, Manila RCC (Philippines), Pitcairn
ized agencies of the United Nations New Zealand), RCC Abidjan (Cote Police (Pitcairn Island), Warsaw RCC
— ICAO, the International Maritime d’Ivoire), MRCC Rijeka (Croatia), JRCC (Poland), RCC Abu Dhabi (Qatar), Civil
Organization (IMO) and the International Curaçao (Aruba, Netherlands Antilles), Aviation Authority Flight Operations
Telecommunications Union (ITU) estab- RCC Larnaca (Cyprus), Air Navigation (Romania), Russia MCC, Kigali RCC
lish requirements and/or standards for Services (Czech Republic), Kinshasa RCC (Rwanda), Samoa National Surveillance
SAR equipment and use. (Democratic People’s Republic of the Center, Saudi Arabia MCC, RCC Dakar
Congo), RCC Karup (Denmark, Faroe (Senegal), ACC Belgrado (Serbia and
  6. In October 2003, Cospas–Sarsat SAR Islands, Greenland), RSC Djibouti, RSC Montenegro), Seychelles RCC, RSC
points of contact worldwide included Bata (Equatorial Guinea), Ecuadorian Freetown (Sierra Leone), Singapore
the following mission control cen- Air Force (Ecuador), SAR Center MCC, Bratislava MCC (Slovakia),
ters (MCCs), rescue coordination (Egypt), ACC Asmara/RCC Asmara Harbor Master Office (Slovenia), MRCC
centers (RCCs [MRCCs for mari- (Eritrea), MRCC Tallinn (Estonia), Honiara (Solomon Islands), South Africa
time; ARCCs for aeronautical]), joint Falkland Islands RCC, RCC Nadi (Fiji), MCC, Spain MCC, Colombo RCC (Sri
search-and-rescue centers (JSRCs), RCC Turku (Finland), France MCC Lanka), Department of Civil Aviation
rescue sub-centers (RSCs) and orga- (Andorra, Gibraltar and France), RCC (Surinam), RSC Matsapha (Swaziland),
nizations: Rinas Tirana International Tahiti (French Polynesia), RSC Libreville ARCC Göteborg (Sweden), Taipei
Airport (Albania), Ascension Island Air (Gabon), RSC Banjul (Gambia), MRCC MCC (Taiwan, China), Dar es Salaam
Operations (Ascension), RCC Australia Georgia (Commonwealth of Independent RCC (Tanzania), Thailand MCC, RCC
(Australia, Adelie Land, Christmas Island, States), RCC Münster (Germany), Bangkok (Thailand), RSC Lome (Togo),

128 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Tonga Defence Services (Tonga), Tunis motor lifeboats; motor surf boats; large that maintain a fixed position above a
ACC (Tunisia), RCC Ankara (Turkey), utility boats; surf rescue boats; port secu- point on Earth with orbital speed equal
ARCC Funafuti (Tuvalu), Entebbe RCC rity boats; aids-to-navigation boats; and to Earth’s rotation).
(Uganda), Odessa MRCC (Ukraine), a variety of smaller, nonstandard boats
Emirates RCC (United Arab Emirates), including rigid inflatable boats. 13. Schaefer, Richard. Office of Search and
U.K. MCC (United Kingdom of Great Rescue, U.S. Coast Guard. E-mail com-
Britain and Northern Ireland), U.S.   9. Lemon, Dan. Interview by Rosenkrans, munication with Rosenkrans, Wayne.
MCC (United States), Carrasco RCC Wayne. Washington, D.C., U.S. June Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Sept. 5, 2003.
(Uruguay), Vanuatu Meteorological 24, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Services, RCC Maiquetia (Venezuela), Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Virginia, U.S.
Vietnam MCC, RCC Sanaa (Yemen), 10. Russell, Paul D. Interview by Flight Safety 14. IMO, ICAO. IAMSAR Manual. Volume II,
Lusaka RCC (Zambia) and Harare RCC Foundation editorial staff. Alexandria, Mission Co-ordination. Chapter 6, “Rescue
(Zimbabwe). Virginia, U.S. May 1, 2003. Flight Safety Planning and Operations.”
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. In
  7. IMO and ICAO. International Aeronautical 15. Most 406-MHz emergency locator
the U.S. Coast Guard, Russell conducted
and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) transmitters (ELTs) and emergency posi-
more than 200 water landings and served
Manual. Document 9731–AN/958. tion-indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs)
in various positions, including command-
Volumes 1–3. 1998, 1999. “False alerts are include a 121.5-MHz auxiliary homing
er of two air stations, chief of the Aviation
any alerts received by the SAR system which transmitter that enables SAR aircraft and
Training Center Training Division and
indicate an actual or potential distress situ- SAR vessels to locate the radio beacon
chief of SAR operations in the Northwest
ation, when no such situation actually ex- using direction-finding equipment.
Region, before retiring in 1984 with the
ists,” the IAMSAR Manual says. “The term ICAO and the International Maritime
rank of captain. He is chief engineer, avia-
‘false alarm’ is sometimes used to distin- Organization (IMO) require h ­ oming
tion system safety, Boeing Commercial
guish a false alert known to have originated capability, which is not part of the
Airplanes, and a maritime safety and
from an equipment source intended to be performance specifications of Cospas-
accident investigator for Safety Services
used for distress alerting. Causes of false Sarsat. Similarly, civil aviation authorities’
International.
alerts include equipment malfunctions, requirements for automatic activation of
interference, testing and inadvertent human 11. Dell, Jay. Interview by Rosenkrans, Wayne. ELTs by impact forces and maritime au-
error. A false alert transmitted deliberately Washington, D.C., U.S. July 2, 2003. Flight thorities’ requirements for automatic ac-
is called a hoax. It is essential that SAR per- Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, tivation of EPIRBs by immersion are not
sonnel treat every distress alert as genuine U.S. part of the performance specifications of
until they know differently.” Cospas–Sarsat. Current-generation direc-
12. Cospas–Sarsat Secretariat. Cospas–Sarsat
  8. The Coast Guard uses cutters — marine Information Bulletin No. 16 (August tion-finding equipment carried by SAR
vessels 65 feet (20 meters) or greater in 2003). U.S. National Aeronautics and aircraft and SAR marine vessels can home
length having adequate accommodations Space Administration Goddard Space to these beacons using both the 406-MHz
for crew to live aboard — and small boats Flight Center; U.S. National Oceanic frequency and the separate 121.5-MHz
on the water, and airplanes and helicopters and Atmospheric Administration; homing signal, but this equipment has
in air operations. Cutters usually have U.S. National Environmental Satellite, not been widely adopted. Therefore,
a motor surf boat and/or a rigid-hull Data and Information Service. aircraft operators should ensure that ELTs
inflatable boat aboard. Fixed-wing aircraft Cospas–Sarsat Search and Rescue System. and EPIRBs include a 121.5-MHz signal
— Lockheed Martin HC-130 Hercules Publication no. LG 2000-XX-XXX- for homing by searchers using standard
turboprops and Dassault HU-25 Falcon GSFC, 2000. <www.sarsat.noaa.gov> direction-finding equipment and meet
jets — operate from large air stations and <poes.gsfc.nasa.gov/sar/sar.htm> the applicable requirements of national
and small air stations. Helicopters — the Commercial satellite-based systems authorities.
Eurocopter HH-65 Dolphin and Sikorsky also are used for distress alerting. For 16. IMO, ICAO. IAMSAR Manual.
HH-60 Jayhawk — operate from flight- maritime distress, for example, Inmarsat,
deck equipped cutters, air stations and air based in London, England, is a global 17. Day, Brian. E-mail communication and
facilities. Boats — all marine vessels 12 mobile satellite communication operator telephone interview by Rosenkrans,
feet to 64 feet (four meters to 20 meters) that provides telephone, fax and data Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July
in length — usually operate near shore communication using a constellation of 2, 2003, and July 4, 2003. Flight Safety
and on inland waterways. They include five geostationary satellites (i.e., satellites Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 129
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

A Signal for Help Is Heard,

Help Arrives Too Late
When search-and-rescue authorities reported that they had detected the signal
from a 406-megahertz emergency radio beacon, many people assumed
— incorrectly — that a visual search had been launched.

— FSF Editorial Staff

T
he headline in a sailing magazine left no The SAR case that provided hard lessons learned
room for doubt — “EPIRB: If you set it involved a 406-MHz EPIRB carried by the experi-
off, they will come!”1 Like mariners who enced two-person crew of the sailboat Leviathan.
believe that activating the emergency The beacon was activated for six hours on June
­position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) guar- 8 and June 9, 2001, in the Indian Ocean, begin-
antees a swift rescue at sea, aircraft operators who ning on June 8 at 1958 coordinated universal
conduct overwater flights can become too reliant on time (all times UTC).3 With no information
the aviation version of the emergency radio beacon that confirmed genuine distress, however, SAR
— the emergency locator transmitter (ELT). authorities in the area conducted only a com-
munication search (i.e., calling the missing crew
The expectation of rescue is understandable be- on maritime radio frequencies and broadcasting
cause among 365 worldwide search-and-rescue a pan-pan4 about the safety of the sailboat via
(SAR) cases in 2001 that involved beacons detected marine radio and satellite-based communication
by satellites, only three involved failure to find any with the crews of commercial ships and military
of the people in distress.2 But one of these cases ships in the area). The regional SAR authorities
revealed a stark reality: SAR authorities in some — unaware that Leviathan’s crew had reported
parts of the world — unlike those in the United rough weather conditions before failing to meet
States, for example — do not consider the distress predetermined radio schedules — assumed that a
alert from a 406-megahertz (MHz) beacon, the false alert had occurred, probably by inadvertent
most current and preferred technology, to be suf- activation of the beacon. Other sailboat crews
ficient reason to launch a visual search. conducted efforts to determine Leviathan’s con-
dition, but they were unaware that the sailboat’s
Sixty-eight (19 percent) of the SAR cases involved beacon had been activated only a few hours after
aircraft. In five (7 percent) of the aircraft cases, the crew had reported rough weather conditions.
a 406-MHz beacon was activated. In 63 (93 per- Neither the other sailboat crews nor SAR authori-
cent) of the aircraft cases, a 121.5-MHz beacon (or ties had complete information about Leviathan’s
military beacon) was activated. In 18 (26 percent) situation.
of these aircraft cases, the signal from the beacon
was the only distress alert (see “The Search-and- More than 11 days after Leviathan’s beacon was
rescue System Will Find You — If You Help,” activated, the regional SAR authorities and the U.S.
page 111). Coast Guard were provided additional facts, and

130 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

the U.S. Coast Guard coordinated a visual search.

49° E

49° 20' E

49° 40' E

50° E
Neither Leviathan nor its crew was found.
10° S 26.3 Nautical Miles
When any maritime search is delayed, the June 8, 13:00
Last Position
probability of finding survivors decreases un- June 8, 21:27 Reported by
10° 10' S
Leviathan Via
less signals from the beacon continue until 25.7 Marine Radio
June 8, 23:43
searchers arrive at the distress site. Without an June 9, 02:02
Nautical
June 8, 19:58 Miles
ongoing signal to update position information, 10° 20' S
Nautical Miles
winds and ocean currents cause search targets EPIRB Positions Radio Report
0 10 20
to drift at sea, said Dan Lemon, chief of the
Coordination Division, Office of Search and
Rescue, U.S. Coast Guard.5 Seychelles

Weather Conditions
Deteriorated
Leviathan's
T he story unfolded as follows:
Last Reported
Positions
Farquhar
Group
• Leviathan was a 32-foot (10-meter) Down
East cutter en route from Chagos Archipelago Comoros
to Île de Mayotte, both in the Indian Ocean,
during the second year of a four-year circum-
navigation of the world. The crew recently
had purchased the beacon and had encour- Madagascar
aged other sailors to carry a beacon. No life
raft was aboard the boat, which carried an
inflatable dinghy. Leviathan’s crew was cruis-
La Réunion
ing loosely as part of a group of four sailboats
(i.e., crews typically would be out of visual
range of one another). They were communi-
cating with one another via marine radio at EPIRB = Emergency position-indicating radio beacon
Scale Approximate

a scheduled time each day;

• On June 7, Leviathan’s crew reported that they • At 1958, six hours and 58 minutes after the
would continue to the island of Mayotte (the last radio communication from the crew, a
southernmost island in the Comoros chain) in satellite detected the first of four signals from
deteriorating weather conditions. The cruis- Leviathan’s beacon (see map).7 The first sig-
ing group’s other crews, who were trailing nal provided insufficient position data to SAR
Leviathan by 40 nautical miles to 60 nautical authorities, which is a normal technological
miles (74 kilometers to 111 kilometers), elected limitation of the Cospas–Sarsat8 International
to anchor at nearby Farquhar Island; Satellite System for Search and Rescue (see
“Truths About Beacon Signals and Satellites
• At 1300 on June 8, Leviathan’s crew com- Hidden in the Details,” page 134). One hour
municated by marine radio with the other and 29 minutes later, when the Leviathan bea-
crews, and they agreed to a twice-a-day radio con’s signal was detected by a second satellite
schedule. Leviathan’s crew reported that they pass at 2127, SAR authorities were able to con-
were in big seas and 45-knot winds, but they firm its position in the Indian Ocean about
did not report that they were in distress.6 While 142 nautical miles (262 kilometers) north of
such weather conditions would be demanding Antsiranana, Madagascar (the nearest city on
and uncomfortable for the crew, the conditions the large island; local time for Madagascar is
would not suggest a life-threatening emergency UTC plus three hours) and about 330 nauti-
to experienced sailors in a sturdy boat; cal miles (612 kilometers) from Mayotte. Two

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 131
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

hours and 16 minutes later, a third • RCC Antananarivo — in whose SAR boat could not be reported missing
signal was relayed by a satellite at region the beacon was located — did until 10 days had passed. (The U.S.
2343; and two hours and 19 min- not respond to telephone calls about Coast Guard later said that no such
utes later, the fourth and last signal this case from other RCCs. As a re- waiting period exists under interna-
was detected by a satellite at 0202 on sult, RCC La Réunion maintained tional guidelines for SAR responses.)
June 9. The last beacon position was responsibility for the case, as would Other hams and maritime-oriented
approximately 52 nautical miles (96 be expected under international SAR amateur radio nets were made aware
kilometers) west of Leviathan’s posi- guidelines; of Leviathan’s missed radio schedule.
tion at the time of its crew’s last radio (Many cruisers obtain amateur radio
call. The beacon signals then ceased • At 0302 on June 9, RCC La Réunion licenses to enable them to exchange
for unknown reasons. Incorporating and RCC Seychelles began broad- messages with families, friends and
a hydrostatic-release mechanism and casting messages in French on 2182 fellow hams, as well as to take ad-
a water-activated switch, the EPIRB kilohertz, an international maritime vantage of the resources of a wide
carried on Leviathan was designed emergency frequency. The messages variety of volunteer radio nets.);
to automatically float free and acti- asked all vessels in the area — includ-
vate if the sailboat sank; the beacons ing French military vessels at Mayotte • At 2000 on June 9, when called by
also could be activated manually (see preparing for training exercises — to telephone, the Leviathan crew’s
“Stay Tuned: A Guide to Emergency look out for Leviathan and to report emergency point of contact told per-
Radio Beacons,” page 139); any information to SAR authorities; sonnel at RCC La Réunion that her
most recent communication with
• Personnel of U.S. Coast Guard • At 0345 on June 9, Leviathan’s crew Leviathan’s crew had occurred two
Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) did not check in on the predeter- months before June 8. This person
Alameda (California, U.S.; local time mined radio schedule. Awareness could tell SAR authorities only that
for California is UTC minus seven that Leviathan’s beacon had been the Leviathan was believed to be en
hours during daylight saving time) activated — combined with a route to the Madagascar area;9
simultaneously received copies of missed radio schedule and the re-
the first two distress alerts concern- port of high winds and heavy seas • On June 11, the cruising group’s crews
ing Leviathan as a routine procedure — would have caused the cruising said that they became aware that SAR
because of the beacon’s U.S. registry. group’s crews to assume that a genu- authorities were conducting “look-
At 2015 on June 8, they told the ine distress was likely. Nevertheless, out” broadcasts for Leviathan but
Leviathan crew’s emergency contact they were unaware that Leviathan’s they were not aware that its beacon
in the United States — identified in beacon signal had been detected signal had been detected;10
the U.S. 406-MHz beacon-­registration seven hours and 47 minutes earlier.
database — that the signal from the (Unless otherwise agreed, a missed • On June 15, the cruising group’s
beacon had been detected; radio schedule would not signal an crews learned from hams that
emergency. Crews may miss sched- Leviathan’s beacon had been activat-
• RCC La Réunion — located about ules as they cope with the demands ed on June 8; they were now certain
700 nautical miles (1,296 kilometers; of operating a boat — especially in that the vessel had been in distress.
local time for La Réunion is UTC rough weather conditions — and By June 17, they had learned that no
plus four hours) southeast of the unexpected problems such as de- visual search had been conducted for
beacon’s position — received data pleted battery power, a damaged the vessel;11
about these distress alerts via the antenna or equipment failure.)
Toulouse, France, Mission Control • After conducting the communica-
Center of Cospas–Sarsat. RCC La That same day, the missed ra- tion search from June 9 to June 15,
Réunion’s first step was to relay dio schedule was reported to a the duty officer at RCC La Réunion
these data to RCC Seychelles (where ­maritime-oriented amateur radio suspected a false alert because only
local time is UTC plus four hours), net that assisted cruisers in the four positions were received from the
about 485 nautical miles (898 kilo- Indian Ocean and along the East beacon and the signal had ceased after
meters) northeast of the beacon’s African coast by providing weather a few hours, he said. When ­plotted
position, and to RCC Antananarivo forecasts and safety information. on a chart of the area, the beacon
(Madagascar), about 565 nautical The Kenya-based net was run by an positions also seemed consistent
miles (1,046 kilometers) south of amateur radio operator (“ham”), with a sailboat traveling on a normal
the beacon’s position; who said — incorrectly — that a course at a normal speed. A theory

132 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

to explain these distress-alert data June 20, 21 and 22 using a U.S. Navy P-3C find out if they need assistance. There
— which RCC La Réunion called Orion airplane from Diego Garcia, a U.S. has to be a clear handoff of every case
“false alert by wrong manipulation” military base about 1,000 nautical miles between RCCs; when standard phraseol-
— was that the beacon probably had (1,852 kilometers) from the last known ogy is used, there is no doubt about who
been activated inadvertently, then de- position of Leviathan’s beacon. This has accepted responsibility.
liberately deactivated by Leviathan’s search was suspended when no sign of
crew because there was no distress. the boat or crew was found. “We got this confirmation [of the activa-
The duty officer at RCC La Réunion tion of a U.S.-registered beacon] at the
operated under this theory until June same time as French SAR authorities at
18. Later, he said that about 99 per- SAR Policies Vary RCC La Réunion. From our initial checks
cent of distress alerts from 406-MHz with them, we found out that they were
beacons in the area had proven to be
false alerts;12, 13 and, E xactly what happened to Leviathan and
its crew was not determined by SAR
authorities. The U.S. Coast Guard provided
taking this SAR case for action although
the distress alert was in the Madagascar
search-and-rescue region. From that point,
• After they were unable to persuade insights into the SAR response, however. this was their [RCC La Réunion’s] case. We
personnel at RCC La Réunion to knew they had it, and there was no further
conduct a visual search, the cruising Despite wide adoption of international follow-up by RCC Alameda. This is how
group’s crews on June 18 persuaded guidelines that encourage consistent the system is supposed to work. We don’t
personnel at RCC Cape Town, South practices among SAR authorities, varia- report back to other RCCs, so it is easy to
Africa, to relay to RCC Alameda their tions exist in policies. Most importantly, see why we were not in on what RCC La
information that the Leviathan crew criteria may differ for launching a search Réunion was doing.”
had reported rough weather condi- after receiving a distress alert from a bea-
tions before failing to make prede- con. Moreover, SAR authorities, aircraft Unlike RCC Alameda, which received in-
termined radio schedules. Personnel operators or families may assume incor- formation about the first two beacon po-
at RCC Alameda, who had assumed rectly that SAR authorities in another sitions, RCC La Réunion received all four
that RCC La Réunion was coordi- country are launching a search when, in beacon positions, said Cmdr. Michael
nating an appropriate response, then fact, the indications of distress required Hicks of the U.S. Coast Guard.16
communicated with personnel at by local SAR authorities to launch a
RCC La Réunion about the status search have not been received. “They said that they were conduct-
of this case. E-mail messages about ing some preliminary communication
Leviathan also received the attention How the U.S. Coast Guard becomes in- searches, and we made the assumption
of French government officials, who volved in a case outside its SAR regions then that they were the ‘first RCC’ [i.e.,
relayed information to the duty of- is based on general principles rather than they would maintain responsibility for
ficer at RCC La Réunion. The duty procedures, Stuhlreyer said. Providing as- this case unless a different RCC — such
officer at RCC La Réunion later said sistance outside these regions is common, as one with more suitable resources — ac-
that he “understood the reality of the but becoming involved when the case is cepted responsibility by formal transfer],”
situation” (i.e., that the Leviathan as far away as the Indian Ocean is fairly Hicks said. “That contributed to some
was missing and that the distress unusual, Stuhlreyer said. Involvement confusion.”17
alert probably had been genuine). with SAR activities of other nations de-
pends typically on how much assistance The U.S. Coast Guard had received no
“The crews of sailboats that had been they request.15 further information about the Leviathan
with Leviathan got the ball rolling for case until the call from RCC Cape Town.
us to become involved,” said Lt. Thomas “When another RCC is responsible for While a P-3C Orion was en route to be-
Stuhlreyer of the U.S. Coast Guard. “At that the SAR case, it is their ball,” he said. “If a gin the air search, RCC Alameda received
point, it was clear from RCC La Réunion case similar to Leviathan happened now, information that the crew of a French
that nothing beyond communication we would get information from the emer- navy vessel had spoken with the crew
searches had been carried out. The call gency contact [for the U.S.-­registered of Leviathan, he said. This information
[prompted] people at RCC Alameda to 406-MHz beacon], then follow up by proved to be false.
begin working with the U.S. Department calling the regionally responsible RCC
of Defense on the air search.”14 to make sure that the nearest RCCs are Personnel at RCC Alameda discussed the
aware of the distress alert, that an RCC status of this case with personnel at RCC
Based on the new information, RCC has assumed responsibility and that they La Réunion.
Alameda coordinated a visual search on have all our information. We also try to Continued on page 135

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 133
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Truths About Beacon Signals and Satellites Hidden in the Details

Know this: All emergency radio beacons are not equal! Depend on a 406-MHz beacon
with built-in position reporting as the best type for alerting search-and-rescue resources.

I
n the exaggerated and misinformed action to take such as launching — or not Polar-orbiting satellites receive signals
claims of some equipment sales launching — an air search. from 406-MHz beacons and 121.5-MHz
personnel, activating an emergency beacons. The 406-MHz data are stored
radio beacon guarantees that search- These geostationary satellites receive until a ground receiving station is in view.
and-rescue (SAR) authorities will receive signals only from 406-MHz beacons; If a ground receiving station is in view
instantaneous notification of the beacon’s because they have no motion relative to simultaneously with the reception of a
signal and an equally fast calculation of the Earth, Doppler-shift processing can- 121.5-MHz signal, that information (and
position. Buyer beware, because cave- not be used to calculate the position of the 406-MHz data) will be forwarded to
ats are many in the world of beacons and activated beacons. Thus, awareness of the ground receiving station. If a 121.5-
satellites. Under optimum conditions with a distress condition is not synonymous MHz signal is received and no ground re-
the appropriate equipment, notification of with knowing the position of the distress ceiving station is in view, that 121.5-MHz
a distress alert and position information beacon. If a 406-MHz beacon has been information will not be stored or forwarded
can occur in less than 10 minutes. In other registered by its owner, SAR resources by polar-orbiting satellites; authorities will
cases, hours could pass before an ac- can begin mobilization with corroborating have no knowledge of the signal. For ex-
curate position of the activated beacon is information from the emergency contact, ample, mid-ocean areas of the southern
determined. Moreover, 121.5-megahertz such as the approximate flight track of hemisphere and southern Africa are not in
(MHz) beacon analog signals are vastly an aircraft, until a more accurate posi- view simultaneously with ground receiving
inferior to 406-MHz beacon digital signals, tion can be calculated. If the beacon is stations.
making the 121.5-MHz beacon the least equipped to provide accurate position
desirable for emergencies. (See Figure data in its signal, SAR authorities im- Among beacons, a 406-MHz beacon
1, page 116, for more information about mediately will receive that data, too. with accurate position-data reporting
notification times and search areas based Otherwise, a ground receiving station provides the fastest notification of dis-
on the type of beacon signal.) only can calculate an accurate position tress and an accurate position. When this
based on beacon data received during type of beacon is activated, its position
Four meteorological satellites (one main- two separate passes of a polar-orbiting will be updated once every 20 minutes.
tained by India, two maintained by the satellite(s), and that data will be relayed For example, if an emergency locator
United States and a European satellite via the MCC to the RCC. transmitter (ELT; a beacon designed for
that was declared operational in January aviation use) is interfaced with an external
2004) are in geostationary equatorial Eight polar-orbiting satellites (three main- global positioning system (GPS) receiver
orbits (synchronized with the Earth’s tained by Russia and five maintained by and is activated aboard an aircraft during
rotation so that the satellites appear fixed the United States) change their views descent from altitude in preparation to
above the Earth). They are in constant constantly and are often out of view of ditch, the last position downloaded from
view of at least one of 12 ground receiving their 42 ground receiving stations. The the GPS receiver will be transmitted by
stations, and each satellite views a vast system requires four of these satellites to the ELT for 20 minutes. After 20 minutes,
section of Earth between approximately be operational at any given time to pro- the ELT will accept an updated position,
70 degrees north latitude to 70 degrees vide SAR coverage of the high latitudes; which in turn will be transmitted for 20
south latitude. These satellites carry typically, 60 minutes to 90 minutes elapse minutes. Moreover, despite the greater
SAR instrument packages, and a 406- between polar-orbiting satellite passes inherent accuracy of GPS (less than 10
MHz signal from a beacon activated in over a specific location, with the shortest meters [33 feet]), beacon-data constraints
view of one of these satellites is received intervals near the poles and the longest result in the transmission of less accurate
immediately and relayed to a ground re- intervals near the equator. These inter- position information ranging from about
ceiving station. After processing of the vals, coupled with the time required for 120 meters (394 feet) to 7.4 kilometers
data by a ground receiving station, the data to be stored and transmitted later (four nautical miles). Nevertheless, rapid
data are forwarded to a mission control to a ground receiving station, can result notification of SAR authorities and confir-
center (MCC) for additional information in much more than an hour of cumulative mation of a position are far more important
and data refinement, before forwarding delays from two satellite passes before than extreme accuracy of position.
the notification of a distress alert to the an accurate position can be calculated
appropriate rescue coordination center by the ground receiving station and then In addition to the ELT, the family of 406-
(RCC). The RCC will determine appropriate relayed to the RCC. MHz beacons includes the emergency

134 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB), the fastest notification of distress and an deployable ELT (ADELT) should be aboard
which is designed for maritime use, and accurate position. the aircraft during overwater operations.
the recently introduced personal locator An EPIRB and/or a PLB (each with or
beacon (PLB), which is designed for An automatic fixed ELT will remain at- without internal GPS receivers) also can
use on land (and also used on water) by tached to a sinking aircraft after a ditching be carried aboard the aircraft and used.
individuals. Using the same distress fre- and, like the other types, will not broadcast No matter which type of 406-MHz beacon
quencies, these beacons differ mainly in a usable signal after sinking. Therefore, is activated, SAR authorities will receive
packaging and activation methods. When regardless of regulatory requirements, the distress alert. 
any of these beacons incorporates accu- at least one additional 406-MHz beacon
rate position data in its signal, it provides such as a survival-type ELT or automatic — FSF Editorial Staff

“The staff at RCC La Réunion said that I do not believe that we ever talked to a­ lthough the flow of communication and
they had assumed the Leviathan EPIRB anyone in Madagascar,” Hicks said. “It the SAR responses will vary depending on
signal was a false alert, and it appeared to was apparent that this RCC was not where the distress occurs.”
us that they were not going to take action,” going to do anything. The fact that we
said Hicks. “Although the probability of could not talk to them factored into our Stuhlreyer said that anyone who car-
success was very low, we believed that we reasons to conduct an air search. When ries a 406-MHz beacon should know
should at least make our best attempt to we know that insufficient action or no ac- that even though it is the most current
locate the vessel. One factor we look at tion has been taken, we have authority to technology, it represents a method of last
is whether or not there is a chance that [conduct SAR operations in international resort to communicate distress. No bea-
someone still may be alive. This crew waters]. We took action based on what con should be depended upon to replace
had been in radio communication and was known at the time.” two-way communication as the primary
then was out of communication. We also means of signaling distress. This prin-
learned then that the crew had reported Absence of any response by an RCC to a ciple has been emphasized strongly in
encountering bad weather. On the chance distress alert is unusual, Lemon said. international SAR guidance for aircraft
that they might be adrift and unable to operators and other users of the global
communicate, we applied our drift model “The U.S. Coast Guard tried unsuccess- SAR system.
and looked for the highest-probability fully to contact RCC Antananarivo, and
area to search. Finding a SAR aircraft to our people were very frustrated,” Lemon Anyone who is monitoring the safety of a
conduct a search in the Indian Ocean was said. “The ones who should have been marine vessel or aircraft will need not only
not a trivial matter. There aren’t any U.S. responding to that SAR case, and did not, a plan of communication but a plan of ac-
Coast Guard assets at the ready to search in caused some delays which, I believe, may tion for situations in which distress may be
many parts of the world. The nearest usu- have been the critical factor in not finding indicated by absence of communication,
ally will be a U.S. Department of Defense those people.” but distress is uncertain. The plan should
asset; those assets are something we can designate who will initiate a communica-
try to get on a case-by-case basis. In the Having all available information soon tion search and the threshold of action
Indian Ocean, many countries are much after a distress alert influences search (such as elapsed time) for how and when
less equipped to conduct large open-ocean decisions, Hicks said. communication with SAR authorities will
searches, however, than countries such as begin. Personnel monitoring the safety of
Australia, Canada, Japan, Russia and the “Better communication from the start an aircraft or vessel also should be alert for
United States.” would be the key to confirming that elements of a radio message that convey
another RCC is taking the proper ac- possible danger although distress has not
Personnel at RCC Alameda attempted to tions,” Hicks said. “We urge anyone who been declared.
communicate with their counterparts at has concerns about the safety of a vessel
RCC Antananarivo to determine what or aircraft to immediately tell the nearest “If there is a lesson in this SAR case for
SAR resources they might have for this SAR authorities. For example, for U.S.- aircraft pilots, it is that activating an ELT,
case. registered aircraft and marine vessels, the EPIRB or PLB does not guarantee that
U.S. Coast Guard should be contacted. SAR personnel will arrive, because capa-
“No one answered the telephone, or the Our RCCs also should know how to call bilities vary around the world,” Stuhlreyer
contact information was incorrect, and directly the RCCs in other countries, said. “The remoteness of a region has an

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 135
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

• Accurate description of the aircraft When the 406-MHz beacon is unreg-

B
(especially color, including a photo istered — or registration information
or digital image of the aircraft for is inaccurate — the RCC’s response
eacon- the RCC that can be faxed or sent to a distress alert may involve life-
by Internet e-mail); threatening delays. Absence of accurate
registration data … ­beacon-­registration data can prevent
• Name, age and gender of each air- RCC personnel from determining that a
must be kept as craft occupant; and, distress alert is a false alert or knowing the
number of people who may be at risk.
up-to-date as
• Survival equipment carried on the
“For example, if a satellite receives the
possible. aircraft (such as life vests, life rafts,
signal from an unlocated, unregistered
signaling devices, protective cloth-
406-MHz beacon, there is not much that
ing, first aid supplies and drinking
SAR authorities can do until the beacon’s
water) and training of aircraft oc-
effect on ability to respond — some areas position is determined[if the beacon does
cupants to use the equipment.
are a lot harder to get to than others.” not provide the position from an internal
global postioning sytem (GPS) receiver],”
This should be only the beginning of said Lt. Cmdr. Paul Steward, liaison offi-
Another lesson is that beacon-­registration
the emergency contact’s involvement cer to the Cospas–Sarsat International
data and information about the specific
with SAR authorities. Ground person- Satellite System for Search and Rescue
flight operation must be kept as up-to-
nel designated to speak for the missing and implementation officer for the
date as possible.
crew and passengers must be well pre- Distress Alerting Satellite System, Office of
pared with detailed information about Search and Rescue, U.S. Coast Guard. “The
“In this SAR case, people who were con-
training, experience, equipment and distress alert is not ignored, but it is cat-
tacted did not have specific information
other overwater-survival preparations. egorized as ‘unlocated, unregistered’ and
about the sail plan,” Stuhlreyer said. “I
They must be assertive in their initial stored by its unique identification code,
would recommend leaving a copy of the
communication and follow-up com- which tells only the nation of registry, the
flight plan or the sail plan with the emer-
munication with SAR authorities. They manufacturer and the type of beacon. Two
gency point of contact who is listed in the
should focus on providing and receiving passes by polar-orbiting satellites later will
database.”
factual information. The aircraft operator provide the beacon’s position data, and at
By querying the 406-MHz owner- should be prepared to do whatever is re- that point, the distress alert will be sent
­registration database, RCC personnel quired to maintain communication with by geographic reference to the responsible
rapidly can identify the associated air- the RCC throughout the SAR response to RCC.” The RCC’s response will depend on
craft or marine vessel, owner information a distress alert. resources available.18
(name, address, telephone numbers) and
emergency-contact information. What the aircraft operator tells RCC per- Nevertheless, if the aircraft operator be-
sonnel about the crew and passengers of lieves that the aircraft is in distress and
The emergency contact named in the the ditched aircraft can influence the can provide information that enables RCC
database should know, or should be able assumptions and decisions made by the personnel to calculate an approximate po-
to determine quickly, the following infor- RCC’s SAR mission coordinator. sition, a SAR aircraft or SAR marine vessel
mation that will aid SAR operations: may be launched with the expectation of
“When the aircraft is operated by a com- receiving the satellite-aided position while
• All communication equipment pany, the company often will establish an en route to the distress scene.
available to the aircraft occupants; emergency operations center to work di-
rectly with the Coast Guard,” Lemon said. The personnel of RCC Alameda reviewed
• Flight-plan data, expected ar- “The primary emergency contacts first the Leviathan case to distill any lessons
rival times and the crew’s normal should be people who can be contacted learned.
­practices in overwater operations, 24 hours a day and who can provide
and other relevant schedule infor- useful information. If we know that a “If this scenario happened today, we
mation. This includes the num- person on the aircraft is a professional largely would follow the same steps, but
ber of people aboard the aircraft and trained in survival, we are more likely we probably would follow up more fre-
(­passengers, pilots, flight attendants to assume that the person has done the quently on subsequent days — checking
and other crewmembers); right things.” in with the responsible RCC on a more

136 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

regular basis — whether they request as- during one satellite pass or only during The crew of an aircraft involved in a
sistance or do not request assistance from two satellite passes.19 Crews of commer- ditching or other water-contact accident
the U.S. Coast Guard,” Stuhlreyer said. cial vessels will be asked to keep a lookout, ideally will be able to communicate their
but typically they will not be requested distress and position to air traffic con-
The Leviathan case does not reflect the to divert to the scene to conduct a visual trol (ATC). If the aircraft in distress is
normal exchange of information among search until the Coast Guard receives a detected by SAR authorities only because
RCCs, Lemon said. Nevertheless, the case beacon position based on three satellite of the 406-MHz signal from a beacon,
was especially disconcerting to cruisers passes. SAR authorities typically would be able
who conduct long-distance voyages in to confirm genuine distress with ATC be-
boats and may communicate infrequently “In the vast majority of SAR cases, RCCs cause of a flight plan, loss of radar contact
with the person who has been designated work together well despite weaknesses and/or flight-following procedures. If no
in the U.S. 406-MHz beacon-­registration due to resource limitations in some na- flight plan has been activated with ATC,
database as their emergency point of con- tions,” Lemon said. “We typically have however, and no one else can confirm
tact. Moreover, anyone who may have to rely an effective response — but that is not quickly that a water-contact accident is
on a beacon for rescue should understand always the situation. Some cases occur probable, the responsible RCC in some
the system’s limitations. in remote areas where there are no SAR parts of the world might not respond be-
resources. We need to work even harder cause the situation fails to meet its criteria
For example, the U.S. Coast Guard policy through the International Civil Aviation for a visual search, or because they have
is to require additional information be- Organization and the International insufficient resources to respond and do
fore conducting an open-ocean visual Maritime Organization to get RCC ca- not request assistance from other RCCs.
search if the signal from a 121.5-MHz pabilities built up so that there is some-
beacon — the older and less-preferred one who knows what to do to answer the Unfortunately, help came too late to find
technology — has been detected only phone in these areas.” Leviathan’s crew. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Update beacon-registration 24-hour contacts — who should know how SAR functions — and ensure that
they have current information about the aircraft, survival equipment, crew and passengers.

• When first notified about a distress alert, beacon-registrants must confirm which RCC has accepted
responsibility and confirm how to contact the RCC.

• Establish routine confirmation of flight plans and arrivals, whereby failure to report is a possible indication
of distress and should activate procedures for locating the aircraft.

• Communicate early and directly with SAR authorities when concerned about the safety of an aircraft.

• Be an assertive survivors’ advocate to influence RCC decisions about conducting and suspending a visual
search. Ask questions. Get answers. Follow up.

Notes This count comprises all search-and- was received by satellite on June 8, 2001,
rescue (SAR) cases involving genuine from a location in the Indian Ocean. The
  1. Emory, Dennis S. “EPIRB — If You Set It distress that were detected by satellites in report said, “Vessel is missing. No SAR
Off, They Will Come!” Blue Water Sailing. the Cospas–Sarsat International Satellite operation conducted by local authority.”
November 2002. System for Search and Rescue; commercial Two people were involved; they were not
satellite systems also are used for distress rescued, the report said. On Feb. 8, 2001, a
  2. Cospas–Sarsat Secretariat. “List of alerting. One report from the French 406-MHz emergency position-indicating
SAR Events Assisted by Cospas-Sarsat, Mission Control Center said that a 406- radio beacon (EPIRB) aboard the Sandia,
January–December 2001.” Annex C to megahertz (MHz) distress alert from an a maritime fishing vessel, was activated
Cospas–Sarsat Report on System Status emergency radio beacon carried on the in the North Atlantic Ocean; SAR aircraft
and Operations, January–December 2001. U.S.-registered sailing vessel Leviathan and SAR vessels searched for four days but

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 137
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

did not find the three crewmembers. On RCC Alameda, California, U.S., were pro- 10. Nicholson.
March 21, 2001, a 406-MHz EPIRB aboard vided to FSF editorial staff by Nicholson,
the Nam Yang Ho, a maritime fishing ves- a senior editor of Cruising World. 11. Nicholson.
sel, was activated in the East China Sea; an 12. Nicholson.
oil slick was found, but searchers did not   7. While activated, a 406-MHz EPIRB trans-
find the six crewmembers. mits a signal containing a half-second 13. The U.S. Coast Guard policy is to initiate
burst of data once every 50 seconds. In a SAR response to all distress alerts from
  3. EPIRBs transmit distress alerts on 406 this SAR case, two polar-orbiting satel- 406-MHz beacons unless they are con-
MHz (with five-watt radio-frequency lites detected signals from the Leviathan firmed to be false alerts.
output power) and transmit a separate EPIRB when the satellites passed over
121.5-MHz signal (0.025-watt radio- the Indian Ocean. These signals were 14. Stuhlreyer, Thomas. Interviews by
frequency output power) for homing processed and routed automatically to Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia,
by SAR aircraft and SAR marine vessels SAR authorities as messages showing U.S. Oct. 8, 2003, and Oct. 14, 2003. Flight
within the search area. All 406-MHz one distress alert per satellite pass, based Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
beacons are electronically similar, with on when the satellite detected the EPIRB U.S. Lt. Stuhlreyer is chief, Pacific Area,
differences in packaging, activation signal (called the time of closest ap- District 11 Command Center, U.S. Coast
mechanisms, data-encoding protocols proach). A 406-MHz emergency locator Guard. He supervised RCC Alameda in fall
and capability to encode global position- transmitter (ELT) or personal locator 2003.
ing system data in the signal. beacon (PLB) essentially functions in
15. U.S. Coast Guard assistance was not
the same manner. All 406-MHz beacons
  4. “Urgency” in phraseology of the requested, and RCCs in one country have
transmit a unique identification code
International Civil Aviation Organization no obligation, except as a professional
that enables SAR authorities to identify
(ICAO) means “a condition concerning courtesy, to inform RCCs in other coun-
the owner, emergency contact person
the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or tries about their operational decisions or
and other information in a nation-
of some person on board or within sight, the status of a case, Lemon said.
specific beacon-registration database.
but which does not require immediate 16. Hicks, Michael. Interview by Rosenkrans,
assistance.” In addition to the term “pan-   8. Cospas–Sarsat Secretariat. Cospas–Sarsat
Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Oct.
pan” repeated three times in voice radio Information Bulletin No. 16 (August
16, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
communication, repeated switching on 2003). The Cospas–Sarsat International
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. In June 2001,
and off of the landing lights or repeated Satellite System for Search and Rescue
Cmdr. Hicks was chief, Pacific Area,
switching on and off of navigation lights currently includes satellites provided
District 11 Command Center, U.S. Coast
(in such manner as to be distinct from by the European Organization for the
Guard. He supervised RCC Alameda.
flashing navigation lights) communicates Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
At the time of the interview, he was
urgency in ICAO procedures. ICAO said (EUMETSAT) with the European Space
commander of the U.S. Coast Guard
that an urgency signal will “mean that an Agency, India, Russia and the United
International Ice Patrol, based in Groton,
aircraft wishes to give notice of difficulties States. Cospas is the acronym for the
Connecticut, U.S.
which compel it to land without requir- Russian words Cosmicheskaya Sistyema
ing immediate assistance.” (ICAO Annex Poiska Avariynich Sudov, which means 17. The duty officer of RCC La Réunion, in
10, Aeronautical Telecommunications, “space system to search for marine one fax message to the U.S. Coast Guard
Volume 2, 5.3, “Distress and Urgency vessels in distress,” and refers to a on June 21, 2001, said that this RCC was
Radiotelephony Communication SAR-instrument package carried on not directly in charge of assistance in the
Procedures.”) Russia’s polar-orbiting satellites. Leviathan case but had been working with
Sarsat, the acronym for Search and RCC Seychelles since the first distress
  5. Lemon, Dan. Interview by Rosenkrans, Rescue Satellite-aided Tracking, refers to alert. Officials at RCC La Réunion did not
Wayne. Washington, D.C., U.S. June Canadian/French-built SAR-instrument respond to an e-mail query and repeated
24, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, packages carried on U.S. polar-orbiting telephone queries from FSF editorial staff
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. satellites. about responsibility for this case.
  6. Nicholson, Darrell. E-mail communica-   9. Griffiths, Jenni. “Without A Trace.” 18. Steward, Paul. Interview by Rosenkrans,
tion with Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, Cruising World. December 2002. Wayne. Suitland, Maryland, U.S. April
Virginia, U.S. Oct. 7, 2003. Flight Safety 64–70. Griffiths and Darrell Nicholson 9, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. conducted research on the Leviathan Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Steward retired
Copies of fax memorandums sent by case and provided some of their docu- from the U.S. Coast Guard in June 2003.
Maritime Rescue Coordination Center ments to assist Flight Safety Foundation
(RCC) La Réunion to U.S. Coast Guard in fact-checking for this article. 19. Lemon.

138 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Stay Tuned: A Guide to

Emergency Radio Beacons
Civil aviation authorities and search-and-rescue authorities strongly
encourage all aircraft operators to upgrade to 406-megahertz technology
— especially for overwater operations.

—FSF Editorial Staff

Beacons include
ELTs, EPIRBs
and PLBs, such as
the one displayed by
Lt. Cmdr. Paul Steward.

E
mergency radio beacons include and limited compatibility with satellite-based
emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) search and rescue (SAR).
carried on aircraft, emergency position-
indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) car- One cause of false alerts is radio-frequency in-
ried on marine vessels and personal locator beacons terference. The 121.5-MHz signal — heard as a
(PLBs), which are designed to be carried by people siren-like tone — often cannot be distinguished
for use on land (but also are used on water). from other radio-frequency sources, such as bank
automatic-teller machines, pizza ovens and sta-
Beacons generally are differentiated by the pri- dium scoreboards. False alerts also are caused by
mary frequency on which they transmit a distress beacon malfunctions, unapproved beacon tests,
signal: 121.5 megahertz (MHz) or 406 MHz.1 The beacon tests conducted at unapproved times,
121.5-MHz beacons are dinosaurs whose days are mishandling of beacons, ­inadvertent human er-
numbered because of a very high false-alert rate ror and deliberate beacon activation.2

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 139
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Only about 20 percent of the 121.5-MHz the distress signal as a digital message. During searches, crews of SAR aircraft
signals detected by the Cospas–Sarsat The data in the message can help SAR typically find every 406-MHz beacon that
International Satellite System for Search forces identify the source of the alert, con- is activated in a distress situation.7
and Rescue are from beacons — and al- firm that the alert is genuine and pinpoint
most all of the 121.5-MHz distress signals the location of the beacon when the first Worldwide in 2002, about 690,000 121.5-
are false alerts. For each emergency that signal is detected (if position information MHz beacons were carried by aircraft and
SAR forces are alerted to by a 121.5-MHz also has been transmitted). marine vessels, and about 314,000 406-
distress signal, there are 1,000 false alerts, MHz beacons were carried by aircraft,
which waste time and resources.3 The signal from each 406-MHz beacon in- marine vessels and individuals (see “The
cludes identification data that are unique Search-and-rescue System Will Find You
Because of this, SAR forces do not re- to the beacon (see “A Signal for Help Is — If You Help,” page 111).
spond as quickly to a 121.5-MHz distress Heard, Help Arrives Too Late,” page 130).
signal — or to a distress signal transmit- If the beacon is registered, SAR person- Despite the benefits of 406-MHz ELTs,
ted on 243.0-MHz, a SAR frequency for nel can access information that helps them relatively few have been installed in
military aircraft that is used as an auxil- to quickly determine whether an alert is aircraft.
iary frequency by many ELTs. genuine or false.5
“We tell pilots to keep in mind when
“Compared to the almost instantaneous choosing an ELT, ‘If you need to use
detection [and confirmation] of a your ELT, the reason is that your life is

“I
406-MHz [distress signal], SAR forces’ in jeopardy,’” said U.S. Coast Guard Lt.
normal practice is to wait for either a Cmdr. Paul Steward. “Nevertheless, in the
f you need to
confirmation of a 121.5/243.0-MHz alert U.S. beacon-owner-registration database
by additional satellite passes or through of 406-MHz beacons, only 4 percent are
use your ELT, the
confirmation of an overdue aircraft ELTs — a very low percentage.”8
or similar notification,” said the U.S. reason is that your
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).4 During the 1990s, many U.S. aircraft
“SAR forces can initiate a response to a life is in jeopardy.” operators did not buy 406-MHz ELTs
406-MHz alert in minutes, compared to because the benefits were not considered
the potential delay of hours for a 121.5/ to be worth the higher cost compared
243.0-MHz [alert].” with 121.5-MHz ELTs. A 121.5-MHz
automatic fixed ELT — the type aboard
Largely because of the high volume of false Some 406-MHz beacons have built-in most aircraft — costs about US$200 to
alerts, Cospas–Sarsat in February 2009 will global positioning system (GPS) receiv- $500. A 406-MHz automatic fixed ELT
cease its satellite-based detection of dis- ers or can be equipped to receive and costs about $1,600 to $3,600, and the in-
tress signals transmitted on 121.5-MHz transmit position data from on-board terface device that most ELTs require to
and on 243.0 MHz. Although 121.5 MHz GPS receivers or other navigation use GPS or other navigation equipment
will remain an international aeronautical equipment (see “Tests of 406-MHz GPS costs $1,000 to $1,500. (The costs are
distress frequency and 121.5-MHz bea- Beacons Show Position Deficiencies,” higher for ELTs with six-axis crash sen-
cons will be usable after February 2009 page 141). sors designed for use in helicopters.)
in countries that have not prohibited
them, any aircraft operator that has not Rescue coordination center (RCC) per- All 406-MHz beacons have self-test
transitioned to 406-MHz technology will sonnel assume for operational purposes switches that enable the user to check
become dependent on signal detection that position data received from a 406- for specific malfunctions, but 406-MHz
only by pilots of overflying aircraft, air MHz GPS beacon via the Cospas–Sarsat signals and transmitted data must be
traffic control (ATC) facilities or SAR system typically will enable them to begin tested with specialized equipment un-
forces that monitor 121.5 MHz. a visual search with a search-area radius of der carefully controlled conditions to
0.05 nautical mile (0.09 kilometer), which prevent a false alert. In the United States,
compares to a search-area radius of 2.0 the Coast Guard provides facilities to
Showing Who and nautical miles (3.7 kilometers) when a test beacon signals and data; manufac-
Where You Are 406-MHz beacon’s position is determined turers and commercial services also test
with polar-orbiting satellites (see “Truths and certify that beacons conform to

A mong the advantages of 406-MHz

beacons is their ability to transmit
About Beacon Signals and Satellites
Hidden in the Details,” page 134).6
standards.
Continued on page 143

140 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Tests of 406-MHz GPS Beacons Show Position Deficiencies

U
.S. search-and-rescue (SAR) au- some test phases, and some models alerts from 406-MHz GPS beacons
thorities found that 22.6 percent were not activated for every test phase contained encoded locations. The exact
of emergency radio beacons (e.g., the PLBs were not activated at circumstances were unknown, however,
tested in 2003 — all designed to take ad- sea). The report contains combined said Lt. Cmdr. Paul Steward, Cospas–
vantage of the global positioning system results for seven models activated in Sarsat liaison officer and implementation
(GPS) — failed to encode any position in optimal conditions and non-optimal officer for the Distress Alerting Satellite
their signals. In two tests of one beacon conditions. System (DASS), Coast Guard Office of
model, the first positions broadcast to a Search and Rescue.6
satellite were inaccurate by more than “The availability of encoded location
27 nautical miles (50 kilometers), the varied significantly by beacon model,” “In 2001, we found that some beacons
test report said.1 (All subsequent posi- the report said. Overall, three beacon transmitted a GPS position within two
tions encoded by this model, updated models failed to encode position data minutes and some beacons took up to
at 20-minute intervals, were accurate to in 37.8 percent of activations, and the 20 minutes to attain a position and to
0.05 nautical mile [0.09-kilometer]; see other four beacon models failed to transmit the position,” said Lt. Cmdr. Jay
“Stay Tuned: A Guide to Emergency encode position data in 5.1 percent of Dell, Cospas–Sarsat liaison officer and
Radio Beacons,” page 139.) activations. In 28.6 percent of activations, implementation officer for DASS, Coast
beacons required more than five minutes Guard (see “Truths About Beacon Signals
When buying 406-megahertz (MHz) to encode position data.4 Accuracy of and Satellites Hidden in the Details,”
GPS2 emergency locator transmitters encoded position exceeded 0.5 nautical page 134).7
(ELTs), emergency position-indicating ra- mile (1.0 kilometer) in 13.3 percent of 60
dio beacons (EPIRBs) or personal locator activations, exceeded 2.7 nautical miles Beacon performance was measured in
beacons (PLBs) to encode position data (5.0 kilometers) in 3.3 percent of these the following conditions: a stable, dry,
from a GPS receiver in beacon signals, activations and exceeded 5.4 nautical stationary outdoor surface on land with
aircraft operators and other consumers miles (10.0 kilometers) in 3.3 percent of no obstruction of the sky; carried on
assume that this technology is superior these activations. land; sky obstructed by trees on land;
to non-GPS 406-MHz beacons. When moving deck of a vessel at sea with no
they operate correctly, 406-MHz GPS Standards of the Cospas–Sarsat sky obstruction; life raft at sea; floating
beacons do enable a rescue coordi- International Satellite System for Search in the sea (EPIRBs only); submerged in
nation center3 to confirm an accurate and Rescue require that beacons water, set afloat and continually doused
distress location and to launch a rescue equipped with an internal navigation with water; afloat at sea with no dous-
as quickly as possible (see “The Search- device provide within 30 minutes a po- ing; attached to a life vest at sea after
and-rescue System Will Find You — If sition that does not exceed the correct submersion (some models of PLBs);
You Help,” page 111). beacon position by 5.0 kilometers. All and simultaneous activations in close
type-­approved beacons currently must proximity on land.
From this test, however, aircraft operators conform to these standards under opti-
have no way of knowing the relative per- mal operating conditions. Because results for these beacon mod-
formance, which models to exclude from els were deidentified and model-specific
consideration or whether manufacturers Obstructions — trees — between the problems were apparent, Douglas S.
have corrected the deficiencies because beacon antenna and the sky significantly Ritter, one of the 2003 test participants,
the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard and affected position availability, so the report conducted an independent follow-up test
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric recommended that users ensure a clear of 406-MHz GPS beacons in January
Administration (NOAA) withheld iden- view of the sky in all directions for the best 2004,8 and he will publish results with
tification of these beacon models to performance. As long as the GPS receiv- beacon models identified. Ritter found-
encourage manufacturer participation. ers received signals from GPS satellites ed in 1994 the Equipped to Survive
Specific test results for each beacon that were adequate to encode a posi- Foundation <www.equipped.org> and
— comprising EPIRBs, PLBs and one tion, obstructions between the beacon is its executive director. The Internet site
ELT — were disclosed only to the respec- antenna and the sky were not a factor in is a comprehensive online resource for
tive manufacturers. accuracy of position. independent reviews of survival equip-
ment and outdoor gear, as well as survival
During the test, 56 beacons from four The test was prompted by distress-alert and search-and-rescue information. He
manufacturers were used in 84 activa- data from Cospas–Sarsat member na- said that the 2004 test included 15 ex-
tions; some beacon models were ac- tions.5 These data appeared to show amples of each of three PLB models (45
tivated more often than others during that only about one-third of distress beacons) and four examples of each of

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 141
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

nine EPIRB models (36 beacons). The Cospas–Sarsat Joint Committee, search for marine vessels in dis-
21 scenarios were designed to represent June 15–18, 2003. tress,” and refers to a SAR-instru-
optimum conditions (to collect baseline ment package carried on Russia’s
data), rough sea conditions off the coast 2. Frequencies in the range of 406.0 polar-orbiting satellites. Sarsat, the
of California, U.S., and land conditions at megahertz (MHz) to 406.1 MHz acronym for Search and Rescue
forest/canyon sites in a California state are reserved exclusively for emer- Satellite-aided Tracking, refers to
park. The scenarios were similar to the gency radio beacons designed Canadian/French-built SAR-instru-
2003 test and included simulation of rain- to broadcast distress alerts in ment packages carried on U.S.
fall under open sky and under life raft the Cospas–Sarsat International polar-orbiting satellites.
canopies, PLBs tipped over with incor- Satellite System for Search and
rectly oriented antennas, PLBs held by Rescue. Most current 406-MHz 6. Steward, Paul. Interview by
survivors floating in life vests and EPIRBs beacons operate on 406.025 Rosenkrans, Wayne. Suitland,
and PLBs used with open/closed life raft MHz or 406.028 MHz. In 2004, Maryland, U.S. April 9, 2003. Flight
canopies. All beacons were programmed beacons that use an additional Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
with test codes to broadcast simulated channel — 406.037 MHz — will Virginia, U.S. Steward retired from
distress signals; the data received by be a
­ vailable. the Coast Guard in June 2003.
Cospas–Sarsat satellites were provided
to the test team by NOAA and the U.S. 3. A rescue coordination center 7. Dell, Jay. Interview by Rosenkrans,
Federal Aviation Administration, and (RCC) is an organization — estab- Wayne. Washington, D.C.,
on-site GPS receivers and 406-MHz lished by a country or a group of U.S. July 2, 2003. Flight Safety
­beacon-test kits were used. Some bea- countries in the same geographic Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
cons had been tested in a laboratory area — that takes responsibility for U.S. Distress signals from 406-
to finalize protocols for the field-testing promoting efficient organization of MHz beacons are messages
phases, Ritter said.9 SAR services and for coordinating comprising digital-pulse radio
the conduct of SAR operations broadcasts: a 0.5-second broad-
“Manufacturers had a litany of complaints within a specific region. cast, called a “data burst,” is sent
about the 2003 test methods, and it is every 50 seconds.
risky to draw far-reaching conclusions 4. The time limit was 31 minutes;
about beacon performance other than to some beacons were turned off 8. The January 2004 test was
say that there are some problems,” Ritter before the time. conducted with the U.S. Federal
said. “We did not know if those results Aviation Administration Civil
were anomalies, so we conducted ad- 5. Cospas–Sarsat Secretariat. Aerospace Medical Institute as
ditional testing to validate the surprising Cospas–Sarsat Information government sponsor. Costs were
earlier results. We looked again at the Bulletin No. 16 (August 2003). underwritten by West Marine (a
question of whether 406-MHz GPS U.S. National Aeronautics U.S. retail distributor of beacons
beacons offer a substantial reduction in and Space Administration and other marine products), Boat
SAR-response time — which they should Goddard Space Flight Center; USA Foundation and the Equipped
when they work correctly. We also have U.S. National Oceanic and To Survive Foundation.
tried to answer questions raised and the Atmospheric Administration; U.S.
what-ifs when beacons are not activated National Environmental Satellite, 9. Ritter, Douglas S. Interview by
in optimum conditions. Consumers need Data and Information Service. Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
to know what they can expect when they Cospas–Sarsat Search and Virginia, U.S. Jan. 14, 2004. Flight
pay a premium price for the advantage Rescue System. Publication no. Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
of accurate position reporting. I have LG 2000-XX-XXX-GSFC, 2000. Virginia, U.S.
no doubt, no question, that 406-MHz <www.sarsat.noaa.gov> and
beacons and Cospas–Sarsat work, <poes.gsfc.nasa.gov/sar/sar.htm>.
however.”  Cospas–Sarsat currently in-
cludes satellites provided by the
— FSF Editorial Staff European Organization for the
Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites (EUMETSAT) with the
Notes European Space Agency, India,
Russia and the United States.
1. U.S. Coast Guard. “Analysis of Cospas is the acronym for the
a 406-MHz Location Protocol Russian words Cosmicheskaya
Beacon Test.” Report presented Sistyema Poiska Avariynich Sudov,
to the 17th meeting of the which means “space system to

142 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Some U.S. aircraft operators believe that — which means that ELTs operating during a Part 135 positioning flight on
FAA’s evolving automatic dependent solely on 121.5 MHz must be replaced Dec. 24, 1996. Extensive searches on the
­surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) system, before 2005. ground and in the air failed to locate the
which uses avionics on the aircraft flight airplane, which was not equipped with
deck and electronic equipment on the ICAO currently recommends that ELTs an ELT. The wreckage was found by a
ground for non-radar airspace surveil- be installed in all airplanes, regardless of forester on Nov. 11, 1999.14
lance and airborne aircraft-separation how they are operated, and requires that
assurance, will eliminate the need for commercial airplanes carry ELTs on flights In response to the congressional man-
ELTs. beyond gliding distance of shore and dur- date, FAA revised Part 91.207, rescind-
ing takeoffs and landings over water when ing the exemption, on Jan. 1, 2002, but
“Voluntarily equipping an aircraft with “in the event of a mishap, there would be allowed affected operators two years to
a 406-MHz ELT is money very well a likelihood of ditching.” equip their aircraft with ELTs.
spent,” said Dan Lemon, chief of the
Coordination Division, Coast Guard ICAO also requires that at least two ELTs FAA said that to “limit the scope of the
Office of Search and Rescue. “We dis- (including one automatic type) be car- rule change,” Congress also mandated
agree with those who argue that ADS-B ried aboard airplanes during long-range that Part 91.207 be revised to exempt
equipment will make the ELT function overwater flights conducted in interna- from the requirement to carry an ELT
unnecessary. A lot of aircraft will not be tional commercial air transport.12 “aircraft with a maximum payload
required to carry ADS-B. The ELT is still capacity of more than 18,000 pounds
important.”9 [8,165 kilograms] when used in air
U.S. Rescinds ELT transportation.”15
Lemon said that ADS-B equipment Exemption for Some Jets
will not be functionally equivalent to Currently, Part 91.207 also exempts the
an ELT because it does not have to
meet ELT crashworthiness require-
ments, independent electrical power
B efore 2004, turbojet aircraft oper-
ated privately under U.S. Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 91, in
following aircraft from carrying ELTs:

• “Aircraft while engaged in scheduled

requirements or automatic-activation on-demand operations under Part 135 flights by scheduled air carriers;
requirements. and in on-demand air carrier operations
under Part 121 were not required to be • “Aircraft while engaged in training
equipped with ELTs. operations conducted entirely with-
Rule Changes Favor in a 50-nautical-mile [93-­kilometer]
406-MHz ELTs FAA said that the exemption was included radius of the airport from which
in Part 91.207, “Emergency locator trans- such local flight operations began;

T he number of 406-MHz ELTs used

in some sectors of civil aviation will
increase, however, because of changing
mitters,” because turbojet aircraft “are
normally flown under instrument flight
rules and are normally in radio contact
• “Aircraft while engaged in flight
operations incident to design and
international requirements and national throughout their flight with [ATC]; as a testing;
requirements. result, their location is generally known
by ATC throughout their flight.”13 Thus, • “New aircraft while engaged in flight
Since Jan. 1, 2002, the International turbojet aircraft “were considered to be operations incident to their manu-
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has more readily located after an accident,” facture, preparation and delivery;
required that any ELTs that are installed in FAA said.
aircraft used for international operations • “Aircraft while engaged in flight
must operate on both 406 MHz and 121.5 The exemption was rescinded by leg- operations incident to the aerial
MHz.10,11 (Currently, most 406-MHz islation passed in April 2000 by the application of chemicals and other
ELTs transmit auxiliary signals on 121.5 U.S. Congress in response to the delay substances for agricultural pur-
MHz and on 243.0 MHz, primarily for in locating a Learjet 35A that struck poses;
homing.) mountainous terrain in instrument
meteorological conditions during a • “Aircraft certificated by the [FAA] for
Beginning Jan. 1, 2005, ICAO will re- nonprecision instrument approach research and development purposes;
quire that all ELTs in aircraft used for to Lebanon (New Hampshire, U.S.)
international operations must oper- Municipal Airport. The accident, in • “Aircraft while used for showing
ate on both 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz which both pilots were killed, occurred compliance with regulations, crew

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 143
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

The RTCA standards include speci- as one-hand operation, a tether,

fications for crashworthiness, wa- “foolproof ” attachment of the an-

A n
terproofing, radio-frequency output
power, resistance to cold and to heat,
and signal duration. For example,
tenna and visual indication that it
is operating. This type of ELT is
required to pass a more limited
‘automatic fixed’ the standards for a 406-MHz ELT set of crashworthiness tests than
include r adio-frequency output an automatic fixed ELT. In the
ELT is … the type powers of 5.0 watts for the 406-MHz United States, survival-type ELTs
distress signal and 0.1 watt for the are required by Part 135.167 for
typically installed 121.5-MHz homing signal, and suffi- extended overwater operations by
cient battery capacity for the 406-MHz on-demand and commuter aircraft
in aircraft. signal to be broadcast every 50 seconds and by Part 121.339 for extended
for a minimum of 24 hours.16 Battery overwater operations conducted by
capacities must be sufficient for the 406- air carriers. A 121.5-MHz ­survival-
MHz signal of an EPIRB to be broadcast type ELT costs about $400 to $700.
training, exhibition, air racing or every 50 seconds for a minimum of 48 A 406-MHz survival-type ELT
market surveys; hours and for the 406-MHz signal of a costs about $2,100 to $5,000.
PLB to be broadcast for a minimum of
• “Aircraft equipped to carry not more 24 hours. • An “automatic portable” ELT is de-
than one person; [and,] signed to be attached rigidly to the
RTCA categorizes ELTs according to fac- aircraft (to function as an automatic
• “An aircraft during any period for tors such as whether they transmit posi- fixed ELT during impact) and to be
which the transmitter has been tion information, how they are installed readily removed from the aircraft
temporarily removed for inspection, and how removable/deployable types are after impact so that it can be teth-
repair, modification or replacement, designed and activated. ered to a life raft or to a survivor’s
subject to the following: life vest. An automatic portable ELT
ELTs are categorized as follows: has an integral antenna or an aux-
– “No person may operate the iliary antenna that can be attached
aircraft unless the aircraft re- • An “automatic fixed” ELT is designed after the aircraft antenna is discon-
cords contain an entry which to remain attached to the aircraft nected from the ELT. Some regula-
includes the date of initial before and after impact, and to be tions require that this type of ELT be
removal, the make, model, activated either automatically by a installed in the aircraft as far aft as
serial number and reason for crash sensor or manually. This is the practicable. A 121.5-MHz automatic
removing the transmitter, type typically installed in aircraft. portable ELT costs about $500. The
and a placard located in view Some regulations require automatic costs for 406-MHz automatic por-
of the pilot to show ‘ELT not fixed ELTs to be installed as far aft as table ELTs range from about $2,100
installed’; [and,] ­practicable. to $2,300.

– “No person may operate the • A “survival-type” ELT is designed • An “automatic deployable ELT”
aircraft more than 90 days af- to be attached to a packed life raft (ADELT) is designed to be attached
ter the ELT is initially removed or stowed near an exit, so that a rigidly to the aircraft and to be
from the aircraft.” survivor can tether it to a life raft ejected and deployed automatically
or to a survivor’s life vest, and to after the crash-force sensor has been
be activated manually. Optional activated. This type of ELT must
RTCA and EUROCAE Set standards for buoyancy require be waterproof and buoyant. Some
ELT Standards that a survival-type ELT be self- ADELTs are integrated with deploy-
righting and substantially main- able digital flight data recorders and

R TCA (formerly the Radio Technical

Commission for Aeronautics)
and the European Organization for
tain a normal operating position
while floating. A survival-type ELT
must not be affected adversely by
cockpit voice recorders. An ADELT
costs about $10,000 to $15,000.

Civil Aviation Equipment set design immersion in salt water or by All current EPIRBs and PLBs transmit
standards and operating standards standing water on the equipment distress signals on 406 MHz. EPIRBs are
for ELTs. surfaces. It must have features such classified as follows:

144 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

• A “Category I” EPIRB is designed How to Keep a NOAA said that “although 406-MHz bea-
to be activated automatically when 121.5-MHz Beacon cons have a lower false-alarm rate, there is
released from a bracket by water From ‘Crying Wolf’ still room for improvement.” NOAA said
pressure (i.e., when the marine that owners should do the following to
vessel sinks) or manually. This type prevent false alerts:
of EPIRB must meet maritime re-
quirements for waterproofing and
T he U.S. National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA),
which operates the U.S. mission control
• “Test your 406-MHz beacon in
saltwater operation. A strobe light accordance with manufacturer’s in-
center for Cospas–Sarsat, said that own-
illuminates while the EPIRB is ac- structions. Most beacons have a ‘test’
ers of 121.5-MHz beacons should do the
tivated. A Category I EPIRB costs switch which will fully test the unit
following to prevent false alerts:17
about $700 or about $1,000 with an [i.e., electronics, battery and antenna
internal GPS receiver. • “Mount your beacon properly; but not signal transmission] at any
time; [and,]
• A “Category II” EPIRB is designed to • “Maintain fresh batteries in accor-
be activated manually. Cost is about dance with the manufacturer’s recom- • “Register your beacon. (This may
$600 or about $900 with an internal mendations [and check whether ELT not reduce the number of false
GPS receiver. maintenance must be performed by a alarms, but it will greatly reduce
certified maintenance technician]; their impact on search-and-rescue
PLBs are compact beacons designed for personnel.)”
personal portability and to be activated • “Disconnect your battery when the
manually. PLBs must be waterproof; unit is shipped or disposed of; In summary, aircraft operators have
some are inherently buoyant. PLBs cost many incentives to upgrade equip-
about $600 or $900 with an internal GPS • “Familiarize yourself with all ­beacon- ment so that survivors of a ditching
receiver or a built-in interface to an exter- operating instructions — before an or other water-contact accident have
nal GPS receiver. (The Coast Guard has emergency situation arises; at least one 406-MHz beacon as a
issued 406-MHz PLBs, encoded as per- backup means of communicating
sonal EPIRBs [PEPIRBs], to its boat crews • “Monitor 121.5 MHz after each land- distress to SAR authorities anywhere
as standard safety equipment attached to ing to verify [that] your ELT is not in the world. The aircraft operator’s
life vests for all missions.) accidentally transmitting; [and,] selection of this preferred technology
is important, but knowledge of the
There are several other types of portable • “Test your 121.5-MHz beacon only beacon’s strengths and limitations
beacons that transmit distress signals on during the first five minutes of any may be equally important in helping
121.5 MHz. The specifications and costs hour and limit the transmission to SAR forces find and rescue survivors
vary widely. three audio sweeps.” as quickly as possible. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Choose an emergency radio beacon wisely; your life will be at stake if you ever need to use it.

• Upgrade now to 406-MHz technology to be in tune with the global search-and-rescue system.

• A beacon with built-in GPS position-reporting will bring help sooner.

• The ELT attached to your aircraft will be useless when the aircraft sinks.

• Carry at least one portable 406-MHz beacon that can be transferred to the life raft.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 145
 Se a r c h a n d Re s c u e

Notes and funding for one Internet site that 5.2.10 [“En route — two power units inop-
would enable beacon owners worldwide to erative”], and 30 minutes or 185 kilometers
  1. Frequencies in the range of 406.0 mega- register and to update ­registrations. (100 nautical miles), whichever is the lesser,
hertz (MHz) to 406.1 MHz are reserved for all other airplanes.”
for emergency radio beacons designed to   6. An RCC is an organization — established
transmit distress signals for reception by by a country or a group of countries in 13. FAA. “Emergency Locator Transmitters
the Cospas–Sarsat International Satellite the same geographic area — that takes (Final Rule)” Federal Register Volume 65,
System for Search and Rescue. Most cur- responsibility for promoting efficient No. 247 (Dec. 22, 2000): 81316–81319.
rent 406-MHz beacons operate on 406.025 organization of SAR services and for co-
MHz or 406.028 MHz. In 2004, beacons ordinating the conduct of SAR operations 14. FSF Editorial Staff. “Failure to Maintain
that use an additional channel — 406.037 within a specific region. Situational Awareness Cited in Learjet
MHz — will be available. Approach Accident.” Accident Prevention
  7. Cospas–Sarsat Secretariat. “Cospas–Sarsat Volume 60 (June 2003). The U.S. National
  2. International Maritime Organization Data Distribution Plan.” Issue 4, Revision Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in
(IMO); International Civil Aviation 5. October 2002. its final report (NYC97FA194), said that
Organization (ICAO). International the probable causes of the accident were
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and   8. Steward. “the captain’s failure to maintain situ-
Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual. Document ational awareness, which resulted in the
9731–AN/958. Volumes 1–3. 1998, 1999.   9. Lemon, Dan. Interview by Rosenkrans, airplane being outside the confines of the
Wayne. Washington, D.C., U.S. June instrument approach, and the crew’s mis-
  3. U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 24, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, interpretation of a step-down fix passage,
Administration (NOAA). Cospas–Sarsat Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. which resulted in an early descent into
Search and Rescue Satellite System. 2003. rising terrain.”
10. ICAO. International Standards and
  4. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Recommended Practices. Annex 6 to the 15. “Air transportation” is defined by FAA as
(FAA). Aeronautical Information Manual. Convention on International Civil Aviation: “the carriage of persons or property as a
Chapter 10, “Search and Rescue.” Operation of Aircraft. Part I, International common carrier for compensation or hire
Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes. — [that is,] operations conducted by air
  5. Steward, Paul; Cospas–Sarsat liaison Part II, International General Aviation carriers.”
officer and implementation officer for the — Aeroplanes. Part III, International
Distress Alerting Satellite System, office Operations — Helicopters. Chapter 6, 16. RTCA (formerly Radio Technical
of Search and Rescue, U.S. Coast Guard. Aeroplane Instruments and Equipment. Commission for Aeronautics). Document
Steward retired from the Coast Guard (DO)-204, Minimum Operational
in June 2003. Interview by Rosenkrans, 11. ICAO. International Standards and Performance Standards 406 MHz
Wayne. Suitland, Maryland, U.S. April Recommended Practices. Annex 10 to the Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT),
9, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Convention on International Civil Aviation: contains standards for the use of 406-MHz
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. NOAA, which Aeronautical Telecommunications. Volume ELTs as optional adjuncts or replacements
operates the U.S. mission control center III, Part II, Voice Communication Systems. for 121.5-MHz ELTs. Standards also are in-
for Cospas–Sarsat and maintains the U.S. Chapter 5, Emergency Locator Transmitter cluded in DO-183, Minimum Operational
406-MHz beacon-­registration database, (ELT) for Search and Rescue. Performance Standards for Emergency
in August 2003 launched an Internet site Locator Transmitters – Automatic Fixed
for initial registration of all types of 406- 12. ICAO. Annex 6, 6.5.3, “All aeroplanes on – ELT (AF), Automatic Portable – ELT
MHz beacons. The secure database can be long-range over-water flights,” defines long- (AP), Automatic Deployable – ELT (AD),
accessed by rescue coordination centers range overwater flights as “routes on which Survival – ELT (S) — Operating on 121.5
(RCCs) worldwide only for search-and- the airplane may be over water and at and 243.0 Megahertz). Some countries use
rescue (SAR) purposes. Although beacon more than a distance corresponding to 120 European Organization for Civil Aviation
owners can use mail or fax to submit minutes at cruising speed or 740 kilome- Equipment (EUROCAE) Document
registration forms, the online process ters (400 nautical miles), whichever is the ED.62 for specifying the technical charac-
enables owners to provide updated data, lesser, away from land suitable for making teristics and operational performance of
such as different emergency contacts, 24 an emergency landing in the case of aircraft 121.5-MHz ELTs and 406-MHz ELTs.
hours or more before a flight. Since 2002, operated in accordance with 5.2.9 [“En
Cospas–Sarsat has been studying the costs route — one power unit inoperative”] or 17. NOAA.

146 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
Survival
  Survival

149 Keeping Your Head Above Water

When Your Aircraft Isn’t
157 Don’t Leave the Aircraft Without It

163 Will to Live Is Essential in Survival

Situation, Specialists Say

177 ‘Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor Any

Drop to Drink …’
179 Making Seawater Drinkable in
Just a Few Strokes
182 With a Little Agitation, Desalting Kits
Yield Drinkable Water
184 Water Maker Maintenance Interval
Clarified

187 Is There a Doctor Aboard the

Life Raft?

211 What’s Eating You?

It’s Probably Not a Shark

225 Aviators and Sailors in the Water

Depend on the Same Rescue
Resources
 Su r v i va l

Keeping Your Head Above Water

When Your Aircraft Isn’t
Thinking about the unthinkable for most of his working life, a survival specialist
shares the raw facts of living aboard a life raft: A floating shelter that is surely the
last place at sea anyone wants to be, unless it is the only option for survival.

— FSF Editorial Staff

Floating in the
Gulf of Mexico
classroom of survival
specialist Ken Burton,
a student is enclosed
in a large clear plastic
trash bag, which helps
trap water warmed
by the student’s body
and illustrates the
importance of thinking
differently in survival
situations.

T
he experience of surviving at sea in life 382). “If the survivor isn’t prepared, he or she is
rafts for several days, weeks or months likely to die before being rescued.”
does not have to be repeated today by
aviators — or mariners — who prepare Burton has operated his company for nearly 25
themselves for the unexpected. years in Panama City, Florida, U.S. The compa-
ny’s clients are primarily in the aviation sector
“For the prepared survivor, technology probably — ranging from recreational aviation and cor-
will curtail the time at sea,” said Ken Burton, presi- porate flight departments to airline operations
dent of STARK (Sea, Tropical, Arctic, Regional — although many mariners also have partici-
Knowledge) Survival Co. <starksurvival.com>, pated in his training programs, which include
which conducts an open-water life raft survival land survival, underwater egress, open-water
training program for aircraft operators, crews and training in the Gulf of Mexico, executive train-
passengers (see “If You Need It, They Have It,” page ing for frequent passengers aboard corporate

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 149
 Su r v i va l

aircraft, and in-house training set in motion for survivors, from evacuating the
at the client’s location. aircraft to launching life rafts, boarding life rafts
and surviving until a rescuer brings them home.
“We owe a lot of our knowledge Then they are truly survivors.”
about long-term survival aboard
life rafts to cruising sailors who
have done the real-time ‘re- Never Risk the Life Raft
search,’ especially during the past
30 years,” Burton said. “Aviators
during this same period had the
advantage of better communica-
A s long as the aircraft remains afloat, it provides
a bigger and different target that is more easily
seen than a life raft. Nevertheless, Burton favors
tion and preplanned routes that an early disconnection from the aircraft to lower
helped with rapid rescues. Unlike any risks that would place the life raft near any
aviators, rescued sailors often jagged metal or debris that could damage the life
abandoned their vessels without raft (see “Prepare to Ditch,” page 20).
being able to alert anyone [to]
their condition, and rescue be- “In the ocean, you need that life raft to survive,”
came a matter of chance.1 said Burton. “The life raft must not be put at
risk. A sinking aircraft could drag the life raft
Ken Burton “Modern 406-megahertz [MHz] ELTs [emergency on the surface of the water, where floating debris
believes that locator transmitters; see ‘Truths About Beacon could puncture or tear the life raft. The mooring/
open-water training Signals and Satellites Hidden in the Details,’ inflation line is designed to break, however, so the
offers the most
page 134] with built-in GPS [global position- life raft won’t be dragged under water.
ing system] position reporting have reduced life
realistic experience
raft durations to a few days or even hours,” said “Hopefully, the aircraft remains afloat long enough
for students.
Burton, who — unexpectedly — was on a life raft for everyone to get in the life raft and for the raft
for two days when weather became too rough and commander to cut the mooring/inflation line with
forced a military training exercise he was leading the raft knife. If the evacuation isn’t complete and
to continue until the weather abated. “A week on the aircraft begins to sink, then a flight attendant or
a life raft would today be a long time.” other designated person in charge of the evacuation
should command everyone in the aircraft to get in
During 21 years of service in the U.S. Air Force, the water immediately and hold on tightly to the
Burton also attended Army and Navy survival mooring/inflation line before the flight attendant cuts
schools. Most of his career was as a certified in- the line. The life raft will hold the mooring/inflation
structor in aviation physiology, hyperbaric therapy line very taut. When the mooring/inflation line is
and water-survival training. cut, the life raft is going to move downwind from
the aircraft and take the mooring/inflation line
Burton has a series of questions for aviators who with it. The sea anchor, if deployed automatically,
conduct overwater flights: “How long could you will slow — but not stop — the life raft’s down-
stay afloat without a life vest? How long could you wind drift; if the sea anchor hasn’t been deployed,
live without fresh water? How long could you live then it should be deployed, if possible, before the
knowing that no one knew that your aircraft had mooring/inflation line has to be cut.
been ditched or knew where you were?
“Survivors in the water also will be moving down-
“Some people may laugh at the unlikelihood of wind, toward the life raft — probably faster than
these kinds of predicaments, but you won’t be the life raft is moving if the sea anchor has been
laughing if you find yourself treading water in the deployed. The survivors should continue to use
Atlantic Ocean. And pilots do ditch in the oceans the mooring/inflation line to pull themselves to
and other places — often close to shore — every the life raft, where other survivors will help them
year [see ‘The Unthinkable Happens,’ page 3]. aboard.

“Ditchings are survivable, but with every suc- “Survivors should not release their grip on the
cessful ditching, a series of challenging events is mooring/inflation line and attempt to swim to

150 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

the life raft, which would be very difficult to ac- emptied before retriev-
complish while wearing an inflated life vest. No ing the survivors on the
one should deflate his life vest to make swim- mooring/inflation line.
ming easier. Exhaustion may easily overcome the But all these actions
survivor. must be taken with
great caution and are
“If a survivor loses his hold on the mooring/ not warranted in rough
inflation line, he may be able to reach one of the sea conditions.”
other survivors and be pulled close enough to
regrip the line. If the survivor is too far to reach If two life rafts have
another survivor, then he should allow the cur- been deployed on the
rent and wind to carry him toward the life raft, same side of the aircraft
without struggling, which could exhaust him. and from the same or
Survivors on the life raft should get the heaving nearly the same deployment point, free-floating The raft knife is
line and make sure that it is secured to the life raft. survivors might be aided more easily. Moreover, provided to cut the
Because throwing a heaving line successfully usu- the life rafts should be joined together with mooring/inflation line
ally requires practice, the raft commander should about 15 feet (five meters) of line, so when the and allow the life raft
consider asking for an able-bodied volunteer to mooring/inflation lines are cut, the life rafts will to drift free of the
secure the heaving line around his waist. Then, drift together. Burton said that if the life rafts are
sinking aircraft.
if the floating survivor’s path is not taking him deployed from opposite sides of the aircraft, they
directly to the life raft, the able-bodied volunteer might be too far apart to allow a connection, but
can go overboard and try to intercept him before they likely will remain in the same area.
he passes the life raft. Then, survivors aboard the
life raft can pull the survivors to the life raft and “If a sinking aircraft forces the raft commander
help them aboard. to cut the line away at the life raft, the survivors
on the aircraft — who no longer can use the
“If there are no volunteers, or if the raft com- mooring/inflation line to pull themselves to the
mander elects not to allow anyone else to be put life raft — must be in the water as quickly as pos-
in jeopardy, the heaving line can be thrown to the sible. Again, with the sea anchor deployed from
survivor when he comes close to the life raft. In the life raft, the survivors will probably drift on
my practical experience, a person throwing the the same track as the life raft and faster than the
heaving line, with its attached quoit [a doughnut- life raft. The raft commander will be faced with
shaped buoyant grip at the end of the line], for the the same question of whether to ask a tethered
first time is not likely to throw it more than 20 feet volunteer for assistance or to throw the heav-
[six meters] or so. And if the throw isn’t accurate, ing-line quoit.”
a quick second throw will be unlikely because the
wet line will likely tangle. And if all this activity is at night in rough weather
conditions?
“If the survivor floats past, but there are several
survivors holding the mooring/inflation line, the “Darkness and rough weather make things more
survivors on the mooring/inflation line must difficult, but not impossible,” said Burton. “A light
be retrieved first. Then the sea anchor can be on the life raft should be visible to all survivors in
retrieved; and if the water-ballast bags can be
‘emptied’ — some life rafts have lines attached
to the bottoms of the bags to allow them to be
pulled upward to reduce the amount of water they
hold, to further reduce drag — these actions will
allow the life raft to drift faster toward the float-
Retroreflective tape
ing survivor. Paddles can be used to try to steer
allows signaling,
the life raft in a general direction downwind, but
they won’t be very effective for much more than but no one is paddling
that. In benign conditions, the sea anchor might a raft home with
be retrieved and the water-ballast bags might be these paddles.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 151
 Su r v i va l

Retroreflective tape the water. If the life raft has retroreflective tape, a Getting Aboard
shines brightly from well-located survivor-locator light on the life raft
light directed onto its
surface and makes life
canopy might reflect light from the tape, further
enhancing visibility of the life raft. [Retroreflective
materials are engineered to reflect light in the di-
D esign improvements have made the board-
ing of modern life rafts much easier than in
the past, but some people will require assistance,
rafts more visible in
rection of its source and are most effective when especially if they are injured.
darkness or low-level
the ambient light is low.]
light conditions. “Inflatable boarding ramps that have appeared
“The survivors should be wearing life vests with on life rafts in the past few years have greatly im-
lights, too; unfortunately, retroreflective tape isn’t proved boarding access for many people,” Burton
required on U.S. aviation life vests or on U.S. life said. “Even if they can’t climb all the way in, they
rafts. Situational awareness — knowing where can get in a better position for being pulled aboard.
everyone and everything are located — will be But these devices can fail, so a ladder constructed of
very important. flexible-nylon webbing may be the only means of
getting aboard, and that can require more physical
“The raft commander can use a flashlight to at- effort; so, some people might require more help.
tract attention and to see survivors. He can use
a whistle to help survivors locate the life raft. “The ‘bob method’ of boarding requires two
Again, he must be familiar with the life raft and people on the life raft, each pushing down on
know where this equipment is located. Seconds one side of the life vest of a survivor in the water.
count. In rough seas, high waves and darkness, You count ‘one,’ and push the survivor down into
a survivor in the water could pass by a life raft the water — you won’t be able to push him too
before anyone has time to react. Think about far — then allow him to bounce back up. Then
that, because it will be a whole lot scarier than you count ‘two,’ and do it again. Then you count
it sounds.” ‘three,’ but the two people on the life raft put their

152 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

hands under his armpits and use that last bob to Life Raft?” page 187). A person who has stopped
help launch-pull him into the life raft. breathing requires prompt attention, as does
someone who is bleeding profusely or is showing
“If someone is injured, you do the best you can symptoms of shock. Burton said that these three
to get him in the life raft, but accept that doing conditions can be treated with first aid, which
it without causing further pain or injury may be might prevent much more serious conditions for
impossible. which no treatment can be successful on a life raft.
He calls it the BBS method: breathing, bleeding
“Under the best of conditions, getting into a life and shock.
raft isn’t marked by gracefulness. Just get in.”
“If someone isn’t breathing and there are no ob-
vious injuries, ideally, resuscitation should begin
Who Is in Charge? within four minutes but probably not later than six
minutes of when the person stopped breathing,”

B urton said that passengers are likely to as-

sume that the aircraft captain and the other
crewmembers are trained in life raft operations,
said Burton. “Beyond the first critical minutes, this
type of casualty calls for advanced life support,
not first aid.”
but passengers will quickly learn how much con-
fidence they should place in them. Burton said that the raft commander might be
faced with a tough decision, depending on avail-
“The captain of the aircraft, or one of the surviv- able resources. If survivors in the life raft are
ing crew in order of rank, will be the life raft com- bleeding or suffering from other serious injuries
mander based on the tradition of maritime law, not while other survivors are in the water, unless as-
on aviation regulations,” said Burton. “But ‘cream sistance is available to render first aid, the raft
rises to the top.’ Another person who has had sur- commander might take the decision not to ini-
vival training as the result of military experience, for tiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation because of
example, might be selected by the raft commander insufficient resources. He must think in terms of
to oversee the operation of the life raft, a sure sign doing the greatest amount of good for the greatest
of good leadership by the raft commander.” number of people.

Listening to others and sharing knowledge will “A person showing signs of shock should have his
help the raft commander to instill confidence in feet elevated and should be kept warm, wrapped
his leadership. in an emergency space blanket [small, lightweight,
packaged blanket made of laminated layers of poly-
“A benevolent dictatorship might be one way to ester film, such as Mylar, with a reflective coating
describe the leadership style,” said Burton. “The raft that can be used either to retain body heat or to
commander can’t allow everyone to be in charge. A protect from sunlight]. Ideally, a person should be in
final-decision maker is required, but being fair and dry clothing, but wearing dry clothing after board-
honest in leadership will be important. A strong and ing a life raft isn’t likely. Really
self-confident personality will be necessary, because wet clothing could be removed,
this will be a high-stress environment. Other per- wrung dry and put back on.

“Y
sonalities — maybe a company president with no
appropriate experience — may compete for leader- “Anyone who has had training
ship. Obviously, having life raft training will go a long on a life raft knows just how ou have
way in winning the raft commander the confidence difficult this scenario would
of the other survivors [see ‘Will to Live Is Essential in be while trying to board other to understand that
Survival Situation, Specialists Say,’ page 163].” survivors in a space barely big
enough for each person to sit. this is a life raft,
You have to understand that
Immediate Action this is a life raft, not a hospital. not a hospital.”
Restart breathing, stop bleeding,

S eriously injured survivors will need immediate

first aid (see “Is There a Doctor Aboard the
prevent shock and hypothermia,
and do your best to prevent

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 153
 Su r v i va l

Figure 1
Approximate Seawater Temperatures
90˚N
60˚N
30˚N
Latitude
0˚
30˚S
60˚S
90˚S

0˚ 30˚E 60˚E 90˚E 120˚E 150˚E 180˚ 150˚W 120˚W 90˚W 60˚W 30˚W 0˚
Longitude

Fahrenheit 32˚F 41˚F 50˚F 59˚F 68˚F 77˚F 86˚F

Celsius 0˚C 5˚C 10˚C 15˚C 20˚C 25˚C 30˚C

Temperature

seasickness. That’s reality; extraordinary While directing immediate first aid ac- a few breaths of air, the life vests can be
measures may not be possible.” tions, the raft commander also will be re-inflated quickly if necessary. Bulky,
ensuring that survivors get aboard the fully inflated life vests would only add to
He said that some types of injuries — a life raft. Usually after boarding, they will everyone’s discomfort.”
crushed chest or spinal injuries — may move to the opposite side from where the
preclude some people from evacuating boarding is being conducted. When everyone is aboard, a roll call is
the aircraft, but anyone able to make necessary to determine the number of
his way to the life raft is likely able to “Survivors in the water need to be retrieved survivors and to gather any other infor-
be treated effectively. Unless someone from the water as soon as possible to delay mation about missing persons.
among the survivors has been trained the onset of hypothermia,” said Burton.
appropriately in first aid, Burton said “Even in warm waters, they may be strug- “Roll call will confirm who is aboard the
there should be no attempts at extraor- gling against wind and waves, and they are life raft and allow a quick determination
dinary treatment, such as attempting to likely to be exhausted from the experience of facts about those who did not survive,”
set broken bones. of the ditching, evacuating the aircraft and Burton said. “This confirmation also al-
making their way to the life raft [see Figure lows the raft commander to cut the
“Don’t attempt to set broken bones un- 1, Approximate Seawater Temperatures]. mooring/inflation line and disconnect
less you know what you are doing,” said from the aircraft.”
Burton. “Splint them in place and do “As they board the life raft, each survivor
the best you can to make the survivor as should be told to partially deflate his life No one returns to the airplane to look
comfortable as possible.” vest but to continue to wear it. With just for survivors or to gather equipment.

154 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

The basic assumption is that the airplane is go- “The sea anchor is an essential piece of equipment
ing to sink. in stabilizing the life raft, so the raft commander
needs to ensure that it has been deployed correctly.
“I just can’t think of any circumstances under He can pull the sea anchor line in close enough
which anyone should return to the sinking air- to confirm that the sea anchor hasn’t become
craft,” Burton said. “The risks are just too high. fouled, which would prevent it from functioning
This emphasizes why the evacuation must be well correctly. If the sea anchor is a manually deployed
planned and be conducted swiftly.” device, then the raft commander needs to deploy
it quickly. Hopefully, the sea anchor is equipped
Burton said that a prompt burial at sea will be with a swivel, which will help prevent fouling. If
necessary for anyone who succumbs after board- not, when a watch is established and the sea an-
ing the life raft. The dead person’s clothing — if chor line is checked for chafing and fraying, the
it is serviceable — and personal items should be person on watch needs to be certain that it hasn’t
removed and the body lowered overboard; cur- fouled. The sea anchor is so important, that having
rent and wind will move the body downwind. The a spare with at least 50 feet of line packed either in
clothing might help other survivors; the personal the life raft or the ditch bag would be a good idea
items should be held by a family member, friend [see ‘Life Raft Primer: Guidelines for Evaluation,’
or the raft commander and given to the next of kin page 233].”
after rescue. If the survival equipment pack (SEP)
includes a waterproof notebook and a writing tool,
the raft commander should record information Ready-to-drink Fresh Water
about deaths and injuries.

“Under no circumstances can the body be teth- F resh water must be readily available to sur-
vivors as soon as they board the life raft (see
“Water, Water Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to
ered to the life raft in hopes of keeping the body Packaged
for a burial on land,” said Burton. “Predators Drink,” page 177). Such readiness rules out wa-
ready-to-drink
will be immediately attracted to the body… you ter produced by a desalting kit or from a hand-
fresh water will offer
don’t want that. Brief words, prayers, songs or operated water maker [manual reverse-osmosis
desalinator]. Old concepts of waiting 24 hours immediate relief
a period of silence will have to suffice for the
before drinking any water and of rationing water to survivors
burial. This may seem cold, but there really are
no other options. The duty of the survivors is are no longer espoused. on the life raft.

to survive.”

Operation of the emergency radio beacon and the

sea anchor must be confirmed.

“Hopefully, the beacon is a 406-MHz type with

built-in GPS position reporting,” said Burton.
“That is the only type of beacon that you should
rely on. On some life rafts, the beacon is water-
activated automatically after deployment of the
life raft. Without the optional water-activated
operation of the beacon, manual activation will
be required. If the raft commander has received
sufficient training and is familiar with the life raft
and its equipment, he can take care of this task
as soon as he boards the life raft. Otherwise, he
might not have time to search for the beacon, read
the instructions and carry them out while get-
ting survivors aboard. Activation of the beacon
will have to wait until everyone is aboard the life
raft, or he can assign an able-bodied passenger
to the task.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 155
 Su r v i va l

A life raft
and its survival
equipment pack
are laced tightly
during packaging
under pressure.

“Holding back dehydration is going to be a num- water carried from the aircraft in the ditch bag
ber one priority, so that means seasickness has is another source of readily available water, but
to be prevented,” said Burton. “Ready-to-drink survivors might not be able to rely on that being
water must be immediately available to the sur- available. Ideally, the water should be packed in
vivors, who have exerted themselves and will have the life raft/SEP.”
swallowed plenty of seawater while they were in
it. And anyone who didn’t take anti-seasickness The water might be packed at the top of the SEP or
medication before ditching should take it imme- it might be packed in a storage pocket on the life
diately after boarding the life raft. The first time raft. Only with knowledge about the equipment
somebody pukes, in short order most everyone on and with planning would the raft commander
the life raft will be puking, and that dramatically know where to find the water or be able to direct
speeds dehydration. However, a dab in each nostril someone else to it. Moreover, except for the water
of Vicks VapoRub — packed in the ditch bag [see used immediately after boarding, the remaining
‘Don’t Leave the Aircraft Without It,’ page 157] packaged water should be saved for an emergency,
— will help mask the odor of the vomit and might and the survivors should rely on the hand-operated
prevent other people from vomiting. water maker and rain for daily drinking water.

“The survivors need to have drinking water — if “When the life raft is purchased, the aircraft opera-
they want it — without learning how to use the tor should designate a member of the flight crew
water maker or the desalter. The life raft should or the cabin crew to work with the life raft manu-
be equipped with at least eight ounces [250 mil- facturer to get information about the placement of
liliters] of fresh water per person — packed in water and other supplies and equipment [see ‘Life
small plastic containers or in soft-foil packages. Raft Evaluation: Pooling the Resources,’ page 258],”
The supply of fresh water should be adequate for said Burton. “Most of the manufacturers will be
the life raft’s rated overload capacity. Of course, Continued on page 159

156 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Don’t Leave the Aircraft Without It

A
ditch bag (also known as an clip or carabiner at each end of the lanyard pounds (seven kilograms) of weight, the
abandon-ship bag, a grab bag will allow fast attachment. $69 Ocoee Duffel floated easily. This
and a jump-out bag) carries spe- bag would be more suitable for carrying
cific survival equipment and personal Watershed’s Ultimate Ditch Bag mea- minimum equipment, such as a very-
items that might not be packed in a life sures 15 inches by 32 inches (38 centi- high-frequency (VHF) marine handheld
raft or a survival equipment pack (SEP). meters by 81 centimeters) and is fitted waterproof transceiver, a 406-megahertz
There are limits to what can be packed with a very large, full-length, waterproof (MHz) personal locator beacon (PLB), a
into a life raft (or a ditch bag), and some zipper and an oral-inflation tube to add few flares, prescription medicine and other
items might have practical uses that air for buoyancy. The Foundation loaded personal items.
would be beneficial in situations that do this US$250 bag with 130 pounds (59
not require deployment of the life raft. kilograms) of weight, and it floated. Ken Burton, president of STARK (Sea,
Most important, the ditch bag would This bag would be sufficient aboard Tropic, Arctic, Regional Knowledge)
be readily accessible for carry-out and corporate jets to store most supple- Survival Co. <starksurvival.com>, sug-
require no effort by the crew to remember mental survival equipment, with room gested the items below for a ditch bag
gear that should be in it. In a ditching, an for a corporate jet, based on the pos-
aircraft crewmember should be assigned sibility of having 15 people (overload
the responsibility to ensure that the ditch capacity) in a 10-person life raft and a
bag reaches the life raft (see “Prepare to rescue within one week.3 Nevertheless,
Ditch,” page 20). operators should review their individual
requirements to determine the contents
A variety of purpose-built ditch bags of their ditch bags. Discuss with the life
are on the market, but few combine raft manufacturer how some supple-
durability, waterproofness and buoyancy. mental items might be packed with
Plastic cases, such as those available from a life raft/SEP. Burton also advocates
Pelican Products,1 provide these features, that anything in the aircraft — blankets,
but fabric bags might provide some flex- paper towels, trashcan bags, cans of
ibility in an aviation environment. soda/water — that might be useful on
the life raft should be placed in plastic
One company (there may be others) that bags (impromptu ditch bags) or clothing
offers ditch bags that are durable, water- and carried to the life raft by the survi-
proof and buoyant is Watershed, which vors, conditions permitting.
provided two models of its ditch bags
for evaluation by Flight Safety Foundation Safety Items
(FSF). 2 The bags are constructed of
seamless polyurethane applied in layers A buoyant ditch bag is buckled to the (Avoid glass containers.)
to nylon pack cloth, which is available in mooring/inflation line and is pushed by
a variety of colors; yellow is preferred for • Eight red SOLAS (International
the survivor as he pulls himself to the
a ditch bag because of its high visibility. Convention for the Safety of Life at
life raft.
The company said that the material is Sea) parachute flares;
flexible in cold weather, ultraviolet stable
and resists abrasion and puncture. Both • Two red handheld flares;
left for storing personal items such as
bags were equipped for “backpack- money, credit cards, driver licenses
• One 406-MHz emergency locator
ing” with plastic buckles that could be and passports; most survivors cite the
transmitter (ELT) or PLB with built-
adapted to secure the bag to a life vest loss of such personal items as major
in GPS position reporting; consider
or a mooring/inflation line. The company inconveniences between the rescue and
emergency position-indicating radio
has a simple lifetime repair/replacement arrival at home.
beacon (EPIRB) because of 48-hour
guarantee.
nominal operating time;
The Ocoee Duffel (above) measures eight
The Foundation’s in-water evaluation inches by 17 inches (20 centimeters by • Two orange smoke flares;
showed that attaching a four-foot (one- 43 centimeters) and has a very large, full-
meter) lanyard between a life vest and a width, self-locking closure. No oral-infla- • One waterproof VHF marine
ditch bag provided an easy way to float tion tube was included (but the company transceiver with two sets of spare
the ditch bag to the life raft. Putting a snap will fit one for a small cost), but with 15 batteries;

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 157
 Su r v i va l

• One Rescue Laser Flare with two • Fifteen high-carbohydrate energy Burton believes that corporate aircraft
sets of spare batteries; bars. should be equipped with a customized
first aid kit. No matter the type of opera-
• Two waterproof, medium-size tion, the aircraft first aid kit should be car-
flashlights with accessory red lenses
First Aid
ried to the life raft.
and with two sets of spare batteries; • Two large tubes of over-the-counter
Discuss with the company physician
multi-antibiotic ointment;
• Two hundred feet (61 meters) of recommendations for including in the
nylon twine (165-pound [75-­kilogram] ditch bag one or two prescription
• Variety of transparent waterproof
test); broad-spectrum antibiotics for treatment
breatheable bandages;
of infections and prescription drugs for
• One hundred fifty feet (46 meters) of pain. For more specialized assistance,
• Two six-ounce containers of
550 military-specification parachute seek the advice of specialists, such as
Betadine;
cord; the staff of MedAire <medaire.com>,
• One small container of Vicks a company that provides aviation and
• One waterproof notebook;
VapoRub; marine assistance in health and security
• Two waterproof pens; issues, including customized first aid kits
• Ninety anti-seasickness tablets; for aircraft operators (see “If You Need It,
• Two pencils; They Have It,” page 382).
• Ninety Ibuprofen;
• One multi-purpose knife-tool; By the way … Iridium Satellite System
• Sixty aspirin; <iridium.com> is currently the only pro-
• Six Cyalume light sticks; vider of global — oceans, polar regions
• Package of gauze; and airways — satellite voice and data
• One spare life raft inflation pump; coverage, with a constellation of 66 low-
• Two SAM Splints (constructed from earth-orbiting satellites. If you sign on for
• One spare sea anchor with line; malleable aluminum); and, service and have your portable satellite
telephone with you, call home from
• One package of gallon-size zipper- • Three rolls of adhesive tape. anywhere with a clear view of the sky …
lock bags;
maybe even from a life raft. 
• Two packages of small-size trash
Personal Items
bags; — FSF Editorial Staff
• Two eight-ounce containers of
SPF (sun-protection-factor) 30 sun
• Two medium sponges; Notes
block;
• Six large, heavy-duty 30-gallon (114-   1. <www.pelicanproducts.us>.
liter) trash bags; • Two pairs of sunglasses;
  2. Watershed, 2000 Riverside
• One roll of duct tape; • Two sunshade hats;
Drive, Asheville, NC 28804 U.S.
• One 16-ounce container of liquid <www.drybags.com>.
• One collapsible, one-gallon (four-liter)
water bottle; soap and a bar of soap;
  3. See <www.equipped.org> for more
• Sixty waterless cleansing wipes; information and discussions about
• Sufficient plugs for life raft pressure-
ditch bags and the equipment that
relief valves and topping valves, as
• One roll of tissue paper; and, might be included in them.
required; and,
• One large container of toothpaste (for
• Four spare small mechanical clamps
finger-brushing of teeth).
and two medium mechanical clamps
for buoyancy tube leaks.
Special Items
Food and Water
If any passengers flown regularly on the
• Fifteen eight-ounce (237-milliliter) corporate aircraft require ongoing pre-
water packets; scription medicines (e.g., nitroglycerine),
a 10-day supply of the drugs should be
• Fifteen emergency space blankets; included in the ditch bag; typically, drugs
and, have a shelf life of one year.

158 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

willing to make special arrangements, is aboard, the entrance is closed and life life raft should get in a swimming pool
such as placing water and anti-seasick- becomes more tolerable. Body heat gen- and train with it, so they know how to use
ness medication among the first avail- erated by the survivors in the confined it. They might be satisfied with this type
able items in the SEP or placing water space will help prevent hypothermia. of life raft or they might decide to buy a
containers in the life raft’s storage bags. different type of life raft.”
The crewmember should carefully exam- “Although I have had plenty of experi-
ine the items in the SEP for their quality ence with manually erected canopies Burton said that he prefers an auto-in-
and adequacy for the aircraft’s geographic — stick-built is what I call them — I just flating, insulated floor and he believes
area of operations. Consider, too, that a can’t recommend them, unless people are strongly that insulated floors are essen-
life raft and the SEP can provide shelter well-trained to use them. They require tial. Extra insulation on the life raft floor
and supplies on land.” too many separate parts that are too will help prevent hypothermia. Burton
easy to lose overboard. And the canopy favors features that will make the life raft
— which is so important to protect the more comfortable for survivors.
Auto-erecting Canopy, survivors — can be blown away during
Insulated Floor Provide the construction phase or washed away “Ocean water, no matter how warm it is,
Immediate Protection or damaged during a capsizing. You can’t is cooler than human body temperature,”
wait for the weather to improve to install said Burton. “That means survivors must

I f the life raft has been deployed with

an auto-erecting canopy, the survivors
have immediate shelter with minimal
guard against hypothermia. An insulated
floor will help extend survival time, espe-
cially when the water is cool — or cold.

“O
effort by the survivors. U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration Technical “Auto-inflating floors aren’t that com-
Standard Order (TSO)-C70a, Liferafts cean water, mon, but just like the auto-erecting
(Reversible and Nonreversible) (paragraph canopy, anything the life raft can do
4.4) says, “The erected canopy must be no matter how warm it for the survivor will be in the survivor’s
capable of withstanding 35-knot winds best interest, especially if the survivor
and 52-knot gust[s] in open water. The is, is cooler than human
is injured — or more likely — is un-
canopy must provide adequate headroom trained and knows nothing about the
and must have provision for openings body temperature.”
life raft. Most inflatable floors must be
180 degrees apart. … If the canopy is inflated with the raft pump. I’m not that
not integral with the [life] raft, it must familiar with life rafts that have a layer of
be capable of being erected by occupants foam that provides additional insulation,
following conspicuously posted, simple but the design does promise protection
instructions. It must be capable of being the canopy, because the survivors need without action by the survivor.
erected by one occupant of an otherwise shelter immediately or they may die of
empty [life] raft and by occupants of a hypothermia.
“I am in favor of features that will help
[life]raft filled to rated capacity.” morale. A life raft built to the minimum
“In my training programs and in the TSO standards doesn’t offer much. But a
Burton, however, is not an advocate of military, too, I’ve used these types of life clear plastic window on a rainy day may
manually erected canopies. rafts. They require considerable coordi- help prevent seasickness and, in turn,
nation, especially in a survival situation prevent dehydration. That simple fea-
“If the life raft is equipped with an auto- made more difficult by darkness, wind, ture could mean the difference between
deploying canopy, shelter is available high waves and heavy rain. These types life and death on a life raft. People need
immediately, especially desirable if sea of life rafts have been used by many air- to give careful thought about such details
conditions and weather conditions are lines, whose crews have been trained to before they buy a life raft.”
rough,” he said. “Although an entry will use them, but even with training, erecting
be open to board survivors, any means the canopies on these types of life rafts
of preventing more water from getting can be very challenging. Settling In
aboard means you have that much less
water to bail. Protection from the water
— and the wind — will be useful in pre-
venting hypothermia for all the wet sur-
“Yet, until life rafts were improved in
recent years, these types of life rafts were
very common. Flight crews and cabin
E veryone is aboard, immediate first
aid has been initiated, the beacon
has been activated, roll call has been
vivors who are aboard. When ­everyone crews who currently have this type of taken, drinking water has been made

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 159
 Su r v i va l

available, survivors’ life vests have “Dampening clothing may offer some relief from
been deflated partially, the sea heat,” said Burton. “Tasks, such as daily organizing
anchor has been deployed, the and cleaning of the life raft, should be scheduled
mooring/inflation line has been in the cooler hours of early morning or late after-
cut, the canopy has been deployed noon. Even in cool conditions, the sun can cause
as necessary, the insulated floor has sunburn, so survivors need to protect themselves
been inflated, and lights on the life from the sun, but they should be sure to keep their
raft have been activated — or have heads covered because most body heat is lost from
been deactivated (water-activated the head and neck. Huddling together for warmth
batteries can be removed from the will be important. Emergency space blankets can
water to extend their longevity) be used to trap body heat, and if a person puts his
— as necessary. Now the raft com- body into a large plastic bag, even more warmth
mander can begin to establish the can be trapped.”
next phase of life raft operations.
All the survivors are likely to be exhausted, and a
Survivors are more than likely to variety of emotions will be expressed as they settle
be in life rafts at or near their rated into the next phase of preparing to be rescued.
capacity, and little extra room will Nevertheless, a routine must be established quickly
be available for anyone to lie down to tend to tasks necessary for survival, as well as
to sleep. More than likely, survivors preparations for rescue.
will be sitting in a round-type life
raft because more of these are “The raft pump must be tethered so it won’t be lost
Life raft bellows made than any other type. Survivors will be sitting overboard,” Burton said. “The inflated parts of the
pump and a with their backs to the inside walls of the buoyancy life raft are probably going to need to be ‘topped
backup oral tubes and with their legs intertwined in the center off ’ with air, especially as the life raft cools at night.
inflation hose. and/or knees drawn upward against the survivors’ If the life raft is equipped with an inflatable floor,
chests. Survivors, whether awake or asleep, likely it may have to be topped off, too. Getting that
will be seated side-by-side. Moreover, some allow- done quickly will be another important means of
ances might be necessary to help survivors who preventing hypothermia.
have been injured.
“The bailer is important, because you need to
“People need sleep,” said Burton. “Without suf- get the water out of the life raft. ‘Dry’ will be a
ficient sleep, people will be less alert, which could relative term, but water shouldn’t be sloshing
lead to unsatisfactory decisions or to unpleasant on the life raft floor. A sponge will help get the
morale. People on watch must have sufficient water that the bailer won’t get, especially in the
sleep to remain awake, especially those whose sections where the floor meets the buoyancy
watches will be at times when they normally tube.”
would be sleeping. Naps may be one way to cope,
but an effort should be made to ensure that each Survivors must perform these tasks because ev-
survivor has at least a few hours of uninterrupted eryone needs to participate in surviving. The SEP
daily sleep. The watch schedule also fashions a must be retrieved. In some life rafts, it is ejected
rudimentary sleep schedule.” into the water and connected by a tether to the
life raft. In other life rafts, it is contained in the
If weather conditions are hot, the survivors need life raft.
to stay in the shade and wear clothing to protect
their arms, legs, neck, face and head from the “Obviously, the SEP that is contained in the life
sun. Sunscreen can be applied to exposed skin, raft probably has less opportunity to be lost or
especially for survivors on watch during 10 am to damaged by water,” said Burton. “Sometimes,
2 pm, when sunlight is most intense. Moreover, the raft instructions may not be adequate and
water will reflect sunlight too. An adult exhales a the survivors may not realize that a survival kit is
quart of moisture in breathing during a 24-hour under water [where the manufacturer intended
day. And in a warm climate, sweating probably it to be] and attached to the end of a line from
causes the greatest loss of moisture. the life raft.”

160 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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In the United States, for example, the of the supplies and equipment aboard “The equipment may be much less than
Federal Aviation Regulations for Part the life raft. what your children took on a weekend
91 extended overwater operations more scout-camping trip, but it will be all the
than 100 nautical miles or more than “An inventory soon after settling in will gear that is supplied,” said Burton. “You
30 minutes flying time from the nearest be helpful in determining what equip- want to be sure it does not go overboard,
shore [see “Regulations, Judgment Affect ment and supplies are aboard the life especially if the life raft is capsized.”
Overwater Equipment Decisions,” page raft, especially those brought aboard as
387] for large and turbine-powered personal items by the survivors,” said
multi-engine airplanes require that Burton. More Drinking Water
“a survival kit [SEP] appropriately
equipped for the route to be flown,
must be attached to each required life
The emergency signaling equipment, in-
cluding a signal mirror, whistle and flares,
B urton said that every life raft should
be packed with a manual reverse-os-
mosis desalinator (see “Making Seawater
raft.” Under Part 135 extended overwater should be grouped together so that it is
operations (more than 50 nautical miles Drinkable in Just a Few Strokes,” page 179,
readily accessible and everyone in the life
from the nearest shore), the operator can and “With a Little Agitation, Desalting
raft knows where it is located. The same
choose between an SEP “appropriately Kits Yield Drinkable Water,” page 182).
should be done with first aid supplies,
equipped for the route to be flown” for
each life raft or an SEP with 18 specific “The [Katadyn] Survivor-06 hand-
items; three of those items — a canopy, operated water maker is a must-have

“T
retaining line (mooring/inflation line) item, although the bigger model
and a CO 2 inflation cylinder — are [Survivor-35] may be better for situa-
normally attached to the life raft. The he quality of the tions where 10 or more people may be
remaining 15 items are barely sufficient on the life raft,” said Burton. “First, the
to ensure survival aboard a life raft for a contents of any SEP can weight tradeoff. Try to carry a week’s
short period: radar reflector (emergency worth of packed water for 15 people or
space blanket or reflective tape); one life vary from manufacturer enough desalting kits to keep them going
raft repair kit; one bailing bucket; one for a week. The water would be heaviest,
signaling mirror; one police whistle; one to manufacturer.” followed by the desalting kit, followed
raft knife; one inflation pump; two oars; by the Survivor. But when the packaged
one magnetic compass; one dye marker; water is consumed, and the desalting
one flashlight having two D batteries or kits are expended, the water maker can
equivalent; two-day supply of emer- still be pumped, and it will provide the
gency food rations supplying at least food and water, and survival tools, such survivors with a lot more water than the
1,000 calories per day per person; for as the utility knife and fishing kit. minimum required to survive.”
each two persons the life raft is rated to
carry, two pints of water or one seawater A good fishing kit includes a variety He said that using the water maker comes
desalting kit; and one book on survival of small and large hooks; that kit must at the cost of using human energy in a
appropriate for the area in which the be securely stored so the hooks do not situation in which there is likely to be an
aircraft is operated. puncture the life raft or the survivors. insufficient replacement of that energy.
Even if they are packed in a tough bag, a Children and ill or injured adults probably
“The quality of the contents of any SEP short time in a wet life raft probably will will be unable to pump sufficient water.
can vary from manufacturer to manufac- weaken the package so the hooks can
turer, and some may include additional break through the package. “So, the raft commander has to as-
equipment in the SEP,” said Burton. sign people to pump the water, which
Some manufacturers provide storage should be stored in a separate water
“Get details about the gear in the SEP bags that are attached to the life raft; bag,” said Burton. “Refill the containers
from the life raft manufacturer. And op- others provide individual plastic bags that provided the ready-to-drink water,
erators should pack supplemental gear in with zipper-type closures; and some don’t especially if the water was in containers
a ditch bag [see ‘Don’t Leave the Aircraft provide any extra bags. Anything that has with screw-on caps. If plastic storage
Without It,’ page 157].” a tether must be tied securely to the life containers, plastic trash bags, vacuum
raft, and anything that should not be lost bottles or other closeable containers were
The raft commander should record, in the overboard should be packed in a storage transferred from the airplane to the life
waterproof notebook, a basic ­inventory compartment or fitted with a tether. raft, fill them, although the trash bags

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 161
 Su r v i va l

the interior of the life raft, where it can be directed

into containers. These internal scoops are usually
equipped with some type of closure, so the flow
of water can be stopped.

Food and Energy

Conservation

I f the food in the SEP is packed to Part 135 re-

quirements, for example, then it will be no more
than 1,000 calories per person per day for two days
(see “If You Need It, They Have It,” page 382).

“If plenty of water is available for digestion, then

the food can be eaten,” said Burton. “And it might
be a tasty treat in a survival situation. But people
can go a long time without food, and the raft
commander must emphasize that fact to people
who may not understand the realities of survival,
especially when the meager food supplies have
Four of these sealed shouldn’t be filled so much that they would burst been eaten.
packets of food would or prevent a knot from being tied with the bag’s
end. And if people want to drink water, let them. “That will go hand-in-hand with survivors refrain-
be only 500 calories
They shouldn’t guzzle it, but thirsty people should ing from any unnecessary physical activity, but
short of meeting the
drink. As long as drinking water is available, no that doesn’t include in-place exercises to stretch
requirements of 1,000 muscles in the neck, shoulders, back, legs and
rationing of water should be necessary.”
calories per day per feet, which will go a long way to making cramped
person for 15 persons. If containers of juice, soft drinks, etc., have been positions more bearable. Energy conservation is
retrieved from the airplane (see “Prepare to very important, so unless survivors are perform-
Ditch,” page 20), these should be retained after ing assigned chores or scanning the horizon for
the liquids have been drunk, because they will ships, land and airplanes, they should be doing
be useful for storing fresh water from the hand- as little as possible. Talk games or playing cards
operated water maker or to hold rainwater. Small (waterproof playing cards are sometimes included
openings for drinking — the smaller the better in an SEP) can be used to pass time. People can
— in these containers will help prevent spillage as share funny stories, laugh and sing songs to keep
the life raft moves in the water. A larger container positive outlooks.”
— such as a bailer — can be used to capture
water and fill small-hole containers. Alcoholic The survival manual on the life raft will include
beverages, which cause dehydration, shouldn’t information about fishing for food, which types
have been retrieved from the aircraft. to avoid and which body parts aren’t edible. The
raft commander should assign a team to try their
The canopy should be rinsed with seawater to hand at fishing, especially if experienced fishermen
remove any packing powder or other materials are among the survivors. In addition to nourish-
that might be present from when the life raft was ment, fish provide some moisture. Care is required
packed. Washing the canopy should be a daily task, when fishing to prevent injuries to the survivors
which will help to keep salt buildup on the fabric in the life raft and to prevent punctures of the
to a minimum. When rain arrives, remaining salt buoyancy tubes.
can be washed away quickly and the canopy can
be used to funnel rain into a bailer and into any “Of course, everyone had better like raw fish,” said
other containers the survivors have opened. Some Burton, who noted that sufficient water will be
life rafts are equipped with a special scoop on the necessary to digest food.
canopy that will funnel water via a fabric tube into Continued on page 164

162 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Will to Live Is Essential in Survival Situation, Specialists Say

M
aintaining a positive mental been in survival situations]. … Preparing involved in a worthwhile task until rescuers
outlook may be the single most yourself physically for a survival situation arrive and that, in addition to being busy,
important factor in any water- depends greatly on the shape [physical they feel that they have some control over
survival situation. condition] you are in now.” what will become of them.

In advisory information about aircraft Every situation will include several priori- “If someone has nothing to do, the mind
ditchings, the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority ties, but the order of their importance is going to start to wander,” Storey said.
(CAA) called the will to live “the most pow- will vary, depending on the specific Depression may follow, along with a loss
erful force to prolong life.”1 situation, Storey said. Those priorities of the will to live.
are the following:
“Without a will to survive, there can be no In addition, although people can survive
survival,” said Roger Storey, aviation phys- • First aid — caring for yourself or without food, hunger pains can contribute
iologist and survival-training instructor for others who may require medical to mental stress and can weaken the will
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration treatment; to live. CAMI said that, in these cases,
(FAA) Civil Aerospace Medical Institute the best response is to ensure that the
(CAMI). “If you do not have a desire to • Shelter — ensuring that the life raft individual has assigned survival-related
survive, there is no equipment made that has been deployed properly; that tasks to perform.5
will help you survive.”2 the canopy, if there is one, has been
erected; that the inside of the life An assigned task is the best method of re-
Furthermore, Ken Burton, president of raft is as dry as possible; and that lieving anxiety, which is “most contagious
STARK (Sea, Tropic, Arctic, Regional occupants of the life raft are evenly and can destroy chances of survival on the
Knowledge) Survival Co., said, “If you’re spaced on the life raft; open sea,” said the United Nations World
not focused on your survival, all the other Health Organization in its International
things are going to bother you.”3 • Signaling — having signaling devices Medical Guide for Ships.6
available and ensuring that someone
In a survival situation, mental depression knows how to operate them; Extreme anxiety and other mental dis-
and boredom can be devastating, he said. turbances may appear among survivors,
• Water — knowing how to procure either before or after rescue, the guide
One of the best ways to avert such condi- water. (Food is of secondary impor- said.
tions and to develop a positive attitude is tance, especially if rescue is likely
to undergo survival training, Storey and within several days.); and, “Acute agitation should be treated
Burton agreed. promptly, as the situation demands; in
• Rest — providing opportunities for the some situations, forcible restraint may be
“Everybody has survival instincts,” Burton body and the mind to recuperate from required,” the guide said.
said. “Training helps you develop skills that the physical stress and mental stress
give you confidence that you will survive in inherent in a survival situation. The will to live is enhanced by thoughts
an alien environment, on the life raft.” of loved ones, survival-training special-
Life on a life raft is likely to be better with ists said.
Storey said, “There are two simple, but as many people and as many supplies as
important, ways you can increase your possible, said Paul D. Russell, a maritime Doug Stanton, author of a book about
chances of survival. These involve prepa- safety specialist and accident investigator, the survivors of the USS Indianapolis, a
ration — before you ever find yourself in and a retired U.S. Coast Guard captain U.S. Navy heavy cruiser that sank after
an actual survival situation. The first is to with more than 5,000 flight hours in fixed- being struck by Japanese torpedoes in
admit to yourself that ‘it can happen to wing and rotary-wing aircraft. As a result, the Pacific Ocean during the final days of
me.’ The next step is to prepare yourself, in situations in which two or more life rafts World War II, said that during interviews,
both mentally and physically. It is not are deployed, the life rafts should be tied the men told him that “their survival had to
enough to prepare mentally if you cannot together as closely as possible. The des- do with will, with a sharpened conscious-
withstand the physical requirements of a ignated leader — often the captain of the ness of one’s own self, with a stunning
survival situation. aircraft — should ensure that everyone on awareness of what one would and would
the life raft is assigned a specific task.4 not do to keep living.7
“The mental preparation can come in
the form of educational courses, books Those individual assignments are required “Every man I talked to said that, early on
or conversations [with people who have to ensure that everyone on the life raft is in the disaster, he somehow decided he

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 163
 Su r v i va l

was going to survive. Most actually said do, are the ones who survive,” Russell Region, before retiring in 1984 with
to themselves, ‘I am going to live.’ They said. “People who intend to perish and the rank of captain. He is chief
heard within themselves some voice get wrapped up in their current situation engineer, aviation system safety,
— a mother’s whisper, a father’s urging are the ones who die.”  Boeing Commercial Airplanes, and
to try harder; at other times, it was a a maritime safety and accident
basketball coach’s chewing out over not — FSF Editorial Staff investigator for Safety Services
playing a great game. Sometimes, it was International.
the memory of a girlfriend back home, her Notes
hair lit by a halo of sun on a summer day.   5. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
These men clung to these apparitions with   1. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). Civil Aerospace Medical Institute.
all their might, and they lived.” General Aviation Safety Sense: Basic Survival Skills for General
Ditching (Leaflet 21A). 2000. Aviation: The Will to Survive. Global
Cold-water survival specialists Frank Survival Video Series.
Golden, M.D., Ph.D., and Michael   2. Storey, Roger A. Airman
Tipton, Ph.D., writing in Essentials of Education Programs Topics   6. United Nations World Health
Sea Survival, said that the will to survive of Interest: Striving to Survive. Organization (WHO). “Medical
and other psychological considerations <www.cami.jccbi.gov/aam-400/ Care of Castaways and Rescued
cannot be considered apart from physi- striving.htm>. Aug. 12, 2003. Persons.” International Medical
ological considerations for individuals on Guide for Ships. Chapter 12.
a life raft.8   3. Burton, Ken. Interview by Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 1988.
Werfelman, Linda. Hollywood,
“In a survival scenario, the boundary Florida, U.S., April 22, 2003. Flight   7. Stanton, Doug. In Conversation
between psychological and physiologi- Safety Foundation, Alexandria, With Doug Stanton and Survivors
cal responses becomes blurred because Virginia, U.S. of the USS Indianapolis. <ussindia
many of the signs and symptoms associ- napolisinharmsway.com/qa.htm>.
ated with both are similar and therefore   4. Russell, Paul D. Interviews by June 10, 2003.
difficult to distinguish,” they said. “We Werfelman, Linda. Hollywood,
know that the physiological state can alter Florida, U.S., April 22, 2003, and Stanton is the author of In Harm’s
perception. For example … hypothermia Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., May 1, Way: The Sinking of the USS
will usually produce introversion; dehydra- 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Indianapolis and the Extraordinary
tion and hunger cause lassitude [fatigue Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Story of Its Survivors. The
and/or indifference]; and hyperventilation “conversation” is on an Internet site
is associated with panic.” In the U.S. Coast Guard, Russell maintained by the book’s publisher,
conducted more than 200 water Henry Holt and Company, New
Survival specialists say that the will to landings and served in various York, New York, U.S.
survive can help people overcome many positions, including commander
physiological challenges. of two air stations, chief of the   8. Golden, Frank; Tipton, Michael.
Aviation Training Center Training Essentials of Sea Survival.
“People who keep centered on living, Division and chief of search-and- Champaign, Illinois, U.S.: Human
centered on something they yet want to rescue operations in the Northwest Kinetics. 2002.

Some fishing kits are much better a serious cut if a big fish took the bait,” Traveling Companions
than others. For example, a preferred Burton said. “Use a paddle to wrap the
kit approved by the U.S. Coast Guard
provides extra fishing line, a variety of
hooks, a variety of lures and several leads.
line. If a fish breaks it, you didn’t need
that fish aboard the life raft anyway. The
line needs to be retrieved very carefully
R eports by survivors are gener-
ally consistent in saying that sharks
— and other fish — will be congregating
Unfortunately, unless this information is to ensure that a hook doesn’t snag and under the life raft and “bumping” it while
learned beforehand, an inferior fishing kit puncture the life raft, which would be competing for the survivors’ next meal,
— line with a hook on it and wrapped likely to occur below the water when said Burton (see “What’s Eating You? It’s
around a piece of cardboard — can be pulling the line in. The SEP should have Probably Not a Shark,” page 211).
packed in the SEP. a utility knife that can be used to cut the
fish, which must be done very carefully “Some of those bumps have been
“Don’t allow anyone to wrap the fishing on a paddle or other hard surface to avoid described as painful,” said Burton.
line around a hand, which could result in puncturing the life raft.” “Unfortunately, shark skin is just like

164 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

sandpaper, so it can abrade the life raft material,

but a lot of rubbing would be required to do
damage. To most sharks, a life raft is just a lifeless
shape that doesn’t invite a taste-test. That is one
reason to dispose of human waste in a plastic bag.
While plastic packaging won’t prevent a shark’s
very sensitive senses from associating the waste
with a potential meal, lessening its association
with the life raft may prevent the life raft from
being confused with something good to eat.”

The likelihood that sharks and other large fish will

be in the area is another reason that no one should
go overboard, except in an emergency.

“Except under emergency circumstances, no one

should leave the life raft to ‘exercise’ or to ‘bathe,’”
Burton said. “Such activity will require energy that
can’t be replaced, and getting back into the life
raft will probably require the assistance of other eight hours). When on watch, a survivor should be U.S. Coast Guard-
energy-depleted survivors. Moreover, anyone who assigned a seat position at the primary entry (and approved fishing kit
goes overboard can be bitten by fish, and those the alternate entry with a team). If people on watch provides a wide variety
wounds might become infected. don’t have their own sunglasses and hats, people of aids necessary
off watch should loan them their accessories.
to catch fish to
“If an important piece of equipment falls over- supplement life raft
“The watch will be on lookout for ships, low-flying
board and floats, then a heaving line can be tied rations.
aircraft, land, changing weather conditions and
to an able-bodied volunteer’s life vest and he can
anything else that might affect the condition of
go overboard and try to retrieve the gear, but
the life raft and the survivors,” said Burton. “For
only as far as the line allows. The raft commander
example, being aware of weather conditions will
might follow a similar procedure for a survivor
allow the watch to be prepared to collect rain for
who falls overboard but cannot be recovered with
drinking water and to ensure that the canopy will
the heaving-line quoit.
be secured to maintain a dry interior.
“The sea anchor can be retrieved, the water-ballast
“The watch will also be responsible for checking
bags can be emptied, if possible, to allow the life raft
the life raft equipment, including topping off the
to drift faster toward the survivor, and paddles can
life raft with air if necessary and checking the sea
be used to attempt to steer the life raft, although
anchor line to ensure that it isn’t chafing, which
they aren’t very effective for propulsion. But all these
could damage the life raft or dramatically reduce
actions must be taken with great caution and are
its stability if the line parted and the sea anchor was
not warranted in rough sea conditions.”
lost. Moreover, chafing could result in an air leak
from the buoyancy tube and require a repair.
Keeping Watch
“Caring for sleeping, ill and injured survivors will be

I deally, pairing people to perform tasks, includ-

ing watches, provides a backup and a teammate
with whom to share tasks. A watch system must
a duty of the watch, and range from ensuring that
people do not fall asleep where they could suffer
sunburn to preventing someone’s arm from hang-
be introduced to ensure that at least one survivor ing in the water, which could attract a predator.”
is on watch all hours of the day. The simplest
system is to divide 24 hours by the number of Flashlights supplied with SEPs generally are not the
people physically able to be on watch (e.g., with most effective signaling devices. They have been
six people, each watch period is four hours, or provided so that survivors can use them at night
if divided into three teams, each watch period is to locate equipment and to check the condition of

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 165
 Su r v i va l

the life raft. Survivors A variety of flashlights are available that use long-
should use flashlights life LEDs (light-emitting diodes), which require
judiciously, even if less power and which dramatically extend battery
extra batteries have life. These lights vary from simple minimal lights
been supplied in the seen on key chains to powerful and waterproof
ditch bag. Nevertheless, high-intensity spotlights with 60 LEDs. For ex-
survivors should use ample, a one-LED self-powered — no battery
any available device to — flashlight evaluated by the FSF editorial staff
attract attention when required only gentle shaking for 30 seconds to
possible rescuers are charge the capacitor that powered the light for
seen or heard. five minutes and was claimed to be good for more
than 100,000 charges. The waterproof light floated.
“Before the flight crew Although not a bright light, it could be used to
and cabin crew aban- locate equipment in the life raft.2
don the aircraft, they
should be grabbing “Light will be important, so a couple of rugged
every flashlight and flashlights — with accessory red lenses to protect
spare battery carried night vision — with waterproof switches will be
Flashlights will on board,” said Burton. “Flashlights will be very good additions to the ditch bag,” said Burton.
be essential to useful to the evening watch and the early morning
locate equipment watch. They will need them to check the condi- “In addition to using his eyes, the survivor on
and to check the tion of the life raft, to get the flares to signal a watch will be using his ears to listen for airplanes
passing ship or a low-flying search plane and to and ships,” he said. “The sounds of a ship’s engine
condition of the
check the condition of the other survivors. Even can travel in the water, so survivors should be
life raft during
on a rainy day, some enclosed life raft interiors informed that if they are awakened from sleep
darkness.
can be relatively dark.” by engine sounds, they probably are engine
sounds, and everyone should be looking for a
Chemically powered lights, such as those manu- ship. Sometimes engine sounds can be heard
factured under the Cyalume brand by American through the water before they can be heard
Cyanamid Co., can provide a bright light for through the air.
several hours. A six-inch (15-centimeter) “light
stick” is a robust plastic tube that houses a glass “The person on watch needs to know how and
vial of chemicals separated from other chemicals when to use the flares, which should be stored
in the plastic tube. To generate light, the plastic close to where the watch is seated. If a ship is vis-
tube is bent, which breaks the vial and mixes the ible, a flare should be launched. If the watch has
chemicals together. The light is claimed to be non- to first wake the raft commander and discuss the
toxic, but eye contact with the chemicals should be situation before action is taken, the opportunity
avoided. Burton said that white light is best, but could pass very quickly.
other colors are available.
“So, once again, the raft commander must know
“One of these lights will provide sufficient il- the capability of the equipment that he has at
lumination for the interior of the life raft for an hand and how best to use it, so he can transfer
entire night,” said Burton. “That will save a lot of that information to the other survivors.”
flashlight batteries. If you tie one of these lights
onto a short string and twirl it around, it will be Sightings of ships and aircraft should be reported
a good signal light that can be seen for a mile or to the raft commander, so that he can record the
more. Remember, on the ocean, there will be no sightings in the notebook.
background lights, just light from stars and the
moon. ‘Dark’ is really dark on the ocean, so light
is readily visible. Moreover, despite the importance Personal Hygiene
of light, the survivors on watch must protect their
eyes from unnecessary light so their night vision
won’t be impaired.” T he survivors are going to stink very quickly.
They are going to smell like fish or worse.

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They and their clothing will have been wet with provides for some modesty, it can be made to work
salt water teeming with a variety of tiny organ- in a crowded life raft and its primary purpose is
isms, and they probably won’t be dry until they are to prevent people from being in a position where
rescued. Moreover, salt is accumulating on their they could fall overboard.”
skin, and that can cause problems.
By putting waste into a plastic bag, there are less
“Remember, no survivor goes overboard to bathe, organic scents to attract predators. No one should
but liquid soap taken from the airplane or packed be allowed to attempt to perform bodily functions
in the ditch bag can be used to wipe salt accumula- from the side of the life raft because of the risk of
tions from exposed skin, and that will be useful in falling overboard and the risk of contaminating
preventing boils,” said Burton. “Napkins, toilet tis- the interior of the life raft.
sue or paper towels can be used to apply the soap.
In seawater, soap does not create suds and tends to If no trash bags or plastic resealable bags are avail-
leave a film on the skin. The survivors also must able, then a bailer might have to be dedicated to
ensure that they maintain clean hands, including the task.
under the nails. Dirty hands are a primary means
of spreading sickness.”
Taking Care of Home
With a hand-operated water maker aboard the
life raft, sufficient fresh water might be available
occasionally to damp clean the skin. Nevertheless, I n daylight, especially in bright and unobstructed
sun, the air in the life raft’s buoyancy tube(s)
will be warmed, and expansion will occur. Most
survivors most often will use only seawater to rinse
accumulations away, but without harsh rubbing life rafts are equipped with pressure-relief valves
that could further irritate skin. that automatically vent air when the air pressure is
excessive, and survivors may be surprised to hear
While life raft survivors’ accounts tell how the legs the sudden WOOOOOOOOOSH of air being re-
of men who were urinating overboard were held leased. As the sun sets lower in the sky and the life
by other survivors to prevent them from falling raft becomes cooler in the evening, air contracts
overboard, Burton has a more modest means of and additional air must be pumped into the buoy-
coping with the logistics of bodily waste. ancy tubes until they are very firm and without
wrinkles caused by insufficient air.
“The raft commander has to make sure soon after
everyone is aboard the life raft that a ‘swimming The manufacturers pack only one pump to a life
pool’ mentality doesn’t threaten the health of every- raft, so if that pump is lost or damaged beyond
one in the life raft,” said Burton. “Unless the ditch repair, despite human ingenuity, no more air can
Duct tape can
bag has been supplied with prescription antibiotics, be added to the life raft.
be used to patch air
an infection caused by urine/fecal contamination is
leaks in the buoyancy
going to be impossible to treat with a Band-Aid.” “I know of only one manufacturer who also sup-
plies a length of hose with a valve fitting on one tubes … and for a

For most survivors, bowel movements will stop end that is intended to inflate a life raft orally,” said variety of other uses
within a day or two of being on the life raft, but the Burton. “The process may tax the physical condi- on a life raft.
excretion of urine will continue, probably at the tion of some people,
rate of a pint (a half liter) or less per day. Women’s but the device works.
menstrual periods are likely to stop, too. Nevertheless, adding a
spare pump to the ditch
“Those paper products taken from the airplane bag is a good idea.”
may also be useful for completing bodily func-
tions,” Burton said. “Small-size plastic trash bags A modern life raft is
can be placed on pulled-down pants and under- remarkably strong;
garments to capture bodily waste — liquids and nevertheless, caution
solids — as one stoops over the bag. Then the is necessary to ensure
plastic bag is knotted and thrown overboard. This that the buoyancy tubes
goes for men and women. While this position are not punctured by

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 Su r v i va l

jewelry, fish hooks, aluminum cans, ballpoint tube. The clamps come in three-inch, five-inch and
pens, signal mirrors, utility knives, or anything eight-inch [eight-centimeter, 13-centimeter and 20-
else that could damage the life raft. Survivors will centimeter] sizes, and they provide a good long-
have to be alert to hard objects that could chafe term seal. Even so, repaired leaks should be checked
the life raft’s fabric. Any section of the life raft by each scheduled watch.
that shows signs of wear should be protected with
extra clothing or anything else that would prevent “Sometimes cone-shaped and threaded rubber
further damage. plugs are available, but they are generally used
only as temporary plugs. And if a leak is serious,
then anything at hand should be used to stem the
Fixing Air Leaks loss of air, from clothing to a ‘finger in the dike.’
Losing air in a buoyancy tube will mean that the

L eaks can have a variety of causes: The pres-

sure-relief valve can malfunction in the open
position; glue or stitching can fail; or a puncture
life raft’s freeboard [the distance from the top of
the buoyancy tube to the water] will be lowered,
and that will make the life raft more susceptible
can occur. The survivors might hear the escaping to water entering the life raft. Actually, duct tape
air first, but pinpointing the leak may require mov- applied to a clean and dried buoyancy tube can
ing fingertips over the area of a suspected leak. If stop leaks above the waterline.”
the leak is under water, a steady stream of bubbles
may signal its location.
Patch-and-glue repair kits require that the surface
be dried — a challenge on a life raft — before
“Leaks have to be repaired,” said Burton. “Most life
the repair can be made. For serious leaks on the
rafts today are equipped with two or three mechani-
buoyancy tube below water, the life raft must be
cal clamps for air-holding repairs: Two oval-shaped
capsized to make the repair.
pieces of metal face each other and are connected by
a screw-down winglet on a threaded rod. The oval
metal with a rubber gasket is inserted in the leak Capsizing
hole, which is usually made into a wider slit with

S
a utility knife to accept the metal oval. The metal everal ocean-going sailboat races in the past
A mechanical
oval, now inside the buoyancy tube, is placed with few decades have provided the life raft indus-
clamp provides a the rubber gasket against the buoyancy tube fab- try with tragic examples of life raft failures when
leakproof repair of ric. The oval face on the outside is screwed tightly weather conditions worsened so much that many
buoyancy tubes. against the oval piece on the inside of the buoyancy of the yachts — some undamaged — were aban-
doned by their crews. Insufficient ballast, loss of
sea anchors and physical destruction of life rafts
provided lessons learned. Sailors who were sepa-
rated from their life rafts after capsizing usually
died; survivors who were able to right their life
rafts and get back on board — sometimes several
times — were rescued.

While a storm often generates high winds, the

high winds alone are not directly responsible
for capsizing life rafts. For example, a six-person
round-type life raft might have a cross section of
about 18 square feet (1.7 square meters).3 Thus, at
wind speeds of 10 knots, the total dynamic wind
pressure on the life raft would be about six pounds
(three kilograms); 20 knots = about 23 pounds
(10 kilograms); 30 knots = about 54 pounds (25
kilograms); 40 knots = 90 pounds (41 kilograms);
50 knots = 144 pounds (216 kilograms); and 60
knots = 216 pounds (98 kilograms).4

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Thus, a life raft downwind from its sea anchor [life] raft will still be upset
is not subjected normally to tremendous forces by passing breakers, causing

“C
by the wind. (Rectangular-shaped life rafts ben- the people [in the life raft]
efit from this configuration, because the smallest to be ejected or tumbled and
profile of the life raft should face the wind with a smashed into each other. apsizing
correctly mounted and deployed sea anchor.)
In fact, a BFGoodrich Co. [now is something
TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.3) requires that “a sea Goodrich Co.] engineer told
anchor, or anchors, or other equivalent means me that during a Caribbean people have to
must be provided to maintain the raft, with rated hurricane in the 1970s one
capacity and canopy installed … to reduce the drift of their enclosed ballast-type prepare for.”
to two knots in 17[-knot] to 27-knot winds.” These life rafts containing a “group
winds are sufficient to build waves of four feet to of people” was tumbled over
six feet (one meter to two meters) and create very 100 times by breaking waves.
rough sea conditions. Luckily, no one was ejected.
Upsetting a ballasted life raft requires a fairly
Wind blowing across open water can generate very large … breaker.
large and powerful waves. A life raft is subjected
to the same destructive force of water that sinks “Capsizing is something people have to prepare
ships and racing sailboats, said Daniel Shewmon, for,” said Burton. “The wind will be howling, the
an engineer who is best known for his compre- waves will be huge, and people will be having a
hensive studies of sea anchors.5 heck of a time hanging onto the grasp line.

The average North Atlantic storm wave is 30 “Everything in the life raft has to be stored in
feet [nine meters] high and 250 feet [76 meters] pockets or must be tethered to the life raft. If the
from crest to crest. Such a wave travels at a speed life raft is capsized, the survivors can’t afford to
of over 20 knots and can easily overtake most lose any of the equipment. And they need to hang
boats running before it. If a storm were to last on to the grasp line inside the life raft.”
18 hours before abating, roughly 9,000 such
waves would pass a single point. Many would The survivors should all be tethered to the life raft
be topped with tumbling or falling breakers. with several feet of line: enough from their tether
point near the entry to allow the life raft to be
When they break, such large waves have righted without having to disconnect their tethers.
unimaginable power. For example, on top When the life raft overturns, air will be trapped
of a 30-foot breaking wave and just behind under the life raft floor, so the survivors will be
the top of its foam, is a short, shallow surface able to breathe. Nevertheless, the life raft and the
layer of solid green water being blown about water will be moving and if the capsizing occurred
22 knots, so fast it continually tumbles ahead in darkness, the survivors will use the grasp line
of the crest. This moving layer of water has to lead them to the exit and to the surface. They
the potential to strike a stationary or slowly will hold on to the life raft’s line.
moving vessel with a force of about 1,400
pounds [635 kilograms] on each square foot. “An able-bodied volunteer should be preassigned to
Here then, is the potential to damage or even right the life raft in these conditions, but in rough
sink most standard boats. … It is no surprise sea conditions anyone who can right it, should right
that boats so struck have been rapidly broken it,” said Burton. “Ideally, the entry will face the wind,
up, heeled over, rolled, slewed around, or oc- which will help turn the life raft upright. In these
casionally flung through the air. Under such conditions, and without the benefit of the weight of
movement, everything inside may be torn the water ballast, the life raft may turn upright with
or ripped loose and turned into missiles. … little effort. The usual righting method, of someone
Some [crewmembers] successfully get into boarding the life raft near the inflation cylinder and
their life rafts, but even those who do will then grasping the righting line while leaning out-
probably discover that they have jumped from ward from the life raft until it falls upright, may be
the frying pan into the fire, [because] their modified by events.

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 Su r v i va l

“Then, everyone will board the life raft and repeat bag. He said that the EPIRB is worth the extra bulk
many of the actions taken during the first board- created by its buoyancy requirement; aviation life
ing. This is a rather simple maneuver on a calm rafts are designed to carry ELTs.
day, but it is going to be scary and difficult in storm
conditions. But you do it. “An EPIRB is waterproof and has a nominal op-
erating time of 48 hours rather than the 24 hours
“Under no circumstance should survivors allow operating time of an ELT or a PLB,” said Burton.
themselves to become separated from the life raft. “Out in the middle of the ocean, or in a part of the
Anyone who drifts away in these conditions can’t world where SAR resources may not be optimal,
be retrieved and will die.” rescuers may not get to your location in 24 hours
or more. Thus, with an ELT [or an EPIRB or a PLB]
when the battery power is drained, rescuers won’t
Electronic Signaling have the benefit of a homing signal. For example,
even with the ELT’s last reported position before

T he 406-MHz ELT with built-in GPS position

reporting is the last resort to alert search-and-
rescue (SAR) resources that survivors are in distress
the battery failed, in steady winds, a lightly bal-
lasted life raft that later lost its sea anchor could
probably move at two [knots] or three knots. Over
(see “Truths About Beacon Signals and Satellites a period of 24 hours, that total unanticipated drift
Hidden in the Details,” page 134). Current technol- could amount to 48 [nautical miles] to 72 miles.
ogy makes these devices very reliable. Nevertheless,
electronics can fail, can be damaged or can be lost, “ELTs attached to life rafts are designed to operate
so this piece of equipment should have a backup. out of the water, but most EPIRBS are designed
Moreover, the automatic fixed ELT will sink with to operate in the water. They should be tethered
the aircraft, so one or more backup beacons could to the life raft and allowed to float for optimum
make a life-saving difference. Most ELTs currently transmission.”
installed on aircraft do not use 406-MHz technol-
ogy; activating immediately any type of secondary A handheld waterproof marine VHF [very-high-
406-MHz beacon would be preferable to relying frequency] transceiver will be a useful communi-
on a 121.5-MHz ELT after a ditching (see “If You cation aid to have and should be part of the ditch
Need It, They Have It,” page 382). bag. Some pilots have a carry-on handheld VHF
aviation transceiver that can be useful, too.
“Anyone betting lives on an electronic device like
an ELT better have a 406-MHz version, preferably “These types of handheld transceivers cost only
with built-in GPS position reporting,” said Burton. a few hundred dollars for a waterproof model
“And they better have two of them. If the primary that operates with alkaline batteries, not just re-
406-MHz ELT was lost or damaged during the life chargeable batteries,” said Burton. “Alkaline bat-
raft deployment, for example, a backup ELT will teries have a long storage life, but spares should be
be very welcome. packed in the ditch bag. Rechargeable batteries lose
their charge fairly quickly in storage, so they are
“Let the ELT packed with the life not satisfactory for a survival situation, especially
raft operate for 24 hours, then if they can’t be replaced with alkaline batteries. Be
activate the backup beacon. sure to tether the radio to the life raft, and hold it

“D o not deactivate
Now you have beacon signals
operating in series for a total
of 48 hours. Do not deactivate
[and ELTs] with their antennas vertical. Although
life raft manufacturers report their canopies as RF
[radio frequency] transparent, the transceiver an-
any radio beacon until any radio beacon until told by tennas should have a clear ‘view’ of the sky.
rescuers to deactivate it.”
told by rescuers to “A handheld waterproof marine transceiver makes
Burton said that he recom- it possible to transmit a mayday [i.e., a declaration
deactivate it.” mends that operators consider of a distress condition] on the maritime universal
an EPIRB [emergency position- hailing-and-distress channel, which is monitored
indicating radio beacon] rather by many vessels at sea, although GMDSS [Global
than an ELT or PLB for the ditch Maritime Distress and Safety System] has changed

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 Su r v i va l

monitoring procedures. If a vessel is spotted by the “Tell the ship’s crew

watch, for example, then the watch can transmit on where the life raft is
the distress channel or a ship-to-ship channel. The located in relation to
channels can be marked in indelible ink on the back the ship,” he said. “Tell
of the radio. A successful contact with a ship will them ‘you are heading
make it possible for the survivors to communicate toward us’ or ‘you are
with the ship’s crew to coordinate a rescue. Most SAR heading away from us’
aircraft will be able to communicate on the marine or ‘we are on your left
distress frequency, too. side’ or ‘we are on your
right side.’ You just need
“With a handheld aviation radio, a mayday can to give them some idea
be transmitted on the aviation distress frequency of where they have to
when aircraft or aircraft contrails are visible — or begin looking for you.
when engines are audible. If a 406-MHz ELT [or A life raft is a small
a 121.5-MHz ELT] has been activated, its homing target, so any relative-
signal will be broadcast on 121.5 MHz. Just ignore position information
it and broadcast appropriate mayday information; you can provide rescu-
do not turn the ELT off. The transceiver will be ers will help. Even with
broadcasting a much stronger signal than the ELT powerful radars installed on ships, the life raft is Used correctly,
[homing signal]. The watch can also broadcast not likely to be visible on radar, although the re- a signal mirror
that he will listen on a different frequency for a flective side of an emergency space blanket may can be one of
response from the aircraft. reflect sunlight while secured on one side of the the most effective
canopy, and it might reflect radar at close range
signaling devices
“Of course, you could be in one-way communica- [five nautical miles (nine kilometers) or less].”
during daylight.
tion with an aircraft flight crew. But the flight crew
can confirm your survival and provide up-to-date The watch must be able to provide information
information to SAR personnel. If the ditching was about the aircraft type and registration number,
within a few hundred miles of land and the flight the number of survivors, the types of injuries,
crew remembers any en route VHF frequencies the number of life rafts and the type of signal-
that were in use, a transceiver listening watch ing equipment available. This information will
might be established on those frequencies too. confirm the aircraft’s condition and will enable
SAR resources to know how many people remain
“VHF signals are typically line of sight [for aircraft to be rescued.
frequencies and marine frequencies]. At life raft
height, the horizon is less than five nautical miles.
But the antenna on a ship may be 30 feet to 50 Day Signaling
feet [nine meters to 15 meters] or more above the
water, so the range of your handheld transceiver to A signal mirror, which reflects the sun, can be seen
a particular ship could be 15 nautical miles to 20 for several miles and is not energy-dependent no
nautical miles [28 kilometers to 37 kilometers] or matter how many times it is used, and the wet
farther. Finally, if you hear a strong signal, there is environment of a life raft will not diminish its
a good chance that your signal can be heard, too. effectiveness. It is most effective in line-of-sight
Nevertheless, if the watch doesn’t receive a response applications, and airplanes may see the signal at
to the mayday after several attempts, avoid depleting altitudes even above 20,000 feet.
the transceiver’s batteries. Turn the transceiver off
and save the batteries for future attempts.” “The mirror is usually packed in the SEP, and
it is one of the most effective signaling devices
If communication is established with a ship or a survivor can have,” said Burton. “Instructions
aircraft, the watch must be accurate in transmit- are usually printed on the back of the mirror,
ting position information in relation to the ship or which might be highly polished stainless steel
aircraft. For example, Burton suggests that survivors or plastic with a metallic reflective finish. A hole
use a simple procedure that places the ship or air- usually is provided in the middle to help aim
plane as the reference point. the mirror.

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 Su r v i va l

“Basically, the sun is reflected off the mirror, which is lightweight and easily deployed. This device will
is aimed at the target: a ship or aircraft. The sur- help make the life raft more visible to SAR person-
vivor forms a V with two fingers with the target nel — especially aboard aircraft — when they are
in the bottom of the V. Using his other hand to conducting a search. Of course, I like it because it
hold the mirror, he aims the reflected light from doesn’t require any energy. It is always working [see
the mirror at the V formed by the fingers on the “If You Need It, They Have It,” page 352].”
hand of his outstretched arm. Simple, really, and
with a little practice the survivor can become very Smoke and sea-dye markers also are effective as
accurate with this type of device.” signals for help and for position fixing, but they
have some limitations.
Other daytime devices include kites and even
helium-filled balloons, but their use aboard a “Smoke — usually orange — is an excellent signaling
life raft is not practical. Burton believes that one device when the wind isn’t blowing, but even then, it
simple device — the See/Rescue Streamer — is an will remain effective for only a few minutes,” Burton
especially effective visual aid.6 The company pro- said. “When the smoke isn’t blown away, it can be
vided FSF editorial staff an Aviator model in both seen from aircraft and ships that are fairly close, usu-
a non-retroreflective version and a retroreflective ally less than three nautical miles [six kilometers].
version, both made of polyethylene. The compact
Aviator weighed 6.7 ounces (189.9 grams), but the “Packets of luminescent dye — usually green
polyethylene package unrolled into a long single — can cover an area of a few thousand square
sheet six inches wide by 40 feet long (15 centime- feet. But over a period of time — 30 [minutes]
ters by 12 meters). The device is available in three to 60 minutes, the life raft will have drifted away
primary sizes, varying in width and length, and from the dye, which will have dissipated. The dye
has an indefinite storage life. is really best seen from aircraft.”

“The See/Rescue Streamer is an excellent lightweight

Green luminescent
device that is designed to trail behind the life raft Night Signaling
dye is readily or a person in a life vest,” said Burton. “The device
visible from an varies in length and width, but the bright orange Flares packed in SEPs often are inadequate both
aircraft. color is very visible and contrasts with the water. It in quantity and quality. SOLAS [International

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Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea] flares, Rocket-launched red parachute flares are packed After deployment,
for example, exceed the requirements of the U.S. in a waterproof container that is the launcher; the See/Rescue
Coast Guard in brightness, altitude and burn instructions are printed on the container. Burton Streamer requires
time (one exception is the burn time for red said that these and other flares must be handled no attention from
handheld flares). A SOLAS red parachute flare with caution.
life raft survivors.
may burn for nearly a minute, reach a height of
about 1,000 feet and burn with the brightness “Higher is better, but all these flares should
of 40,000 candle power. A non-SOLAS flare may be used when a ship is visible on the horizon,
reach the same height, but burn half as long with ideally when the ship is headed toward the life
only 10,000 candle power. Because SOLAS flares raft. While a parachute flare may have a claimed
are self-contained, they do not require separate visibility of 40 nautical miles [74 kilometers],
launchers. at that distance the illumination would be
minimal for a chance sighting by the ship’s crew.
“Only one approved pyrotechnic signaling device Nevertheless, if you can see the lights of a ship,
is required in a U.S. aviation life raft,” said Burton. that ship’s crew is close enough to see a flare.
“That means you might get one opportunity to Flares will be in short supply, so they should be
signal a ship or an aircraft. Most SEPs include at used only if they have a high likelihood of being
least three flares, but chances are, they won’t be seen by a vessel that is coming toward the life
SOLAS flares. Given a choice, get SOLAS flares. raft or passing close by.”

“In my experience, out-of-date flares have about Unfortunately, ships have become highly auto-
a 50 percent failure rate. Flares typically have a mated; far at sea, only one crewmember may be
three-year life rating, but even flares that are not on the bridge, and he may not be looking outside
expired often fail.” while performing a variety of tasks related to the

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 Su r v i va l

be launched within 10 degrees or so of vertical,

so that it is directly ahead of the vessel for the
greatest likelihood of being seen. Pistol-launched
flares are launched similarly. If a flare fails to fire
after 15 seconds, drop it in the water. Never point
a flare at anyone, and don’t look into a launching
tube that fails to ignite, he said.

“Red handheld flares burn longer than parachute

flares, but at life raft height, the light easily can be
obscured by swells,” said Burton. “The burn time
on these flares can be about one minute to three
minutes. Using them should be timed very care-
fully so that they will be burning at the top of the
swell, not in the trough between swells. Handheld
flares are used to help guide rescuers to the life
raft.” Burton cautions that molten slag can drip
from flares and cause serious burns to exposed
skin or damage the life raft. Flares should be held
away from the body at an angle to allow any drips
to fall away from the hand. Moreover, most flares
will be good daytime distress signals, too.

Burton said that he has tested a battery-powered

device, Rescue Laser Flare, and he believes that
this offers powerful signaling capability. Burton
has used the Rescue Laser Flare to successfully
signal aircraft several miles away. Manufactured
by Greatland Laser, its Magnum model is about
the size of a small flashlight and is powered by two
AA batteries. The company said that the laser light
emits a vertically expanding line of red light that is
6,000 feet (1,820 meters) wide at 16 statute miles
(26 kilometers). The waterproof light can operate
continuously for 72 hours.7

“The light is aimed at a target much the same way

a signal mirror is used,” said Burton. “Then the
A military ship’s operation. Rescued survivors frequently survivor slowly moves the vertical light beam to
helicopter with have reported that they launched flares to signal the right and to the left — back and forth. On the
a well-trained one or more ships, but there was no indication receiving side, the light is a sudden bright red flash
crew can rescue that the ships’ crews saw the flares. Some sur- that definitely attracts attention. In some ways, this
vivors reported that flares were launched even might be a better signal tool to use first in attempt-
survivors.
as ships nearly overran the life rafts. Despite his ing to attract the attention of a ship’s crew, because
use of flares, nine ships passed by Steve Callahan its duration is much longer and can be kept operat-
during his 76 days aboard a life raft. ing as long as charged batteries are available.”

“Parachute flares are launched downwind, so A portable strobe light can be used to attract at-
that survivors’ faces and bodies are protected tention at night, but such a light is not officially
from the flames and smoke that are part of the recognized as a distress device because strobe
launch,” said Burton. The person launching the lights are used to mark navigation buoys, fishing
flare should lay across the upper buoyancy tube nets and weather buoys. Thus, a ship’s crew may
with outstretched arms. Ideally, any flare will assume that it is not a distress signal. Nevertheless,

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a strobe light can attract attention, and lights in the direction of the helicopter, alongside a small life raft can be done, but
most strobe lights are powered by re- especially at night. An orange smoke flare tremendous skill is required. In those cir-
placeable alkaline batteries. may help the crew see the life raft more cumstances, the crew may expect you to
readily and provide them with some basic jump into the water and to swim to a rope
“Portable strobe lights are relatively in- information about the wind at sea level. ladder, which you climb to the deck.
expensive and lightweight,” said Burton.
“Attracting attention of passing vessels “Equipped with a marine transceiver, the “Get a safety line secured to the life raft,
is important, but most important, the survivors will be able to communicate with lots of slack to allow for the motion
strobe light — or any light — will be with the helicopter crew. If not, a trans- of the waves and the ship, to prevent the
visible to SAR personnel who will be ceiver might be dropped to the life raft, life raft from drifting too far from the
looking for anything that might be a or a rescue swimmer will be dropped into ship. Ask for a second safety line from
signal from a life raft.” the water. The rescue swimmer will swim the deck that could be used to help you
to the life raft and issue instructions. get to the ladder. Tie it securely around
Listen to him. Do what he says. The raft your waist. Struggling in the water to
Rescue commander should advise the swimmer reach the ladder could be exhausting,
of any of the survivors’ physical, emo- so that safety line could be very helpful.
A rescue likely will be completed by a tional or medical problems, especially any Add rough weather conditions to a steel
helicopter or a ship. If by a helicopter, that might influence the rescue.” mass that could easily flatten the life raft
trained rescuers probably will be con- and its occupants, and this type of rescue
ducting the rescue. If the survivors are several hundred miles becomes very dangerous.
from land, there is a high likelihood that
“Off the coasts of the United States, if the the rescue will be conducted by a com- “If the ship has a small motor vessel that
life raft is within the range of a helicopter, mercial ship’s crew who probably have can be launched, the rescue could be far
the survivors likely will be rescued by U.S. not been trained or been equipped to safer. They launch the vessel, which will
Coast Guard personnel who are trained rescue survivors from a life raft. be easier to board from the life raft. Then
and experienced professionals,” said you ask to remain aboard while the vessel
Burton. “That’s good for the survivors. “Rescue under these circumstances could is hoisted aboard the ship. Most likely,
be one of the most dangerous phases of you will remain aboard the ship until
“When the helicopter arrives on the the entire period since the ditching,” it reaches its destination. Now you’re a
scene, be sure not to fire flares or shine said Burton. “Maneuvering a large ship survivor.” 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• A passenger might say “we have a life raft” (which also may express his total knowledge of life rafts),
as if the life raft is ready to appear magically to rescue survivors from disaster. It can’t.

• We cannot overemphasize the importance of in-the-water training (pools and open water) as the most
effective means of preparing flight crews and cabin crews to learn how to use a life raft and its associated
equipment.

• Learn from the manufacturer exactly what is included with the life raft and its survival equipment pack.

• Pack a separate durable, buoyant and waterproof ditch bag with other essential equipment and ensure that
it will arrive at the life raft after a ditching.

• The life raft commander will inspire confidence by his understanding of the life raft and its equipment,
while providing firm but caring leadership to the survivors, all of whom (unless seriously ill/injured)
must participate in completing tasks to survive until rescue.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 175
 Su r v i va l

Notes rescued by the crew of a Costa Rican coast guard

boat less than 10 nm off the coast. (Butler, Bill;
  1. On Nov. 23, 1942, German U-boats torpedoed the Butler, Simonne. Our Last Chance. Coral Gables,
British ship Benlomond, which sank in the Atlantic Florida, U.S.: 1991.)
Ocean in two minutes. The sole survivor was a
second steward, Poon Lim, who, with no knowledge   2. Eternity Flashlights, P.O. Box 4066, Annapolis,
of the sea and no survival rations or water, survived Maryland 21403 U.S.
for 133 days on a small wooden raft by eating fish
  3. Williams, David. E-mail communication with Rozelle,
and birds and drinking rain water. He was rescued
Roger. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. June 19, 2004. Flight
by a Brazilian fishing family off the coast of Brazil
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
near the mouth of the Amazon River. (McCunn,
Ruthanne Lum. Sole Survivor. Boston, Massachusetts,   4. Hinz, Earl. Heavy Weather Tactics Using Sea Anchors
U.S.: Beacon Press, 1985.) & Drogues. Arcata, California, U.S.: Paradise Cay
Publications, 2000.
On June 15, 1972, the 43-foot (13-meter) schoo-
ner Lucette was struck by killer whales and sank   5. Shewmon, Daniel. The Sea Anchor & Drogue
60 seconds later about 180 nautical miles west of Handbook. 1998. Shewmon Inc., 1000 Harbor Lake
the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific Ocean. Dougal Drive, Safety Harbor, Florida 34695-2310, U.S.
Robertson, his wife, his 18-year-old son and two
12-year-old boys and a family friend, a teenaged boy,   6. Rescue Technologies Corp., 99-1350 Koaha Place,
were equipped with rations and water for only three Aiea, Hawaii 96701 U.S.
days. The six of them survived for 37 days before   7. Greatland Laser, 4001 W. International Airport
the crew of a Japanese fishing boat saw their 10-foot Road #2, Anchorage, Alaska 99502 U.S.
[three-meter] dinghy and rescued them about 290 <greatlandlaser.com>. The company provided a
nm from Costa Rica. (Robertson, Dougal. Survive Magnum model that was tested by FSF editorial
the Savage Sea. New York, New York, U.S.: Praeger staff.
Publishers, 1973.)

On March 4, 1973, the 31-foot (nine-meter) sailboat

Auralyn was 300 nm east of the Galapagos Islands,
Additional Notes
when the vessel was struck by a sperm whale and
Burton, Ken; president, STARK Survival Co.,
sank an hour later. Maurice Bailey and his wife,
6227 E. Highway 98, Panama City, Florida 32303
Maralyn, survived 117 days before they were rescued
<starksurvival.com>. Interviews by Rozelle, Roger,
in the Pacific Ocean by the crew of a Korean fishing
during training program. Panama City, Florida, U.S.
boat about 1,500 nm northwest of where the Auralyn
Oct. 22–26, 2002.
sank. (Bailey, Maurice. Staying Alive. Ballantine
Books, 1975.) Resch, Dean; former U.S. Army helicopter pilot/
instructor and retired U.S. Federal Aviation
On Feb. 4, 1982, the 21-foot (six-meter) sailboat
Administration safety specialist who participated
Napoleon Solo, built by Steven Callahan, struck an
in the STARK Survival Co. training program and
object in the Atlantic Ocean, 1,800 nm northwest of
provided a fast boat for photography in the Gulf of
the Cape Verde Islands. The boat sank in less than
Mexico. Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. Panama City,
a minute. Callahan, alone on the sailboat, survived
Florida, U.S. Oct. 22–26, 2002.
76 days aboard his life raft before being rescued by
fishermen near the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe. McLendon, Capt. Jerry, and the crew of Double Time,
(Callahan, Steven. Adrift. Boston, Massachusetts, a 52-foot (16-meter) dive boat provided for in-water
U.S.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986.) STARK Survival Co. training program in the Gulf of
Mexico. Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. Panama City,
On June 15, 1989, the 38-foot (12-meter) sailboat
Florida, U.S. Oct. 25, 2002.
Siboney was struck by pilot whales in the Pacific
Ocean 1,200 nm west of Panama and sank about Burton. Telephone interviews by Rozelle, Roger.
30 minutes later. Bill Butler and Simonne Butler Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Jan. 26–29, 2004. Flight
survived 66 days aboard their life raft before being Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

176 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

‘Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor

Any Drop to Drink … ’
But when Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner was published in
1798, there was no such thing as a manual reverse-osmosis desalinator,
which converts seawater into safe drinking water.

— FSF Editorial Staff

H
umans can live for several weeks equipment designed to make seawater drinkable,
without food but only several days or both (see “For Ditching Survival, Start With
without water. In a life raft, obtain- Regulations, But Don’t Stop There,” page 395).
ing an adequate supply of safe drink-
ing water is a primary concern for survival; food For example, U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations
is secondary (see “Is There a Doctor Aboard the (FARs) Part 135 (“Commuter and On-demand
Life Raft?” page 187). Operations”) says that operators have the option
of including either of the following:
Civil aviation authorities typically recommend
that life rafts carry a small amount of packaged • A survival kit that contains — for each two
water (about 1.0 pint [0.5 liter] per person)1 or people that the aircraft’s life raft is rated to

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 177
 Su r v i va l

carry — 2.0 pints (1.1 liters) of water or one and survival-training instructor for the U.S.
seawater desalting kit; or, Federal Aviation Administration Civil Aerospace
Medical Institute.5 If an empty water container is
• A survival kit that is “appropriately equipped being stored “with the intent of using it to collect
for the route to be flown” — a phrase that water in a survival situation,” that container also
includes no specific mention of water. should be flexible so that it will require less space
in a life raft SEP or ditch bag, Storey said.
Part 91 (“General Operating and Flight Rules”)
does not specify how much water or desalting Ray E. Smith, a U.S. Navy survival-training
equipment should be carried; instead, it says that specialist, said that survivors should think of
aircraft must contain a survival kit “appropriately their packaged water as a reserve supply, to be
equipped for the route to be flown.” saved for use when other sources of water are
not available.6
Some operators might construe the absence of
specific information in the regulations as carte One of those other sources is seawater that has
blanche to carry a minimal amount of water been made drinkable by a manual reverse-osmosis
(see “Regulations, Judgment Affect Overwater desalinator, which can be used to desalinate about
Equipment Decisions,” page 387). 1.0 quart (0.9 liter) to more than 1.0 gallon (3.8
liters) of water per hour, depending on pump size
Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) Part (see “Making Seawater Drinkable in Just a Few
Manual reverse- 725.95 requires life rafts to be equipped with “a Strokes,” page 179). Reverse-osmosis desalinators
osmosis desalinators, two-day supply of water, calculated using the function by pumping seawater under pressure
such as Katadyn’s overload capacity of the raft, consisting of one through a semipermeable membrane that removes
Survivor-06 pint of water per day for each person or a means salt and other contaminants, including bacteria
hand-operated water of desalting or distilling salt water sufficient to and many viruses, leaving drinkable water.7
maker, left, and
provide an equivalent amount.”
Storey said that the device is “a must” for survivors
chemical desalting kits
Water packaged for use on life rafts usually is on a life raft; Smith agreed.
are used to remove salt
available in aseptic (free of disease-causing mi-
from seawater, making croorganisms) containers or flexible pouches “Pumping is the most reliable means of ensuring
it safe for drinking. containing sterile (without microbial growth) that you’ll have all the water you need,” Smith
emergency drinking water said. “Supply is unlimited, as long as you’re
with a five-year usable pumping.”
life. Each container holds
about four ounces (118 Bill Butler, who with his wife, Simonne, survived
milliliters) or eight ounces 66 days adrift on a life raft in the Pacific Ocean
(237 milliliters).2,3,4 after a collision with whales sank their sailboat on
June 15, 1989, credited a manual reverse-osmosis
Both types of containers desalinator with helping save their lives.8 The
are designed with several desalinator they used was Katadyn’s Survivor-35
layers of packaging to hold hand-operated water maker, which weighs seven
sterile water within an air- pounds (3.2 kilograms), desalinates about 1.2
tight, light-resistant sterile gallons (4.5 liters) of water per hour and sells for
container. about US$1,500. A smaller model, the Survivor-06
hand-operated water maker, weighs 2.5 pounds
Aseptic containers prob- (1.1 kilograms), desalinates about one quart of
ably are easier to store water per hour and sells for about $600.
inside an aircraft, if space
is adequate. If the water In their book, Our Last Chance: Sixty-six Deadly
containers must fit into Days Adrift, Bill Butler wrote that they had con-
a life raft survival equipment pack (SEP) or a sumed most of their stored water before he de-
ditch bag, flexible pouches probably are a better cided, on their eighth day in the life raft, to “check
choice, said Roger Storey, aviation physiologist Continued on page 180

178 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Making Seawater Drinkable in Just a Few Strokes

F
or a thirsty survivor in a life raft, get- A laminated sheet of instructions attached
ting water from a manual reverse- to the Survivor-06 hand-operated water
osmosis desalinator like Katadyn’s maker’s tether line tells users how to oper-
Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker ate the device and also provides storage
isn’t quite as easy as turning on a faucet, instructions and important precautions.
but it’s close (Photo 1). Several first-time users read the instruc-
tions and found them confusing in one
respect: Neither the instructions nor the
accompanying unlabeled diagram clearly
identified which of the water maker’s three
hoses was the “product hose” from which
2
they would obtain fresh water.
hoses can be placed in an onboard con-
The confusion was resolved by looking at tainer of seawater.)
a more complete diagram in the operating
manual, which shows that the product hose After about one minute of pumping, the first
is separate from the attached intake/reject drops fell into the glass. Those drops, along
hoses. The approximately four-foot-long with the other water pumped during the
(one-meter-long) product hose emerges first two minutes, were discarded, accord-
from the water maker’s end cap; the intake/ ing to instructions, because Katadyn said
reject hoses (both about 6.6 feet [2.0 me- that the first water to be pumped contains
ters] long) are attached hoses that emerge the biocide solution used by the factory to
from the body of the water maker. The tips prevent the growth of bacteria within the
of both the product hose and the reject hose water maker. Then the product hose was
are protected by small red caps when the repositioned to allow pumping to resume
1 water maker is not in use; at the end of the and water to be collected in the glass.
intake hose is a black water strainer.
Each person took a turn operating the
Katadyn describes the Survivor-06 wa- The manual comprises about five pages of water maker, positioning the left hand
ter maker as the smallest hand-operated instructions in each of 11 languages, plus under the water maker’s end cap and the
water maker in the world. The stainless eight blank pages for notes. The manual right hand over the end of the handle and
steel and plastic device weighs 2.5 was included in the box in which the water pumping the handle up and down, as far
pounds (1.1 kilograms), measures 5.0 maker was delivered, but — even if the as it would go in each direction, trying to
inches by 8.0 inches by 2.5 inches manual was available on the life raft when achieve the manufacturer’s recommended
(12.7 centimeters by 20.3 centimeters the water maker was in use — it likely 40 strokes per minute.
by 6.4 centimeters) and can produce would not remain readable very long in
more than six gallons (23 liters) of fresh the wet environment because it is printed Pumping was not difficult — but not effort-
drinking water a day, the manufacturer on non-laminated paper. less, either — and after just a few minutes,
says. A tether sold with the water maker some of those who pumped were ready
— when secured correctly — prevents As instructed, the water maker’s users for a break.
the water maker from becoming sepa- positioned the black strainer, the accom-
rated from the life raft. panying weight and the attached intake/ “There is resistance in the machine, so it
reject hoses (Photo 2) in a vase containing requires an effort to pump it,” one person
Katadyn says that the Survivor-06 hand- seawater taken from the Atlantic Ocean said.
operated water maker works this way: “A during a colleague’s vacation in Florida;
semipermeable membrane inside the unit the product hose was positioned to al- Nevertheless, during his first two minutes,
acts as a molecular filter. When seawater is low fresh water to drip into a glass. (The he pumped nearly two ounces (59 milliliters)
pressurized to 800 psi [pounds per square intake/reject hoses are long enough to of drinking water — more than the typical
inch] (about 55 bar) by pumping the handle hang over the side of a life raft to draw wa- amount, presumably because his pumping
and [is] forced against the membrane, only ter directly from the ocean. Nevertheless, if speed was faster than recommended.
the water molecules can pass through. Salt survivors prefer — because of rough seas
molecules are unable to pass and flow out or because large fish might mistake the The users surmised that pumping
of the system.” plastic filter for a meal — the intake/reject presumably would be more difficult for

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 179
 Su r v i va l

survivors in a life raft, especially if they were to prevent seawater from becoming stag- of biocide solution (purchased separately)
on rough water or if they were weakened nant inside the device. Customer service through the system. The water maker
by seasickness. representative Nate Mueller said that the should be allowed to dry thoroughly and
goal is to prevent any buildup of microbes then should be stored. The biocide treat-
Another user expressed concern that, de- or mineral deposits that might clog the ment, if performed according to directions,
spite an attached weight, the lightweight membrane or hoses.1 Such a buildup is should be adequate for three years — just
hose and strainer might float in the water; if unlikely after just one day without pump- as it is if the treatment is performed by the
that occurs, attaching an additional weight ing, he said, but daily pumping is part of factory or by authorized service providers.
to the hose near the strainer should solve a “very conservative” plan for keeping the
the problem. water maker in good operating condition Otherwise, although the instructions say
on the life raft. that the device should be inspected an-
After others took their turns pumping, it nually, Katadyn North America said that in
was time for a drink. One person described Whenever the water maker will not be used 2004, it began recommending three-year
the water as “just fine”; others thought they for a couple of days — for example, if a service intervals for Survivor-06 hand-
detected a slight aftertaste — perhaps be- heavy rainfall has provided the survivors operated water makers that are stored
cause the purified water tasted different than with enough water to eliminate the need inside life rafts in a controlled environment
chemically treated tap water. Nevertheless, for daily pumping — seawater should be (see “Water Maker Maintenance Interval
everyone agreed, “Absolutely, that wouldn’t removed from it by removing the intake Clarified,” page 184). 
stop you from drinking it.” strainer and intake hose, turning the device
upside down and pumping the handle until — FSF Editorial Staff
The laminated instruction sheet says that a water no longer exits.
slight salt taste is normal but cautions against Note
drinking water with a “strong salt flavor.” After rescue, if survivors are able to take the
water maker with them as they leave the life   1. Mueller, Nate. Telephone interview
The instructions also say that, during raft and the water maker will not be used by Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria,
periods of prolonged use, the Survivor- again for at least seven days, it should be Virginia, U.S., Feb. 3, 2004. Flight
06 hand-operated water maker should cleaned by pumping one quart (one liter) Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
be pumped for at least 10 minutes a day of water containing about one spoonful Virginia, U.S.

out the water maker and His wife described the taste of the water as “first
see how it works. … class” and compared it with bottled water from
her native France.
“The body of the pump is
almost 2.0 feet [0.6 meter] “The knowledge that we could drink any quantity
long and has a two-foot of fresh water we wished gave us peace of mind
handle attached to one with which to cope with the many other facets of
end,” he said. “As I stroke survival,” Butler said.
the handle and salt water is
sucked in from the sea, the In addition to supplying drinkable water, manual
pressure needed to move reverse-osmosis desalinators have another benefit,
the handle increases. After said Cmdr. J. Russell Bowman, D.O., a U.S. Coast
The Katadyn a dozen strokes, bubbles and finally water drips Guard flight surgeon in Sitka, Alaska.10
Survivor-35 from the small tube which [Simonne] holds over
hand-operated water the side until the water is clear. “Pumping is a labor-intensive process, but it keeps
maker (also known your mind on something while you’re waiting for
as a manual reverse- “I put the tube in my mouth while I continue to help,” he said.
pump. The water is salty at first, but 10 strokes
osmosis desalinator,
later, the water becomes sweet and pure.”9 Another water-collection method is the solar still, an
can desalinate 1.2
inflatable floating device with an outer layer of clear
gallons (4.5 liters) of Each liter of water required 20 minutes of pump- plastic and an inner layer of dark, absorbent material.
water per hour. ing, at a rate of one stroke of the pump per second; Solar stills sell for about $150 to $200. As sunlight
40 minutes of pumping produced a day’s supply passes through the clear plastic, the inner material
of water, he wrote. is warmed. After this inner material is wetted with

180 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

seawater, the water evaporates; then the water vapor The kits must be inspected every five years.
pressure increases in the air between the plastic and Nevertheless, they can be expected to last indefinitely,
the dark material; the water vapor condenses on the as long as the briquettes remain properly sealed, said
inner surface of the clear plastic and drips into a col- Prozzillo, who has a number of World War II-era
lection area that can be drained periodically.11 desalting kits that appear to be in good condition.

Cold-water survival specialists Frank Golden and Richard Brower, president of Life Support
Michael Tipton said that, in theory, the concept of International of Bristol, Pennsylvania, U.S., another
the solar still is excellent, but “their practical per- distributor, said that, if he were assembling supplies
formance at sea is extremely poor. The movement for an aviation life raft that he might use himself, “I
of the stills in a seaway makes it extremely difficult personally think I would use a mix of [packaged]
to prevent saltwater contamination of the collected water and desalters, and I would spend my money
moisture in some [types of solar stills].”12 on good electronics,” including communication ra-
dios, personal locator beacons and a satellite cellular
Smith said that the solar stills he has used were telephone to be used to attract rescuers.
effective, although they functioned poorly in
rough seas. His supplies would include enough prepackaged
water for the first 24 hours and desalting kits to
Steven Callahan, who survived 76 days adrift in provide water for an additional 48 hours, he said.
an inflatable life raft after his sloop sank in the
Atlantic Ocean, west of the Canary Islands, said Desalting kits similar to those in use today were
in Adrift, his book about the experience, that two routinely issued to soldiers and sailors during the
solar stills failed before he performed modifica- last two years of World War II. Each kit produced
tions that allowed him to place a solar still on 10 times its weight in water.16
his life raft, rather than in the ocean. With those
modifications, Callahan collected about 20 ounces A report originally published in the 1950s about
(0.6 liter) of drinkable water a day.13 a study of 2,500 accounts by military airmen of
survival at sea after bailing out of an aircraft or
Chemical desalting kits are another method of ditching said that most narratives mentioned de-
making seawater drinkable (see “With a Little salting kits without comment, “which would leave
Agitation, Desalting Kits Yield Drinkable Water,” one to believe they worked satisfactorily.”
page 182). The kits contain a plastic bag for col-
lecting seawater and six or eight clay “briquettes” The study said, however, that “some dissatisfaction
embedded with particles of silver zeolite. When a was expressed” — often when the men tried to
briquette is added to the seawater in the bag, the use the same briquette to desalinate more water
chemical reaction involving silver zeolite and sea than directed.
salt removes the salt from the water. The silver
zeolite is dissolved during the mixing process. “The survivors’ usual practice was to drink a little,
The kits, manufactured by Van Ben Industries, a then add more seawater,” the
division of Truetech of Riverhead, New York, U.S., report said. “A few tried to drink
sell for about $200.14,15 the water from the top of the bag
instead of through the filter, as

“S
“It tastes a little salty, and it [may look] very slight- prescribed in the instructions.
ly brownish, but it’s drinkable,” said Fred Prozzillo, One survivor who lost his spare
president of Aviation-Marine Specialty Products briquettes when his raft [was] up- [ olar stills’]
of Pipersville, Pennsylvania, U.S., a distributor of set used the remaining briquette
the desalting kits. practical performance
several times. When rescued, he
was delirious and suffering from
at sea is
“Most of the time, the water is clear as it comes the effects of drinking salt water.
through the filter bag,” he said. “Some salt is in-
extremely poor.”
tentionally left in the water to compensate for “Several survivors remarked
perspiration losses. If a less salty taste is desired, a that the time it took to produce
smaller amount of water can be used in the bag.” Continued on page 183

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 181
 Su r v i va l

With a Little Agitation, Desalting Kits Yield Drinkable Water

C
arefully following instructions, sur- ounces, or one-half liter) of drinking water.
vivors in a life raft can use chemical The bag can be tied to the life raft with a
desalting kits to make seawater fit length of attached material to prevent it from
to drink. being washed overboard; an attached cord
can be used to secure the box.
The kits, manufactured by Van Ben
Industries, a division of Truetech of Instructions printed on the outside of
Riverhead, New York, U.S., are packaged the orange box explain how the process
in orange plastic boxes that weigh slightly works: “Each pack of chemical, when
more than 1.0 pound (0.5 kilogram) and mixed with seawater in the plastic bag,
measure 4.5 inches by 4.5 inches by 2.0 makes about one pint of drinking water.
inches (11.4 centimeters by 11.4 centime- The mixture of seawater and chemical ap-
ters by 5.1 centimeters). The kits contain pears muddy. Filter at bottom of the bag
either six packages or eight packages of holds back all sediment. Only pure water
desalting chemicals (clay “briquettes” con- can come out through this filter.”
taining particles of silver zeolite), one plastic
bag for collecting seawater, and tape to For these articles, several people used a
mend the bag in the event of a tear (Photo desalting kit, which was supplied by a life-
1). Each package of two briquettes (Photo raft manufacturer. The date stamped on the
2) can be used to make about one pint (16 outside of the box was 1989; inside, the
labels on each package of briquettes said 3
that they were packed in 1987 — still good
because of the briquettes’ indefinite shelf pulverize [the] chemical by kneading gently
life. The kit’s users followed the detailed until dissolved.”
instructions printed on the bag, which had
a greasy film on the inside and outside and There was no avoiding the step that fol-
a strip of what appeared to be brittle, yel- lowed: “Agitate bag gently for 60 minutes.”
lowed cellophane tape at the top. The kit’s users took turns shaking the bag
at intervals of about five minutes each — a
A package of two briquettes and slightly somewhat tedious process, they agreed,
less than one pint of seawater (obtained but as one person said, “If you were in a
from the Atlantic Ocean during a col-
1 league’s vacation in Florida) were placed
in the bag, which clearly shows — in two
ounce increments — how much water
it contains (Photo 3). The instructions
say that the water should be in the bag
before the briquettes are added, but for
photographic purposes, the kit’s users re-
versed the order. The instructions allowed
for a full pint but included an explanation
that using the full amount of water would
“leave a little salt in the desalted water to
compensate for perspiration losses. If you
desire it less salty, fill the bag to about an
inch [2.5 centimeters] below the filling line
[which marks about one pint.]”

As instructed, the top of the bag was fold-

ed and snapped in place for a watertight
seal. The briquettes dissolved quickly in
the water, eliminating the need for the next
2 4
step in the instructions — to “if necessary,

182 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

life raft with nothing else to do, this would should be rinsed in seawater to remove • The desalting kit weighs slightly
fill the time.” the desalting chemicals. Then the bag more than one pound (0.5 kilo-
can be reused to make the next batch of gram) and measures 4.5 inches
After an hour, the water inside the bag was drinking water. by 4.5 inches by 2.0 inches (11.4
dark gray but ready to drink, according to centimeters by 11.4 centimeters
the instructions (Photo 4). The small valve In the event the bag is punctured or torn, the by 5.1 centimeters); the Survivor-
at the bottom of the bag was unscrewed instructions say that the affected area should 06 hand-operated water maker
over a glass and the bag was squeezed be dried and patched using the mending weighs 2.5 pounds (1.1 kilograms)
to push out the first few drops, which also tape included in the box. If the bag is dam- and measures 5.0 inches by 8.0
were gray. Quickly, however, the water aged beyond repair or lost, the box itself can inches by 2.5 inches (12.7 centi-
emerging from the bag was clear and the be used instead. Instructions on the box say meters by 20.3 centimeters by 6.4
valve was positioned over clean glasses to that it should be filled with seawater to a centimeters),
give each of the kit’s users an ounce (30 level designated inside; after a package of
milliliters) or so to taste. briquettes is added to the water, the mix- • One package of desalting chemicals,
ture should be stirred or shaken gently (if agitated in seawater for 60 minutes,
“There’s nothing wrong with it; there’s really shaken, the box should be held upright, according to instructions, produce
no flavor at all,” one person said. because the cover is not watertight) for one about one pint (16 ounces; 0.5 liter)
hour. Then, before drinking, the water should of water; pumping a Survivor-06
Others detected a peculiar taste, and be poured through a piece of cloth to remove hand-operated water maker for 60
even the first person said later that he had the desalting chemicals. minutes at 40 strokes per minutes,
noticed a slight aftertaste for several hours according to instructions, produces
after the water-tasting session. The instructions also caution that the about 30 ounces (0.9 quart; 0.9
plastic bag becomes brittle in very cold liter).
The taste was not so unpleasant that temperatures and should be soaked in
anyone would have been deterred from seawater before it is unfolded. • A desalting kit with eight packages of
drinking if they had been in a life raft. briquettes produces about 8.0 pints
The chemical desalting kit and Katadyn’s (128 ounces; 3.8 liters) of water;
“Out there on the ocean, it wouldn’t mat- Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker the water maker produces about
ter,” one person said. (also known as a manual reverse-osmo- 30 ounces an hour for an unlimited
sis desalinator; see “Making Seawater period. 
After all drinking water has been con- Drinkable in Just a Few Strokes, page
sumed, the instructions say that the bag 179) can be compared this way: — FSF Editorial Staff

drinkable water with the desalting kit recount how anxiously it was awaited. to rid them of accumulated salt crystals.
made little difference because it gave Almost as numerous, by contrast, are the Saltwater residue will contaminate the
them something to do. Some complained stories where the survivors have forgotten first of the rainwater, but the concentra-
the kits produced too little water, others or disregarded the chores that have to be tion of salt will be less than the concen-
deplored its odor. Because survivors com- done to take full advantage of rain. One tration of salt in seawater; if a container
monly tied the filled desalting kit overside has to realize that it is not just a question is filled more than once, subsequent col-
to keep it cool, it was often the only water of opening one’s jaws wide — that only lections of water will be uncontaminated
saved after capsizing.” provides a square inch or two of collecting by salt.18,19
surface.”17
Some aviation life rafts have a built-in
Preparations Allow Long before a rainfall, survivors should water collector that funnels water into a
Survivors to Take Full begin their preparations for collecting plastic bag for storage. SAE International
Advantage of Rainwater rainwater, Robin said. They should plan re co m m e n d s , i n i t s Ae ro s p a ce
to spread canvas or plastic, including Recommended Practice (ARP) 1356, Life

R ain often has been a primary source

of fresh water for life raft survivors.
plastic bags, to make a large surface on
which water can be collected; the water
then can be poured into all available
Rafts, that every life raft be equipped with
“a means for the collection and storage
of rainwater.”20
“The first rain [after boarding a life raft] cans, bottles and plastic bags. Before
has almost always proved a saving grace,” they are used for collecting water, the Survivors should drink as much rainwa-
Bernard Robin, a physician, sailor and au- canvas, plastic and other collection ter as they want and then should save as
thor, wrote in Survival at Sea. “Most tales surfaces should be rinsed with seawater much as possible, Smith said.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 183
 Su r v i va l

Water Maker Maintenance Interval Clarified

F
or survivors who must spend more Survivors had one-year service intervals. device to remove any biocide preserva-
than a few hours in a life raft at sea, a We were being conservative. But as more tive that was used to prevent biological
source of drinkable water becomes Survivor water makers were stored inside growth. The water flow is tested to ensure
essential. Drinkable water can be obtained life rafts in a controlled environment, our that it meets output specifications. The
from pouches in the survival equipment service experience indicated that a longer desalinization is then measured. The
pack (SEP), a solar still or chemical de- interval was acceptable and provided ad- manufacturer said that although the
salting kits. But the preferred source is a equate safety guidelines. official specification is 1,500 parts per
manual reverse-osmosis desalinator (see million (ppm) salt, the company’s internal
“Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor Any Drop “So we ‘unofficially’ became more flexible, guideline is 1,000 ppm. From time to time,
to Drink …” page 177). because life raft companies understand- a membrane, pump body, or rubber com-
ably wanted our servicing to match their ponents such as o-rings and seals may
The standard manual reverse-osmosis de- recommended frequency of inspection. In need replacement. “Even a Survivor unit
salinator offered by life raft manufacturers 2003, we completed an analysis of about that has gone without servicing past the
is the Katadyn (pronounced “CAT-a-dine”) 7,000 military units that have been ser- recommended time won’t stop working,”
Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker. viced, which supported that extending the said Lizee. “Typically, the freshwater out-
(The Survivor-06 water maker was formerly service guidelines to three years provides put might be a little reduced.”1
marketed by PUR/Recovery Engineering, adequate frequency.” (Katadyn continues
which Katadyn acquired in 2001). In the to recommend annual service for units Katadyn authorizes life raft companies to
unit, a hand-operated pump forces salt stored outside life rafts.) perform Survivor-06 hand-operated wa-
water through a semipermeable membrane ter maker maintenance, so that the water
that water molecules can flow through but This latest information from Katadyn re- maker can be serviced at the same time
salt molecules cannot penetrate. solves a controversy among life raft manu- as the life raft. 
facturers, some of whom believed that they
The instruction booklet that came with a had been placed in an unfair competitive — FSF Editorial Staff
sample model of the Survivor-06 hand- position against other life raft manufacturers
operated water maker says, “For your safety, that had recommended a three-year ser- Note
we require that an inspection be completed vice interval for the water maker — despite
once a year.” Katadyn’s previous recommendation of a   1. Lizee, Alan. E-mail communications
one-year service interval. with Darby, Rick. Alexandria,
Beginning in 2004, Katadyn “will officially Virginia, U.S., Nov. 10, 2003,
recommend three-year service intervals,” Standard maintenance for the Katadyn and Nov. 25, 2003. Flight Safety
said Alan Lizee, president, Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
North America. “Historically, non-military includes pumping water through the U.S.

Any rainwater contaminated by salt — and any probably will not be pleasant, the water will be
fresh rainwater that has acquired a foul smell drinkable.21
or foul taste — should be saved for other pur-
poses, such as cleaning wounds and rinsing skin.
(Because of the presence of bacteria, seawater Survival Rations
should not be used in the thorough cleansing Are Preferred Food
of wounds; nevertheless, it can be used to rinse
foreign particles from wounds and to rinse the
skin.) S ome civil aviation authorities recommend that a
small quantity of survival rations be packed into
life rafts — usually packaged food bars designed to
Small amounts of water can be collected by us- meet survivors’ basic nutritional needs. For example,
ing a sponge from the survival equipment to FARs Part 135 says that aircraft flown in air taxi and
mop up condensation that collects inside the life commercial operations must carry either a survival
raft. (The sponge should be stored in a plastic kit “appropriately equipped for the route to be flown”
bag to prevent it from becoming contaminated or a kit containing a number of specific items, includ-
with seawater.) Although the water may have ing “a two-day supply of emergency food rations sup-
acquired the flavor of the sponge and the taste plying at least 1,000 calories per day for each person.”

184 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Part 91, however, says that general aviation aircraft food ration specifically formulated to provide a bal-
must contain a survival kit “appropriately equipped anced minimum-daily diet (with critical drinking-
for the route to be flown.” water restriction) for aviation survival situations.”
For infants or injured people, the product can be
As is the case with the water, some operators might “mixed with liquids for drinking or mashed into a
construe the absence of specific information in the porridge,” the company says.22
regulations about food as carte blanche to carry a
minimal amount of food. Smith said, “If survivors have a choice between
survival rations or fish, they should choose sur-
Regardless of the type or amount of food available, vival rations, which would have more balanced
survivors should eat only if they have an adequate nutrition. They’d also be a lot more palatable to
supply of drinking water because the digestive eat than a raw fish.”
process increases the body’s requirements for
water. The body converts stored fat and protein Some survival manuals include instructions for
into glucose, allowing most people to survive catching fish and birds, and typical survival kits
for several weeks without food. Nevertheless, if include minimal fishing equipment. Fishing and
survivors eat, they should choose carbohydrates catching birds are unlikely to be necessary if rescue
rather than protein because carbohydrates require occurs within several days.
less water for digestion.
Storey said that, even with the equipment included
Specially formulated survival rations — typically in the survival kit, “the task of catching fish or birds
wheat-based carbohydrate bars with added vitamins will be difficult at best” and should be attempted
and a usable life of five years — are the preferred only after all packaged survival rations have been
food, survival specialists said. Survival rations are consumed.
formulated so that they will not stimulate thirst, a
problem with the candy that in the past was included Nevertheless, the process of catching food might
in SEPs; to be stored in all climatic conditions; and have another benefit.
to fulfill basic nutritional requirements.
Storey said, “It can provide a useful diversion,
For example, S.O.S. Food Lab describes its emergen- which, in itself, may add to a positive mental
cy food as a “compact, lightweight baked ­survival attitude.” 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Drink water when you’re thirsty, but don’t guzzle.

• A life raft survivor can live by drinking about one cup of water — sometimes less
— per day.

• Without drinking water, survivors likely will die within three to five days, but they can
survive weeks without food.

• Packaged water and desalting kits provide a limited amount of drinking water, but
the most reliable source of an ongoing supply of water at sea is a hand-operated water
maker (also known as a manual reverse-osmosis desalinator). As far as we know,
Katadyn is the only manufacturer of these devices.

• Preparations for collecting rainwater should begin long before the first rain.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 185
 Su r v i va l

Notes 14. Prozzillo, Fred. Telephone interview and e-

mail correspondence with Werfelman, Linda.
  1. Although people usually are told to drink about Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., Sept. 5, 2003; Oct.
2.0 quarts (1.9 liters) of water a day under normal 17, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
conditions, cold water survival specialists Frank Virginia, U.S.
Golden and Michael Tipton said in Essentials of Sea
Survival (Champaign, Illinois, U.S.: Human Kinetics, 15. Brower, Richard. Telephone interview with
2002) that people can survive by drinking as little as Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., Feb. 2,
3.7 ounces to 7.4 ounces (110 milliliters to 220 mil- 2004. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
liliters) a day. U.S.

  2. AquaBlox. Product Overview. <www.aquablox.com/ 16. Llano, George Albert. Airmen Against the Sea.
Product_Overview/product_overview.html>. Oct. 1, Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center
2002. (ADTIC), Research Studies Institute, U.S. Air
Force. ADTIC Publication G-104. 1955. The
  3. S.O.S. Food Lab. Aviation: For Use in Aircraft Life preface said that the report was “the fourth in a
Rafts. <www.sos-rations.com/AVIATION.HTM>. series of ADTIC studies to determine how military
Aug. 19, 2003. personnel survived under emergency conditions
  4. Survivor Industries. Emergency Water Packets. in various parts of the world.” The series included
<www.survivorind.com/water.html>. Aug. 19, 2003. 999 Survived (Southwest Pacific tropics), Sun, Sand
and Survival (African deserts) and Down in the
  5. Storey, Roger. Telephone interview and e-mail com- North (Arctic). Most of the information in Airmen
munication with Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, Against the Sea was obtained from records of the
Virginia, U.S., July 10, 2003; Aug. 22, 2003. Flight U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy; the publication
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. also includes information from records of the air
forces of Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany and
  6. Smith, Ray E. Telephone interview with Werfelman,
New Zealand, and from other sources. The report
Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., April 18, 2003.
is based on information gathered from airmen
Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
who survived ditching or bailing out of airplanes
  7. Katadyn. The World’s Smallest Desalinators. mostly during World War II and to a lesser extent
www.army-technology.com/contractors/field/ during the Korean War and the early 1950s. “The
katadyn/press2.html. Feb. 14, 2003. most valuable and informative material was found
in the firsthand accounts written by the survivors
  8. Butler, Bill; Butler, Simonne. Our Last Chance: Sixty- themselves,” the report said.
six Deadly Days Adrift. Miami, Florida, U.S.: Exmart
Press, 1991. 17. Robin, Bernard. “The Battle Against Thirst.”
Survival at Sea. Chapter 32. Camden, Maine, U.S.:
  9. Ibid. International Marine Publishing Co., 1981.
10. Bowman, J. Russell. Telephone interview by 18. Ibid.
Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., July 3,
2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, 19. Craighead, Frank C.; Craighead, John J.; Smith, Ray
U.S. E.; Jarvis, D. Shiras. How to Survive on Land and Sea.
Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press,
11. Golden, Frank; Tipton, Michael. “Necessities for 1984.
Sustained Survival: Water and Food.” Essentials of
Sea Survival. Chapter 8. Champaign, Illinois, U.S.: 20. SAE International. Aerospace Recommended
Human Kinetics, 2002. Practice (ARP) 1356. Warrendale, Pennsylvania, U.S.:
1990.
12. Ibid.
21. Golden, Tipton.
13. Callahan, Steven. Adrift. Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.:
Houghton Mifflin, 1986. 22. S.O.S. Food Lab.

186 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Is There a Doctor
Aboard the Life Raft?
Whether in a life raft or floating in the water, survivors must cope with a
variety of physical risks, including drowning, temperature-related ailments
and thirst. Survival will be influenced greatly by their preparedness and
resourcefulness.

— FSF Editorial Staff

D
itchings1 and other water-contact In many circumstances, crewmembers and pas-
accidents present numerous risks sengers must cope with multiple risks simultane-
to survivors. Even those who safely ously — usually without much medical expertise
exit the aircraft and board a life raft and with only the rudimentary supplies that are
sometimes do not survive. packed in typical life raft first aid kits or the first
aid kits that sometimes can be salvaged from the
Survivors may die of drowning, cold shock (the aircraft.
body’s response to a sudden plunge into cold
water), hypothermia (an abnormally low body “It’s very dangerous out there,” said Roger
temperature), dehydration, injuries received in Storey, aviation physiologist and survival-
the accident, or one of a number of other ail- training instructor for the U.S. Federal Aviation
ments. Usually, sharks and other sea creatures are Administration (FAA) Civil Aerospace Medical
unobtrusive neighbors; nevertheless, they have the Institute (CAMI). “You’re in a raft out in the
potential to harm survivors (see “What’s Eating middle of nowhere; you just do what you can
You? It’s Probably Not a Shark,” page 211). do.”2

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 187
 Su r v i va l

Cold-water Immersion Can by insufficient blood flow and insufficient oxygen

Stop Survivors From Taking to the brain).5,6
Lifesaving Action
Sudden death directly caused by cold shock is rare
among people who are healthy; they are unlikely
S ometimes, the initial plunge into cold water
results in rapid physiological changes that can
cause death. This phenomenon is known as cold
to suffer problems with increased heart rate and
increased blood pressure. Nevertheless, they prob-
ably will be affected by the involuntary changes
shock, in which there is a sudden increase in the
in breathing that follow immersion in cold water.
rate of breathing, heartbeat and blood pressure.
The hyperventilation that follows cold-water
Cold shock occurs when the water temperature is
immersion causes a decrease in carbon dioxide in
below about 59 degrees Fahrenheit (F; 15 degrees
the blood, resulting in constriction of blood vessels
Celsius [C]), although people who are unaccus-
in the brain, inadequate blood flow and confusion,
tomed to cold water may experience problems
loss of coordination, fainting and drowning.
with their circulation and breathing in water as
warm as 77 degrees F (25 degrees C).3 Large areas
During the first few minutes in cold water, blood
of the world’s ocean waters are cooler than 77
flow increases to the brain and to vital organs in
degrees F.
the chest and abdomen; at the same time, blood
flow decreases to the skin and muscles. After about
Immediately after an individual’s immersion into five minutes, the survivor’s muscles are too stiff to
cold water, he or she may gasp involuntarily — a swim to safety, don a life vest, grip a rescue line or
response sometimes called the “gasp reflex” — and hold onto an object to stay afloat. After 15 minutes
then may hyperventilate for as long as one minute. to 20 minutes, the survivor may “attempt to swim
(Hyperventilation is usually marked by inap- to a distant shore or take off his [life vest],” Gill
propriately rapid breathing often associated with said. “Intense cold may destroy his will to live.”7
anxiety.)
The most dangerous reaction to cold shock prob-
Writing in The Onboard Medical Handbook, Paul ably is the reduction in an individual’s ability to
G. Gill Jr., M.D., said, “If you are under water hold his or her breath. Hyperventilation reduces
when you gasp, you may aspirate a large amount breath-holding ability from a normal average time
[as much as three quarts (three liters)] of water of 60 seconds to about 15 seconds to 25 seconds in
into your lungs and asphyxiate [die or become cold water — a complicating factor for someone
unconscious because of inadequate oxygen].”4 trying to escape from a sinking aircraft.8

Immersion in cold water also causes blood ves- Cold-water survival specialists Frank Golden,
sels below the skin’s surface to constrict (narrow), M.D., Ph.D., and Michael Tipton, Ph.D., writing
increasing not only the body’s resistance to the in Essentials of Sea Survival, cite U.S. Coast Guard
flow of blood toward and through those blood records of a 1973 boating accident in which eight
vessels but also the flow of blood returning to crewmembers were trapped in an air pocket be-
the heart. The heart beats faster, neath the boat.
blood pressure increases, and the
sudden stress causes hormones “Although it only involved a short underwater
to be secreted into the blood. As swim to escape, two of the crew were unable

“I ntense cold
a result, people with coronary
artery disease may experience
abnormal heart rhythms, which
to hold their breath long enough to do so and
drowned in the attempt,” they said.9

may destroy [the] may occur because of the rapid An example of the effects of several minutes in
cooling of the skin and because very cold water followed the Jan. 13, 1982, acci-
will to live.” of breath-holding while the face dent in which an Air Florida Boeing 737 struck a
is immersed in water; those with bridge and plunged into the Potomac River after
hypertension (high blood pres- departure from Washington (D.C., U.S.) National
sure) may experience a stroke Airport.10 Five of the 74 people in the airplane
(the death of brain tissue caused — four passengers and one cabin crewmember

188 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

— survived the accident and escaped from the air- After 20 minutes in the freez-
plane into the river, where they awaited rescue. ing water, I heard the beautiful

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB), in the final report on the accident, said
sound of an approaching heli-
copter. It was nearly impossible
for any of us to catch the rescue
“A s I clutched

that the temperature of the river water at the time rope and hold on while we were the wreckage and tried
of the accident was about 34 degrees F (one degree pulled to safety. Every survivor
C). Cold-water survival data show that half the was seriously injured, besides to stay above water, my
people exposed to water at that temperature for being weak and stiff from the
22 minutes to 35 minutes (the time period that the cold. After several tries, I was hands began to stick
survivors were in the river before being rescued) the second one of the survivors
typically lose consciousness.11 to be able to get the rescue rope to the cold metal.”
around me. …
All five survivors remained conscious; neverthe-
less, the report said that the water was so cold that As weak as I [had] felt in the
they lost the effective use of their hands; two of water and as panicked as I felt
the five were unable to “get themselves into the life in the water, I at no time felt like I was going
ring and/or the loop in the rescue rope that was to let go of that rope. … They had to pry the
dropped by the [rescue] helicopter crew.” They rope out of my hands when they got me over
also were unable to use their fingers to open the to shore.
plastic package containing the only life vest that
they were able to retrieve; they opened the pack- Fourteen years earlier, also in the Potomac River,
age by “chewing and tearing at it with their teeth,” nine men who had just completed two months
the report said. The surviving cabin crewmember to three months of U.S. Marine Corps training
inflated the life vest and gave it to the most seri- — including 20 hours of water-survival training
ously injured passenger. — to become military physical fitness instructors
apparently drowned when their canoe capsized. A
Later, the cabin crewmember, Kelly Duncan, de- published news report on the drownings said that
scribed the situation:12,13 the men had been dressed in full-length exercise
clothes and gym shoes and that they had seat-
I was disoriented. I didn’t know where I was. cushion flotation devices and no other gear.14
When I found myself in the water … when I
surfaced, I saw the tail of our airplane in the The water temperature was 36 degrees F (2 de-
water, and I was shocked. … I couldn’t swim grees C). Marine Corps officers said at the time
[because the water was numbingly cold], and that they believed that the paralyzing effects of
I panicked. … the cold water prevented the men from either
righting their canoe or swimming to shore. One
I clung to pieces of metal wreckage floating officer was quoted as saying, “Any one of these
nearby and tried to look for other survivors. guys could easily swim the river back and forth
The icy water made my entire body numb. in good weather.”

Other people floated near me, clutching at the The American Canoe Association, after citing the
cold metal and trying to stay afloat. … Marines’ experience in a subsequent newsletter,
said, “This is the bluntest of messages for all of us.
As I clutched the wreckage and tried to stay … Being able to swim in the warm waters of summer
above water, my hands began to stick to the has nothing to do with survival in cold water.”15
cold metal; I lifted them one at a time to keep
them from freezing. My elation at having sur-
vived the crash was replaced by the fear [that] Drowning Kills Most
I wouldn’t be rescued in time. … Ditching Survivors

The water was just so intensely cold. It hurt

because it was so cold. … M ost people who are “lost at sea,” as well
as most people in aircraft that have been

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 189
 Su r v i va l

involved in water-contact accidents, die percent to 90 percent of all drown- “It’s like a bite of food going down the
of drowning — suffocating in water as a ings are wet drownings; and, wrong way,” he said. “You start coughing,
result of an inability to keep water out of and then you take in more water.”
the airway long enough to breathe nor- • “Dry drowning” occurs when the
mally.16,17 Total submersion in water is presence of water at the opening Symptoms of near-drowning include
not necessary for drowning; intermittent of the trachea (windpipe) causes coughing, vomiting, rapid pulse, diffi-
submersion resulting from “wave splash” muscle spasms that close the airway. culty breathing and cyanosis (blueness
(waves breaking over the face of someone Death occurs because oxygen cannot of the lips and fingertips). Even people
wearing a life vest without facial protec- reach the lungs; during autopsy, wa- who have none of these symptoms should
tion) may cause an individual to inhale so ter is not found in the lungs. Between be monitored for about 12 hours for a
much water that he or she drowns. 10 percent and 15 percent of all delayed reaction.25 Hospital treatment
drownings are dry drownings. for near-drowning is designed to ensure
Peter Fenner, M.D., a specialist in drown- that adequate oxygen is delivered to
ing and an Australian designated aviation Inhalation of as little as 0.25 liter to 0.50 the blood. If sections of the lungs have
medical examiner, said, “Waves slapping liter (0.5 pint to 1.0 pint) of water can collapsed, a respirator often is used to
against the face can cause the same cause death as a result of “near-drown- re-inflate them. Other treatment may
involuntary hyperventilation, and sub- ing” (sometimes also called “secondary include medication to prevent airway
sequent waves slapping against the face drowning”) a condition in which the spasms, intravenous solutions to restore
during uncontrolled hyperventilation the blood’s chemical balance, antibiotics
can mean that [a survivor] inhales water to treat infections and blood transfusions
and can drown while floating with [his to replace red blood cells.
or her] head above the water.”18

The sequence of events involved in

N ear-drowning can On a life raft, however, even if those mon-
itoring the victim observe a worsening of
drowning includes panic, a period of sub- begin with his or her condition, they probably will
mersion in water while breath-holding, not be able to help.
swallowing water, loss of consciousness inhalation of as little
(after about three minutes under water), “There’s not a whole lot you could do
brain damage (after about five minutes as a tablespoon for them,” Bowman said. “Their breath-
under water), irregular heart rhythm, and ing could get worse, and they could die.
cessation of heartbeat.19 of water. It may not progress to that point, but
there could be difficulty breathing, or
Because someone who is drowning more respiratory problems, up to and
concentrates on keeping his or her head including death.”
above the water and breathing, there victim survives after aspirating water
may not be a call for help. Instead, the but then incurs lung damage, impaired Golden and Tipton said that victims of
victim’s behavior in the water is the breathing, a severe deficiency of oxygen near-drowning have described a variety
most reliable indication of whether as- in the blood and a correspondingly severe of memories of the experience:26
sistance is required. Flailing arms, uneven reduction in the amount of oxygen deliv-
swimming motions and/or an unusual ered to the body’s vital organs. In some Some describe a period of terror
position (lying face-down in the water or cases, victims of near-drowning survive while they struggled to hold their
keeping only the head out of the water, but suffer permanent brain damage. In breath until they were no longer
with the mouth open) may be indications other cases, they develop irregularities in capable of doing so, and then feeling
that someone is drowning.20 heart rhythm, an imbalance in salt and a tearing, burning sensation in their
water in the body, kidney failure, neu- chests as water entered their airways.
There are two types of drowning:21 rological damage and/or lung infections In contrast, others describe a feeling
from bacteria in the water.23 of absolute calmness and tranquility,
• “Wet drowning” is caused by inhal- with panoramic views of their past
ing a relatively large amount of wa- Cmdr. J. Russell Bowman, D.O., a U.S. lives passing before their eyes.
ter — typically at least 1.5 liters (1.6 Coast Guard flight surgeon in Sitka,
quarts), or about 22 milliliters per Alaska, said that near-drowning can begin In addition, they said that other near-
kilogram (0.34 ounces per pound) with inhalation of as little as a tablespoon drowning victims experience high
of the victim’s weight.22 Eighty-five of water.24 blood pressure; vomiting; involuntary

190 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

urination, defecation and/or seminal ­ eliver effective compressions of the heart.

d Deborah Kasman, M.D., M.A., assistant
emission; convulsions; coma; blood- In the water, with both the victim and the professor at the Georgetown University
pressure collapse; slowed respiration; rescuer wearing life vests, the rescuer should Medical Center Department of Internal
and death. be behind and under the victim. The res- Medicine and Center for Clinical
cuer should administer compressions by Bioethics in Washington, D.C., U.S.,
On occasion, people have survived being reaching under the victim’s life vest and said that if someone has not responded
submerged in cold water for one hour placing a fist, with the thumb down, on to CPR that is administered for near-
or longer because of the mammalian the lower one-third of the sternum (breast- drowning or for any other cause, “you’re
diving response (diving reflex) — the bone) and the other hand, palm-down on not going to save them at sea, in a boat in
same reflex that enables seals and other top of the fist. In a life raft, the floor may the middle of nowhere, without advanced
marine mammals to go without breath- provide adequate support; otherwise, an- medical help.”30
ing for 30 minutes or longer while under other person may lie beneath the victim to
water. The reflex is stronger in marine provide a more solid surface.29 “There are cases that are clearly futile, and
mammals than in humans, and stronger no one is ever required to administer futile
in children than in adults. Bowman said that after breathing has care,” Kasman said. “Laypeople are going
resumed during CPR, a victim should to feel uncomfortable with this concept,
The response occurs when the face is im- be placed in the recovery position, lying but sometimes you have to make very hard
mersed in cold water, which stimulates the on his or her side. (This position is rec- decisions. You may have to dump the body
nerves around the eyes. Cold water enters ommended to prevent the victim’s airway at sea and say a prayer.”
the lungs, slows the heartbeat and redirects
the flow of blood away from the hands, feet For protection against drowning, aircraft
and intestines and toward the heart and crewmembers and passengers should

“Y
brain. The cold water cools body tissues, wear suitable, properly maintained avia-
which then require less oxygen.27,28 tion life vests (see “Your Life Vest Can
ou may Save Your Life … If It Doesn’t Kill You
Ideally, cardiopulmonary resuscitation First,” page 346). For additional protec-
(CPR) should begin immediately on have to dump the tion, a spray hood or face mask should
victims of near-drowning (including be worn to reduce the amount of water
those who have been submerged for body at sea and splashing into the nose and mouth.31
relatively long periods) — if necessary
say a prayer.” If a life vest is not available, other items
and if possible, while they are still in
the water, even before they reach a life from the airplane — such as flotation seat
raft. If the victim’s airway is obstructed, cushions, headrests, armrests or pillows;
the Heimlich maneuver (an emergency plastic boxes; or pieces of polystyrene
technique for dislodging something from being obstructed by vomit or by the (from a cooler, for example) — can be
from the victim’s windpipe by applying tongue rolling back into the throat.) used to help someone stay afloat. Another
upward force on the upper abdomen) can possibility is to use a large plastic bag or a
be performed in the water. “They’re going to have to get along until relatively large piece of material, lifting it
help arrives,” Bowman said. “There’s no into the air and lowering it to the surface
Nevertheless, administering “makeshift medicine or piece of equipment that’s of the water to trap air inside it. Another
CPR” in the water is “not the easiest going to help them.” technique involves trapping air inside
thing in the world,” said Storey, who a pair of trousers by tying the bottoms
taught survival classes to U.S. Air Force Bowman also warned of the difficulties of both trouser legs, lifting the trousers
pilots before he began teaching the FAA of administering effective CPR in a life — open end first — into the air and low-
survival course 12 years ago. “I’m not sure raft to someone who had stopped breath- ering them to the surface; the legs fill with
I could do it.” ing for more than a few minutes or who air and remain above the water.
would probably require intensive medical
The process is only somewhat easier in a life treatment in addition to CPR. Many survival specialists no longer
raft, especially if the life raft is crowded. The recommend that someone in the water
victim’s body must be horizontal — or at “I would recommend not to even attempt without a life vest use a technique called
least positioned so that the head is slightly it,” he said. “You could try rescue breathing drown-proofing to prolong their sur-
lower than the chest — and firm support for someone, but the likelihood is low that vival time — or they recommend that
for the back is required for the rescuer to that is all they would require to survive.” the technique be used only in limited

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 191
 Su r v i va l

circumstances. Drown-proofing calls for float- which interfered with — and in some cases, almost
ing face-down in the water with the chin on the inhibited — swimming.”
chest, the waist bent and the arms extended to
the side and regularly using a frog-kick (a kicking The report said that the decrease in swimming
motion in which the knees are apart and turned efficiency was apparent in the characteristics of
out) to lift the head out of the water long enough the swimmers’ strokes, which became shorter and
to breathe. The drown-proofing technique was more rapid, and their position, which became
devised to help conserve energy and prevent nearly upright.
aspiration of water.32
“Since stroke length and [stroke] rate and swim
Today most survival specialists say that, espe- angle are more easily observed than swimming ef-
cially in cold water, the drown-proofing position ficiency, they may also help to identify individuals
results in a rapid loss of body heat through the who are about to reach swim failure,” the report
head and neck (as much as one-third to one-half said.
of the body’s heat loss) and can be exhausting for
someone who is uneasy being in the water.
Hypothermia
“If drown-proofing’s going to work, the person’s Survival Times Vary
probably practiced it before,” Bowman said.
“There are better ways.”

In recommendations to crews of commercial

H ypothermia occurs when more heat escapes
from the body than the body can produce.
Hypothermia is present when an individual’s body
ships and recreational boats, the U.S. Coast Guard temperature — normally 98.6 degrees F (37.0 de-
(USCG) says, “The more your body is out of water, grees C) — decreases to 95 degrees F (35 degrees
the warmer you’ll be. Don’t use drown-proofing C) or below.
methods that call for putting your face in the water.
Keep your head out of the water to lessen heat loss Hypothermia can occur because of exposure to
and increase survival time.”33 cold air or cold water. In water, however, hypo-
thermia develops more quickly because body heat
Drowning sometimes results from “swim failure,” dissipates more quickly in water — even relatively
a loss of ability to swim caused by a weakening of warm water with a temperature below about 82
muscles in the arms and legs after swimming in degrees F (28 degrees C; Table 1, page 193).
cold water. A 1999 study evaluated 10 volunteers
as they attempted to swim for 90 minutes in water Hypothermia can be exacerbated by wind chill,
at three temperatures — 25 degrees C (77 degrees which is based on the rate of heat loss from
F), 18 degrees C (64 degrees F) and 10 degrees exposed skin caused by the combined cooling
C (50 degrees F). All 10 swimmers were able to effect of the wind and the outdoor temperature
swim for 90 minutes in 25-degree-C water, eight (Figure 1, page 194). The U.S. National Weather
swimmers swam for 90 minutes Service Office of Climate, Water and Weather
in 18-degree-C water, and five Services defines the wind chill temperature
swimmers swam for 90 minutes as the measurement of how cold people and
in 10-degree-C water.34 animals feel when they are outdoors. As wind

“T he more “At the end of swims in 10-de-

gree-C water, swimmers reported
speed increases, heat is moved away from the
body more quickly, resulting first in a decrease
in skin temperature (which can cause frostbite,
your body is that it became increasingly dif- if the air temperature is below freezing) and/or
ficult to straighten their limbs a decrease in body temperature (which can be-
out of water, the and coordinate their swimming come hypothermia).35
movements,” said the report on
warmer you’ll be.” the study, conducted by Tipton, For example, if the temperature is 45 degrees F
Golden and two other research- (seven degrees C) and the wind is blowing at 15
ers. “The loss in coordination was miles (24 kilometers) per hour, the wind chill tem-
attributed to increased shivering perature is 38 degrees F (three degrees C).

192 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

noticing one of the buttons of my oilskin jacket

Table 1 was undone. For some reason, I was unable
Expected Survival Time in Cold Water — and unwilling — to do anything about it,
although I knew I should. But one of the effects
Exhaustion or Expected of hypothermia is that your brain just seems
Water Temperature Unconsciousness in Survival Time
to come to a grinding halt, which of course
More than 80 degrees Fahrenheit (F) makes things worse.”38
More than 26.5 degrees Celsius (C) Indefinite Indefinite
70–80 degrees F Those who typically are most at risk of hy-
21–26.5 degrees C 2–12 hours 3 hours–indefinite
pothermia are the elderly, because they may
60–70 degrees F have medical conditions that hinder the body’s
15.5–21 degrees C 2–7 hours 2–40 hours
ability to regulate temperature, and children,
50–60 degrees F
because their relatively larger surface-area-to-
10–15.5 degrees C 1–2 hours 1–6 hours
mass ratio means that they lose large amounts
40–50 degrees F
of body heat to surface cooling more quickly
4.5–10 degrees C 30–60 minutes 1–3 hours
than healthy adults.
32.5–40 degrees F
0.3–4.5 degrees C 15–30 minutes 30–90 minutes
Others at increased risk of developing hy-
32.5 degrees F Less than Less than
0.3 degrees C 15 minutes 15–45 minutes
pothermia include individuals with some
medical conditions — such as hypothyroid-
Source: U.S. Coast Guard
ism (an underactive thyroid); diseases such as
stroke that cause paralysis and reduce mental
awareness; diseases such as Parkinson’s disease
With wet clothing — a likely condition for some- that restrict physical activity; conditions that
one aboard a life raft — an individual feels even restrict normal blood flow; and conditions that
colder.36 involve memory disorders — and individuals
who take over-the-counter cold medications or
Visible symptoms of hypothermia include shiver- medications for depression or nausea.
ing; slurred speech; abnormally slow breathing;
cold, pale skin; fatigue; lethargy; apathy; and loss Typically, large people, with relatively greater
of consciousness (Figure 2, page 195). amounts of body fat, develop hypothermia more
slowly than thinner people. Cooling rates for men
Golden and Tipton said that people with hypo- and women are about the same. Physical fitness is
thermia may “exhibit uncharacteristic behavior or no defense against hypothermia; although those
personality. They will usually be uncoordinated, who are fit have more stamina than others, they
with a general slowing in physical and mental ac- also have less body fat.
tivity. This condition will increase the incidence
of errors of omission or commission and, in turn, Other factors also determine how quickly an
may lead to poor judgment, bad decisions, reduced individual will lose body heat, including the tem-
perception, or dropping or damaging vital equip- perature of the water (the colder the water, the
ment. In general, hypothermic individuals will be more rapid the heat loss), the condition of the
performing far below par and be a risk both to water (wind and spray result in more rapid heat
themselves and others.”37 loss) and the insulating quality of the individual’s
clothing (several layers of heavy clothing can in-
Sometimes, victims of hypothermia do not recog- crease survival time in cold water as much as 30
nize — at least initially — that they are experienc- percent to 40 percent).39 Aircraft crewmembers
ing problems. and passengers who wear immersion suits have
additional protection against the cold (See “Cold
For example, one survivor of a deadly 1979 Outside, Warm Inside,” page 357).
storm that disrupted the annual Fastnet sailboat
race off the southern coast of Great Britain, kill- In laboratory tests, the body temperature of a
ing 15 people and sinking five yachts, said later, man wearing non-protective clothing and keep-
“I remember sitting in the [boat] cockpit and ing his head above water decreased 3.6 degrees

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 193
 Su r v i va l

Figure 1 The effectiveness of shivering is

Effects on Exposed Skin of Wind and Outdoor Temperature limited, however. Eventually — in
very cold water, after a period of
minutes, and in warmer waters or
Actual Air Temperature on land, after several hours — an
Estimated (degrees Fahrenheit/degrees Celsius) individual becomes fatigued, the
wind body’s fuel reserves are depleted,
speed and shivering stops. An individu-
(knots) 50/10 32/0 10/-12 -9/-23 -31/-35 -49/-45 al’s shivering is diminished when
oxygen levels decrease or levels of
0 carbon dioxide increase in inspired
air; this situation is likely to occur
in circumstances in which fresh air
s
10

sh
on

d f
pe r

se r o
d fo

fle
rs

ventilation is inadequate, such as in

po ge
se r
es g e

ex an
20 enclosed life rafts.44
dr an

of d d
ly d

sh po f
d
fle f ex er o
er tle

se
in se
op Lit

Shivering sometimes is considered

ez rea

o ng
30 g

in da
fre Inc

a determining factor in whether

ez at
pr

someone has mild hypothermia

g
fre Gre
40 (and may be able to rewarm
or more
himself or herself after reaching
a warmer environment) or severe
Source: International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual hypothermia, which may require
medical treatment.
F (2.0 degrees C) to 95 degrees F (35 degrees C)
after one hour in water with a temperature of 41 Hypothermia also may be classified according to
degrees F (5.0 degrees C). The same decrease in how rapidly the condition develops:45
body temperature was recorded after three hours
to six hours in water with a temperature of 59 • Acute hypothermia develops after several min-
degrees F (15 degrees C).40 utes in cold water with a temperature of less
than 59 degrees F (15 degrees C). Treatment
Hypothermia affects people even in warmer is designed to carefully increase the body
waters. A June 19, 2003, report published in the temperature to avoid forcing cold blood from
Honolulu (Hawaii, U.S.) Star-Bulletin said that a the arms and legs back toward the heart and
48-year-old fisherman was treated for hypother- other organs. After the body is warmed, normal
mia after being pulled from the water near a Pacific physiological processes resume; and,
Ocean beach the previous day.41 Water tempera-
tures in that area in June average 79 degrees F (26 • Chronic hypothermia develops after longer
degrees C).42 periods of time, sometimes many hours, in
water between 68 degrees and 82 degrees F
An individual’s behavior also influences the rate (20 degrees and 28 degrees C). A person with
at which body heat is lost. Movement in the water chronic hypothermia probably is exhausted,
(for example, swimming or treading water) results and the body’s fluid reserves may be insuf-
in an increase in circulation and increased blood ficient for normal blood circulation after the
flow near the skin, as well as an increase in the body is warmed.
flow of water around the skin. This can cause the
body to cool as much as 50 percent faster than The lower an individual’s body temperature is, the
maintaining a relatively still position. more likely he or she is to suffer serious complica-
tions, such as frostbite, loss of consciousness or
Shivering is the body’s attempt to generate heat with heart arrhythmia. If the body temperature is at
the involuntary contraction and expansion of many or above 90 degrees F (32 degrees C), there prob-
small parts of skeletal muscle tissues — an action ably will be no lasting damage. If the temperature
that creates friction and, as a result, heat.43 is between 80 degrees F (27 degrees C) and 90

194 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

degrees F, most people will recover, although can be used either to retain body heat or
some will experience permanent damage. If the to protect from sunlight) to transfer body
body temperature is below 80 degrees F, death is heat to the person with hypothermia. This
likely. (Some people will lose consciousness and method requires care to ensure that the
— if floating in the water — will drown before warmer person does not lose so much body
body temperature is low enough to cause death heat that he or she, too, becomes hypo-
by hypothermia, however.)46 thermic. (The space blanket material also
is used in mummylike thermal protective
Treatment of hypothermia — after the victim aids, which have sleeves, a hood and a zipper
has been removed from the cold — involves the in the front — and sometimes legs — and
following:47 which are designed to provide warmth and
shut out moisture and wind. Another use of
• Exchanging wet clothing for dry clothing, or the material is in drawstring bags designed
sharing body heat by removing the victim’s to enclose the entire body, with an adjust-
clothing and the clothing of another indi- able opening for breathing, and to be worn
vidual without hypothermia and having over life vests by survivors floating in the
them lie next to each other beneath other water. The bags slow the loss of body heat
clothing or an emergency (“space”) blanket and prevent bodily wastes and blood from
(made of laminated layers of polyester film, entering the water and attracting sharks, the
such as Mylar, with a reflective coating that manufacturer says.)48;

Figure 2
Symptoms of Hypothermia
99
Mild Hypothermia Stage 1
Normal, shivering can begin.
37
Mild Hypothermia Stage 2
Cold sensation, “goose bumps,” unable to perform complex tasks with hands, shiver can be mild to severe, hands numb. 96
Moderate Hypothermia Stage 1

Core Body Temperture (degrees) Fahrenheit

Intense shivering, lack of muscle coordination, movements slow and labored, mild confusion.
35
Core Body Temperture (degrees) Celsius

Moderate Hypothermia Stage 2 93

Violent shivering, difficulty speaking, sluggish thinking, amnesia, gross muscle movements sluggish,
unable to use hands, signs of depression, withdrawn.

33 90
Severe Hypothermia Stage 1
Shivering stops, exposed skin blue or puffy, muscle coordination very poor, confusion,
incoherent/irrational behavior, may be able to maintain posture and appearance of awareness.
87
31
Severe Hypothermia Stage 2
Muscle rigidity, semiconscious, stupor, loss of awareness of others, pulse and respirations decrease,
possible heart fibrillations. 84

29
Severe Hypothermia Stage 3 81
Unconscious, heart beat and respiration erratic, pulse may not be felt.

27
78
Severe Hypothermia Stage 4
Pulmonary edema, cardiac and respiratory failure, death. Death may occur before this temperature is reached.

25 75

Source: U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 195
 Su r v i va l

• Covering the head to limit the loss of body In cold water without a life raft, survival special-
heat; ists say that, because an individual’s ability to use
his or her hands will deteriorate quickly, any tasks
• Laying the victim face-up on the warmest requiring manual dexterity should be performed
surface available and monitoring breathing. immediately.
If breathing has stopped or if the breathing
rate is determined to be dangerously slow (less After that, the primary goal is to conserve heat.
than six or seven breaths per minute), the res- Survival specialists make the following recom-
cue breaths of CPR should be administered. mendations:50
Nevertheless, Paul S. Auerbach, M.D., clinical
professor of surgery at the Stanford University • A group of survivors should tie themselves
Medical Center Division of Emergency into the huddle position (Figure 3), with
Medicine, said that because hypothermia is their lower bodies and the sides of their chests
“protective” — that is, the extreme cold causes pressed together. Children should be placed
the body temperature to drop and the me- in the middle of the group;
tabolism to slow — the body is more tolerant
of a lower-than-normal heart rate, respiratory • A lone survivor should use the heat-escape-
rate and blood pressure. As long as the person lessening posture (HELP), with the sides of
shows any signs of life, including breathing, a the arms against the chest and the thighs
pulse or movement, the chest compressions of together and elevated slightly to protect the
CPR should not be administered. Auerbach groin; and,
said that “pumping on the chest unnecessarily
is ‘rough handling’ and may induce ventricu- • Swimming should be avoided unless the
lar fibrillation [a type of irregular heartbeat distance is short. (The U.K. Civil Aviation
that can lead to sudden death]”49; Authority [CAA] said that the distance
should be less than 1.0 kilometer [0.6 stat-
• If the victim is able to swallow, he or she ute mile] and that the person should be a
should drink a warm nonalcoholic beverage, strong swimmer.) Swimming does not help
although this may not be possible in a life anyone stay warm. Instead, the body heat
raft. Alcoholic drinks reduce the
body’s ability to retain heat;
Figure 3
HELP and Huddle Positions
• Treat the person gently because
of the risk of cardiac arrest.
Don’t rub the body or administer
massage; and,

• Avoid applying heat to the

person’s arms and legs. This
could cause cold blood from the
extremities to flow toward the
heart, lungs and brain, resulting
in a potentially fatal decrease in
body temperature.

Occupants of the life raft should at-

tempt to create an environment that
limits the effects of hypothermia, by
erecting the life raft’s canopy as soon
HELP Huddle Position
as possible to limit the effects of wind
(Heat-escape-lessening Posture)
chill, by keeping the floor of the life
raft as dry as possible and by wringing
out wet clothing. Source: U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

196 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

generated by increased blood circulation in In Frostbite Cases,

the arms, legs and skin is transferred to the Extremities Freeze First
water.

Nevertheless, some specialists question the useful-

ness of the HELP and huddle positions.
E xposure to the cold can cause a variety of
ailments.

Frostbite, in which parts of the body are damaged

Golden and Tipton said that “stability problems permanently by the cold, can occur when the tem-
make [the HELP] posture difficult and imprac- perature of exposed body tissues is 31 degrees F
tical to maintain in an open seaway” and that (minus 0.55 degrees C) and the fluid in the skin
less body heat is generated in the groin and the — or the skin itself — freezes.54
armpits than was once believed. They said that,
although the huddle position might be useful in This is among the most serious types of injuries
calm waters, survivors on the downwind side from the cold and usually affects the fingers, toes,
of a group in the huddle position in the open cheeks, ears and nose, although prolonged expo-
sea would constantly be splashed in the face by sure to the cold can cause the freezing to extend
oncoming waves.51 into the arms or legs.55

In the past, some specialists said that removing Symptoms cause the affected
clothing while in the water would aid survival.

E
skin to appear white or grayish-
Today, specialists disagree with that recommen- yellow. After a period of pain,
dation. Instead, they recommend wearing all the affected area feels numb, xposure
available clothing, including shoes and a hat, if although numbness may be ac-
one is available, and tightening collars, cuffs and companied by tingling or aching. to the cold can
hoods. (Clothing, including coats, should be worn If frostbite damage is superficial,
under a life vest.) Water trapped inside clothing the skin may feel hard and, when cause a variety of
will be warmed by the body and then will provide pressure is applied, the underly-
insulation against colder water.52 ing tissue may feel soft; if damage ailments.
is severe, the entire affected area
Those floating in the water — especially in cold may feel hard. Blistering will oc-
water — are presented with another risk: circum- cur in 12 hours to 36 hours, and
rescue collapse, a sudden loss of consciousness or when the area thaws, it will be
death, which occurs immediately before, during red and swollen; gangrene (death of tissue) may
or immediately after rescue. (This phenomenon occur later.
also sometimes affects survivors in life rafts who
have not been immersed in water.) Data show On a life raft, treatment might be limited to
that, in incidents involving the rescue of large providing the victim with a space blanket for
numbers of people who are immersed in water, warmth. Additional care, not possible on a
about 20 percent may be subject to circumrescue life raft, usually includes slow warming of the
collapse.53 Golden and Tipton said that specialists frostbitten area by placing it in warm water and
believe that several factors could be responsible administering antibiotics.56
for circumrescue collapse, including the body’s
physical response to stress, lengthy exposure to The best-known victim of frostbite at sea may be
cold and resulting hypothermia, the amount and Howard Blackburn, whose two-man fishing dory
type of physical activity required of the victim was caught in a surprise storm in the Atlantic
during rescue, hypovolemia (a decrease in the Ocean off Newfoundland, Canada, in January
volume of circulating blood), hypoxia (a short- 1883. As Blackburn and his companion bailed
age of oxygen supplied to the brain) resulting from water and rigged an anchor, Blackburn’s mittens
near-drowning, hemorrhaging from an internal washed overboard. Knowing that his hands would
injury, or too-rapid rewarming of a hypothermia freeze, he grasped the oars, so that his hands would
victim. Survivors who collapse after rescue, how- freeze around them and he would be able to row
ever, usually do so because of hypoxia caused by the dory. The other man died, but Blackburn
near-drowning, they said. rowed for five days until he reached shore. He lost

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 197
 Su r v i va l

eight fingers and parts of both thumbs to frostbite

and the subsequent gangrene.57

Immersion foot (trench foot), which occurs after

the feet have been in water at temperatures be-
tween freezing and 50 degrees F (10 degrees C) for
more than 12 hours, is most often found among
people on life rafts where activity is limited, diet is
inadequate and clothes (such as socks and shoes)
are wet and cold. Symptoms include swelling of
the feet and lower legs, numbness, itching, tingling,
pain, muscle cramping and discoloration of the
skin.58 If untreated, infection may develop.59

Immersion foot usually is treated after rescue by

warming, cleaning and drying the feet while avoid-
ing too-rapid rewarming. Antibiotics and an injec-
tion to prevent tetanus may be administered.

To prevent immersion foot, people on life rafts

should try to keep their feet as warm and dry as
possible and should elevate their feet and exercise
their toes and ankles several times a day.

Chilblains, in which part of the body becomes red

and slightly swollen in response to cold, is a mild
injury that occurs in temperatures between freez-
ing and about 61 degrees F (16 degrees C) with
high humidity. The affected areas, which may itch
as they are warmed, usually are the ears, fingers
and the back of the hand.60

If exposure has been brief, chilblains symptoms

may disappear. Recurring exposure, however,
may cause increased swelling and discoloration
of the skin, blisters and bleeding areas. If petro-
leum jelly is available in the life raft, it may relieve
discomfort. Those most at risk of heat illness are the elderly,
young children, individuals who are very obese,
alcoholics, and those using antihistamines, anti-
In Survival Situations, Heat psychotic drugs or cocaine.
Illness Is Difficult to Treat
The early stage of heat illness is heat exhaustion,

H eat presents other weather-related risks.

Heat illness — heat exhaustion or heatstroke
— occurs when the body’s natural cooling mecha-
in which exposure to high temperatures causes the
body to lose too much fluid through perspiration.
As fluids are lost, so are blood electrolytes (dissolved
nisms cannot compensate for excess heat gener- mineral salts in the blood); the result is disruption
ated by warm weather. The risk of heat illness is of circulation and brain function.
exacerbated by strenuous activity, which increases
the amount of heat produced by the muscles; de- Symptoms of heat exhaustion include fatigue,
hydration, which interferes with the production weakness, anxiety, heavy perspiration, a feeling
of perspiration; and high humidity, which reduces of faintness (especially when standing), a slow-
the cooling effect of perspiration.61,62 ing of the heartbeat and confusion.

198 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

If heat exhaustion is not treated, the condition should be applied not only to exposed skin but also
sometimes — usually in cases involving strenuous to skin beneath clothing made of loosely woven
activity in extremely warm weather — develops fabrics, because UVR can penetrate these materi-
into heatstroke, a life-threatening illness in which als.65 Taking shelter whenever possible beneath the
the body temperature rises as high as 106 degrees life raft’s canopy can provide protection against
F (41 degrees C). Heatstroke is unlikely to occur direct UVR; nevertheless, the canopy is not as ef-
among occupants of a life raft, however.63 fective in protecting against indirect UVR reflected
from the water’s surface. In addition, the canopies
In a life raft, treatment of heat illness is difficult, of most aviation life rafts are made of translucent
and preventive measures should be emphasized. ripstop nylon material that provides only limited
Nevertheless, if someone in a life raft experiences UVR protection.
the early symptoms of heat exhaustion, he or she
should — if possible — remove outer clothing, Ken Burton, president of STARK Survival Co.,
lie in shade and expose the skin to a breeze to said that survivors also should ensure that their
aid evaporation of perspiration. He should drink heads are covered. Those without hats should
water until he is rehydrated and then try to limit dampen something — perhaps underwear, he
further exposure to the heat. suggested — with water and put that on their
heads. Clothing also can be dampened with water
Severe sunburn is a risk for people in life rafts, espe- to help in cooling.66
cially those in life rafts without a protective canopy
and at latitudes near the equator, where the sun’s ul- UVR exposure also can damage the eyes, causing a
traviolet rays (UVR) are strongest. UVR levels vary variety of ailments, including photokeratitis (sun-
according to the time of day and time of year and burn of the cornea, the transparent tissue over the
are greatest when the sun is highest in the sky. UVR front of the eye). This condition is temporary and
levels are greatest on clear days, but cloud cover does occurs after a few hours in bright sunlight, often in
not effectively block UVR, which can be reflected sunlight that is reflected off water. Photokeratitis
and scattered by various surface materials, including can be painful for one or two days and can cause
water. Wind dries the skin and — along with water a temporary loss of vision. Other ailments, includ-
— removes urocanic acid (a substance that forms ing cataracts (the clouding of small regions of the
naturally in the skin and protects against sunburn); normally transparent tissue in the eye’s lens, lo-
this makes skin more susceptible to sunburn and cated behind the colored part of the eye) generally
causes “windburn,” an additional irritation of skin result from long-term exposure to UVR.67
that already is sunburned.64
People who are not wearing appropriately de-
Symptoms of sunburn include reddened skin, signed sunglasses (with lenses that protect against
itching and pain. If the sunburn is severe, it is damaging UVR and sidepieces that extend beyond
called sun poisoning; symptoms include vomit- the hinges) should avoid looking directly at the
ing, weakness, headache, chills and fever. water. Survival specialists suggest that survivors
might limit eye damage by placing a bandage or
Treatment includes analgesics other loosely woven fabric in front of their eyes
(pain-relief medications) such or by partially closing their eyelids.68
as aspirin or ibuprofen, and

“S evere
soothing sunburn lotions, which
may be included in life raft first
aid kits.
Treatment of photokeratitis or other minor sun-
related eye irritations includes rinsing the eyes
several times a day with small amounts of fresh
sunburn is a risk water and covering them with a bandage to exclude
Wearing clothing of tightly wo- light for at least two days.
for people in ven fabrics and application of a
sunblock such as zinc oxide or
life rafts.” a sunscreen lotion with a high ‘When You’re Thirsty, Drink’
sun-protection factor (SPF), if
available in the life raft, can pro-
tect against sunburn. Sunscreen D ehydration is the excessive loss of water from
the body, sometimes because of inadequate

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 199
 Su r v i va l

consumption of liquids but also as a result of a to replace water in the bloodstream, and the cells no
number of other factors, including exposure to longer function properly. Eventually, movement of
hot weather, vomiting or diarrhea — conditions water from the cells into the blood also slows.
that would be likely for people in ocean-survival
situations, either inside life rafts or floating in a As dehydration becomes more severe, symptoms
life vest in ocean waters.69 include fatigue, nausea, emotional instability,
clumsiness, headache, elevated body temperature
About two-thirds of an individual’s body weight is and respiratory rate, dizziness, slurred speech,
water, and water is essential in replicating cells, car- weakness, confusion, swollen tongue, circulatory
rying nutrients through the body, eliminating waste problems, decreased blood volume and kidney
from the body and regulating body temperature. failure. After the body has lost about 8.5 quarts
(9.0 liters) of water, symptoms may include in-
Medical specialists recommend that people drink ability to swallow and cracked skin. If a loss of
about two quarts of water every 24 hours to replen- 11.3 quarts (12.0 liters) of water occurs, death
ish the amount excreted in urine and perspiration usually is imminent.
and to prevent decreases in blood volume and in
blood electrolytes. Nevertheless, people can survive Dehydration is exacerbated by consumption of
by drinking as little as 3.7 ounces to 7.4 ounces (110 alcoholic beverages and caffeinated beverages, be-
milliliters to 220 milliliters) of water a day.70 cause they have diuretic effects, and also by spend-
ing time in a pressurized aircraft, where the low
The amount of water in the body and the concen- humidity accelerates the body’s loss of water.
tration of electrolytes in the blood are related, and
both must be maintained at proper levels for the Because of these conditions, many aircraft crew-
body to function properly.71 members and passengers may be slightly dehy-
drated even during a normal flight; for them,
If someone becomes thirsty (the first noticeable dehydration may become noticeable very quickly
symptom of dehydration) but does not drink in a survival situation.
enough to compensate for the body’s loss of water,
the kidneys excrete less urine and the amount of per- In a modern life raft equipped with a reverse-
spiration decreases. Water in the body’s cells begins osmosis water pump, supplies of drinking wa-
ter should be adequate, survival
specialists say (see “Water, Water,
Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to
Drink …” page 177).

These specialists generally agree

that people in a life raft should
not ration water and should not
delay taking their first sips of
water but should drink when they
are thirsty.

“Plain H2O is going to take good

care of you,” said Burton, who has
taught water-survival classes to
flight crews, cabin crews, frequent
flyers and business executives. He
prescribes a course of cautious
consumption.

“When you’re thirsty, drink,” he

said. “You don’t want to gorge,
but … taking only a sip of water

200 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

is equivalent to putting a thimbleful of unlikely to be very effective, medical spe- wilderness rescue, described water-
gasoline in an empty [vehicle] tank.” cialists say. Although the large intestine ab- retention enemas as generally useful in
sorbs about two quarts of water daily, most treating dehydration, although “I would
Ray E. Smith, a U.S. Navy survival-train- of that amount is absorbed at a site so far have a pretty hard time envisioning this
ing specialist, said that people in life rafts from the anus that it would not be reached on a life raft.”78
should “use common sense” about drink- by a typical water-retention enema.76
ing water.72 Nevertheless, he said, “There are no rules.
Because of the high salt content, spe- … You need to have several different op-
“They definitely should not get dehy- cialists believe that ocean water cannot tions, and an enema is one option that
drated,” Smith said. “Don’t ration water, safely be used in water-retention enemas might work.”
but if you’re thirsty, drink.” because both water and salt are absorbed
by the body through the intestinal wall, Some specialists say that drinking fluids
Paul D. Russell, a maritime safety specialist and the additional salt exacerbates dehy- other than water can be beneficial, in-
and accident investigator, and a retired U.S. dration. In addition, a 1969 study found cluding the blood of captured turtles, fish
Coast Guard captain with more than 5,000 that water absorption ceased when the eyes and spinal fluid, and fluids squeezed
flight hours in fixed-wing and rotary-wing salt concentration was about 20 percent from the bodies of fish.79
aircraft, said that in the high-stress environ- higher than the typical concentration of
ment of a life raft, people generally feel an salt in the body.77 “Fish eyes contain fresh water; they are as
increased need for water. Russell said that sweet as grapes when you are half-crazed
those who are fully hydrated should try to by thirst,” Gill said. “After cleaning the
delay 12 hours to 18 hours before drinking. flesh off any fish you’ve caught, snap the
(If someone is dehydrated, the tissues inside spine and suck out the spinal fluid; it
the mouth begin to appear white instead of
pink, and urine becomes darker.)73 P eople in
contains fresh water, glucose and protein.
You can squeeze a few drops of potable
fluid out of any fish or other marine life.
“If you drink a lot of it right away, your life rafts should ‘use … Section the fish, fold it up in a cloth
body can’t process it; you’ll pee it away,” and squeeze the fluid out of the flesh by
Russell said. “Don’t overdo it.” common sense’ about twisting the ends of the cloth. You also
can carve holes in the side of a large fish
People who are sick or injured, however, drinking water. and allow lymphatic fluid to accumulate
should be urged to drink whenever they in the holes.”
feel thirsty, he said.
Golden and Tipton said, however, that
Other safe sources of drinking water include the “energy expended and body fluid
collected rainwater or condensation.74 In circumstances in which an individual lost in undertaking the work to squeeze
is unconscious or is vomiting because of a small amount of fluid from fish flesh
One controversial alternative method of seasickness and is unable to retain even can outweigh the benefits.”80
acquiring fluid is to use nonpotable fresh small amounts of water (for example,
water (water that is undrinkable because one teaspoon [five milliliters] every In addition, the process of squeezing
of its unpleasant taste) or fresh water that five minutes to 10 minutes) by mouth, fluid from a fish may make some people
has been contaminated by ocean water for a water-retention enema of nine parts queasy, Storey said.
a water-retention enema. Lyn Robertson, fresh water to one part ocean water (ad-
a nurse who spent 38 days on a life raft ministered with plastic tubing that might “If they’ve got a strong stomach, it’s
in the Pacific Ocean with her husband, be included in a customized first aid kit) OK,” he said. “Otherwise, it’s a last-case
their three teenage children and a deck- might have some value. scenario.”
hand in 1972 after a whale attacked and
sank their 43-foot (13-meter) schooner, Some survival-training specialists, in- In the past, at least one researcher said
administered water-retention enemas to cluding Storey, consider water-retention that people could survive by drinking
compensate for their shortage of drinking enemas an “extreme alternative. We don’t limited amounts of ocean water. In
water; all five survived.75 teach that as a useful technique,” he said. 1952, Alain Bombard, a French physi-
cian, sailed an inflatable boat first across
Nevertheless, in most ocean-survival cir- Jeffrey Isaac, a physician’s assistant and the Mediterranean Sea and then across
cumstances, water-retention enemas are instructor in emergency medicine and the Atlantic Ocean to prove his theory

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 201
 Su r v i va l

that survivors on life rafts could — un- Nevertheless, most specialists — at the In the past, some survival specialists have
der some conditions — safely consume time of Bombard’s journey and today recommended that people drink their
ocean water. Those conditions were — dispute his theory and strongly advise own urine. Today, they generally agree
that they begin consuming ocean water against drinking ocean water. that because of the high concentration
early, before they became dehydrated or of minerals and waste material, drinking
thirsty; that they match their intake of “People can die from drinking salt water,” urine will increase thirst, draw fluid from
ocean water with the body’s maximum Bowman said. “The salt in seawater takes the cells and exacerbate dehydration.85
need for sodium chloride and, accord- more fluid out of us. It’s so salty that our
ingly, consume only small amounts of body uses its stored fluids (in cells and The digestive process increases the body’s
ocean water; and that they not drink fat) to make the seawater more like our requirements for water, and specialists
ocean water for longer than six days or body fluids. You dehydrate yourself even advise people to eat only if they are well
seven days — enough time, Bombard more by drinking seawater.” supplied with drinking water. The body
calculated, for them to have developed will convert stored fat and protein into
a plan for obtaining other sources of In addition, the high mineral content glucose, allowing most people to survive
drinkable water.81 of seawater can lead to diarrhea and for several weeks without food.
delirium.83
In his description of the Mediterranean
voyage, Bombard said:82 Lewis Haynes, M.D., a doctor on the USS Life Raft’s Movements
Indianapolis, a U.S. Navy heavy cruiser Contribute to
From 25th to 28th May, we drank that sank after being struck by Japanese Seasickness
seawater: for four days, in my case, torpedoes in the Pacific Ocean during
and three days, in [a companion’s
case]. During this period, our urine
was perfectly normal, and we had
the final days of World War II, said that
drinking seawater was a major problem
during the five days that the survivors
D ehydration is aggravated by seasick-
ness (motion sickness). Symptoms
include sensations of dizziness and/or
no sensation of thirst, but it should spent in the water awaiting rescue.84 falling, sweating, headache, drowsiness,
be remembered that it is essential weakness, increased salivation, nausea,
not to wait for dehydration before In excerpts of interviews for a book about and vomiting.
drinking seawater. … Two days on the sinking, Haynes gave the following
sea perch [fish] then provided us account: Charles Oman, Ph.D., director of the
with food and drink, but care had Man Vehicle Laboratory in the Center
to be taken not to compensate too You get dehydrated because you for Space Research at the Massachusetts
quickly for our fast. Six more days of don’t drink. And you’re exercising (U.S.) Institute of Technology, who has
seawater followed, bringing us to the and losing fluid. I remember fight- conducted considerable research on
safety limit, and then two more days ing with guys to keep them from motion sickness, said that seasickness
of fish, without any internal com- drinking salt water. It was one of occurs when the cerebellum (the part of
plications. In other words, out of 14 my jobs: to make the group not the brain that controls balance), receives
days, we drank fish juice for four and drink. Because if you drink it, you “inconsistent, unexpected” combina-
seawater for 10. By interrupting the get diarrhea — and that dehydrates tions of signals from the eyes, inner ear,
consumption of seawater, we were you more. You get delirious, like muscles and joints.86
able to double what I considered the somebody with a high fever. In the
safety limit. … beginning, someone would drink salt “The basic hypothesis is that, over a
water and thrash around and raise lifetime of living ashore, the ‘balance
I noticed none of the effects normally hell. The two guys holding him down brain’ has learned to predict exactly
associated with the consumption of would get exhausted, and they’d die, what sensory signals it should receive
seawater, and neither [the compan- too. So you lost three men for one guy from moment to moment each time
ion] nor I vomited or had diarrhea. who drank salt water. an active body movement is made,
On the contrary, we were subject particularly from the vestibular organs
to persistent constipation, with- We had hallucinations. Guys would in the inner ear,” Oman said. “The bal-
out pain, coating of the tongue or see the ship underneath them. They’d ance brain probably computes a ‘sensory
mucus membranes or bad breath, think they could dive down and get conflict’ signal — the difference between
and this lasted 12 days. However, water out of the scuttlebutt [water actual and anticipated sensory informa-
we both suffered continuously from fountain]. They’d see it. And then tion received. ‘Sensory conflict’ signals
[flatulence]. you’d think you could see it. represent the unanticipated portion of

202 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

sensory information and are thought to trigger Describing a 1985 incident in

corrective postural reflexes and help stabilize which he abandoned a 65-foot

“W
gaze. In everyday life ashore, sensory cues arrive (20-meter) catamaran after it
in consistent, anticipated patterns, and sensory- struck a submerged object and
conflict signals are small. However, when you go began taking on water during hen you
out on the ocean, the motion of the boat continu- an attempted crossing of the
ously disturbs your posture, increasing the level Atlantic Ocean, Pike said, “It are seasick, survival
of conflict signals. [having the seasickness medi-
cation] saved my sanity. From is no longer a
“When conflict signals increase and are sustained, previous life raft training, I
signals in the ‘balance brain’ spill over to the knew how bad the motion can strong instinct.”
‘emetic [causes vomiting] brain,’ and symptoms be in a raft. When you are seasick,
may occur.” survival is no longer a strong in-
stinct; you just give up.”
Seasickness can be made worse by a number of
factors, including the emotional stress of a ditch- Oman said that although seasickness sometimes is
ing; claustrophobia caused by confinement in a limited to one episode of vomiting, in other cases,
small, closed space, such as a life raft; noxious especially in bad weather and rough seas, repeated
odors, such as those emitted by aircraft fuel, episodes of vomiting and retching (dry heaves)
some life raft materials or other people vomiting; are common.90
an inner ear injury or infection; and the unusual
motions of a life raft. “Sufferers usually are able to respond physically
to real emergencies for a day or so,” Oman said.
Golden and Tipton said that, for most people, “However, if you vomit repeatedly and don’t eat
an inflatable life raft is a “provocative device” for because you feel nauseous, eventually you will …
inducing seasickness. become weak, confused and eventually incapaci-
tated.”
“On a large ship, with a high vantage point and
open visual reference of a distant, relatively stable Russell said that, to avoid seasickness or reduce
horizon (achieved by counterbalancing move- its severity, medication should be administered to
ments of the head and body), the nausea-inducing everyone before symptoms have time to develop
sensation from the balance organs is usually over- — preferably, in the airplane, before the descent
ridden,” they said. “But within the confines of a to the water (Table 2, page 204). Trying to treat
raft, with its peculiar motion (it twists and turns as seasickness after it has begun is difficult because
it rises and falls with every swell), no stable visual repeated vomiting will rid the body of any medica-
reference is present to counter the central input tion taken by mouth, he said.
from the ears. The result is nausea and vomiting,
even in habituated sailors.”87 Oman said that early administration of medication
would be ideal, because most oral anti-seasickness
Oman agreed with their assessment.88 medications (which typically are effective for be-
tween four hours and 12 hours) don’t take effect for
“Even the best-designed life rafts available today 30 minutes to 45 minutes after they are adminis-
are incredibly strong seasickness-makers,” Oman tered, and medication administered in transdermal
said. “Even experienced yachtsmen who have to patches and absorbed through the skin (typically
get into a raft usually get queasy and often frankly effective for between 48 hours and 72 hours) may
sick, primarily due to the herky-jerky motion of not be fully effective for several hours.
the raft and secondarily to the lack of visual cues
caused by the closed canopy.” “But in an airplane, you don’t usually have that
much warning,” Oman said. “Usually, you have
Dag Pike, a sailor who said that he has been res- to plan the ditching and leave the aircraft in a big
cued at sea at least 10 times, said that seasickness hurry before it sinks and deal with the injured.
medication is among the first items he grabs in Thinking about taking seasickness pills just isn’t
preparing to abandon ship.89 a priority at that point.”

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 203
 Su r v i va l

seasickness medication dissolve beneath

Table 2 the tongue, to allow at least some of the
Useful Anti-motion-sickness Drugs medication to be absorbed into the body
through the lining of the mouth.92
Generic Name/Brand Name Duration of
(Manufacturer) Form Action (hours) Other products sometimes used to treat
Dimenhydrinate/Dramamine (Searle) Tablet 4–6 seasickness include a watchlike device
Liquid 4–6 that uses electrical signals to stimulate the
Injection 4–6 nerves in the wrist and thereby disrupt
Dramamine (Richardson) Chewable 4–6
nausea and a wristband that administers
Gravol (Horner) acupressure (application of pressure to
Time- 6
released
specified points on the wrist) to relieve
Capsule nausea.93,94 Some people also believe that
Suppository 6 relief can be obtained through alterna-
tives such as drinking ginger ale or eating
Meclizine HC1/Bonine (Leeming) Chewable 6–12
Tablet a small amount of crystallized ginger or
Antivert (Roerig)
ginger cookies, because of ginger’s ef-
Tablet 6–12
Meclizine (Geneva) fectiveness in soothing upset stomachs;
Tablet 6–12
applying specific herbal oils behind the
Cinnarizine/Stugeron (Janssen) Tablet 6–12 ears to calm the inner ear; tightening a
Cyclizine/Marezine (Burroughs) Capsule 4–6 belt around the waist to relieve nausea;
Injection 4–6 wearing a patch over one eye to decrease
Transdermal Scopolamine/ Skin Patch 48–72 signals being received by the brain; or
  Transderm-Scop (Novartis) drinking lemonade or lemon juice.
Promethazine/Phenergan (Wyeth) Tablet 6–12 Others are skeptical about the effective-
ness of some or all measures that do not
Suppository 6–12
involve traditional medication; in addi-
Injection 6–12
tion, some nontraditional items probably
Promethazine and Ephedrine/ Tablet 6–12 have not been tested in a life raft and/or
  Phenergan plus Ephedrine
(Wyeth)
will not be available on a life raft.95

Source: Charles Oman, Ph.D. Oman said that several techniques may
help relieve symptoms, including avoid-
ing reading and other tasks that require
Later, in the life raft, some people will “If someone is planning a significant focusing the eyes on an object on the life
adjust within 36 hours to 72 hours to the overwater flight where there is a risk of raft and, if possible, sitting upright and
sensory conflicts that cause seasickness; ditching and they are buying anti-mo- keeping the upper body balanced over the
others will be sick much longer.91 tion-sickness drugs which might be taken hips as the raft moves.
… in an emergency, best to discuss ahead
During the adjustment period, survivors of time what people should take with a “Open the canopy if conditions permit, so
may have access to seasickness medication physician who knows their medical con- you can see out, and ventilation improves,”
from the life raft first aid kit — the supply dition [medical history].” Oman said. “Some canopies on the better
might last for a day or two — and pos- rafts afford a relatively wide view, which
sibly from the aircraft first aid kit. Oman In addition, because different medications probably helps. Sleep when you can — you
recommended including a variety of sea- work in different ways and may have dif- are less susceptible while asleep.
sickness medications in a variety of forms ferent side effects, survivors should read
— tablets to be taken orally, transdermal and follow directions for their use. “Having a strategy for treating chronic
patches and suppositories. sickness is also important. Suppositories
Suppositories may be most effective for or [transdermal patches] can help here.
“Some of the more effective drugs, those with severe vomiting. In other cases, If someone vomits repeatedly, keep them
such as scopolamine, have significant medication administered by mouth is most sipping fluids, even though they don’t
side effects and should only be taken if effective. If an individual already is seasick, want to. If they don’t replace the water,
prescribed by your physician,” he said. he or she may benefit from trying to let electrolytes and glucose they lose, in 12

204 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

to 24 hours, they’ll hit the wall, become especially those with chronic liver disease, Later, when the line connecting the din-
listless and unresponsive. Some say that are at an increased risk of having the in- ghy and his sailboat broke, he swam out
in World War II, chronic vomiting was fection spread into the blood and of de- to retrieve the dinghy, spending about an
one of the real killers in life rafts.” veloping potentially fatal complications. hour in the warm water.100
About 50 percent of Vibrio vulnificus
Oman also recommended having an blood infections are fatal. His experience was described in a letter
ample supply of seasickness bags to “help to the editor of the Seven Seas Cruising
the afflicted contain things without hav- Symptoms of Vibrio skin infections in- Association Commodores’ Bulletin:101
ing to hang their heads overboard, which clude redness, swelling and the appear-
can be dangerous. And it keeps the smells ance of bloody blisters.98,99 The following day, [McDonald and his
under control.” wife] noticed swelling in his feet and
Treatment includes cleaning cuts and legs. His wife noticed black lines mov-
Russell said that, generally, if one person other small wounds with an antisep- ing up his legs. Sores started develop-
in a life raft becomes seasick, others also tic solution and applying antibiotic ing on his legs, chest and forearms. He
become ill. ointment, if these items are included was vomiting and getting very weak.
in the life raft first aid kit; otherwise, Fortunately, they had a cell phone and
“Almost everybody gets sick,” Russell wounds may be washed with nonpo- called 911 for a rescue. …
said. “If one person pukes [vomits], table fresh water. (Ocean water can be
everybody’s going to puke. You’ve got to used for quickly rinsing wounds but At the hospital, a sore on his chest
take the anti-seasickness medicine im- — because of the presence of Vibrio had to be lanced. He was put on
mediately, preferably before the aircraft and other bacteria — not for a more antibiotics. … His normal weight
is ditched.” thorough cleansing involving rubbing of 172 [pounds; 78 kilograms] had
or soaking.) Larger wounds also should ballooned to over 200 pounds [91
be cleaned with antiseptic solution and kilograms] from the severe infectious
Marine Bacteria Can all foreign particles should be removed; fluid buildup. The general’s situation
Infect Skin, Digestive administering antibiotics, which usu- went from bad to worse as the doctor
System, Sinuses ally are not included in a standard life was forced to amputate both of his
raft first aid kit, is advisable. Without legs above the knees.

O cean water contains several types

of bacteria that can cause serious
infections. Of these, the most dangerous
them, and without other advanced
medical care, Vibrio vulnificus infec-
tions within deep wounds are consid-
His doctor said of the five cases [of
Vibrio vulnificus] he had treated,
is Vibrio vulnificus, one of a number of ered life threatening. General McDonald was the only
forms of Vibrio bacteria found in shallow survivor. The general’s case was
waters and estuaries in temperate waters Gastrointestinal infections caused by made worse by the fact that he had
worldwide. The bacteria also are found in Vibrio vulnificus and some other forms a preexisting liver condition.
contaminated shellfish and in the mouths of Vibrio can cause vomiting, diarrhea
of sharks.96 and abdominal pain in healthy people; Two other types of bacteria — Mycobac-
in those with weakened immune systems, terium marinum and Erysipelothrix rhyso-
Vibrio vulnificus and some other forms the infections can spread to the blood and pathiae — cause skin infections that, with
of Vibrio can cause serious infections can cause fever, chills, decreased blood time, usually heal without treatment.102
in any wound that is exposed to ocean pressure and skin lesions.
water — even in superficial cuts — and Mycobacterium usually enters the body
in people who eat contaminated seafood. Vibrio also can cause ear infections and through a cut or puncture wound and
(People who eat raw oysters are especially sinus infections. infects skin on the hands and feet, and
at risk.)97 often causes cellulitis in the surround-
One recent victim of Vibrio vulnificus ing skin. The infection, which may be-
Vibrio vulnificus infections of wounds can was retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Charles come apparent as long as three weeks
lead to ulceration of the skin. The bacte- McDonald, who contracted an infection to four weeks after exposure to the
ria can cause cellulitis, an infection in the during a sailing trip off the Florida coast bacteria, may spread to nearby bones
skin and in tissues just beneath the skin, in the Gulf of Mexico in 2002. McDonald and joints.
can destroy body tissues and can spread received scratches and minor cuts on his
into the bloodstream and into muscles. legs while transporting an anchor and Symptoms include the formation of red
People with weakened immune systems, anchor chain in a dinghy to his sailboat. nodules on the skin and peeling skin.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 205
 Su r v i va l

If the infection is correctly identified in its early Body’s ‘Fight or Flight’

stages, it can be treated with antibiotics that prob- Defense May Influence
ably will not be included in the life raft first aid Responses
kit. Without treatment, the nodules heal in about
two years to three years.

Erysipelothrix bacteria usually enter the body

T he hormone epinephrine (adrenaline), which
is secreted by the adrenal glands in response
to sudden stressful or frightening situations, and
through cuts and puncture wounds on the hands. other hormones known as catecholamines may aid
Within several days, the area of the infection be- in the body’s physical response to some aspects of
comes painful, itchy, purple and swollen, and fills a survival situation, such as exiting a sinking air-
with pus; the area is surrounded by an infection- craft, boarding a life raft or fighting off the effects
free area and another ring of red or purple skin. of hypothermia.105
A fever also may develop.
These hormones help the body prepare for whatever
Without treatment, the infection heals in one week is to come — the so-called fight-or-flight syndrome
to three weeks. — by causing the heart to beat harder and faster,
breathing to quicken and the digestive system to
Saltwater boils, pustules or skin ulcers may form slow its activity to allow blood to be sent from the
on the skin at pressure-points on the body, such digestive system to the muscles. Epinephrine also
as in areas where clothing rubs against the skin. causes a reduction in perception of pain.106,107
Healing is difficult on a life raft, where the environ-
ment is damp and salty, but keeping the wounded Nevertheless, the secretion of epinephrine that fol-
area as dry as possible and elevated may help.103 lows sudden immersion in cold water sometimes
results in abnormal heart rhythms. In addition, an
Survivors who spend long periods of time in the individual who feels a sense of relief after realizing
water, including those who sit in puddles of water that rescue is imminent may experience a reduc-
on a life raft that is not kept dry, develop swollen, tion in secretion of catecholamines and an end to
puffy skin. Survivors who leave a life raft to cool off their protective effect.109
in ocean waters are at risk of being bitten by some
of the small fish that typically gather in the shade Although catecholamine secretions may enhance
beneath life rafts; the bites can become infected an individual’s performance in stressful survival
and ulcerated. situations, their physical and mental capacities
may at the same time be diminished by physical
In the aftermath of some water-contact accidents, injuries, fatigue, shock and use of alcohol or drugs,
survivors may swallow or inhale fuel that has leaked including some prescription medications.
from the aircraft’s fuel tanks into the water; fuel also
may irritate the skin and cause an inflammation of
the eyes that may persist for several days. Any avail- First Aid Kits Often Include
able cloths or paper towels should Only Basic Items
be used to gently wipe off the fuel
from around the mouth, nose and
eyes, and the eyes should be rinsed B ecause medical supplies in a life raft are lim-
ited, first aid for occupants of a life raft also

“F irst aid
with sterile eyewash that may be
included in the life raft first aid kit.
(Rinsing the eyes with ocean water
is limited.

Regulations are vague about which items should

for occupants of would further irritate the eyes.) If be included in life raft first aid kits and in what
bath soap is available, the area also quantities. For example, Part 135 (“Commuter
a life raft … may be washed.104 and On-demand Operations”) says, “Some of the
items which could be included in the survival kit are
is limited.” Small amounts of fuel are not triangular cloths, bandages, eye ointments, water
toxic but may cause vomiting if disinfection tablets, sun-protection balsam, heat
swallowed or aspiration pneu- retention foils, burning glass, seasickness tablets,
monia if inhaled. ammonia inhalants [and] packets with plaster.”109

206 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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Typical life raft first aid kits include small quantities The first aid kits can be modi-
of these items and may also include compresses; fied to include additional items

“A
antibiotic ointment; pain-relief medication such requested by the aircraft op-
as aspirin, ibuprofen or acetaminophen; gloves erator — such as prescription
made of latex or a similar material; space blankets; medication and extra pairs of bottle
and a small first aid book. Some kits also include prescription eyeglasses for regu-
eyewash, a splint or a tourniquet. lar passengers. One item often of vitamins is
added by request to MedAire first
If, while evacuating an aircraft, a designated per- aid kits is nitroglycerin, which is the least of your
son retrieves the aircraft first aid kit, survivors on used to treat or prevent angina
the life raft will have access to additional supplies. (chest pain) that occurs with worries.”
For example, Part 135 aircraft with more than 19 heart disease, Garrett said.
passenger seats are required to be equipped with
first aid kits that contain “at least the following One item usually not recom-
appropriately maintained contents in the specified mended or requested for inclu-
quantities:” 16 one-inch (2.5-centimeter) adhesive sion in first aid kits is vitamins because, Bowman
bandage compressors, 20 antiseptic swabs, 10 am- said, “a bottle of vitamins is the least of your
monia inhalants, eight four-inch (10-centimeter) worries.”
bandage compresses, five 40-inch (102-centimeter)
triangular bandage compresses, one noninflatable Survival-training specialists said that some of the
arm splint, one noninflatable leg splint, four four- items in the aircraft kits are those that they would
inch roller bandages, two one-inch standard rolls recommend adding to the supplies in a life raft
of adhesive tape, one pair of bandage scissors first aid kit, such as required prescription medi-
and one pair of protective nonpermeable gloves cations; additional eyeglasses or contact lenses;
or their equivalent.110 ciprofloxacin, a powerful oral antibiotic often
prescribed for a variety of infections; and elastic
Joan Sullivan Garrett, president of MedAire, which stretch (compression) bandages for applying pres-
supplies first aid and medical kits for aircraft sure to wounds.
built by several manufacturers, said that aircraft
crewmembers should be aware of the location “A good first aid kit increases your chances of sur-
of the aircraft first aid kit in relation to the exit vival,” Storey said. “Without having anything, you
and should ensure that someone in the aircraft just have to depend on luck.”
is responsible for transferring the kit to the life
raft.111 The materials in the aircraft first aid kit Nevertheless, the most important element of first
would greatly enhance those in the life raft kit, aid on a life raft is enough medical knowledge to
Garrett said. be prepared for the situation, he said.

Aircraft first aid kits are packed in water-resistant Although aircraft crewmembers — flight
cases to ensure that crewmembers and passengers crews and cabin crews alike — might receive
“will have the kinds of things that they’re likely training on how to use the materials included
to need most in case of an accident or ditching,” in aircraft first aid kits, that training likely is
Garrett said. “It’s kind of a first-response kit.” not comprehensive, and developing plans on
how to cope with every eventuality would be
MedAire’s aircraft first aid kits include a number impossible. Instead, crewmembers and other
of items not required by Part 135: a CPR mask, survivors must do what they can to respond to
non-latex examining gloves, a manual suction life-threatening problems.
device, eyewash, a chemical “cold pack” contain-
ing substances that become cold when the pack is Bowman said that the most immediate medical
squeezed,112 tablets to relieve digestive disorders, concern would be stopping all obvious bleeding
antihistamine for treating allergic reactions and by covering the wound with any available piece
sometimes for aiding sleep, a stethoscope, a of material or a hand to apply direct pressure to
blood-pressure cuff, a digital thermometer and the wound and — if possible — by elevating the
tweezers.113 area of the injury.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 207
 Su r v i va l

Next, broken bones should be splinted Kasman said that a guiding principle for Sometimes it’s pain, but most of the time,
as soon as it becomes practical to do so, people in this situation is “you should do it’s being alone. Hence, administering
Bowman said. what’s within your ability and knowledge care is potent and significant.”
to help.”
Although some illnesses — dehydration, Survivors of ditchings and other water-
sunburn and seasickness, for example If someone on the life raft has a condi- contact accidents must cope with a num-
— are likely to occur on a life raft, almost tion that requires more treatment than is ber of potentially life-threatening medical
any illness or injury that occurs on land also available on the life raft, “you just admin- challenges. Their success depends in large
can occur on a life raft. Specialists said that, ister comfort and care in any capacity you part on how well they have prepared for
in those situations, their best advice would can,” she said. “For everybody, that’s dif- the situation and how resourceful they
be for survivors to cope in the best way they ferent: Hold them, talk, write down their can be in using medical equipment on
could within the limitations of their medi- last words. One of the things people are the life raft and the knowledge of those
cal supplies and medical knowledge. most afraid of about dying is dying alone. on board. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• No refills on a life raft; secure prescription drugs or over-the-counter medication against

water damage or loss.

• Ensure that the aircraft first aid kit is taken aboard the life raft.

• Survivors must do the best they can with the supplies and skills they have.

• Sometimes, nothing can be done to save a person’s life.

Notes   5. Golden, Tipton. passed the helicopter’s rescue rope to

others in the water.
  1. A ditching is defined as a deliberate   6. Transport Canada. Survival in Cold
emergency landing on water. Waters: Staying Alive. TP13822E. Ottawa, The report said that the probable cause of
Ontario, Canada, 2003. the accident was the flight crew’s “failure
  2. Storey, Roger. Telephone interview to use engine anti-ice during ground
by Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria,   7. Gill. operation and takeoff, their decision
Virginia, U.S., July 10, 2003. Flight Safety to take off with snow/ice on the airfoil
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.   8. Ibid.
surfaces of the aircraft, and the captain’s
  3. Golden, Frank; Tipton, Michael. Essentials   9. Golden, Tipton. failure to reject the takeoff during the
of Sea Survival. Champaign, Illinois, U.S.: early stage when his attention was
10. The name of the airport was changed called to anomalous engine instrument
Human Kinetics. 2002.
in 1998 to Ronald Reagan Washington readings.” Contributing factors were
For most healthy people, sudden (D.C., U.S.) National Airport. “the prolonged ground delay between
immersion in warm water (water nearly deicing and the receipt of ATC [air traffic
11. U.S. National Transportation Safety
the same as the normal body temperature) control] takeoff clearance, during which
Board (NTSB). Aircraft Accident Report:
presents no risk. For people with heart the airplane was exposed to continual
Air Florida Inc. Boeing 737-222, N62AF,
ailments, however, the slight increase in precipitation, the known inherent pitch-
Collision With 14th Street Bridge,
pressure against the body that occurs with up characteristics of the B-737 aircraft
Near Washington National Airport,
immersion increases the volume of blood when the leading edge is contaminated
Washington, D.C., January 13, 1982.
pumped by the heart, reduces air space with even small amounts of snow or ice,
NTSB-AAR-82-8. The airplane was
in the lungs and makes breathing more and the limited experience of the flight
destroyed; and 69 of the 74 people in
difficult. crew in jet transport winter operations.”
the airplane and four people on the
  4. Gill, Paul G. Jr. The Onboard Medical ground were killed. One of the airplane 12. Duncan, Kelly. Duncan was interviewed
Handbook: First Aid and Emergency passengers, who received minor injuries in “Accidents and Incidents,” a videotape
Medicine Afloat. Camden, Maine, U.S.: when the airplane struck the bridge and written and produced by Ken Clagett, Video
International Marine, 1997. the river, drowned after he repeatedly Support Services, Eastern Airlines, for flight

208 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

attendant training by Eastern Airlines In- Virginia, U.S., Aug. 22, 2003. Flight Safety 47. Ibid.
flight Services. The date of production (in Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Hospitals administer varying treatments
the early 1980s) was not available.
31. U.K. CAA. for hypothermia, including intravenous
13. Moore, Kelly [Duncan], as told to Beverly, delivery of warm fluids and hemodialysis,
32. Gill.
Joy. “Twice Rescued: Why Had I Survived in which an artificial kidney is used to
the Crash of Air Florida Flight 90?” Today’s 33. U.S. Coast Guard. Cold Water Survival. filter the blood, thereby removing extra
Christian Woman. January–February 1999. <www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/mse4/ fluids, chemicals and wastes from the
pfdcold.htm>. April 3, 2003. blood.
14. “Nine Drown in Icy Potomac in Marine
Training Exercise.” The Washington Post. 34. Tipton, Michael; Eglin, Clare; Gennser, 48. Land/Shark Instant Survival Shelter.
March 8, 1968. Mikael; Golden, Frank. “Immersion <www.land-shark.com>. Oct. 8, 2003.
Deaths and Deterioration in Swimming
15. American Canoe Association. Off-season 49. Auerbach.
Performance in Cold Water.” The Lancet
Boating, Cold Shock and Hypothermia.
Volume 354 (Aug. 21, 1999): 626–629. 50. U.K. CAA.
<www.enter.net/~skimmer/
coldwater.html>. April 3, 2003. 35. U.S. National Weather Service Office of 51. Golden, Tipton.
Climate, Water and Weather Services.
16. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 52. Russell, Paul D. Interviews by Werfelman,
Wind Chill Terms and Definitions.
General Aviation Safety Sense: Ditching Linda. Hollywood, Florida, U.S., April
<www.nws.noaa.gov/om/windchill/windc
(Leaflet 21A). 2000. 22, 2003, and Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.,
hillglossary.shtml>. Sept. 8, 2003.
May 1, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
17. Golden, Tipton.
36. Auerbach, Paul S. Medicine for the Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
18. Fenner, Peter. E-mail correspondence with Outdoors. Guilford, Connecticut, U.S.:
The Lyons Press, 2003. Russell is a maritime safety specialist and
Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, Virginia,
accident investigator, and a retired U.S.
U.S. July 4, 2003; July 9, 2003. Flight Safety
37. Golden, Tipton. Coast Guard captain with more than 5,000
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
flight hours in fixed-wing and rotary-wing
38. Ibid.
19. Cheng, David. Drowning. aircraft. In the U.S. Coast Guard, Russell
<www.emedicine.com/aaem/ The storm, which included winds conducted more than 200 water landings
topic166.htm>. July 2, 2003. of 60 knots to 70 knots, caused the and served in various positions, including
abandonment of 19 yachts, 14 of which commander of two air stations, chief of the
20. Ibid. Aviation Training Center Training Division
later were recovered. Rescuers picked up
21. Ibid. 136 race participants. Of the 15 people and chief of search-and-rescue operations
who died, three died during rescue and in the Northwest Region, before retiring in
22. Golden, Tipton. seven died after they had safely boarded 1984 with the rank of captain. He is chief
their life rafts. engineer, aviation system safety, Boeing
23. Gill.
Commercial Airplanes, and a maritime
24. Bowman, J. Russell. Telephone interview 39. Gill. safety and accident investigator for Safety
and e-mail communication with 40. Golden, Tipton. Services International.
Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, Virginia,
41. Honolulu (Hawaii, U.S.) Star-Bulletin. 53. Golden, Tipton.
U.S., July 3, 2003; Sept. 9, 2003. Flight
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, “Big Surf Keeps Rescuers Busy.” <http: 54. Ibid.
U.S. //starbulletin.com/2003/06/19/news/
story1.html>. Sept. 10, 2003. 55. United Nations World Health Organization
25. Golden, Tipton. (WHO). “Medical Care of Castaways and
42. U.S. National Oceanographic Data Rescued Persons.” International Medical
26. Ibid. Center. Hawaiian Island Coast: Water Guide for Ships. Chapter 12. Geneva,
Temperatures in Degrees Fahrenheit. Switzerland: WHO, 1988.
27. Ibid.
<www.nodc.noaa.gov/dsdt/cwtg/
28. Berkow, Robert (editor). “Near Drowning.” hawaii.html>. Sept. 10, 2003. 56. Berkow. “Cold Injuries.” Merck Manual
Merck Manual of Medical Information of Medical Information — Home Edition.
43. Search and Rescue Society of British Section 24, Chapter 281.
— Home Edition. Section 24, Chapter
Columbia. Hypothermia — Physiology,
283. Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, U.S.:
Signs, Symptoms and Treatment 57. Aquatic Network. Howard Blackburn:
Merck Research Laboratories. 1997.
Considerations. <www.sarbc.org/ Fisherman Hero. <www.aquanet.com/
29. Craighead, Frank C.; Craighead, John hypo1.html>. Aug. 8, 2003. features/blackburn/blackburn1.htm>.
J.; Smith, Ray E.; Jarvis, D. Shiras. How March 9, 2004.
44. Golden, Tipton.
to Survive on Land and Sea. Annapolis, 58. WHO.
Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 45. Ibid.
59. Berkow. “Cold Injuries.”
30. Kasman, Deborah. Telephone interview 46. MayoClinic.com. What Is Hypothermia?
by Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, <www.mayoclinic.com>. April 4, 2003. 60. WHO.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 209
 Su r v i va l

61. Golden, Tipton. Intact Human Colon.” Journal of Clinical 96. Gill.
Investigation Volume 48 (1969): 1336–1347.
62. Berkow. “Heat Disorders.” Merck Manual 97. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
of Medical Information — Home Edition. 78. Isaac, Jeffrey. Telephone interview by Prevention (CDC). Vibrio vulnificus.
Section 24, Chapter 280. Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, <www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/
U.S., Oct. 23, 2003. Flight Safety vibriovulnificus_g.htm>. Oct. 8, 2003.
63. Golden, Tipton. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
98. Ibid.
64. Tilton, Buck. Destination Outdoors: Sun 79. Gill.
Care. <www.destinationoutdoors.com/ 99. Gill.
textarticles/suntext.html>. Sept. 8, 2003. 80. Golden, Tipton.
100. Pope, Charlie; Pope, Chris. Letter
65. Golden, Tipton. 81. Robin, Bernard. Survival at Sea. Camden, to Seven Seas Cruising Association
Maine, U.S.: International Marine Commodores’ Bulletin. August 2002.
66. Burton, Ken. Interview by Werfelman, Publishing Co., 1981.
Linda. Hollywood, Florida, U.S., April 101. Ibid.
22, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, 82. Ibid.
102. Gill.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 83. Gill.
103. Golden, Tipton.
67. Rash, Clarence E.; Manning, Sharon D. “For 84. Haynes, Lewis. In Conversation With
Pilots, Sunglasses Are Essential in Vision Doug Stanton and Survivors of the USS 104. Ibid.
Protection.” Human Factors & Aviation Indianapolis. <www.ussindianapolisinhar
Medicine Volume 49 (July–August 2002). 105. Ibid.
msway.com/qa.htm>. June 10, 2003.
68. Golden, Tipton. Stanton is the author of In Harm’s Way: 106. Berkow. “Anatomy.” Merck Manual of
The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis and Medical Information — Home Edition.
69. FSF Editorial Staff. “Dehydration Section 1, Chapter 1.
the Extraordinary Story of Its Survivors.
Presents Unique Risks for Pilots.” Human
The “conversation” is on an Internet 107. Panzarino, Peter J. Jr. Diseases and
Factors & Aviation Medicine Volume 48
site maintained by the book’s publisher, Conditions: Stress. University of
(July–August 2001).
Henry Holt and Company, New York, Miami School of Medicine Glossary.
Excessive loss of water from the body also New York, U.S. <www.med.miami.edu/patients/glossary/
can result from fevers, use of diuretics art.asp?print=yes&ArticleKey=488>.
85. Smith.
(substances that increase the production Sept. 15, 2003.
and excretion of urine) and diseases such 86. Oman, Chuck. “Offshore Health: In
as diabetes. Search of a Cure for Seasickness.” Cruising 108. Golden, Tipton.
World. December 1991. 109. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
70. Golden, Tipton.
87. Golden, Tipton. (FAA). Advisory Circular 120-47. June 12,
71. FSF Editorial Staff. 1987.
88. Oman, Charles. E-mail correspondence
72. Smith, Ray E. Telephone interview and with Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, 110. FAA. U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations
e-mail communications with Werfelman, Virginia, U.S. Oct. 7, 2003; Oct. 15, 2003. Part 135, “Commuter and On-demand
Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., April 18, Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Operations,” 135.177, “Emergency
2003; June 17, 2003; June 23, 2003; Flight Virginia, U.S. Equipment Requirements for Aircraft
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, Having a Passenger Seating Configuration
U.S. 89. Goddard, JoAnn W. “In Depth: Feeling of More Than 19 Passengers.”
Seasick? You’re Not Alone.” Soundings
73. Russell. Volume 41 (September 2003). 111. Garrett, Joan Sullivan. Telephone
interview by Werfelman, Linda.
74. Craighead et al. “Preparedness and 90. Oman. “Offshore Health: In Search of a
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Sept. 9, 2003.
Priorities.” Chapter 11. How to Survive on Cure for Seasickness.”
Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Land and Sea.
91. Jacobs, Michael. “Seasickness.” Wilderness Virginia, U.S.
75. Robertson, Dougal. Survive the Savage Medicine Letter. Volume 19 (Summer
Sea. New York, New York, U.S.: Praeger 112. A chemical “cold pack” contains
2002).
Publishers, 1973. substances — often water and the
92. Golden, Tipton. chemical ammonium nitrate — which
76. Binder, H.J.; Sandle, G.I.; Rajendian, V.M. are packed in separate compartments
93. ReliefBand Device.
Chapter 7, The Large Intestine: Physiology, but which mix together when the pack
<www.reliefband.com>. Sept. 25, 2003.
Pathophysiology and Disease. (S.F. Phillips is squeezed. The chemical process that
et al., editors). New York, New York, U.S.: 94. Sea-Band. <www.sea-band.com>. Sept. occurs when the ammonium nitrate
Raven Press, 1991. 25, 2003. mixes with the water is an endothermic
process — a process that absorbs heat
77. Billich, C.O.; Levitan, R. “Effects of Sodium 95. Goddard, JoAnn W. “Remedies: The Tried
(becomes cold).
Concentration and Osmolality on Water and the Truly Odd.” Soundings Volume 41
and Electrolyte Absorption from the (September 2003). 113. MedAire. Aircraft First Aid Kit Contents.

210 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

What’s Eating You?

It’s Probably Not a Shark
Encounters with sharks are dramatic, widely publicized and frightening.
Nevertheless, the dangers from sharks and other predators rank low on the scale
of threats to survivors of water-contact accidents, compared with more common
risks such as hypothermia and dehydration.

— FSF Editorial Staff

A
lthough sharks, jellyfish and other Webster said that, for example, in the mid-Atlantic
ocean fish and mollusks can harm Ocean, days might pass without encountering
humans by biting or by injecting toxic any marine animals, while in tropical waters near
venom through spines or tentacles, se- northern Australia, especially near shore, encoun-
rious injuries from encounters with most of these ters would be more likely, especially with jellyfish Sharks are
creatures are relatively rare. or a Portuguese man-of-war.
attracted by shiny
jewelry that resembles
For survivors of an aircraft ditching or other Without a life raft, however, the situation might
water-contact accident, sharks and other ocean be different, Burgess and Webster said. the sheen of fish scales

creatures “are really of no concern at all” — as and by bright colors,

long as the survivors are in a life raft, said George “Once you’re in the water, there is concern,” including the “yum-yum
Burgess, director of the International Shark Attack Burgess said. “Sharks can, and occasionally do, yellow” of life vests.
File (ISAF), which investigates reports of shark-
human interactions and maintains records of
sharks that have bitten humans worldwide dat-
ing from the mid-1500s.1

“Food, water, communication with whoever’s

going to save you — not to mention the health
and safety of people on the raft — would all be
of greater concern than a shark attack,” Burgess
said. “The shark would be at the bottom of the
page, as a footnote.”

Steven Webster, senior marine biologist at the

Monterey Bay Aquarium in Monterey, California,
U.S., agreed.

“The most likely thing to happen, so far as marine

animals are concerned, is nothing,” Webster said.2

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 211
 Su r v i va l

sutures are expended on seashell lacerations of the

feet than on shark bites.”4

Although any shark longer than about seven feet

(two meters) should be considered a potential
threat to humans, the largest of all species of sharks
— the whale shark, which can grow as long as 66
feet (20 meters) and can weigh as much as 90,000
pounds (40,824 kilograms)5 — has been cited in
only two reports. Of the approximately 350 spe-
cies of sharks found in the world’s oceans — and
occasionally in fresh water — ISAF data show that
about 40 species have bitten humans. Of those 40
species, the great white shark has been cited far
more often than all others, followed by the tiger
shark and the bull shark.6

Specialists say that damage human beings. Humans can be attrac- ISAF data show that in most years, there are be-
three fatal shark tive targets, especially if they’re bleeding.” tween 70 and 100 instances worldwide in which
attacks were reported sharks bite humans and that those bites result in
worldwide in 2002. Nevertheless, even an injured person in the ocean between five and 15 deaths.
without a life raft should be “far more concerned
about drinking water, exposure and any injuries In 2002, ISAF investigated 86 reports of shark bites
than about a shark attack,” Burgess said. that resulted in three deaths.7 Of the 86 reports, 60
were classified as unprovoked incidents in which
ISAF said that shark bites are a “potential dan- “an attack on a live human by a shark occurs
ger that must be acknowledged by anyone that in [the shark’s] natural habitat without human
frequents marine waters, but it should be kept in provocation of the shark.” Fourteen of the 86
perspective.” (Although most sharks live in oceans, reports were classified as provoked incidents in
some species live in fresh water, or spend some of which “a human initiated physical contact with
their time there.) a shark, e.g., a diver [is bitten] after grabbing a
shark or a fisher [is bitten] while removing a shark
For example, Burgess said, every year, 15 times from a net.” Three reports involved sharks biting
more people are killed when they are hit by falling marine vessels, and three reports were determined
coconuts than are killed by sharks.3 not to have been shark bites; six reports included
insufficient information to determine whether a
In addition, ISAF said, “Bees, wasps and snakes shark bite actually occurred.8
are responsible for far more fatalities each year.
In the United States [with a population of more About 80 percent of the 60 unprovoked bites oc-
than 280 million], the annual risk of death from curred in North America, mostly in U.S. waters off
lightning is 30 times greater than that from the coast of Florida; the remaining unprovoked
shark bites. For most people, any shark-human bites occurred in Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica and
interaction is likely to occur while swimming or South Africa.
surfing in near-shore waters. From a statistical
standpoint, the chances of dying in this area are In a typical year, most bites occur in waters near
markedly higher from many other causes (such the shore, either between a sandbar and the shore;
as drowning and cardiac arrest) than from shark between two sandbars, where sharks often feed and
bites. Many more people are injured and killed where they sometimes become trapped at low tide;
on land while driving to and from the beach than or in areas with steep drop-offs, which also are the
by sharks in the water. Shark-bite trauma is also sharks’ feeding grounds.
less common than such beach-related injuries as
spinal damage, dehydration, jellyfish [stings] and Unprovoked shark bites are grouped into three
stingray stings, and sunburn. Indeed, many more categories:9

212 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

• “Hit-and-run” bites, in which the shark bites A study of 2,500 accounts by military airmen of
a human while apparently perceiving that the their survival at sea after bailing out or ditching
human is one of the shark’s customary food during the 1940s and early 1950s found that only
sources — for example, a seal. These bites 38 accounts mentioned any type of contact — in-
usually occur in the surf in turbulent water cluding visual contact — with sharks; 12 of those
conditions that include poor visibility for the 38 contacts resulted in injury or death.12
shark. ISAF specialists say that the shark prob-
ably recognizes immediately upon biting that Nevertheless, George Albert Llano, Ph.D., author
the human is not the food it was seeking, and of a report on the study, said, “As these figures are
then releases the human and does not return; based only on the accounts of survivors, they can
be misleading. When sharks are successful, they
• “Bump-and-bite” bites, in which the shark leave no evidence, and the number of missing air-
circles and bumps its victim before biting. men who may have succumbed to them cannot
These bites usually occur in deeper water and be estimated.”
may involve repeated bites and/or sustained
bites, and severe injuries; and, One of the accounts included in Llano’s study was
that of an Ecuadorian flight officer who — with
• “Sneak” bites, which occur without warning. two companions — ditched an aircraft in the
These bites, like bump-and-bite bites, usu- Pacific Ocean off the coast of Ecuador. All three
ally occur in deeper water and may involve men removed their clothes before donning life
repeated bites and/or sustained bites, and vests and entering the water. (Removing clothing
severe injuries. was once a common recommendation.) After the
first of his colleagues died, about five hours after
Bites involving survivors of aircraft accidents and the ditching, the flight officer pushed the floating
marine-vessel accidents typically are either bump- corpse ahead of him in the hope of “taking it out
and-bite bites or sneak bites, which ISAF said are [for burial on land] if we managed to reach land.”
— unlike hit-and-run bites — a result of “feeding Instead, the flight officer said, “a strange force
or antagonistic behaviors” by the shark. dragged the body, and I did not see it again.”

After his second colleague died, the flight officer

Sharks Attracted by Some again tried to push the corpse ahead of him. The

S
Aircraft, Ship Disasters following is his description of what happened
next:13
harks
S harks show apparent curiosity about unusual
sounds and unusual activities in the water
— such as the commotion of an aircraft impacting
As it was a [moonlit] night and during some
moments very clear, I was able to observe that
show apparent
the water. Their acute senses of hearing and smell, strange figures crossed very close to us, until at
curiosity about
their sometimes-excellent eyesight (although some a given moment, I felt that they were trying
species of sharks do not see as well as others) and to take away the corpse, pulling it by the feet,
unusual sounds
their electro-sensory system, which enables them on account of which I clutched desperately the
to detect the weak bioelectric currents generated body of my companion, and together with him, and unusual
by living things, help them locate their prey and we slid until the tension disappeared. …
other objects of interest.10 activities in
Once refloated, with despair I touched his legs
“You can count on sharks making an appearance and became aware that a part of them was the water.
after a disaster,” Burgess said. “They won’t all be lacking … and continued swimming with the
there to eat you. Some will come just to look now-mutilated corpse until the attack was
around.” repeated two times more and then, terrorized
at feeling the contact of fish against my body,
Ray E. Smith, a U.S. Navy survival-training spe- turned loose the corpse, convinced that I would
cialist, said, “Historically, if there’s been a major be the next victim. … As soon as it was light, I
aircraft crash and there’s lots of activity in the could see the coast at a great distance, but I had
water … sharks are attracted.”11 no hopes of reaching it because with the light

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of day, I could clearly see that under, and this time I found myself separated
various sharks were following from [the radioman]. I also was the recipient

“O
me. … When I moved my legs of a wallop across the cheekbone by one of the
slowly, with the object of rest- flying tails of a shark. From that moment on,
ne by one, ing, I touched with my feet the I watched [the radioman] bob about from the
bodies of these animals, which attacks. His head was under water, and his
sharks began were constantly below mine in body jerked as the sharks struck it. As I drifted
order to attack me. I would then away … sharks continually swam about, and
to pick off thrash the water, and thus for a every now and then, I could feel one with my
few moments, the danger would foot. At midnight, I sighted a … boat and was
the men …” pass. I continued swimming all rescued after calling for help.
day Friday until at sundown, I
found myself some four [hun- Perhaps the most notorious shark-bite incidents
dred meters] or 500 meters involved survivors of the USS Indianapolis, a U.S.
[1,312 feet or 1,641 feet] from Navy heavy cruiser that was struck by Japanese
the rock on the coast, and as I was already tired torpedoes in the Pacific Ocean during the final
… because of the undertow which existed, I days of World War II. Of the 1,197 people on the
could not reach the rocks until after making a USS Indianapolis, about 880 survived the sink-
superhuman effort. ing just after midnight July 30, 1945. Of the 880
survivors, many were seriously injured. Five days
In another incident, the pilot of a U.S. Navy later, when rescuers arrived, only 317 men were
Grumman S2N Tracker encountered sharks after still alive.15 Two hundred men are believed to have
an engine failure forced him to ditch the airplane been killed by sharks.16
over the Pacific Ocean. He lost consciousness
during the impact, and his radioman pulled him Patrick J. Finneran, former executive director of
from the airplane and put on the pilot’s life vest. the USS Indianapolis CA-35 Survivors Memorial
The two men tied themselves together with dye Organization, wrote in his history of the ship that
marker cords. sharks began appearing at daylight, several hours
after the ship sank, among the hundreds of men
The following is the pilot’s description of what hap- who were in the water wearing life vests — or
pened during the 16 hours before his rescue:14 sharing life vests with others:

It was within a very short time (about one- One by one, sharks began to pick off the men
half hour) when sharks were quite apparent on the outer perimeter of the clustered groups.
swimming around us. … An hour later, we Agonizing screams filled the air day and night.
heard aircraft, and I said … ‘Let’s kick and Blood mixed with the fuel oil [that had entered
splash around to see if we [can] attract their the water from the ship’s fuel tanks]. The sur-
attention.’ It failed, but suddenly [the radio- vivors say the sharks were always there by the
man] said he felt something strike his right hundreds — swimming just below their dan-
foot and that it hurt. I told him to get on my gling feet. It was a terror-filled ordeal — never
back and keep his right foot out of the water, knowing if you’d be the next victim.17
but before he could, the sharks struck again,
and we were both jerked under water for a Woody Eugene James, a coxswain on the USS
second. I knew that we were in for it, as there Indianapolis who was in the water without a
were more than five sharks around and blood life vest after giving his life vest to an officer, said
all around us. He showed me his leg, and not years later that the sharks had numbered in the
only did he have bites all over his right leg, but hundreds.18
his left thigh was badly mauled. He wasn’t in
any particular pain, except every time they “You’d hear guys scream, especially late in the
struck, I knew it and felt the jerk. I finally afternoon,” James said. “Seemed like the sharks
grabbed my binoculars and started swinging were the worst late in the afternoon, [worse] than
them at the passing sharks. It was a matter of they were during the day. Then they fed at night,
seconds when they struck again. We both went too. Everything would be quiet, and then you’d

214 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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hear somebody scream, and you knew a shark not yield food. As a result, a shark would be ex-
had got him.” tremely unlikely to bite at a life raft, he said.20

Capt. Charles B. McVay III, commanding officer “It’s not that it can’t happen, but it isn’t likely,”
of the USS Indianapolis, who was on one of the Russell said.
ship’s few life rafts (most of the rafts sank along
with the ship), described a different experience Burgess said that ISAF data show that when sharks
with a shark: have bitten at boats, the boats generally have been
metal vessels used in fishing operations. In those
We had a shark that adopted us. … We events, the shark — using its electro-sensory sys-
couldn’t get rid of him. [Some sailors] were tem — presumably has mistaken the signals from
scared to death of this shark because he kept the boat’s electromagnetic field for the electric sig-
swimming underneath the raft. You could see nals generated by its usual prey and has taken an
his big dorsal fin, and it was white, almost exploratory bite, often of a boat’s propeller.
as white as a sheet of paper; apparently (the
shark) spent most of his time on the surface, “They get confused by the presence of metal,”
and this fin had bleached out, so he didn’t Burgess said. “A life raft probably wouldn’t be as
blend in with the water at all. … interesting.”

We were trying to get some fish to use as bait.

… Every time we caught a little one and used Bright Colors, Fishing
that for bait, the shark got it before we could Activities Appeal to Sharks
get any other fish.19

The experiences of the USS Indianapolis survivors

are not typical, however.
S harks are attracted by shiny jewelry, which
— to their eyes — resembles the sheen of fish
scales, by uneven tanning and by bright colors,
including the bright orange and yellow used in
“With [an accident involving] a small helicopter life vests.
or airplane, it’s extremely rare to have any problem
with a shark, or even any contact with a shark,” “The safety orange/yellow used in [life vests]
Smith said. is referred to as ‘yum-yum yellow’ by shark bi-
ologists,” said Burgess, who noted that although
Although sharks may be attracted to life rafts, studies have indicated sharks’ attraction to bright
they generally are more interested in the fish that and/or contrasting colors, there are no data to
congregate beneath a life raft than in the humans show that sharks have been attracted to — and
inhabiting the raft. bitten — people because of their yellow or orange
life vests. “But it’s a trade-off. To
“Most sharks will not cause any grief to a float- be readily seen by rescue folks in
ing vessel, including a life raft,” Burgess said. “But the air or from a vessel, you also
there’s a little bit of concern that, if things get too must be seen by sharks.”
lively among the creatures underneath your vessel,
there might be an accidental bite at the life raft [by
a shark chasing something else].”
Sharks also are attracted to waters
where fishing activity is in prog-
“I t’s extremely

ress and to waters containing rare to have any

Paul D. Russell, a maritime safety specialist and effluents (liquids discharged as
accident investigator, and a retired U.S. Coast waste by sewers), human waste or problem with a shark,
Guard captain with more than 5,000 flight hours blood. (There are no data to show
in fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, said that that menstrual blood increases or even any contact
sharks would be more likely to bump into ballast the risk of a shark bite, but many
bags attached to the underside of a life raft than to specialists believe that sharks can with a shark.”
bump into a raft itself, and that such contact prob- sense the presence of menstrual
ably would be enough for the shark to recognize blood.)21 They are more likely to
that the ballast bags — and the life raft — would bite a solitary individual than a

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member of a group and more likely to be necessarily enable the person to assess said Erich Ritter, chief scientist with
active — and therefore more likely to bite the shark’s intentions, Smith said. the Shark Research Institute’s Global
— during darkness or twilight. Shark Attack File;29
“The only thing that can be said about
The U.S. Army says, in its U.S. Army Field sharks that will be true and right in all • Remain in a group “at all costs” and
Manual No. 21-76: Survival, that sharks cases is that they are unpredictable,” Smith gather together as much floating
that live in tropical and subtropical oce- said. “If the shark is close enough to kick material as possible, Burgess said;
anic waters typically are more likely to bite or punch, it’s time to kick or punch. Doing
than those living in cooler waters. The nothing is not recommended.” • Do not remove any clothing, in-
manual includes the following caution: cluding shoes. Sharks generally bite
As for concerns that a kick or punch unclothed people — and those with
[Sharks’] normal diet is live animals might further provoke a shark, Smith bare feet — before they bite those
of any type, and they will strike at said, “if they are about to take a bite of wearing clothing. Clothing also pro-
injured or helpless animals. Sight, you, they don’t need to be provoked.” tects against cuts and scrapes from
smell or sound may guide them to the shark’s rough skin — injuries
their prey. … They are also sensitive The following actions are recommended if that might occur if a shark brushes
to any abnormal vibrations in the you observe sharks while in a life raft:24,25 against a human;
water. The struggles of a wounded
animal or swimmer, underwater • Do not fish. If a fish has been • Do not urinate or defecate while
explosions, or even a fish struggling hooked, let it go. Do not clean fish sharks are in the area; and,
on a fish line will attract a shark.22 in the water;
• If you are injured and bleeding, stop
Advice originally developed for use by • Do not let arms, legs or equipment the bleeding as quickly as possible. If a
U.S. Navy personnel and later published dangle in the water. Remain quiet group of people is in the water, form a
in the book How to Survive on Land and and still; and, circle around the bleeding survivor.
Sea warns against dangling hands or feet
in the water when sharks are nearby and • Bury the dead as soon as possible by Ritter said that, if a shark actually bites
against “flopping about on the surface,” pushing the bodies into the ocean. and does not let go, “the best thing to do
which could sound to a shark like a … is to not fight the shark, besides trying
wounded fish. If sharks approach, they If you are floating in the water and ob- to get its mouth open. Any motion, such
are not necessarily going to bite but may serve sharks, the following actions are as jerking away from the shark, will lead
instead be on “an investigative foray,” the advised:26,27,28 to much more severe wounds and can be
book says. “A sharp poke on the snout much more devastating than the actual
may send the shark on to less trouble- • Survivors should float vertically and bite. Opening a shark’s mouth should not
some prey.”23 move as little as possible. Someone be attempted by hitting the animal, since
lying horizontally in the water is more that reflects a ‘prey action.’ I consider it
Smith, one of the book’s authors, said that likely to resemble sharks’ typical prey, the best to go after the gills or the eyes
he has complied with that advice and has and poke them, if reachable.”30
hit or kicked sharks on the snout when
they approached while he was diving. Ritter was himself the victim of a shark

“T
bite on April 9, 2002, while he was working
“It worked,” he said. “Common sense with a film crew on a documentary about
says ‘do something’ — hit as hard as you he … thing sharks. He was standing in waist-deep wa-
can to defend yourself. I think the snout ter in The Bahamas, wearing tan shorts, a
would be the most likely and easiest tar- that can be said tan shirt, black footwear and black gloves,
get. The eyes would be harder to hit but when an 8.0-foot (2.4-meter) bull shark
about sharks …
probably as effective.” swam up behind him, bumped him and
bit into his left leg; after Ritter raised his
is that they are
Someone wearing a life vest and keeping leg toward the water’s surface, the shark
his or her head out of the water prob- let go and swam away. The bite removed
unpredictable.”
ably would not see clearly enough to much of the calf muscle and severed a
observe a shark’s underwater behavior, major artery in the leg. Ritter described
but even a close observation would not the pain as “excruciating.”31

216 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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“I had the impression that everything had If the wound severs major arteries, the vic- The prognosis for a shark-bite victim
slowed down around me,” he said. “I was tim may suffer a “torrential” hemorrhage; who spends days in a life raft or in ocean
not angry, upset or anything like that, but injuries also can include broken bones and waters before receiving emergency medi-
I just understood what had happened and massive internal injuries, Auerbach said. cal treatment depends on the extent of
what had to be done. “Because the victim is generally far from the blood loss and wounds, he said.
medical assistance, blood loss may be
“On my way to the hospital, I started profound. The wounds have historically He said that including tablets of the
to get cold, and I felt disconnected to been fatal in 15 [percent] to 25 percent of antibiotic ciprofloxacin among medical
what had happened to me. Then I found attacks, with major causes of death listed supplies that are packed into life rafts or
some form of peace and acceptance that as hemorrhage and drowning.” ditch bags would be useful in treating not
I may die.” only an infection resulting from a shark
Hypovolemic shock (shock resulting from bite but also a variety of other infections
loss of blood) usually is the greatest threat that could afflict people on a life raft (see
Blood Loss, Drowning to life, he said. Recommended treatment, “Is There a Doctor Aboard the Life Raft?,”
Are Most Serious Risks while a victim is in the water, includes page 187). Use of prescription medica-
to Shark-bite Victims manual compression of wounds (cover- tions should be discussed with medical
ing the wound with any piece of material personnel during training, and printed

W ounds inflicted by a shark’s rough

skin or its multiple rows of sharp
teeth can be relatively minor, such as skin
or even a hand while applying firm, con-
stant pressure to stop the bleeding). After
a victim is out of the water, “all means
information about how to administer
the medications should be included in
the personalized medical kit.
abrasions after a shark’s body brushes available must be used to ligate [tie off]
against a victim or relatively small cuts large, disrupted blood vessels or to apply
from bites — usually on the legs — that compression dressings,” Auerbach said. Researchers Continue
are inflicted during a hit-and-run bite.32 to Seek Reliable Shark
The bites often are crescent-shaped or a Wounds inflicted by sharks often con- Repellents
series of parallel cuts.33 tain a variety of contaminants, includ-

A shark also can break human bones if it

hits a person while traveling at speeds up
ing ocean water, sand, shark teeth and
marine organisms. Ideally, the wounds
should be washed and bandaged, and
R esearchers have attempted for years
to develop devices to repel sharks.

to 25 miles (40 kilometers) per hour.34 a victim should receive antibiotics to During World War II, the U.S. Navy
prevent infection. This may be difficult developed one of the first shark repel-
Other bites, especially those inflicted dur- on a life raft, where supplies of fresh lents — a combination of black dye and
ing bump-and-bite and sneak encounters, water for washing the wounds might chemicals intended to resemble both the
can result in more serious injuries. be limited and antibiotics might not be defensive secretions of squid and octopus
available. (Ocean water, which contains and decomposing shark flesh. The crew
Paul S. Auerbach, M.D., clinical bacteria, can be used for quickly rins- of the USS Indianapolis was not equipped
professor of surgery in the Stanford ing wounds to expel foreign particles but with the repellents, which later were
(California, U.S.) University Medical should not be used for a more thorough found to be ineffective.37,38
Center Division of Emergency Medicine, cleansing.)
said that when a shark bites a human, More recently, scientists have tested meth-
the shark most frequently bites the legs, Nevertheless, infection probably would ods of repelling sharks by using substances
arms and hands, as the victim tries to not develop for at least 24 hours to 36 derived from other ocean animals, such as
fight off the shark. In more severe bites, hours — perhaps longer — after a shark sea cucumbers and crocodiles, and from
a shark often “shakes its head and fore- bite and the probable lack of effective an- decomposing shark flesh.
body in an effort to tear flesh from the tibiotics would not be the most immedi-
victim,” Auerbach said.35 ate risk to a shark-bite victim, Auerbach An Australian company has designed two
said.36 devices — one intended for use by divers
“Severe shark bites result acutely in mas- and the other, by swimmers or surfers
sive tissue loss, hemorrhage, shock and For a shark-bite victim in the water — that generate a protective electrical field
death,” he said. “Even a smaller [shark] without a life raft, Auerbach said, “the to overwhelm the sharks’ electro-sense and
can bite with bone-crushing force. The number-one problem is that they’re go- to keep them away. A device weighs about
potential for rapid destruction is unpar- ing to drown. … They may not be able to 3.0 pounds (1.4 kilograms) and is worn on
alleled in the animal kingdom.” stay afloat.” the thigh or the ankle.39

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 Su r v i va l

accident, the season and the availability of the

jellyfish’s prey, “you could land in a jellyfish soup,
or you could be there for days and not see one,”
Webster said.

Although jellyfish usually are found near coasts,

some species also live in open ocean waters, he
said.

Worldwide, in all ocean regions, there are thou-

sands of species of jellyfish and related ocean
creatures, called cnidarians or coelenterates.

Each of these creatures has thousands — some

species have millions — of nematocysts (sting-
ing cells) on the outer surfaces of the tentacles or
near the mouth. When something (the jellyfish’s
prey or a person who has crossed the jellyfish’s
path, for example) brushes against a jellyfish, the
trigger hairs on the outside of the nematocysts
are released. This, in turn, releases coiled-thread
tubes inside each nematocyst; the tubes puncture
the skin of the victim and release venom that can
paralyze or kill prey (or sting a human).40 A jel-
lyfish sting usually involves the release of venom
from many nematocysts.

Three main classes of jellyfish can deliver stings

that present risks to humans:

• Scyphozoans or “true” jellyfish — including

sea nettles and moon jellyfish — vary in color.
Jellyfish stings can Webster said that, although some develop- Their bodies (bells) may be blue, green, pink,
cause pain and itching ments, especially the electronic repellent, are red, brown or clear; they often are difficult to
and — depending on promising, no chemical shark repellent has see in the water. They also vary in size; some
the species — serious been found effective in the environment of species are smaller in diameter than one inch
open ocean waters. (2.5 centimeters) while others may grow to
injury or death.
more than 10 feet (three meters) in diameter
with tentacles more than 100 feet (31 meters)
Jellyfish Stings Can Cause long.41 Their bodies generally are balloon-
Minor Pain — or Death like in appearance, with dangling tentacles.
Webster said that although some species of

S urvivors of a water-contact accident who are

floating in the water or who leave a life raft
temporarily to cool off in ocean water may en-
true jellyfish do not have tentacles, all species
sting their prey. (Some have stinging cells too
small to sting humans, however.)
counter jellyfish or other related species, whose
stings cause pain and itching and — depending Most true jellyfish are active night and day,
on the species and the individual victim’s sensi- whenever food is available, Webster said.
tivity to the jellyfish venom — can cause serious Some species migrate to the ocean surface at
injury or death. night, when surface waters have a more plenti-
ful supply of food, and descend hundreds of
Depending on a number of factors, including the feet during the day to the relative safety of the
location of the ditching or other water-contact dark waters well below the surface;

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• Cubozoans including “box” jellyfish, which bluebottle), technically are not jellyfish but
are considered the most deadly of all jellyfish, — because of some similar behaviors — typi-
are found in parts of the Pacific Ocean and cally are considered with them.
Indian Ocean — usually near coastlines and
reefs — from Australia north to southern The Portuguese man-of-war, which resembles
Japan and southern India. Data show that, a true jellyfish, actually is a colony of four kinds
in recent years, at least one death a year in of individuals (polyps) found primarily in
Australia is a result of a box jellyfish sting; tropical waters. The floating portion (bell) of
from 1883, when record keeping began, the man-of-war, which usually is blue, is one
through March 2003, 68 deaths were attrib- individual, which supports the other three,
uted to box jellyfish.42,43 including the tentacles. Although the sting
rarely is fatal, it can be extremely painful.47
The Australian Institute of Marine Science
says that a box jellyfish has a transparent, Most jellyfish stings result in a small, raised rash
pale blue, box-shaped bell, measuring up to that appears on the skin as a series of lines. An area
about eight inches (20 centimeters) on each of reddened skin sometimes surrounds the rash.
side, with as many as 15 tentacles extending The area often itches, and may be painful. The
from each of the four corners; the tentacles rash may develop into pus-filled blisters. The sting
are up to about 10 feet long.44 may result in other symptoms, including weak-
ness, nausea, headache, muscle pain and/or muscle
“In clean ocean waters, they are almost in- spasms, watering eyes and nose, sweating, changes
visible, and for years, it wasn’t known what in the heart rate, and chest pains.48
was actually causing such excruciating pain,
often followed by death,” the museum says Peter Fenner, M.D., a specialist in jellyfish enven-
in its description of box jellyfish. “If a swim- omation and an Australian designated aviation
mer makes contact with the box jellyfish’s medical examiner, said that survivors of an aircraft
tentacles, perhaps only six [meters] or seven ditching or other water-contact accident in the
meters [20 feet or 23 feet] of them, death may open ocean would have only a remote chance of
result. … The severity of the sting is relative to being stung by jellyfish, unless the aircraft landed
the size of the box jellyfish, the sensitivity of “in an armada of Portuguese man-of-war.”49

M
the victim’s skin and the amount of tentacle
that has come into contact.” “[Survivors’] best protection is that they are in
ost
clothing, which prevents being stung, except in
The stings of several species of very small exposed areas,” Fenner said. “Stings to exposed
jellyfish stings
box jellyfish (whose bodies have diameters areas would not be sufficient to cause a threat to
of less than one-half inch [13 millimeters]) life and would only cause local skin pain, which, result in a small,
have been identified as the cause of Irukandji although uncomfortable, would not usually be
syndrome, in which the victim initially is sufficient to worry about treatment.” raised rash that
aware of only minor skin irritation but, after
about 30 minutes, experiences other symp- The stings of all jellyfish should be treated by appears on the
toms, including generalized pain; nausea, cleaning the area of the sting with ocean water
vomiting and abdominal cramps; headache; — not fresh water, which can stimulate the release skin as a
severe back pain; and “a feeling of impending of additional toxin.
doom,” said two researchers in the Tropical series of lines.
Australian Stinger Research Unit at James Specialists do not agree on some other elements
Cook University.45 The stings of some of of treatment.
these small box jellyfish also have caused hy-
pertension (elevated blood pressure), other Fenner said that, for all but box jellyfish stings,
heart problems, breathing difficulties and he recommends rinsing the area of the sting with
— rarely — death;46 and, ocean water and, if possible, applying ice or a
chemical “cold pack,” which becomes cold when
• Hydrozoans, or “other” jellyfish, includ- squeezed. This should relieve pain and itching
ing Portuguese man-of-war (also called within 20 minutes.50

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 Su r v i va l

sting, and death can occur quickly. For example,

Fenner said, a victim who needed antivenom prob-
ably would die before reaching the life raft.

Smith said that, because people entering the wa-

ter from an aircraft presumably would be clothed,
packing a life raft to include the materials gener-
ally required for treatment probably would not
be necessary.

Fenner said, however, that chemical cold packs

might be useful in treating jellyfish stings.
Nevertheless, he said, “These would be low on
a list of priorities in favor of other more urgent
medicine, food, water and survival gear.”

Barracuda Would Rather

Bite Your Catch Than You
Barracuda attacks Some other specialists say that the stings of all
often occur as
they try to steal
jellyfish except box jellyfish can be treated by
applying vinegar, a weak solution of ammonia,
window cleaner, meat tenderizer, urine or other
O ther animals found in the open ocean (and
sometimes closer to land) that sometimes
present risks include the following:
fish from people
substances to relieve pain;51,52 others, including
spearfishing.
Fenner, say that these substances — in addition • Barracuda, which generally swim near shore-
to being generally unavailable on a life raft — are lines in tropical and subtropical waters and in
ineffective or, in some cases, harmful. open ocean waters, have bitten humans, but
the bites are rare. When bites have occurred,
Some specialists also say that medical care adminis- usually the barracuda are trying to steal fish
tered under ideal circumstances (not on a life raft) from people using spears to fish, or they ob-
includes removal of visible tentacles using forceps serve shiny objects such as divers’ knives and
or another similar instrument or by hand, with mistake them for small, shiny fish. The bites,
precautions to protect the person removing the which typically are not fatal, usually result
tentacles. The area of the sting is soaked again in in cuts and a loss of tissue.55 Ideally, these
a solution of water and vinegar; and the wound is wounds should be cleaned with fresh water
covered with shaving cream, which is scraped away — if the supply on the life raft is sufficient
with a sharp knife or razor blade to remove unseen — to remove debris, including embedded
tentacles. (On a life raft, if a knife or razor blade is teeth. Jagged cuts may require sutures; if tape
not available, some specialists say that the edge of is available on the life raft, taping the wound
a credit card or similar item can be used to brush shut may be an acceptable alternative.56
off remaining tentacles.)53 The area of the sting is
soaked in the water-vinegar solution again before Sometimes, the wounds are more severe.
administration of an antihistamine, a pain-reliever Barracuda — with two parallel rows of teeth
and an anti-itch ointment — which might be in- — can tear human flesh and can sever blood
cluded among some life raft medical supplies.54 vessels.57 In these cases, treatment requires
controlling bleeding by pressing directly on
Fenner said that, for box jellyfish stings, treatment the wound with a piece of cloth or even a
should begin with cardiopulmonary resuscitation, if hand. This may be difficult while the victim
necessary, followed by application of vinegar to help is in the water; in such cases, the best action,
deactivate nematocysts on any tentacles remaining if possible, might be to tie a strip of cloth
on the skin. Victims with severe stings may require around a bleeding arm or leg. After the victim
administration of antivenom (antivenin); without is out of the water, the cloth should be re-
it, they may stop breathing within minutes of the moved and bleeding should be controlled by

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direct pressure on the wound.58 Auerbach said found as far as 40 statute miles (60 kilometers)
that treatment of bleeding and tissue damage from shore in open ocean waters. Crocodile
is foremost; if antibiotics, such as ciprofloxa- bites typically kill several people each year;60,61
cin, are available, they can be administered for and,
infection;
• Electric rays, also called torpedoes, are found
• Sea snakes, which are found in tropical and in tropical and temperate open ocean waters
subtropical waters of the Indian Ocean and and closer to shore, along sandy or muddy
the western Pacific Ocean, are venomous and ocean floors. Although humans rarely en-
sometimes bite if they are provoked. Most counter them, they are capable of producing
victims are believed to be fishermen who are paralyzing electric shocks.62
bitten while handling nets that have captured
sea snakes along with fish. Although the sea Other ocean animals that can inflict painful stings
snakes’ venoms are potent, about 80 percent of or cuts — usually if they are stepped on or brushed
bites do not contain enough venom to result against — live close to shore or around reefs. They
in serious harm to their victims. Under ideal include the following:
circumstances (not in a life raft), treatment in-
cludes application of a pressure bandage over • Stingrays, which generally are found in sand or
the bite to prevent the venom from spreading muddy areas near shore in tropical, subtropical,
through the body, keeping the victim as still as warm and temperate regions, have venomous
possible and administering antivenom as soon barbed tail stingers. They are not aggressive,
as possible. Before the development and use of but if stepped on, their stingers can penetrate
antivenom, about 10 percent of sea snake bites the foot. Immediate treatment involves rinsing
were fatal; today, with prompt treatment, the the sting with fresh water, if possible, or ocean
death rate is much lower. Precise data are not water; removing parts of the embedded stinger;
available, however;59 and applying pressure to stop bleeding. Wounds
may become infected and may ultimately re-
• Estuarine crocodiles, which generally live in quire hospital treatment or — if the stingray
saltwater bays in tropical areas, may also be was very large — may be fatal;63,64

Stingrays
have venomous
barbed tail stingers
that can cause
injury if stepped on.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 221
 Su r v i va l

pack, if available, to reduce pain. Cuts from

brushing against corals sometimes result in
serious infections; the cuts should be treated
by removing embedded coral; rinsing with
fresh water, if available, and pressing on the
wound to stop bleeding;67,68 and,

• Other venomous marine creatures include

some species of fish — often those living
around coral reefs — with venomous spines
in their fins or tails or on their backs and
some cone shells and auger shells — generally
those found in the Indian Ocean and Pacific
Sea snakes, which • Moray eels, which usually live in holes or Ocean — with venomous stinging barbs. Sea
have potent venom, beneath rocks and coral in tropical and urchins also can emit venom through their
sometimes bite if they subtropical waters, sometimes bite when spines; the most frequent wounds are to the
are provoked.
disturbed. The bites are rare but potentially feet or hands of people who inadvertently step
severe and can damage nerves or tendons in on them while walking in shallow near-shore
the hands and feet. The wounds should be waters or pick them up. The spines should
rinsed with fresh water, if available, embed- be pulled out, although embedded spines
ded teeth should be removed, and pressure usually either come out through the skin or
should be applied to stop bleeding;65,66 are absorbed by the body; most wounds heal
within a month.69,70
• Anthozoans, including sea anemones and
some corals, are among the coelenterates Although many ocean creatures can inflict seri-
related to jellyfish. They typically are found ous injuries on humans, specialists say that the
on reefs and ocean bottoms. Anemones usu- risk of an encounter with a dangerous predator
ally have minimal toxicity, and their stings is relatively slight for survivors of a water-contact
should be treated by rinsing with ocean water accident. Nevertheless, not all dangers can be
to remove tentacles and applying ice or a cold eliminated. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

Despite the rarity of shark encounters, we know that shark facts are of special interest. …

• Human encounters with sharks are rare, and worldwide data show that each year, between three and 15
people are killed by sharks.

• Survivors floating in the water — not in life rafts — are more likely to be targeted by sharks.

• Survivors should avoid activities that attract sharks. In life rafts, this means not dangling arms or legs in the
water and not fishing when sharks are visible nearby. In the water, survivors should remain fully clothed,
stay in groups and float vertically — not horizontally like sharks’ typical prey.

• If a shark does bite, the best response is to punch it or kick it in the snout, eyes or gills.

• Survivors in cold waters of the North Atlantic might not encounter any dangerous animals; in the warm
waters off the southeastern United States, they would be more likely to encounter sharks; and near the
Australian coast, they could find themselves amid box jellyfish, whose sting can kill within minutes.

222 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Notes   8. ISAF. International Shark Attack 17. Finneran.

File 2002 Shark Attack Summary.
  1. Burgess, George. Telephone interview and 18. James, Woody Eugene. A Survivor’s Story.
<www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/sharks/
e-mail communication with Werfelman, <www.ussindianapolis.org/woody.htm>.
statistics/2002attacksummary.htm>.
Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., May 5, May 13, 2003.
April 21, 2003.
2003; May 6, 2003; May 8, 2003. Flight
19. McVay, Charles B. III. Oral History: The
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,   9. ISAF. How, When and Where Sharks Attack.
Sinking of USS Indianapolis, Recollections
U.S.
10. Oceanic Research Organization. of Capt. Charles B. McVay III, USN,
  2. Webster, Steven. Telephone interview and Sharks and How They Live. Commanding Officer of USS Indianapolis
e-mail communication with Werfelman, <www.oceanicresearch.org/ (CA-35), which was sunk by Japanese
Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., May sharkspt.html>. June 19, 2003. submarine I-58 on 30 July 1945 near the
28, 2003; June 17, 2003; June 20, 2003; Philippines. (McVay’s recollections are
11. Smith, Ray E. Telephone interview and
June 30, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, included in a series of World War II
e-mail communication with Werfelman,
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. interviews at the Naval Historical Center.)
Linda. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., April
<www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq30-
  3. “Experts: There Will Be Shark Attacks, But 18, 2003; June 17, 2003; June 18, 2003;
7.htm>. May 13, 2003.
Consider the Odds.” The Daytona Beach June 23, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
(Florida, U.S.) News-Journal. May 22, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 20. Russell, Paul D. Interviews by Werfelman,
2002. Linda. Hollywood, Florida, U.S., April
12. Llano, George Albert. Airmen Against the
22, 2003, and Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.,
Sea. Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information
  4. International Shark Attack File May 1, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
Center (ADTIC), Research Studies
(ISAF). Shark Attacks in Perspective. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. In the U.S.
Institute, U.S. Air Force. ADTIC
<www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/sharks/attacks/ Coast Guard, Russell conducted more
Publication G-104. 1955. The preface
perspect.htm>. April 21, 2003. than 200 water landings and served in
said that the report was “the fourth in a
various positions, including commander
  5. John G. Shedd Aquarium. Fishes: series of ADTIC studies to determine how
of two air stations, chief of the Aviation
Frequently Asked Questions. military personnel survived under emer-
Training Center Training Division and
<www.sheddnet.org/ani_faqs_ gency conditions in various parts of the
chief of search-and-rescue operations in
04.html#b>. Sept. 2, 2003. world.” The series included 999 Survived
the Northwest Region, before retiring in
(Southwest Pacific tropics), Sun, Sand and
  6. ISAF. How, When and Where Sharks Attack. 1984 with the rank of captain. He is chief
Survival (African deserts) and Down in the
<www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/sharks/attacks/ engineer, aviation system safety, Boeing
North (Arctic). Most of the information
howwhen.htm>. April 21, 2003. Commercial Airplanes, and a maritime
in Airmen Against the Sea was obtained
safety and accident investigator for Safety
  7. Conversely, humans kill about 100 million from records of the U.S. Air Force and the
Services International.
sharks, skates and rays every year through U.S. Navy; the publication also includes
fishing and unintentional catching of the information from records of the air forces 21. Mowatt-Larssen, Eric. Shark Bite.
creatures in fishnets, Burgess said. of Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany <www.emedicine.com/aaem/
and New Zealand, and from other sources. topic534.htm>. June 18, 2003.
The U.S. National Parks Conservation The report is based on information gath-
22. U.S. Army. “Sea Survival.” Chapter 16
Association said that the worldwide ered from airmen who survived ditching
in U.S. Army Field Manual No. 21-76:
population of each of the 350 or more or bailing out of airplanes mostly during
Survival. June 1992.
species of sharks is unknown but that World War II and to a lesser extent during
shark populations in many areas have de- the Korean War and the early 1950s. “The 23. Craighead, Frank C. Jr.; Craighead,
clined in recent years. (U.S. National Parks most valuable and informative mate- John J.; Smith, Ray E.; Jarvis, D. Shiras.
Conservation Association. Sharks. <http: rial was found in the firsthand accounts “Environmental Hazards at Sea.” Chapter
//npca.org/marine_and_coastal/marine_ written by the survivors themselves,” the 13, in How to Survive on Land and Sea,
wildlife/sharks.asp>. Aug. 20, 2003.) report said. Fourth Edition. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.:
Naval Institute Press. 1984.
A 2003 report on a study by Canadian 13. The date of the incident was not included
scientists said that, of 17 species of sharks in Llano’s report. 24. ISAF. Reducing the Risk.
found in the North Atlantic, populations <www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/sharks/attacks/
of 15 species had declined rapidly between 14. The date of the incident was not included
relariskreduce.htm>. April 21, 2003.
1986 and 2003; the greatest decline was in Llano’s report.
the 89 percent reduction in the popula- 25. U.S. Army.
15. Finneran, Patrick J. The Tragedy of the USS
tion of hammerhead sharks (Baum, Julia Indianapolis. <www.ussindianapolis.org/ 26. Ibid.
K.; Myers, Ransom A.; Kehler, Daniel G.; pfinnstory.htm>. May 12, 2003.
Worm, Boris; Harley, Shelton J.; Doherty, 27. ISAF. Reducing the Risk.
Penny A. “Collapse and Conservation 16. Stanton, Doug. In Harm’s Way: The Sinking
28. Smith.
of Shark Populations in the Northwest of the USS Indianapolis and the Extraordinary
Atlantic.” Science Volume 299 (Jan. 17, Story of Its Survivors. New York, New York, 29. Ritter, Erich. Ritter was interviewed in
2003): 389–392). U.S.: Henry Holt and Co., 2001. Anatomy of a Shark Bite, a Discovery

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 223
 Su r v i va l

Channel television program first shown 45. Carrette, Teresa; Seymour, Jamie. First Aid for Soldiers. <www.vnh.org/
Aug. 10, 2003. Jellyfish Responsible for Causing Irukandji FirstAidForSoldiers/Fm211_6.html>.
Syndrome. <www.jcu.edu.au/interest/ July 1, 2003.
30. Ritter, Erich. Shark Week: Ask the Expert.
stingers/information.htm>. June 18, 2003.
<http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/ 58. Thomas, Scott.
sharkweek/ask/ask.html>. Aug. 21, 2003. 46. Fenner, Peter J.; Hadok, John C. “Fatal
59. Foster, James; Bolger, Angela.
Envenomation by Jellyfish Causing
31. Ritter, Erich. Interviewed in Anatomy of a Snake Envenomations, Sea.
Irukandji Syndrome.” Medical Journal of
Shark Bite. <www.emedicine.com/emerg/
Australia Volume 177 (7): 362–363.
topic543.htm>. May 21, 2003.
32. ISAF. How, When and Where Sharks Attack.
47. Australian Museum Online.
60. U.S. Army. “Dangerous Fish and
33. Mowatt-Larssen. Australian Museum Fact Sheets: the
Mollusks.” Appendix F in U.S. Army
Bluebottle or Portuguese Man-of-War.
34. Ritter, Erich. Interviewed in Anatomy of a Field Manual No. 21-76: Survival. June
<www.amonline.net.au/factsheets/
Shark Bite. 1992.
bluebottle.htm>. May 23, 2003.
35. Auerbach, Paul S. “Shark Attacks.” 61. Britton, Adam. Crocodilian Species List.
48. Berkow, Robert (editor). “Marine Animal
NewsShare: Newsletter of the International <www.flmnh.ufl.edu/cnhc/csl.html>.
Stings and Bites.” Section 24, Chapter
Society of Travel Medicine March–April May 21, 2003.
287 in The Merck Manual of Medical
2002: 2–5. Information — Home Edition. Whitehouse 62. Craighead et al., p. 313–317.
36. Auerbach, Paul S. Telephone interview by Station, New Jersey, U.S.: Merck Research
Laboratories. 1997. 63. Ibid.
Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, Virginia,
U.S. July 1, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, 49. Fenner, Peter. E-mail communication 64. Thomas, Scott.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. with Werfelman, Linda. Alexandria, 65. Ibid.
Virginia, U.S., June 25, 2003. Flight Safety
37. Stanton.
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 66. Florida Museum of Natural History.
38. Sisneros, Joseph A.; Nelson, Donald R.
50. A chemical “cold pack” contains sub- 67. Tucker.
“Surfactants as Chemical Shark Repellents:
stances — often water and the chemical
Past, Present and Future.” Environmental 68. Thomas, Scott.
ammonium nitrate — which are packed
Biology of Fishes Volume 60 (2001):
in separate compartments but which mix 69. Ibid.
117–129.
together when the pack is squeezed. The
39. SeaChange Technology. SeaChange chemical process that occurs when the 70. U.S. Navy. U.S. Navy Diving Manual,
Shark Shield: How It Works. ammonium nitrate mixes with the water is SS521-AG-PRO-010, Revision 4, Change
<www.sharkshield.com/howitworks.html>. an endothermic process — a process that A, March 2001. Appendix 5C, “Dangerous
June 30, 2003. absorbs heat (becomes cold). Marine Animals.”

40. Fenner, Peter J.; Williamson, John 51. Berkow.

A. “Worldwide Deaths and Severe
52. Tucker, Jeffrey. Coelenterate and Jellyfish
Envenomation From Jellyfish Stings.” The
Envenomations. <www.emedicine.com/
Medical Journal of Australia Volume 165
emerg/topic104.htm>. May 21, 2003.
(1996). <www.mja.com.au>.
April 29, 2003. 53. Virginia Poison Center at the Medical
College of Virginia Hospitals at Virginia
41. Jeffress, Dorothy; Steimle, Frank.
Commonwealth University. The Poisons of
“Common Jellyfish of the Middle
Summer. <www.vcu.edu/mcved/iframe/
Atlantic.” Underwater Naturalist Volume
tox/pdf/poison_summer.pdf>. July 1, 2003.
19 (June 1990).
54. Tucker.
42. Fenner and Williamson.
55. Florida Museum of Natural History.
43. “Boy’s Death From Box Jellyfish
Biological Profiles: Great Barracuda.
‘Avoidable,’ Says Expert.” Sydney
<www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/education/
(Australia) Morning Herald. March 24,
bioprofile.htm>. April 17, 2003.
2003. <www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/
03/24/1048354533747.html>. June 17, 56. Thomas, Craig; Scott, Susan. All Stings
2003. Considered: First Aid and Medical
Treatment of Hawaii’s Marine Injuries.
44. Australian Institute of Marine Science.
<www.aloha.com/~lifeguards/
Dangerous Marine Animals of Northern
alsting1.html>. July 1, 2003.
Australia: Sea Wasp. <www.aims.gov.au/
pages/research/project-net/dma/pages/ 57. Virtual Naval Hospital. “First Aid for
seawasp-01.html>. April 17, 2003. Bites and Stings.” Chapter 6 in FM21-11

224 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Crewmembers from
the U.S. Navy ship
Spica transferred
sailor Brian King
and two of their
rescue swimmers
from a life raft to the
rigid inflatable boat,
which was hoisted
to the ship’s deck.

Aviators and Sailors in the

Water Depend on the Same
Rescue Resources
Rescues at sea are perilous and present opportunities for success and failure.

— FSF Editorial Staff

F
inding people in distress is just the Azores.1 Collingridge was the owner and skipper
beginning of the problem for rescuers, of a 36-foot (11-meter) Moody 36 sailboat.
based on a Canadian sailor’s story of his
emergency transfer from a sailboat to a “It’s very common for sailors to be volunteer
U.S. Navy ship in summer 2003. Brian King, 57, crew on long-distance voyages,” King said. “Tony
a retired firefighter from Toronto, Ontario, with was returning to his home port in England, and I
a weakened heart had volunteered to assist, his had asked him to give me a shout if his son-in-law
friend Tony Collingridge, 67, as a crewmember for could not make the voyage as planned. I always had
a voyage across the Atlantic Ocean from Titusville, wanted to sail across the Atlantic Ocean, but had
Florida, U.S., to Faro, Portugal, with a stop in the abandoned my dream because of health concerns. I

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 225
 Su r v i va l

0 500 1,000
Kilometers
0 500 1,000
Nautical Miles

Brian King Rescue

800 NM (1,481 KM) Azores
West of Azores
Departure: Destination:
Titusville, Florida, U.S. Faro, Portugal
2,404 NM (4,453 KM)

ATL A N TIC O CEAN

The crewmember was being treated for heart enlargement from a viral gales (on the Beaufort Wind Scale, a gale involves a
became ill after infection in 2001, which left my heart working at wind speed of 34–40 knots [63–74 kilometers per
22 days at sea and 20 percent efficiency. I knew it could be a roll of the hour]) and 20-foot (six-meter) waves. King said
was rescued near dice to do this adventure, but I had no symptoms that motion of the sailboat had been moderate to
and no trouble sailing from Lake Erie to Florida a heavy for about 70 percent of the voyage.
the Azores.
few weeks earlier. In preparation to go with Tony, I
carried enough blood-thinning medication for the “Because of constant motion, I found that I was
voyage and an extra month’s supply.” more tired than expected, and two gales at sea
forced us to stop twice for one and a half days,”
The sailboat was 800 nautical miles (1,481 kilome- King said. “Reducing sail for the gale conditions
ters) west of the Azores — about a week’s sailing was exhausting. The weather knocked the stuffing
time — after 22 days at sea, when King recognized out of us during the first three weeks. We were a
that he might have a serious medical condition. week away from medical assistance, and we knew
Collingridge attempted to obtain information we needed medical advice beyond our first aid
to treat King’s symptoms — moderate pain and training.” They could not find information about
urination of blood for more than a day — first King’s symptoms in the medical guides carried in
by broadcasting a medical urgency message by the boat, Collingridge said.
very-high-frequency (VHF) marine transceiver.2
No response was received. Without long-range
communication capability and concerned about Beacon Registration Helps
a possible life-threatening emergency, he then Confirm Voyagers’ Distress
activated a 406-megahertz (MHz) emergency po-
sition-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) to notify
search-and-rescue (SAR) authorities. T he EPIRB, registered to Collingridge, enabled
U.S. Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center
(RCC) Norfolk (Virginia, U.S.) to verify with family
The voyage involved 24-hour watchkeeping with members that the sailboat was on a sea voyage and
alternating three-hour sleep periods at night, to learn details of its float plan. RCC Norfolk coor-
which was difficult to sustain for three weeks. They dinated the SAR response by requesting assistance
encountered winds and waves that were higher from nearby commercial ships that participated in
than expected for the time of year, including two the Amver (Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel

226 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

Rescue) ship-reporting system and from the U.S. t­ ransceiver], and then returned to the Spica to
Navy (see “The Search-and-rescue System Will Find get more crew. A rescue swimmer will deploy
You — If You Help,” page 111). from the helicopter and swim over to our boat
and come aboard and assess the situation. The
The crew of the U.S. Navy Ship (USNS) Spica rescued Navy ship is about 30 nautical miles [56 kilo-
King on June 25, 2003, provided shipboard medical meters] away.
care and enabled him to return with the ship six days
later to Norfolk. In the following excerpts from his “The helicopter returned and the rescue swim-
journal, King described his experience: mer jumped off and swam over. Once the rescue
swimmer was aboard, we quickly told him about
“I still have what appears to be nothing but blood the blood in my urine — but not about my
in my urine, and so we activated the EPIRB at 0130 heart condition — and the rescuers decided it
local time [and kept the VHF marine transceiver was best for me to return immediately to their
on]. We just want to talk to someone and try and ship. Unfortunately, the only way to get on the
get some medical advice on my condition. We got helicopter was to retrace the rescue swimmer’s
a call on our VHF radio from a nearby tanker ship movements. I was to put on a life vest and rescue
just 4.5 hours later that a naval vessel with a doctor harness, jump into the water with him and swim
was on the way to our position. The Greek tanker over to the helicopter, and we’d be hoisted aboard
Niriis is standing by a mile off our port side and by their winch and cable. He said that I may not
will remain in radio contact and visual contact be returning to the sailboat.
until the naval vessel has us in sight. Pretty damned
impressive results so quickly in the middle of the “I was wearing my rain-gear jacket and a pair of
Atlantic Ocean! shorts. Knowing I may not be returning to the
sailboat, I put my wallet, credit cards and … pass-
“By 0830, a U.S. Navy helicopter flew over, port … into a small Ziploc bag and stuffed it into
and the crew spoke to us [by VHF marine one pocket and closed the pocket with a Velcro

The crew of the

U.S. Navy Ship
Spica responded
to the request by
the U.S. Coast Guard
for an open-ocean
rescue.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 227
 Su r v i va l

Deployed from a fastener. I put my important heart medications “Nothing was happening. No upward movement
helicopter after the into another Ziploc bag and, along with my two occurred. Then a little up movement occurred,
malfunction of a winch, latest urine samples for the doctor, jammed them but we could feel the cable slipping. Back down
a life raft is retrieved into the other pocket and sealed it tight. I put my in the water we went. Then the helicopter moved
sandals on as I’d need shoes to get home. backward with the two of us still attached at water
after it provided
level.
flotation and shelter
“I jumped into the water with the rescue swim-
to Brian King and two
mer off the back of the boat. From there, we swam “With the speed that we were being dragged
rescue swimmers from toward the helicopter and the hoist cable. As we through the water, I was taking in a lot of salt
the U.S. Navy Ship approached the helicopter, the rotor downwash water and was starting to panic. I slapped my
Spica. and engine noise were incredible. hand hard on the rescue swimmer’s shoulder to
indicate trouble, and finally the helicopter stopped.
“We were floating up and down on the four-foot The swimmer released his harness and left just me
[1.2-meter] swells, and at the same time we were attached to the cable hoping that the hoist would
being hammered with spray from the rotor down- raise me alone.
wash. (I later learned from the pilots that close
surface helicopter activity actually attracts sharks “Now I was being dragged around again, gulping
with the water disturbance and sound waves.) more water. The cable started to raise me, but I
The rescue swimmer finally was able to grab the could still feel it slipping, and over the next 10
dangling cable, and he fastened us together and minutes or so — who the hell knows? — I was up
gave the sign to hoist us. and down like a bungee cord, sometimes getting

228 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Su r v i va l

close to the helicopter and then being dropped motion of the life raft on four-foot swells for
again into the water.” about 30 minutes.

“By this time, Tony had arrived, but we were safe

Helicopter Rescue Fails on the life raft. As Tony went by, we yelled to him
(because the second rescue swimmer’s radio be-

“A t some time during this failed attempt to

hoist me aboard, I lost … my underwear,
shorts and one sandal. (Later, the pilot told me
came inoperative) to throw me a pair of shorts.
When Tony did the next drive by, I yelled to him
to get my luggage ready because the rescuers
that she saw my shorts floating by down below.) would return for it after taking me to the ship.
I could feel myself slipping from the harness [Collingridge also provided drinking water to King
under my armpits. The harness prevented me and the rescue swimmers.]
from looking down to see how far off the water
surface I was. I didn’t start to slip right away, “Now the Spica was nearby … a supply vessel for
but only after several attempts at raising me up. the U.S. Navy. They lowered their rigid inflatable
Perhaps I was losing strength and not able to hold speedboat, and it came over with some crew to
on properly. I elected to release myself from the rescue me and their two rescue swimmers. We
harness — I didn’t fall out — after being dragged quickly got to the ship, and a long ladder was
one more time into the ocean. I realized by that lowered over the side. The crew climbed aboard
time that the winch wasn’t working and I was not the ship up the ladder and asked if I could climb
going to reach the helicopter. the ladder.

“By this time, I had lost sight of the first res- “I looked up and said, ‘My wife would kill me now
cue swimmer who was with me; the helicopter if I had a heart attack and died half way up,’ so I
came down close and a second rescue swimmer declined. Anyway, I was supposed to be sick and
jumped in the water to be with me. So now he had already gone through the most challenging
and I were floating in the swell trying to find thing I’ve ever had to do. So they raised … the
the first swimmer. This second rescue swim- speedboat and me and some of the crew up to the
mer who was with me had a radio — the first deck rail, and I climbed aboard and … the ship’s
rescue swimmer didn’t. I told him to radio his medical professional greeted me and whisked me
helicopter crew to get Tony back here to rescue off to an already-prepared warm bath and dry
us because clearly the damned cable hoist wasn’t clothes in the sick bay. [The crew of the rescue
working. He did that and said that Tony was boat returned to the sailboat to retrieve King’s
returning. So while we were in the water, we luggage.]
looked around and could see the mast of the
boat getting closer, and I could also see the Navy “After a quick interview, [the medical profes-
ship heading toward us a long way off. sional] was on the satellite phone
talking to a physician about my

“I
“Then, nearby us, we saw a smoke flare in the symptoms and medications I was
water and what turned out to be an upturned on. Turns out that my prescrip-
inflatable life raft dropped by the helicopter. [The tion blood thinner taken with realized by
crew of the helicopter had descended close to the over-the-counter [nonpre-
the surface to deploy the life raft and to deploy scription] laxative on board the that time that
the second rescue swimmer without using the sailboat was the cause of the
hoist cable, Collingridge said.] As the life raft got bleeding. the winch wasn’t
closer, we saw the first rescue swimmer with it,
and then both rescue swimmers grabbed onto it “For the first time in my life working and I was
and flipped it upright. The first rescue swimmer — even after 30 years on the fire
department — this was the first not going to reach
struggled aboard and then helped me. It was easy
to gain access by crawling first onto an inflat- time I ever genuinely felt like I
the helicopter.”
able platform in front of the doorway. Then the could die … I was really scared,
second rescue swimmer climbed on. One of the and when I was dangling from the
swimmers started to feel seasick because of the cable out there and being dragged

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–FEBRUARY 2004 229
 Su r v i va l

through the water, I feared that I may not make In retrospect, King said that despite 27 years of
it out of this one and never see my family and sailing experience, he underestimated the physi-
friends ever again. What an exhausting and emo- cal demands of the voyage and the health-related
tional experience!” limitations.

The helicopter crew primarily was assigned to “Because I had no heart-related symptoms and did
transfer cargo from the Spica to U.S. Navy marine not ‘max out’ [exhaust myself] day to day during
vessels in the Mediterranean Sea, King said, and the previous voyage, I believed that I was fit for this
the crew was trained to conduct ocean rescues but adventure,” he said. “After the first week, I knew
had not conducted an actual rescue. Investigation that I did not belong there.”
of the helicopter hoisting problem revealed that
the clutch had a mechanical problem that was Collingridge sailed solo uneventfully for six days
not identified during normal preflight checks, to Portugal, where he was met by a friend who
King said. helped to crew the sailboat to England. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• The signal from an up-to-date registered 406-MHz emergency radio beacon with built-in
GPS position reporting enables SAR authorities to confirm that the beacon probably is at the
position detected by satellite.

• A 406-MHz beacon with built-in GPS position reporting can dramatically reduce the time to launch
a rescue.

• A commercial ship and/or a military ship may be diverted to carry out a rescue — rather than
launching SAR aircraft or SAR marine vessels — at a distress scene far out in the ocean.

• The rescue phase can be hazardous, under the best of conditions.

• Survivors must follow instructions of SAR personnel and must provide complete information about
any condition that could affect the rescue.

• A VHF marine transceiver — carried by survivors or dropped by rescuers — makes communication

more effective during on-scene SAR operations.

Notes
1. King, Brian. E-mail communication with Rozelle, 2. King. E-mail communication with Rozelle, Roger.
Roger, and telephone interviews by Rosenkrans, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Nov. 1, 2003. Flight Safety
Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. July 3, 2003; Aug. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
27, 2003; Oct. 7, 2003; and Oct. 8, 2003. Flight Safety
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

230 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equipment
and Training
  Equipment and Training

233 Life Raft Primer:

Guidelines for Evaluation

258 Life Raft Evaluation:

Pooling the Resources
293 Life Rafts: Ask the Person Who’s Tried One

323 All Aboard … Except Me

337 Physical Fitness for Life Rafts

and Life Vests
339 FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1B, Acceptable
Methods, Techniques and Practices —
Aircraft Inspection and Repair
340 One Repair Station’s Standard Life Raft
Inspection Procedures

346 Your Life Vest Can Save Your Life …

If It Doesn’t Kill You First

357 Cold Outside, Warm Inside

361 JAA Proposes Standards for Immersion Suits

365 HEED This

372 Train to Survive the Unthinkable

378 Train to Rise to the Top

382 If You Need It, They Have It

 This frog-like
photographer ensured
that both still images
and video images were
captured in the wave
pool during the 2002
life raft evaluation.

A Life Raft Primer:

Guidelines for Evaluation
— Douglas S. Ritter With FSF Editorial Staff

An aircraft operator has a wide choice of aviation life rafts of different designs,
construction and features. Nevertheless, these differences — and their influence on life raft
performance — are not always readily apparent. For example, life rafts that meet the minimum
standards required by a national civil aviation authority can vary considerably in their
life-saving effectiveness. All life rafts are not created equal.

T
he parameters of the 2002 evaluation of reflects similar parameters under which the previ-
aviation life rafts (and marine life rafts), ous evaluations were conducted.
and previous evaluations in 1993, 1996
and 2000, all of which were conducted Moreover, the data in the evaluation (see “Life Raft
in Arizona, U.S., by Douglas S. Ritter (and his Evaluation: Pooling the Resources,” page 258) are
wife, Sue), executive director of the Arizona-based a compilation of the results of the evaluations of
Equipped to Survive Foundation, are described aviation life rafts since 1993. As this article goes to
below. The 2002 evaluation, which was conducted press, some of the life rafts may not be in produc-
with Flight Safety Foundation, August 23–25, tion (although they are likely to continue to be in

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 233
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

use by aircraft operators for many years); current capture events as they unfolded throughout the
features and auxiliary equipment may be different evaluation. Under water, two scuba (self-contained
than those tested; and the products were evalu- underwater breathing apparatus)-equipped divers
ated without regard to manufacturers’ rankings used a still camera and a video camera to capture
of top-of-the-line vs. their most basic offerings. images to allow evaluation of stability systems,
Nevertheless, the evaluations provide a practical boarding devices and capsizing effects. The div-
means of understanding the range of designs, ers were readily available during capsizing tests to
construction and features of life rafts offered by assist volunteers in an emergency, which has never
various manufacturers. occurred in any of the evaluations.

Although a wide range of aviation life rafts was After the in-water evaluation was completed, the
evaluated in 2002, the Foundation focused on life rafts were moved to a warehouse where each
aviation life rafts with rated capacities of six oc- was inflated and was mounted on boxes to dry.
cupants or more. Then each life raft was moved to a stand that al-
lowed accurate measurement and photography.
With the exception of the 1993 evaluation, which Each life raft’s design, construction and features
was conducted in a conventional swimming pool, were noted. Some life raft components, such as
the in-water evaluations were conducted in a large sea anchors and manually operated inflation
indoor wave pool with a trained lifeguard staff pumps, were removed from the life rafts and the
at the Kiwanis Park Recreation Center in Tempe. performance of each component was assessed
The wave-pool generates 3.0-foot to 4.0-foot (0.9- separately. Each survival equipment pack (SEP),
meter to 1.2-meter) waves, and provides a more often referred to as a “survival kit,” was opened
realistic condition for probing the effectiveness of and the contents were recorded, examined and
boarding devices, righting aids and some other photographed.
features.
Many of the
Still photographs and videotapes were made of Volunteers
volunteers with deployments, boardings, capsizings and other
an array of aviation
life rafts included
in the evaluation.
actions associated with the life rafts. Two, and
sometimes three, still photographers and three
video photographers were positioned poolside to
T he in-water evaluation was conducted with
a diverse group of about 35 volunteers, typi-
cal of past evaluations (see “Life Rafts: Ask the
Person Who’s Tried One,”
page 293). They included
men and women with a wide
range of body types, heights,
weights, physical conditions
and ages.

Some volunteers had no pre-

vious water-survival training
or any other experience with
life rafts, while other volun-
teers had received water-
survival training and/or had
other experiences with life
rafts in the military, aviation
training or recreational boat-
ing. Reasons for participating
in the three-day evaluation
varied, but several of the
volunteers wanted to use the
experience as an opportunity
to examine a variety of life

234 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Modest simulation
of heavy rain was far
less than an ocean
storm of heavy rain,
high winds and
breaking waves.

rafts to determine which products they wanted to life raft evaluation, each volunteer recorded on
purchase for use aboard aircraft or boats. waterproof paper comments about the experience
and noted general and specific impressions of the
During the in-water evaluation, the volunteers life raft and his interaction with it, including things
wore long pants, shirts and shoes, in addition to such as an irritating interior color; an unpleasant
an inflated life vest, to approximate how a person odor; a difficult or easy boarding experience; torn
Douglas S. Ritter’s fabric; and ease of operation of zippers. Moreover,
might be dressed and equipped to abandon an
evaluations of life rafts aircraft. observing the volunteers and how they coped with
have influenced the the life rafts provided additional information for
industry that builds After each life raft was deployed in the water — the evaluation.
them and educated the usually by a poolside volunteer with no previous
people who buy them. life raft experience — a mixed group of volunteers Volunteers were instructed not to abuse the life
was assigned to jump into the pool, rafts and the associated equipment, which should
swim to the life raft, board it, sit in be expected to remain functional during the evalu-
it, capsize it and right it. Where ap- ation, a far less demanding environment than an
plicable, they located and retrieved actual survival event at sea.
the SEP, sometimes inside the life
raft or sometimes on a line un-
derneath the floating life raft, and Manufacturer Participation
they assembled and erected manual
canopies. They were on the life raft
when it was sprayed by water from
a fire hose to simulate heavy rain,
R epresentatives from life raft manufactur-
ers were excluded from the evaluation.
Although most argued that they should be on
and when a buoyancy tube was site to respond to specific queries about their
deflated and freeboard (the dis- respective products, several volunteers who had
tance from the water to the top of participated in previous evaluations said that
the remaining buoyancy tube) was the representatives would have interfered with
measured. Immediately after each an already demanding, but carefully organized,

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 235
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

evaluations inappropriately favored Winslow

LifeRaft Co.

“We listen to anyone who suggests product im-

provements for our life rafts, including Douglas S.
Ritter,” said Fred Shoaff, an entrepreneur who in
1989 bought what later became Winslow LifeRaft
Co. “Ritter has a lot of good ideas, and we have
implemented some of them — not all of them
— just those that made practical sense to us. Of
course, any of the other manufacturers can choose
to implement them, too. We have to be reason-
able, however. We can’t overdo redundancy, and
we can’t build a floating hotel, because the life raft
would be too heavy to get out of the aircraft and
too expensive to sell.

Life rafts were three-day evaluation. They agreed that the pres- “As far as I’m concerned …[Ritter’s evaluations]
carefully stowed ence of the representatives could influence the have been to the benefit of everybody out there,
and checked for volunteers’ enthusiasm to be the “experts” in the whether they like them or not. If he stops [con-
damage overnight
evaluation. Thus, their absence ensured that the ducting evaluations] somebody would need to
volunteers could proceed without bias — in- take that up for the benefit of the industry. I don’t
between the daily
tentional or unintentional — being injected by know who that would be.”
sessions with
representatives rightfully eager to present their
volunteers in products as positively as possible. Ritter acknowledges that he could conduct his
the wave pool. evaluations differently, but said that he treats
In discussions with six of the seven manufac- each manufacturer’s products the same and that
turers, most told FSF staff that improvements the gold standard of independent consumer evalu-
had been made to their products as a result of ations is that they are conducted without manu-
the previous evaluations, but that they wanted facturer involvement. Volunteers provide practical
more input in evaluations of their products. And feedback, and manufacturers see innovations in
some people in the industry said that Ritter’s their competitors’ products.

A promotional photo,
from the archives of
Winslow LifeRaft Co.,
reflects a 1950s era of
life rafts and how they
were marketed.

236 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

“If we had an unlimited budget, we might do Alternate means to meet some standards may be
things differently, ” said Ritter. “But I think … we allowed, if the manufacturer demonstrates to the
get a lot of valid data. In some cases, it’s just a gross satisfaction of the regulatory authority — the U.S.
comparison, but the differences are gross enough Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for example
that they are relevant. People can see them and — that the alternate means provide an equivalent
understand them.” level of safety and performance. In assessing some
TSO deviations, this principle was considered.
Regardless of evaluations, nearly all the life raft
manufacturers described a common sales dilem- The life raft’s functional criteria that affect sur-
ma: The aircraft operators usually are interested vivability of the occupants were of most concern;
in hearing about the latest life raft developments these criteria include ease of deployment and op-
and in seeing the manufacturers’ best products, but eration; stability; ease of entry; protection from
when it’s time to purchase one, the operators often the environment; functionality; livability/comfort;
said, “Sell me the least expensive life raft you have auxiliary equipment; and quality of the life raft
that meets the [government] requirements.” and its auxiliary equipment.
Some criteria are more critical
Hoover Industries and Winslow LifeRaft Co. than others, but all should be

A
provided their products for the 2002 evaluation. considered when selecting a
Despite previous agreements to provide their life life raft.
lternate
rafts, Air Cruisers and Goodrich elected not to
provide their products for evaluation; Eastern Some contend that the most
means to meet some
Aero Marine declined to participate; Survival essential criterion is survival,
Products did not respond to repeated solicita- so livability/comfort is less
standards may be
tions to participate. important or even unnecessary.
Survival specialists and survivors
allowed.
Arrangements were made to purchase or to bor- counter that livability/comfort
row life rafts marketed by these other manufac- are of greater importance than
turers to use in the evaluation. Some models were others recognize.
no longer marketed but they differed little from
current models (see Table 1, page 238, for current Survival literature is replete with admonitions
specifications of 10-person aviation life rafts of- that the most important survival tool is a survi-
fered by the manufacturers whose products were vor’s brain. The ability to take clear and rational
included in the 2002 evaluation). decisions is essential in any survival situation.
Particularly in water survival, the survival equip-
ment must mitigate the effects of hypothermia,
Evaluating by the Regulations seasickness and dehydration in cramped, wet
and cold conditions, which will influence any

W hile conducting the evaluation, an effort was

made to confirm that the life rafts and their
auxiliary equipment met applicable U.S. Federal
survivor’s state of mind and the ability to take
decisions (see “Is There a Doctor Aboard the Life
Raft?,” page 187). Weight and size of the packed
Aviation Regulations (FARs) and Technical Standard life raft are important, too. If a life raft is too
Orders (TSOs) (see “Regulations, Judgment Affect heavy to be easily lifted and to be launched from
Overwater Equipment Decisions,” page 387). the floating aircraft, survivors could be robbed
Those criteria establish minimum standards (al- of its use.
though most manufacturers produce products
that exceed the minimum standards). Moreover, All aspects of a practical evaluation do not
the FARs closely mirror life raft requirements of lend themselves to objective measurement. For
other national civil aviation authorities, as demon- example, although no exact measurement was
strated by manufacturers who have products that taken of the amount of water that entered each
meet multiple requirements, such as Joint Aviation life raft when it was sprayed with water from a fire
Requirements (JARs) and FARs (see “For Ditching hose, the relative leakage rate of a life raft could
Survival, Start With Regulations, But Don’t Stop be compared with the leakage rates of other life
There,” page 395). Continued on page 242

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 237
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Table 1
Specifications of 10-person Aviation Life Rafts, Approved Under FAA TSO-C70a, Type I1
For acronyms, references and an important note, see page 241.

Air Cruisers Co.

P.O. Box 180, Belmar, NJ 07719 U.S.
Telephone: +732-681-3527; Fax: +732-681-9163
Internet site: <www.aircruisers.com>
Life raft approval: FAA TSO-C70a; JAR-OPS 1.
Service life: Indefinite with proper maintenance.
Maintenance: Interval — Inflatable raft, six years; inflation system, three years.
Typical cost — US$400; shipping not included.
ELT options: 406 MHz; 121.5 MHz (standard). ELT maintenance interval: three years to five years (battery). Excel 10-person
Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker: Standard.
Vacuum packing: Optional.
SEPs offered: FARs Part 91; Part 121; Part 125; Part 135; JAR-OPS Part 1; CARs; custom.
Air Cruisers aviation models range from rated capacities of four to rated capacities of 56.
Certificated Repair Stations2
United States: Chino, California; Wall, New Jersey. Outside the United States: Ars, France; Mitry Mory, France.
Weight (pounds/kilograms)
No. of Water-
Buoyancy ballast Bags
Tube x Freshwater Packed With With
Rated/ Diameter Capacity Dimensions FARs FARs
Cost Overload (inches/ (pounds/ (inches/ Floor Without Part 91 Part 135
Model no. (US$)3 Capacity centimeters) Canopy kilograms) centimeters) Insulation SEP SEP SEP
Excel 7,700 10/15 9.1/23 Automatically 4 x 62.4/28.3 7 x 14 x 31/ No 40/18 46/21 50/23
10-person inflatable = Total 249.6/ 18 x 36 x 79
113.2
PaxAir 9,900 10/15 12/30 Automatically 4 x 62.4/28.3 15 x 10 x 33/ Foam 62/28 72/33 72/33
10-person inflatable = Total 249.6/ 38 x 25 x 84
113.2
Eastern Aero Marine
5502 N.W. 37th Avenue, Miami, FL 33142 U.S.
Telephone: (800) 843-7238 (U.S.); +305-871-4050; Fax: +305-871-7873
Internet site: <www.theraft.com>
Life raft approval: FAA TSO-C70a.
Service life: Indefinite if raft passes periodic maintenance inspection.
Maintenance: Interval — three years. Typical cost — US$450–600; shipping not included.
ELT options: 406 MHz; 121.5 MHz/243 MHz. ELT maintenance interval: four years to five years,
depending on model.
Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker: Standard with FARs Part 135 SEP and JAR-OPS 3 SEP.
Vacuum packing: No. VIP T1OAS
SEPs offered: FARs Part 121; Part 135; Part 135/JAR-OPS 1; Part 121/JAR-OPS 1; Part 121/JAR-OPS 3/CARs; Part 135/JAR-OPS 3.
Eastern Aero Marine aviation models range from rated capacities of four to rated capacities of 46.
Certificated Repair Stations
United States: Anchorage, Alaska; Valencia, California; Van Nuys, California; Miami, Florida; Thunderbolt, Georgia; Hudson, Michigan; North
Oakdale, Minnesota; Las Vegas, Nevada; Hackensack, New Jersey; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Houston, Texas. Outside the United States: Brisbane,
Australia; Goussainville, France; Rome, Italy; Colonia Martin, Carrera, Mexico; Madrid, Spain; Stockholm, Sweden; Tokyo, Japan.
No. of Water- Weight (pounds/kilograms)
Buoyancy ballast Bags
Tube x Freshwater Packed With With
Rated/ Diameter Capacity Dimensions FARs FARs
Cost Overload (inches/ (pounds/ (inches/ Floor Without Part 121 Part 135
Model no. (US$)3 Capacity centimeters) Canopy kilograms) centimeters) Insulation SEP SEP SEP
VIP T10AS4 5,230 10/15 11.25/29 Automatically 5 x 99.8/45.3 32 x 17 x 8/ Inflatable N/A 53.5/24 64.5/29
inflatable = Total 499/ 81 x 43 x 20 floor
226.3 (optional)
VIP Deluxe 6,050 10/15 11.25/29 Automatically 55 x 99.8/45.3 32 x 17 x 9.5/ Inflatable N/A 67/30 78/35
T10AS4 inflatable = Total 499/ 81 x 43 x 24 floor
226.3

238 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Table 1
Specifications of 10-person Aviation Life Rafts, Approved Under FAA TSO-C70a, Type I1 (continued)

Goodrich Corp.
Aircraft Interior Products
3414 South 5th Street
Phoenix, AZ 85040 U.S.
Telephone: +602-243-2200; Fax: +602-243-2300
Internet site: <www.aip.goodrich.com>
Life raft approval: FAA TSO-C70a.
Service life: Indefinite if passes periodic maintenance inspection.
Maintenance: Interval — initially two years, then annually.
Typical cost — US$300–$400; shipping not included. 10-person
ELT options: 406 MHz; 121.5 MHz/243 MHz. ELT maintenance interval: three years (121.5 MHz/243 MHz); five years (406 MHz).
Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker: Standard.
Vacuum packing: SEP only.
SEPs offered: FARS Part 91; Part 121; Part 135; CARs; JAR-OPS 1; U.K. CAA AR-43.
Goodrich aviation models range from rated capacities of four to rated capacities of 12.
Certificated Repair Stations2
United States: Phoenix, Arizona; Van Nuys, California; Colorado Springs, Colorado; Riviera Beach, Florida; Thunderbolt, Georgia; Hudson,
Michigan; Teterboro, New Jersey; Dallas, Texas; Houston, Texas; Seattle, Washington. Outside the United States: Eagle Farm, Queensland,
Australia; Quebec, Canada; Dorval, Stansted, England; Paris, France; Singapore; Basel, Switzerland.
No. of Water- Weight (pounds/kilograms)
Buoyancy ballast Bags
Tube x Freshwater Packed With With
Rated/ Diameter Capacity Dimensions FARs FARs
Cost Overload (inches/ (pounds/ (inches/ Floor Without Part 91 Part 135
Model no. (US$)3 Capacity centimeters) Canopy kilograms) centimeters) Insulation SEP SEP SEP
10-person 8,800 10/15 9.5/24 Automatically 4 x 92.8/42.1 34 x 14 x 10/ Inflatable N/A 59/27 68/31
inflatable = Total 371.2/ 86 x 36 x 25 floor
168.4

Hoover Industries
7260 N.W. 68th Street, Miami, FL 33166 U.S.
Telephone: +305-888-9791; Fax: +305-883-1925
Internet site: <www.hooverindustries.com>
Life raft approval: FAA TSO-C70a.
Service life: Unlimited with proper maintenance.
Maintenance: Interval — two years. Typical cost — US$200–300; shipping not included.
ELT: Optional. Automatic-deploying 121.5 MHz /243 MHz. ELT maintenance interval: five years. FR-10
Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker: Optional.
Vacuum packing: No.
SEPs offered: FARs Part 91; Part 121; Part 135.
Hoover Industries aviation models range from rated capacities of two to rated capacities of 46.
Certificated Repair Stations2
United States: Phoenix, Arizona; Cerritos, California; Miami, Florida; Honolulu, Hawaii; Belmar, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey; Bristol,
Pennsylvania; Seattle, Washington. Outside the United States: Victoria, Australia; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Sofia, Bulgaria; Santiago, Chile; Bogotá,
Colombia; Larnaca, Cyprus; Kent, England; Merseyside, England; Athens, Greece; Cangkareng, Indonesia; Belfast, Ireland; Tokyo, Japan; Mexico
City, Mexico; Schiphol Airport, Netherlands; Panama City, Panama; Santiago, Rep. of Cabo Verde; Moscow, Russia; Singapore; Johannesburg,
South Africa; Madrid, Spain; Palma de Mallorca, Spain; Basel, Switzerland.
No. of Water- Weight (pounds/kilograms)
Buoyancy ballast Bags
Tube x Freshwater Packed With With
Rated/ Diameter Capacity Dimensions FARs FARs
Cost Overload (inches/ (pounds/ (inches/ Floor Without Part 91 Part 135
Model no. (US$)3 Capacity centimeters) Canopy kilograms) centimeters) Insulation SEP SEP SEP
FR-10 4,877.48 10/15 12.5/32 Manually 3 x 4.9/2.2 = 14 x 26 x 10.5/ No 47/21 64/29 74/33
erected Total 14.7/6.7 36 x 66 x 27

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 239
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Table 1
Specifications of 10-person Aviation Life Rafts, Approved Under FAA TSO-C70a, Type I1 (continued)

RFD/Revere
3 Fairfield Crescent
West Caldwell, NJ 07006 U.S.
Telephone: +973-575-8811; Fax: +973-575-1788
Internet site: <www.reveresupply.com>
Life raft approval: FAA TSO-C70a; U.K. CAA BCAR A-4-8.
Service life: 15 years minimum.
Maintenance: Interval — one year. Typical maintenance cost — US$400; shipping not included.
ELT options: 406 MHz; 121.5 MHz. ELT maintenance interval: five years.
Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker: Optional.
Vacuum packing: No.
SEPs offered: FARs Part 91; Part 135. Aerolite 10
RFD/Revere Aerolite aviation models range from rated capacities of four to rated capacities of 11;
“R” reversible series aviation models range from rated capacities of seven to rated capacities of 18.
Certificated Repair Stations2
United States: Cerritos, California; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Thunderbolt, Georgia; Hudson, Michigan; Moonachie, New Jersey; South
Hackensack, New Jersey; West Caldwell, New Jersey; Houston, Texas. Outside the United States: Through RFD Aviation network.
No. of Water- Weight (pounds/kilograms)
Buoyancy ballast Bags
Tube x Freshwater Packed With With
Rated/ Diameter Capacity Dimensions FARs FARs
Cost Overload (inches/ (pounds/ (inches/ Floor Without Part 91 Part 135
Model no. (US$)3 Capacity centimeters) Canopy kilograms) centimeters) Insulation SEP SEP SEP
Aerolite 10 5,770 11/17 10.8/27 Arch tubes 4 x 37.8/17.1 33 x 18 x 9/ Inflatable N/A 57.5/26 66.8/30
automatically = Total 151.2/ 84 x 46 x 23 floor
inflatable 68.6
F10R 6,458 10/15 10.8/27 Manually None 32 x 18 x 8/ Single floor N/A 76/34 85/39
(Reversible) erected 81 x 46 x 20 is between
tubes

Survival Products
5614 S.W. 25th Street
Hollywood, FL 33023 U.S.
Telephone: +954-966-7329; Fax: +954-966-3584
Internet site: <www.survivalproductsinc.com>
Life raft approval: FAA TSO-C70a.
Service life: Indefinite if properly maintained.
Maintenance: Interval — one year. Typical cost — US$205; shipping not included.
ELT Options: 406 MHz; 121.5 MHz/243 MHz. ELT maintenance interval: One year to two years. 10-Man
Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker: Optional.
Vacuum packing: No.
SEPs offered: FARs Part 91; Part 121; Part 135.
Survival Products aviation models range from rated capacities of four to rated capacities of 12.
Certificated Repair Stations2
United States: Honolulu, Hawaii; San Juan, Puerto Rico; St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. Outside the United States: Castle Hill, Australia; St. Johns,
Newfoundland, Canada; Winnipeg, Canada; Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Canary Islands; Roskilde Airport, Denmark; Thistead, Denmark; Saumur, France;
Banzin, Germany; Castenedolo, Italy; Tokyo, Japan; Edinburgh, Scotland; Celje, Slovenia; Fahrwangen, Switzerland; Caracas, Venezuela.
No. of Water- Weight (pounds/kilograms)
Buoyancy ballast Bags
Tube x Freshwater Packed With With
Rated/ Diameter Capacity Dimensions FARs FARs
Cost Overload (inches/ (pounds/ (inches/ Floor Without Part 91 Part 135
Model no. (US$)3 Capacity centimeters) Canopy kilograms) centimeters) Insulation SEP SEP SEP
10-Man 4,112 10/15 10/25 Manually 2 x 124.8/ 7 x 14 x 19/ No 32/14 43/19 48/22
erected 56.6 = Total 13 x 36 x 48
249.6/113.2

240 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Table 1
Specifications of 10-person Aviation Life Rafts, Approved Under FAA TSO-C70a, Type I1 (continued)

Winslow LifeRaft Co.

11700 Winslow Drive, Lake Suzy, FL 34269 U.S.
Telephone: (800) 838-3012 (U.S.); +941-613-6666; Fax: +941-613-6677
Internet site: <www.winslowliferaft.com>
Life raft approvals: FAA TSO-C70a; U.K. CAA BCAR-B-4-8; DGAC QACI-144.
Service life: 10–15 years.
Maintenance: Interval — three years. Typical cost — US$450 (raft only); shipping not included.
ELT Options: 121.5 MHz/243 MHz; 121.5 MHz/406 MHz;121.5 MHz/243 MHz/406 MHz
with full speech capability. ELT maintenance interval: five years.
Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker: Standard.
Vacuum packing: Standard. Super-Light Ultima
SEPs offered: FARs Part 91/121; Part 135; JAR-OPS 1; JAR-OPS 1/FARS Part 135; CARs.
Winslow aviation models range from rated capacities of four to rated capacities of 15.

Certificated Repair Stations2

United States: McNeal, Arizona; La Mirada, California; Van Nuys, California; Lake Suzy, Florida; Miami, Florida; Riviera Beach, Florida; Thunderbolt,
Georgia; Oakdale, Minnesota; South Hackensack, New Jersey; Dallas, Texas; Houston, Texas; Tukwila, Washington. Outside the United States:
Wayville, South Australia, Australia; Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada; Stansted Airport, England; Mereuil le Meaux, France; Goroka, Papua New
Guinea; Basel Airport, Switzerland.
No. of Water- Weight (pounds/kilograms)
Buoyancy ballast Bags
Tube x Freshwater Packed With With
Rated/ Diameter Capacity Dimensions FARs FARs
Cost Overload (inches/ (pounds/ (inches/ Floor Without Part 91 Part 135
Model no. (US$)3 Capacity centimeters) Canopy kilograms) centimeters) Insulation SEP SEP SEP
Ultra-Light 7,414 10/15 9/23 Automatically 5 x 79.2/36 = 9 x 18 x 32/ Inflatable N/A 54/24 64/29
1015FAUL inflatable Total 396/180 23 x 46 x 81 floor
Super- 7,414 10/15 11.25/28.58 Automatically 5 x 79.2/36 = 9 x 18 x 34/ Inflatable N/A 66/30 75/34
Light inflatable Total 396/180 23 x 46 x 86 floor
Ultima
1015FASL

Note: This table presents specifications of similarly sized life rafts by the manufacturers whose life rafts were evaluated in 2002 (see “Life Raft
Evaluation: Pooling the Resources,” page 258). Most models of the life rafts in this table were not included in the 2002 evaluation; contact
manufacturers for the most current specifications and costs. Any specifications or opinions given in the evaluation may not apply to current models.
CARs = Canadian Aviation Regulations DGAC = French Direction Générale de L’Aviation Civile ELT = Emergency locator transmitter
FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration FARs = U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations JAR-OPS = Joint Aviation Requirements — Operations
N/A = Not applicable SEP = Survival equipment pack TSO = Technical Standard Order U.K. CAA = United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority
1Typeis based on requirements of U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C70a. Type I life rafts are approved for any
category of aircraft. They must be of independent-double-tube construction. Type II life rafts are approved for nontransport-category aircraft. They
may be of single-tube construction but the tube must contain two independent chambers. For the full text of TSO‑C70a, see page 396.
2Maintenance must be performed at repair stations certificated by a civil aviation authority such as the European Joint Aviation Authorities, FAA or
U.K. CAA. If certificated by FAA, the repair station must also have a limited rating to repair specific items of emergency equipment (FARs Part 145.61).
Manufacturer-authorized repair stations meet the manufacturer’s qualifications for service and repair. Those qualifications may include training,
manufacturer-specified tools and a current copy of the manufacturer’s Component Maintenance Manual.
3Costs are based on each TSO-C70a Type I life raft equipped with a canopy (inflatable or mechanical), floor insulation, valise pack, and FARs Part 91 SEP.
If any of these features are absent, they are noted in the table.
4Cost includes a Part 121 SEP.

Source: Manufacturers, January 2004, with FSF editorial staff

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

is assumed to have no familiarity with a

life raft and its auxiliary equipment.

Informal polls conducted by Ritter

at several National Business Aviation
Association (NBAA) Annual Meeting
& Convention venues have shown
that aircraft crews — pilots and flight
attendants — often lacked familiar-
ity with life rafts aboard their aircraft.
Surprisingly, these polls reflected simi-
lar unfamiliarity among FARs Part 135
aircraft crews. Moreover, aircraft
crewmembers who have been trained
to use life rafts may have had minimal
training or they may have been trained
with equipment not carried aboard
their aircraft. Even if a crew is well
trained, the crew may not survive a
ditching, so the untrained passengers
will be responsible for determining how
to exit the aircraft and how to deploy
the life raft. Similar informal polls by
FSF editorial staff at the Foundation’s
2003 annual Corporate Aviation Safety
Seminar echoed Ritter’s findings.

Volunteers were rafts that were evaluated. The occupants pro- A life raft and its auxiliary equipment
uniformly surprised vided first-hand observations about how much should be as foolproof as possible. Opportunities to
that the wave pool water was entering the life raft and where the further threaten survival should be eliminated, and
created conditions leaks were occurring — along a sewed seam or how to use the equipment should be obvious/intui-
that so dramatically
zipper, or at points where fabric had been torn tive to the average-intelligence, non-mechanically-
during boarding. The interiors of some of the inclined person. The life raft should be designed
influenced boarding
life rafts remained relatively dry, but others were and equipped to take care of the survivor; it should
life rafts and floating
described as being in a “waterfall.” Which life raft demand little or nothing of the survivor who may
in life vests. would you prefer to be aboard? Thus, subjective be unable to do much in his behalf: The worst-case
judgments were made of how much water was scenario is a lone and injured survivor. How well do
leaking into the life raft. the life raft and its auxiliary equipment fulfill their
roles in this scenario?
Many of the stenciled instructions and placards on
these life rafts were difficult to read. Some manu- While no life raft of reasonable size, weight and
facturers make excellent use of easily understood cost will be ideal in every scenario, large minorities
pictograms. Readily available information, quickly of people are not “average.” Moreover, in today’s
identified and easily understood, is essential for population — especially in the United States
survivors— most of whom, will be having their — the average does not represent a particularly
first experience with a life raft. healthy or physically able person; observing a vari-
ety of people struggle into life rafts has proved this.
Significantly smaller-than-average persons; heavy
No Experience Required? individuals — especially those who are bottom
heavy; and those without adequate upper-body
In conducting these evaluations, an important as- strength are at a life-threatening disadvantage
sumption is made, based on reviews of survival in- because they often have difficulty boarding some
cidents and interviews with survivors: The survivor life rafts.

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Life raft performance is, for the most part, gen- physical challenge, in its aftermath, a survivor
der neutral, although some physical traits affect- may be left with a significantly reduced reserve of
ing performance may be more likely among one energy to meet additional challenges. This will be
gender than the other. For example, when we refer exacerbated if a survivor is required to perform a
to sizes and weights of the volunteers in relation demanding physical activity only made possible by
to life raft performance, we are considering the the adrenaline boost. Moreover, sudden stress and
average volunteer to weigh 170 pounds (77 kilo- the accompanying flood of hormones can initiate
grams) and to be five feet, six inches (1.7 meters) incapacitating levels of shock. The design of life-
tall, regardless of gender. “Short” volunteers are saving equipment must not assume extraordinary
less than five feet, six inches tall and represent a effort or fortunate circumstances.
greater proportion of female volunteers than of
male volunteers. Typically, those who are consider-
ably shorter will have more difficulty boarding life Sum of Its Parts
rafts than those who are slightly shorter.

Some claim that adrenaline will provide survivors

with the necessary strength to overcome the ob-
M ost of the life rafts included in this evalua-
tion have at least a few features that are bet-
ter than average compared with the others. Some Fifteen people —
stacles of boarding a life raft. In many situations, have several such features. Many have features the overload capacity
this has been true, but other things can mitigate that, although not outstanding, offer an accept- of a 10-person aviation
the influence of this performance-enhancing able level of performance for a specific use. But life raft — may be a
hormone, which sometimes allows super-hu- a few good features, or even many good features,
laughing matter for
man effort. Shock, age, injuries, extreme cold do not guarantee a good life raft.
some people in the
and exhaustion can diminish overall physical
pool evaluation, but
— and mental — capacities. Passengers may also A life raft, especially a well-designed and well-
when floating on an
be under the influence of illness, fatigue, alcohol constructed model that boasts many desirable
or drugs (prescription and over-the-counter). features, is similar to an aircraft in that it is the ocean everything
Although adrenaline fuels the “fight-or-flight sum of its parts. Consider the various parts and would be would
response” by raising metabolic rates to meet a features of a life raft as a system on an aircraft. If a focused on survival.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Stowage

T he life raft is packed in a valise (often called a

“soft pack”) or a hard case that provides more
protection from the environment (e.g., water, sun,
dirt, spills), rough handling and inadvertent de-
ployment. Weight is an essential element in the
design and operation of an aircraft, and may result
in the selection of smaller and less capable life
rafts. Moreover, the interiors of some aircraft are
installed without adequate consideration of such
equipment as life rafts, evidenced by the oddly
shaped custom-packed life rafts produced for
some specific aircraft configurations. The more
capable life rafts tend to be larger packages than
the less capable life rafts so stowage constraints
can limit lifesaving capabilities.

Most aircraft manufactures specify a standard

available life raft or life rafts; some offer options
from among different life raft manufacturers. That
Inexperienced critical system does not function well or does not is not to say that an operator cannot specify a par-
volunteers were function well in combination with other systems, ticular life raft. Most aircraft manufacturers will
selected to deploy
it may overcome other — perhaps many other accommodate such requests if the product fits in
— positive attributes. A life raft is more than a the available space, or if it can be accommodated
the life rafts. They
lifesaving device: A life raft is a lifesaving system. by reasonable changes in interior configuration or
were allowed to read
by some other means, such as custom packaging
the directions and to by the life raft manufacturer.
deploy the life raft Basics
from the side of the
Deployment
pool, as if they were
standing at an open
A t its simplest, a life raft is a device to support
survivors out of the water to improve the
cabin door.
likelihood of their survival. With the rate of heat
exchange for a person floating in water generally
accepted to be 25 times that of a dry person in
D eployment requires that the life raft must
be retrieved and moved — dragged or car-
ried — from stowage to an exit, where a crew-
still air, the advantage of being out of the water is member or a passenger must locate, read and
obvious. The life raft also serves as a refuge from understand the instructions printed on the valise
marine life (see “What’s Eating You? It’s Probably or hard pack, possibly with minimal illumina-
Not a Shark,” page 211). tion. Then the life raft must be moved outside
the aircraft cabin and deployed (see “Prepare to
Providing survivors a platform out of the water Ditch,” page 20).
can be accomplished with a simple design: an
inflatable ring (buoyancy tube) glued to a fabric Stored-gas inflation systems are installed on these
floor that will support a specific number of oc- life rafts. A high-pressure cylinder — typically con-
cupants. Some unapproved life rafts are no more structed of aluminum, steel or a composite mate-
sophisticated than that, and they are used in light rial — usually is charged with carbon dioxide and
recreational aircraft. Regulatory authorities, how- a smaller amount of nitrogen, the conventional
ever, have established requirements for approved industry practice. Faster inflation can be accom-
life rafts, which require additional features to en- plished by using nitrogen as the primary infla-
hance survivability. Nevertheless, at the low end tion gas with a lesser amount of carbon dioxide.
of the market, even an approved life raft may not Moreover, nitrogen is not affected significantly
be much more sophisticated than its unapproved by cold-weather temperatures. Carbon dioxide,
sibling. on the other hand, may barely meet the TSO-

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C70a one-minute requirement that the life raft Sea Anchor

be “rounded out” at the temperature specified by
the manufacturer, typically –30 degrees Fahrenheit
(F; –34 degrees Celsius [C]) (see “FAA Technical
Standard Order (TSO) C70a, Life Rafts (Reversible
A major key to the stability of a life raft — re-
gardless of shape — is the sea anchor, an es-
sential component for stabilizing the life raft in the
and Nonreversible),” page 396). water and reducing drift. The typical life raft sea
anchor — a fabric parachute-like drag device — is
On the high-pressure cylinder, a valve is activated attached ideally to a swivel at the end of a line not
by pulling a lanyard (via the mooring/inflation less than 25-feet (7.6-meters)-long that is secured
line or an immediate-inflation handle). Thus, the to the life raft. The swivel allows the sea anchor
gas is released to inflate the life raft’s buoyancy to rotate freely so the bails (shroud lines), which
tube(s), and on some life rafts, canopy supports help hold the shape of the sea anchor when it is
and boarding aids. deployed in the water, will not become entangled
and reduce the sea anchor’s effectiveness. Studies
have shown that without a swivel, frequent twist-
Shapes, Fabrics and ing of the sea anchor line can result in its failure
Construction and the loss of the sea anchor.

A viation life rafts are constructed in three basic

shapes: round or nearly so — hexagonal (six
sides), octagonal (eight sides) or decagonal (ten
If the sea anchor is deployed automatically with the
deployment of the life raft, survivors are relieved
of an essential task, while added life raft stability
sides)— square and rectangular (with rounded is available immediately. Advocates of manual
ends). Round life rafts comprise the majority of deployment of sea anchors claim that entangle-
aviation life rafts in service. ment of the sea anchor with the ditched aircraft is
prevented, but evidence of such entanglements has
Round or nearly round life rafts favor no particu- not been reported. Manual deployment enables
lar side and exhibit little of the fishtailing, bend- survivors to ensure that the sea anchor line is not
ing and twisting associated with rectangular life tangled during deployment; tangled sea anchor A volunteer is
rafts, and to a lesser degree, square life rafts, but lines have occurred with auto-deployments. surrounded by
survivors may be uncomfortable sitting against Survivors, however, must know how to deploy
the variety of sea
the inside rim of the life raft with their legs inter- the sea anchor, and instructions frequently are
twined in the center. anchors that were
absent or incomplete. Ideally, the life raft’s primary
removed from the
entrance will be downwind — protected from the
Square and rectangular shapes, which can be more wind and waves — from the sea anchor deployed life rafts during the
easily produced and provide more usable room on the opposite side of the life raft, which will help evaluation in the
for survivors, have corners that can dig into the prevent the life raft from lifting above the water wave pool.
waves, which can trip the life rafts and
lead to capsizing.

The square and rectangular shapes

have fewer joints to fail, but technol-
ogy has made such failures a rarity.
Octagonal and decagonal life rafts
are inherently stiffer than round,
square or rectangular shapes, be-
cause spliced sectional construction
increases their strength and rigidity.
Seams should overlap — butt joints
are undesirable — and should be
taped on both sides — inside and
outside. Depending on the material,
seams may be glued or welded using
heat and pressure.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

and allowing wind under the life raft to become nauseous even during the most prevent capsizing as well as when they
precipitate a capsizing. benign movements while in a life raft. function together as a system.

Sea anchors were evaluated indepen- No substantive data were found to sug- Life raft ballast includes the survivors
dently from the life rafts. The sea anchors gest that carouseling exists, but there and equipment in the life raft, and wa-
were towed through the water in the were some reports that round-type life ter contained in ballast bags, which are
wave pool to allow underwater observa- rafts (and other configurations) without attached to the bottom of the life raft
tion and underwater photography. With a sea anchor may rotate randomly in the and provide the most effective ballast.
the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard water, which could orient the life raft’s Weights are sometimes used in the bot-
Auxiliary, Division 10, the sea anchors primary entrance to face the wind and tom of the water-ballast bags to ensure
were deployed and were towed slowly waves. that they function as quickly as possible
behind a powerboat in calm weather to enhance stability after deployment of
conditions on Saguaro Lake in Arizona. Steve Callahan, another sailing author the life raft. Openings — usually in the
In turn, each line was attached to a spring and naval architect who survived 76 days highest part of each bag — allow water
scale to measure its relative drag and the adrift in a six-person marine round-type to fill the bags, and ensure that if the bags
effect of increasing and decreasing the life raft, said, “My own [life] raft would are lifted from the water, the water ballast
length of the sea anchor line. have [rotated] had I not stabilized it, does not drain from the bags.
first with a drogue [sea anchor]… .”3
Of particular concern is what happens if the Callahan said that he believes that af- When submerged, water-ballast bags have
sea anchor is lost or is improperly deployed, ter the loss of a sea anchor, a life raft neutral buoyancy; they become effective
neither of which is an uncommon experi- ballast only when the life raft begins to
ence, as documented by the reports of many lift the water-ballast bags from the water.
survivors and by studies by maritime safety Water-ballast bags are intended to help the
organizations. Without a functioning sea
anchor, a rectangular life raft turns quickly
broadside to the swells and waves, a posi-
S tability
life raft resist lifting, which allows the wind
to blow under the life raft. The more of the
underside that is exposed, the greater the
tion that is more vulnerable to capsizing of of the life raft opportunity for the wind and the waves to
rectangular life rafts than other shapes. combine to capsize the life raft.
is essential.
Nevertheless, Earl Hinz, an well-known Some manufacturers have attached lines
sailing author and retired aerospace en- to the water-ballast bags so that survivors
gineer, wrote, “An octagonal (or nearly can pull the bags upward, allowing far less
circular [life] raft), which loses its sea an- equipped with an asymmetrical ballast room for the collection of water and cre-
chor, is highly susceptible to a phenom- system could continue to orient the life ating less drag. In some conditions, this
enon known as ‘carouseling’ where the raft’s primary entrance downwind. This, might allow the life raft to be blown faster
[life] raft rotates rapidly (as a carousel) he said, would prevent any rotation from with the wind or water current, or to be
causing dizziness in the occupants.” Hinz allowing the primary entrance’s expo- “sailed” by using the canopy as a sail.
was unable to cite first-hand details about sure to breaking waves.
specific incidents of carouseling and said To provide a means of comparing water
that his information “came from a series ballast bags among the life rafts, the wa-
of … Internet forums.”1. Sunny Side Up ter ballast bags were measured (as accu-
rately as was practical considering their
A naval architect disagreed with the car-
ouseling theory. S tability of the life raft is essential.
Survivors’ accounts often report
that their life rafts capsized repeatedly,
flexible construction), and the approxi-
mate volume and the weight of fresh
water each could hold was calculated.
“Carouseling — rapid spinning of a life frequently losing supplies, equipment Although the measurements are not pre-
raft that would cause dizziness as in a and other survivors. A sea anchor and cise, they provide a comparison of gross
carnival ride— makes no sense with life raft ballast are the two principal differences in water-ballast capacity. Too
basic physics. Such a thing is laugh- devices that help to prevent the life raft little water ballast, and the life raft can
able,” said Prof. Dr. Ing. Fen-Dow Chu, from capsizing, but the shape of the life be capsized more easily. Too much wa-
a naval architect at the State University raft and center of gravity also contribute ter ballast in poorly constructed fabric
of New York Maritime College.2 He and to keeping the life raft right side up in bags could cause a fabric failure when
Hinz agreed that some survivors might rough seas. Individually, they do not the bags will be needed most. None of

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

the water-ballast bags was determined life raft manufacturers claimed extended aviation life rafts. Hazardous solvents and
to be too large for its construction, service life for the material, which has the glues are used to construct life rafts from
though there was some tearing of fabric potential of saving operators money; oth- this neoprene, which requires construc-
and seams. Simply stated, life rafts with er claimed advantages, such as increased tion by hand.
effective water-ballast bags are more abrasion and puncture resistance, and
difficult to capsize than those with less light weight, appealed to operators. Lacking access to sophisticated testing
effective water-ballast bags or no water- methods, practical tests were used that
ballast bags. Volunteers capsized each of Nevertheless, these aviation life rafts were would demonstrate any significant ad-
the life rafts to evaluate the effectiveness all single-coated PCF (i.e., applied to only vantages of the products but might not
of the ballast and to assess the effect of one side of the nylon fabric substrate); reveal minor differences.
capsizing on the life raft’s structure and marine life rafts use double-coated fab-
its occupants. Essentially, this provided ric. The single coating could compromise To measure puncture resistance, samples
a gross comparison of how easy or how the life raft’s integrity under some con- were placed under very light tension and
difficult it was to capsize a life raft, and ditions. Some manufacturers fabricated attempts were made to puncture and
that allowed comparison with other their life rafts with the coated side outside slice the fabric using a large fishhook
life rafts. Combined with our measure- and others fabricated their life rafts with (puncture) and a knife (puncture and
ments of the water-ballast bags, test of the coated side on the inside. The coat- slice). PCF was noticeably more difficult
the sea anchor, the shape of the life raft, to puncture, compared with traditional
and appropriate numbers of volunteers fabric, when PCF was tested on the coated
assigned to each life raft, a subjective side. When tested on the uncoated side, as

T
estimate of stability and resistance to used by some manufacturers, there was
capsizing was possible. noticeably less resistance to puncture,
he stability and PCF performed about equal to, or
Survivor ballast is secondary to water perhaps slightly better than, traditional
ballast, and the value of survivor ballast of most life rafts fabric.
diminishes with fewer than the maximum
capacity of the life raft (i.e., only one sur- depends on water- The coated side of the PCF was much
vivor or two survivors in a life raft rated more resistant to slicing. The uncoated
for six or more survivors). The heaviest ballast bags side, was easily sliced — much more
single piece of equipment is usually the easily than the traditional material. Thus,
and a sea anchor.
inflation cylinder and its associated hard- exposing the uncoated side appears to ne-
ware, which is most often mounted on the gate some of the advantages of PCF.
outer side of the life raft, but the ballast
effect of this equipment is negligible. To test abrasion resistance, 180-grit
ing provides the air seal on the buoyancy sandpaper attached to a convex sanding
The stability of most life rafts depends tube. If the coating is damaged, the air block was used to sand through the PCF.
on water-ballast bags and a sea anchor. can leak out. The coating also provides The coated side proved more resistant
Without these essential aids, an aviation virtually all the abrasion and puncture than traditional fabric. The uncoated
life raft of any shape is at the mercy of resistance, while the nylon fabric provides side of PCF was less resistant than the
wind, waves and swells, and in rough sea most of the material’s strength. traditional fabric.
conditions, survivors will be guaranteed
a brutally uncomfortable experience that Manufacturers’ samples of the fabrics For 2000, we had developed a more
will include dramatic movement in every used in the buoyancy tube(s) and cano- objective test apparatus to test fabric re-
axis. And you can be sure that dizziness pies were tested against claims of PCF’s sistance to puncture and abrasion, made
and nausea will be part of the experience improved resistance to puncture and more important by a greater diversity
for many survivors in such conditions. abrasion, compared with a more tradi- of fabrics for marine life rafts and the
tional material — nylon fabric coated manufacturers’ sometimes conflicting
on both sides with neoprene, a synthetic claims about their benefits, including a
Construction Material rubber, which has proven itself as a longer useful life. Unfortunately, some
durable and reliable material for many of the manufacturers declined to provide

L ate 1995 marked the introduction of

polyurethane-coated fabric (PCF)
into the U.S. general aviation life raft. The
years for marine life rafts (and inflat-
able boats); in lighter-weight fabrics,
the coated neoprene material is used for
samples because they said that consumers
would not be able to make value judg-
ments about the relative importance of

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 247
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

PCF performance in the tests vs. the light weight for approved life rafts under the FARs, defines this
of aviation life rafts. distinction as a “type” of life raft. Counter-intui-
tively (and the source of frequent confusion), the
A significant amount of the performance advantage TSO defines two types: A Type I life raft, which
of PCF is lost when used with the uncoated side out- can be used in any category of aircraft, has two
side, because damage to the coating allows air to leak independent buoyancy tubes, one stacked and
from a buoyancy tube. This problem would not be attached to the top of the other; a Type II life raft,
a concern if double-coated PCF were used, but then which can be used only in non-transport category
it would be much heavier, an undesirable quality in aircraft, has a single buoyancy tube constructed
aviation life rafts. with internal bulkheads that divide the tube into at
least two independent chambers. (None we tested
For the manufacturers, PCF has been attractive had more than two.)
because it can be welded by a variety of processes,
usually by the application of heat and pressure. In all currently produced Type II life rafts, the
Moreover, welding lends itself to mechanical single buoyancy tube is divided in half with
production and cost savings. vertical bulkheads within the tube. When one
chamber of the life raft is deflated, survivors
Properly maintained and serviced, neoprene- must gather in the remaining half circle of a tube,
coated life rafts have remained serviceable for and the other half is open to the water across the
as long as 20 years. Moreover, neoprene-coated diameter of the life raft; the deflated half floats
material appears more resistant to fungus and in the water and is incapable of supporting any
environmental degradation than significant weight. It is unlikely that survivors
PCF, claims that will be proven in the life raft at its rated capacity will fit in the
only after PCF has additional half life raft that remains inflated. Moreover, the

M aterial is
time in the marketplace.

Material is only one element of a

survivors must fold the deflated section inward
to separate the survivors from the water. The de-
flated section allows some buoyancy, and repairs
only one element life raft’s performance. The best can probably be made in this situation, but with
materials and most advanced great difficulty. Just a partially deflated chamber
of a life raft’s construction techniques will presented difficulty for the volunteers, and they
not save your life, but inadequate agreed that this would be a very distressing prob-
performance. materials and poor construction lem in open water.
can doom any life raft. In-use
failures of life rafts seem to be Type I life rafts are manufactured in nonrevers-
most often associated with con- ible and reversible styles. A nonreversible life raft
struction and maintenance. has the floor attached to the bottom of the lower
tube; a reversible life raft has the floor sandwiched
between the two tubes. As the designation suggests,
Redundancy a nonreversible life raft only has only one side that
is designed for occupancy; if it inflates upside

W hile these life rafts are constructed of tough

fabric that will withstand some abuse,
including a small and sharp knife blade dropped
down or capsizes, the life raft must be “righted”
— turned right side up by the survivors — before
they can board the life raft. If one of the buoyancy
point down onto the raft, the life raft remains vul- tubes deflates, the remaining buoyancy tube free-
nerable to puncturing. For example, a puncture can board will help prevent water from entering the
be caused by the sharp aluminum of the damaged life raft and provide the survivors a reasonable
structure of a sinking aircraft. A puncture is always platform to make repairs.
possible, but redundancy will save the day.
Although reversible life rafts have no specific “up-
Redundancy is accomplished by either dividing a right side” for purposes of stability, the occupied
single buoyancy tube into multiple independent side becomes the de facto upright side. A Type I
compartments or by having two independent reversible life raft with the floor sandwiched be-
tubes. TSO-C70a, which cites the requirements tween the two buoyancy tubes may have a higher

248 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

center of gravity than a Type I

non-reversible life raft. Thus, the
reversible life raft may be more
prone to capsize, all other quali-
ties being equal. Some reversible
life rafts are said to be designed
to create a suction effect between
the water and the life raft that is
reputed to resist capsize.

Capacity

L ife raft capacity is rated by

factors that include floor
area, seating space and buoyancy.
“Rated capacity” is the number of
survivors that the life raft must
hold with a minimal amount of
space for each survivor and a
specific degree of buoyancy. TSO-
C70a requires a minimum of 3.6
square feet (0.3 square meter) per
person unless an alternate seating
demonstration method is utilized, Although marine life rafts that are built to speci- This Type II
in which case as little as 3.0 square feet (0.3 square fications of the International Convention for the four-person aviation
meter) is acceptable. (3.6 square feet is almost 23 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) provide 4.0 square life raft is at overload
inches x 23 inches [58 centimeters x 58 centime- feet (0.4 square meter) per person, survivors re- capacity with six
ters]. Mark that area on the floor, sit within the main crowded. Lack of space is a common com-
persons; the U.S.
space and ponder how life could be for hours or plaint and a major detriment to the comfort and
Federal Aviation
days in that amount of space.) morale of survivors.
Administration has

Aviation life rafts have an “overload capacity.” determined that it

Some aircraft operators have determined that
Generally, this amounts to half again more than a few extra pounds and a larger package are meets the minimum
the rated capacity: six people, for example, in a acceptable and up-sized their life rafts to al- requirements.
four-person life raft and nine people in a six-per- low more space for survivors. For example, the
son life raft. Nevertheless, the overload capacity operator of an aircraft that normally carries an
must provide no less than 2.4 square feet (0.2 eight-person life raft replaces it with a 10-person
square meter) per person. If the volunteers com- life raft or 12-person life raft. This is a good
plain of a tight fit at rated capacity, at overload strategy if the life rafts have sufficient water bal-
capacity they were packed so tightly that they last and an effective sea anchor, but up-sizing
experienced physical pain; movement was im- to increase space probably should not exceed
practical and difficult. 50 percent of the expected rated capacity, be-
cause the life raft’s stability may be diminished
We carefully measured and calculated the in rough seas without the additional weight of
interior floor space of the life rafts. Only one the occupants.
life raft did not meet the 3.6 square feet per
person standard. Some of the life rafts provide
more space, and the configuration and shape Freeboard
can make a difference in livability/comfort.
Regardless of how life rafts are measured, there
is not much space for survivors. “Close” takes
on new meaning in a life raft.
F reeboard is the distance from the water to
the top of the buoyancy tube(s). Generally, a
higher freeboard is found on life rafts with two

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

and measured. Next, the lower buoyancy tube was

deflated by removing or opening the pressure-re-
lief valve (PRV) or topping valve to simulate a
puncture, and freeboard was measured.

The PRV is designed to relieve pressure at a cer-

tain set point to prevent overinflation. Sufficient
inflation gas is provided to inflate the buoyancy
tube(s) at very cold temperatures, thus providing
significantly more inflation gas than is required
at warmer temperatures. The topping valve is
designed to accept a manual inflation pump, so
that the buoyancy tube(s) can be inflated.

Finally, the partially deflated life raft was unloaded

to rated capacity, and freeboard was measured. All
the Type I life rafts in the evaluation exceeded the
freeboard requirements of TSO-C70a.
Inflatable buoyancy tubes than life rafts with a single buoy-
boarding ramps ancy tube. Moreover, the diameter of the buoyancy
have made boarding tubes can vary within the same line of life rafts, Boarding
much easier for thus changing freeboard, all other things being
volunteers.
equal (a larger-diameter buoyancy tube increases
freeboard and a smaller-diameter buoyancy tube
decreases freeboard). Higher freeboard provides
L ifelines must be within reach of survivors
— even if the life raft is capsized — so they
can use them to stay with the life raft until they can
greater protection from waves and a more com- right it, if necessary, and board it. Lifelines should
fortable backrest for survivors. Higher freeboard is be easy to grip and they should lead to boarding
an important aid in rough seas because the survi- aids without large gaps that could jeopardize a
vors must brace themselves against the buoyancy survivor’s hold on the life raft. Cold air and cold
tube(s) to prevent being tossed about by the mo- water can have a very rapid and debilitating ef-
tion of the life raft. Nevertheless, higher freeboard fect on a survivor’s strength and ability to grasp
adds to the difficulty of boarding the life raft from lifelines and boarding aids.
the water. The higher the freeboard, the greater
the need for very effective boarding aids. Type I Boarding the life raft is one of the most critical
reversible life rafts generally trade somewhat lower phases of water survival. If a survivor cannot get
freeboard and a less comfortable backrest for a life into the life raft, the risk is increased dramatically
raft that does not require righting. that the survivor will die. Optimal entry aids al-
low an adult of any stature and weight to board
During the evaluation, freeboard was measured at the life raft unassisted, even with an injured leg
rated capacity and at overload capacity. The total or arm.
weight in each life raft was adjusted with specific
volunteers, all of whom had been weighed at pool- It is a challenge to board a life raft in a calm sea
side before the evaluation was begun. Supplemental without wind; it is a much greater challenge when
ballast (5.0 pounds [2.3 kilograms] of lead shot in the life raft and the water are in motion from
plastic bottles and/or 10.0 pounds [4.5 kilograms] the wind, waves and swells. The most essential
of pea gravel in plastic bottles) was used to adjust — and most difficult — entry is that made by
the appropriate weight. Freeboard measurements the first survivor (and possibly the only survivor)
were taken around the life raft, typically at each joint because no one is aboard to provide assistance.
or at eight positions to 10 positions on round and The first survivor aboard the life raft can assist
rectangular life rafts, then averaged. other survivors.

After the measurements were taken at rated capac- In recent years, inflatable boarding aids have be-
ity, the life raft was loaded to overload capacity come more common and when properly designed,

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they can make boarding much easier for survivors,

compared with a traditional entry, such as a lad-
der. Some life rafts are equipped with inflatable
entry aids at all entries (typically two entries), a
design that could create problems. For example, if
a lower buoyancy tube fails because of a puncture
on a Type I life raft and each inflatable entry aid
is not equipped with a check valve to prevent the
boarding aid from deflating, all such entry aids
will be useless. Even with a check valve to prevent
deflation of the boarding aid, the entry aid may
not function adequately because it is attached to
a deflated buoyancy tube. When a secondary en-
try is equipped with a boarding ladder or similar
non-inflatable entry aid, this second aid will not be
affected by such a failure. When an inflatable entry
aid is the primary means of boarding, redundancy
is best achieved by a different means of boarding
the life raft. Primary entry aids and auxiliary en-
try aids were evaluated for ease of use, as well as
construction and susceptibility to damage.

Canopies

A canopy provides protection from the sun,

wind, waves and rain; moreover, reducing
ventilation in the life raft can allow body heat to
generate warmth within the closed canopy. Just
how much protection is provided depends upon
its design, construction and materials.

A canopy that must be manually assembled and

erected by the survivor(s) is not as desirable as
one that erects automatically as the life raft de-
ploys. The latter provides immediate protection
without intervention by a survivor. The effort
required to close the canopy openings is another
area of interest.

Time and effort required by inexperienced life

raft volunteers to assemble and to erect canopies
that were not designed to erect automatically was
evaluated. This included the consideration of
instructions, the functionality of the equipment
and the practicality of the task. Of special inter-
est was determining if manually assembled and
erected canopies met the TSO requirement that
the canopy “must be capable of being erected by
one occupant of an otherwise empty [life] raft.”
A ladder of nylon webbing will be on most life rafts, either as an alternate
means of boarding or as a primary means of boarding, but boarding by a The evaluations were conducted in daylight (in
ladder is usually more difficult than by an inflatable boarding ramp. addition to the facility’s bright overhead lighting).

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

was available to occupants and

whether the occupants could
sit upright at all positions in
the life raft. Where a canopy
design requires bending at the
waist and/or the neck, the oc-
cupants complained quickly of
being uncomfortable — some
were near tears because they
were so uncomfortable. Such
positions will not contribute
to the well-being of survivors
during days — or even hours
— at sea. Moreover, these po-
sitions will make bracing in
position very difficult when
the life raft is pitching in rough
seas. If the canopy also droops
from the pooling of water from
rain and waves, headroom will
be reduced further from the
Manually erected Remove light, and replace it with darkness, and “wetting-down” phenomenon,
canopies demand most tasks become more difficult. Add wind, rain which is particularly a problem with lightweight
training and and rough seas, when survivors will benefit most fabrics. For example, lightweight rip-stop nylon is
coordination to erect from the protection of a canopy, and the difficulty used in some canopies, and the fabric’s waterproof
them quickly and
of assembling and erecting a manually assembled barrier is on the interior of the fabric. Thus, the
canopy increases dramatically. Moreover, the unprotected exterior can absorb water, which will
correctly.
integrity of the canopy should not be compro- add weight to the canopy and result in sagging.
mised after the capsizing and the righting of a
life raft.
Righting the Life Raft
After ensuring that each canopy was fully and prop-
erly erected and sealed, and excepting any damage
incurred thus far in the evaluation, the canopies
were sprayed with a fire hose and combination
W ater-survival training has long taught that
the nonreversible life raft has a 50 percent
chance of inflating upside down, but during the
nozzle set for moderate dispersion (courtesy of life raft evaluations, such occurrences have been
the Tempe Fire Department). The nozzle operator far less frequent than 50 percent.
was located on a ladder about 15.0 feet (4.6 meters)
above the water and about 15.0 feet from the life Nevertheless, nonreversible life rafts do sometimes
raft. The life raft was rotated slowly — two complete inflate upside down; therefore, they must be de-
revolutions — by volunteers in the pool (not those signed to allow survivors to right the life raft or
in the life raft), while the nozzle operator directed the life raft to right itself. Self-righting life rafts are
the water on all the above-water surfaces of the designed to right themselves without intervention
life raft. This provided a modest simulation of by survivors. All the nonreversible life rafts that
wind and rain that was far less than a storm at sea. deployed right side up were capsized to evalu-
Nevertheless, the simulation was adequate to expose ate the effort required to right them. During the
deficiencies; significant leakage was quickly signaled capsize test, volunteers crowded to one side of the
by shouts from the enclosed volunteers when the life raft until they managed to capsize the life raft;
water made its way under the canopy. then they swam out the canopy openings to the
surface, and they righted the life raft.
TSO-C70a (paragraph 4.4) requires that “the can-
opy must provide adequate headroom,” but “ade- Righting is accomplished by gripping a flexible
quate” is not defined. We evaluated what headroom grab handle, line or flexible ladder attached to

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

the bottom of the life raft for that purpose, then floor that is said to provide insulation equivalent
pulling oneself up and onto the overturned to 1.0 inch (2.5 centimeters) of air.
bottom of the life raft (on the side nearest the
inflation cylinder). That same line is then used
to lean outward, while sitting or standing, and Life Raft Equipment
to lift the opposite side of the capsized life raft
from the water until it falls on top of the per-
son performing the righting maneuver. Some E ach life raft includes auxiliary equipment. This
equipment is essential to survival and is used
to assist the survivors or is used by the survivors
smaller four-person and six-person Type II life
rafts can be righted simply by grabbing a line or to maintain the life raft. Most of this equipment
handle from in the water and pulling them over. must be tethered — attached by a line to the life
Then the life raft can be boarded. We evaluated raft — to prevent losing it overboard; generally,
the ease of righting the life raft, and the right- this equipment has no backup.
ing instructions on the life raft were evaluated
for ease of locating the instructions, clarity of
Manual Pumps
instructions (text or pictogram), and the degree
of visibility (size of text, contrast with the life
raft’s color).
A m a nu a l p u m p ( of ten
called a topping pump)

E
is used to complete a soft (un-
Floors derinflated) deployment; to
reinflate the buoyancy tubes ach life raft
or other inflatable chambers
A n insulated floor is essential for life rafts
that might be deployed in cold water,
because otherwise only a thin layer of fabric
(e.g., floor, boarding aid,
canopy support tubes) after a
includes auxiliary

equipment … generally,
separates the survivors from the cold water. failure and subsequent repair;
Insulating the survivors from cold-water tem- and to maintain the inflation
this equipment has
peratures and reducing the transfer of heat from of the buoyancy tubes, includ-
the life raft to the water combats hypothermia. ing those which will release air
no backup.
Even in the 84-degree F (29-degree C) water through the PRV as the result
of the wave pool, the volunteers were aware of expansion that occurs dur-
of the increased warmth provided by life rafts ing the warmer periods of
with insulated floors. The typical temperature daylight, but leaves the tubes
of ocean water ranges from 32 degrees F (0 de- soft in the evening. Some life rafts include plugs
grees C) in the high latitudes to temperatures or other mechanical means to seal the PRVs to
above 80 degrees F (27 degrees C) in the tropics. prevent loss of air pressure during the day or
All these water temperatures are less than the if the PRV fails in the open mode or venting
98.6-degrees F (37.0 degrees C) temperature mode.
of the human body, so every practical aid to
prevent hypothermia is essential. Inflatable in- Because survivors may require the pump im-
sulated floors provide an additional flotation mediately after deployment, it should be readily
chamber, which adds to redundancy. If the floor available after they board the life raft. The ease
can be inflated to a hard condition, as in an air with which these tasks are accomplished depends
mattress, the floor also isolates survivors from in part on the effectiveness of the pump. The ca-
the bumping of the underside of the life raft by pacity of each of the manual pumps was evaluated
fish, an experience that survivors have reported relative to the TSO-C70a requirement and to the
as very uncomfortable. An inflatable floor that other pumps.
cannot be inflated to feel firm may compromise
its usefulness to insulate the survivors from the This evaluation was accomplished by measuring
water, because the air will move to wherever the water displaced from a clear graduated con-
there is no pressure on the floor and leave sur- tainer that was first submerged in a much larger
vivors without the insulating barrier of air un- container to fill with water and then turned upside
derneath them. One manufacturer has a foam down with no trapped air. A short length of hose

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

it isn’t adequately robust. Some life rafts include

a back-up oral inflator: a tube with a fitting to
attach it to a topping valve.

Bailers

C onsiderable quantities of water are going

to enter the life raft with survivors as they
board from the water. In rough seas, waves can
sweep across the life raft and create a floating
bathtub in the time required to board and close
the life raft canopy; even more time is required
if the canopy must be erected manually before it
can be closed. A leak or deflation can allow water
into the life raft, too. No matter what the weather
conditions, or the condition of the life raft, water
will be in the life raft.

Particularly in cold conditions, the life raft must

be dried (a relative term) as quickly as possible.
The primary means of removing water is a “bail-
er” (sometimes referred to as a “bailing bucket”),
an essential container used to scoop water from
the life raft and to dump it overboard. The bailer
has many other uses, such as for collecting and
storing fresh water, or holding and disposing of
waste, tasks which are best done with two inde-
pendent, leakproof containers.

The bailer is another piece of equipment that should

be immediately available upon boarding the life raft.
Bailers were evaluated by bailing water to determine
how easy it was to use them to scoop water and how
well they retained the water for dumping.

(Some marine life rafts are equipped with self-bail-

ers, which remove water from the life raft without
Equipment is fed air from the pump to the mouth of the sub- effort by survivors, but no such devices were fitted
arranged at the merged container. Each pump was tested several to the aviation life rafts that were evaluated.)
entrance to the times using full strokes. The air displaced water
wave pool at the in the graduated container, and the displacement Sponges
close of each day’s
could be compared with that of other pumps.
evaluation.
The evaluation also considered the ease of use
and the tolerance to out-of-alignment use. For
A bailer will remove most of the water, but
sponging will be required to remove the
remaining water in the life raft. A sponge that is
the typical bellows-type pumps, a soft buoyancy too large will tire the hands quickly; one that is
tube is inflated while applying out-of-alignment too small will frustrate the user. The sponge must
forces to the pump and its connection to the be sufficiently durable to sustain repeated use.
tube. Because of unfamiliarity with the equip- Ideally, two sponges are preferred, one for bailing
ment, rough seas or urgency, it is difficult to and one for collecting fresh drinking water that
align the pump correctly for each stroke; this often condenses on the surfaces of the canopy and
could result in breaking the pump or fitting if buoyancy tubes.

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Heaving Line Lights

A “heaving line” (also called “heaving/trailing

line” or “rescue line”) can be thrown to A t least one approved survivor-locator light
(see “FAA Technical Standard Order [TSO]-
C85a, Survivor-locator Lights,” page 462) must
survivors in the water, but anyone will be hard
pressed to toss it accurately more than 25.0 feet be fitted to the exterior of the life raft, and in
to 35.0 feet (7.6 meters to 10.7 meters). The line accordance with TSO-C70a (paragraph 4.12),
must be not less than 75.0 feet (22.8 meters) for “the lights must be automatically activated upon
Type I life rafts and not less than 35.0 feet for [life] raft inflation in the water, and [must be]
Type II life rafts. Its more practical use, at least visible from any direction by persons in the
in warmer waters, is as a safety line. By placing water.” With all the lights essentially similar
an arm through the quoit — usually a dough- among the life rafts, the evaluation focused on
nut-shaped buoyant grip at the end of the line whether the light could be seen by a volunteer in
— or tying the line to a survivor’s belt or around calm water.
a survivor’s waist, the survivor can leave the life
raft to retrieve another survivor or equipment An interior light is a major benefit for survivors,
lost overboard, without being separated from the although some lights function better than others;
life raft. The heaving line allows others in the not all life rafts are equipped with them. Because
life raft to pull the survivor back to the life raft. the in-water evaluation compromised the lights’
Nevertheless, the small diameter line is difficult single-use batteries, the interior lighting was evalu-
to grip with cold, wet, numbed hands. ated later using new batteries to determine the
effectiveness of the lighting.
The “trailing” part of the nomenclature refers to
allowing the heaving line to trail behind the life raft ELT
so that if someone falls out of the life raft, he may After throwing
have a chance to grab the line as it trails behind
the life raft. If alone, the survivor can pull himself
aboard, or if others are aboard the life raft, they
T SO-approved survival-type emergency locator
transmitters (ELTs) that were included with
many of the life rafts were not evaluated (see “Stay
the raft pack into the
pool, the volunteer
leaped into the pool
can use the line to pull the person back to the life Tuned: A Guide to Emergency Radio Beacons,”
and used his hands
raft. The heaving line must be buoyant for this to page 139). Nevertheless, an ELT is essential survival
be effective. During the evaluation, all the heaving to pry open the life
equipment, so some features were noted: whether
lines were thrown as they were supplied in the life an ELT was included as standard equipment or op- raft pack, which is not
raft, and they were examined for ergonomics and tional equipment; frequency type: 121.5 megahertz the correct method of
sturdiness of the quoit, buoyancy of the quoit and (MHz) or 406 MHz; optional capabilities, such as deploying any life raft.
buoyancy of the line.

Raft Knife

T he raft knife is used to cut the mooring/

inflation line when the line is secured to the
aircraft; by regulation (and design), this line is
required to fail before a sinking aircraft drags
the life raft under water, but that is secondary to
cutting the line with the raft knife. The raft knife
must be immediately available upon boarding,
and it must be designed to lessen the likeli-
hood of injury to the user in the rush to cut the
mooring/inflation line by an untrained survivor.
The evaluation determined the ease with which
the raft knife was located and was retrieved and
how easily it cut.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

built-in voice communication or global position- primary items of survival equipment, not every
ing system-derived position reporting; manual item.) The primary items of survival are:
activation or automatic activation; and means of
attachment to the life raft and effect, if any, on ELT • Utility knives;
performance or livability/comfort of the volunteers.
For example, if the ELT was mounted inside the • Flashlights;
life raft on a buoyancy tube, did its location cause
discomfort to a volunteer who had to lean against • Distress signaling devices;
it while seated?
• Paddles;

Survival Equipment Packs • Fresh water, desalinization equipment and

water storage;

L ife raft manufacturers pack survival equipment

with their life rafts in a variety of ways. In this
evaluation, the SEPs were packed with the life raft,
• Survival rations; and,

but some SEPs were designed to remain in the de- • First aid supplies;
ployed life raft, and other SEPs were designed to be
ejected into the water as the life raft was deployed.
Survival Equipment Storage
In some aircraft installations, where stowage space
is limited, the SEP may be stowed separately from
the life raft, rather than be packed with the life raft.
A life raft cannot be equipped with a giant
storage locker, but some of them provide
practical aids to stow equipment beyond the SEP,
While FARs allow the SEP to be stored “adjacent” which generally is laid on the floor (or across
to the life raft, adjacent is often interpreted to allow the legs of survivors). Often, the SEP must be
several feet — even the length of the aircraft cabin emptied partially to retrieve the desired equip-
between the life raft storage location and the SEP ment, and this risks losing equipment. If specific
storage location. Generally, in such circumstances, equipment is required quickly — for example,
a tether and clip are provided to attach the SEP to flares to signal a passing ship — the scramble to
the life raft before deployment. get the equipment invites loss. Having a means
to organize and store equipment and supplies is
All the SEPs were evaluated to determine their pro- a big advantage.
tection from loss and from water damage; ease of
accessing their contents; and how the contents were
packed inside the SEP. If the contents of an SEP were Service
damaged during the in-water evaluation, an effort
was made to determine what led to that damage. The
contents of each SEP were also compared with the
applicable FARs (most were Part
A life raft and the auxiliary equipment require
regular maintenance (see “Physical Fitness
for Life Rafts and Life Vests,” page 337). Some
135) and noted any missing items equipment has a limited shelf life and must be
or items provided in excess of the replaced at specific intervals. For example, in the

S ome
requirements.

Items such as immediate action

United States, the Department of Transportation
mandates inspection requirements for com-
pressed-gas cylinders: five years for aluminum
equipment has a instructions, life raft manual and and steel, and three years for some composites.
survival manual were evaluated Flares, emergency food and other items also have
limited shelf life and as for usability, effectiveness and time limits before they must be replaced, inspect-
how well they withstood a wet ed or serviced, and usually are not produced by
must be replaced at environment. Also considered the life raft manufacturer, which stipulates the
was whether tethers were sup- inspection and service intervals only for its life
specific intervals. plied for primary items that rafts. Until a few years ago, the service interval
could be lost overboard. (The was uniformly set at one year. This has changed,
evaluation includes only the and extended service intervals are more common.

256 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

While this is a convenience to operators, that have authorized service centers in

the reasonableness of some of the service many locations may provide additional
intervals was examined. Manufacturers convenience to operators. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Studying an evaluation is a useful aid in understanding life rafts, but it should be the beginning —
not the end — of the process to determine which life raft is best for your operation.

• Run from anyone who offers to sell you a life raft and tells you that training to use it isn’t necessary.

• Good design makes the life raft functions and equipment obvious to survivors, but nothing will beat
in-the-water training by an experienced instructor with the aircraft operator’s life raft.

• The SEP provides essential equipment that varies in quantity and quality among manufacturers.
Study it carefully and, if necessary, request appropriate changes.

Notes representative. Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. <www.equipped.org> and is its executive

Winslow LifeRaft Co. Lake Suzy, Florida, U.S. director. The Internet site is a compre-
  1. Hinz, Earl. “Heavy Weather Tactics Using Oct. 20–21, 2002.
Sea Anchors & Drogues.” 2000. Paradise hensive online resource for independent
Cay Publications, Arcata, California, Oroshnik, Miriam, president and CEO; reviews of survival equipment and out-
U.S. E-mail communication with Oroshnik, Sam, founder; Schwartz, Martin, door gear, as well as survival and search-
Rozelle, Roger. Flight Safety Foundation. chief engineer; and Wheeler, Matt, director of and-rescue information.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. June 13, 2003. sales. Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. Eastern Aero
Marine. Miami, Florida, U.S. Aug. 13, 2003.
  2. Prof. Dr. Ing. Fen-Dow, Chu, State A licensed pilot, Ritter is a frequent con-
University of New York Maritime Edrisinha, Thivi, engineer; Elliott, James, qual- tributor of articles to a wide variety of
College. Telephone communication with ity control supervisor; and Sosa, Alain, vice aviation and boating publications, but
Rozelle, Roger. Flight Safety Foundation. president of production. Interviews by Rozelle, he has developed particular expertise in
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. June 19, 2003. Roger. Hoover Industries, Miami, Florida, U.S.
survival and survival equipment. Ritter
Feb. 10, 2003.
  3. Callahan, Steve, and Douglas S. Ritter. has attended several survival-training
E-mail communication with Rozelle, Ableton, Beatrice, vice president; and programs, in addition to participating in
Roger. Flight Safety Foundation. Koniecpolski, Stella, president. Interviews field exercises with the U.S. military and
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April, 27, 2003. by Rozelle, Roger. S.O.S. Food Lab, Miami,
several U.S. government agencies. He has
Florida, U.S. Feb. 11, 2003.
published more than 250 articles related
Additional Notes Miller, David, director of engineering; Rogers, to survival and is a frequent speaker and
Charles Jr., president; and Rogers, Donna, vice consultant on the subject.
Ritter, Douglas S.; and Ritter, Sue. Interviews president of marketing. Interviews by Rozelle,
by Rozelle, Roger. Tempe, Arizona, U.S. Aug. Roger. Survival Products. Hollywood, Florida,
20–28, 2002. Writing about life rafts has earned
U.S. Feb. 12, 2003.
him wide recognition and the top
Hoggle, Paul, engineering trainer and Bant, Jay, sales, general aviation; Henry, Brian, award from the 2000 Boating Writers
technician; Nelson, Douglas, manager; Saigler, program engineer; and Perdoni, Louis, vice International Writing Contest. As a full
Robert, operations manager; and Stegarl, Brian, president, Sales and Service. Air Cruisers.
chief inspector. Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. member of SAE International Aerospace
Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. Near Allaire
Goodrich. Phoenix, Arizona, U.S. Aug. 27, 2002. Airport, New Jersey, U.S. March 14, 2003.
Council, Aircraft Division, S-9 Cabin
Safety Provisions Committee and the
Geits, Kate, director of administration;
S-9A Subcommittee, Evacuation and
Graham, Bill, chief engineer; Hall, Tom,
completion center manager; Mittelbach,
About the Author Ditching Systems, Ritter participates in
Linda, director of human resources; Shoaff, the development of standards, proce-
Irene, vice president of production; Shoaff, Douglas S. Ritter founded in 1994 dures and recommended practices on
Fred; and Williams, David, senior technical the Equipped to Survive Foundation transport category aircraft.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 257
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Volunteers in the life

Life Raft Evaluation:

raft are attempting to
capsize it.

Pooling the Resources

Unlike a car, you usually can’t test drive a life raft. But our volunteers did,
and learned plenty about what did — and didn’t — make the work of
surviving easier on models by seven leading manufacturers.

— Douglas S. Ritter and FSF Editorial Staff

T
he data in this evaluation are Arizona-based Equipped to Survive <www.flightsafety.org> Aug. 23 to Aug. 25,
a compilation of the results Foundation <equippedtosurvive.org>.1 reflect similar parameters under which the
of evaluations of aviation life The parameters of the 2002 evaluation previous evaluations were conducted.
rafts (and marine life rafts, (see “Life Raft Primer: Guidelines for
which are not included here) in 1993, Evaluation,” page 233, for information This evaluation is only one of several
1996, 2000 and 2002, all of which were that will enhance the understanding of articles in this publication that will help
conducted in Arizona, U.S., by Doug- “Pooling the Resources”), which was educate aircraft operators, flight crews
las S. Ritter, executive director of the conducted with Flight Safety Foundation and cabin crews about aviation life

258 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

rafts, and provide them with practical Such forums have educated consumers the first helicopter floats for Igor Sikor-
information to consider in selecting a and generated product improvements ski. In 1987, the company was acquired
life raft to meet their particular operat- through competition. Ritter’s previous by the France-based Groupe Zodiac and
ing requirements and budget limitations. evaluations of life rafts, which have been introduced its first general aviation life
Prospective buyers must gather current published in a variety of consumer- raft in 1999. Air Cruisers life rafts were
information from the manufacturers; ask advocate publications, have helped to constructed of single-coated polyure-
questions about their respective products; educate aircraft operators and have thane over single-ply nylon fabric with
evaluate differences in features and deter- helped foster a more competitive market the coated side on the interior of air-
mine whether or not they are important that continues to boast ongoing product holding chambers. The Premier Series
for a particular operation; and ask for a improvements. included life rafts with four-person,
product demonstration. Most important, 10-person, 12-person and 13-person
get training to use the selected life raft. In 1993, only five U.S. companies rated capacities. The four-person Pre-
manufactured general aviation life rafts: mier was hexagonal (six sided), and the
As this article goes to press, some of Goodrich (then BFGoodrich), Eastern larger Premier life rafts were round. The
the life rafts may not be in production Aero Marine (EAM), Hoover Industries, Excel Series was identical to the Premier,
(although they are likely to continue to Survival Products and Winslow LifeRaft with less-sophisticated boarding aids that
be in use by aviation operators for many Co.; the latter two did not produce life reduced weight and volume. In 2002, the
years); current features and auxiliary rafts to meet requirements of TSO-C70a PaxAir Series was introduced with a life
equipment may be different than those (see “FAA Technical Standard Order raft with a rated capacity of 10 persons.
evaluated; and products were evaluated (TSO)-C70a, Life Rafts (Reversible and The 10-person PaxAir was octagonal
without regard to manufacturers’ rank- Nonreversible,” page 396). Elliot Life (eight sides) and had inflatable board-
ings of top-of-the-line vs. the most basic Rafts had ceased production of aviation ing aids, but appeared to be substantially
offerings, where such differences exist. life rafts, and Switlik Parachute Co. was similar to the Premier Series.
no longer selling to the general aviation
All the aviation life rafts in the 2002 eval- market. No European manufacturer had Air Cruisers provided a Premier Series life
uation have been approved by the U.S. a presence in the U.S. market that year. raft with a four-person rated capacity and
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) a Premier Series life raft with a 13-person
and therefore are required to meet the In 1992, RFD, based in Northern Ireland, rated capacity for the 2000 evaluation.
minimum standards of Technical Stan- entered the U.S. market via Revere Aero-
dard Order (TSO)-C70a (and some of space, which marketed their approved The 13-person Premier Series life raft
the life rafts also have been approved by life rafts as RFD/Revere. Winslow re- was the only life raft evaluated that did
other national civil aviation authorities). ceived its first TSO approval in 1994. In not meet the 3.6 square feet (0.334 square
Deficiencies, in our opinion, were based 1999, Air Cruisers entered the market meter) per person standard of TSO-C70a
on the comments, observations and with an entirely new approved design, (paragraph 4.1); it provided 3.36 square
experiences of the volunteers (see “Life and Survival Products began selling its feet (0.312 square meter) per person.
Rafts: Ask the Person Who’s Tried One,” first approved life raft. The measurements were checked and
page 293); Ritter; and during the 2002 rechecked, but Air Cruisers said that the
evaluation, FSF editorial staff. life raft did meet the standard. Air Cruis-
ers also said that the life raft meets the
All the manufacturers provided helpful requirements via the alternative compli-
information in the development of this ance methods of the TSO (paragraph
article. Moreover, some of the manu- 4.1.1, which says, “The rated capacity
facturers loaned equipment to the FSF … may be determined by the number of
editorial staff: Air Cruisers provided a occupant seating spaces which can be ac-
survival equipment pack (SEP); Eastern commodated within the occupiable area
Aero Marine provided life vests; and exclusive of the perimeter structure [such
Winslow LifeRaft Co. provided a life raft as buoyancy tubes] without overlapping of
and an SEP. Air Cruisers was manufacturing life vests the occupant seating spaces and with the
and life rafts for the military at least 60 occupant seating spaces located to provide
Today’s consumers have a wide array of years ago in New Jersey, U.S., said Louis each occupant with a back support of not
independent forums that test, review Perdoni, vice president of sales and ser- less than eight inches [20.3 centimeters]
and evaluate products ranging from vice.2 Later, the company produced slide high”). Less than 3.6 square feet per person
peanut butter to automobiles to aircraft. rafts for early jet transport aircraft and was a deficiency, in our opinion.

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Valise pulling harder; then again, pulling even

harder. The life raft deployed on the fourth
The yellow valise used nylon lacing to attempt as the volunteer pulled so hard
pack the life raft; no Velcro fastener was that the life raft was almost as high out of
used, so an opportunity was removed for the water as the 4.0 feet (1.2 meters) to the
a survivor to attempt to inappropriately pool deck before inflation began.
deploy the life raft by pulling apart the
seams secured by Velcro. (Volunteers Based on viewing videotapes of the in-
— people who participated in these flation attempts, the vacuum packing
evaluations — attempted to do this sev- appeared to interfere with the inflation
1 mechanism and was a deficiency, in our
eral times.) The 13-person life raft was
vacuum packed, a US$300 option that opinion. This vacuum-packed life raft did
reduced pack volume; this is a practical mooring/inflation line hung loose and not appear to meet, in our opinion, the
choice for space-limited applications, the mooring/inflation line was gathered TSO-C70a requirement (paragraph 5.2)
and provides added protection from the under the flap and hung from each side that “the tension required to withdraw
environment (e.g., spills). of the flap. More-secure retention and the static mooring line and to actuate
protection of the mooring/inflation line the gas release mechanism(s) must be
Most essential information was printed and clip would help prevent inadvertent between 20 [pounds] and 30 pounds
in black on a white placard on the face of inflation. Under the flap was an excellent [9.0 kilograms and 13.6 kilograms].”
the yellow valise. The largest text on the large aluminum handle that normally The majority of the evaluated marine
placard was used for the operating instruc- would be expected to be used for imme- life rafts were vacuum packed, including
tions and the life raft’s size. All the text was diate inflation. Instead, the handle was five with similar vacuum-packing designs
readily legible, a desirable feature. secured to the far end of the mooring/ that were manufactured by Air Cruisers’
inflation line, so that a survivor would parent, Zodiac. All inflated without
Stenciled in red directly on the valise in have to pull out all the line to inflate the excessive effort.
larger — but narrower — text, were the life raft. Instructions on the flap were in
instructions, “INFLATE THIS SIDE UP.” English and Spanish.
Righting
Air Cruisers said that complying with the
directions ensures that the life raft will Of the TSO-approved life rafts, the Air
inflate upright. In dim light, these in- Cruisers life raft had the best grip. The Air Cruisers used two different righting
structions did not contrast well against large T-shaped aluminum handle was systems. On the four-person life raft, a
the yellow valise, compared with the four inches (10 centimeters) wide and was single blue 1.0-inch-wide (2.5-centimeter-
black-on-white inflation instructions. gripped easily even with gloved hands or wide) nylon-webbing righting line was
with cold, wet, numbed hands. Neverthe- attached across the exterior bottom di-
less, the absence of an immediate-inflation ameter of the life raft. Loops were sewn
A handle of wide white nylon webbing
handle was a deficiency, in our opinion. into the line at intervals to allow easy
was attached to each end of the four-
grasping of the line when righting the
person life raft valise, and two such
The mooring/inflation line was 3/16-inch life raft. Stenciled instructions on the
handles were attached to each end of
(0.5-centimeter) flat braid. A robust and exterior bottom of a capsized life raft
the 13-person life raft valise as well as
easily operated stainless steel carabiner were satisfactory, except that these in-
on each long side.
clip (an oblong metal ring with a spring structions were not visible to volunteers
clip) was affixed to the end of the line. in the water.
Mooring/Inflation Line
On the 13-person life raft, a triangular
At one end of each valise was an orange Inflation righting ladder (photo 2, page 261) was
flap (photo 1) with a single snap that constructed of red one-inch-wide nylon
retained the mooring/inflation line, but The four-person Premier Series life raft webbing. A correctly implemented right-
there was no immediate-inflation handle inflated satisfactorily in 13 seconds. The ing ladder was an excellent asset in righting
that would allow a survivor to quickly volunteer attempting to inflate the 13- larger life rafts, compared with a line or a
inflate the raft with a single short pull person life raft pulled the mooring/ line with grab handles. The righting loca-
of the handle, rather than having to pull inflation line with a pull that normally tion was to the left of the inflation cylinder
out the entire mooring/inflation line. would result in inflation, but inflation (when the capsized life raft was viewed
The large snap clip on the end of the did not occur. The volunteer tried again, from the water). The instructions/arrows

260 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

On the four-person life raft, the board- ramp’s buoyancy tubes to create a floor
ing ramp (photo 3) was located be- between them. The floor fabric was not
tween the two buoyancy tubes, and on stretched tightly, but had little slack.
the 13-person life raft, which has two
larger buoyancy tubes, the ramp was When wet, the floor became slick and
located below the midpoint of the lower contributed to the difficulty some
buoyancy tube. While there were minor volunteers had in boarding the life
differences in construction, they did not rafts. Some volunteers reported that
seem to influence the effectiveness of the the slickness and the slight slackness
boarding ramp. contributed to the boarding ramps col-
2 lapsing into the water (photo 4) while
they attempted to board the life rafts.
on the exterior bottom of the life raft de- This, in turn, led to the failure of two
scribed how to use the righting ladder to volunteers to board the 13-person life
position the life raft upright. raft, which already was more difficult
to board because of its larger buoyancy
The righting location was not identified, tubes and the resulting higher freeboard
and no righting instructions were printed (distance between the water surface and
on the side of the life raft — these were the highest point on the buoyancy tubes,
deficiencies, in our opinion, that would see Table 1).
affect survivors not trained to right a life
3
raft. Moreover, despite the satisfactory
instructions on the exterior bottom of
the life raft, survivors who require in- The inflatable tube support for the board-
structions may not see them. ing ramp was splayed — that is, the tubes
were spread apart in a U-shape on the
Boarding Aids four-person life raft, and in a truncated
V-shape, in which a straight tube replaced
An inflatable boarding ramp was used for the apex, on the 13-person life raft; both
the primary boarding location on the life boarding ramps were about the same
rafts we evaluated, and a boarding ladder size. Buoyancy-tube fabric was attached
across the bottom of each boarding 4
was used at the alternate entry.

Table 1
Freeboard Comparison of Life Rafts in Evaluation

Freeboard Freeboard With Tube Freeboard Freeboard Overload With

Raft (in/cm) Deflated (in/cm) Overload (in/cm) Tube Deflated (in/cm)
Air Cruisers — 13 person 19.88/50.50 11.25/28.58 16.75/42.55 9.75/24.77
EAM VIP — 10 person 18.75/47.62 9.85/25.02 16.03/40.72 9.63/24.46
Goodrich — 10 person 12.00/30.48 5.00/12.70 9.38/28.83 4.69/11.91
Hoover ReadyRescue — 6 person 15.75/40.01 8.19/20.80 12.25/31.12 6.31/16.03
Survival Products Type I — 6 person 15.25/38.74 7.69/19.53 12.31/31.27 6.25/15.88
Winslow FA-AV-UL Ultralight — 10 person 17.15/43.56 9.45/24.00 14.50/36.83 8.88/22.56
Winslow FA-AV Ultima — 12 person 21.00/53.34 12.25/31.12 18.50/46.99 10.25/26.04
Winslow FA-AV Ultima Light — 10 person 20.15/51.18 11.19/28.42 17.75/45.09 9.25/23.50
in/cm = inches/centimeters
*Freeboard measurements were not conducted at the time of the evaluation for RFD/Revere life rafts.
Source: Douglas S. Ritter

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Air Cruisers later said that the boarding both life rafts, some volunteers grabbed the interior side of the upper buoyancy
ramp of the 13-person configuration had the rolled-up fabric to pull themselves tube. Each ladder had three rungs, with
been improved to prevent deflection un- aboard; a volunteer who was having the widest rung closest to the buoyancy
der load, with an angle to make it easier difficulty boarding grabbed the edge tubes. Survivors could remove the interi-
to get inside the life raft. of the canopy at the entry and ripped or ladders after boarding was completed.
it apart at the zipper seam. Air Cruis- These ladders proved very effective for
On top of the upper buoyancy tube of ers has reinforced this area on current volunteers with long arms and those who
both life rafts was a blue one-inch grab life rafts. had sufficient strength to reach over the
handle (four-person life raft) or a red upper buoyancy tubes, grasp the first
one-inch grab handle (13-person life A means was provided to assist pulling rung and pull themselves aboard. Short
raft) constructed of nylon webbing. (Each oneself into the life raft. On the four- and bottom-heavy volunteers, however,
grab handle was twisted so that it did not person life raft, one end of blue one- had difficulty in boarding the raft.
lie flat on the tube; this allowed easier inch-wide nylon webbing was attached
grasping.) A similar grab handle was to the midpoint interior side of the upper Two volunteers were unable to board the
attached to each boarding ramp’s floor, buoyancy tube and the opposite end was 13-person life raft from either the primary
about one-third of each boarding ramp’s attached to a plastic snap buckle, which entry or the alternate entry. Moreover, the
length to its attachment point on the life was then attached to an anchor point in boarding-ramp inflatable-support tubes
raft. The four-person life raft also had a the middle of the floor. Two staggered on the four-person life raft and the 13-
grab handle on top of the boarding-ramp handhold loops were sewn onto each side person life raft had no check valves; if a
tube at the center of the U-shape; the 13- of the webbing. The webbing was useful boarding-ramp tube were punctured, the
person life raft had a grab handle at about to pull oneself into the life raft (photo lower buoyancy tube would deflate. This
the midpoint on both sides (interior and 6) but the effectiveness of the handhold was a deficiency, in our opinion. This de-
exterior) of the upper buoyancy tube. loops was diminished because they were sign did not appear to meet the require-
not easily grasped. The loops were con- ments of TSO-C70a (paragraph 4.6) that
The alternate entry on both life rafts structed of flat webbing, and they tended “puncturing of inflatable boarding aids
incorporated a three-rung ladder of to lie flat together, rather than in an easy- must not affect the buoyancy of the raft
white 1.75-inch-wide (4.44-centimeter- to-grasp open loop. Grasping a handhold buoyancy chambers.”
wide) nylon webbing with sewn-in flat loop would require first spreading the
semi-flexible rungs (photo 5). The ladder webbing apart, but that could be difficult
extended well below the bottom of the life with cold, wet, numbed hands. This was Canopy
raft, making it easy to climb, although its a deficiency, in our opinion.
presence was not immediately apparent An inflatable single-arch canopy support
to some volunteers. Within reach of the was on the four-person life raft and 13-
ladder, a grab handle was midway on the person life raft. It was not a stay-erect
exterior side of the upper buoyancy tube design: If the upper buoyancy tube were
and another grab handle was on top of deflated, the canopy would deflate, too;
the upper buoyancy tube. if the canopy support deflated, the upper
buoyancy tube would deflate. In either
event, the canopy fabric and the canopy
support would collapse on the survivors
in the life raft, which then would have
lower freeboard. In rough sea condi-
6 tions — wind, waves and spray that
wet the survivors and equipment, while
moving the life raft very uncomfortably
The 13-person life raft had a pair of V- — water would be more likely to enter
shaped interior ladders constructed of the life raft. The canopy — but not the
red one-inch nylon webbing. The nar- canopy support — could be removed to
5 rower V-end of each ladder was attached allow survivors more freedom to repair
with a plastic snap buckle to an anchor the life raft, provided they were familiar
On both life rafts, the entry flap was rolled point in the center of the floor; plastic with the life raft construction and assem-
down from the top and rested on the up- snap buckles at the wider end of the lad- bly and had the presence of mind to do
per buoyancy tube across the entry. On der were attached to an anchor point on so. A better solution would be to install a

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

check valve to prevent the loss of air from significantly more headroom than any of Air Cruisers said that a heavier fabric and
the undamaged tube. Absence of a check the other single-arch canopies. more robust zippers were being used for
valve in this application was a deficiency, closure flaps in current life rafts.
in our opinion. The large buoyancy tubes on the 13-
person life raft and the high canopy Rain Simulation
The four-person life raft used a 6.0-inch- support reduced the inherent disad-
diameter (15.2-centimeter-diameter) vantages of single-arch canopy designs Because of the canopy problems, the life
canopy-support tube, and the 13-person that could force survivors to bend in rafts were deficient in the rain simula-
life raft used a 7.5-inch-diameter (19.0- an uncomfortable position that would tion (photo 10). The rainwater collector
centimeter-diameter) canopy-support be difficult to maintain for hours or appeared to function adequately. The
tube. Both canopy supports were squared, in rough weather. The entries were canopy was equipped with a V-shaped
but had inward sloping legs. The canopy arch shaped, and the closure flaps were diverter (photo 11) of semi-rigid fabric
fabric was lightweight translucent-orange rolled down and secured to the upper design that channeled water into a reser-
rip-stop nylon with retroreflective strips buoyancy tube. The zipper closure was voir at the rainwater-collector tube (photo
affixed. (Retroreflective materials are en- of very lightweight construction. Cloth 12, page 264). This was necessary when the
gineered to reflect light in the direction pulls were attached to the single-action canopy slope was so steep that water would
of its source and are most effective when zippers. Both zippers on the 13-person not naturally pool to the tube.
the ambient light is low.) life raft failed. One zipper was ripped
from the canopy (photo 8) and the
The bottom edge of the canopy was other zipper was pulled out from one
secured with an elastic hem, which side when volunteers were closing the
stretched over the upper buoyancy tube, canopy (photo 9). The lightweight clo-
and plastic quick-release buckles (photo sure flap was jammed so firmly that it
7) were used to attach the canopy to an- could not be loosened from a zipper on
chor points on the four-person life raft; the four-person life raft. These failures
nylon ties were used to tie the canopy to would reduce dramatically the canopies’
anchor points on the 13-person life raft. effectiveness to protect survivors from
This type of design allowed relatively easy the wind, rain, waves and sun; these were
removal of the canopy. deficiencies, in our opinion. 10

7 8
11

Headroom was 41 inches (104 centime-

ters) at the center for the four-person life Lifelines and Grasp Lines
raft, 18.0 inches (45.7 centimeters) at the
sides and 20.0 inches to 24.0 inches (50.8 One-inch nylon webbing was used for
centimeters to 61.0 centimeters) elsewhere; lifelines and grasp lines: blue on the
for the 13-person life raft, headroom was four-person life raft and red on the 13-
46.0 inches (117.0 centimeters) at the person life raft. The lifeline was attached
center, 36.0 inches (91.4 centimeters) at high on the lower buoyancy tube with
the sides and 30.0 inches to 33.0 inches adequate slack to be reached by survivors
(76.2 centimeters to 83.8 centimeters) in the water, regardless of the life raft’s
9
elsewhere. The 13-person life raft provided orientation: upright or capsized.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

15

opening at the entry end and a 3.0-inch-

diameter (7.6-centimeter-diameter)
opening at the bottom, with a drawcord
to close the bottom if desired. The sea an-
chor was 44 inches (111 centimeters) long
12 14 and was fitted to a 14.5-foot (4.4-meter)
line of 3/16-inch (0.48 centimeter) braid-
The grasp line was strung along the inte- ed nylon line. This was considerably less
assist in quickly deploying each bag when
rior side of the lower buoyancy tube. The than the minimum 25.0 feet (7.6 meters)
the life raft was inflated, but did not seem
grasp line was difficult for some volun- required by TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.3)
to make any difference. The water-ballast
teers to use because the line was too low. and likely would prove unsatisfactory in
bags dropped down and filled at about
Storage bags were attached to the grasp a rough sea. On these two life rafts, the sea
the same rate as conventional unweighted
line (photo 13), which compromised anchors would be deployed manually by
bags. The four-person life raft had three
its usefulness because survivors would survivors; the sea anchors on all the other
water-ballast bags, and the 13-person life
have to compete with the storage bags aviation life rafts in the evaluation would
raft had four water-ballast bags. Both life
for space on the line. be deployed automatically.
rafts were relatively easy to capsize during
the evaluation because the water ballast
was insufficient. This was a deficiency, in Despite the short line, the sea anchor
our opinion. The disadvantage of the high performed satisfactorily in the sea-
canopy was that it provided more surface anchor evaluation, but longer lines
area to be blown by the wind, which could would improve performance. There was
contribute further to a capsizing. no swivel in the sea anchor line to pre-
vent line twisting. This was a deficiency,
in our opinion.
The water-ballast bags were constructed
of lightweight canopy fabric with buoy-
ancy-tube fabric used only on the ends. Floor
13 The half-round inflow holes at the top had
reinforcing trim sewn onto the rounded A thin closed-cell foam was used for
Stability lower portion of the hole. We found tears insulation. This feature eliminated the
in the fabric of the water-ballast bags of necessity of manually inflating a floor.
The water-ballast bags were unusual in the 13-person raft during our evaluation The foam was glued to the interior of the
both shape and construction. The bags (photo 15). The tears originated in the in- life raft floor and had a very lightweight
were a truncated V-shape with rounded fill holes at the top of the bags, where some fabric covering; Air Cruisers said that
bottoms, and each bag (photo 14) held essentially square corners in the cutouts the foam provided an insulation value
approximately 63 pounds (29 kilograms) would invite propagation of tears. equivalent to a 1.0-inch (2.5-centimeter)
of fresh water. A small 3/8-inch (0.95- air space.
centimeter) drain hole was in each end Air Cruisers used a relatively large
of the bag. A spring wire was fitted inside conical sea anchor of lightweight para- The foam proved to be vulnerable to
the rim at either end, helping to maintain chute fabric. It had a 24-inch-diameter damage (photo 16, page 265) during the
the bag’s shape. This had been expected to (61-centimeter-diameter), unreinforced evaluation. Sections of the insulation were

264 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

chain. Our initial impression was that this pouch was not identified as a bailer, so it
solved some of the tight-fit problems we could have been overlooked by someone
had with the pump on the four-person life who expected a more traditional bucket-
raft. Our enthusiasm evaporated quickly, shaped bailer. Its functionality was noted
however, when the bayonet fitting at- by volunteers as being unsatisfactory.
tached to the adapter hose did not match This was a deficiency, in our opinion.
the fitting of the topping valves (inflation
valves used to “top off” [add to] the air in A single small, compressed sponge was
the life raft). included.
16
It appeared from the U.S. military- Heaving Line
separated from the floor, and the surface specification (mil-spec) labeling that this
of the floor was abraded. This was a combination of manual inflation pump A heaving/trailing line (also called a
deficiency, in our opinion. Air Cruisers and adapter was meant for a military life “rescue line”) of mil-spec parachute cord
said that it had added a layer of fabric raft, not for this civilian life raft. Thus, was attached to a traditional round-ring
that will withstand better the rigors of the pump became useless. This was a rubber quoit. This was secured inside
life raft use. deficiency, in our opinion. the life raft with a fabric clasp wrapped
around an interior grasp line (photo 18)
Life Raft Equipment Moreover, the beaded chain was at- and secured with a metal snap. This loca-
tached to the hose with a cable tie that tion could interfere with the primary use
was trimmed incorrectly and had a very for the grasp line. We were unable to throw
Pump
sharp tail that cut one of the volunteers. the quoit without the line tangling. This
This was a deficiency, in our opinion. The was a deficiency, in our opinion. Moreover,
The manual inflation pump (also called
injury was easily treated during the evalu- the parachute cord was nylon, was not in-
a topping pump) was stored inside the
ation, but could have been much more herently buoyant and apparently did not
survival equipment pack (SEP), making it
serious in a survival situation. comply with the TSO-C70a (paragraph
unavailable immediately after deployment
of the life raft. No tether was fitted to the 5.4) requirement for a “floating heaving/
pump, so it could be lost overboard. That trailing line.”
Bailer and Sponge
was a deficiency, in our opinion.
The bailer was a flat 11.0-inch by 12.0-
Volunteers had difficulty using the man- inch (27.9-centimeter by 30.5-centimeter)
ual inflation pump on the four-person pouch, which was constructed of buoyan-
life raft because the cap interfered with cy-tube fabric. The seams were ultrasoni-
positioning the pump (photo 17), even cally welded, so the pouch did not leak, an
when the cap lay flat, by preventing inser- excellent attribute. The top 2.5 inches (6.4
tion of the pump into the valve. centimeters) of the opening were folded
over and welded to create a slightly stiff
opening lip around the pouch. A 3.0-inch
(7.6 centimeter) oval cut at the top on 18
one side served as a handle. Being a flat
pouch, it could not stand upright, nor Raft Knife
could the open end easily be held open,
which could be a disadvantage for some A tethered raft knife (photo 19, page 266),
possible uses, such as to retain bodily intended to be used to cut the mooring/
waste or to collect rainwater. inflation line, was retained inside a yellow
sheath attached to a silver piece of fabric
Volunteers had difficulty using the bailer glued to the upper buoyancy tube. The
17
to empty water from the life raft because contrast between the yellow and silver
they were not able to capture much water helped to make the sheath more notice-
On the 13-person life raft, a six-inch (15- in it, despite its capacity of 10.0 quarts able. A long Velcro-secured flap, upon
centimeter) adapter hose was attached to (9.5 liters). A tether could be attached to which was stenciled “KNIFE” in black,
the manual inflation pump with a beaded the handle, but none was provided. The retained the knife. A hook-shaped guard

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 265
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

page 462), powered by separate water- an arrow pointing to where the SEP
activated batteries, were used for the was tethered to the life raft. The canopy
exterior and the interior; the lights were covered most of the text so that the text
secured with a metal snap. For the exte- could not be seen readily or read. On
rior light, that should have been satisfac- the four-person life raft, “SURVIVAL
tory because the canopy fitted over the KIT” was stenciled with an arrow on the
light and would help hold it down and interior side of the upper buoyancy tube.
in proper orientation. For the interior The imperative instructions were more
light, which was located off center on the appropriate, in our opinion, even if the
canopy-support arch tube, however, the text had to be smaller to fit.
19 location allowed the fixture to hang down
and direct its light to one side, somewhat The long box-shaped SEP was made
(photo 20) helped to prevent contact with reducing its effectiveness. Nevertheless, of life raft buoyancy-tube fabric with
the knife blade. On the four-person life that also made the light easy to unsnap heavy metal snaps to keep the top closed.
raft, the sheath was on top of the buoy- and to direct where needed, within the An inner clear plastic bag, sealed closed
ancy tube to the left of the entry (while limited range of movement provided by with mil-spec tape, held all the contents,
boarding), tucked under the canopy, the wire keepers. If the keeper were cut but water entered the plastic bag during
where it was less visible and subject to carefully, freeing the wire, or Air Cruisers its brief time in the water. Some water-
being overlooked. provided more free-wire length, then this resistant items were loose inside this
light could have been even more useful. larger bag, along with the shrink-wrapped
Using the interior light would reduce the Katadyn Survivor-06 hand-operated water
need to consume energy from the batter- maker (also known as a manual reverse-
ies in the flashlight. osmosis desalinator), but there were also
two other “modules” vacuum packed in
ELT heavy clear plastic. Despite finger holes
that allowed a good grip and a slit in the
Air Cruisers offered a DME Corp. 121.5- plastic, opening proved difficult when we
megahertz (MHz) auto-deploying emer- tested one of these vacuum-packed mod-
gency locator transmitter (ELT) as an ules on the 13-person life raft.
option. The ELT was attached to the upper
20 interior face of the lower buoyancy tube. Two stowage bags were provided on the
The short whip antenna was attached to four-person life raft, and three larger bags
The raft knife on the 13-person life raft the upper tube near the primary entry. On were provided on the 13-person life raft.
was located opposite the primary entry, both life rafts, the antenna was bent, which They were stenciled with “KIT STOW-
on the interior side of the buoyancy could compromise the ELT’s transmission, AGE” on the four-person life raft; a stencil
tube, and was therefore more notice- said DME. The wires that connected the on the buoyancy tube, “SURVIVAL KIT
able, as long as someone did not cover ELT to the remote antenna and to the wa- STORAGE,” identified the stowage bags
it while sitting in front of it. Because the ter sensor were exposed for the most part on the 13-person life raft. The stowage
normal survivor action upon boarding a on the interior and were subject to being bags were constructed of buoyancy-tube
life raft is to move as far from the entry snagged and damaged, which could render fabric in an envelope-like manner, 12.0
as possible, the likelihood is high that the the ELT useless. Volunteers reported that inches by 11.0 inches (30.5 centimeters by
raft knife would be obscured from view. the ELT was uncomfortable if they had to 27.9 centimeters) on the four-person life
Moreover, volunteers discovered that the sit against it. raft and 23.0 inches by 11.5 inches (58.4
tether on the raft knife was four feet too centimeters by 29.2 centimeters) on the
short to reach the mooring/inflation line. Air Cruisers offered a 406-MHz ELT 13-person life raft. The flap was secured
This was a deficiency, in our opinion. Air option. with two metal snaps (photo 21, page
Cruisers has extended the tether. 267) or four metal snaps, respectively. The
Survival Equipment Packs flap was folded over the interior grasp line
Lighting and then snapped closed, which attached
On the 13-person life raft, the instruc- the bag to the interior grasp lines. This
TSO-approved survivor-locator lights tions “SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT PULL attachment was viewed as unsatisfactory
(see “FAA Technical Standard Order IN IMMEDIATELY” were stenciled on by volunteers because the bags got in the
[TSO]-C85a, Survivor-locator Lights,” top of the upper buoyancy tube with way of grasping the lines, and unsnapping

266 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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Utility Knife Paddles

A good-quality Camillus Cutlery Co. Air Cruisers provided a pair of two-

Dura-Tool all-stainless-steel pocketknife, piece plastic paddles. The handle had
with a nonlocking 2 5/16-inch (5.8- to be slipped into the paddle where it
centimeter) clip-point blade and bottle was retained solely by friction, not the
opener/screwdriver with an attached most secure design. The paddles were
nylon cord tether, was provided. not equipped with lanyards. Neverthe-
less, these were the most effective and
comfortable paddles among the avia-
21 Flashlight
tion life rafts compared and could be
readily used with two hands. The wide
Two waterproof Rayovac Roughneck
the flap meant that the bag was no longer plastic surface made a good, but not flat,
flashlights were supplied, each with a
secured to the life raft. This was a deficiency, cutting board.
krypton bulb and zoom lens, and pow-
in our opinion.
ered by two AA-cell lithium batteries. A
tether was attached to the lanyard ring. Fishing Kit
Survival Equipment Two independent flashlights would
eliminate the immediate need to change A well-equipped and compact mil-spec
Repair batteries and/or bulbs. The lithium fishing kit was provided. Lines on plas-
batteries are light, perform well at cold tic winders, leaders, swivels, lures and an
Two three-inch mil-spec repair clamps
temperatures and have a storage life of assortment of fishhooks were included
were included. Air Cruisers, in a depar-
up to 10 years. with some other useful items such as a
ture from normal aviation life raft indus-
single-edge razor blade (which, however,
try practice, recommended in their life
This flashlight had a push-on/push-off will rust promptly if not already rusted),
raft manual (LRM) plugging the pres-
style switch on the top of the body. This safety pins and aluminum foil. All were
sure-relief valves (PRVs) immediately
model flashlight had been packed in tightly packed inside a fragile hard plastic
after inflation. This would eliminate the
other SEPs, and we discovered that the case, which was cracked in the 13-person
need to top up the buoyancy tubes each
switch had been turned on during stor- SEP. The instructions were satisfactory
evening, as is usually required with PRVs
age. Despite a plastic guard being added and waterproof.
that are allowed to vent. Nevertheless, the
to prevent such occurrences, the guard
PRVs are designed to vent excess pres-
failed — breaking in half — under pack-
sure that is most likely present at warmer First Aid
ing pressure. The flashlights in the Air
temperatures. If they are plugged imme-
Cruisers SEPs functioned satisfactorily,
diately, higher-than-desired pressure may Air Cruisers assembled its own first
but the importance of having a func-
be retained. aid kit of individually packaged items,
tioning flashlight is significant, and this
flashlight’s vulnerability was a deficiency, including an assortment of compress
The Air Cruisers plugs looked nothing bandages, triangle bandages, adhesive
in our opinion.
like conventional plugs; rather, they were bandages and medications. They were
pins that secured the valve in the closed vacuum packed, but once opened, no
position. The pins were equipped with a Signaling Devices storage was available for these items to
float in case they were dropped into the keep them dry.
water, but a tether would have been much Two Skyblazer XLT aerial meteor flares
better security. Clear instructions to use and a 2.0-inch by 3.0-inch (5.1-centime-
the pins were in the LRM. ter by 7.6-centimeter) Skyblazer acrylic Water
signal mirror, which was equipped with
Nevertheless, we question whether plug- a nonfunctional aiming aid and a lan- A Survivor-06 hand-operated water
ging the PRVs is of such high priority that yard. Volunteers previously rated the maker was an option, and the life rafts
it should be the fourth item on the im- mirror as unsatisfactory. Also included were so equipped. There was no pack-
mediate-action instructions in the LRM. were a small package of Skyblazer sea dye aged ready-to-drink water. This was a
Survivors would have much higher pri- marker and a high-quality International deficiency, in our opinion.
orities at that time, such as ensuring that Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
all survivors are aboard and recovering (SOLAS)-specification survival whistle Moreover, no dedicated means to store
the SEP from the water. with a lanyard. water was provided. This was a deficiency,

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in our opinion. Given that a moderately Service

effective water collector was on the
canopy — in addition to the optional Air Cruisers made the life raft service
Survivor-06 hand-operated water maker interval a major marketing issue when
— a means to store water would be useful. it introduced its line of general aviation
A bottle of Portable Aqua tablets to purify life rafts. Spending money on an annual
fresh water was included, too. service, in addition to the cost of a life
raft (which most owners never expect to
use), is viewed as an unnecessary aggrava-
Food
tion and expense by some consumers. Air
22 Cruisers claimed that these life rafts only
Food rations are required under some
require service every six years, compared
regulations. For short-term survival
Air Cruisers said that it had changed the with the then industry standard of an-
situations likely with aviation life rafts,
food rations. nual service. This extended interval
food may not be necessary. Even the most
represented a significant reduction in
easily digested dry foods require water
Providing one ration package per person, aggravation and a benefit in financial
to digest and few SEPs include adequate
the supplied food did not meet the Part savings. Nevertheless, consumers must
supplies of water, so the inclusion of
135 specification of “a two-day supply of understand some important details be-
food in these SEPs may not be neces-
emergency food rations supplying at least hind this claim.
sary. Moreover, with insufficient water,
1,000 calories per day for each person.”
eating food could hasten dehydration.
Our calculation determined that the sup- Because the company uses a composite-
The September 2000 revision of the
plied food was about 27 percent less than wound inflation cylinder, this cylinder
recommendations contained in the SAE
the specification. must be hydrostatically tested every
International Aerospace Recommended
Practice ARP1282, Revision A, Survival three years, as opposed to every five
After the SEPs were unpacked, several of years for an aluminum or steel inflation
Kit – Life Rafts and Slide/Rafts (aimed
the food packages were found ruptured cylinder. Moreover, the composite cylin-
at transport category aircraft) deleted
or damaged and the food was spoiled. ders have a maximum service life of 15
all requirements for food. If food is in-
Another food package that appeared to years, after which they must be replaced.
cluded, it should be appropriate for life
be undamaged externally was discovered Air Cruisers said that while the life raft
raft survival: easily digested with minimal
later to have been spoiled by water intru- valise must be opened and the cylinder
water, without provoking thirst.
sion, probably during inflation of the life must be removed for testing and then
raft. Sugar and Life Savers turned the in- reinstalled, the life raft itself does not
Air Cruisers included mil-spec survival terior of the package into a gooey mess. need servicing.
rations containing 1,447 kilocalories. The
contents of each sealed pouch (photo 22)
included a pair of vacuum-packed gra- Survival Manual/Life Raft Currently available 121.5-MHz ELTs
nola bars, a corn-flake bar, a shortbread Manual equipped with alkaline batteries have
bar and a chocolate-chip dessert bar, three-year service intervals. The ELT
along with a roll of Life Savers (a hard The Air Cruisers “Life Raft Manual was attached to the buoyancy tube on
candy) and a packet each of sugar, instant — Immediate Action for Survival” was the interior of the life raft, so to service
lemon tea and chicken-flavored soup stored inside the SEP, which was not the ELT and replace the battery, the life
with a gravy base. The instructions on inside the life raft upon inflation. The raft must be unpacked and unfolded.
the package cautioned that the soup base waterproof manual was printed on one
should not be used if the user is exposed side only and held together with a brass Survival rations had a five-year service life
to, or has swallowed, salt water. Moreover, grommet in one corner. The bold and before replacement from date of manu-
while the tea and soup packets could be large black text on white paper was easy facture. Flares had a regulatory 42-month
consumed without any water, their di- to read and the brief instructions were service life from date of manufacture.
rections required reconstitution with 14 easy to understand. Survivors in life
ounces of water. This was not appropriate rafts equipped with a Survivor-06 hand- To maintain compliance with the various
for a life raft, in our opinion. Volunteers operated water maker could be disap- replacement dates of different products
said that the food bars were extremely pointed to discover that the listed water produced by a variety of manufacturers,
dry and thirst provoking; again, not a packets are absent. There was no mention consumers may be required to remove
desirable attribute for a life raft ration. of this water maker in the LRM. the life raft from the aircraft and ship it

268 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

for appropriate service at a service in- Guideline for Evaluation,” page 233). chamber of the life raft was deflated,
terval that will be less than six years and The VIP line was introduced in 2000 as survivors were in a half circle of tube
perhaps as often as every two years. the “Alpha Series” of Type I and Type II open to the water across the diameter
life rafts. The Type I was renamed the of the life raft; the deflated half floated
Aside from servicing components, the VIP Series in 2002 coincidental with the in the water and was incapable of sup-
life raft manufacturer had determined introduction of the VIP Deluxe Series porting any significant weight. It was
that the life raft would not need to be version of the Type I life raft with added impossible for the survivors in the life
serviced for six years. Nevertheless, features. The VIP life rafts incorporated raft at its rated capacity to either fit in
humans construct and pack life rafts, self-erecting canopies and other contem- the one-half life raft remaining afloat,
and mistakes do occur. The deficiencies porary survival features. or even if they somehow managed to fit,
observed during this evaluation, such as for them to fold the deflated portion of
the short tether on the raft knife and an The Classic Type I life rafts were available the life raft across the remaining buoyant
incorrect manual inflation pump fitting, in six-person (hexagonal) and 12-person chamber and remain “out of fresh water”
testify to that. Regular service tends to (octagonal) rated capacities. The Classic as specified in TSO-C70a (paragraph
catch such errors. Type II life rafts were available in two- 4.2.2). The remaining inflated portion of
person, four-person (hexagonal), six-per- the tube provided buoyancy and a base
son and nine-person (octagonal) rated from which repairs could be made, but
capacities. The VIP Type I life rafts were repairs would be difficult at best.
available in four-person, seven-person,
10-person and 15-person rated capaci- Alternatives to this common design ex-
ties. The VIP life rafts were octagonal. ist that can meet the TSO requirements.
Sam Oroshnik, the founder of his family- There are marine life rafts of these de-
owned company, Eastern Aero Marine, EAM provided a Classic Type II four- signs, and at least one aviation life raft was
worked on life rafts at Switlik Parachute person life raft for the first evaluation produced in very limited quantities using
Co. after his U.S. Army service as a me- and thereafter declined to participate in one of these concepts (but it has been
teorologist in Alaska, U.S.3 Oroshnik then evaluations. In subsequent evaluations, dropped from the manufacturer’s line).
moved to Miami, Florida, U.S., where his Classic life rafts were obtained from Such a life raft was evaluated previously
company began refurbishing and resell- EAM dealers and service centers. The and it functioned as advertised, main-
ing military surplus life rafts in 1952. By Classic Type I 12-person life raft, Classic taining adequate freeboard and keeping
the 1960s, his company was focused on Type II four-person life raft and Classic the survivors dry and “out of fresh wa-
repairing life rafts and in 1968 began Type II six-person life raft were evaluated ter” after the deflation of one chamber.
manufacturing them. In 1980, the com- previously. In 2002, EAM again declined The disadvantage of such designs is that
pany introduced its first TSO-approved to participate in the evaluation. A new they cost more to manufacture, become
Type II life raft, and later expanded to in- 10-person VIP life raft (then referred to heavier and require additional volume,
clude TSO-approved Type I life rafts with as the Alpha Series) was purchased from though not nearly as much as a typical
rated capacities up to 46-person. Further EAM by an associate who provided it for Type I life raft.
expansion included the manufacturing of the 2002 evaluation.
TSO-approved life vests, and servicing of
aircraft evacuation slides. Today, Miriam EAM’s Type II life rafts incorporated a Valise
Oroshnik has succeeded her father as design feature, common to all other Type
president and CEO, but he continues a II life rafts in this evaluation, that seemed Classic life raft valises incorporated a
daily routine at the company. to conflict with TSO-C70a requirement separate valise for the SEP enclosed in-
(paragraph 4.2.2) that “the life raft will be side the primary valise and attached to
EAM TSO-approved life rafts include the capable of supporting the rated number the life raft with a nylon tether. The valise
Classic and VIP series. All are constructed of occupants out of fresh water in the and SEP closures on the smaller Classic
of double-coated neoprene over two-ply event one chamber is deflated.” The Type life rafts utilized metal snaps (photo 1,
bias-cut nylon fabric. II (single-buoyancy-tube) life rafts, which page 270) on three sides to close a top flap
we evaluated, did not appear to comply of the box-shaped valise. Based on the
The Classic Type I and Type II life rafts with the requirements of the TSO. evaluations, this was not as secure as the
are the traditional line and use manu- slip-loop lacing used on EAM’s larger life
ally assembled and erected canopies that In these life rafts, the single buoyancy raft valises, and we found smaller Classic
EAM has produced since the founding tube was divided in half by vertical life rafts with one or more of these snaps
of the company (see “Life Raft Primer: bulkheads within the tube. When one unfastened.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

to the side where the mooring/inflation pressure could be confirmed without

line was located. Some volunteers failed conventional methods, such as weigh-
to readily find the instructions because ing the life raft. The valise had a placard
they were in smaller print than the (photo 6) next to the gauge window that
manufacturer’s name and general in- provided an “AMBIENT TEMPERA-
formation about the life raft. Despite TURE VS. MIN. CYLINDER PRESSURE”
what seemed to be reasonably clear chart to determine if the pressure read on
instructions, most volunteers began the the gauge was satisfactory. While this is an
inflation by trying to unsnap the metal innovative concept, there is a disadvan-
snaps of the valises. tage: A pressure gauge can fail and cause
a gas leak. The relatively fragile connec-
1
The larger Classic life raft and VIP life raft tion on the pressurized cylinder would
A single white nylon-webbing handle had no text instructions on the face of the be subject to damage if the life raft were
was attached to one side on smaller va- valise; rather, they had a two-frame picto- mishandled. The gauge itself could be
lises (photo 2); two or four white nylon- gram showing a woman deploying the life damaged in a ditching. Thus, this seems
webbing handles (photo 3) were provided raft. There was no arrow indicating the an unnecessary weak link in an otherwise
on the side and one on each end of the position of the mooring/inflation line. robust inflation system. For example, the
larger valises. gauge was not aligned correctly in the life
The VIP life raft had inflation instruc- raft in the evaluation. Only by pulling the
tions printed in small text on the end of tight valise fabric aside did a portion of
the valise next to the mooring/inflation the gauge become visible.
line. The text was partially covered by
flaps and folds in the valise fabric (photo
4) and the mooring/inflation line.

4 Mooring/Inflation Line

The VIP life raft also incorporated a clear The mooring/inflation line was located
round plastic window (photo 5) to view on the end of the life raft valise, protected
a pressure gauge for the inflation cylin- under an orange flap with a pair of snaps
der. By checking this gauge, the cylinder to secure it in place on the Classic life
3 rafts; a piece of Velcro and a snap secured
this line on the VIP life raft. On the VIP
Black instructions were stenciled on the life raft, and on some Classic life rafts,
yellow valise fabric. While easy to read the immediate-inflation handle also was
when new, these instructions are sus- retained under this flap.
ceptible to wear over time, and we have
seen life rafts in service with instructions On the Classic Type I 12-person life raft,
barely legible. there were difficult-to-read small black
text instructions for inflation stenciled
For the smaller Classic life rafts, the on the orange flap. The smaller Classic
instructions were on the top face of the life rafts were placarded boldly with the
5
life raft valise with a large arrow pointing words “LANYARD PULL HANDLE” in

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

black on yellow fabric and affixed to (photo 9). The only means to secure The lengths of the mooring/inflation
the orange flap. The VIP life rafts had the life raft to the aircraft would be to lines ranged from 67.0 feet (20.4 me-
no information on the flap, but the use the webbing; this method requires a ters) to 72.0 feet (21.9 meters) on the
mooring/inflation line was imprinted person to tie a knot that won’t fail. This VIP life raft, collectively the longest
with small black indistinct lettering appears to be inconsistent with TSO- such lines of all the life rafts we evalu-
(photo 7) directly on the thin 0.5-inch C70a (paragraph 5.2): “The ripcord grip ated. This far exceeded the minimum
(1.3-centimeter-wide) white nylon web- or the attached static mooring line must 20.0 feet (6.1 meters) required by TSO-
bing, “RETAINING LINE,” and the end be provided with means for attachment C70a (paragraph 5.1). On the Classic life
loop affixed around the flap so it was to the aircraft.” This was a deficiency, rafts, the mooring/inflation line was not
visible. in our opinion. A snap clip would of- secured to the life raft at or next to the
fer a readily usable means to secure the primary boarding aids, but to the infla-
mooring/inflation line to the aircraft. tion cylinder, which was on the opposite
side of the life raft. On the VIP life rafts,
On the life rafts so equipped, the im- the mooring/inflation line was attached
mediate-inflation handle was a 2.0-inch- to the inflation cylinder located near the
diameter plated-steel ring, providing a primary boarding aid; thus, the line led
narrower grip area than the ripcord grip survivors to this important location.
required in TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.2).
A survivor would be able to grip the ring
(photo 10, photo 11) with only two fin- Inflation
gers or three fingers (average male or
7 female, respectively). This was a defi- The four-person Classic life raft provided
ciency, in our opinion. The 12-person by EAM for our first evaluation could not
Type I life raft was not equipped with be inflated in the conventional manner,
The 0.5-inch-wide nylon-webbing the aforementioned ring or any other despite 10 attempts, including pulling
mooring/inflation line (photo 8) on all similar device to serve as the “primary hard enough to lift the valise entirely from
EAM rafts was terminated by a loop inflation control” required in TSO-C70a the water and almost back onto the pool
sewn back onto the webbing, creating (paragraph 5.2), which was a deficiency, deck. A volunteer finally inflated this life
a 4.0-inch (10.2-centimeter) handhold in our opinion. raft by getting in the water, bracing both
feet on the life raft valise on either side
of the line’s exit location, and pulling on
the mooring/inflation line with consider-
able force. This was far in excess of the 20
pounds to 30 pounds (nine kilograms to
14 kilograms) actuation tension required
by TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.2) and an ef-
fort that might preclude timely inflation
in an emergency. This was a deficiency, in
our opinion. A similar problem occurred
previously with an EAM Classic life raft,
8 10 which had been packed by an authorized
service facility. We also experienced dif-
ficulty with the 10-person VIP life raft
during our second inflation after the life
raft was repacked and recertified by EAM.
It, too, required a number of tries and was
lifted nearly onto the pool deck before it
finally inflated. The other EAM life rafts
were inflated without difficulty.

The inflation times until PRVs actuated

on the Classic life rafts, without a canopy,
9 11
were all in the range of 15 seconds to 17

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

seconds. The VIP life raft achieved full

inflation in 14.6 seconds. This rapid infla-
tion of the VIP life raft was the result of
using nitrogen as the primary inflation
gas with a small amount of carbon diox-
ide, as opposed to carbon dioxide being
the primary inflation gas with a small
amount of nitrogen, the conventional
standard in the industry. The nitrogen
inflation provides another benefit: the
inflation time is not significantly affected 12 14
by cold temperatures, whereas inflation
systems with carbon dioxide often barely but a good grip on the narrow righting line weight was placed upon it, rendering it
meet the TSO-C70a requirement (para- was necessary, which might be difficult in nearly useless. The grab handles were
graph 6.2.5) of one minute until the life cold conditions. more useful. Volunteers had consider-
raft is rounded out (i.e., attains its design able difficulty boarding the life rafts
shape and approximate dimensions) at The EAM life rafts had no indication on despite the single buoyancy tube and
whatever minimum temperature is the side of the life raft of the righting-aid low freeboard. The ineffective foothold
specified by the manufacturer, typically location or any instructions for righting seemed to be the primary culprit. Volun-
–30 degrees Fahrenheit (F; –34 degrees the life raft. This was a deficiency, in our teers with superior upper-body strength
Celsius [C]). opinion. and minimal lower body bulk had less
difficulty in boarding.
The VIP life raft used a composite-wound
cylinder that would have to be hydrostati- Boarding Aids
The Classic Type I life rafts were equipped
cally tested every three years, as opposed with a two-rung boarding ladder made
to every five years for a traditional alu- The EAM Classic Type II life rafts had a
of white two-inch-wide (five-centimeter-
minum or steel cylinder. The composite single boarding location (photo 13) with
wide) nylon webbing hanging down at
cylinders also had a maximum service life a single long loop of one-inch-wide white
the entry. The ladder was equipped with
of 15 years, after which they would have nylon webbing hanging down at the
semi-rigid flat rungs; a hard, but flexible,
to be replaced. material was sewn between two pieces of
webbing to make the rungs. The lower
rung hung well below the bottom exterior
Righting of the life raft (photo 15). There were two
white nylon-webbing grab handles, one
The righting aid on EAM Classic Type II on top of the buoyancy tube and one
life rafts was a single nylon-webbing grab midway down the interior side of the
handle affixed to the bottom of the life buoyancy tube. A lifeline passed behind
raft with the text “RIGHTING HANDLE” the ladder’s midsection. While difficult
stenciled adjacent to it. Persons of short for those heavier and shorter than aver-
stature might have difficulty reaching age, most volunteers managed to board
13
this grab handle. It was effective on the the life raft with minimal problems.
smaller life rafts we evaluated, but we had
concerns about its effectiveness on larger boarding position to be used as a foot-
life rafts based on experience with other hold, which volunteers often overlooked.
life rafts and boarding aids. Three white nylon-webbing grab handles
(photo 14) were provided, one on top of
The VIP life raft was equipped with a the buoyancy tube, one midway down on
black one-inch-wide nylon-webbing the interior side of the buoyancy tube and
righting line that crossed the bottom of one on the floor, as well as the interior
the life raft off-center (photo 12), and a grasp line. The foothold was not much
single black nylon-webbing grab handle help, even for volunteers who recognized
adjacent to the line at the righting point. it and used it; the foothold would swing
15
The righting aids functioned satisfactorily, under or away from the life raft after any

272 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The VIP life raft (seven-person and to the lower section of the beams, both
larger) was equipped with an inflatable rungs hanging below the lower buoyancy
boarding platform (photo 16) and an in- tube. The ladder beams were attached to
terior boarding ladder of black two-inch- and hung from the upper portion of the
wide nylon webbing at the primary entry. lower buoyancy tube. The telescoping
The boarding platform had a fabric bot- upper section of the rigid beams was
tom with five drainage holes (photo 17). forced against the exterior side of the
There were black two-inch-wide nylon- lower buoyancy tube when weight was
webbing grab handles on the top of the applied to the ladder, thus preventing the
18
ladder from swinging under the life raft,
as occurs with webbing-only ladders.
The secondary entry on the larger life
rafts was equipped with a boarding lad- The result was a secondary boarding
der with rigid telescoping beams, a pair aid that all volunteers found to be effec-
of semi-rigid flat rungs and an interior tive, even though on the evaluation life
boarding ladder, both of black two-inch- raft, the left-hand beam failed to extend
wide nylon webbing. The interior board- (photo 20), so only one beam was work-
ing ladder was attached to the exterior of ing as designed. This was a deficiency, in
the lower buoyancy tube, and two rungs
16
were available as handholds on the ex-
terior of the life raft, in addition to the
four rungs inside. A nylon-webbing grab
handle was on top of the upper buoy-
ancy tube, and the lifeline crossed the
boarding point to provide an additional
handhold.

The two-inch-wide black nylon-webbing

beams of the boarding ladder (photo 19)
encased a two-part telescoping, spring-
17 loaded tube that was compressed for
packing and which was supposed to
platform’s inflatable buoyancy tube at the extend automatically upon inflation of
center and along both legs that extended the life raft. The two rungs were attached
from that center. (On a four-person VIP
Deluxe life raft exhibited at a National
Business Aviation Association (NBAA) 20
convention, these three grab handles were
replaced by a single black one-inch-wide our opinion. Had both beams failed to
nylon-webbing grab handle on the end extend, the failure would have been more
of the platform.) The lifeline provided noticeable and would have more ad-
a handhold at the buoyancy tubes. A versely affected the ease of entry, though
webbing brace extended from the upper it likely would have remained a functional
buoyancy tube to the end of each leg of boarding aid, just not as effective. Given
the platform to provide support to help that no changes have been indicated and
prevent the platform from collapsing that the telescoping rails were made of
under load (photo 18). This functioned aluminum tubing and a nonstainless-
for the most part, though it was possible steel spring and are subject to both nor-
to bend the platform down with the right mal corrosion and galvanic corrosion in
combination of weight and force, as some storage under adverse environmental
heavier volunteers discovered. The plat- conditions, we remain concerned about
form proved an easily used and effective the reliability of this otherwise excellent
19
boarding aid for all volunteers. design concept.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The four-person VIP life raft (not evalu- The telescoping canopy-support rods
ated) was available with either the inflat- often were the source of considerable
able boarding platform or the telescoping frustration for volunteers (photo 24).
rigid boarding ladder as the primary Problems manifested themselves during
entry. The four-person VIP Deluxe life the installation of the canopy, and dem-
raft included as standard equipment the onstrated that previous training would
inflatable boarding platform. For board- be required to erect this canopy.
ing aids at the other required entry on
this smaller raft, EAM said, “The infla-
tion cylinder is positioned at the rear of
the EAM-T4AS along with handles to be 22
used as a boarding aid.” With no means
provided for a survivor to get a foothold ineffective in reflecting light, nor will it
below water level or on the bottom of the reflect radar signals effectively. (The U.S.
life raft and only a single nylon-webbing Coast Guard has suspended the SOLAS
grab handle on top of the buoyancy tube requirement that marine life rafts in the
to assist, in our opinion, these aids are United States be equipped with a radar
not functional for a significant portion reflector until one is proven effective for
of potential users and do not appear to this application.) 24
satisfy the requirements of TSO-C70a
(paragraph 4.6) that “for Type I life rafts, A water-collection tube was sewn into The telescoping canopy-support rods
boarding aids must be provided at two the canopy top surface (photo 23), ap- had a spring-loaded mechanism to lock
opposing positions on the raft. Boarding proximately at the midpoint between them into the extended position. Never-
aids must permit unassisted entry from the center mast and the periphery. Water theless, there was nothing to prevent the
the water into the unoccupied raft.” With pooling on the top surface naturally flows two independent sections from being
a possibility of a failure of the primary to the tube. separated, although they remained con-
boarding aid, the ineffective alternative nected by an internal nylon string. An
boarding aids on this four-person raft arrow was printed in black ink on each
were a deficiency, in our opinion. of the sections of rod — one slightly
larger than the other — that must be
Canopy aligned so that the ball on one rod can
be aligned with the socket on the other
The EAM Classic life raft canopy was a rod. All volunteers who expanded the
manually erected stick-built design using canopy-support rods initially separated
lightweight translucent orange rip-stop the two sections (sometimes two times or
nylon fabric (photo 21). The canopy three times before they determined how
option provided a section of metalized the rods were joined), which then had to
polyester fabric (photo 22), which is ra- 23 be rejoined. The nylon string, which con-
dar reflective but too small to be effective. nected the sections, complicated rejoin-
Moreover, is not retroreflective, so it is ing the rods because the string first had
On smaller life rafts, EAM used telescop- be pushed back into the larger section
ing tubular-aluminum canopy-support (photo 25, page 275). If several volunteers
rods to hold up the periphery and the were involved in assembling the canopy,
center of the canopy. On larger life rafts, then more time and coordination were
the outer canopy-support rods were of required for them to develop sufficient
fixed length; only the mast (the central synchronization to assemble the canopy
canopy-support rod) telescoped. There in a reasonable amount of time.
was a peripheral canopy-support rod at
each corner of the hexagon or octagon Assembly was not made easier by the
(the configuration depended on the life spring-loaded locking buttons, which
raft). This ensured that the canopy sides sometimes required soaking in water
were supported outside the inside cir- for several minutes before the locking
21
cumference of the buoyancy tube. buttons functioned correctly; otherwise

274 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

position, they discovered that a snap was

broken and the assembly could not be
completed. Instructions were on the floor
of the life raft, but they were easily over-
looked, especially when they were under
foot. Moreover, volunteers said that the
instructions were not clear.

The Classic Type I life raft had a manually

27
inflatable “donut” (photo 29) surround-
25 ing the center mast (or a pillow under
The canopy-support rod had to pass the mast on the six-person life raft). This
in these situations, the buttons did not through a loop of nylon webbing and provided added support for the center of
operate or were “sticky.” No informa- then be snapped onto a small retainer the life raft floor, preventing the center
tion or cautions were provided about tab equipped with a female snap (photo mast from depressing the floor too far
these problems, which was a deficiency, 28). Volunteers consistently failed to into the water.
in our opinion. insert the canopy-support rod through
the loop.
The male snaps at the ends of the canopy-
support rods (photo 26), which connected
to the canopy and life raft, were screwed
into wooden plugs that were then press-
fitted into the ends of the tubing. Many
of these wooden plugs fell out easily or
were pulled out by the volunteers while
assembling the canopy; then the small
plugs had to be found — which would
be difficult to accomplish in a crowded 29
raft or if lost overboard — and reinserted
28
in the rod. Only by soaking them in wa- Snaps were used to attach the canopy to
ter for about 10 minutes to 15 minutes the top of the canopy-support rods. The
would these wooden plugs expand and Initially, this was believed to result from bottom skirt was elastic and was forced
remain in place. No information was difficulty in recognizing the instructions down around the outside of the buoy-
provided about this problem, which was that were obstructed by other volunteers ancy tube to hold it in place. During one
a deficiency, in our opinion. in the crowded life raft. Therefore, experi- evaluation, despite many hands to assist,
ments were conducted with volunteers the elastic bottom was impossible to put
Despite instructions stenciled on the who were handed a canopy-support rod into place because it was too small to
interior side of the buoyancy tube, the and directed to read the instructions fit over the buoyancy tube. On another
volunteers improperly installed the before installing the canopy-support occasion when the volunteers gave up,
periphery canopy-support-rod base in rod on the buoyancy tube. Despite the the canopy already was coming apart at
three of four evaluations (photo 27). effort to ensure that volunteers read the a seam where it snapped onto a canopy-
instructions, more than half of them support rod.
failed to install correctly the canopy-
support rod. This led to the conclusion The Classic Type I life rafts had a pair of
that the instructions were inadequate, a openings on opposite sides of the canopy;
deficiency, in our opinion. the Classic Type II life rafts had a single
opening. These were equipped with clo-
On the Classic Type II life rafts, either sure flaps that could be secured with cloth
the three-section tubular canopy-support ties along the two sides, but there were
rod or one of the paddles could be used gaps between the ties; the closure flap was
for the canopy mast. One group of volun- not weathertight. The closure flap could
teers tried using a paddle for the canopy be rolled up and secured in the open posi-
26
mast. When they placed the paddle into tion with cloth ties (photo 30, page 276).

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 275
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

eye — would be possible. On the Classic the raft (photo 32). The Velcro also was
Type I reversible life raft, retrieving the coming unglued on two other sections.
canopy and the canopy-support rods The tension of the tightly stretched
from underneath the life raft so that they canopy was pulling up the Velcro. Tem-
could be reinstalled again would present perature was approximately 95 degrees
a problem. This type of canopy system F (35 degrees C). In addition, the Velcro
was deficient, in our opinion. attachment of the canopy to the tube
was not even and, in some places, only
The VIP life raft had a single square-arch 0.5-inch (1.3 centimeters) of the 2.0-inch
self-erecting canopy (photo 31) with a (five-centimeter) Velcro was attached.
30 5.0-inch-diameter (12.7-centimeter)-
diameter inflatable canopy-support tube.
On two occasions, the volunteers over- The lightweight translucent rip-stop ny-
looked the instructions stenciled on the lon fabric was orange, with much greater
canopy or they failed to comprehend that conspicuity than the traditional light-
the canopy opening was supposed to be weight orange canopy fabric. The ridge
aligned with the boarding aids; therefore, of the canopy was covered with a metal-
the canopy was installed with the opening lic-coated (or metalized) fabric. Effec-
in an incorrect position. tive radar reflectivity was no more likely
than with any other nonreflective radar
The average time to (incorrectly) erect the reflector. Because this fabric covered only 32
canopy was 28 minutes. After trying to a small portion of the upper surface of
erect a canopy for 33 minutes, one group the canopy, there was little likelihood that During the in-water evaluation, the
of volunteers gave up. Another group cor- ELT signals would be affected. glue on the canopy-support tube failed
rectly erected the canopy in 14 minutes. where the tube was folded to create an
These evaluations were conducted in arch. There was no reinforcement of this
optimum daylight conditions with no section of the tube (photo 33). When the
wind, rain, high waves or cold. glue failed, the tube was retained by the

Even after they were erected properly,

none of these stick-built canopies sur-
vived capsizing and subsequent right-
ing without damage to the canopy
and degradation of the protection it
provided. Most often, the canopy came
loose from the snaps holding it to the 31
canopy-support tubes. In every capsiz-
ing, the canopy fabric ripped at some of The PRV for the upper buoyancy tube
the snap-attachment locations. In some was located on the exterior of one leg of
capsizings, one or more canopy-support the canopy-support tube, and there was a 33
rods were bent to the point of no longer matching hole in the canopy. The canopy
being useable, while others were bent (reinforced at this location) was secured canopy. The canopy became elongated
slightly, but enough that the canopy no to the support tube with Velcro placed and created a dip in the center of the
longer fit properly. around the PRV. arch (photo 34, page 277), which resulted
in the canopy collapsing during the rain
While submerged under the life raft af- The canopy was attached to the buoyancy simulation. The black fabric-reinforcing
ter a capsizing, survivors could become tube with a two-inch-wide Velcro strip. donut, where the canopy support tube
entangled in the fabric and their escape After the second inflation of this raft, was attached to the buoyancy tube, also
to the surface could be hindered. The it was thoroughly rinsed and left over- experienced a partial glue failure (photo
ends of the canopy-support rods caused night indoors to dry. The next morning, 35, page 277).
minor scratches and bruises to some we discovered that the Velcro strips used
of the volunteers despite precautions. to secure the canopy to the upper tube Ritter said that after the 2002 evaluation
A serious injury — such as poking an had come unglued along one section of was completed, his proxy contacted EAM

276 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

remaining areas (approximately Both boarding-ladder beams

320 linear inches [810 linear centi- extended fully, but the ladder be-
meters]), peel and shear adhesion came hung on the exterior lifeline
were excellent. … The remaining (photo 36). (The primary board-
bonded areas would have stayed ing aid deployed correctly.) Upon
in place and not allowed attach- entering the water, we made what
ment of the canopy to fail. As the we believed would be the natural
photos in your report show, after reaction of a survivor by pulling
two tests in chlorinated pool water, on the ladder, which only wors-
the canopy of the raft remained at- ened the situation. Only by lifting
34 tached.” Nevertheless, the Velcro the ladder legs up and clear of the
was not subject to any abuse in the lifeline (photo 37) was it possible
second inflation, as might occur in to deploy the ladder. This proved
a real survival situation. awkward to accomplish from the
water. This was a deficiency, in our
As a result of the evaluation, howev- opinion.
er, tape reinforcement of the canopy
arch tube was incorporated into the
life raft design.

The sea anchor and sea anchor line

were found inside the raft, although
35 the sea anchor is supposed to be
deployed automatically. The sea
during a period of several weeks by tele- anchor line was routed incorrectly
phone and e-mail several times to discuss and was captured by the Velcro that
the glue failure, before EAM requested secured the canopy to the side of the
that the life raft be returned for inspec- upper buoyancy tube. The coiled 36
tion; it was returned to the proxy several sea anchor line also was secured
weeks later. incorrectly with a plastic cable
tie, which was determined to have
After the life raft had been returned to been done before the life raft was
the proxy, FSF staff told EAM that the packaged for return to EAM. EAM
life raft had been used in an evaluation acknowledged the possibility that,
and that Ritter had asked to confirm that during the repair to the canopy,
the repair had been completed correctly. their inspectors and mechanics had
EAM agreed to have Ritter check the life failed to notice the plastic cable tie
raft and agreed to repack and certify the and that the sea anchor was placed
life raft after that in-the-water check at improperly during the repair of the
EAM’s expense. A brief summary of the canopy. EAM said that it reviewed 37
check and of EAM’s responses is cited these oversights with its repair sta-
below: tion personnel.
EAM said that this had occurred
As to the Velcro failures, EAM said The locator light did not activate a few times during deployment
that the Velcro had been removed upon the second deployment. tests, and had been remedied by
from the tube sections of the life raft EAM did not replace the water- test subjects lifting the ladder from
to determine if it had been applied activated battery, and said that the the lifeline.
correctly. EAM reported that “ad- life raft had been returned with a
hesion application was found to be work request that did not indicate EAM said that “any discrepancies
uneven in the few, small areas (ap- that the life raft had been deployed found did not affect the air-holding
proximately 18.0 linear inches [45.7 in water. The battery checks were or lifesaving ability of the life raft”
linear centimeters]) where you saw passed and the original light was and “that they were isolated and
the Velcro lifting. However, in the reinstalled. specific to the life raft tested.”

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 277
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

EAM was not the only manufacturer that Rain Simulation

experienced failures from human error,
but this example was well documented Both Classic Type I and Type II life rafts
and allowed closer examination than leaked significantly in the same areas. The
others. If anything, this underscores flap entries were impossible to seal com-
that aircraft operators, flight crews pletely and allowed considerable water to
and cabin crews should recognize the enter through the gaps. Some flaps blew
importance of redundancy and train- open, despite the cloth ties; others held.
ing to use the equipment that is carried Tying technique apparently had a lot to
on their aircraft. Ideally, the equipment do with their effectiveness. These gaps
will function correctly. If it does not, also would allow the entry of cold air 39
a trained survivor is more capable of and spray in windy conditions.
correcting the problem or discovering flaps held, but large quantities of water
a satisfactory alternative. leaked through the Velcro around the
entry flaps.
For example, a survivor without life raft
training may not have realized the im- Lifelines and Grasp Lines
portance of the sea anchor deployment;
with training, the survivor likely would The lifeline and the grasp line on the
have determined quickly how to resolve Classic Type II life rafts were 0.75-inch-
rerouting of the line, cut the plastic tie wide (1.9-centimeter-wide) thin white
and deployed the sea anchor. As for the nylon tape, which would be difficult to
nonfunctional light, if trained survivors grip with cold, wet, numbed hands. The
correctly deployed the life raft, they 38
Classic Type I life raft was equipped with
would know to use the mooring/infla- heavier nylon webbing that was easier to
tion line to lead them to the life raft, even All the canopies allowed large quantities grip. The white webbing did not provide
in total darkness. of water into the interior of the life raft, a high contrast against the yellow fabric
because the elastic skirt was pushed over of the life raft.
In addition to the glue and the locator the buoyancy tube by the water spray,
light, there were other anomalies involv- creating a gap between the bottom edge The Classic Type II life rafts had only a
ing the canopy. of the canopy and the buoyancy tube. The single lifeline that was located on the up-
sewn seams of the canopy fabric showed per section of the interior of the buoyancy
There were two openings, one at each some stress and signs of parting at some tube (photo 40). The lifeline could not be
boarding aid, that were closed via a flap stress points on some of the canopies, seen easily by a survivor floating in the
that was rolled down to the tube upon even after our brief evaluation. This was water. It could be difficult or uncomfort-
inflation and secured with a pair of one- a deficiency, in our opinion. able to grasp in the water by survivors,
inch-wide Velcro straps. Closure was particularly those with shorter arms, who
made by strips of two-inch-wide Velcro The canopies leaked significantly where would have to reach over the tube. In our
surrounding the openings. These did not the water-collection tube was sewn into opinion, this lifeline did not meet the re-
align very well and gaps were apparent the canopies’ top surface. Some leakage quirement of TSO-C70a (paragraph 4.8)
when the flaps were closed. After our occurred at all sewn seams. Aside from that it “must encircle the life raft on the
in-water evaluation, tears were found in the leaks, the water-collection tube func-
the canopy at the corners of the openings tioned reasonably well, although the only
(photo 38), and a number of sewn seams way to close it was to tie a knot in it.
were beginning to pull apart. Strips of
two-inch-wide retroreflective tape were The VIP life raft canopy collapsed dur-
affixed around the canopy openings ing the rain simulation (photo 39). It ap-
and on some shorter strips on the sides, peared that this was related to the earlier
making them very visible at night when canopy-support-tube failure. We were
light is shone on them. These strips not able to re-evaluate this during the
were backed by the Velcro and helped second inflation after it was upgraded.
stop further ripping of the canopy at the This was a deficiency, in our opinion.
40
openings’ corners. The Velcro closure of the canopy entry

278 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

outside periphery so that it can be eas- assembly method used on the VIP life raft buoyancy tubes as the life raft rises during
ily grasped by persons in the water.” The did save weight and bulk. a capsizing. This was mostly noticeable in
lifeline was not visible or functional while calm waters. Waves or movement of the life
the life raft was overturned. This was a There was sufficient slack in the lifeline raft tended to unseal the lower buoyancy
deficiency, in our opinion. to allow the line to hang within easy tube, negating any vacuum effect.
reach whether the life raft was upright
The Classic Type I life raft had both a life- or capsized. The Classic life rafts that we evaluated
line and an interior grasp line. The lifeline were capsized easily, a deficiency, in our
was attached to the lower buoyancy tube Stability opinion.
without much slack, and this could be
difficult for some survivors to reach on The Classic life rafts had no provisions for The VIP life raft had five V-shaped
the larger life rafts. The grasp line did ballast. This was a deficiency, in our opin- water-ballast bags (photo 43) that had
not cross the two entry points; this was ion. EAM did fit a pair of sea anchors on an approximate capacity of 63 pounds
a deficiency, in our opinion. short (36-inch [91-centimeter]) tethers (29 kilograms) of fresh water. The bags
(photo 42), which they said in their bro- had polyurethane-coated nylon-fabric
The VIP life raft had a lifeline and an in- chure “improves raft stability.” Volunteers attachments and were constructed of
terior grasp line of black one-inch-wide noticed no difference in raft stability with rip-stop canopy fabric. We experienced
nylon webbing. A loop of webbing was the anchors or without them. The conical no damage to the bags as a result of our
provided for each section of the octagon, anchors were 12.0 inches (30.5 centime- evaluation. Those water-ballast bags were
inside and out, secured to the life raft by ters) in diameter on the large end and 3.0 weighted, so we expected them to drop
passing the webbing through the joint inches (7.6 centimeters) in diameter at immediately upon inflation and to fill
between the two buoyancy tubes where the other end. They were constructed of rapidly; they required one minute and
it was sewn in place (photo 41). We had rip-stop nylon canopy fabric with a nylon four seconds to drop, despite induced
some reservations about adding any cinch line at the exit end, but it seemed movement of the life raft. This could be
stress to this joint because it is a com- to make no difference if they were open a problem in some situations and was a
mon life raft failure point. or closed. deficiency, in our opinion.

The short sea anchors did not appear to

comply with TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.3),
which says, “The line must be at least 25
feet [7.6 meters] in length.” It may be that
the life rafts so fitted did meet the drift
requirements of this paragraph (we had
no means to evaluate this), but being so
small and on such short tethers they could
not have any anti-capsizing effect.
41 43

EAM said that this is preferable to the A self-deploying sea anchor on a 24.0-foot
method used by all other manufacturers, (7.3-meter) length of 1/8-inch (0.32-
as well as by EAM on their other life rafts, centimeter) braided nylon line was fitted.
of gluing patches to the buoyancy tube to There was no swivel, a deficiency, in our
which the lines are secured, which they opinion. The sea anchor was the same type
said can lead to a buoyancy-tube failure used on the Classic life rafts and had no
if a patch is pulled off. This is not in noticeable anti-capsizing effect, although
compliance with U.K. Civil Aviation we expect that it would reduce drift and
Authority (CAA) requirements, for ex- 42 provide some influence on stability.
ample, “that failure or tearing off of the
attachment will not damage any inflated The Classic Type I reversible life raft had Floor
compartment.” In other words, the glue some theoretical inherent anti-capsizing
shall fail before the integrity of the buoy- potential because of the vacuum that could The Classic life rafts were not available
ancy tube fabric is compromised. The be created with the floor between the two with an insulated floor. The Type I life

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 279
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

rafts offered some potential for improved a separate bag attached to the pump and EAM said that the EAM-designed manual
thermal protection. Depending upon had to be screwed onto the pump by the inflation pump does need to be held in
how heavily loaded the life raft was, all survivor. There was no tether attached, so place, especially as the inflation pressure
or some sections of the floor could be the opportunity existed for the adapter to approaches full inflation, and later said
elevated above the water surface in calm be lost overboard in the process of install- that perhaps the instructions could have
water. If the life raft were in rough sea ing it on the pump. Without the adapter, been clearer.
conditions, heavily loaded or the lower the pump would be useless. This was a
buoyancy tube were collapsed, then such deficiency, in our opinion. EAM said, “We have had a problem,” and
insulation performance would be lost. that the fitting had been redesigned to
The older manual inflation pump had improve the swedge where it is secured
An option for the VIP life raft was a an aluminum male-bayonet fitting, and to the pump. We asked to receive a new
manually inflatable insulated floor that it came out of the valve almost as easily pump with the redesigned fitting. It ar-
incorporated 18 reeds (these short fab- as it went in, despite an O-ring which was rived quickly, but the new fitting and
ric pieces were attached between the two supposed to secure it, and that created swedging looked no different than the
floors — interior and exterior — to re- problems for our volunteers. As soon fitting that failed. A quick evaluation
strain the floor from ballooning when air as a volunteer reached the end of the resulted in exactly the same failure.
was pumped into the chamber to provide expansion stroke (air being pulled into
an insulating barrier of air). The manual the pump), the pump was pulled easily The failure of the manual-inflation-
inflation pump was used to inflate the out of the valve. pump fitting was a deficiency, in our
insulated floor. Other than the inflation opinion.
valve in the floor and accompanying The instructions did not mention the
notation — either text or pictogram for need to hold the manual inflation pump As a result of the 1993 evaluation, EAM
the VIP life raft and VIP Deluxe life raft, into the valve; they simply said to “insert said that clearer instructions were issued
respectively — there was no indication pump in valve and pump to inflate.” Hav- for those pumps on hand and that the
that an inflatable floor was available to ing to hold the pump with both hands EAM pump was replaced quickly by
survivors, who might not recognize this was a disadvantage; it would be an ad- one produced by Mirada Research and
feature or its influence on their survival. vantage to be able to pump with only one Manufacturing.
This was a deficiency, in our opinion. hand. We asked a dozen volunteers to try
using the pump, and all experienced the The VIP life raft arrived with a Mirada
same difficulty. industry-standard manual inflation
Life Raft Equipment
pump (model B-51224) that passed our
Of more concern, one of the volunteers out-of-alignment pumping evaluations.
Pump trying to use the manual inflation pump EAM said that this pump is now standard
became frustrated with it slipping out of on all current-production life rafts. The
EAM’s manual inflation pump was of the valve; instead of pumping in and out green bayonet adapter was tethered to the
the common bellows design. On all the exactly in line with the valve, he inad- pump, but was secured with a nylon line
Classic life rafts we evaluated, this pump vertently applied force to the pump at through the adapter (photo 44 ). While
provided about 75 percent of the capac- an angle. The threaded pump fitting, to it was possible to assemble and use the
ity, “at least 32 cubic inches [524 cubic which the bayonet adapter was attached, adapter without detaching it from the
centimeters][of air] per full stroke,” re- failed and separated from the pump, tether, it was difficult to screw onto the
quired by TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.5). making it useless.

Volunteers observed several minor prob- This would not be an unusual applica-
lems and some more serious problems tion of force in normal survival cir-
with the EAM manual inflation pump in cumstances, with the life raft’s motion
the first evaluation. These problems were and a survivor attempting to cope with
resolved with the current pump supplied that motion. Immediately, several vol-
with EAM life rafts. Nevertheless, many of unteers tried the same action with all
these older pumps remain in service with the other life raft manufacturers’ man-
older life rafts. ual inflation pumps on hand (and we
subsequently did so with all pumps
The older manual inflation pump used a we evaluated; there were no similar
44
bayonet adapter, which was contained in failures).

280 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

pump and difficult to force into the top-

ping valve; the tether had to be cut (photo
45), which risked loss of the adapter. A
9.0-foot (2.7-meter) twisted nylon cord
tether was attached to one of the pump’s
finger loops, but there was no attached
instruction to secure the line to the life
raft, potentially putting the pump at risk
of loss — a deficiency, in our opinion.

46 48

No sponge was included with the Classic somewhat elliptical-shaped device with
life raft in standard SEPs. A three-inch by a very narrow-angle end grip, which was
four-inch inch compressed sponge was uncomfortable to grasp and might be
included with the VIP life raft SEP. difficult with a cold hand. The line was
coiled, gathered with a pair of rubber
Heaving Line bands, and then the line and quoit were
suspended from a grasp line using a
45 For the required heaving/trailing line on fabric clasp with two metal snaps. Vol-
its Classic life rafts, EAM used mil-spec unteers were unable to throw the quoit
parachute cord, which was not inher- successfully because the line tangled, a
Bailer and Sponge deficiency, in our opinion.
ently buoyant and did not appear to be
in compliance with the requirements of
The bailer in Classic life rafts was tethered Raft Knife
TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.4) for at least
to the life raft — inside on Type II rafts,
one “floating line” and a round-rubber
over the side on Type I rafts. A stenciled The tethered raft knife was stored inside
buoyant quoit (photo 47). It was packed
placard on the buoyancy tube indicated a sheath with a snap closure in the Clas-
inside a small pouch; on the Type I life
the attachment point. The 9.0-quart (8.5- sic life rafts; the sheath was attached to
raft, it had to be retrieved from over the
liter) capacity bailer was constructed of the buoyancy tube at the closed end. The
side.
sewn buoyancy-tube fabric. raft knife was placarded with a stenciled
“KNIFE” on the buoyancy tube below
The VIP bailer was packed inside the the sheath (photo 49) with an arrow
SEP where it was inaccessible imme- pointing to the sheath. Stenciled in-
diately upon boarding. The 8.0-quart structions were partially obscured by the
(7.6-liter) capacity bailer was con- interior boarding ladder on the VIP life
structed of sewn polyurethane-coated raft. On the VIP Deluxe life raft, printed
life vest fabric. An 8.8-foot (2.7-meter) placards added an instructional pictorial
twisted nylon cord tether was attached to instruction (which illustrated a life raft
a metal grommet on the bailer, but no at- mooring/inflation line being cut loose
tached instruction directed the survivor from a boat).
to secure it to the life raft, a deficiency, 47
in our opinion.

Neither bailer was fitted with a handle The VIP heaving/trailing line was in-
(photo 46), or had any reinforcement herently buoyant 3/16-inch braided-
to the mouth that would keep it open, polypropylene line with a special quoit.
which makes a bailer more effective. The This was constructed of a 90-degree
bailers leaked at the sewn seams. While plastic barbed hose fitting with attached
not an issue for bailing, for other uses, orange-plastic tubing that was kinked
such as holding fresh water or emptying (photo 48) to return to the other side
collected waste, this was a deficiency, in of the plastic fitting. The line was at-
49
our opinion. tached to the fitting, and the result was a

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Lighting If the survivors did not know that they

should retrieve the SEP, they might not
The TSO-approved locator light on Clas- do so in a timely manner. The canopy and
sic life rafts was attached to the buoyancy canopy-support rods also were contained
tube adjacent to the entry (or adjacent to in the SEP, so failure to retrieve the SEP
an entry if there were two entries, as on also would delay erection of the canopy.
both sides of the Type I life raft). Another
locator light was stored in a plastic bag Because the SEP was not waterproof, the
(photo 50) and attached to the life raft contents were exposed to the water and
lifeline. After the canopy was erected, an depended on their own packaging to
attachment was provided for the light on 52 remain dry. Unfortunately, several items
the canopy (photo 51). With the canopy were inadequately packaged to prevent
erected, the light located on the buoyancy them from being damaged by water.
tube near an entry became the interior
light, but it was not high enough to be On two occasions, the closures on the
very effective. On the first Classic life raft SEPs came loose after the life raft was
that volunteers evaluated, the locator light deployed and before the SEPs were
was ripped off the buoyancy tube during retrieved. Both life rafts lost important
boarding by one of the volunteers. Being survival equipment before the SEPs were
located adjacent to the entry made such a retrieved from the water. This was a defi-
loss possible. ciency, in our opinion.
53
The SEP on the VIP life raft was packed
inside the life raft and attached to the
to the center underside of the canopy- life raft by a single tether. When the life
support tube. This was a superior source raft deployed upside down, the SEP was
of illumination for the interior, compared ejected from the interior of the life raft
with using the traditional survivor- through the primary entry and had to
locator light, which is not designed for be retrieved from the water after the life
general area illumination. Being able to raft was righted. There was no placard to
switch the light off to conserve the battery indicate the SEP location or that retrieval
for later use was another advantage. might be required.
50
ELT The SEP was a flat pouch constructed
of yellow polyurethane-coated nylon
None of the life rafts was equipped with life vest fabric, and “EQUIPMENT” was
the optional ELT. EAM offered DME stenciled in large text on its face. A life
and Artex 121.5-MHz ELTs in either vest oral-inflation tube was affixed to the
auto-deploying or manually deploying face of the pouch. A vacuum was drawn
versions. via the oral-inflation tube (EAM also
manufactured life vests which had to be
Survival Equipment Packs evacuated via their oral-inflation tube be-
fore packaging), so that the SEP became
The SEPs on all Classic life rafts were a vacuum-sealed pouch; the contents re-
51
packed externally to the life raft and were mained completely dry while submerged
secured via a 5.0-foot (1.5-meter) tether. and until the pouch was opened, which is
The VIP life raft was equipped with an The SEP would have to be retrieved from a good concept, in our opinion.
exterior locator light affixed to one end the water by the survivors, who might not
of the canopy at the peak (photo 52). No even realize the SEP exists. The location A slit across the top face of the pouch
interior light was fitted. The VIP Deluxe of the attachment point was stenciled in near one end was sealed with adhesive
life raft was equipped with a manually black on the buoyancy tube or floor, but it and seam tape. A short tab was used to
switched lithium-battery-powered ACR was easily overlooked because it generally grasp the tape and pull it loose, which was
HemiLight (photo 53), which was secured would be behind a survivor or underfoot. easy to accomplish. While, for the most

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

part, this was self-evident, instructions A 27.0-inch (68.6-centimeter) twisted- hands, making them easier to use and
for opening should have been included. nylon-cord tether was attached to each more effective. They were not useful for
Once opened, the SEP could not be re- of the flashlights. any other purpose (and they were not
sealed or closed, except perhaps by the required to be) — as a cutting board,
expedient means of using the tether to The VIP Deluxe life raft also included a for example — because the fabric easily
tie off the open end of the pouch. The two-AA-cell aluminum water-resistant could be cut or punctured.
contents inside the pouch were contained flashlight in a sheath on a leg of the
in a heavy plastic bag with the open top canopy support tube for immediate ac- Fishing Kit
folded over, but not sealed. cess after boarding the life raft, a desirable
feature, in our opinion. EAM’s fishing kit provided an assortment
Survival Equipment of hooks and other fishing gear, as well
Signaling Devices as a pair of heavy cotton gloves, which
Repair would be worthwhile for handling the
A single mil-spec Mark13 MOD-0 Day/ monofilament fishing line.
A single three-inch mil-spec life raft- Night hand flare or an Orion 12-gauge
repair clamp was provided with all life flare pistol and four red 12-gauge aerial
First Aid
rafts, regardless of size. No means was flares were included.
provided to plug the PRVs. EAM had a variety of first aid kits de-
A flimsy metal mirror with no sighting
signed to meet the various requirements
aid was included in Classic SEPs. The VIP
Utility Knife of the FARs and the European Joint Avia-
SEP included a good-quality two-inch by
tion Requirements.
three-inch Ultimate Survival polycarbon-
A poor-quality (in our opinion) multi-
ate mil-spec mirror with a tether.
function pocketknife with a nonlock- Water
ing drop-point blade, can opener,
Also included was a single mil-spec
screwdriver/bottle cap opener and a SEPs included a combination of water
sea dye marker packet and a superior-
14.5-inch (36.8-centimeter) twisted ny- sources, depending upon the specific
quality SOLAS-specification survival
lon cord tether was included in the Clas- SEP and options selected. Older Classic
whistle with a lanyard.
sic life raft SEPs. The knife became wet life rafts in service provided mil-spec
upon deployment, and where the knife chemical desalting kits. Some current
blade and other parts were joined at the Paddles
Classic SEPs include these desalting
handle, rust began appearing almost im- kits.
mediately. Paddles were constructed of hardened
foam, life vest fabric, wire and aluminum
Sealed pouches that contain 0.025 pint/
The VIP SEP included a good-quality tube (photo 54). The paddles were usable
125 milliliters of water also might be in-
Imperial (by Camillus Cutlery Co.) of- only after being immersed in water for a
cluded in an SEP. These have a five-year
ficial Boy Scout pocketknife incorpo- while to allow the ball-and-socket lock
shelf life.
rating a nonlocking spear-point blade, on the telescoping-tubular-aluminum
screwdriver/bottle cap opener, can handles to become functional. These
EAM included a Survivor-06 hand-
opener, leather punch and a 14.5-inch paddles’ longer handles provided enough
operated water maker in some SEPs, such
twisted-nylon-cord tether. reach that they could be used with two
as the one that came with the Alpha Series
(VIP) life raft that was evaluated.
Flashlight
No packaged ready-to-drink water was
A water-resistant, two-D-cell flashlight included. Having no water available im-
with conventional bulb was provided in mediately upon boarding is a deficiency,
the Classic SEP, and a similar flashlight in our opinion.
with krypton bulb, which provided
much brighter illumination at the cost An 8.0-inch by 24.0-inch (20.3-centimeter
of reducing run time, was provided in by 61.0-centimeter) plastic water-storage
the VIP SEP. Both had a spare bulb in bag with a roll-and-tie-sealed spout and
the tailcap, which was very difficult to re- five cone-shaped paper drinking cups were
move. No spare batteries were included. 54 provided.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Food black text on white material. In the life rafts. Goodrich ceased offering a Type
Alpha Series (VIP) life raft, the instruc- II life raft. In 2000, Goodrich provided for
Appropriate quantities of U.S. Coast tions for canopy setup and some other evaluation production versions of four-
Guard-approved and vacuum-packed instructions were not relevant to the person and 12-person Type I life rafts.
survival rations produced by S.O.S. Food features of that life raft, a deficiency, in
Lab, with an EAM label and part number, our opinion. The manufacturing of Goodrich’s new-
are now included.4 generation life rafts was moved to the
Service company’s West Virginia, U.S., facility
from Phoenix soon after FAA TSO ap-
Survival Manual/Life Raft provals of the new designs were received
Manual The Classic life raft series had an annual
service requirement. The VIP life raft had in 1997. In 1999, manufacturing of the
a three-year service interval. life rafts was moved to the company’s
A reprint of an outdated U.S. Air Force facility in India. Production of life rafts
Aircrew Survival Manual in a plastic ceased in India in 2001, and in 2002,
binder was provided. The pages did not Goodrich consolidated its entire slide,
turn easily and tore in use; they were not slide-raft and life raft production into
water resistant and likely would deterio- expanded facilities in Phoenix, where
rate quickly in a life raft environment. Aircraft Interior Products is headquar-
The absence of a waterproof survival tered, said Douglas Nelson, manager,
manual in a life raft is a deficiency, in Goodrich — once known for its tires Aviation Life Rafts.5
our opinion. and now known for its aerospace and
chemical businesses — entered the avia- Current Goodrich life rafts are rectangu-
Log pages were provided for six days, tion life raft business when it purchased lar with round ends (rectangular ovals)
but no writing instrument was provid- Sergeant Pico in 1985 and moved pro- and are constructed of single-coated
ed, rendering the log pages useless un- duction from California, U.S., to a newly polyurethane over single-ply nylon fab-
less survivors had a writing instrument. built plant in Phoenix, Arizona, U.S., in ric with the coated side on the interior of
The ability to maintain a log of events, 1987. The Goodrich life rafts were con- air-holding chambers. They are available
to write notes and to record important structed of neoprene-coated fabric and in four-person, eight-person, 10-person
information that otherwise might be incorporated auto-erecting canopies and and 12-person rated capacities.
forgotten under the stress of survival, other features more commonly found at
is an important element for improving that time on marine life rafts. Goodrich A new Goodrich 10-person life raft was
survival chances. provided a four-person Type II life raft provided for the 2002 evaluation; the
and a seven-person Type I life raft for life raft was sold directly by Goodrich
An abbreviated LRM provided an ap- evaluation in 1993 and, despite some to a customer who planned to use it on
propriate list of immediate-action advanced features, the life rafts had, in a corporate aircraft, and it was delivered
items and general life raft-maintenance our opinion, some deficiencies, including for customer pickup the day before the
information, including illustrations that ineffective boarding aids and an absence evaluation. The customer agreed to allow
showed how to use a life raft-repair of water ballast. The four-person Type it to be used in the evaluation. The pro-
clamp and signaling instructions. It was II life raft was round; the seven-person duction date stamped on the life raft was
tethered to the floor of the Classic Type Type I was rectangular with round ends January 2001, 19 months before delivery
II life rafts, but it was stored inside the (rectangular oval). to the customer; the production date
SEP of the Classic Type II and VIP life stamped on the valise was March 2001.
rafts where it would not be immediately After publication of the 1993 evaluation
available for reference to the immediate- results and the announcement at the 1995
action items. Even when this abbreviated NBAA convention of the then-upcoming Valise
LRM was immediately available, not one 1996 life raft evaluation, in late 1995
volunteer found the manual until after and early 1996 Goodrich developed and The standard yellow valise was of con-
settling in the life raft and beginning to delivered for the evaluation a 10-person ventional box-style construction (photo
organize the life raft equipment with the Type I prototype for a new generation of 1, page 285). The valise was fastened with
other volunteers. Goodrich life rafts. With a few changes, a Velcro seam along the middle of the top
these life rafts were put into production surface with yellow Velcro that matched
This abbreviated LRM was waterproof in early 1997, followed quickly by termi- the valise fabric. Use of a matching color
with bold, easy-to-read printing, with nation of production of the older-style would make the Velcro seam less visible

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plastic bands. The case had two red nylon- was not inherently buoyant. Satisfactory
webbing grab handles on each side. instructions/identification to attach the
snap to the aircraft were stenciled in black
At one end of the hard-case top was on the sleeve, but this information was
another orange placard with inflation obscured partially by the line and snap on
instructions in small and readable text. the valise. On the hard case, the last line of
There was no arrow indicating that the the information was obscured because it
mooring/inflation line was on the side was well under the curve of the sleeve.
of the life raft adjoining this placard,
although the mooring/inflation line and
1 Inflation
hardware were readily visible.
to a survivor and would make it less likely The small, lightweight snap (photo 4) was
Goodrich used red one-inch-wide nylon
that survivors would attempt to open the slipped over the open end of the fabric
webbing sewn into a triangular shape for
valise at the seam. The valise had white ny- sleeve; it slid off several times when the
an immediate-inflation handle, which
lon-webbing handles — two grab handles packed life raft was moved during the
was secured by Velcro to the valise on two
on the face of the smaller valises and two evaluation and if unnoticed, could have
legs of the triangle. With one side of the
grab handles along each side of the larger snagged on something and deployed the
triangle unsecured, there was a possibility
valises — with one grab handle at the end life raft. The small snap was not satisfac-
that the unsecured leg could be hooked
opposite the inflation mechanisms. tory for attaching directly to any but the
inadvertently and the life raft could be
slimmest secure structure, but it was
inflated, a serious occurrence inside an
Orange placards were used for essential adequate for attaching to the mooring/
aircraft cabin during flight or when try-
information and for nonessential infor- inflation line that was looped around a
ing to evacuate after a ditching.
mation (photo 2); thus, a survivor’s at- secure structure.
tention could be misdirected at a critical
No adjoining instructions/identification
time. The manufacturer-and-data placard The mooring/inflation line was 31.3 feet
of the immediate-inflation handle were
was the largest placard, and black text was (9.5 meters) long and led to the boarding
located on one end of the hard case or the
printed against the orange background. A aids. The thin parachute cord exceeded
valise, although such information was lo-
smaller orange placard was printed with the strength requirements of the TSO but
cated on the top surfaces of both packages.
the instructions “EJECT THIS END might be difficult to grasp with cold, wet,
Because the immediate-inflation handle
FIRST” with an arrow pointing in the numbed hands.
was boldly visible (photo 3), it might be
correct direction.
selected inadvertently for inflation, in lieu
of the mooring/inflation line. Volunteers had no difficulty understand-
ing the inflation instructions, but they
had to move much closer than might be

(At an NBAA convention, a model of this 3

life raft was exhibited, and the orange
placard with nonessential information had Mooring/Inflation Line
been replaced with a silver placard, allow-
ing the user to distinguish it from essential Next to the immediate-inflation handle
information on the orange placards.) was an orange fabric sleeve that con-
tained the white mil-spec parachute-
The life raft could be packed in an optional cord mooring/inflation line (referred to
4
white plastic hard case secured by two as a “firing” line on the placard), which

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

desirable to read the instructions, which

were in small text.

The 10-person life raft inflated in 25

seconds; the hard case was designed so
that both halves would be jettisoned
upon inflation, which we prefer because
they then could not interfere either with
survivors or with the life raft.

6 8
Righting

Goodrich stenciled explicit righting obtaining a good grasp with which to the water. Moreover, the capsized life raft
instructions on one side of the life raft; right the life raft.) submerged enough to create a vacuum
they were designed to be read when the that made righting it more difficult
life raft is capsized: “PULL STRAP TO The inflatable canopy-support tubes without assistance from additional
UPRIGHT” (photo 5). On the opposite were relatively narrow — four inches volunteers or without breaking the
side of the life raft was stenciled: “RIGHT in diameter. When the life raft was seal to the water first; this was problem
FROM OTHER SIDE.” The stenciled text capsized, the canopy-support tubes had solving that a survivor should not be
was in red on the yellow fabric. (The life insufficient buoyancy to lift the life raft expected to perform. This experience
raft exhibited at the 2003 NBAA conven- off the surface of the water; the canopy was not repeated with similar-capacity
tion had text accompanied by pictorial support tubes were submerged and the single-buoyancy-tube life rafts (without
righting instructions that provided very life raft floated flat against the water on canopies), which had larger tubes and
clear and unambiguous instructions. the upper buoyancy tube. When right- weighed less, because they tended to lie
Placards and instructions were printed ing the 10-person life raft, the submerged on the water — not to submerge in the
rather than stenciled, so readability was canopy became a sea anchor that had to water — when capsized.
improved.) be overcome to turn it upright (photo 7);
a small and lightweight person could have Boarding Aids
difficulty accomplishing the task. The
canopy remained collapsed after the life In our opinion, the old-style Goodrich
designs had the least-satisfactory board-
ing aids of the life rafts that were evalu-
ated. Current Goodrich life rafts have a
boarding platform, similar to one used
on a line of European life rafts (Auto-
flug). A prototype in the 1996 evaluation
was found to have deficiencies, but Go-
odrich made substantial changes before
5 certification.

A single red one-inch nylon webbing A pair of inflatable tubes projected from
with two hand loops sewn into it was 7 the life raft at the entries (photo 9, page
attached from one side of the life raft 287). A pair of white one-inch nylon-
across to the other side in the middle of raft was righted (photo 8), a deficiency, webbing straps from the upper buoyancy
the life raft (photo 6). The hand loops in our opinion; the volunteers pushed it tube attached to these tubes, near their
laid flat and were not easily grasped, but up after boarding. outermost ends. They served as braces
they helped to counteract slipping on the to prevent bending when weight was
exterior bottom of the life raft. (The life The four-person life raft presented a placed on the platform. A large section
raft exhibited at the 2003 NBAA conven- similar problem. The small diameter of fabric was hung between the project-
tion had a righting ladder constructed of of the single-arch canopy-support tube ing tubes and was lower; this platform
one-inch nylon-webbing rails with five lacked sufficient buoyancy to prevent the satisfactorily supported the heaviest
two-inch nylon-webbing rungs. This life raft from settling upside down, rather volunteers. Height to the top of the lower
would appear to address concerns about than resting on its side on the surface of buoyancy tube was approximately 28.0

286 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

end. This crosspiece had a depressed

section in the center, apparently to ease
entry onto the platform. It was otherwise
similar in construction to the original,
but extended out further to provide a
substantial base for boarding.)

There were several red, one-inch ny-

lon-webbing grab handles. While not
twisted, they were constructed so that
9 they tended to rise up from the buoy- 11
ancy tubes to which they were affixed;
inches (71.1 centimeters), which was thus, they were easier to grab. There was person life raft; at the second entry, a
a comfortable distance for all but the one grab handle on the top forward sec- single one-inch nylon-webbing loop
shortest volunteers. tion of each support tube, one centered hung from the lower buoyancy tube
below the entry above the midpoint of approximately 12 inches and had grab
The platform was made of buoyancy-tube the lower buoyancy tube and one on handles near the top of the tube (photo
fabric with a triangle arrangement of six each side of the midpoint of the entry 12). This entry was unsatisfactory for
large round holes cut into the center of above the midpoint of the upper buoy- many volunteers, especially those who
the platform and three large round holes ancy tube. were shorter than average, had minimal
next to the buoyancy tube to allow the upper-body strength or were mid-section
platform to settle in the water. A double An interior three-rung boarding ladder heavy or bottom heavy. As with the EAM
layer of fabric reinforced the area with of white, one-inch nylon webbing had VIP four-person life raft, this type of
the holes. The holes were large enough one rung directly on top of the upper boarding aid is deficient, in our opinion;
that a small foot could get caught in one, buoyancy tube, serving as a grab handle it does not comply with the requirements
a deficiency, in our opinion. (photo 11). The ladder was attached per- of TSO-C70a (paragraph 4.6).
manently to the life raft floor at the bases
Despite the holes, the fabric platform of the beams, extended up and over the The support tubes for the boarding plat-
tended to float upward (photo 10), and upper buoyancy tube and was attached to form had no check valves; and, if punc-
this caused some hesitance on the part the boarding platform support tubes with tured, the lower buoyancy tube would
of some volunteers as they stopped to quick-release buckles. These buckles had deflate, thus it did not meet the require-
assess the situation and then pushed to be released to close the canopy door. ments of TSO-C70a (paragraph 4.6). (On
the fabric down into the water before The canopy door was rolled down to the the revised platform exhibited at the 2003
proceeding with boarding. Volunteers tube, but it was secured tightly to the tube NBAA convention, it appeared that this
boarded with minimal difficulty, al- with the ladder rung lying on top of it; it
though several reported that there was was unlikely that it would be grabbed to
room for improvement. (The life raft assist in boarding.
exhibited at the 2003 NBAA conven-
tion had a more conventional boarding The interior boarding ladder, located
platform installed with a flat fabric floor in the midst of the volunteers, proved
and an inflatable crosspiece at the fore an annoyance even when released. One
volunteer suggested using the raft knife
to cut the boarding ladder loose from
the floor to eliminate the annoyance.
The alternate solution, used effectively
on life rafts by Air Cruisers, EAM and
Winslow, would be quick-release buckles
at the bases of the ladder rails inside the
life raft.

One platform entry was installed at

each end of the larger life rafts. A single
10 12
platform entry was fitted to the four-

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

had been addressed and, if so, should on each of the flaps. The single-truck zip- headroom (29 inches) at the ends and
have met the TSO-C70a [paragraph 4.6] per made it difficult to adjust the opening sides, where the canopy sloped down to
requirement.) or to rig the flap for shade. (The life raft the tube.
exhibited at the 2003 NBAA convention
The sea-anchor attachment point for the had double trucks to allow for more There was no rainwater-collection
larger life rafts was centered on the end, versatility.) There was satisfactory head- mechanism.
bisecting one of the boarding platforms. room in the center rectangular section of
This was the same entry to which the the life raft, 36.5 inches (92.7 centimeters), Rain Simulation
mooring/inflation line led, thus making 40.5 inches (102.9 centimeters) to the top
it the de facto primary entry. The loca- of the arch tube, and less headroom at the Closing up the canopies was easy and
tion of the sea anchor line interfered with ends and sides, 29.0 inches (73.7 centime- quick to accomplish; the life rafts proved
boarding. A solution would be to direct ters), where the canopy sloped down to reasonably weathertight, though they
survivors to the opposite entry as the the upper buoyancy tube. leaked some water through the zippers
primary boarding location. because storm flaps were not effective
The larger life rafts were equipped with
(they were too small). (The life raft
an auto-erecting, stay-erect canopy. A
Canopy exhibited at the 2003 NBAA convention
pair of four-inch canopy-support tubes
had larger storm flaps that might be more
were fitted at the corners of the life raft
The four-person life raft was equipped effective.)
(photo 14). A central tube connected the
with a four-inch-diameter auto-erecting
two arches across the center of the life
stay-erect single-arch canopy-support The canopies on the larger life rafts
raft, adding rigidity to the arches. The
tube located on the short (eight-inch) sagged considerably after they became
canopy fabric was glued to the top of the
straight center section of the buoyancy wet, significantly reducing headroom
canopy-support tubes and to the central
tube (photo 13). The arch incorporated (photo 15). More of a concern was
square corners for improved head- the fact that the larger life raft canopy
room. The canopy was constructed of
lightweight translucent orange coated
rip-stop nylon fabric. As with all the
translucent fabric canopies, sun shining
through it gave everything and everyone
an unappealing orange tinge.

14
15

connecting tube. The top of the canopy

was approximately three feet wide and ex- seemed to have a weak spot on top where
tended between the two arches. The sides the center support was joined. A partial
and ends could be opened or closed, so collapse of that section was observed,
the life raft could be well ventilated. particularly on the 12-person life raft,
but a complete collapse did not occur;
13 the canopy rebounded immediately after
Upon inflation, all the flaps were rolled
water pressure was removed.
down on the tube and secured by Velcro
The canopy fabric was glued to the straps. As on the smaller life raft, a large
top of the canopy-support tube and plastic zipper was used on each of the Lifelines and Grasp Lines
glued where it was attached to the up- four opening flaps. The single-truck zip-
per buoyancy tube. Upon inflation, per made it more difficult to adjust the The lifelines and grasp lines were red
the two flaps were rolled down on the opening or to rig for shade. one-inch nylon webbing. Lifelines were
upper buoyancy tube and secured with attached along the sides of the life raft and
Velcro straps. Both sides of the life raft There was good headroom in the center extended to the boarding aids, where they
were fully exposed with the flaps open. rectangular section of the larger life raft, were secured to the upper buoyancy tube
A large plastic one-way zipper was used 36.5 inches and 40.5 inches, and less with adequate slack to be easily reached

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by survivors in the water. Grasp lines, shape of the larger life raft, which was On the life raft (built in 2001) borrowed
secured to the upper buoyancy tube, particularly vulnerable to capsizing if for the 2002 evaluation, the attachment
encircled the interior of the life raft. the sea anchor was lost or was deployed point had been improved and was satis-
incorrectly. This was a deficiency, in our factory (photo 20).
Stability opinion. The yellow tab that held the sea
anchor detached from one of our evalu-
The Goodrich life rafts had four small ation Goodrich life rafts (photo 18).
ballast bags constructed of buoyancy tube
material containing approximately 56.1
pounds (25.4 kilograms) of fresh water
each. A bag was attached at each corner
of the rectangular life rafts (photo 16)
and at equidistant intervals around the
four-person life raft. Five one-inch holes
were in the bottom of each bag, which 20
allowed water to escape, albeit relatively
slowly (photo 17). Nevertheless, drain Stability of the four-person life raft was
holes should not be in the bottom of 18
satisfactory. On the larger life rafts, the
water-ballast bags, because the ultimate ballast was inadequate. The lack of a
Goodrich used a flat, round, parachute-
style sea anchor made of lightweight swivel in the sea anchor was a deficiency,
nylon parachute fabric, 36 inches in in our opinion. This was particularly an
diameter (flat) with eight shrouds. The issue on the four-person life raft and on
anchor was deployed automatically upon the larger Goodyear life rafts, given the
life raft inflation and was attached to the boat-shaped life rafts’ dependence upon
life raft opposite the primary entry on the an effective sea anchor.
four-person life raft and at the primary
entry of the larger life rafts. No swivel was Floor
fitted to the 29.0-foot (8.8-meter) para-
chute cord that was the sea anchor line, An inflatable floor was standard on all the
16 so the likelihood of failure was increased, Goodrich life rafts. These were equipped
a deficiency, in our opinion. with long reeds that ran from one side of
the life raft to the other, two in the smaller
The sea-anchor attachment point failed life rafts and three in the larger life rafts.
on the 12-person life raft we evaluated in This floor construction did not lend itself
2000, tearing away from the life raft dur- to being inflated “hard,” it just ballooned
ing boarding (photo 19). The failed as- up between the reeds; thus, its effective-
sembly was returned to Goodrich, which ness was compromised (photo 21).
said that analysis showed that the failure
was the result of substandard bonding, The inflation valve was located near the
an assembly error. edge of the floor, rather than in its center

17

performance of the water ballast would

be diminished, compromising the stabil-
ity of the life raft. (The life raft exhibited
at the 2003 NBAA convention had ballast
bags constructed of lightweight canopy
fabric and did not have drain holes.)

The water ballast did not appear suffi-

19 21
cient to compensate for the rectangular

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

(photo 22). Survivors might not readily wire-reinforced rim. The rim maintained
locate the inflation valve. Moreover, the an open end and made the bailer easier
valve was not comfortable to sit on, to use. It had a capacity of 4.0 quarts (3.8
even though it was recessed; volunteers liters) and leaked at the seams. There was
adjusted their position to avoid sitting no tether and no place to attach one con-
on the valve. veniently, a deficiency, in our opinion.

Goodrich included a single six-inch by

3.75-inch (9.53-centimeter) by one-inch
compressed sponge that was very dense
23 and difficult to squeeze. That was not
a good attribute for a life raft sponge
pump body and caused difficulty insert- because ease of use and conservation of
ing or operating the pump. A red-stenciled strength are a vital survival necessity.
“HAND PUMP FITTING” was adjacent
to each valve. (The life raft exhibited at Heaving Line
22 the 2003 NBAA convention had screen-
printed text and an arrow that was easier Goodrich used nylon parachute cord,
The red-stenciled placard next to the infla- to read. There were also a pictogram and which was not inherently buoyant, and a
tion valve said “HAND PUMP FITTING” instructions to use the manual inflation round-ring rubber quoit (photo 24). The
and had a small arrow pointing toward the pump, which was located near the upper line was retained on the upper buoyancy
valve. (The life raft exhibited at the 2003 buoyancy tube topping valve.) tube to the right (while boarding) of the
NBAA convention had screen-printed text primary entry with a yellow buoyancy
The manual inflation pump was a con- tube fabric clasp. A single metal snap held
with two arrows that was easier to read.
ventional bellows pump, but it had fewer it together. The clasp wrapped entirely
There were also a pictogram and further
bellows and very short strokes compared around the line and quoit, squeezing the
instructions to use the manual inflation
with other pumps. The TSO-C70a re- quoit into an oval shape. The clasp was
pump, which was located near one of the
quirement (paragraph 5.5) is 32.0 cubic stenciled in red with “RESCUE LINE,”
buoyancy tube topping valves.)
inches (524.4 cubic centimeters) per full and the fabric tab for the metal snap
stroke. The pump provided about 75 was stenciled “LIFT.” Neither was easily
Life Raft Equipment percent of the TSO-required capacity readable because of wrinkled fabric and
during our evaluation. inadequate stenciling. The quoit did not
Pump return to a round shape after it was re-
The manual inflation pump was stowed leased from the clasp, making the quoit
A molded recessed receptacle held the in a small pouch constructed of orange more difficult to grasp from some angles
topping valve. While volunteers attempted canopy fabric and stenciled with “HAND (photo 25, page 291). (The four-person
to insert the manual inflation pump into PUMP.” It was secured in the pouch life raft exhibited at the 2003 NBAA
the topping valve, the attached rubber cap under a long flap tucked in beside the convention had screen-printed text for
interfered with the pump body. The cap pump. The pump pouch was in the life “RESCUE LINE” that was easier to read;
had to be positioned carefully and held raft, tethered to the floor. It was difficult “LIFT” was stenciled in small text and
out of the way to attach the pump. The to remove the pump from the tightly fit- was difficult to read. There was also a
recess did not allow the attached cap ted pouch, and the flap was difficult to
enough space to be flat, as it would be open. There was no tether or lanyard on
when the valve was fitted flush. the pump; thus, it could be lost overboard
after being removed from the pouch, a
A recessed valve also made it more diffi- deficiency, in our opinion.
cult to use the manual inflation pump with
two hands for maximum-effort pumping Bailer and Sponge
(photo 23). On the larger life raft, the
positioning of the topping valve on the The bailer was stored inside the SEP,
lower buoyancy tube was too close to the where it was not immediately avail-
upper buoyancy tube; the overhang of the able after boarding. It was constructed
24
upper buoyancy tube interfered with the of sewn plastic-coated fabric with a

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Goodrich used a raft knife that was made the information more readable, but the
by Hoover Industries. The finger hole re- information remained on the floor of the
tained the little nibs that remained after life raft where it could be overlooked or
removal of the plug that was molded origi- obscured by survivors.)
nally in the hole. These nibs were sharp
and painful when the raft knife was pulled Lighting
from the sheath or when the knife was
used to cut anything (photo 26). Hoover Approved locator lights were used in the
trimmed these nibs on the knives used in interior and on the exterior of the life
their life rafts; Goodrich did not. rafts, except no interior light was used
25 in the four-person life raft, a deficiency,
in our opinion. On the larger life rafts, the
pictogram showing how to throw the exterior light was on top of one canopy-
rescue line to retrieve survivors from the support tube, at the primary entry, and
water.) Volunteers were unable to throw the interior light was on the underside of
the quoit successfully because the line the opposite canopy-support tube. The
tangled, a deficiency, in our opinion. interior light was at the end opposite
where the immediate-action instructions
While measuring the length of the heav- were displayed.
ing line (to check for the required 75
feet) on the four-person life raft, the end This was likely an effort to meet the
attachment to the quoit came loose. The 26
requirements of TSO-C70a (paragraph
knot securing the line to the quoit had 4.12) that the locator light be “visible
come undone after minimal handling, a The mooring/inflation line and the from any direction by persons in the
deficiency, in our opinion. sea-anchor line were in relatively close water.” Because the exterior light was
proximity to each other. A confused or not at the highest point on the canopy,
Raft Knife panic-stricken survivor could cut the the light was shaded from effective view
wrong line by mistake, a deficiency, in for approximately 200 degrees around
The raft knife was located on the inte- our opinion. On the floor of the life raft, the life raft. The interior light located at
rior side of the canopy support-tube to stenciled text and a small arrow identi- the opposite end would appear to have
the right (while boarding) of the entry. fied the lines, but the information was provided a locator light for the shaded
The raft knife was wrapped in its tether difficult to read or to see and might be areas, at least upon inflation or when
and held under a Velcro-secured flap in overlooked or obscured by survivors the canopy was open (except the sections
a sheath of yellow buoyancy-tube fabric. (photo 27). (On the life raft exhibited blocked by the canopy support tubes).
The yellow sheath was not readily visible at the 2003 NBAA convention, screen- This does not meet the requirements of
against the identically colored life raft fab- printed text with a larger arrow made the TSO or the practical reasons for hav-
ric. The sheath was stenciled inadequately ing the light in the first place: to serve as
in red: “KNIFE.” On the four-person life a life raft locator light for survivors in
raft, a loop of the tether was hanging out the water and for searchers. Successful
of the sheath, and it was easy to use that to rescues have occurred because of these
pull out the knife. On the larger life rafts, dim lights, whose effectiveness is mul-
there was no such loop, and it was not tiplied when searchers use night-vision
easy to pull the raft knife from the sheath. equipment.
(The life raft exhibited at the 2003 NBAA
convention had “KNIFE” screen-printed (On the life raft exhibited at the 2003
in large vertical text next to the raft knife NBAA convention, there was also a lo-
sheath and a screen-printed pictorial in- cator light on the underside of the life
struction of the raft knife on the sheath; raft, which was an improvement, in our
both contributed to making its location opinion. Nevertheless, it was located op-
very noticeable. A pictorial instruction posite the righting location, which was
and text instructions to use the manual somewhat counterintuitive because in
inflation pump were located near one of that position it would attract survivors
27
the buoyancy tube topping valves.) to the wrong side of the life raft.)

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ELT Signaling Devices

The life rafts were equipped with an Two Skyblazer XLT aerial meteor flares
auto-deploying DME Corp. 121.5-MHz and a mil-spec sea-dye marker packet
ELT. The ELT was installed in a pocket on were provided. The two flares in the SEP
the exterior of the life raft: on the lower from the 2002 evaluation life raft were
buoyancy tube on the larger life rafts manufactured in February 2000 and had
and on the upper buoyancy tube on an expiration date of August 2003.
the four-person life raft. Located on the
exterior of the life raft, opportunities for A two-inch by two-inch BCB Interna-
discomfort caused by sitting against the 29 tional signal mirror had an effective
ELT were eliminated. The whip antenna aiming aid, but offered inadequate
was located in the interior on top of the canopy fabric (photo 29). There was a reflectivity. A superior-quality SOLAS-
upper buoyancy tube beside a canopy- short strip of one-inch Velcro on the flap specification WindStorm Safety Whistle
support tube. No 406-MHz ELT option closure, but there was a large gap at each with a lanyard was included.
was offered. (On the life raft exhibited at end that allowed the contents to escape.
the 2003 NBAA convention, the beacon Simply extending the Velcro all the way Paddles
location was on the interior, attached to across the flap would improve the clo-
the leg of the canopy-support tube.) sure. (On the life raft exhibited at the
Goodrich used the mil-spec blue plywood
2003 NBAA convention, there were four
paddles with a retroreflective tape applied
Survival Equipment Packs stowage pouches, and the Velcro extended
to one side. These were not comfortable
across the flap, a notable improvement.)
to use because the handles were difficult
Goodrich secured one pouch or two
to grip and the paddles were too short to
pouches inside the life rafts on short Survival Equipment be very effective or to be used with two
tethers (photo 28). Pouches were con-
hands. Wrist lanyards of nylon tape were
structed of orange canopy fabric; sev-
Repair fitted to the handles.
eral strips of yellow Velcro were used to
close each pouch into a compact bundle.
One three-inch mil-spec repair clamp Fishing Kit
and one five-inch mil-spec repair clamp
were included. (On the life raft exhibited
A mil-spec fishing kit was included.
at the 2003 NBAA convention, there was
a screen-printed placard on the upper
buoyancy tube illustrating how to install First Aid
a repair clamp.)
A useful assortment of first aid supplies
Utility Knife was assembled into plastic zipper-lock
bags. A plastic bottle of SPF (sun protec-
A poor-quality stockman’s pocketknife tion factor) 30 sunscreen was included.
28 was fitted with a non-locking three-inch The inclusion of the sunscreen was ex-
spear-point blade, an awl, a pair of combi- cellent because sunburn can cause great
nation bottle/cap openers and large/small discomfort and accelerate dehydration.
Inside the pouches were four 4-mil zip-
screwdrivers. This knife began to rust al- The bottle had leaked sunscreen into its
per lock plastic bags containing survival
most immediately after immersion. heavy plastic zipper-lock bag in one of the
equipment modules for signaling, life
three SEPs examined, however.
raft maintenance, first aid and food.
A shrink-wrapped Survivor-06 hand- Flashlight
operated water maker, vacuum-packed The antibiotic ointment packets in the
Land/Shark Emergency Survival Bag Goodrich used two Rayovac Roughneck 2002 evaluation life raft were labeled by
and paddles also were included. flashlights powered by two AA-cell lithi- the manufacturer with expiration dates
um-batteries. As noted in the Air Cruisers of August 2002 (seven packets) and Janu-
Goodrich provided two 9.0-inch by 14.0- evaluation, the switch on the Roughneck ary 2003 (three packets). Affixed to the
inch (22.9-centimeter by 35.6-centimeter) flashlight was subject to inadvertent acti- packets was a paper label “EXPIRATION
envelope-construction bags of lightweight vation, a deficiency, in our opinion. Continued on page 298

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Life Rafts: Ask the Person Who’s Tried One

J
an Rishbim, aircraft certification down and loop the ladder over my Never having done that before
service, U.S. Federal Aviation foot and I don’t have a lot of upper- and then realizing that there was
Administration, who has responsi- body strength, so that was a little enough air once the [10-person]
bility for many TSOs (technical standard challenge. But I made it in. life raft was turned over, that you
orders), including those for life rafts, said didn’t have to rush to get out. You
that he had never been in a life raft before To survive, yeah, I could spend time didn’t have to panic.
the evaluation. in a life raft. You know, five days
would be pushing your luck. I’m There’s plenty of room in this life
It was a great opportunity to come thinking three would be pushing raft, especially for four to six people.
out here and get a good hands- your luck and hopefully the rescue You know 10 people could just fit in
on feel for what these life rafts would be a lot sooner than that. It there, and 11 was getting snug, and
are like … how they perform … was pretty cramped in there. So, then we had 15 people [overload
and what some of the important you have to like the people you’re capacity] in there. It held up pretty
features are. in the life raft with. Our legs were well. But it was really packed.
like, entwined with each other. If
The life rafts were a lot more you were injured you’d be hard up. Ron Ripps, 59, retired entrepreneur,
cramped than I expected … that I don’t know if an injured person Scottsdale, Arizona:
was the biggest thing for me. And could have gotten in the life raft. It
if you can’t get in them, they don’t would have taken people in the [life] I think [the evaluation] ought to be
do you any good. raft to get them in. … Alone, I don’t required … for people going off
know if [an injured person] could shore … because there’s a lot of
I was very impressed … how have gotten in or not. Honestly, that surprises when you open up these
organized it was … a well-done was a challenge even for … a test- [life rafts] such as how they’re
event. ing environment. I thought about boarded. What the different ac-
that as I was climbing in, what if I cessories are. And really, which
Edie Redfern, 30, is a civilian intern train- was injured? [life] rafts are good [life] rafts to be
ing to be a survival instructor for the U.S. in. [As a result of this experience],
Air Force at Sheppard Air Force Base, When I go back to [work as a I know pretty much which [life raft]
Wichita Falls, Texas. Redfern, a former survival instructor] I have the I’m going to get, which company
high school teacher with a master’s de- knowledge and terminology about I’m going to use and to some de-
gree in education, recently changed ca- how the life raft functions because gree a lot of the equipment I may
reers and is in her first year as an intern, [at Sheppard] we don’t have [in- want on it.
training to train. water training for life rafts] … it’s in
a classroom, so having this back-
I just took on this job at Sheppard ground will definitely be a plus.
and part of what I do is teaching
individuals about life rafts. I’ve Julia Ripps, 43, from Scottsdale, Arizona,
not [been trained in or] taught recently retired from her picture-framing
those blocks yet. It’s brand new business of 20 years, and is planning to
and I totally have no clue where go cruising with Ron, her husband, aboard
to start. their sailboat.

I was a little nervous [about deploy- We wanted to experiment with life

ing the life raft] … the arrow pointed rafts since we need to purchase
to a certain area … I pulled a line one and find out what a really good
and that’s not exactly what [the life raft should be.
instructions] wanted me to do …
I had done the wrong thing, but it I was in … this particular life raft that
was easy enough to see what the had …only two openings and when
right thing was. we had to tip the [life] raft over, and
swim out from underneath it, that
Getting in [the life raft] was a little was a pretty interesting experience
bit difficult. I actually had to reach with all the people in there. Ron Ripps

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who is in boating or in aviation … going to have to be getting along

ought to volunteer… because it is with these people for who knows
a wonderful experience …because how long and [that] just makes the
… you buy a life raft, what do you situation that much worse. You
know about it? would lose all humility… .

We fly over San Francisco Bay Here, I’ve [boarded] eight [life] rafts
fairly regularly. When I’m shooting … and can really compare the pros
approaches into Monterey I carry and cons of all of them. They all
life vests, which most people think have something I like, they all have
I’m really silly to do, but that’s an something I don’t like. Getting the
overwater approach … I would practice of getting in and out of a
rather have a life vest on board [life] raft has been incredible.
than not.
I think I’m learning as much watch-
Patrick Miller, 45, is a principal engineer ing [the life raft activity from pool-
for a software company. side] as being in the water.”

The [evaluation] is well organized Alan Shaw (no relation to Mike Shaw), 49,
Jonathan Redfern and I feel safe because there’s a from Lummi Island, Washington, is a con-
number of people making sure that sultant working with regulatory issues for
Tech. Sgt. Jonathan Redfern, 33, aircrew the people who are in the [life] raft manufacturers of lifesaving equipment.
life support instructor, U.S. Air Force, when we do [a capsizing], to make
Sheppard Air Force Base, Wichita Falls, sure you make it out. There’s life The marine side of life raft specifi-
Texas: guards … and underwater divers. cations has been revamped more
recently than the aviation life raft
[The evaluation is an] opportunity Staying in the [life] raft in rough specifications… that go back to
to see, maybe the best and not seas I think would be [likely] but the 1970s and essentially nothing’s
so best of the aviation and marine getting into the raft injured [and] by changed … there’s been a lot of
life raft products that are available yourself, I don’t believe is possible. advances in life raft products in
today. Also to see what is already I think it would be very difficult to do that time.
out there compared to what we any kind of first aid … other than
have in the military. lying across everyone [else in the A ditching will happen … do you
loaded life raft] and … I’m not sure want to have a life raft on board or
I participated two years ago in [a that you can get more than one or do you want to be swimming? It’s
similar] test and it’s just incredible to two lying down simultaneously. that simple. The odds are small, but
see that some of the manufacturers because there are odds, it does
really heeded some of the [previous It looked like the seams were happen and will happen.
volunteers’] safety concerns … and coming already coming apart on
corrected them, and some of their a brand new [life] raft.
innovations are really neat with
what they came up with. On the Mike Shaw, 35, an environmental consul-
downside it’s kind of sad that there tant from Charlotte, North Carolina, is a
are still some of the manufacturers sailboat owner who plans to sail offshore.
… that have done nothing and … He said that he had never been in a life
are still selling ‘dogs.’ raft until the evaluation.

Nancy Miller, 47, from Concord, California, I think one thing that was confirmed
is a biology instructor at a community ju- was how cramped the life rafts are.
nior college. She is an instrument-rated It’s really surprising when you put
600-hour private pilot who flies her single- eight people in an eight-man life raft
engine Piper Archer for pleasure with her how little space you have.
husband Patrick, a student pilot.
This [evaluation] … brought it to
I participated in [a previous life raft life. Oh, if you’re out there on the
evaluation by Doug Ritter] and I water [in a life raft] you are going to
think he does it very well. Anyone be incredibly uncomfortable. You’re Nancy Miller

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This [evaluation] is exciting because Master Chief Butch Flythe, U.S. Coast Things are set up safely. I think
you’ve got products represented by Guard rescue swimmer program man- [Ritter] is being very meticulous in his
many manufacturers and you’ve ager, Washington, D.C., is considering filming [of the life rafts] and tracking
also got people that are not familiar retirement. all the comments [of the volunteers].
with life rafts, using them. And that’s I’m very impressed with the set-up.
the key. Because a life raft has to be We thought it would be a good It’s a very good test. In the military, I
used by someone who’s never seen idea to come out here and see the wish we did more things like this.
one before and it has to be reason- industry’s latest … ’cause sooner or
ably easy … to use. And if it’s not, later we’re going to start looking for It’s really interesting to see the
the manufacturer has failed. replacements [for life rafts in Coast different designs and how they’re
Guard airplanes and helicopters]. marked, the different equipment and
This [evaluation] has been well type of equipment that a manufac-
planned. To have a pool with a Instead of just looking in the turer chooses to put in a life raft and
ramped entrance and a wave [government’s] stock system, [I other manufacturers don’t.
generator … it’s great. am] trying to find something bet-
ter … in the commercial world, if I If I was going to give somebody
You can see why the manufactur- can. If you can justify it by salient advice … you need to pay attention
ers dislike this process. With life features or price or quality … they’ll to what kind of equipment. Does
rafts, the difficulty is nobody ever let you go outside the system and that equipment meet my needs?
sees the product, it’s always in a get something commercial. Don’t just say, ‘Well, here’s a life
container. So this is a rare chance raft and I’ll just buy this one.’ You
to see what’s inside those contain- “This facility is really nice as far as really need to take some time and
ers and for ordinary people … to being able to generate at least some effort and research it.
compare the products arbitrarily, kind of wave action … . There’s a
with no bias, and come up with few of us here that are trained, but I think life rafts in airplanes are a
an opinion. Very valuable, and the for the most part, its people off the must. If you’re flying over water
manufacturers should listen up. street, the kind of people you want and don’t have one, you’re stupid.
The manufacturers that listen up to know: Are they going to be able Anybody that is going to fly over
will certainly benefit. to use that life raft? Continued on page 297

H
al Jensen is an aerospace [Until this evaluation] I have
engineer in the Aircraft Engineer- never had any experience
ing Division at the Federal Avia- in climbing in or out of a life
tion Administration (FAA) in Washington, raft. For me, it was going from
D.C. Jensen and a colleague from the looking at standards that talk
FAA participated in the 2002 life raft about what type of boarding
evaluation, in Phoenix, Arizona. During aid [an aviation life raft] should
the evaluation he shared some of his have and what type of design
personal opinions and observations. features we would like as a
minimum performance stan-
Basically, at headquarters, we dard, to actually looking at
have responsibility for some of some of those life rafts that
the TSO [technical service or- meet the standard and seeing
der] standards that apply to … the difference between the ones
aviation life rafts. My interest [in that far exceeded that standard
attending the evaluation] was in and the ones that may [have]
getting a hands-on experience Hal Jensen met the minimum standard. So
at what makes the life raft a I would typically do. I get more the actual use of the boarding
good design and really to get information from trying to board aids, erecting the canopies, all
some fundamental, in-the-water the life rafts, get out of the life of that was unique for me and
experience. rafts, roll over in life rafts than six extremely valuable.
months of sitting behind a desk
This type of event is more valu- or going to an SAE meeting. It’s With this experience now, I’ll
able than a lot of the things that extremely valuable. look at something [on a life

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raft] and be able to [better minimums [but] there were a The other thing I saw here was
understand it] based on my ex- couple in my mind that might … some people already have
perience. One thing I thought be a little suspect. some of these life rafts and it’s
was very enlightening was the obvious they didn’t know how
length of the ladders … [and This [evaluation of life rafts] gives to use them … in these [very]
the number] of rungs that were me so much more confidence benign conditions. We have
necessary to get in the life raft. in the evaluation of the TSO … plenty of light and there was a
Some that were very short may but when there are [requests little stress level trying to get the
have passed the TSO but they for deviations] — someone [life rafts] deployed, but nothing
were not nearly as easy to use says they want to show a dif- like what you might find if it’s a
as one of the longer ladders. ferent way of meeting one of the dark night in storm conditions.
It was [very] tough to get into criteria — that has to come to So … people that might buy
some of them and … the longer headquarters for our approval. these off the trade-room floor
the ladder, the easier it was. Seeing something here gives probably need to take that extra
me so much more experience step and get training, even if …
So that is … the type of thing I upon which to base approvals it’s a video that would come
would push for in the next TSO or rejections of those requests. with the life raft. Training is the
revision. Maybe we should key with these types of survival
consider a minimum length for [This evaluation] is interesting, equipment.
that ladder. because it’s not a certification
test, it’s like an evaluation … I was very impressed with Doug
The key word is ‘minimum’: from a consumer-advocate Ritter and the degree of organi-
minimum performance specifi- group. I liked it. It’s my first ex- zation … and effort that he and
cations or standards. For some perience in something like this. his wife [Sue] put into it. I think
people, it’s going to be more dif- it accomplished his mission of
ficult to get in [a life raft]. I did see This facility was … very ad- being safe.
that everyone here was able to equate, particularly … because
get in. I’ll admit that I thought you had the waves coming I thought Doug had just the right
…some [life] rafts would be at different angles. I think that level of obvious participation, par-
[easier] to get into — the ones probably demonstrated what ticularly with the life raft deploy-
with the [boarding ramps] you might have with light seas. ments. He only stepped in when
certainly were much easier, And it certainly gave you an idea he thought that there might be a
but even I had some trouble, that if you had trouble in any of potential safety issue, someone
initially, [getting in the life raft]. the [life] rafts in these ‘seas’, … trying to inflate the [life] raft on the
in a little bit heavier seas … the deck, for [example]. Other than
A couple of times the [ladder] problem will probably [increase] that, he allowed people to deal
rungs were [too short]. That was exponentially. with the situation the way they
a difficulty, particularly with the would have to on their own. I’ve
tall two-chambered life rafts. But In my opinion — not FAA’s known Doug for about four years
it goes back to the minimum — some people are willing to [through mutual involvement with
performance standards. And take more risks than others. We SAE International] and I’ve been
while it’s going to be difficult for need to ensure that not only the very impressed with what he
some folks, if we can ensure a operator of the aircraft is safe, does … and [that he] is open to
certain level — it’s not going to but the people who are relying different ideas.
cover every single person — but on him, that get in that aircraft
the vast majority should be cov- with him and are more naïve I filled out all the evaluation forms
ered by that minimum standard. about the environment … that for every [life] raft that I was in. I
That’s the kind of approach we is the reason that we want to put as much detail as I could …
take not only with these stan- ensure that specific aircraft have and of course you focus on the
dards, but the certification of a specific-size life raft and meet things where a life raft seems
aircraft in general. a specific standard. It’s really to weak compared to the way it
protect not only the operator … performs adequately. 
From what I’ve seen, most of but the people who might be
these life rafts surpass the TSO flying with him. —  rial Staff

296 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

water for any length of time is … kind of neat to think that you partici-
at risk by not having some type of pate in something that might have
[life raft] other than a PFD [personal an impact on somebody else.”
flotation device]. The quicker you
can get out of the water and into Rick Bogden, 50, a chiropractor from
that [life] raft, you’re buying yourself Mesa, Arizona, is interested in cruising a
a lot of time. sailboat after his retirement.

Jim Kir, 54, prison counselor, Gilbert, I thought it would be a lot easier get-
Arizona, is a member of his local U.S. ting in and out of the [life] rafts and
Coast Guard Auxiliary (there are large things like that and it’s very difficult.
lakes in Arizona). You have to have some athletic abili-
ties to get into these things. You’ve
This is a great opportunity … to got to use your upper-body strength
learn a little bit about what it’s like to pull yourself in. The first time was
to deploy a life raft. Ed Blanchard
an effort, then it got easier as the
days progressed.
You really have to be pretty agile [to know what they’re doing to do the
get in the life raft]. And you have to [evaluation]. That’s exactly the way A couple of these [life] rafts had … a
work as a team. If one person is hav- it should be tested, at least from my nauseating odor when you opened
ing a problem getting in, you’ve got training and my work in usability. them. I couldn’t stay in [those life
to grab the person and pull ’em in. rafts] for more than [a few] minutes.
Bob Moretti is a psychologist from Chi- A few of them … I felt like I was
To spend two days or three days on cago, Illinois. trapped. [In] other ones I felt more
a [life] raft would be pretty difficult. I comfortable and felt safe ... but none
think legs would go to sleep … and As a sailor, I always have had an of them were real comfortable.
it would be pretty chilly. interest in survival stuff. And all the
products are marketed at very high Bill Bogden (Rick’s brother), 55, a regis-
You’d have to go [urinate] over the prices … but you never really get a tered nurse, wants to sail with his wife to
side. You’d have to untangle your chance to ‘try before you buy’ and I foreign ports during retirement.
legs and let everybody know what wanted to see what these products
you’re doing … I think out in open would be like to use. Just to have It would be very difficult for people
water it might be difficult. the experience of getting in a life to get in these [life] rafts who don’t
raft. Hopefully, I never have to do have any kind of training or any kind
Ed Blanchard, 57, is bio-medical engineer it for real. of [appropriate knowledge]. On top
from Gilbert, Arizona. of all that, the factors of fear and
I deployed one of the … life rafts. ‘What’s going to happen next’… it
I’m retired from the [U.S.] Marine I was the guy who couldn’t get it would be real difficult.
Corps so I’ve done stuff like this open. I was in the water for three
before. I’m really impressed with or four minutes searching for the We were on the [life] raft just a cou-
the way the [life] rafts are put to- line. I own [the same kind of life ple of minutes and [another volun-
gether and all the accessories that raft]. I just bought it, and despite teer] was already claustrophobic.
are placed in them to help you in a that I had looked at the [life] raft … Some of these [life] rafts are a lot
survival situation. I can’t think of any and thought I knew exactly how to darker [inside] than others … and I
of the [life] rafts I’ve been in today deploy it, I had forgotten all … I had hadn’t thought about the air circu-
that I wouldn’t want to be in a real read … and now, under the gun to lation [when the canopy is closed]
survival situation. deploy this thing I couldn’t do it. but that is a real concern. Some of
the [life] rafts had windows, some
Carol Curt, 46, is a human factors special- The instructions [on the life raft] of them didn’t … but having that
ist from Chicago, Illinois. were not clearly marked. You can little bit of light … you get the feeling
see how a small change could be you’re not trapped. 
I was interested in coming out here made that would be so important.
… to see how they did this kind of All [the instructions] had to say — FSF Editorial Staff
product testing. And they know what was ‘lift this flap’ not ‘lift the Velcro
they’re doing. They’ve got a real flap’; there were two Velcro flaps. Note: Interviews with volunteers during life
good program here. All the video- You could see how something like raft evaluation with Rozelle, Roger. Tempe,
taping … getting people who don’t that could save somebody’s life. It’s Arizona, Aug. 23–25, 2002.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

DATE 1/03” that had been added. Seven a ditching well offshore could slow a Hoover’s unique reversible life raft, the
of the ointment packets had expired be- rescue operation, and survival manuals patented ReadyRescue, was made avail-
fore the customer purchased the life raft; never should set deadlines or promote able for the 2002 evaluation. This life raft
the other three would expire before the high expectations. A positive mental was different from Hoover’s previous life
first service date. Despite the amended attitude, confidence in a successful out- rafts, which were similar to those pro-
expiration date, all would expire before come and realistic expectations should duced by EAM (the same engineer de-
the next service date, a deficiency, in our be encouraged. veloped both companies’ early designs).
opinion. For purposes of clarity in this evaluation,
Hoover’s earlier designs, with manually
Water erectable canopies, will be referred to as
“conventional”; this was not a distinction
A Survivor-06 hand-operated water mak- made by Hoover.
er was included, but there was no pack-
aged ready-to-drink water, a deficiency, Hoover provided a four-person conven-
in our opinion. A mil-spec 5.0-pint (2.4- tional Type II life raft for the first evalu-
liter) water bag was provided. ation, did not participate in the second
evaluation, provided a newly developed
Food six-person conventional Type I life raft
30 for the third evaluation and provided a
Vacuum-packed S.O.S. Food Lab survival six-person Type I ReadyRescue prototype
rations were provided. (photo 1) for the 2002 evaluation.
Service
Miscellaneous
The life raft required initial service after
two years, then had a one-year service
An emergency (“space”) blanket (typi-
interval.
cally made of laminated layers of poly-
ester film, such as Mylar, with a reflective
coating that can be used either to retain
body heat or to protect from sunlight)
was provided — not as a thermal protec-
tive aid, but as a radar reflector. A small 1
fresnel lens magnifier, helpful for reading
small print, was included. (Such a lens
The life rafts were constructed of double-
has a surface consisting of a concentric
coated neoprene over two-ply bias-cut
series of lens sections so that a thin lens
nylon fabric. The conventional life rafts
and large diameter are possible.)
were octagonal. The Type I reversible life
raft was available in four-person and six-
Survival Manual/Life Raft person rated capacities; the conventional
Manual Type II life raft was available in two-per-
Hoover Industries, has been involved
in manufacturing a variety of products son, four-person, six-person and eight-
An immediate-action list/LRM was hung
since 1955, beginning with interiors for person rated capacities. The ReadyRescue
from the canopy support arch and was
trains and buses, aircraft furniture and Type I reversible was a rectangular octagon
readily visible (photo 30). It was printed
medical gowns and masks, said Alain with a pair of long sides creating a “boat-
on waterproof paper and stored in a
Sosa, general facilities manager.6 About shaped” life raft. It was available only in
zipper-lock plastic bag. The back of this
1985, the company entered the life raft a six-person rated capacity, but greater-
“Management Guide — Liferaft” was
market when it acquired the product line capacity life rafts were planned.
easy-to-read bold print.
of the then-defunct American Safety Co.
While the LRM was relatively easy to read, Today, the company manufactures vari- Valise
it was not well written. Moreover, one ous models of TSO-approved Type I and
passage said that “assistance may be ex- Type II life rafts up to 46-person capac- The valises for the conventional life rafts
pected within a few hours to not more ity and life vests, and continues to install and for the ReadyRescue life raft were
than 24 hours.” Inclement weather or aircraft interiors. nearly identical to EAM valises.

298 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The six-person conventional Type I valise

and the ReadyRescue valise were rectan-
gular with nylon lacing holding the va-
lises together (photo 2). One-inch-wide
Velcro was used at the end to hold the
valise flaps. The SEP was inside the valise,
in its own separate pack, constructed with
snaps to close it. A pair of nylon-webbing
grab handles was provided on each side,
but none were at the ends.
4 5

(6.33 meters) for the conventional Type rungs were weighted — a good feature
I life raft and 19.5 feet (5.9 meters) for — but the ladder was too short and barely
the ReadyRescue life raft. TSO-C70a hung below the exterior bottom of the life
(paragraph 5.1) requires 20.0 feet (6.1 raft, a deficiency, in our opinion. Getting
meters), so only the conventional Type I a foothold, while still maintaining a grip
life raft met the requirement, a deficiency, on the grab handle(s), was very difficult
in our opinion. for some volunteers and was impossible
for a few. After our 1996 evaluation,
2 Inflation Hoover added another rung to the larger
transport category life rafts, but this im-
Instructions for inflation were stenciled All the life rafts deployed easily. provement had not been incorporated in
in black in very small, indistinct text on all the aviation life rafts.
the yellow valise fabric. The instructions The ReadyRescue life raft fully deployed
would be difficult to read in dim light. in 30 seconds. The PRV was located on The Type II life raft had grab handles
There were no pictorial instructions. the canopy-support tube and vented on top of the buoyancy tube and on the
The end of the mooring/inflation line inside the canopy. SOLAS marine speci- interior side of the buoyancy tube, and
was protected under an orange — un- fications do not allow interior venting an interior grasp line. On the conven-
labeled — flap with snaps to hold it in of PRVs. Interior-venting PRVs are an tional Type I life raft, the grasp line did
place (photo 3). inadequate design, in our opinion, and not extend across the entry, but another
the carbon-dioxide gas vented in a closed grab handle was added to the midpoint
or even partially closed canopy could interior side and exterior side of the
have ill effects on survivors, who might buoyancy tube (photo 6).
experience dizziness, headache, nausea or
rapid breathing, symptoms that would be On the conventional Type I life raft, the
resolved with fresh air flow. entry was flanked on both sides by the
blue insulated wire from the battery to
the locator light attached to the top of
Righting each buoyancy tube (photo 7, page 300).
The locator light inadvertently was pulled
Hoover’s righting aid on the conventional
3 Type II life rafts was essentially the same
as on EAM’s life rafts, a deficiency, in our
Mooring/Inflation Line opinion. Type I reversible life rafts require
no righting aids.
Like EAM, Hoover used 0.5-inch-wide
white nylon tape for a mooring/inflation Boarding Aids
line, with a 3.75-inch hand loop on the
end (photo 4). The absence of a handle On the conventional life rafts, a ladder
was a deficiency, in our opinion. The with two semi-rigid flat rungs made of
line was 18.0 feet (5.5 meters) for the two-inch wide white nylon webbing
6
conventional Type II life raft, 20.75 feet hung at the entries (photo 5). The flat

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

fabric; hanging at its end was a single telescoping-aluminum canopy-support

semi-rigid flat-rung nylon-webbing rods to hold up the edges and center of
ladder. The platform hung from two- the translucent orange-coated rip-stop-
inch-wide nylon webbing, and the base nylon canopy (photo 10). There were four
was located at the bottom of the lower outer masts on smaller life rafts and eight
buoyancy tube, creating a slope up from outer masts on the six-person and larger
the tube to the open boarding end of life rafts, all spaced equidistantly around
the platform. No matter which side was the inside periphery of the life raft.
up, the boarding aid flipped to function
correctly. After volunteers boarded the Volunteers had the same problems
platform, typically on their knees, the with the Hoover canopies (photo 11)
slope helped prevent them from slipping that they did with the EAM canopies
off the platform. One-inch-wide nylon- with one notable exception: Hoover’s
webbing grab handles were located at the telescoping canopy-support rods had
midpoint on the exterior and interior on
the upper buoyancy tube and on the top
of the upper buoyancy tube. Some vol-
7 unteers had difficulty boarding, but all
succeeded. Volunteers suggested adding
from its location during the evaluation. another rung to the ladder and/or stiff-
The light was attached with a snap, so ening the ladder, as well as adding more
it could be reattached. Nevertheless, the handholds.
locator light and/or the inadequately
located wiring could be damaged by Canopy
survivors boarding the life raft, a defi- 11
ciency, in our opinion. The canopy on the conventional life raft
was a manually erected stick-built de-
stops to prevent them from separating,
The ReadyRescue life raft featured a sign (photo 9) similar to EAM’s. It used
a simple improvement that substantially
unique reversible boarding aid — part
improved usability. Hoover also did not
boarding ladder, part rigid boarding
include the dual-purpose paddles/canopy
platform (photo 8). The rigid 20.0-inch
supports used in the EAM life rafts.
by 16.0-inch (50.8-centimeter by 40.6-
centimeter) platform was covered with
The Hoover canopy had two entries
— which the company called “ventila-
tion windows” — on opposite sides that
were closed with metal snaps, but did
not seal tightly (photo 12). They could
be rolled up and secured with fabric ties.
9 In a seating position, approximately 24
inches to 29.0 inches (73.7 centimeters)

8 10 12

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

of headroom were available, depending instructions were inside the life raft, on
on whether measurements were taken at the floor, with an arrow pointing to the
the rods or between the rods, with 39.0 exterior location of the pin. Attached to
inches (99.1 centimeters) of headroom the pin with a stainless steel cable was a
in the center of the single-buoyancy-tube red one-inch-wide nylon-webbing pull
life raft. tab six inches long with “PULL” stenciled
in black and a piece of retroreflective tape
On the conventional Type I life raft, 33 affixed to the end.
inches to 38.0 inches (96.5 centimeters)
of headroom were available around the On the canopy-support tube was the
periphery and about 68.0 inches (172.7 14 exterior locator light, attached to
centimeters) in the center. This resulted the top of the canopy. Its lens, facing
in a life raft floor that was sloped steeply sideways with the canopy still pinned
down to the center, making sitting in down, would be excessively bright for
the life raft difficult because volunteers anyone looking directly at it (photo 17);
kept sliding toward the center of the life however, most likely, the pin would be
raft (photo 13). The center rod also was
difficult to erect fully. If left only partly
erected, the floor was “loose” and the
canopy sagged. The end of the center
canopy-support rod cut a hole in the
floor, not a good thing for a life raft
(photo 14, photo 15). When the life raft 15
was capsized, the canopy tore in several
places and some of the rods were bent, developed its first canopy with an inflat-
making re-erection of the canopy more able support tube, a single square-arch
difficult, a deficiency, in our opinion. stay-erect design with the arch bisecting
the rectangular oval life raft. A canopy 17
Attached to the top surface of the Type and its support arch were installed on
I life raft’s canopy was a metallic surface both sides of the reversible life raft. pulled while survivors were in the wa-
reinforced with a backing material, which ter with their eyes below the light, so in
served as a radar reflector, albeit one that During inflation, the canopy-support most circumstances, it would be less of
might be lost in high winds because it was tube inflated, but the canopy did not an issue. In rough weather conditions,
secured only on the corners. erect. The inflated support tube and the it could become more of a factor as the
attached canopy were secured to the up- life raft moved.
A fabric water-collection tube was fitted per buoyancy tube by a tab secured with
to the canopy; no retroreflective tape was a pinned loop. Instructions — “PULL Thread secured the pin to prevent inad-
fitted to the canopy. PIN TO RELEASE CANOPY”— were vertent release of the canopy. Pulling the
stenciled on the buoyancy tube below pin released the canopy-support tube,
For the ReadyRescue life raft, Hoover the pin at the boarding location, cen- which immediately erected the canopy.
went back to the drawing board and tered on the entry (photo 16). The same This worked satisfactorily on one side
of the reversible life raft. On the oppo-
site side, when the pin was pulled, the
thread did not break; rather than pull-
ing the pin, the entire pinned loop was
pulled off the canopy from where it was
sewn on, resulting in a small tear in the
canopy (photo 18, page 302). The tear
occurred in a section where no adverse
effect was created, either structurally or
functionally. Hoover later said that it
had reinforced this attachment point to
13 16 prevent a similar failure.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

to the upper portion of the canopy that off as the zipper was closed. When the
was only marginally effective because of zipper was closed, the zipper tended to
the steep slope; the tube could be closed part behind the zipper truck (photo
only by tying a knot in it. 22). Hoover said that it had upgraded
the zipper from the size no. 5 YKK zip-
If the life raft were capsized and the can- per that failed on the prototype to the
opy zipper were open, the arch would lay industry-standard heavy duty no. 10
over in the same manner as when the life YKK zipper for production life rafts.
raft was originally deployed. If the zip- The company also said that the canopy
per were closed, the canopy would not lay was given adequate slack in the fabric to
18 over but would remain as erected. After prevent this from occurring again.
a capsizing, the canopy on the opposite
The ReadyRescue life raft canopy was — upright — side could be released, and
constructed of the same lightweight rip- the survivors would be able to reboard a
stop-nylon fabric as the conventional life raft with a canopy (photo 20).
canopies. On the side where the canopy
release was located, the flap closure was
rolled up and tied. One-inch-wide Velcro
was used to close the flap along both sides
and at the buoyancy tube. The narrow
Velcro and tight canopy fabric made seal-
ing the flap difficult, and the fabric was
22
torn on the lower corners of the canopy
opening and the flap (photo 19).
The canopies were fitted with retro-
20 reflective tape in an approximation of
The other side of the canopy was equipped
the U.K. CAA standard pattern, with a
with a zipper that extended nearly from
Large tears in the canopy fabric appeared cross of tape over the top centered on a
one canopy support tube to the other. This
on one side and were believed to have segmented circle (photo 23), a good lo-
left a short piece of fabric attached to the
occurred during the capsizing evalua- cation for this conspicuity aid. However,
upper buoyancy tube, and the remainder
tion (photo 21). Hoover said that it had there was little retroreflective tape visible
was attached to the canopy-support tube.
reinforced these areas to prevent tears in from either end of the life raft, nor was
No means was provided to restrain either
production life rafts. much of this retroreflective tape visible
flap; so upon canopy inflation, the upper
when the canopy was down.
flap hung in the middle of the life raft.
There was a water-collection tube fitted

23
21
Rain Simulation
The canopy zipper on the undamaged
side failed during the evaluation. The The rain simulation results for the con-
canopy was stretched so tightly that ventional Hoover life rafts mirrored the
closing the zipper was very difficult, results of EAM’s Classic life rafts.
a deficiency, in our opinion. During
examination after the in-water evalu- The ReadyRescue life raft’s Velcro-
19
ation, the cloth pull on the zipper tore secured flap-entry closure failed; it was

302 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Stability

Four water-ballast bags (“water ballast

pockets,” Hoover calls them) were sus-
pended from the bottom of the periphery
of the conventional Type II single-buoy-
ancy-tube life rafts (photo 25). The
water-ballast bags were constructed
from canopy fabric and were cylindrical
in shape; each held approximately 52.7
24 pounds (23.9 kilograms) of fresh water. 26
The conventional reversible Type I life
insufficiently secure to withstand the raft had three of the same size ballast (33-centimeter-long) cone-shape con-
spray (photo 24). The long zipper on the bags on each of its two upright sides. struction of canopy fabric with a 12-inch
other side, with no storm flap or protec- A small weight in the bottom of each wire-reinforced opening (photo 27). The
tion, “leaked like a sieve,” one volunteer ballast bag caused the bag to drop down 5/32-inch (0.4-centimeter) white-nylon
reported. Overall, Hoover’s canopies for immediate filling. flat-braid line was 14.0 feet (4.3 meters)
were deficient, in our opinion. Hoover long with a 10.0-inch (25.4-centimeter)
instituted improvements to the life raft bridle secured to brass grommets, con-
after receiving the damaged prototype siderably shorter than the TSO-C70a
from the evaluation. (paragraph 5.3) requirement of 25 feet.
No swivel was fitted, a deficiency, in our
Lifelines and Grasp Lines opinion.

The conventional Type II life raft had its

lifeline strung along the midpoint of the
exterior side of the buoyancy tube.

The Type I life raft had a more substan- 25

tial one-inch-wide white nylon-webbing
lifeline strung along one of the tubes ap- Water-ballast bags made the conventional
proximately midway between the center- Type II life raft only slightly more difficult
point of the upper buoyancy tube and the to capsize than its EAM counterpart. On
joint between the two tubes. The lifeline the conventional reversible Type I life raft
did not extend to the entry, stopping with a higher center of gravity, the water 27
short in the adjoining segment. ballast was ineffective, a deficiency, in
our opinion.
The lifeline on the ReadyRescue life raft On the ReadyRescue life raft, the sea
was attached only on the three end sec- The ReadyRescue life raft had four large anchor was attached to the life raft off-
tions and did not extend along the sides, water-ballast bags on each side, constructed center on one end. Given the boat-shaped
leaving a large gap. On the end where of canopy fabric and attached to the cano- life raft’s dependence upon an effective
the inflation cylinder was located, the py where the canopy joined the buoyancy sea anchor, this was a deficiency, in our
lifeline was stretched tightly over the tube (photo 26). These hung at the outer opinion.
cylinder and was difficult to grasp. The perimeter of the life raft. They were irregu-
lifeline was attached to one buoyancy larly shaped, and determining their capac- Floor
tube near the joint and had little slack, ity was difficult: Each held approximately
so it could be difficult to reach for some 175.5 pounds (79.6 kilograms) of fresh No insulated floor was available. The con-
survivors in the water. The lifelines also water. They were heavily weighted and ventional reversible Type I life raft with
were obscured underneath the water-bal- required only 42 seconds to drop down the floor between the two tubes offered
last bags that were attached to and draped and fill after the life raft inflated. some insulation protection in calm seas
over the canopy, so survivors in the water and with less than a full-capacity load,
might grab onto that fabric, rather than The sea anchor was the same on all but not at full capacity or overload capac-
the lifelines. the Hoover life rafts: a 13-inch-long ity or in rough weather conditions.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 303
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Raft Equipment

Pump

A conventional bellows manual inflation

pump was used; it was similar in design
to all the others but provided the highest
capacity of any we evaluated.

Hoover was the only remaining manu-

facturer of TSO-approved life rafts to 29 30
continue to use a threaded connector
(photo 28) and a manually operated ro- about over-tightening the valve upon at the seams (photo 31). The bailer had
tary topping valve with no check valve, closure. A natural tendency to tighten no handle, so it was difficult to use, a
instead of a bayonet connector with an the valve more than necessary could lead deficiency, in our opinion.
integral check valve. to over-tightening the manual topping
valve. On several occasions, volunteers
tightened the valve so firmly that it
could not be opened again using finger
strength alone.

Thus, with this valve design, a tool, such

as pliers, should be included with the life
raft. Pliers have been included in the past
by other manufacturers that used this
type of valve. Hoover, however, did not
include pliers or any other suitable tool to 31
28 open/close the valve. If the valve could not
be opened, the pump would be unusable. The bailer was tethered to the life raft; a
To operate the manual inflation pump, This was a deficiency, in our opinion. large placard was stenciled on the buoy-
the user would screw the pump into the ancy tube with a brief list of what was
On the ReadyRescue life raft, several
threaded valve and open the plated-metal attached and with an arrow indicating
problems were experienced with the
valve by rotating it clockwise. When the exterior location of the “SURVIVAL
manual inflation pump. The pump was
pumping was completed, the valve would EQUIPMENT.” The placard was ob-
attached via a tether to the exterior of the
be turned counterclockwise to close the scured by seated volunteers (photo 32),
life raft and was stored inside the bailer.
valve and the pump would be removed. and they did not locate the equipment
The tether was too short to allow the
“OPEN” and “CLOSED” text and arrows until they were coached about where to
pump to reach three of the four manual
at the valve indicated clearly the required look for it. The manual inflation pump
topping valves. (Hoover later said that it
movement of the valve. Instructions sten- and the immediate-action instructions
had lengthened the tether.) Volunteers
ciled on the floor of the life raft showed were stored inside the bailer (photo 33,
also were unable to attach the pump to
users the proper procedure and order page 305).
the topping valve on the lower buoyancy
of action, and included the instruction,
tube. The valve was inset into the floor,
“OPEN VALVE ONE TURN.”
and there was insufficient room for the
These instructions were not always pump (photo 30). (Hoover said that it
immediately adjacent to the manual had included a six-inch hose extension
topping valve(s) and could be obscured for the pump and that the extension was
from view under the bottoms and feet tethered to the pump for security.)
of survivors. If the valve was opened
too far, as it was when some volunteers Bailer and Sponge
overlooked the instructions (photo
29), the valve jammed open and was The eight-quart bailer was constructed of
32
difficult to close. There was no caution sewn buoyancy-tube fabric, which leaked

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

of 75 feet for Type I life rafts, a deficiency,

in our opinion.

Raft Knife

The tethered raft knife was stored inside

a sheath of yellow buoyancy-tube fabric
with a snap closure (photo 35). “KNIFE”
was stenciled indistinctly in black on the
sheath, but the sheath was not very notice-
33 able, being the same color as the life raft. 36

The bailer’s tether was too short, and it On previously evaluated traditional
would have had to be untied or cut to Hoover life rafts, the sharp molding nibs
allow the bailer to be used, a deficiency, in the life raft knife’s finger hole had been
in our opinion. Without a secured tether, removed, but the ReadyRescue life raft’s
the bailer could be lost overboard. knife had many nibs in place and was
uncomfortable.
Heaving Line
Lighting
On the conventional Type II life rafts,
the 50.5-foot (15.4-meter) 3/16-inch In our opinion, the exterior locator light
braided-polyethylene (which floats) on the ReadyRescue life raft did not ap-
heaving line and traditional round- pear to meet the requirement of TSO-
rubber quoit were secured inside the life C70a (paragraph 4.12), because when the
raft and attached to the floor in a small canopy was pinned down to the buoyancy
pouch, which would not be readily iden- tube upon inflation of the life raft, the
tifiable by survivors in the life raft. locator light was not “visible from any
direction by persons in the water” (photo
On the conventional Type I and 37). After the canopy was erected, the
35
ReadyRescue life rafts, the 42.3-foot light still did not meet this requirement
(12.9-meter) heaving line and quoit because it was blocked by the canopy. The
were attached to the exterior lifeline with On the conventional Type I and light was not visible to volunteers in the
a fabric flap folded over the lifeline and ReadyRescue life rafts, the raft knife was water when they were located on the side
secured with two snaps, and tethered to in the sheath on the top of one buoyancy of the life raft opposite the light.
the life raft at the same point as the bailer tube next to the mooring/inflation line
and the SEP (photo 34). The “HEAVING attachment. Because the sheath was at- In a lightly loaded life raft in calm con-
LINE” was listed in smaller text under the tached only at the closed end, it could be ditions, the water-activated battery for
larger “SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT” plac- “bent” upward for access and raft knife the locator light might not function. The
ard. The heaving line failed to meet the removal. A small placard was stenciled battery, located on the midpoint of the
TSO-C70a requirement (paragraph 5.4) with “MOORING LINE KNIFE” and an exterior side of the lower buoyancy tube
arrow on the interior of the upper buoy-
ancy tube. The text was small, indistinct
and easily overlooked (photo 36). This
was a deficiency, in our opinion, because
survivors might have an urgent require-
ment to sever the line attaching the life
raft to a sinking aircraft.

Given the low cost, weight and volume of

a raft knife, there seems little reason not to
attach a raft knife on both upright sides of
34 37
the life raft, with appropriate placards.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

(there were two lights in mirrored instal- ELT was discovered during the capsizing survival equipment. These were deficien-
lations, one for each side of the revers- evaluation. Trapped under the life raft in a cies, in our opinion.
ible life raft), might be above the water survival situation, an ELT would have been
(photo 38), a deficiency, in our opinion. useless. No placards to identify the ELT’s Survival Equipment
The life raft had no interior light, which location, coupled with an unsatisfactory
was a deficiency, in our opinion. attachment/inflation, combined to make Repair
this a deficiency, in our opinion.
A single three-inch mil-spec repair
Survival Equipment Packs clamp was included. No PRV plugs were
included. These were deficiencies, in our
The SEPs on the conventional Type II life opinion.
rafts were tethered in a similar manner as
the EAM SEPs, with the same deficiencies,
Utility Knife
in our opinion.

On the Type I life rafts, including the The Type II life rafts, including the
ReadyRescue life raft, the SEP was at- ReadyRescue life raft, had a Part 135 SEP,
tached to the life raft (as noted earlier) including a high-quality utility knife: a
and was contained in a heavy plastic bag standard U.S. military-issue stainless
(photo 39), which had been tied closed steel pocketknife with can opener, bottle
with a knotted line; the bag’s presence was opener, screwdriver, awl and a non-lock-
not obvious. The knotted line was diffi- ing 2.5-inch (6.4-centimeter) spear-point
38 knife blade.
cult to untie, and untying the bag would
have been much more difficult with cold,
wet, numbed hands. Moreover, water had No utility knife was included in SEPs of
ELT
leaked into the bag and had soaked the the conventional Type I life rafts, a defi-
equipment. ciency, in our opinion.
“Dummy” ELTs provided by life raft
manufacturers usually were delivered
in a normal ELT case with an antenna A tether loop was in the center of the Flashlight
— with no electronic components — but life raft floor with a placard stenciled:
weighted correctly. The ReadyRescue life A single water-resistant aluminum
raft was equipped with a dummy 121.5- flashlight with two AA-cell batteries and
MHz ELT, which initially confused every- a krypton bulb was included.
one, because it was a long, heavy piece
of white-capped plastic pipe tethered to Signaling Devices
the life raft. Finally, it was recognized as a
dummy for the type of survival-type ELT A Pains Wessex Mark 14 Day/Night hand
used only on transport category aircraft, flare was included; it resembled a tradi-
an ACR Electronics ELT-201. This ELT tional Mark 13 flare, with a plastic body,
was oversized and overweight, and not screw-on caps and better ergonomics.
appropriate, in our opinion. 39 Nevertheless, it was just as ineffective
because it only provided 18 seconds of
The ACR ELT was normally activated smoke for day use and 20 seconds of flare
upon immersion and floated with the top “KEEP ACCESSORIES TIED TO RAFT for night use. There were also a mil-spec
of the ELT and its whip antenna above the TO AVOID LOSS IN CASE OF CAPSIZ- sea dye marker packet and a mil-spec
water. When the ReadyRescue life raft was ING.” To do so, the tether would have had survival whistle with a lanyard.
deployed in the evaluation, the dummy ELT to be cut and then relocated to the tether
was trapped by its tether under the life raft. loop; the bag would have had to be retied The conventional Type I life raft did
The thin polypropylene line, attaching the after every access. This unwieldy process, not include a signal mirror, a deficiency,
ELT to the life raft at the same attach- which would tend to increase the likeli- in our opinion. The conventional Type
ment point as other survival equipment, hood that it would not be adhered to, II life rafts had a two-inch by three-
was not noticed when the SEP and other would put the survival equipment at risk inch Survival polycarbonate mil-spec
equipment were retrieved. The dummy for loss. There was no other storage for mirror.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The ReadyRescue life raft included a and a pair of lures. This was a deficiency, because it must be retrieved from the
2.5-inch square-acrylic signal mirror in our opinion. bailer) and was printed on waterproof
with a rudimentary aiming aid. Four material with bold, easy-to-read black
V-grooved lines milled into the back First Aid text on a white background. A rea-
(removing reflective material) met at sonable list was included of immedi-
the 5/16-inch (0.8-centimeter) center A satisfactory assortment of packaged ate-action items and general life raft
hole and created an aiming spot on the first aid supplies and a bandage scissors maintenance information, as well as
edge of the center hole. It had a very in two lightweight zipper-lock bags were some basic-water survival instructions
limited effective angle of incidence to provided. The bags were not waterproof; and signaling instructions.
the sun and proved not to be as accurate the supplies were soaked when they were
as conventional aiming aids. A remov- unpacked. Service
able paper cover protected the face of
the mirror until the mirror was used Water Hoover life rafts required annual service.
(photo 40,). All the signal mirrors were
equipped with an 18-inch tether. A combination of water packets — a
good feature — and a chemical desalting
kit were provided for drinking water. No
separate water container was provided, a
deficiency, in our opinion. A Survivor-06
hand-operated water maker is offered as
an option.

Food

Hoover provided S.O.S. Food Lab sur- In 1992, RFD Co. (now RFD Beaufort) of
vival rations. Dunmurry, Northern Ireland, and Revere
40 Supply Co. of West Caldwell, New Jersey,
U.S., entered a joint marketing agreement
Miscellaneous to manufacture and distribute RFD/Re-
Paddles vere life rafts in the marine and aviation
Seventy-five feet of 1/2-inch wide
markets. RFD Co. was founded by Regi-
Mil-spec blue plywood paddles were pro- nylon tape and a space blanket were
nald Foster Dagnall in 1920 and claims to
vided with retroreflective tape on one side included.
have invented the first inflatable life raft
and with wrist lanyards. in 1932. Revere Supply Co., founded in
Survival Manual/Life Raft 1936, initially distributed flotation equip-
Fishing Kit Manual ment and signaling devices manufactured
by its subsidiaries, and distributed life
The Hoover fishing kit (photo 41) in- The conventional life rafts included the rafts manufactured by other companies.
cluded only some line wrapped around U.S. Air Force Aircrew Survival Manual In 1967, Revere established its own life
a piece of cardboard, which disintegrated which, though abbreviated compared raft manufacturing facility.
when wet (and it was wet), a pair of leaders with the more comprehensive version,
was water resistant and was designed for RFD/Revere offered two lines of TSO-
use in a wet environment. Neither version approved life rafts. For the 1996 evalu-
had specific information on life raft care ation, the company provided a seven-
and use. Some water-survival information person version of its R (reversible) Series
was included, but it was spread through- life raft, designed for offshore helicop-
out the manual. In the ReadyRescue life ter use in the North Sea oil fields (and
raft SEP, we received the more comprehen- known as the Heliraft in other markets)
sive version, which was not waterproof, and also marketed for use by U.S. cor-
a deficiency, in our opinion. porate aircraft operators.7 The company
also produced a more conventional non-
An LRM was packed inside the bailer (not reversible life raft, the Aerolite Series,
41
immediately available upon boarding which was promoted for corporate

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

aviation use but not provided for the nylon webbing, folded and sewn to create
evaluation. The company did not pro- a one-inch grab handle that was easy to
vide life rafts for evaluations in 2000 grasp. The webbing wrapped completely
and 2002. under the valise from one side to the
other. The handles did not stay in place
RFD/Revere life rafts were constructed of on top, but flopped at the sides, making
single-coated polyurethane over single- it difficult to grab one with a single hand.
ply nylon fabric with the coated side on Having grabbed one handle, it was im-
the exterior of air-holding chambers. possible to also grab the other with the
The R Series life rafts were octagonal same hand. If placed on top to be within 2
and available in seven-person, 10-person, reach, it immediately flopped back down
12-person and 14-person rated capaci- to the side. Volunteers found the floppy opinion. Hanging from the yellow flap
ties. The hexagonal Aerolite life rafts were handles annoying because two hands on the seam side of the flap was the
available in four-person, six-person and were required to grasp the life raft. This mooring/inflation line with a heavy
11-person rated capacities. could slow inflation because there was clip. This clip was not secured to prevent
no way to just grab and lift the life raft inadvertent snagging, which could result
Valise with one hand. This was a deficiency, in in an accidental inflation, a deficiency,
our opinion. A break-away tie or Velcro in our opinion.
When the R Series life raft was evaluated, would be useful to hold the loose handles
the company said that it had 167 differ- together and to make them easier to grasp Under the orange flap, labeled “SHORT
ent custom valise configurations. The as a single handle. MOORING LINE,” was a steel ring at-
life raft that was evaluated apparently tached to the immediate-inflation line.
had a standard generic valise, similar At each end of the valise was a paral- Anyone who pulled this line might be
to the one shown in a promotional and lel pair of small grab handles, one on surprised to discover that it was the
training video provided by RFD/Revere. either side of the seam, constructed of immediate-inflation line. The volun-
The round, duffel-shaped valise of one-inch-wide nylon webbing. This was teers did not readily locate the inflation
heavyweight polyurethane-coated yel- satisfactory to pull or carry the life raft instructions or the mooring/inflation
low fabric was laced across the top and from the end(s), if necessary. line, deficiencies, in our opinion.
down both ends. The lacing was very
thin, almost thread-like in appearance, Information was stenciled in black on
the valise fabric and was worn and not Mooring/Inflation Line
but very strong; the volunteers were un-
able to pull it apart. No Velcro was used particularly dark on the well-traveled
demonstration sample. All the informa- A small steel ring was used as a hand grip
for closure.
tion on the top/sides of the valise was for immediate inflation. This ring was too
manufacturer’s data with the exception small to easily grip. A survivor would have
A pair of long handles was attached to
of the word “PULL” near one end, with to hold onto the ring to keep the life raft
the sides of the valise (photo 1); the
an arrow pointing to the end of the valise. near the ditched aircraft (for a dry board-
handles could be grabbed at the top, or
This information was not readily recog- ing, for example): this would require
one handle each could be used by two
nizable, a deficiency, in our opinion. considerable strength, and a couple of
people to carry the life raft between them.
fingers worth of grip might be insuffi-
The handles were white two-inch-wide
On one end of the valise, two flaps were cient, a deficiency, in our opinion.
located on either side of the seam at the
bottom (with the main seam topmost), The mooring/inflation line was equipped
one orange with black trim, the other with a robust heavy-duty spring clip
yellow with gray trim, each secured (photo 3, page 309). The spring clip was
with button snaps. Instructions were so stiff that some volunteers were unable
stenciled on the flaps in black and were to use it easily; it was difficult for most
not easily read because of the small size of them to clip it back onto the mooring/
and indistinct stenciling (photo 2). In inflation line. Sturdy fittings are benefits
addition, because of the slightly bulbous generally, but when an average person
shape of the end of the valise, neither cannot easily operate a spring clip, it is
flap could be read without standing too sturdy. This clip was a deficiency, in
1
the valise on end, a deficiency, in our our opinion.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

little contrast, so the white grab handle reports from other venues indicated that
was not recognized readily. Two other this same boarding ramp on the higher-
grab handles were fitted, one at the freeboard Aerolite Series life rafts would
hinge point and one on the top of the be more difficult for some survivors to
upper buoyancy tube. use successfully.

The seven-person R Series life raft was

equipped with a white one-inch-wide
nylon-webbing three-rung boarding
3
ladder at the alternate entry (photo 6).
A single grab handle was provided at
Inflation the top of the ladder where it attached
to the top of the upper buoyancy tube.
The life raft deployed in 22 seconds. This boarding aid’s performance was
deficient, in our opinion. Larger ver-
4 sions of this life raft had dual boarding
Righting
ramps, one attached to either tube. This
would appear to provide a satisfactory
No righting aids were included with the In general, weak or injured survivors
alternate entry, though the steeper in-
R Series life raft because it was a revers- probably could pull themselves onto
cline might make it more difficult to
ible life raft. Nevertheless, in a videotape the ramp and into the life raft (photo
use compared with the primary entry,
supplied with the life raft, the possibility 5). For a heavy survivor, however, the
in our opinion.
was discussed of the life raft capsizing ramp’s buoyancy could be difficult to
and being righted by a conventional overcome, leaving the survivor with
method. This could be accomplished if little or no leverage against which to
it overturned with the erected canopy, push, making boarding very difficult.
while survivors were inside the life raft. Moreover, volunteers of average weight
The videotape demonstrated a “survivor” and height who tried to kneel or stand on
using the inside grasp line as a righting the bottom half of the ramp found that
aid. This method of righting the life raft the ramp collapsed under them. Boarding
was not attempted by the volunteers, became easier as volunteers followed oth-
but this method could be successful. ers who had already boarded the life raft,
Considering the lack of effectiveness of thus lowering the freeboard and creating
the life raft’s vacuum ballast, capsizing is a lower ramp angle. 6
a possibility.

Canopy
Boarding Aids
The canopy was spacious and weather-
The Aerolite Series life rafts and R Se- proof (photo 7). Although it was an auto-
ries life rafts were fitted with a semi- inflating stay-erect design, it did not erect
rigid inflatable boarding ramp (photo automatically. RFD/Revere said that this
4). This entry comprised a splayed
U-shaped inflated tube that protruded
from the life raft. The base of the U
5
was hinged with heavy rubber at the
attachment point. Between the splayed
side tubes was white open-mesh nylon Although it was a two-buoyancy-tube
netting that provided a slip-resistant Type I design, with the floor placed
surface. A one-inch-wide white nylon- between the tubes there was much less
tape grab handle was attached in the initial buoyancy than with a conventional
center of the mesh platform about non-reversible life raft, resulting in the
two-thirds up the ramp. The white grab reversible life raft floating lower in the
7
handle on the white mesh resulted in water when it was loaded. Experience and

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

would allow survivors an unobstructed drawings and text on a very readable interior side of the buoyancy tube for each
360-degree view to search for other black-on-white placard, they were in- canopy arch; the volunteers overlooked
survivors in the water and would allow sufficient, a deficiency, in our opinion. the placards. The tabs were secured with
entry into the life raft from anywhere on Only half of the volunteers understood Velcro to the buoyancy tube. When pulled,
its periphery. the instructions and successfully erected the tabs ripped open the top seam on the
the canopy. In addition, being on the in- canopy cover. There was a seam on both
When the two parallel six-inch-diameter terior side of the upper buoyancy tube, “top” and “bottom”; thus, a seam would
canopy-support arches were inflated, the instructions could be obscured by be accessible regardless of which side of
each laid down horizontally around the survivors, who might overlook them, the reversible life raft was used. On this
outside of the main buoyancy tube. They particularly in darkness or in adverse life raft, one of each canopy cover’s two
were held in place by a sewn and Velcro- weather conditions. seams was stitched (photo 10); the other
secured cover and served as a bumper was restrained with Velcro.
protecting the main buoyancy tubes. The first group of volunteers was unaware
The cover had a layer of black fabric on that a canopy was on the life raft and made
the outermost part for increased abrasion no attempt to find it and erect it, although
protection and puncture protection. canopies were on all the other life rafts,
some of which required manual erection.
RFD/Revere said that these two canopy- These volunteers had to be told to read the
support arches were intended to be two instructions (photo 8) so that they could
of the four buoyancy chambers required erect the canopy. When all who might
by the Helicopter Liferaft Amendment have to use the life raft have been trained
to U.K. CAA Specification No. 2, para- to accomplish the task, this would not be
graph 2.2: “The life raft shall incorporate a problem. Unfortunately, that is an ideal 10
a minimum of four independent pri- that should not be taken for granted.
mary buoyancy chambers.” As the life
The canopy was yellow polyurethane-
raft was inflated, secured at the sides,
coated fabric that was somewhat trans-
the canopy-support arches served that
lucent. The yellow interior was cause for
purpose, albeit with considerably less
negative comments by some volunteers;
buoyancy than the main buoyancy tubes.
as with all the translucent fabric canopies,
After they were erected, they ceased be-
sun shining through it gave everything and
ing “primary buoyancy chambers.”
everyone an unappealing yellow tinge. The
Nevertheless, considering TSO-C70a
canopy fabric was attached permanently
(paragraph 4.2.1 and paragraph 4.2.2),
to the arches and to the exterior of the life
this was not an issue because only
8 raft from the point outward of the canopy-
two primary buoyancy chambers are
arch attachment points (photo 11). The
required. Each arch was fitted with a
canopy arches were attached to opposite
manual topping valve. To erect the canopy, a survivor would sides of the life raft, leaving two opposing
have to release the protective cover over segments clear for entry.
If the canopy-support tube were dam- each canopy arch by pulling on a fabric
aged while acting as a bumper, despite tab placarded “PULL FOR CANOPY RE-
the protective cover, the canopy could LEASE” (photo 9) The placard was on the
not be erected until the tube was re-
paired and reinflated. This might be
preferable to having a main buoyancy
tube damaged, but the reason for having
two independent buoyancy tubes is to
provide redundancy. Delay in erecting
the canopy support could have serious
consequences for survivors.
11
The procedure for erecting the canopy
was not obvious or intuitive. Moreover, Volunteers could not assess the difficulty
9
although the instructions included both of ripping open the sewn seam because

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

we were requested not to do so by RFD/ the canopy supports using the strap; the few inches deploying from the other side.
Revere. Ripping open the Velcro-secured working leverage was initially not very Once connected, there was about a six-
side required some effort but was not be- effective because the canopy supports inch to eight-inch gap between the two
yond the capability of most people. Vol- were being pulled sideways, not up at an pieces of the canopy top.
unteers wondered aloud how difficult it angle. Lifting up at least one arch several
would be to pull the tab with cold, wet, inches by hand made pulling the strap Two flaps of canopy fabric (photo 15),
numbed hands, because the grip area was much easier (photo 14). Once semi-erect, one inside and one outside, completed
not large or easy to grasp; a loop, instead another 11 quick-connect buckles had to the seal to make the canopy weathertight.
of a plain tab, might have been easier to be connected to fully erect and secure the The inside flap was tucked up between
grab. The Velcro pull strip consisted of canopy. The final buckles required sig- the canopy tube and the canopy top
two pieces of hook Velcro sewn back-to- nificant strength to connect. with Velcro, but it provided a weather-
back to create a double-sided hook strip tight seal even without the Velcro. The
with the canopy cover and the buoyancy outside flap normally would have been
tube having the loop Velcro. RFD/Revere sealed first, but it would have been more
said that it planned to replace the sewn difficult to reach. Volunteers did not even
side with Velcro. notice it; hence, our confirmation that the
single flap provided a weathertight seal.
Having uncovered the canopy (photo The flap went over the canopy and con-
12), volunteers next had to pull one nected to the canopy-support tube with
two-inch wide nylon-webbing strap Velcro. When both flaps were sealed, the
from one canopy arch to the other and canopy was weathertight and sturdy,
attach it with a plastic quick-connect 14 with 32.0 inches (81.3 centimeters) of
buckle (photo 13). Pulling the loose end headroom at the center of the life raft
of the strap was supposed to raise the and 22.0 inches (55.9 centimeters) at
canopy. Volunteers discovered that rais- The volunteers questioned whether a lone the entries and sides.
ing the canopy-support arch by hand was and injured survivor with a single usable
easier than pulling on the strap to raise hand could erect the canopy and seal it The process of erecting the canopy
it. This expedient solution would not be from the weather, and they believed that proved to be confusing, even when in-
possible for a survivor working alone. even some uninjured survivors without structions and hints were provided to
Volunteers had to pull very hard to raise sufficient upper-body strength and grip the volunteers. Admittedly, erecting this
strength would have difficulty erecting canopy was not nearly as confusing as the
the canopy. Quick exit after capsizing manually erected canopies on the EAM
also could be hampered by the canopy Classic life rafts and on the Hoover con-
design. Survivors could right the life ventional life rafts, but the process was
raft by crawling “up” the interior of the not easy either.
canopy until their weight caused the life
raft to right. That action would require
prior training or considerable presence of
mind, because no such instructions were
provided on the life raft, a deficiency, in
12 our opinion.

The buckles were attached to the canopy

fabric, not to the canopy-support tubes.
The tubes were erected to their final po-
sition by pulling together the canopy to 15
a point where the tubes were at an angle
of about 50 degrees from horizontal, and
then the canopy was stretched between For providing ventilation, the canopy
them; this also held the canopy-support was not as versatile as others (photo 16,
arch tubes upright. The connecting point page 312). Although the canopy could
was off center, with the bulk of the canopy provide nearly full shade, not consider-
13
top deploying from one side and only a ing the translucence of the canopy fabric,

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

the top of the buoyancy tube rather than over the canopy-support tubes. After the
just lowering the canopy support, which canopy-support tubes were raised, there
would tend to immerse the canopy in was no lifeline, a deficiency, in our opin-
the water. Nevertheless, no means to ion. This could be a problem because the
keep the canopy in place was provided, canopy might not be raisable until almost
so the survivor would have to improvise. all survivors were in the life raft, because
This problem was not discussed in any they would lose any place to easily hold
instructions, but it should have been onto the life raft while in the water. It also
noted in the LRM. could be a problem in an overcrowded life
16 raft when it might be desirable or neces-
Rain Simulation sary for some survivors to remain in the
very little ventilation would be provided water, where they would have nothing
by the small gap in the canopy top. The A single small reversible water-collection to grab.
gap could be widened by releasing some tube was installed off center in the flat
of the lower buckles, but this provided top of the canopy. It had a reversible rub- The interior grasp line was attached
only minimal ventilation because there ber plug and worked very well, although to the floor — not to a buoyancy tube
was only one cloth tie at each entry to minor water leaks occurred on the seam — in an octagon approximately midway
tie back the flap; this provided only mar- where it was sewn to the canopy (the only between the tube and the center (photo
ginally increased ventilation. Additional leaks in the otherwise weathertight cano- 19). Volunteers evaluated all lines and at-
ventilation, not normally a concern in py). A large cross of retroreflective tape tachment points on all the life rafts as best
the North Sea, would be most welcome was affixed to the flat top of the canopy they could, by pulling hard against them,
in more moderate conditions or tropical (photo 18); retroreflective strips also were first with arm strength, then using their
conditions. An improvement would be to located on the perimeter of the life raft’s legs where appropriate. The R Series life
provide a means to retain the interior flap buoyancy tubes, providing satisfactory all- raft was the only other life raft that expe-
and exterior flap so they would remain around retroreflective performance. rienced a failure, aside from the sea anchor
out of the flow of air when ventilation failure on the Goodrich life raft. The grasp
was desired. The interior flap, especially, line was ripped from its attachment point
was annoying because it hung down using only a single arm’s strength, obvi-
when the entry was open and impeded ously less than the TSO-C70a (paragraph
what little ventilation was provided by 4.9) requirement for 500 pounds (227
leaving the narrow gap open. kilograms) minimum strength. This was
a deficiency, in our opinion. (This was a
If the canopy were put down after erec- demonstration life raft and no doubt had
tion (photo 17), it would fill with water been subjected to abuse prior to the evalu-
and would be very difficult to erect ation, which may have contributed to the
again — especially by a lone and injured failure.) The thin nylon webbing also was
survivor — and would be almost impos- not as comfortable to hold as wider or
sible to erect again without soaking the more substantial webbing.
interior of the life raft. Nevertheless, the
problem could be avoided by ensuring
that the canopy fabric was gathered on

18

Lifelines and Grasp Lines 19

The life raft was equipped with white The floor-mounted interior grasp line was
one-inch nylon tape for the lifeline, at- more comfortable to hold onto, compared
17
tached tautly to the center of the covering with buoyancy-tube-mounted grasp lines.

312 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

A survivor could brace against the buoy- valve on the boarding-ramp buoyancy
ancy tube and reach down to hold the tube came untied from its tether, which
floor-mounted grasp line in a natural po- was a concern. These caps seemed ad-
sition. If a life raft were crowded, survivors equate to retain pressure.
would have to reach behind themselves
to hold a buoyancy-tube-mounted grasp The RFD/Revere manual inflation pump
line, an awkward and tiring position. In an (photo 23) was equipped with a large-
uncrowded life raft, the buoyancy-tube- diameter — approximately one-inch
mounted line would have the advantage outside diameter — flexible rubber
because survivors could pull themselves 20 hose, approximately 36 inches long, with
against the buoyancy tube to maintain a a plastic male friction fitting on the end.
position in rough sea conditions. It also This fitting was inserted into the valve;
would be possible to tie oneself or another it had to be inserted tightly or it would
survivor to the buoyancy-tube-mounted work loose. Inserting the fitting did not
grasp line to assist in remaining in place. open the check valve; airflow under
pressure of the manual inflation pump
Stability opened the check valve.

The life raft did not have traditional

water-ballast bags but depended upon
“vacuum” for stability. The concept is 21
that the lower buoyancy tube and the
raised floor create an air space, which at full capacity. In rough weather condi-
develops a vacuum when any attempt is tions, when insulation is most necessary,
made to lift the buoyancy tube from the this life raft would be unsatisfactory for
surface. When the life raft is well loaded, protection against hypothermia. This
the concept is reasonably effective; the life raft originally was designed for, and
weight of the survivors helps keep the is more appropriate for, survivors in cold- 23
lower tube in contact with the water so water immersion suits.
that vacuum can be maintained.
The long hose would allow survivors to
Life Raft Equipment position themselves for best performance
Nevertheless, vacuum might not be sat-
and comfort, and when one survivor be-
isfactory in rough sea conditions or in Pump came tired, the manual inflation pump
a lightly loaded life raft. With only one
could be passed among the other survi-
person aboard, the vacuum was broken The life rafts had plastic topping valves, vors near that particular valve. The long
easily in the wave pool during the evalu- which had a friction-fit opening and a hose was essential for the R Series life
ation; the life raft was easy to capsize and rubber butterfly-flap valve. Each valve rafts because some of the manual topping
offered minimal resistance to capsizing. also was equipped with a friction-fit valves were not inside the life raft.
Even at normal capacity, the life raft was rubber cap (photo 22) that was at-
capsized with relative ease. tached to the valve by a tether of small- The manual inflation pump was of the
diameter nylon cord. The cap for the type that might be used to inflate an air
(This life raft was evaluated before the
mattress or an inflatable boat. The pump
inclusion of sea-anchor evaluations.) The
had a fabric bellows chamber with top
sea anchor (photo 20) was equipped with
and bottom plates and a single-loop
a swivel (photo 21).
handhold/restraint at the top. The pump
collapsed to a flat package, aside from the
Floor long hose attached to it.

Depending upon the load and sea con- There was no way to operate the manual
ditions, the mid-located floor might be inflation pump with one hand. It was
above the surface of the water. Neverthe- even difficult to use the pump with
22
less, this would not be likely in a life raft two hands, because the flexible fabric

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

chamber moved around when under Heaving Line located directly behind the lifeline (photo
pressure. The hose was attached with a 25); we saw lights that were almost not
right-angle fitting that made it difficult The RFD/Revere life raft heaving/trailing visible because they were off-center of
to get a good grip on the bottom of the line was an orange 1/8-inch (0.3-centi- the window.
pump; a good grip was required. This meter) twisted polypropylene line and
pump was deficient, in our opinion. was attached to the traditional round
rubber quoit. The line was stored inside
The inflation valves for the canopy- a lightweight clear plastic sheath. On the
support tubes and inflatable boarding R Series life raft, it was inside the SEP;
ramp were on the exterior of the life raft. until the SEP was retrieved (it might be
Each main buoyancy tube had two infla- in the water over the side), the heaving
tion valves, one for operation from each line would not be available for use. The
side. The inflation valve for the lower heaving line was relatively stiff, not as
buoyancy tube was accessed via a gusset flexible as other heaving lines that were
in the life raft’s floor and was difficult evaluated, and not as easy to recoil for a
25
to work with. In cold weather, it could second throw. It tangled when thrown, a
be more difficult. Volunteers expressed deficiency, in our opinion.
concerns that the remaining inflation This light was covered, partially obscured
valve, with its valve-closure flap, was on Raft Knife at best, and was ineffective because it was
the underside of the life raft and unreach- held down on one side of the life raft until
able, a problem typical of all reversible life For a raft knife, RFD/Revere provided a the canopy was raised, which, depending
rafts with similar topping valves. short wood-handled device with a 1 3/8- on weather, might not occur and gener-
inch (3.5-centimeter) straight blade and a ally would not occur until all survivors
Bailer and Sponge rounded blunt tip. The small handle and were aboard. This installation did not
short blade made this the most difficult to appear to comply with the TSO-C70a
The RFD/Revere bailer was wide (ap- use of all of the raft knives evaluated and (paragraph 4.12) requirement that it be
proximately 12 inches in diameter), but was a deficiency, in our opinion. “visible from any direction by persons in
of shallow (three inches deep), flexible- the water” and was a deficiency, in our
rimmed (wire inside cloth), coated-cloth Lighting opinion.
construction. Four quarts of water was
the most that volunteers could hold The approved exterior locator light The light was powered by a lithium bat-
within the bailer, because the rim sagged (photo 24) for the R Series life raft was tery, which was located on the exterior
under load and the seams leaked. The on the top of one canopy-support arch. of the canopy-support tube and near
volunteers could gather only 4.0 pints Until the canopy was raised, the light was the bottom where the canopy-support
to 5.0 pints (1.9 liters to 2.4 liters) at a on the side of the life raft, underneath tube attached to the upper buoyancy
time by scooping, unless they put down the cover that protected the canopy-sup- tube. This battery could be switched off,
the bailer, collapsed it and picked it up port tube. A small clear plastic “window” conserving power, a great feature, but the
in deep-enough water to substantially was over the light, and the window itself switch was not easy to reach and was not
fill it. The bailer functioned reasonably was bisected by the exterior lifeline. De- readily identifiable.
well, but it was awkward and tiring to use pending on how carefully the life raft was
because the rim had to be gripped tightly packed, the light might or might not be An interior canopy light was not supplied
with both hands. The bailer received the as standard equipment, a deficiency, in
worst marks from the volunteers and was our opinion. RFD/Revere said that it was
a deficiency, in our opinion. The bailer available as an option; this is a desirable
was packed in the SEP, folded up around option, in our opinion.
other supplies and was not available
immediately upon boarding. There was ELT
no tether and no place to attach one, a
deficiency, in our opinion. A 406-MHz ELT and an auto-deploying
Artex 121.5-MHz ELT were optional on
Two 3.25-inch (8.26-centimeter) by 3.25- the Part 135 RFD/Revere life rafts. The
inch by 0.75-inch compressed sponges raft in the evaluation was equipped
24
were included. with the 121.5-MHz ELT, which was

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

attached to the side of the boarding life raft near that point, so retrieving the Signaling Devices
ramp in a foam-padded pocket. This SEP could be confusing. RFD/Revere
allowed the water sensor, a length of used semi-transparent plastic drawstring Included were a Pains Wessex Mark 14
flexible wire with the sensor on the bags to hold the survival equipment. Day/Night hand flare and a Miniflare 3,
end (photo 26), to function, no mat- which included eight red aerial meteor
ter which side of the reversible life raft On the R Series life raft were two bags flares and a pen-style launcher. These
was up. A length of wire connected the (photo 27), one with supplies and equip- were not among the most effective flares.
ELT to the strip antenna that was glued ment, the other with hand paddles, a Although, with the Miniflare, there were
to the adjoining canopy support. This heaving line and a manual inflation enough flares to be of more value.
canopy support was either beside the pump. The ability to see inside the bag,
raft or, when erected, was at about a even if not perfectly, was especially useful RFD/Revere said that its life rafts would
40-degree angle from vertical. The ELT because there was nowhere else on the be equipped with Coast Guard-approved
manufacturer said that with the canopy life raft to store equipment or supplies. metal signal mirrors in the future, but
down, the ELT signal could be received The drawstring top was a bit difficult to they are heavy and difficult to aim, and
by an aircraft overhead or nearby, but use, but better than a tie closure. The bags not among the most effective mirrors on
the manufacturer could not guarantee were not waterproof. the market.
that the signal would be received by the
Cospas–Sarsat International Search and Paddles
Rescue Satellite System.
The R Series life raft had the worst
“paddles” (photo 28) that the volun-
teers encountered. They were really hand
paddles, not conventional paddles with
handles. The wide and thin boards were
covered with coated cloth and measured
approximately 8.5 inches by 14.0 inches
27 (21.6 centimeters by 35.6 centimeters).
Each paddle had a one-inch strap at
the top, and a hand had to be inserted
Survival Equipment under the wide strap covering most of
26
the midsection of the paddle. A survivor
Repair would have to lean over the side of the
The ELT manufacturer said that unless
life raft and immerse a hand and arm
the antenna was near vertical, the com- RFD/Revere included a graduated set of in the water to use a paddle. The pad-
pany would not guarantee that the ELT three tapered life raft plugs for smaller dles were nearly useless and difficult to
would function to specifications or be holes (1.25 inches [3.18 centimeters] di- operate, and would be unusable in
received by the satellites. The further the ameter and less). These were black rubber cold water unless the survivor us-
ELT was from vertical, the greater its loss cones with threads that were screwed into ing them was wearing survival suit
of signal strength. With the canopy up, the hole until they were sufficiently tight to gloves/mitts that protected the hands.
Artex would not guarantee that the ELT seal the opening. The conical repair plugs The paddles were a deficiency, in our
would function 100 percent of the time at functioned reasonably well for small holes, opinion.
the extreme angle. This was a deficiency, but they should be a supplement to mil-
in our opinion. spec repair clamps, not a replacement for
the clamps. They were not as secure as the
Survival Equipment Packs clamps and should not be relied upon as
the only repair equipment on the life raft.
With the R Series life raft, the SEP was Having only one repair clamp was a defi-
placed in the life raft but secured with ciency, in our opinion.
a long tether. If the SEP is not in the life
raft, it must be retrieved from the water. Utility Knife
The location of the SEP was noted with
a large placard, black on white, but there There was no utility knife, a deficiency,
28
are more than a few lines attached to the in our opinion.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Fishing Kit The survival manual was very basic, in a centers. In 2000, Survival Products de-
simple and easy-to-read format on wa- clined to participate, and a four-person
RFD/Revere said that the R Series life terproof paper. It was a flip-style booklet Type I life raft and a six-person Type II
rafts will include Revere’s Coast Guard- with seven pages of sea-survival informa- life raft were purchased by others for the
approved fishing kit, equipped with an tion going one direction and seven pages evaluation. In 2002, the company was in-
assortment of line, hooks leaders, lures, of land survival information going the vited to participate but did not respond
etc. other direction. to e-mails and telephone messages. A six-
person Type II life raft was borrowed for
First Aid Service the 2002 evaluation.

RFD/Revere said that the R Series life The life raft had a one-year service The life rafts were constructed of double-
rafts will be equipped with Revere’s Coast interval. coated neoprene over two-ply bias-cut
Guard-approved first aid kit, a well- nylon fabric. The Type I life raft was
equipped 13-piece kit in a tough plastic INC. available in six-person, eight-person and
UCTS
PROD 10-person rated capacities, and the Type
waterproof zipper-lock container.
II life raft was available in four-person
Water and Food and eight-person rated capacities.

No water-storage bag and no survival ra- Valise

Charles Rogers, president of Survival
tions were included in the demonstration Products, was chief engineer for a
life raft. Absence of packaged ready-to- Florida-based air transport operator The life rafts were packed in a two-piece
drink water and a water-storage bag were when inadequate servicing of its inflat- dark red vinyl-coated nylon valise. One
deficiencies, in our opinion. able products was resolved by starting its half of the package contained the life raft,
own service and repair operation. Rogers and the other half was the SEP. The two
Survival Manual/Life Raft had helped establish the new operation packages were joined with Velcro on all
Manual and when faced with moving when his four sides, resulting in a very secure at-
employer relocated to Europe, he elected tachment that was not likely to separate.
There was no survival manual or to remain in the U.S. and start his fam- A black one-inch-wide nylon-webbing
immediate-action list in the demonstra- ily-owned inflatable life raft service and handle was attached to both the life raft
tion life raft supplied for the evaluation; repair facility in Hollywood, Florida. and the SEP on one side, with a black
the manufacturer later supplied the About 1986, he and his wife, Donna, the plastic cable tie that secured the two valise
manual and the list. company’s vice president of marketing, halves together.
decided to manufacture non-TSO life
An immediate-action list is not “imme- rafts.8 About 1998, the company intro- Volunteers found it particularly difficult
diate” unless it is immediately available duced its line of TSO-approved aviation to locate the inflation line and to read the
upon boarding a life raft. Nevertheless, life rafts based on the unapproved de- instructions. There were no instructions
the second item on this immediate- signs. He had been involved with flight or guidance on either the primary face
action list was to “haul in the emergency attendant training during his career, of the valise or at the top where the carry
pack and emergency bag” in which the list and he had learned that large, bulky and handles were located. On the side, at the
would be found. This was a deficiency, in heavy life rafts were difficult to deploy, corner, printed in small black letters that
our opinion. and that if a life raft couldn’t be deployed, provided low contrast on the dark red
survivors couldn’t use it. So he designed fabric were the words: “TO INFLATE
The immediate-action list was on two his square-shaped life rafts and teepee PULL HANDLE” (photo 1, page 317). In
pages of the LRM. It had bold headings, canopies to be lightweight, compact and minimum lighting, this would have been
but otherwise the text was too small to low-cost — the lightest, most compact even more difficult to find and read. This
read easily under minimal light (no inte- and lowest-cost TSO-approved aviation was a deficiency, in our opinion.
rior light in the life raft). The LRM was a life rafts in this evaluation.
nine-page foldout of water-resistant Mooring/Inflation Line
fabric. Included were illustrations of how Survival Products declined to partici-
to erect the canopy, simply a copy of the pate in the 1993 evaluation and the 1996 A black 3.5-inch (8.9-centimeter) loop of
placard in the life raft, and an illustration evaluation, and its unapproved life rafts 3/4-inch-wide (1.9-centimeter-wide) nylon
of the life raft with parts identified. were obtained from dealers and service webbing, which was the inflation handle,

316 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

depending upon which way it flopped,

rendering the instruction useless. Even
when not covered, a survivor in the
water could have difficulty seeing the
instructions. These are deficiencies, in
our opinion.

1 3

was Velcro-secured to the valise. This hand Boarding Aids

loop did not appear to comply with the
requirements of TSO-C70a (paragraph No foothold was provided to board the
5.2), a deficiency, in our opinion. Type II life raft. The lifeline was attached
above center (photo 4), high on the ex-
2 terior side of the buoyancy tube on both
The mooring/inflation line, black 3/4-
inch-wide nylon webbing, was 20.25 feet sides of the two opposed entries. A grasp
(6.17 meters) long. Although there was no line was stretched across the floor between
The inflation cylinder was attached to the two entries. Volunteers said that these
separate immediate-inflation handle, in-
the bottom of the floor of the Type II lines were of little value as boarding aids.
flation occurred at 3.17 feet (0.97 meter),
life raft. Thus, the righting location was The inflation cylinder’s inflation valve
effectively making the mooring/inflation
not as obvious as when the inflation cyl- poked from underneath the bottom of the
line an immediate-inflation line. If a sur-
inder was located on the exterior side of life raft at the center of an entry point; this
vivor would prefer not to have the life raft
the buoyancy tube; no directions on the was a potential source of injury and a defi-
inflate immediately next to the ditched
single buoyancy tube showed the infla- ciency, in our opinion. Entry was difficult
aircraft — that is, if there were sharp
tion cylinder’s location. A short person for many volunteers, and the life raft easily
edges to avoid — that option would not
in the water might have difficulty reach- was swamped (filled with water so that the
exist with these life rafts. The short length
ing the righting handle from the water top of the life raft was at or near water level
of line until inflation also would preclude
and likely would need to climb onto the with little — if any — freeboard) during
securing the life raft to the aircraft be-
exterior bottom of the capsized life raft; boarding. This was undesirable because,
fore inflation, something recommended
without aids to assist them, survivors in this situation, a large volume of water
by all survival training of which we are
might may find this task difficult or must be bailed out. This was a deficiency,
aware. The mooring/inflation line was a
impossible. in our opinion.
deficiency, in our opinion.
The righting handle on the Type I life raft
Inflation was located on the bottom of the life raft
to the left of the inflation cylinder (when
As noted, the instructions were not easy viewed from the water), which was lo-
to read, and the inflation handle was not cated conventionally on the exterior side
located readily by the volunteers. All the of the buoyancy tubes. The “RIGHTING
life rafts deployed properly. AID” stenciling (photo 3) was located on
the exterior bottom at the edge of the life
Righting raft. On a capsized life raft, the exterior
bottom was lifted well above the water by
4
On the Type II life raft, a righting handle two buoyancy tubes; the instruction was
of black 3/4-inch-wide nylon webbing not visible from the water.
was attached to the bottom of the single Type I life raft boarding aids were mini-
water-ballast bag located in the center The life rafts were easily righted, but the mal. A black loop of one-inch-wide ny-
of the life raft. Stenciled next to the bag instructions on the life rafts would not be lon webbing served as a foothold (photo
was “RIGHTING AID” (photo 2), which readily visible to survivors, and this was 5, page 318), but it was easily overlooked
could be covered by the water-ballast bag, a deficiency, in our opinion. because it hung down in the water. This

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

to a loop in the center of the life raft

using a short piece of nylon cord attached
to that end of the mast.

The bottom edges of the canopy were se-

cured to loops (photo 10) in the lifelines
on the exterior of the buoyancy tube,
at the corners and middle of each side,
with a plastic tab that slipped through
the loops.
6

was a deficiency, in our opinion. The

lifeline, a grab handle on the upper ex- 10
terior side of the upper buoyancy tube 7
and the interior grasp line on the lower A one-inch-wide Velcro closure allowed
buoyancy tube completed the boarding the two slit-flap entries to be closed. A
aids. Nevertheless, most volunteers had loop was attached at the bottom of one
difficulty entering the life raft over the flap, and the plastic tab at the bottom of
two 9.5-inch (24.1-centimeter) buoy- the other flap slipped through that loop
ancy tubes; some were unable to board before going through the loop in the life-
without assistance. Not having satisfac- line on the buoyancy tube to secure both
tory water ballast, the life raft capsized sides of the opening to the lifeline.
frequently on top of the volunteers
(photo 6) during boarding. These were Volunteers questioned how easy these
deficiencies, in our opinion. 8 tasks would be to accomplish with gloves
or with cold, wet, numbed hands.
Canopy valve (photo 9). The mil-spec valve
confused many volunteers because most Volunteers said that sitting under the
The TSO-approved life rafts were had to discover for themselves that the canopy was very uncomfortable. Be-
equipped with a unique teepee-style valve had to be depressed manually to cause the cone-like canopy slanted steeply
canopy (photo 7). After retrieving the open it for inflation. After inflation, the downward from the top of the buoyancy
coated rip-stop-nylon canopy and the loose end of the inflated mast was secured tube, the only way to sit was hunched over
attached orally inflatable mast from and in contact with the canopy fabric, a
the SEP, the volunteers determined how deficiency, in our opinion. On the Type
to erect it in a few minutes; first-time II life raft, only 14 inches of headroom
erection (photo 8) required an additional were available in a seating position, and
12 minutes to 15 minutes. Instructions 40 inches (102 centimeters) were avail-
were stenciled on the center of the life raft able in the center. In the Type I life raft,
floor, but because the process was self- headroom was 21.0 inches to 25.0 inches
evident to the volunteers, the directions (53.3 centimeters to 63.5 centimeters) at
were unnecessary. the sides and 50 inches (127 centimeters)
in the center. There was no provision for
The center mast was inflated by mouth the collection of rainwater. No retrore-
9
through a mil-spec-style oral-inflation flective tape was fitted.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

When the life rafts were capsized, the Lifelines and Grasp Lines
canopies on both life rafts tore at the
peak (photo 11) where the orally inflated Black 3/4-inch-wide nylon webbing was
mast was attached, a deficiency, in our routed around the middle exterior of
opinion. Volunteers also said that with the buoyancy tube on Type II life rafts,
the canopy fully closed and the tabs at except at the entries where the webbing
the bottom of the flaps engaged, egress was attached at the top of the tube. On
from the capsized raft was difficult and the Type I life rafts, the lifeline was routed
provoked anxiety for some volunteers, a on the upper buoyancy tube with little
deficiency, in our opinion. slack, which created a long reach for some
volunteers, but the lifeline was satisfac-
tory, nonetheless.

The Type II life raft had no interior grasp

line, a deficiency, in our opinion. The
Type I life raft had an interior grasp line
of black 3/4-inch-wide nylon webbing
running completely around the interior, 13
attached to the upper section of the lower
buoyancy tube.
11
Stability
Rain Simulation
The two water-ballast bags each held a
Canopies immediately collapsed during total of approximately 124 pounds (56
the rain simulation, and water poured kilograms) of fresh water — a total of
into the life raft from under the bot- 248 pounds (112 kilograms) — but there
tom edge of the canopy and through the were not enough of them and they were
Velcro-secured entry slits. Volunteers not well constructed, deficiencies, in our
complained about the chill transferred opinion. A weight and a one-way flapper 14
through the canopy to their bodies valve in the bottom of the bag hastened
because they were unable to avoid con- filling, which was accomplished satisfac- compared with four inches or more for
tact with the collapsed canopy (photo torily. This was important because each others.
12). Even in a light shower, avoiding bag was open only slightly on top and on
contact with the canopy side would be its sides (photo 13). There were no other Located under the center of the Type II
difficult because of the canopy design. large inflow entries, as were typically life raft was a single water-ballast bag. It
These canopies offered only minimal included along the upper sides of most proved minimally effective at prevent-
shelter, inadequate to protect survivors other life rafts’ water-ballast bags. ing the life raft from capsizing during
in rough weather conditions, a deficiency, the boarding evaluation. The Type I life
in our opinion. The water-ballast bags were constructed raft was equipped with two of the water-
of lightweight canopy fabric for sides, ballast bags, located on opposite sides of
buoyancy-tube fabric for the bottom. the life raft at the entry points. They did
The lightweight canopy fabric tore not prevent volunteers from capsizing the
at the seams near the top attachment life raft during boarding.
points (photo 14), a deficiency, in our
opinion. A marginal advantage of this After the life raft was deployed, the valise
design was that the bag became effective was intended to perform the functions of
as the life raft lifted from the water faster a sea anchor.
than conventional designs because there
was less distance between the bottom of The SEP was attached to the valise, so
the life raft and the effective open top when the SEP was retrieved, whatever
12
of the bag, approximately three inches, stability this equipment provided while

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

in the water was absent. The SEP was DEFL VALVE” (photo 18; survivors must
attached to the valise with a tough black decipher the abbreviations); no informa-
cable tie looped through black webbing; tion noted the function as a PRV. This
this could be difficult to discern in low was a deficiency, in our opinion. This
light conditions. Until the cable tie valve included a protective screen fitting
was severed, requiring a knife or the (photo 19) that should be removed after
presence of mind to use other impro- the life raft inflates. An attached metal
vised methods, the valise could not cap with a seal was used to plug the valve
function fully as a sea anchor. No raft afterward. Plugging the valve is important,
knife was included in the company’s especially when the canopy is erected and
Part 91 SEP, and this was a deficiency, 16 closed; otherwise, the PRV will vent car-
in our opinion. bon-dioxide gas into the enclosed life raft,
Although Survival Products has at- a deficiency, in our opinion. The stenciled
After the cable tie was severed and the tempted to produce an innovative and instructions on the floor of the life raft
valise was returned to the water, it was weight-saving sea anchor, it was deficient, were easily obscured and were overlooked
supposed to perform as a sea anchor. in our opinion. by the volunteers.
The sea anchor (valise) was attached to
a 24.0-foot (7.3-meter), 1/4-inch-wide Floor
(0.6-centimeter-wide), flat-braided
nylon line; the opposite end was at- No insulated floor was available, which
tached to a corner of the life raft. This is unsatisfactory in cold water, in our
was coiled and retained by a cloth tube; opinion.
the line tangled when it was deployed
(photo 15). Including the length of the
Life Raft Equipment
sea anchor’s four one-foot shrouds, the
total length met the requirement of 25
feet specified by TSO-C70a (paragraph Pump
18
5.3). No swivel was attached to the sea
anchor, a deficiency, in our opinion. A Mirada bellows manual inflation
The sea anchor (valise) on the Type II pump (photo 17) provided approxi-
life raft performed satisfactorily until mately 40 percent more capacity than the
its Velcro seams attached to each other TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.5) requirement.
and the sea anchor was rendered useless Nevertheless, some valves located between
(photo 16). buoyancy tubes interfered with the filling
and operation of the pump. The pump
was tethered to a loop in the center of the
life raft floor, stored inside the bailer.

A multifunctional valve from Mirada per-

formed as both the PRV and the topping 19
valve. The valve was identified as “INFL/
Bailer and Sponge

The 5.0-quart (4.7-liter) bailer was of

sewn construction (photo 20, page 321),
15 made of life raft fabric and tethered to the
loop in the center of the life raft floor.
The longer sea anchor (valise) from the
larger Type I life raft became attached Heaving Line
immediately to its Velcro seams; despite
repeated deployments, the sea anchor Give Survival Products credit for cre-
(valise) tended to foul itself very quickly ative thinking in its pursuit of smaller
17
and was rendered useless. and lighter devices. The quoit for its

320 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

the line through the finger hole, and

there was just sufficient slack to pull the
knife from its sheath, a deficiency, in our
opinion.

Lighting

An approved locator light was attached

with Velcro to a corner on the top surface
of the buoyancy tube. One light detached
20 22 from the Velcro during inflation and fell
into the water.
heaving line was a yellow nylon-fabric
tube (photo 21) filled with polymer After the canopy was erected, the light
granules that expanded after being did not function as a locator light be-
immersed in water for a few minutes, cause it was under the canopy (photo
creating a flexible, sausage-like loop. 25), located low and in a corner. In our
This flexible loop could be difficult opinion, this did not comply with the
to hold onto with cold, wet, numbed requirements of TSO-C70a (paragraph
hands while the loop is under tension, 4.12). Moreover, its location made it an
such as when it is being used to pull a ineffective interior light. The water-acti-
survivor to the life raft. The dry quoit vated battery was secured with Velcro to
weighed only a few ounces and packed the exterior bottom of the life raft. The
23
flat. battery was within reach, so it could be
removed from the water and saved for
life raft with the quoit hanging out so later use. (No volunteer considered this
that it normally would fall into the water, possibility, and this action was not noted
absorb water and expand. “HEAVING in any instructions.)
LINE” was stenciled in black on the
sleeve. The heaving/trailing line loca-
tion also was stenciled on the buoyancy
tube, but that was overlooked by some
volunteers because the information was
behind their backs while they sat in the
life raft. The 35.0-foot (10.7-meter) line
21 exactly meets the TSO-C70a (paragraph
5.4) requirement for a Type II life raft,
One quoit split its seam during expan- but falls far short of the 75 feet required
sion (photo 22), spilling hundreds of for the Type I life raft. Volunteers were
sticky, jelly-like polymer globules in unsuccessful in throwing the quoit very 24
the interior of the life raft. Whatever far or accurately. This was a deficiency,
functionality the heaving/trailing line in our opinion.
possessed was compromised, and the
volunteers found the sticky globules Raft Knife
annoying.
The raft knife was stowed in a dark-red
The heaving/trailing line, which was sheath attached to the mooring/inflation
black 0.5-inch-wide nylon webbing line (photo 24). There was no placard or
(photo 23), was coiled inside a fabric labeling on the sheath. Inside the life raft,
Velcro-secured sleeve and retained “MOORING LINE KNIFE” was stenciled
with a pair of rubber bands, one on on the buoyancy tube in a list of other
each end. It was attached above the equipment, all of which was overboard
25
inflation cylinder on the exterior of the in the SEP. The raft knife was sewn onto

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

ELT D-cells was included; a tether was not Service

included, a deficiency, in our opinion.
A manually operated EBC-502 121.5- Survival Products life rafts required
MHz ELT was offered as an option, Signaling Devices annual service.
packed in the SEP.
Three Skyblazer XLT aerial meteor flares
were included. A lightweight, flimsy
Survival Equipment Packs
metal mirror with no aiming aid also was
included, along with an ACR Electron-
The SEP, with its Velcro closure sys-
ics SOLAS-specification survival whistle
tem, remained secure. All the Survival Founded in 1941 as the New York Rub-
with no tether — a deficiency, in our
Products life rafts noted the location of ber Co., in upstate New York, the com-
opinion — and a small and inadequate
the SEP with a stenciled placard (photo pany supplied life rafts to U.S. and allied
package of Skyblazer sea dye marker.
26) on the buoyancy tube. Even the military services during World War II. The
most conspicuous of these was easily company had relocated to Sarasota, Flor-
Paddles
overlooked in a full life raft, and in one ida, when John C. Winslow, a U.S. Navy
instance, the SEP was overlooked by pilot and recreational boater, tried to buy a
A pair of blue plywood mil-spec paddles
the volunteers, who had to be told to life raft from the company. Accustomed to
with wrist tethers was included.
retrieve it from the water. The SEP was selling to the government, not the public,
not waterproof. the company would sell life rafts only in
Fishing Kit
quantities of 100. Winslow bought 100 life
rafts and discovered that they were easily
A well-stocked Coast Guard-approved
sold; he bought the company in 1953 and
fishing kit was included.
renamed it the Winslow Co. Essentially,
the design remained unchanged until his
First Aid death in 1983. In 1989, the company was
acquired by a semi-retired entrepreneur,
A small quantity of packaged first aid Fred Shoaff, who ceased production of the
supplies was stored in a plastic bag. company’s long-time models and designed
an entirely new marine life raft. He later
Water gave the company its current name.9
26
A mil-spec chemical desalting kit were By the early 1990s, Winslow’s lightweight
included. No water or storage container marine life rafts were attracting the at-
Survival Equipment was provided; these were deficiencies, in tention of pilots who also were racing
our opinion. sailors. Demand encouraged Shoaff to
Repair secure TSO approval in 1994 and to
Food expand the aviation line, moving into its
Two three-inch mil-spec repair clamps
current facility in 1999. In 2002, a private
were included. PRV plugs, as noted
Vacuum-packed S.O.S. Food Lab survival investment banking partnership, Dakota
earlier, were integral with the multi-
rations were provided. Capital, backed a management buyout
functional valves; the metal cap plugged
of most of the company; the remaining
simultaneously both the manual topping
Miscellaneous stock remains among several employ-
valve and the PRV valve.
ees. Shoaff ’s executive vice president,
The life rafts included 75 feet (23 meters) Gerard Pickhardt, became president, and
Utility Knife
of flat 1/4-inch-wide braided-nylon line Shoaff has become a special consultant to
and a space blanket. the company.
A poor quality knife, without a tether, was
included in the Part 135 SEP.
Winslow provided life rafts for all the
Survival Manual/Life Raft
Manual evaluations. Evaluations were conducted
Flashlight
of four-person, 10-person and 12-person
Type I life rafts of both the FA-AV(SL)
A water-resistant flashlight with a con- A waterproof U.S. Air Force Aircrew Sur-
ventional bulb and powered by two vival Manual was provided. Continued on page 324

322 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

All Aboard … Except Me

T
he wave pool was in full motion and outward and the hand strap on the floor survival training with life rafts … nearly
the water lifted the life raft — and moved farther from my reach. I was within 30 years ago. Moreover, until recently, I
me — up and down while I held its an inch or two of grasping it. A couple had lived aboard a sailboat for nearly 20
lifeline. Several people already had clam- of times, after bobbing up and down in years, so swimming and propelling myself
bered aboard the Viking RescYou 6 Pro the water to help propel myself over the in and out of small inflatable boats and
marine life raft and I would learn later that top of the tubes, I actually touched the hard dinghies — without any boarding
the two buoyancy tubes provided about hand strap. aids — wasn’t new to me. No way should
12 inches (31 centimeters) of freeboard, I be humbled by a life raft.
with six people aboard. Nevertheless, I kept trying. I kicked, pulled, and
those inches seemed mountainous. I grabbed but that hand strap might just I elected to abandon the attempt to get
struggled to pull myself up by using the as well have been on Mars. Moreover, aboard the life raft and let the evaluation
hand straps on the life raft’s buoyancy I was wearing a fully inflated life vest continue without me. Gasping, I called to
tubes, but the flexible strap of nylon that was pressing against my chest and a lifeguard to pull me to shallow water,
webbing carried my feet under the raft, stomach, and adding additional inches just to be safe (I was already walking on
while my upper body went in the opposite between me and that hand strap. The the pool bottom as the lifeguard reached
direction. Despite my best effort, I was pressure against my body was prevent- me). I was stunned.
unable to complete the process of getting ing easy breathing, not made any easier
on a small inflated platform, get over the by my 255 pounds (116 kilograms) and Had I been alone in open water, this
top tube and reach far enough to grab a sedentary lifestyle. I needed to grab that scenario might have been a life-or-
floor-mounted hand strap, which I could hand strap to pull myself aboard, but I death experience even with the added
use to pull myself into the life raft. soon exhausted myself. My heart was benefit of surging adrenaline that sur-
pounding, and I was gasping for breath. vival specialists claim will be present
The people who already had boarded were I couldn’t believe what was happening in an emergency. Had I been injured,
seated on either side. They were cheering to me. boarding this life raft would have been
for me, but refrained from giving me any impossible, unless someone had been
physical assistance. As I struggled to get This was not my first experience in board- aboard to assist me.
over the water-slick tubes, I pulled them ing life rafts, and I had received water
A few minutes later, I caught up on my
breathing, plopped into the wave pool
and splashed my way to the nearest
life raft ­­– a Winslow 108 OCN 8-person
marine model with an unloaded freeboard
of more than 20 inches (51 centimeters).
The inflatable boarding platform was well-
supported at water level and provided
plenty of room and grab handles for me
to pull myself onto the platform. Then,
while kneeling on the platform, I was
able to pull myself to the top of the two
tubes, where I could easily grasp the
wide-webbed, V-shaped interior lad-
der that was attached with buckles to
the top buoyancy tube; the other and
smaller end was buckled to the center of
the floor. From the platform, I was able
to pull myself hand-over-hand into the
otherwise empty life raft. Heck, it was
almost easy. 
What was a frustrating experience in a pool could have been a life-or-death situation
in open water. — Roger Rozelle

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Super-Light Ultima and FA-AV(UL) nylon-webbing handles was attached,

Ultra-Light models fitted with various one on each long side and each long
options, and the four-person Type II enough to reach over the center seam
GA-ST and related FA-ST Uni-Light, when laid flat on top of the valise. The
non-TSO life rafts. central portion of the grab handle was
sewn around a foam core to provide a
In 2002, Winslow provided a 10-person comfortable carrying handle. Smaller
Type I FA-AV (SL) Super-Light Ultima, life rafts could be gripped by one person
10-person FA-AV(UL) Ultra-Light, six- using one hand; larger life rafts could be
person FA-AV(UL) Ultra-Light and a gripped with separate grab handles by
prototype six-person Type II FA-ST two people. The flat-carry method could
Uni-Light; the life rafts were fitted with be somewhat awkward inside an aircraft,
a variety of options. but the life raft was easily dragged us-
ing the standard handles. There were
Evaluating Winslow’s life rafts required no grab handles on either end of the
several examples of the products because standard valise; no-cost optional pairs
the company offered several distinct lines of side grab handles were available to al-
with the broadest combination of options low retrieval if the life raft was stored on 3
in the industry. its side or end, or if necessary to pull it
from underseat stowage. We recommend Another laminated tag provided detailed
The life rafts were constructed of double- that end handles (photo 2) be specified inflation instructions on one side and im-
coated neoprene over two-ply bias-cut on larger life rafts for easier movement mediate-action instructions on the other;
nylon fabric. The Type I life rafts were inside an aircraft. both sides were printed in black text on
decagonal (10-sided) in four-person a white background. This was a useful
through 16-person rated capacities. Sizes provision, allowing anyone with the time
were in one-person increments. or interest to review more complete in-
structions for use of the life raft, but
Valise notices should be included on each side
to tell the reader that both sides of the
The life rafts shared common valise de- tag provide information; some volunteers
signs, and Winslow offered a wide range failed to turn over the tag. One tag was
of custom valises and cases, numbering lost in handling.
500 at the end of 2003. The standard va-
lises (photo 1) were constructed of yellow In current configurations, placards were
2
polyurethane-coated nylon with braided- in bold black text printed on high-visibil-
nylon laces on both sides and a two-inch ity orange fabric and sewn to the valise;
wide Velcro closure across the top center Volunteers were unable to separate the sufficient contrast allowed the text to be
and across each end, like box-top flaps. Velcro-secured top covers of the valise by read easily. These placards commanded
pulling apart the grab handles. a survivor’s attention. Moreover, these
Aircraft-specific valises were available in placards provided sufficient information
a variety of shapes and were designed to The life rafts were “decorated” with a va- so that a survivor could recognize and use
lie flat. A pair of orange two-inch-wide riety of tags and placards. Two laminated the life raft’s equipment — from sealing
tags were attached with thin plastic ties the canopy against rain to using the ELT.
to the valise grab handles: a double-
sided tag, with black text — “HANDLE Winslow provided required manufactur-
WITH CARE” — on a red background, ing, service and other information — not
and a white build log tag (photo 3). of use to a survivor inflating the life raft
(Each of the workers who had a hand — on different placards that were white
in building the life raft signed the build background with much smaller black text
log card, which was then laminated and and the Winslow logo. It was immedi-
attached to the life raft.) These tags were ately obvious which placards contained
not required, so the customer could re- essential information for survival and
1
move them. which did not.

324 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The standard inflation instructions were respectively). This did not appear to be the packaging also contributes to smaller
immediately identifiable in bold text “TO an acceptable substitute or an “equivalent pack sizes. The life rafts provided for
INFLATE” with clear six-step instructions. means,” and was a deficiency, in our opin- the evaluation were equipped with pro-
To the right of this large placard was an- ion. The orange placard (photo 6) on a totype packaging that since has been put
other stand-alone placard with the text protective covering flap was clearly labeled into production with only minor cos-
“PULL TO INFLATE” and with an arrow metic changes. Winslow’s “UltimaWrap”
pointing to the corner of the protective vacuum-packing material (photo 8) was
flap that covered the mooring/inflation a six-ply laminated-aluminized film
line, out from under which protruded that proved to be abuse-resistant and
a loop of red nylon webbing (photo 4). puncture-resistant.
Pulling on the loop automatically lifted
the flap and pulled out the end of the
mooring/inflation line and its stainless-
steel snap clip (photo 5,), which had been
secured by the closed flap’s Velcro fastener.
The instructions were clear, and the small
loop and its location offered minimal 6
opportunity to be inadvertently caught
on something during movement. “EMERGENCY INFLATION” and pro-
vided clear instructions. Volunteers liked
the caution to “GRASP SECURELY.” On
occasion, we had seen volunteers using
the immediate-inflation mechanism be
startled by the nearly instant inflation and
instinctively let go of the life raft, which
could be disastrous in a survival situa-
tion. A pocket with a Velcro-secured tab
retained the immediate-inflation handle
under the flap (photo 7). 8

4
The life rafts could be packed in optional
white molded-plastic cases (photo 9),
which were usually designed to fit a
particular aircraft installation. The two
halves of the molded case were secured
with plastic strapping bands. A laminated
tag was attached that warned not to cut
the bands and said that they would break
during inflation. Placarding was similar
to that on the valises, but on the hard
7 cases, the identification/data plate was
5
The immediate-inflation placard was
on the side of the valise, not the face.
The immediate-inflation handle — a Nevertheless, some volunteers did not
2 5/16-inch-diameter (5.9-centimeter- notice it as they stood above the valise in
diameter) stainless steel ring — was lo- its normal resting position.
cated on the opposite end of the life raft.
The ring provided a narrower grip area In 2002, Winslow introduced vacuum
than the ripcord grip required by TSO- packing as standard for all its TSO-ap-
C70a (paragraph 5.2). A survivor would proved life rafts. While not an essential
be able to grip it by only two fingers or feature, it provides the protective benefits
9
three fingers (average male or female grip, of sealing the life raft and its contents;

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

red with white text; the other placards aviation customers who can accommo-
were white with black text or red text. date a slightly larger pack should request
Winslow said that the company planned the larger line, which was available as a
to convert the placard colors to the valise no-cost option.
standard. A pair of black grab handles
was provided; instructions said that the The 30.0-foot (9.1-meter) mooring/
grab handles should face the aisle. The inflation line led directly to the primary
hard cases generally were designed for boarding aid.
particular aircraft installations, and thus
have become “standard options,” but they Inflation
cost more than a valise. 11
As noted earlier, the company’s current
The mooring/inflation line was stowed
placarding of the mooring/inflation line Righting
under a white nylon-fabric cover, and
was satisfactory, and survivors will rec-
the spring-clip end was under a Vel- A unique “righting locator light” was
ognize its location.
cro-secured flap, as was the immedi- located on the underside of the life raft
ate-inflation handle; there was no risk at the outer edge adjacent to the righting
The life rafts inflated easily (photo 10),
of inadvertent inflation. The mooring/ line at the righting location. This light,
without noticeable difference from the
inflation line retained one half of the the same approved-type water-activated
inflation of other life rafts that were not
case after inflation; this was a deficiency, locator light used elsewhere, guided sur-
vacuum packed. On one vacuum-packed
in our opinion, because the case could vivors to a capsized life raft and to the
life raft that we specifically measured, the
endanger the boarding survivors in the righting location at night, a significant
force required to activate the inflation
water or the life raft. advantage, in our opinion. It provided
bottle was 23.0 pounds (10.4 kilograms),
within the TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.2) re- sufficient illumination to see the right-
Mooring/Inflation Line quirement of 20 pounds to 30 pounds. ing instructions and righting aids.
Inflation time ranged from 16 seconds Inside the upright life raft, a placard in-
Winslow’s stainless-steel snap clip at the for the smaller life rafts to 20 seconds for structed survivors to retrieve the light’s
end of the mooring/inflation line was the larger ones. water-activated batter y from the
not as large as Air Cruisers’, but it was water (photo 12) and store it in a
robust and functioned smoothly; a large Velcro-secured holder provided for
hand loop was sewn into the end of the that purpose. This was done out of
mooring/inflation line. concern that the light under the life
raft might attract unwanted attention
Concurrent with the change to vacuum from marine life. Winslow provided
packing, the company changed from a very noticeable and bold, easy-to-read
very easily gripped red one-inch-wide righting instructions. At the righting
nylon-webbing mooring/inflation line to location on the bottom buoyancy tube
red 3/8-inch-wide (1.0-centimeter-wide) (the top buoyancy tube when the life
nylon webbing. The narrower line was 10 raft was inverted) was an orange placard
not as easy to grip as the wider webbing, with a black text/pictorial instruction:
but it was more substantial than the thin “RIGHT LINE” (photo 13, page 327),
webbing used by EAM and Hoover, or On larger life rafts, the large quantity of
the Goodrich parachute cord, and about vacuum-packing material (photo 11),
equal to that of Air Cruisers. which remained attached to the mooring/
inflation line next to the primary entry,
The larger mooring/inflation line was was a minor annoyance to some volun-
preferable, being much easier to grip, teers gathering at the boarding platform
especially with cold, wet, numbed hands. prior to boarding, but it did not inter-
Winslow said that the change was nec- fere with anyone boarding the life raft.
essary to offset the increased bulk and One volunteer said that the attached
weight of the new boarding platform and aluminized material could be cut from
other improvements. Its marine life rafts the line and likely could be used in a
12
remain fitted with the one-inch line, and survival situation.

326 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The boarding platform had a bottom of

buoyancy-tube fabric with drainage holes
at the four corners. Nylon webbing braces
were attached at the outer end of the plat-
form and were supported on the upper
buoyancy tube. The webbing braces were
encased in buoyancy-tube fabric to form
sides on the platform. One volunteer said,
“The sides helped stabilize me getting in.
I felt more secure.” A handhold was in-
13 15 corporated on each side, halfway up the
webbing brace, but only one volunteer
next to a pictorial instruction showing a easy to grasp. Righting was straightfor- was observed using it.
life raft being righted, under which were ward and easy to accomplish.
instructions to “GRASP LINE – STAND Retroreflective tape was applied to the
– LEAN BACK.” The righting line and The 10-person Ultima life raft was sides and outer edge of the boarding
placard were located directly over the equipped with an optional righting platform. In addition to an array of
inflation cylinder. Some volunteers said ladder, which also was constructed of “ENTER HERE” placards, there was
that the terminology might be confus- blue two-inch-wide nylon webbing with a clear pictorial instruction — black
ing to survivors for whom “right” means orange two-inch-wide nylon-webbing printed on orange fabric — with text in-
the opposite of “wrong” or “left,” a defi- rungs (photo 16), which further aided structions printed on the lower buoyancy
ciency, in our opinion, but the pictorial righting. tube. While entry appeared self-evident
instruction was clear. and intuitive to all the volunteers, they
commented on the positive value of the
On the opposite side of the life raft, where pictorial instructions.
the opposite end of the righting line or
ladder was secured, was another bright A grab handle was centered on the exterior
orange placard with the same pictorial lower buoyancy tube; a wider grab handle
instruction: a big “X” over the pictorial was centered on the exterior upper buoy-
instruction and the instructions “TO ancy tube; and another grab handle was
TURN OVER RAFT GO TO OTHER centered on the top of the upper buoyancy
SIDE” (photo 14). tube. The boarding platform proved to be
an effective boarding aid, noteworthy con-
16 sidering the high freeboard of some of the
Winslow life rafts (photo 17, page 328).

Retroreflective tape was applied in an Volunteers experienced boarding-plat-

equilateral cross to the center of the form bending (under some combina-
underside of the life raft. tions of weight and force) similar to that
experienced with the EAM boarding plat-
Boarding Aids form. Subsequently, Winslow modified the
platform by increasing the diameter of the
At the primary entry, an inflatable inflatable support tube for added stiffness,
14
boarding platform was standard on all as well as by relocating and adding more
the company’s Type I life rafts, along with webbing braces. We have since had an op-
The blue two-inch-wide nylon-webbing an interior boarding ladder constructed portunity to evaluate the prototype of this
righting line extended from one side to of blue two-inch-wide nylon webbing. All redesigned boarding platform, which was
the other side with loops along its length the grab handles were blue two-inch-wide expected to be in production by the time
to grasp (photo 15). These handholds nylon webbing sewn around a foam core. of publication, and the changes appeared
were made of two-inch orange nylon This ensured that the grab handles were to have solved the bending problem with-
webbing and contrasted with the blue erect and were easily seen and grasped. out an adverse effect on ease of boarding.
nylon webbing. In addition, they were Volunteers commented positively about We were able to jump up and down on the
twisted, so they did not lie flat and were this feature. end of the boarding platform without any

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

bottom of the life raft. The ladder was the bottom end of the rails. Placards on
constructed of blue two-inch-wide ny- the two-inch nylon webbing instructed
lon webbing with a center web between survivors “ONCE ON BOARD UNCLIP
the rails to maintain the flexible ladder’s BUCKLES,” apparently an instruction
shape during boarding. This appeared added after an evaluation in which the
to be a satisfactory alternative to the flat boarders did not realize that the interior
rungs used by Hoover and Air Cruisers. ladder could be disconnected. The interi-
The boarding ladder, combined with the or boarding ladder for the auxiliary entry
interior boarding ladder, was a satisfactory was fixed to the floor and was equipped
primary boarding aid, but the inflatable with quick-release buckles (photo 20) to
boarding platforms, such as Winslow’s, allow it to be stowed after use.
were preferred by the volunteers.

The alternate entry incorporated a simi-

lar exterior boarding ladder (photo 19)
with a single grab handle on top of the
upper buoyancy tube and a short interior
17 boarding ladder of two-inch nylon web-
bing. The placards for the entry identified
it as “REAR BOARDING” and included a
adverse effect on the platform’s integrity
pictorial instruction showing its use. The
or usability.
differentiation in placarding might help
to prevent confusion about which entry 20
Winslow’s original, very effective exterior
is primary. The addition of the interior
boarding ladder (photo 18), in combina-
boarding ladder to the alternate entry Canopy
tion with the interior boarding ladder,
made it effective enough that all the vol-
remained a no-cost option for applica-
unteers were able to use it to board. The standard canopy (photo 21) on
tions where weight or volume was criti-
cal. Attached to the exterior midpoint of the Type I life rafts was a self-erecting,
the buoyancy tube (the upper buoyancy stay-erect tri-arch design with a 5.0-
tube on two-buoyancy-tube life rafts) was inch-diameter (12.7-centimeter) canopy-
a large three-rung or four-rung boarding support tube. The primary arch was lo-
ladder, depending on life raft size and free- cated forward of the life raft centerline so
board, that hung well below the exterior that the canopy covered approximately
60 percent of the life raft when open. The
other square arch extended at a right angle
to the primary arch, from the center of the
arch down to the upper-buoyancy tube in
the rear. The stay-erect tri-arch tube in-
cluded its own topping valve (photo 22,
page 329). The closed rear section of the
convertible canopy was attached to the

19

At the primary boarding entry, the in-

ternal three-rung boarding ladder was
stretched from the top of the upper
buoyancy tube to the bottom buoyancy
tube directly opposite the entry and
18 21
secured with quick-release buckles at

328 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

that the zipper was covered and well the canopy against the tube would have
sealed. A plastic quick-connect buckle at been useful.
the center bottom of the canopy secured
the canopy entry to the buoyancy tube, A combination observation port and
providing additional canopy support in water collector was fitted in one section
rough weather conditions. of the rear of the canopy. This canopy-
fabric duct (photo 26), 12 inches in
Ventilation was provided with the canopy diameter, was sufficiently large to allow
closed via the double-action center zip- a volunteer to put her head through the
per, which could be zipped open at canopy (photo 27) and would be useful
the top. Velcro tie-backs allowed the in allowing survivors to see outside in
two edges to be pulled back to form a inclement weather while protecting the
diamond-shaped opening for increased interior of the life raft. The duct also
ventilation (photo 24). would ventilate the life raft in cold, but

22

arches with one-inch Velcro on the top

and sides and three nylon straps on the
main arch, which were secured around the
tube with metal snaps.

The open half of the canopy was split in 26

24
two, and the flaps were rolled up to the
arch tube, secured by two-piece Velcro
straps, three for each flap (photo 23). A tab The bottom zippers extended back past
on the end of each flap facilitated release the canopy-arch tubes and could be
of the Velcro. The tabs ensured that in cold unzipped completely; the convertible
weather or with gloves, these straps could canopy could be pulled off the arch tubes
be grasped easily to release the flaps. and then rolled up on the main tube at
the rear of the life raft. The third support
arch leg and alternate entry prevented the
canopy from being rolled up and secured
in place, as on Winslow’s Type II life rafts.
The canopy tended to crush the bottom
of the rear arch (photo 25), which served 27
to secure the canopy in the open position.
While this was satisfactory, a Velcro strap dry, weather. Nevertheless, this would not
on either side to hold down and collect be practical, in our opinion, when the life
raft was pitching, although it might keep
the interior drier than opening the entry
23 zipper to look outside. An attached ny-
lon cord tie could be wrapped around
The canopy flaps had large no. 10 plastic the duct and cinched tight to close it
vertical and horizontal zippers, a feature off, or could be cinched partially to al-
common to the entire Winslow line. The low water collection into a container. A
large zippers had large nylon-cord pull Velcro-secured flap was on both the in-
tabs with a plastic grip attached inside terior and the exterior to secure the duct
and outside; all three zippers closed to the when not in use, so water was prevented
center. A large storm flap covered all the from entering the life raft, and the duct
25
zippers. Velcro on the storm flaps ensured was prevented from hanging into the life

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 329
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

raft. A placard with clear instructions was of manufacturer — generally were pre- because of the special materials needed to
attached to the flap. ferred over those with smaller buoyancy meet FAA’s fire-resistance standards. Their
tubes and less freeboard. value, however, was summed up by one
The required second entry was located in volunteer with a tendency to seasickness:
the left rear quarter (opposite the one with Winslow’s standard canopy fabric had a “The only life raft I didn’t start becoming
the observation port). This was a zippered bright orange exterior and sky-blue inte- nauseous in, best innovation seen.”
arched entry door that was rolled down rior of double-coated nylon fabric. This
and secured by a pair of Velcro straps on heavyweight fabric, 6.9 ounces per yard Rain Simulation
the upper buoyancy tube upon inflation. (0.2 kilograms per meter), was opaque.
The single large plastic double-action Many volunteers said that they preferred Winslow’s canopies proved dry when
zipper went completely around the sides the blue interior. All SOLAS life rafts have sealed according to the illustrated plac-
and top of the entry (photo 28). A Velcro- blue canopy interiors because the specifi- ards. This required more effort than just
secured storm flap was fitted. cations require that the interiors “shall be zipping the zippers; the volunteers had to
of a colour that does not cause discomfort ensure that the storm flaps’ Velcro seals
to the occupants.” and the bottom clip on the primary entry
were secured. The reward was improved
On the Ultra-Light life raft and Super- weathertightness. Even without the extra
Light Ultima life raft, the same translu- effort, the life rafts remained dry for the
cent orange rip-stop fabric was used as most part. Some minor leakage occurred
that used by other manufacturers, with where the view ports were sewn into the
the same shortcomings, though it does canopy on the life rafts so equipped.
save considerable weight (60 percent
less) over the standard canopy fabric In the 2002 evaluation, the canopy on the
(2.25 ounces per yard [0.15 kilogram larger life raft tended to collapse under
28 per meter]). Strips of retroreflective the full impact of the fire-hose spray
tape were applied to the canopy and to (photo 30,), something not experienced
The Ultima life raft canopy provided the canopy support arch(es). Strips of in previous evaluations. Investigation re-
satisfactory headroom throughout the radar-reflective fabric were applied to vealed that the canopy-support tube was
life raft, except at the center of the entry: the canopy support arch(es).
four-person life raft, 37 inches to 42 inch-
es (94 centimeters to 107 centimeters) at A unique Winslow innovation was the
the arch, 18.5 inches (47.0 centimeters) optional view ports (photo 29) added to
at the entry, 23 inches at the “quarter” the standard canopy. These clear plastic
sides; 10-person and 12-person rafts, 43 semicircular ports were a feature that
inches to 48 inches (109 centimeters to contributed to a more comfortable envi-
122 centimeters) at the arch, 27.0 inches ronment in a closed-up life raft and as a
(68.6 centimeters) at the entry, 32 inches potential antidote to seasickness, always a
at the “quarter” sides. The Ultra-Light life serious problem for survivors in a closed-
raft had smaller buoyancy tubes, espe- up life raft. Two were fitted to the entry,
cially on the larger life rafts: four-person one on either side, and one was fitted to the
30
life raft, 34.0 inches to 39.0 inches (86.4 rear; they were expensive — US$470 —
centimeters to 99.1 centimeters) at the
arch, 18.0 inches (45.7 centimeters) at the not fully inflated after the life raft had
entry, 23 inches at the “quarter” sides; 10- been manually re-inflated by volunteers.
person life rafts and 12-person life rafts, After topping off, in a second dousing,
33.0 inches to 38.0 inches (83.8 centime- there were no problems. This shows that
ters to 96.5 centimeters) at the arch, 19.0 the inflation of the life raft must be main-
inches (48.3 centimeters) at the entry, 24 tained for maximum performance.
inches at the “quarter” sides. Volunteers
said that they preferred the headroom of Lifelines and Grasp Lines
the Ultima life raft to the Ultra-Light life
raft. The life rafts with larger buoyancy Blue two-inch nylon webbing was used
29
tubes and greater freeboard — regardless for lifelines and grasp lines on the Ultima

330 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

life raft. Blue one-inch webbing was used water each, for a total weight of 404.5 were fitted with spreaders to prevent
on Ultra-Light and Super-Light life rafts. pounds (183.5 kilograms). The five-bag tangling. The sea anchor was deployed
The lifelines were staggered up and down “pentagonal” water-ballast system dis- automatically upon inflation and was
(photo 31), from the midpoint of the up- tributed the water ballast evenly around attached at the rear of the life raft. The
per buoyancy tube to the midpoint of the the life raft. sea-anchor line was coiled and was con-
lower buoyancy tube on the double-buoy- tained within a fabric tube to aid inflation
ancy-tube life rafts. This pattern made The construction of the water-ballast without tangling. A stainless-steel swivel
the lifeline easier to grab, no matter what bags differed between the Super-Light (photo 33) was fitted at each end of the
the position of the life raft. Subsequently, Ultima life rafts and the Ultra-Light 30.0-foot (9.1-meter) long parachute-
the lifeline was extended from beside the rafts. The Ultima ballast bags were con- cord line.
entry platform and attached to the sides structed entirely of buoyancy-tube fabric.
of the boarding platform for improved On the Ultra-Light and “Light” life rafts,
security as survivors pulled themselves the water-ballast bags were constructed
to the front of the platform. mostly of white, coated-nylon fabric
(the same fabric used on Winslow’s
sea anchors), with ends constructed of
buoyancy-tube fabric. In performance,
no discernible difference was observed
between the two types.

A length of parachute cord — a “trip

33
line” — was attached to each water-
ballast bag so that the bag could be
pulled up, emptied and tied to the A small, but telling, finishing touch that
lifelines in a retracted position for was evident wherever lines were tied off
31 on the life rafts, was that the knot and
“sailing” or paddling. Although life
rafts with large ballast bags were more loose end of each line were covered by
The interior grasp lines were located on shrink tubing. This not only looked tidy,
stable, they also were very difficult to
the upper buoyancy tube on the Type I but more importantly, provided added
paddle and less susceptible to drift with
life rafts with sufficient slack to be easily security to prevent the knots from com-
the wind, because the water-ballast bags
grasped (photo 32). ing undone, as has been reported fre-
created an enormous amount of drag.
Large bags also can present problems quently in these evaluations.
for a landfall because they can snag on
rocks and reefs, which can damage or Floor
capsize a life raft. The Winslow water-
ballast bags could be lowered again for Winslow upgraded its integral inflatable
maximum stability. insulated floor in 2002. Standard on the
Type I life rafts, the upgraded floor had
Winslow also offered an approximately 21 reeds, more than any other similar
50 percent greater capacity “Cape Horn” floor among the life rafts that were
water-ballast system as an option on its evaluated. The result was something
32 Type I life rafts. This was the same water- akin to tufted upholstery and provided
ballast system used on its offshore marine more comfortable seating and more
life rafts. The system totaled 624 pounds even insulation while reducing the to-
Stability (283 kilograms) of fresh water. If pack tal volume of air required to inflate the
size and weight constraints allow, specify floor to an equalized air space (photo
Winslow’s water-ballast system was the greater ballast. 34, page 332). The inflated floor was
among the largest-capacity and best- reasonably firm, like an air mattress,
performing ballast systems evaluated. A parachute-style sea anchor of white and it was impossible to feel someone
coated nylon was provided. The sea punching the bottom, even with just a
The five ballast bags around the periphery anchor was 38 inches in diameter at the single person in the life raft. Only EAM’s
of the Type I life raft held approximately open end and was attached with six 0.5- optional floor in its VIP line appeared
80.9 pounds (36.7 kilograms) of fresh inch-wide nylon-webbing shrouds that to be similar, although with fewer reeds;

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 331
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Life Raft Equipment average manual inflation pump with each

full inhalation-exhalation cycle. Care must
Pump be taken not to hyperventilate (excessive
rate and depth of respiration, leading to
abnormal loss of carbon dioxide from the
The manual inflation pump by Mirada
blood, which can cause dizziness, numb-
was a bellows design, but was unique in
ness in hands and feet, and fainting) when
having an internal spring that expanded
using such a device. Survivors should
the bellows automatically. Volunteers
count on using a mechanical pump, not
observed that it was much easier to use
their lungs, to top off a life raft.
34 than the other pumps. The spring al-
lowed easy one-handed pumping; there
Mirada quick-connect topping valves
was no tendency for the bayonet fitting
the EAM life rafts in the evaluations were used. Orange placards with black
to be pulled from the valve, so there
were not equipped with that option, so text and arrows on the upper portion of
was no need to hold it in place with the
that floor was not evaluated. the buoyancy tube pointed down to the
other hand. The pump provided about 40
valve. Because of the orange color and
percent greater capacity than required by
The floor-inflation valve was in the a location where they were readily seen,
TSO-C70a (paragraph 5.5).
center of the floor, equally accessible finding the valves on the Winslow life
by all aboard. An orange placard with rafts was easy. The placards at the valves
black printing surrounded the valve and The manual inflation pump was stored
included pictorial instructions for using
provided clear text and pictorial instruc- with the bayonet fitting attached inside a
the manual inflation pump.
tions; on the rear canopy-support tube, yellow foam-padded polyurethane pouch
a placard, which was readily visible, sug- with a Velcro-secured flap and affixed
with an orange placard boldly labeled in Bailer and Sponge
gested closing the canopy and inflating
the floor in cold weather. black: “PUMP.” The pump was tethered
to the life raft with parachute cord and The bailer was a collapsible bucket (photo
was available for use immediately upon 36) with a handle, rigid wire-reinforced
Manually inflating an insulated floor rims — top and bottom — and a rein-
boarding. A Velcro strap kept the spring-
while sitting on the floor and using the forced bottom. It was constructed of
loaded pump compressed for storage.
manual inflation pump provided in any clear flexible vinyl with welded seams
of the life rafts was hard work (this was that did not leak. While a bit on the large
a generic problem, not just a Winslow An oral inflation tube was included as a
size (nine quarts [eight liters]), making it
problem). Winslow addressed this by backup to the manual inflation pump. A
somewhat unwieldy in the tight confines
providing an optional independent in- rubber mouthpiece was on one end and
of a smaller life raft, volunteers believed
flation cylinder to inflate the insulated a bayonet fitting for the valve was on the
floor. The inflation cylinder either could other end. A yellow laminated placard
be activated automatically when the with instructions in black text was at-
life raft was deployed, or the inflation tached to the oral inflation tube. During
cylinder could be activated manually by the manual inflation pump comparison,
a survivor; the purchaser must choose we determined that the oral inflation tube
the desired method. On larger life rafts, (photo 35) could be very effective, provid-
12-person and more, this system might ing more than six times the volume of the
not inflate fully the floor at extreme cold
temperatures, but significant floor insula-
tion would be available immediately and
would give the survivor a head start. This
feature was well liked by the volunteers.
In addition to increased cost, 4.0 pounds
to 6.0 pounds (1.8 kilograms to 2.7 kilo-
grams) of weight were added to the life
raft. Nevertheless, flying over the cold
water of the North Atlantic, this option
would be desirable, space and weight
35 36
constraints permitting.

332 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

that it was the best bailer. The wide bot- with the traditional quoit. In our throw cold, wet, numbed hands, it could be
tom and moderately stiff material al- evaluations, the line tangled, a deficiency, much more difficult to remove, a defi-
lowed the bailer to stand upright. It was in our opinion. It was located on the up- ciency, in our opinion. After the raft knife
secured by a parachute cord tether inside per buoyancy tube, next to the canopy was pulled from the sheath, unwrapping
the life raft and was immediately available arch on the left of the primary entry. A the parachute cord from the knife might
upon boarding. large orange placard next to the line was slow the process. Winslow later added a
labeled: “THROW LINE.” pull-tab on the raft knife so that it could
When placed in a freezer, the vinyl be- be deployed easily from its sheath.
came very stiff, but after it was removed, The handle was easy to grip, but black
its flexibility returned quickly. In cold was not the best color because of the dif- Lighting
weather/water conditions, the bailer ficulty of seeing it in the water, especially
might stay stiff much longer, making it at night, a deficiency, in our opinion. All Winslow life rafts included an ap-
more difficult to work with. proved interior light and an approved
Raft Knife exterior light, both of which used water-
Winslow included a pair of 6.0-inch by activated batteries. The exterior light was
8.0-inch by 5/8-inch (1.6-centimeter) The raft knife was stowed inside a black located midway on the canopy-support
compressed sponges. fabric sheath on the interior side of the arch tube; the interior light was located
upper buoyancy tube (the single buoy- about midway between the center canopy
ancy tube on the Type II), adjacent to the support and the outer leg.
Heaving Line
primary entry on the right (as survivors
board). Next to it were two orange plac- Winslow also offered the option of a
Winslow used an inherently buoyant
ards labeled in black “KNIFE,” with pic- canopy-arch-mounted strobe light; it
yellow 3/16-inch braided polypropylene
torial instructions affixed next to them was not an automatically activated unit.
line attached to a single-handed water-
(photo 38). One placard was oriented The ACR Electronics Firefly2 strobe
skiing tow-rope handle (photo 37). This
to the interior of the life raft above the light was retained inside a pocket on
was a buoyant and slightly flexible black
sheath, and the other placard was angled the canopy at the top center and was
plastic handle through which was passed
toward survivors who would be board- activated by a manual switch. Hanging
a loop of black 3/4-inch-wide nylon
ing at the primary entry. Volunteers from the canopy-arch tube was a yellow
webbing that was then secured to the
cited this as an excellent presentation, laminated placard with clear instructions
polypropylene line.
but said that on smaller life rafts, the for activating the strobe light.
placard facing the boarding survivors
might be covered by the lower edge of ELT
the canopy.
Winslow offered a range of ELTs as
options, including the auto-deploying
DME 121.5-MHz ELT and 406-MHz
ELT (photo 39, page 334), which were
secured in the life raft interior with the
whip antenna on top of the buoyancy
tube next to the leg of the canopy-sup-
37 port arch. Another option was a Techtest
121.5-MHz ELT that was available for
The line and handle were secured with manual deployment or automatic de-
Velcro to the upper buoyancy tube (the ployment, in which case it was located
single buoyancy tube on the Type II), to 38 on the canopy-support arch-tube leg with
the left of the primary entry next to the an integral whip antenna. A wrist tether
canopy-support arch leg. Small strips of The raft knife was held in its sheath was attached to the ELT for security when
Velcro kept the line neat. If the Velcro by friction and an elastic band at the it was used as a 121.5-MHz transceiver.
were tabbed, as were other Velcro keep- mouth; the parachute-cord tether was A third option was a Kannad 406-MHz
ers on the life raft, deployment of the coiled around the knife. Removing the ELT, which was included in the SEP and
heaving line would have been easier and raft knife from the sheath was not always was deployed manually into a pocket
faster. The low weight of the handle made easy because it occasionally was jammed on the canopy-support tube arch leg. A
it less effective when thrown, compared tightly in the sheath. With gloves or with fourth option was a manually deployed

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 333
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

dividually vacuum-packed modules of by survivors or salvaged from the water.

items grouped by use, with a list affixed The full-length Velcro seal made it unlikely
of what was inside; items were packed that anything but the very smallest items
into the SEP bag in logical order, with could slide out of the bag in the event of
those most likely to be needed immedi- capsizing. (Such small items should be
ately on top. There was no need to open kept inside the heavy-duty six-mil plastic
those not yet needed; the survivors just zipper-lock plastic bags, which were pro-
put the items in one of Winslow’s stor- vided in every SEP.)
age bags. The module with the survival
manual and LRM was on top, labeled The Ultra-Light life raft and Ultima-
“OPEN FIRST” and labeled underneath Light life raft had three (with a no-cost
“FIRST AID NOT INCLUDED.” The option for five) similar storage pouches
second adjacent bag included all the made of lighter-weight white nylon
first aid supplies and personal protec- fabric (as used for the sea anchor) with
tion supplies, clearly labeled. Another buoyancy-tube-fabric reinforcement.
bag included all the life raft repair and These pockets were 13.5 inches (34.3
maintenance gear. centimeters) by 7.0 inches (17.8 centi-
39 meters) by 2.5 inches, with a flap secured
The Survivor-06 hand-operated water by one-inch Velcro.
maker was not vacuum packed; it was
Techtest 406-MHz ELT with integrated inside a heavy plastic zipper-lock bag.
voice communication on 121.5 MHz, or a Survival Equipment
The vacuum-packed food remained in
global positioning system (GPS)-enabled its own packaging and was at the bottom
version of this ELT. of the SEP bag. Repair

No matter which ELT was selected, an or- Each vacuum-packed bag had a slit cut in A pair of three-inch repair clamps and
ange placard with black text and graphics it that, together with a “TEAR TO OPEN” a pair of Mirada PRV plugs (photo 40)
provided instructions on use of the ELT label pointing at the slit, made opening were included. The plugs did not float,
and was affixed to the canopy-support the bag relatively easy. Nevertheless, sur- but each was equipped with a six-foot or-
arch leg. vivors with little hand strength or with ange nylon tether to prevent loss. Adding
cold, wet, numbed hands might have a tag to suggest that the tethers should be
Survival Equipment Packs difficulty opening the vacuum-packed secured before use might prevent them
bags. Subsequently, Winslow included from being lost overboard.
SEP bags were fabricated of yellow poly- a placard with a pictorial instruction
urethane-coated nylon fabric — envelope showing the raft knife being used to open
style. Retrieval of items was easy, but they the vacuum-packed bag, should that be
remained secure in the bag with a two- necessary as backup method to manually
inch Velcro-secured flap for closure. On tearing open the bag; the placard was a
the top face of the bag was an orange helpful addition.
placard with black text, “SURVIVAL
EQUIPMENT,” with instructions to Winslow, the first life raft manufacturer
“PLACE CONTENTS IN INDIVIDUAL to offer storage pouches, provided five
POCKETS ATTACHED TO LIFE RAFT.” pouches (12 inches by 12 inches by two
The bag was equipped with a pair of ny- inches) on the Ultima life raft. These 40
lon-webbing loops at the sides that were pouches were constructed of buoyancy-
used to tie it securely to the life raft’s tube fabric and had a full-length two- Winslow also included a 30-foot roll of
floor. The bag size was adjusted for the inch Velcro seal along the top flap with duct tape, which was listed as part of the
size of the SEP. Two bags were used on an orange placard on the flap: “STOWAGE life raft repair kit. The company claimed
larger life rafts. POCKET,” with a pictorial instruction. that it has found the duct tape satisfac-
The pouches were of box-like construction tory in sealing holes and rips for as long
Inside the SEP, Winslow used the same and sufficiently large to hold anything in as seven days. Volunteers were surprised
vacuum-packing material that was used the SEP, as well as additional supplies and to see that during the evaluation, the
to pack the life raft. Each SEP had in- equipment that might be brought aboard duct tape did seem to hold in the water.

334 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Moreover, duct tape was a welcome ad- Guard-approved handheld flare. SOLAS Food
dition to life raft equipment in a survival flares or Mark 13 Day/Night flares were
situation, regardless of its leak-stopping available as options. A 3.0-inch by 5.0- S.O.S. Food Lab survival rations were
capability. inch (7.6-centimeter by 12.7-centimeter) included.
good-quality Ultimate Survival polycar-
Utility Knife bonate mil-spec mirror with a lanyard Miscellaneous
attached and a superior-quality SOLAS-
A good-quality stainless-steel lock-back specification WindStorm Safety Whistle Winslow included a small Old Testament
knife with a three-inch drop-point blade with a lanyard were included. Bible (a selection of verses; photo 42), 75.0
was included with a tether attached; a feet (22.9 meters) of parachute cord, one
lock-back knife is preferred because it Winslow also included the six-inch space blanket for every two survivors and
may help prevent an injury to a survivor. Rescue Technologies RescueStreamer a large six-mil plastic zipper-lock bag for
signaling device. This was far superior each survivor. Winslow offered the no-cost
to sea dye marker, although a small plas- option of a New Testament Bible (phrases
Flashlight
tic container of Orion sea dye marker only) or Koran (phrases only) — or the
was included. The sea dye marker was option of a spiritual text supplied by the
Winslow life rafts were first to be equipped deficient, in our opinion, because of its purchaser, or no spiritual text at all.
with a flashlight available immediately small quantity, but the RescueStreamer
upon boarding. Called the “Quick Grab” made it redundant.
flashlight, it was a high-quality waterproof
Pelican Products Magnum two AA-cell
Paddles
flashlight with a xenon bulb. The flashlight
was stored in a vertical sheath (photo 41)
Two mil-spec blue paddles with retro-
in plain view on the canopy-support arch
reflective tape and wrist tethers were
leg with an orange placard that showed a
included.
flashlight pictorial instruction. The flash-
light was tethered to the life raft; a second
Pelican Products Magnum with a tether Fishing Kit
was in the SEP. 42
A mil-spec fishing kit was included.

First Aid An assortment of optional equipment

and supplies could be customized for
An assortment of packaged first aid purchasers. Winslow also encouraged
supplies and a first aid manual were aircraft operators to provide special
packed in a plastic zipper-lock bag with items such as prescription eyeglasses and
anti-seasickness tablets (six tablets per medicines to be packed in the life raft,
survivor) and Nitrile gloves. The gloves although weight and space constraints
were much stronger than latex gloves must be considered
and were hypoallergenic, an important
consideration because of the large and Survival Manual/Life Raft
growing number of people who are al- Manual
lergic to latex.
Immediate-action instructions hung
Water from the canopy-support arch tube
and were impossible to overlook. The
A Survivor-06 hand-operated water laminated 7.0-inch by 9.0-inch (17.8-
41
maker was included with all SEPs except centimeter by 22.9-centimeter) card was
the standard SEP for the FA-ST Uni-Light printed in bold black text on yellow stock
Signaling Devices life raft. A 2.0-gallon (7.6-liter) water bag with a red-stripe border with identical
was included. Packaged ready-to-drink information on both sides. The water-
Winslow provided three Skyblazer water was not included, a deficiency, in proof flat placard was resistant to being
aerial meteor flares and an Orion Coast our opinion. crumpled in packing, so it was easy to

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 335
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

read when the life raft was inflated. The about the Winslow life raft and its equip- was the only one to include a writing
instructions were well prioritized, com- ment. The 47-page manual covered first implement.
plete and easy to understand. Volunteers aid, survival and life raft information. A
agreed that it was the best card among pencil was taped into the center of the Service
the life rafts that were evaluated. manual, and blank pages were provided
to keep a log. The current UltimaWrap vacuum-packed
Winslow produced its own waterproof life rafts had a three-year service interval.
survival manual. The manual was stored Maintaining a log was highly recom- The UltimaWrap could be retrofitted to
inside a 4-mil plastic zipper-lock bag in mended in most survival manuals, older Winslow life rafts provided their
the SEP. This manual included specific including many of those used by other condition warrants a three-year service
information and useful illustrations life raft manufacturers, yet Winslow interval. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• All of the evaluated life rafts are capable of saving lives; all life rafts are not created equal.

• There is a life raft for every constraint of budget, size and weight, but remember that this product will be
used only when your life will depend on it.

• Do the homework. Collect information from the manufacturers. Ask questions. Get answers. Compare
details. Ask for a product demonstration. Understand what you are buying.

• Given a choice, airplane operators should choose a TSO-approved Type I life raft with a self-erecting
canopy, an insulated floor and an inflatable boarding ramp. Helicopter operators must select approved life
rafts appropriately for their specific — and often very different — operational requirements.

• We know you’re going to ask, so we’re going to tell you … throughout these evaluations, most of the
volunteers preferred Winslow.

Notes Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. S.O.S. Food Virginia, U.S. Loeffler, Michelle, market-
Lab, Miami, Florida, U.S. Feb. 11, 2003. ing director. E-mail communication with
  1. Ritter, Douglas; Ritter, Sue. Interviews by Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Jan.
Rozelle, Roger. Tempe, Arizona, U.S. Aug. Virginia, U.S. 9, 2004. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexan-
20–28, 2002. Flight Safety Foundation, dria, Virginia, U.S.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.   5. Hoggle, Paul, engineering trainer and
technician; Nelson, Douglas; Saigler, Rob-   8. Miller, David, director of engineering;
  2. Bant, Jay, sales, general aviation; Henry, ert, operations manager; Stegarl, Brian, Rogers, Donna, vice president of market-
Brian, program engineer; Perdoni, Louis, chief inspector. Interviews by Rozelle, ing; Rogers, Charles Jr., president. Inter-
vice president, sales and service. Interviews Roger. Goodrich, Phoenix, Arizona, U.S. views by Rozelle, Roger. Survival Products,
by Rozelle, Roger. Air Cruisers, near Allaire Aug. 27, 2002. Flight Safety Foundation, Hollywood, Florida, U.S. Feb. 12, 2003.
Airport, New Jersey, U.S. March 14, 2003. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
  6. Edrisinha, Thivi, engineer; Elliott, James,
Virginia, U.S.
quality control supervisor; Sosa, Alain,
  9. Geits, Kate, director of administration;
  3. Oroshnik, Miriam, president and CEO; vice president of production. Interviews
Graham, Bill, chief engineer; Hall, Tom,
Oroshnik, Sam, founder; Schwartz, Mar- by Rozelle, Roger. Hoover Industries,
completion center manager; Mittelbach,
tin, chief engineer; Wheeler, Matt, director Miami, Florida, U.S. Feb. 10, 2003. Flight
Linda, director of human resources; Shoaff,
of sales. Interviews by Rozelle, Roger. Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
Irene, vice president of production; Shoaff,
Eastern Aero Marine, Miami, Florida, U.S. U.S.
Fred; Williams, David, senior technical
Aug. 13, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
  7. Kaufmann, Howard, president, RFD/ representative. Interviews by Roger Rozelle.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Revere. Telephone interview by Darby, Winslow LifeRaft Co., Lake Suzy, Florida,
  4. Ableton, Beatrice, vice president; Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Jan. 19, U.S. Oct. 20–21, 2002. Flight Safety
Koniecpolski, Stella, president. 2004. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

336 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Physical Fitness for

Life Rafts and Life Vests
Civil aviation authorities certify repair stations, and manufacturers issue
recommended maintenance procedures. The operator, however, must take
an active role in ensuring the serviceability of life rafts and life vests.

— FSF Editorial Staff

H
aving scheduled maintenance per- Maintenance intervals and procedures for life rafts,
formed for water-survival equipment the survival equipment packs (SEPs) they contain
is like having a medical check-up in- and life vests are determined by manufacturers and
stead of waiting to get very ill before by any applicable civil aviation authority regula-
seeing a doctor. The doctor might be able to restore tions.1 The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
you to health, but if a serious problem on a life raft (FAA) Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C70a,
is discovered at an inconvenient time — such as which sets standards for life rafts under FAA ju-
when your life raft is sliding down 20-foot waves risdiction, has no specifications for maintenance
and you are 100 miles from land — recovery might other than that the manufacturer must furnish
not be possible. FAA with “maintenance instructions including

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 337
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

instructions regarding inspection, repair (Air Cruisers). Two-year and three-year Practices — Aircraft Inspection and
and stowage of materials.” U.S. Department intervals are typical. Repair, FAA provides guidance for life
of Transportation (DOT) regulations re- raft maintenance (see FAA Advisory
quire pressurized cylinders, including the Considering the maintenance interval Circular 43.13-1B, Acceptable Methods,
inflation cylinders on life rafts, to be hy- only for the life raft, however, can be Techniques and Practices — Aircraft
drostatically tested — every five years for misleading. Air Cruisers, despite its six- Inspection and Repair, page 339).
metallic cylinders, every three years for year recommended life raft maintenance
some composite-material cylinders.2 interval, specifies a three-year interval for Winslow lists the steps that its factory and
hydrostatic testing of the inflation cylin- authorized service stations perform dur-
Manufacturers provide customers with a der (as U.S. regulations require). On Air ing a standard inspection, excluding any
list of authorized maintenance facilities, Cruisers life rafts, the SEP (which also has repairs that must be made if the life raft
which often include independent con- a recommended maintenance interval of fails any of the required functional tests
tractors as well as the manufacturer’s three years) and inflation cylinder are (see “One Repair Station’s Standard Life
facility. Douglas Nelson, manager aviation removable for maintenance without un- Raft Inspection Procedures,” page 340).
life rafts for Goodrich Aircraft Interior packing the life raft. Nevertheless, while
Products (AIP), described the process by the life raft is thus out of service, it seems Life raft inflation cylinders are manufac-
which his company authorizes indepen- unlikely that an operator would not have tured of aluminum, steel or composite
dent repair stations certificated by FAA or the life raft inspected at the same time. materials. Aluminum is more expen-
approved maintenance organizations by sive and lighter than steel. Composite
the European Joint Aviation Authorities Maintenance intervals for life rafts can materials (e.g., aluminum/fiberglass,
(JAA). vary among different TSO models made aluminum/Kevlar and aluminum/
by the same company. Martin Schwartz, carbon) are lightest of all.
“In order to be [authorized], facilities must Chief Engineer for Eastern Aero Marine
pass an initial audit screening,” Nelson said. (EAM), said that larger life rafts tend to Mark Trudgeon, business development
“A report is generated from this audit and have longer inspection intervals because manager at Luxfer (a manufacturer of
provided to the facility for review and, as they are used by commercial operators that composite cylinders and aluminum
necessary, corrective action. Each provider have their own inspection programs.4 cylinders), said that carbon composite
is trained to perform the various life raft cylinders are about one-half the weight
inspection, maintenance and minor- The recommended life raft inspection of aluminum cylinders and 40 percent of
repair procedures at our AIP Aquatic interval also can change as the life raft the weight of steel cylinders.5
Test Facility in Phoenix [Arizona, U.S.]. ages. Winslow LifeRaft Co. specifies that
Training is structured according to the de- its aviation life rafts will have initial In 2001, DOT extended the hydrostatic
tailed procedures in Goodrich’s technical maintenance two years after the date of test interval from three years to five years
documentation. Recurrent training must manufacture; two years after the initial for carbon composite cylinders (but not
be scheduled within prescribed guidelines maintenance; and every year following for composites of other materials).
for the facility to remain [authorized]. the second maintenance interval. (If
Each [authorized] facility is supported by a a Winslow life raft is vacuum packed The inflation cylinder hydrostatic test is
Goodrich AIP factory-owned service center — which the company says that all of its intended to ensure that the pressurized
in its region, which continues to be avail- life rafts for corporate aviation customers cylinder retains sufficient strength so
able to the facility for technical support. are — the maintenance interval is three as not to risk an explosive failure. The
Periodic audits are conducted at each years.) Goodrich recommends a first cylinder is placed in a sealed water-filled
[authorized] location to ensure that the maintenance for all of its life rafts after container and pressurized with water
[authorization] terms are being met.”3 two years, and annually after that. to greater than the cylinder’s working
pressure (a typical ratio is 5-to-3). That
“The annual maintenance involves a causes the cylinder to expand, and the
Recommended thorough system inspection, with com- expansion is measured by the amount of
Maintenance Intervals ponent-system testing as required,” said water displaced from the container. When
Can Be Misleading Nelson. “We recommend a detailed sys- the pressure is released from the cylinder,
tem overhaul, including a functional test the amount of displaced water is mea-

M anufacturers establish recom-

mended maintenance intervals
for life rafts. Intervals range from one
of all components, every five years.”

In Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1B,

sured again. The difference between the
total amount of water displaced and the
amount of water displaced after the pres-
year (Survival Products) to six years Acceptable Methods, Techniques and sure is released represents the cylinder’s

338 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1B, Acceptable Methods,

Techniques and Practices — Aircraft Inspection and Repair
The document includes the following, introduced at the fitting normally It is suggested that serviceable [life]
among other provisions: connected to the CO2 bottle(s). rafts be marked to indicate the date
After at least one hour, to allow for of inspection and that soapstone be
9-38. Life Raft Inspections. Inspection the air within the [life] raft to adjust used when folding them preparatory
of life rafts should be performed in ac- itself to the ambient temperature, to insertion into the carrying case.
cordance with the manufacturer’s speci- check pressure and adjust, if nec- Take care to see that all of the [life]
fications. General inspection procedures essary, to two psi and allow the [life] raft’s required equipment is on board
to be performed on most life rafts are as raft to stand for 24 hours. If, after and properly stowed. If the [life] raft
follows. 24 hours, the pressure is less than lanyard, used to prevent the [life] raft
one psi [703 kgf/m2], examine the from floating away from the airplane,
Caution: Areas where life rafts are in- [life] raft for leakage by using soapy is in need of replacement, use a
spected or tested must be smooth [and] water. lanyard not less than 20 feet long and
free of splinters, sharp projections and oil having a breaking strength of about
stains. Floor with abrasive characteristics, In order to eliminate pressure 75 pounds [34 kilograms];
such as concrete or rough wood, will be variations due to temperature
covered with untreated tarpaulins or heavy differences at the time the initial b. It is recommended that the afore-
clean paper. and final readings are taken, test mentioned procedure be repeated
the [life] raft in a room where the every 18 months using the CO2
a. Inspect life rafts for cuts, tears or temperature is fairly constant. If the bottle(s) for inflation.1 
other damage to the rubberized pressure drop is satisfactory, the
Note
material. If the [life] raft is found [life] raft should be considered as
to be in good condition, remove being in an airworthy condition and   1. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
the CO2 [carbon dioxide] bottle(s) returned to service after being fitted (FAA). Advisory Circular 43.13-1B,
[inflation cylinder(s)] and inflate the with correctly charged CO2 bottles Acceptable Methods, Techniques
[life] raft with air to a pressure of as determined by weighing them. and Practices — Aircraft Inspection
two psi [pounds per square inch; [Life] rafts more than five years old and Repair. Section 3, “Emergency
1,406 kilogram-force per square are likely to be unairworthy due to Equipment.” Paragraph 9–38, “Life
meter (kgf/m2)]. The air should be deterioration. Raft Inspections.” Sept. 8, 1998.

permanent expansion, which must typi- Maintenance: ounces [118 milliliters]), five years; bat-
cally be not more than 10 percent; other- The Inside Story teries, three years; desalter kit, five years;
wise, the cylinder must be replaced. iodine swabs, three years; and ammonia

M aintenance of supplementary inhalant, five years.8

“Besides the hydrostatic test, an internal items carried inside the life raft is
and external visual inspection is very also important. The Kataydn Survivor-06 hand-operated
important,” said Douglas Svoboda, Chief water maker (also known as a manual re-
Inspector at Flightpath Services, who Ricardo Salisbury, EAM repair station verse-osmosis desalinator) is flushed with
performs inspections of life raft inflation manager, said that the inspection inter- biocide to prevent growth of algae and
cylinders. “We look for corrosion as well vals of the available SEPs are designed bacteria, according to the water maker
as cracking and any other indications of to coincide with inspections of the manufacturer’s instructions (see “Water
damage, which could lead to failure.”6 company’s life rafts for which the SEPs Maker Maintenance Interval Clarified,”
are intended. Life-limited items include page 184).
At any approved maintenance facility, a flares and rations.7
repair technician or final inspector au- First aid kits also include life-limited
thorized by the repair station signs FAA Hoover Industries says that basic items in items that must be kept current. In first
Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Approval Tag, its survival kits have the following expira- aid kits supplied by EAM, the life-limited
or an approved equivalent document be- tion periods after the dates marked on the items include pharmaceutical drugs, burn
fore the life raft can be legally returned items: day/night flare, 42 months; rations compounds, antiseptic swabs, ammonia
to service. (2,000 calories), four years; water (four Continued on page 341

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

One Repair Station’s Standard Life Raft Inspection Procedures

  1. Log life raft as received in the life cylinder must be recharged after c. Inspect all batteries;
raft receiving log; required components have been
replaced; d. Test flashlights;
  2. Open service work order, and
record the following life raft   9. If firing head and cylinder head e. Inspect food rations and water
information: are over the five-year service-life packs for leaks and general
span, or will be prior to the next ­condition;
a. Customer information; service-due date, then the firing
f. Inspect first aid kit; [and,]
head and cylinder head must be
b. Shipment information;
rebuilt; g. Perform service of … water
c. Incoming dimensions; maker unit, if included (service
10. Inflate life raft using filtered dry
includes recertification and
d. Incoming weight; air;
biocide treatment);

e. Life raft serial number; 11. Detach survival equipment

20. Apply … magnesium silicate
[pack];
dessicant;
f. Date of manufacture and last
service; [and,] 12. Inspect life raft attachments
21. Repack survival equipment [pack],
(grasp lines, sea-anchor line,
including any customer-supplied
g. A n y s p e c i a l c u s t o m e r etc.) for security of attachment;
items;
requirement(s);
13. Inspect stencils for condition and
22. Deflate life raft and pull vacuum
  3. Perform visual inspection of va- ­conspicuity;
to [meet specifications];
lise, canister, hard pack or Pelican
Pac [an airtight, watertight suit- 14. Inspect canopy for condition and
23. Fold life raft per service manual
case-type container] and general function;
procedures and data for that life
condition; raft model and configuration;
15. Perform pressure-retention tests
  4. Remove life raft from valise, canis- for buoyancy tubes, arch tube
24. Place inside valise, canister, hard
ter, hard pack or Pelican Pac and and floor;
pack or Pelican Pac;
unfold life raft;
16. Perform pressure-relief valve
25. Place in compaction unit to
  5. Detach inflation system and re- test;
achieve final required pack height.
cord the following information: Life raft is compacted to size uti-
17. Perform arch-tube-transfer valve
test; lizing [a] compaction unit;
a. Cylinder serial number;
18. Verify canopy lights for function 26. Close and secure valise, canister,
b. Cylinder weight;
and battery condition (swollen hard pack or Pelican Pac;
c. Date of last cylinder hydro- water-activated batteries must
27. Record the following information:
static test. (If past due, or due be replaced);
prior to the next service-due “a. Outgoing dimensions;
date, then hydrostatic testing 19. Perform inspection of survival-
must be performed); [and,] equipment components:
“b. Outgoing weight; [and,]
a. Verify expiration date of all
d. Firing head serial number; “c. Next service-due date;
items with a limited useful life,
  6. If cylinder is [less than] or [more replace any items [that have] 28. Affix … serial-numbered service-
than] the required weight, then the expired or that will expire validation certificate;
cylinder must be recharged; before the next service-due
date; 29. Complete all service paperwork;
  7. Perform inspection of inflation
system and components; b. Inspect all pyrotechnics for 30. Prepare life raft for shipment;
general condition ([ensure [and,]
  8. If inflation system components that] flares are not leaking
need to be replaced, then the chemicals [or] crushed); 31. Ship life raft to customer. 

Source: Winslow LifeRaft Co.

340 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

inhalants and the “eye dressing packet.” these corners are in contact with the has been certificated by FAA to conduct
Salisbury said, “The expiration periods carrying cases, or with adjacent parts of this inspection.”
for life-limited items in the first aid kit the rubberized fabric, they tend to wear
are those set by the manufacturers. The through due to vibration.” The AC says
average is probably something like three that life vests should be inspected at 12- Life Vests Require
years.” month intervals for “cuts, tears or other Approved Maintenance
damage to the rubberized material.”
In addition to checking expiration
dates, a typical inspection of a first aid
kit includes scrutinizing items such as
AC 91-69A, Seaplane Safety for [FARs]
Part 91 Operators, says, “Any FAA-
S ome aircraft operators’ maintenance
technicians assume that they can
inspect and repair life vests because
bandages, splints, compresses and sterile approved flotation gear [life vests] they conduct maintenance using similar
gloves for damage or contamination. The used in operations for compensation materials, Kalinowski said. FAA specifi-
first aid kit container also is inspected for or hire must be inspected at least ev- cally approves repair stations to inspect
damage to latches, handles, mounting ery 12 months by persons authorized and repair life vests because proper
hardware and inside-lid gaskets. by [U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations manufacturer’s manuals, procedures,
(FARS)] Part 43. This inspection would tools, materials, parts lists, test equip-
Life vests are less complex than life rafts, be included in the annual or 100-hour ment and standards of shop cleanliness
and manufacturers recommend a longer inspection for the aircraft or under any are required.
maintenance interval for life vests than other inspection program that the op-
for life rafts. RFD/Revere says that its erator is authorized to use.” Despite the Helicopter operators and other aircraft
aerospace life jackets can be in service for regulatory tone of the AC’s language, operators that use constant-wear styles of
10 years before maintenance is needed. FAA issues ACs to explain specific ways TSO-C13f life vests (see “Your Life Vest
Hoover says that the maintenance inter- to meet a regulation. Because it is ac- Can Save Your Life … If It Doesn’t Kill
val for its life vests is “up to 10 years,” ceptable to use other methods, the AC You First,” page 346) often establish with
although the 10-year interval is recom- is not a requirement. FAA an alternative, ongoing method of
mended only for airlines that qualify by complying with inspection and mainte-
virtue of “proper handling and quality The inflation cylinder on a life vest is nance requirements, she said.
systems”; the standard recommended not required to undergo a hydrostatic
maintenance interval is two years. EAM test, but its integrity is checked. The “For example, if helicopter pilots wear the
specifies a first maintenance 60 months cylinder is weighed to determine if the life vest daily, aircraft operators often will
after the life vest is placed aboard an air- measured weight closely matches the develop their own criteria for in-house
craft but no later than 63 months from weight marked on the cylinder, which safety inspections that exceed the FAA re-
the date of manufacture, and subsequent indicates whether there has been gas quirements, such as regularly checking the
maintenance at 60-month intervals. leakage. “Unless the cylinder has been life [vest] by unpacking and orally inflat-
fired or fails the weight test, it doesn’t ing the cell every three months,” Kalinowski
Some advisories differ from manufactur- need to be replaced at inspection time,” said. “Sometimes they perform their own
ers’ recommendations about life limits or said Gerry Audlee, former EAM repair routine maintenance, then obtain an an-
recommended maintenance intervals for station manager.9 nual inspection by a repair station that is
life vests. FAA-approved for life [vests].”
Requirements for inspection, maintenance
AC 43.13-1B says, “Inflatable life [vests] and airworthiness approval of life vests FAA says that life vests should be inspect-
are subject to general deterioration due have been areas of misunderstanding, ed in accordance with the manufacturer’s
to aging. Experience has indicated that said Kathleen Kalinowski, aviation sales specifications, unless climate, storage or
such equipment may be in need of re- manager of Switlik Parachute Co.10 operational conditions indicate the need
placement at the end of five years due to for more frequent inspections. The in-
porosity of the rubber-coated material. “Pilots often call us and ask about the spection will include:
Wear of such equipment is accelerated safety of carrying aboard their aircraft life
when stowed on board aircraft because vests that have not been not inspected for • Looking for cuts, tears or other
of vibration, which causes chafing of the many years,” Kalinowski said. “Because damage to the rubberized (urethane-
rubberized fabric. This ultimately results urethane-coated fabric will deteriorate coated) material;
in localized leakage. Leakage is also likely under conditions of high heat and high
to occur where the fabric is folded be- humidity, life vests in the United States • Checking the oral-inflation valves
cause sharp corners are formed. When must be inspected by a repair station that and tubing for leakage, corrosion,

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

deterioration and proper operation Maintenance Under Part 145.1, a manufacturer for-
of the discharge mechanism for the Facilities Receive merly could be issued a repair station
carbon-dioxide gas cylinder; certificate with a limited rating to main-
Thorough Oversight
tain its own products without being re-
• Removing, checking and correctly quired to meet many of the requirements
reinstalling the carbon-dioxide gas
cylinder(s);11
L ife raft maintenance facilities must be
certificated under FARs Part 145 or
any other civil aviation authority having
of Part 145. Such a repair facility is called
a manufacturer’s maintenance facility
(MMF). A revision to Part 145, effective
jurisdiction.
• Testing the ability of the inflation Jan. 31, 2004, has eliminated the special
cells to maintain rigidity for 12 hours provisions for MMFs, and MMFs have to
after inflation with air or carbon di- Organizations whose work is restricted transition to meeting all the requirements
oxide. (Inflation with carbon dioxide to maintaining life rafts and other wa- for a certificated repair station.14
every 24 months is recommended ter-survival equipment can qualify for a
because the gas permeates the fab- limited rating under FARs Part 145.61 A U.S. Part 145 repair station certificate
ric at a faster rate than air and will (formerly Part 145.33). A limited rating or rating stays in effect indefinitely, unless
indicate if the porosity of the mate- applies to “a certificated repair station it is surrendered, suspended or revoked.
rial is excessive.) If repairable leaks that maintains or alters only a particular A non-U.S. repair station certificated
cannot be identified by immersion type of airframe, powerplant, propeller, under Part 145, such as a repair station
in soapy water, the life vest fails the radio, instrument or accessory, or part used by a U.S.-registered air carrier in
test because of excessive deteriora- thereof, or performs only specialized another country, must apply for renewal
tion and porosity of the material; maintenance requiring equipment and before the certificate expires 12 months
skills not ordinarily performed under after the date on which the certificate was
• Checking for abrasions, chafing and other repair station ratings.” issued. Certification can be renewed for
soiling across folded cell areas and 24 months.
around metal parts; Life raft and life vest maintenance or-
ganizations must have a limited rating Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR)-145,
• Checking for separation of cell under Part 145.61(b)(10), “Emergency Approved Maintenance Organisations, is a
fabric and loose attachments along equipment.” Like all certificated repair set of requirements established by JAA and
the edges of patches and sealing stations, those with a limited rating for adopted by all national aviation authori-
tapes; emergency equipment must follow the ties (NAAs) that are JAA members. The
requirements in Part 145.207 and Part European Aviation Safety Agency, which
• Checking for deterioration in areas 145.209 for a repair station manual; and became operational Sept. 28, 2003, has
contaminated by oil or grease; the requirements of Part 145.211 for a assumed the responsibility for civil avia-
quality control system. tion safety among nations in the European
• Operating snaps and/or buckles; Union. (JAA will continue to have jurisdic-
Obtaining FAA certification as a Part tion over its member nations that do not
• Verifying that operating instructions 145 repair station, which can require belong to the European Union.) JAR-145
are ­readable; six months or more, involves approval specifies that aircraft registered in JAA
by the FAA Flight Standards District member countries must be maintained
• Checking stitching for gaps, pulls Office (FSDO) with jurisdiction for the by an organization approved or accepted
and tears; geographical location of the repair sta- by JAA.
tion. Certification procedures follow the
• Visually inspecting the cell containers FAA Airworthiness Inspector’s Handbook JAR-145 acceptance can be obtained
for snags, cuts, loose stitching and (Order 8300.10, Vol. 2, Chapter 162). by a repair station that meets detailed
contamination/deterioration by oil requirements for facilities; personnel;
or grease; “A maintenance organization that applies certifying staff; equipment, tools and
for FAA certification under Part 145 is re- material; maintenance data; production
• Checking hardware for rusted parts quired to submit a repair station manual,” planning; certification of maintenance;
or broken parts and serviceable cot- said Manuel Miranda, quality assurance, maintenance records; occurrence report-
ter pins; and, Winslow. “FAA will come in and audit the ing; maintenance procedures and quality
organization’s records, procedures, poli- system; and a “maintenance organization
• Checking the condition and opera- cies — even every form used — before it exposition” describing in detail the repair
tion of the survivor-locator light.12 assigns a rating.”13 station’s management, the approved

342 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

scope of work, manpower resources, • “A statement by the accountable space on work orders for the repair
notification procedures for changes in manager, as defined by JAR-145, of 10 Goodrich life rafts, although
the organization, a description of the which commits the repair station to the FAA investigation report said
organization’s procedures and quality these special conditions. … ; [and,] that he performed no work on the
system, and other items. life rafts and that his initials had been
• “The repair station must specify written by someone else.
A repair station located in the United the items to be contracted and
States and certificated under Part 145 have procedures in place to ensure • The repairs to the first of the 10
can qualify for acceptance by JAA under that contractors meet the terms of life rafts did not conform to the
JAR-145.10(c), provided it meets special these implementation procedures; manufacturer’s ­specifications.
conditions in addition to those for Part that is, using a JAA-accepted source
145. JAA acceptance is valid for up to two or, if using a non-JAA-certificated FAA said, “C&M applied glue to the
years. source, the repair station returning seams of the life raft to prevent air
the product to service is responsible leakage. The Goodrich repair manual
For JAR-145 acceptance, a Part 145 repair for ensuring its airworthiness.” prescribes that a leaking seam either
station must provide a supplement to its be opened and rebonded, or repaired
inspection procedures manual, accepted When an FAA inspector observes a viola- with the application of a ‘bridge’ of
by FAA on behalf of the applicable NAA, tion of approved procedure, administra- fabric across the seam, as appropri-
that includes the following: tive actions result. Those actions can be ate. At the time C&M approved the
an informal notice, a formal warning life raft for return to service, the life
• “Detailed procedures for the op- or imposition of a financial penalty. raft had not passed the Goodrich
eration of an independent quality- Suspensions and revocations of repair prescribed air-retention test.
monitoring system; stations certificated under FARs Part 145
are rare. Suspension or revocation of certi- “Despite the seam leak, C&M re-
• “Procedures for the release or ap- fication is generally limited to situations in turned [the life raft] to its customer,
proval for return to service that meet which there are multiple noncompliance Electronic Data Systems (EDS), as if
the requirements of JAR-145.50 issues or noncompliance over a lengthy it had been properly repaired.” The
for aircraft and the use of the FAA period. life raft was installed in a Gulfstream
Form 8130-3 for aircraft compo- aircraft that carried passengers on
nents, and any other information 12 international overwater flights
required by the owner or operator
Certification before the unairworthy life raft was
as appropriate; Revocations Reveal removed from service.
Falsified Maintenance
• “Procedures to ensure that repairs • C&M performed maintenance on two
and modifications as defined by
JAA requirements are accomplished
in accordance with data approved by
F light Safety Foundation requested
from FAA a list of repair-station cer-
tification revocations since Jan. 1, 1993.
life rafts manufactured by Winslow
and approved them for return to ser-
vice on March 19, 2001, and May 11,
[the NAA]; The Foundation then obtained, through 2001, respectively. On July 20, 2001,
the Freedom of Information Act, details of Winslow inspected the two life rafts.
• “Procedures for reporting of un- two recent revocations that involved facili-
airworthy conditions as required ties servicing water-survival equipment. FAA said,“The Winslow Co. observed
by JAR-145 on civil aeronautical the following nonconformities and
products to [the NAA], aircraft de- On Dec. 27, 2001, FAA issued an Emergency discrepancies regarding C&M’s life
sign organization and the customer Order of Revocation concerning C&M raft servicing p
­ rocedures:
or operator; Marine of Addison, Texas, U.S.
– “Tangled sea-anchor line packed
• “Procedures to ensure complete- The revocation order included the fol- between folds;
ness of and compliance with the lowing findings:
customer or operator work order – “Expired survival-equipment
or contract, including notified • The initials of a C&M employee who items not replaced;
[NAA] airworthiness directives was certificated for maintenance of
and other notified mandatory inflatable life vests — not life rafts – “Installed damaged survival-
instructions; — appeared in the “Technician” equipment items;

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

– “Life raft packed with incom- clear heavy plastic bags. The bags as lightweight, compact and
plete survival equipment; did not meet the TSO certification ‘Government Approved,’” said the
requirements; UPN. “The ‘yellow tags’ attached
– “Installed water-activated bat- to the life rafts give the appearance
tery manufactured in January • “The aforesaid major alterations that Survival Products Inc. is a
1976;15 were made without approved data; certificated repair station and that
the life rafts were inspected and
– “Protective foam not installed • “LSSH approved a total of 346 al- approved for return to service.
over inflation system; tered life [vests] for return to service Survival Products Inc. does not
from November 1997 to February hold an FAA production approval
– “Valise laces not trimmed after 1999. All of the altered life [vests] for the life rafts, nor is Survival
life raft–sizing operation; were unapproved as described above Products Inc. an FAA-certificated
and, therefore, unairworthy; [and,] repair station.”
– “Life raft canopy not properly
arranged; and, • “On Dec. 31, 1997, the chief inspec- [Survival Products now manufac-
tor of LSSH left the company’s em- tures some life rafts that are ap-
– “Broken life raft oars.” ploy. From that date through June proved under TSO-C70a. With the
18, 1998, LSSH had no authorized elimination of the MMF provisions
The individual who was part owner, chief personnel to inspect or approve avia- of FARs Part 145, the company is
inspector and shop supervisor of C&M tion equipment for return to service. not currently performing factory
Marine pleaded guilty to falsely certify- Nevertheless, from Jan. 1, 1998, to maintenance. It is, however, in the
ing to FAA that repairs had been made to June 18, 1998, LSSH approved 174 process of obtaining FAA repair sta-
life rafts used as survival gear on aircraft. life [vests] for return to service.” tion certification.]
He was ordered by a U.S. District Court
judge to pay US$2,000 in fines and resti- [In its settlement with FAA, LSSH de- • March 4, 2002: Aircraft emergency
tution of $3,413. nied any wrongdoing, and the parties equipment serviced by J.F. McRae
agreed that the settlement did not con- Aero-Craft.
FAA revoked the repair station certifi- stitute an admission by LSSH of the FAA
cate of Life Support Systems Hawaii ­allegations.] “Information received during [an
(LSSH), effective Nov. 1, 2000. FAA FAA] suspected unapproved parts
found that: Another administrative action available investigation indicated that J.F.
to FAA is the issuance of an Unapproved McRae Aero-Craft Inc., a former
• “Airline life [vests] had been altered Parts Notification (UPN). A UPN can FAA-certificated repair station … ,
with a pull-tab sewn to the top of be published when FAA determines improperly maintained and ap-
the vest and a carrying pouch sewn that a repair station has improperly proved for return to service various
to the lower waist strap. Accordingly, maintained and approved for return to emergency equipment, including
the airline life [vests] had been al- service a component, or that an original life vests and [life] rafts,” said the
tered to represent quick-donning life equipment manufacturer has sold unap- UPN. “Specifically, evidence indi-
[vests]; proved equipment. cates that McRae maintained and
approved for return to service the
• “Approved quick-donning life FAA records for recent years show three following life vests without using
[vests] had been altered by having UPNs related to servicing and sales of current maintenance manuals,
the approved pouches removed and life raft equipment and water-survival instructions for continued air-
replaced. The replacement pouches equipment: worthiness and the tooling and
did not meet the requirements equipment required by [FARs]
of the manufacturer’s Technical • Sept. 3, 1998: Life rafts manufactured Parts 43 and 145.” The life vests
Standard Order (TSO)-C13d, C13e by Survival Products. cited were Air Cruisers model
or C13f [Life Preservers] for testing AC-2, Eastern Aero Marine model
or ­markings; “An [FAA] unapproved parts in- KSE-35L8 and Switlik model
vestigation revealed that Survival AV-35.
• “Airline-passenger life preserver Products Inc. manufactures life
pouches had been altered by replac- rafts and advertises them for sale • July 1, 2002: Emergency inflatable
ing the outer cases with unauthorized in popular aviation publications life rafts serviced by C&M Marine.

344 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The UPN was issued for the for emergency inflatable life rafts until a determination can be made
violations that later resulted in the maintained or approved for return regarding each life raft’s eligibility
certification revocation for C&M to service by C&M. Verification for i­ nstallation.”
Marine. should be conducted indepen-
dently of information provided on Having the work done by a manufacturer-
FAA issued the following recom- any work order or return-to-service authorized repair station minimizes the
mendation in the UPN: entry. You should take appropriate risk of improper maintenance. A greater
action if any of these life rafts have risk is neglecting timely maintenance.
“Aircraft owners, operators, main- been installed in an aircraft. If any Actual emergency use imposes a severe
tenance organizations, manufactur- existing inventory includes these test on life rafts and life vests, and the
ers and parts distributors should life rafts, the FAA recommends cost of their malfunctioning in the water
inspect their aircraft, aircraft that you quarantine the equipment can be considerably greater than the cost
records, and/or parts inventories to prevent installation on an aircraft of periodic maintenance. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Manufacturers set maintenance intervals for life rafts and life vests.

• Maintenance should be performed by manufacturer-authorized repair stations.

• Life raft and life vest maintenance facilities must be certificated by the government authority having
­jurisdiction.

• Repair station wrongdoing in servicing life rafts and life vests appears to be rare.

Notes   6. Svoboda, Douglas. Telephone interview manufacturer of life vests for aviation use
by Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., and marine use.
  1. The term maintenance is used here to Jan. 15, 2004. Flight Safety Foundation,
mean any type of regular service, includ- Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 11. A routine inspection of one inflatable life
ing inspection, repair and time-limited vest worn by U.S. Navy aviators revealed
component replacement.   7. Salisbury, Ricardo. Telephone interview that the device had been packed carelessly
by Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., and that carbon-dioxide cartridges had not
  2. Periodic-test requirements and Dec. 16, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, been attached to actuators; further investi-
specifications are contained in the Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. gation revealed that four of seven life vests
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, had been packed and inspected incorrectly
49 CFR 173.34.   8. Hull, Tyler, sales, Hoover Industries.
by one inspector. Brodhead, Daniel W.
E-mail communication with Darby, Rick.
“Saving Lives With Life Preservers.” Mech.
  3. Nelson, Douglas. E-mail communica- Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., Dec. 22, 2003.
U.S. Naval Safety Center. Spring 2002.
tion with Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Virginia, U.S., Aug. 4, 2003. Flight Safety Virginia, U.S. 12. FAA. Advisory Circular 43.13-1B.
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
  9. Audlee, Gerry. Telephone interview by 13. Miranda, Manuel. Telephone interview
  4. Schwartz, Martin. Telephone interview Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., by Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.,
by Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., Aug. 27, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Dec. 4, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
Jan. 15, 2004. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
10. Kalinowski, Kathleen. Telephone inter- 14. Federal Register, Sept. 29, 2003, p. 55819.
  5. Trudgeon, Mark. Telephone interview by view by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., Virginia, U.S. April 15, 2003. Flight 15. Winslow recommends that every battery,
Feb. 4, 2004. Flight Safety foundation, Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia. including water-activated batteries, be
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. U.S. Switlik Parachute Co. is a U.S. replaced at four-year intervals.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 345
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Your Life Vest Can Save Your Life …

If It Doesn’t Kill You First
The life vest, properly used, reduces your risk of drowning. But if the life vest is
inflated at the wrong time, don’t count on escaping from a sinking aircraft.

— FSF Editorial Staff

I
n water, aircraft cockpits and cabins suddenly a­ utomatically when immersed — can make escape
can turn into traps for unwary crewmembers impossible if water is filling the aircraft. Inflating
or passengers who wear the wrong type of an aviation life vest before evacuating can be just
life vest or improperly use a life vest. One as deadly.
wrong decision before an overwater flight — such
as carrying a marine life vest made of inherently While planning overwater operations, aircraft op-
buoyant materials or wearing one that inflates erators must take informed decisions about the

346 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

following issues to ensure safe flotation means and “FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C72c,
for individuals: Individual Flotation Devices,” page 459). Many
countries have adopted TSO-C13f, and the U.K.
• The specific type of life vest to be used by Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) — which has ap-
crewmembers; proved life vests for public transport aircraft under
Specification no. 5 — soon will adopt a European
• The specific type of life vest to be used by TSO that is harmonized with TSO-C13f.
passengers;

• The nominal time available to don life vests in Newest Standard Requires
scenarios of ditching and other water-contact Best Performance
accidents, and whether life vests will be worn
during flight;

• Crewmember training and passenger brief-

T he following comparison of TSO-C13f and
TSO-C72c shows why TSO-C13f life vests
provide superior characteristics and performance:
ings about donning life vests and using them
effectively; and, • TSO-C13f buoyancy tests conducted in fresh
water at 72 degrees Fahrenheit (F; 22 degrees
• Proper stowage and regular maintenance of Celsius [C]) must show that adult life vests
life vests. and adult–child combination life vests provide
a minimum buoyant force of 35 pounds (16
The terms “life vest,” “life preserver,” “lifejacket,”
kilograms), child life vests provide a minimum
“individual flotation device” and “personal
buoyant force of 25 pounds (11 kilograms)
flotation device” describe various inflatable de-
and infant–small child life vests provide a
vices cited by civil aviation authorities to provide
minimum buoyant force of 20 pounds (nine
emergency flotation to an aircraft crewmember or
kilograms) for at least eight hours. (Buoyant
passenger. Life vests are the best option to keep a
force is the weight of fresh water displaced by
person afloat, whether conscious or unconscious, The newest
the life vest when totally submerged.);
but some civil aviation regulations also allow the
U.S. standards for
approval of noninflatable aircraft equipment
• TSO-C72c buoyancy tests conducted in fresh aviation life vests
— such as seat cushions — as “approved flotation
water at 85 degrees F (29 degrees C) must show permit designs with
means for each occupant” in some contexts (i.e.,
that not less than 14.0 pounds (6.4 kilograms) a single buoyancy
not-for-hire operations beyond power-off gliding
of buoyancy (i.e., the amount of weight the
distance but less than 50 nautical miles [93 kilo- chamber.
device can support at this temperature) is
meters] from the nearest shore). For consistency in
provided for eight hours;
this publication, “life vest” has been adopted.

Since 1995, when the U.S. Coast Guard published • TSO-C13f requires that the
its standards for inflatable life vests designed for life vest must right the wearer
recreational boating, the variety of life vests on the (turn the wearer to a face-up
market has been a source of confusion. Although position) within five seconds,
U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) provide maintain a completely relaxed
latitude for use of such Coast Guard-approved ma- wearer in the required flotation
rine devices when FARs do not specify U.S. Federal attitude and keep the wearer’s
Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved life vests mouth and nose clear of the
or other FAA-approved flotation means, aircraft op- water line;
erators are well advised to follow the conservative
strategy of carrying only FAA-approved life vests. • TSO-C72c contains no require-
Moreover, of two FAA technical standard orders ment for righting the wearer or
(TSOs) for the approval of life vests — TSO-C13f, maintaining freeboard (for life
Life Preservers (1992), and TSO-C72c, Individual vests, freeboard is the distance
Flotation Devices (1987) — TSO-C13f 1 standards between the lowest point of the
are superior (see “FAA Technical Standard Order wearer’s mouth and the water
(TSO)-C13f, Life Preservers [Life Vests],” page 452, surface);

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

• TSO-C13f contains specific performance on physical fitness or swim-

“T
standards for infant–small child devices and ming skill alone to prevent
requires tethers for these devices; drowning. An additional
purpose is to delay the onset he main
• TSO-C72c does not include standards for in- of hypothermia by enabling
fant–small child devices but makes seat cush- the wearer to move from the cause of death after
ions, headrests, armrests, pillows or similar aircraft into a life raft or into
aircraft equipment eligible for approval as a rescue device with the least- ditching is drowning,
flotation devices if they comply with the possible physical exertion and
minimum requirements for safety and per- by slowing the loss of body usually hastened by
formance. Many safety specialists, however, heat by keeping the survivor’s
consider such equipment inferior to life vests head out of the water and by hypothermia and/or
(but suitable as a backup to life vests that are providing some insulation
lost or damaged in a water-contact accident); to the upper torso (see “Is exhaustion.”
There a Doctor Aboard the
• Typical users of TSO-C13f devices must be Life Raft?” page 187).
able to remove the life vest from its storage
package and don the life vest without assis- Ideally, the life vest rights the body and floats the
tance within 25 seconds by securing no more body by changing the wearer’s buoyancy — so
than one attachment and making no more that the combined body and life vest weigh less
than one adjustment for fit (the standard ex- than the volume of water they displace — and by
cludes the infant–small child device from this repositioning the buoyancy forces to keep the head
requirement, specifies how many test subjects above the water surface. Body mass/fat, lung size,
must be able to do this, and contains different clothing and whether the water is rough or calm
requirements for attaching a life vest to a child determine whether a person inherently will sink or
and for simulating the placement of a child float without a life vest and without treading water.
in an infant–small child device); The Coast Guard said that most adults require
7.0 pounds to 12.0 pounds (3.2 kilograms to 5.4
• TSO-C72c says that life vests “must be capable of kilograms) of additional buoyancy to minimally
being utilized by the intended user with ease”; keep their heads above water.

• Unlike TSO-C72c, TSO-C13f contains require- The wearer’s ability to escape from a sinking air-
ments for oral inflation, overpressure protec- craft takes priority in the design of aviation life
tion (i.e., no damage if the mechanical inflator vests. In some water-contact accidents, aircraft oc-
discharges carbon dioxide into an inflated life cupants were trapped under water because their
vest), deliberate-deflation capability and rein- life vest prevented them from passing through an
flation capability, high-visibility color, preven- emergency exit, door or window or because they
tion of inadvertent release of life vest fasteners, could not overcome with human strength the
adjustment in the water, an unobstructed view, buoyancy of their inflated life vest (or an inher-
an automatically activated survivor-locator ently buoyant device) to descend to an underwater
light and legible instructions that can be read exit. Life vests also are more susceptible to punc-
while wearing the life vest; and, tures and snagging while inflated.

• TSO-C13f requires tests for resistance of coated A U.K. CAA analysis of ditching data from the
fabrics, seams and webbing to tearing, punc- United States and the United Kingdom, cited in
ture, wear and deterioration, and operation of 2000, found that life vests were an important factor
inflators and valves, that generally exceed simi- in survival after ditching.2
lar testing requirements under TSO-C72c.
“In many cases, the deceased persons did not have
The primary purpose of a life vest is to prevent life [vests], either worn or available to them,” U.K.
drowning if a conscious survivor or an unconscious CAA said. “The main cause of death after ditch-
survivor of an aircraft water-contact accident enters ing is drowning, usually hastened by hypothermia
the water. In this situation, survivors cannot depend and/or exhaustion.”

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Data compiled in 2003 by Flight Safety Foundation difficulty finding and fastening straps and hooks
show that the majority of aircraft occupants sur- after evacuating, FAA said.
vived after ditchings (see “About 75 Percent of
Airplane Occupants and More Than 87 Percent “It would take considerable effort to accomplish
of Helicopter Occupants Survived Ditchings, Data the combined maneuver of pulling a life [vest] over
Show,” page 469) but were inadequate to analyze one’s head while in the water, trying to stay afloat,”
the role of life vests. FAA said. “If a life [vest] is not worn before [a
water-contact accident], it is practically impossible
Worldwide, civil aviation regulations governing for a survivor with an injured arm, for example,
life vests are based in part on requirements of to don the life [vest] in time for it to be effective
the International Civil Aviation Organization for survival.”
(ICAO), which specify carriage of “a life [vest]
or an equivalent individual flotation device” for Studies of accidents involving drowning show
extended flights over water in airplanes (see “For that if a person must use physical exertion in the
Ditching Survival, Start With Regulations, But water to maintain freeboard for breathing, the
Don’t Stop There,” page 395).3 heart rate will be faster and the loss of body heat
will occur more quickly than if the person can
The TSO-C13f life vests help to prevent drown- maintain a relaxed floating position. Research also
ing by righting the wearer within five seconds and has demonstrated that with or without insulation,
by maintaining a 30-degree body angle (inclined from ordinary clothing or special clothing such
backward from the vertical position) so that the as a cold-water immersion suit (also known as a
lowest point of an unconscious wearer’s mouth survival suit, exposure suit, helicopter-passenger
remains clear of the water surface without effort suit, aircrew immersion suit and helicopter off-
by the wearer. shore transport suit), the body cools significantly
faster in rough seas than in calm seas (see “Cold
“The fact that pilots and passengers can easily don Outside, Warm Inside,” page 357).
and wear inflatable life vests (when not inflated)
provides maximum effectiveness and features Although some life vests are approved in an
an uncluttered exterior surface that protects the adult–child combination size, child size or in-
working components and allows for unrestricted fant–small child size, relatively few scientific data
movement,” FAA said. “The TSO-C13f life [vests] are available about the real-world performance of
have excellent self-righting capabilities … pilots life vests worn by children.
should demonstrate or supervise the proper don-
ning of the device so that wearers will not put the
device on improperly and defeat this self-righting Consistent Briefings Save Lives
ability.”4

Donning the life vest before

entering the water is an im-
F AA has emphasized, in guidance to FARs Part
121 air carriers and to other aircraft operators
conducting overwater flights under FARs Part 91,
portant factor in surviving General Operating and Flight Rules, that complete

T he body
an aircraft water-contact
accident. Aircraft operators
should ensure ready acces-
passenger briefings about life vests and other in-
dividual flotation devices are essential.

cools significantly sibility to each life vest on the For example, FAA Advisory Circular 121-24C,
aircraft at all times and verify Passenger Safety Information Briefing and Briefing
faster in rough that any life vests stored in a Cards, published in 2003, said that appropri-
sealed pouch can be opened ate crewmembers must brief passengers on the
seas than in easily without tools. In the following:
past, some types of life vests
calm seas. carried in sealed pouches • Type, location, and use of required flotation
have been difficult to remove equipment. “This briefing must include the
and to don in a flooded air- type of equipment available at the individual
craft, and survivors have had passenger’s seat and the method of use in the

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

water, such as putting the arms through the operations, briefing cards also must depict Designs vary
straps and resting the torso on the cushion,” stowage locations and life vest instructions, significantly in the
FAA said. “When the aircraft is equipped including the fitting of adult life vests on infant–small child
with life [vests], the briefing must include small children and the correct operation
category of life vests,
instructions about the location and removal of other child flotation devices. Moreover,
which require a tether
of life [vests] from stowage areas, including if a flight will proceed directly over water,
pouches, and the donning and inflation of the passenger briefings about life vests and and incorporate

life [vests]. If the aircraft is equipped with both individual flotation equipment must be methods of slowing the
flotation cushions and life [vests], [crewmem- completed before takeoff. onset of hypothermia.
bers] should brief passengers on both types of
equipment and must brief passengers on the In October 2003, the U.S. General Accounting
required flotation equipment”; and, Office (GAO), citing FAA research, said that airlines
in the past varied in their instructions to passengers
• Life vests. “[Crewmembers] must point out on the use of approved flotation seat cushions.5
the stowage locations of life [vests] and dem-
onstrate their removal from stowage, extrac- “For example, some airlines advise that passengers
tion from pouches, donning, and their use hold the cushions in front of their bodies, rest their
including manual and oral inflation meth- chins on the cushions, wrap their arms around the
ods, instructions on when the equipment cushions with their hands grasping the outside
should be inflated, and manual operation loops, and float vertically in the water,” the GAO
of survivor-locator lights and accessories,” report said. “Other airlines suggest that passengers
FAA said. “If there are significant differences lie forward on the cushions, grasp and hold the
in the donning or operation of life [vests] at loops beneath them, and float horizontally. FAA
various seats, passengers should be briefed also reported that airlines’ flight attendant train-
only on the characteristics of the life [vests] ing programs differed in their instructions on how
located at the individual passenger’s seat. It to don life vests and when to inflate them.” These
is suggested that [crewmembers] individu- methods of holding seat cushions in the water un-
ally brief parents or guardians accompany- derscore the difficulty of swimming/maneuvering
ing small children on the use of life [vests] to a life raft while grasping a cushion compared
as it applies to these children.” In air carrier with swimming/maneuvering with the arms free

350 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

while wearing a life vest. Results of a cur- the company has ordered ‘constant-wear’ voluntarily using approved aviation life
rent study of life vest performance are life [vests] for use in all their aircraft. vests. One example is FAA’s advice to
expected to be available in 2004 from the seaplane operators.
Cabin Safety Research Team at FAA’s Civil “In situations when the occupants of light
Aerospace Medical Institute, FAA said.6 aircraft are faced with the probability of “FAA recommends that seaplane operators
having to ditch in the water, it is not real- who are not engaged in for-hire operations
The importance of donning uninflated istic to expect them to don life [vests] (if use the FAA’s TSO life [vests] or individual
life vests before conducting a ditching carried) while concentrating on making [flotation devices],” FAA said.9
has been emphasized by civil aviation a survivable ditching. It is, therefore, un-
authorities. For example, the U.K. Air likely that an occupant will attempt to put Design elements of some current marine
Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), on a life [vest] which is not being worn at life vests are incompatible with aviation
in one accident report, said, “Although the time the ditching emergency starts, un- safety requirements. No inherently buoy-
the ditching was performed in a disci- til after the ditching has actually occurred. ant marine life vest should be carried in the
plined manner and everyone aboard the Once ditching has occurred, the situation, cabin or the cockpit of an aircraft because
[single-engine] aircraft survived, it was as in this case, is likely to demand an ur- of the risk that occupants who don this type
noted that the pilot never had the time gency for escape from the aircraft which of life vest will be trapped, for example.
to get into his life [vest]. Had the blow Inflatable life vests approved by the Coast
that he received to the head at the time of Guard for specific marine uses also have
ditching rendered him unconscious, the many restrictions for marine safety reasons.

D
outcome might not have been so good. For example, they are not approved for
… The pilot and passengers of the aircraft children who are less than age 16, and they
onning
had not donned their life [vests] before are not recommended for nonswimmers.
they set off over the sea because [the life uninflated life vests
vests] were of the traditional rubber- In general, FAA and U.K. CAA have said
ized-vest type, which they found tended before conducting that if aircraft operators decide to use an
to become hot and uncomfortable after a inflatable marine life vest at their own
little time. This appears to be a common a ditching has been risk for any reason, extreme caution is
reason given for not putting life [vests] required. In the advice to seaplane op-
on before flight over water and is largely emphasized. erators, for example, FAA said that three
related to the types of life [vest] most types of inflatable life vests approved by
commonly available in aircraft.”7 the Coast Guard for various marine uses
— called Type I offshore life [vests], Type
AAIB said that investigation of the ditch- will preclude the opportunity to locate and II near-shore buoyant vests and Type III
ing of another single-engine airplane don life [vests]. flotation aids10 — are used by some air-
revealed that neither the instructor pilot craft operators when FAA-approved life
nor student pilot donned the life vests “In this particular accident, had the stu- vests or FAA-approved flotation means
that were carried on their aircraft. dent been wearing a suitable life [vest] are not required by regulations.
which he had inflated after escaping from
“The aircraft carried two crew life [vests] the aircraft, he would almost certainly have Nevertheless, U.K. CAA said, in recom-
which were packaged in plastic wallets survived, since it would have extended the mendations for general aviation pilots,
and stowed behind the pilots’ seats,” AAIB time which the tug and the search-and- “Many automatically inflated life [vests],
said. “These [life vests], which were not of rescue helicopter had available to locate used by the sailing community, are ac-
the ‘constant-wear’ type, were not worn him while he was still alive.”8 tivated when a soluble tablet becomes
by the crew and they did not attempt to wet. This type is totally unsuited for
don them after the power loss or dur- FAA requires carrying TSO-C13d, TSO- general aviation use as they will inflate
ing the subsequent descent into the sea. C13e or TSO-C13f life vests for all occu- inside a water-filled cabin, thus seriously
(A [test] subsequently carried out in a pants under specified conditions, such as hindering escape.”11 The water-activa-
similar aircraft with both pilot seats oc- when operating a large/turbine-powered tion feature can be disabled on some life
cupied showed that it was possible, with multi-engine airplane more than 30 min- vests, and the life vest also can be inflated
some difficulty after first unfastening the utes or 100 nautical miles (185 kilometers) manually (i.e., by pulling a tab/handle on
restraint harness, to remove a life [vest] from the nearest shore, whichever is less. the inflation mechanism to fill the life vest
from its container and don it in approxi- FAA has recommended that even when with carbon-dioxide gas or by blowing air
mately one minute.) Since the accident, not required, aircraft operators consider into oral-inflation tubes).

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 351
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Aircraft operators especially must vest from becoming detached from the wearer
consider how the complexity of during a jump at any attitude from at least five
automatic marine life vests could feet above the water (TSO-C13f) when donned
compromise safety if used in an and adjusted correctly. Among current aviation
aircraft. life vests, an example of an exception to this
generalization is one model of a constant-wear
In recommendations for seaplane TSO-13d life vest that incorporates crotch straps
pilots conducting operations under in a special design for helicopter crewmembers
Part 91, FAA said, “Please keep the who wear weapons and other equipment used in
following in mind regarding U.S. law enforcement.
Coast Guard-approved inflatable
[life vests]: Type I and Type II One or two cylinders containing compressed
inflatable [life vests] have a higher carbon-dioxide gas and an actuator mecha-
minimum buoyancy [33 pounds/ nism provide the primary method of inflation.
15 kilograms] than a Type III [life Activating the inflation mechanism causes
vest, 22 pounds/10 kilograms]. gas in the cylinder(s) to inflate the life vest in
They will outperform a Type III approximately two seconds (typically at 70
[life vest] that does not exceed degrees F [21 degrees C]). If the life vest has two
the U.S. Coast Guard minimum cylinders, both must be used for full inflation.
requirements. Some [automatic Each carbon-dioxide cylinder is depleted after
life vests] will allow the user to one inflation.
Unlike most aviation disarm the automatic portion of
life vests designed the inflation mechanism. If the user improperly Each buoyancy chamber has one oral-inflation
for adults, this disarms the automatic portion of the inflatable tube, containing a one-way valve, to provide a
constant-wear [life vest], he/she might also disarm the manual backup system that enables the wearer to fully
design incorporates
portion. Wearing a [life vest] with the automatic inflate the life vest or to add air by blowing into a
portion armed would most certainly put passen- mouthpiece. The valve also allows the wearer to
crotch straps to
gers at risk of being trapped in the airplane or release some inflation gas from the life vest for
enable helicopter
damaging the [life vest], rendering it unusable. improved comfort in the water or after boarding
crewmembers to adjust If the device is to be used in both a seaplane and a life raft. High-visibility colors are standard on
their flotation attitude a boat, then the device must be rearmed for civilian life vests; some life vests are available with
in the water. boating.” (Operation of seaplanes in the United retroreflective tape. (Retroreflective materials are
States requires compliance with state laws and engineered to reflect light in the direction of its
federal regulations governing use of life vests; U.S. source and are most effective when the ambient
Coast Guard regulations exempt seaplanes from light is low.) Various attached accessories, such as
the safety-equipment requirements applicable to a water-activated survivor-locator light, may be
marine vessels, however.)12 standard or optional. In some countries, life vests
also can be purchased with a splash guard, spray-
hood or plastic face shield that helps to protect the
Technical Specifications mouth and airway, to reduce the amount of water
Help Ensure Performance flowing across the face and to delay the onset of
hypothermia.

C urrent aviation life vests typically have one

or two inflatable buoyancy chambers (cells)
made of flame-resistant, urethane-coated nylon.
Kathleen Kalinowski, aviation sales manager of
Switlik Parachute Co., said that proper fit of the life
They are donned over the wearer’s head while de- vest to the individual is important for optimum
flated and are held in place by adjustable straps flotation performance.13 Some life vests designed
(a waist strap and, in some designs, a crotch strap for constant wear — such as those typically worn
and/or back panel). by helicopter pilots and pilots of single-engine
airplanes during extended overwater operations
The crotch strap is used on some infant–small — are manufactured in a range of sizes, enabling
child life vests; the waist strap on all other cat- an individual crewmember to select the best-
egories is designed and tested to prevent the life fitting size.

352 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Other life vests are manufactured in one size or “In my opinion, redundancy is desirable in a life-
in adjustable sizes for adults and children, and saving application,” said Gus Fanjul, a specialist in
must be adjusted to fit snugly at the time they life vest design for a U.S. manufacturer. “For me,
are donned. For example, the TSO-C13f life the relevant issue is simply that two-cell life vests
vest specifies the adult category for wearers who provide redundancy, and one-cell life vests provide
weigh more than 90 pounds (41 kilograms), the no redundancy.”14
adult–child category for wearers who weigh more
than 35 pounds, the child category for wearers Life vest designs with a single buoyancy chamber
who weigh a maximum of 35 pounds and the in- can be approved under TSO-C13f, which also re-
fant–small child category for wearers who weigh quires a single waist strap, and TSO-C72b; designs
less than 35 pounds. with two buoyancy chambers can be approved
under TSO-C13f or TSO-C13d.
“The life vest is designed, and needs to be adjusted
to fit, so that the face of a person who is wearing To specify accessories to be attached to a life vest,
the correct size will remain above the water surface aircraft operators should consider minimum
at the proper angle of flotation,” Kalinowski said. requirements of the civil aviation authority and
“For example, an infant cannot wear an adult– whether to specify additional accessories based on
child size life vest because the infant’s head would their plan for aircraft occupant survival in antici-
not stay in the life vest or float at the appropriate pated operating environments. For example, FAA
angle. When the correct size is worn in the correct requires a TSO-C85a survivor-locator light on TSO-
way, the life vest will remain attached while the C13f life vests, but a signaling whistle — a required
wearer jumps into the water [from a minimum accessory in the United Kingdom and some other
height of five feet (1.5 meters) during TSO-C13f countries — is not required by FAA. U.S. specifica-
testing], even with the life vest inflated, and will tions for survivor-locator lights require a device that
provide all flotation to the front of the body to is similar in performance to a household flashlight,
right even an unconscious wearer. The wearer then but survival specialists recommend the use of strobe
lies back in the water with the face out of the water. lights that exceed the minimum specifications and
This enables the person to relax, lie back and wait increase the probability of detection by searchers
for rescue or to swim to a life raft.” in darkness and low-visibility conditions (see “FAA
Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C85a, Survivor-
In the United States, life vest designs with two locator Lights,” page 462).
buoyancy chambers and life vest designs with
one buoyancy chamber can meet FAA TSO per- “Personally, I would choose the higher buoyancy, the
formance requirements for approval, and aircraft survivor-locator light and other safety features of
operators can choose either design based on their the TSO-C13f life vest,” Kalinowski said. Accessory
own requirements and preferences. items add to the weight of the life vest, so aircraft
operators specify accessories based
“With two-cell design, if one cell is punctured, on the anticipated risks.

“T
the other cell will provide half of the buoyancy
although the life vest will not have the same per- In general aviation in the United
formance with one cell deflated,” Kalinowski States, crewmembers and passen- wo-cell
said. “The advantages of the one-cell design are gers of fixed-wing aircraft — in-
lighter weight, simpler design and maintenance, cluding most business aircraft life vests provide
and fewer parts. Although the one-cell design for — are required to carry life vests
life vests only has been approved for aviation in and/or to wear them only under redundancy, and
the United States for about seven years, this design specific conditions (i.e., wearing
has been approved by U.K. CAA for the past 40 life vests while conducting for- one-cell life
years with no problems.” hire operations in a seaplane).
vests provide no
Given the unpredictability of an aircraft water- “Many general aviation airplane
contact accident, however, another specialist said pilots and passengers voluntarily redundancy.”
that he would prefer to be wearing a dual-chamber exceed overwater requirements
life vest. by wearing life vests,” Kalinowski

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 353
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

said. “Most airplane operators carry air- TSO-C13f life vests often establish with Comfort,
line-style TSO-C13f life vests to meet the FAA an alternative, ongoing method of Durability Distinguish
requirements.” complying with inspection and mainte- Constant-wear Life Vests
nance requirements, such as unpacking

L
With current packaging, storage and in- and orally inflating the life vest every three ife vests that are approved by one or
spection methods, life vest manufacturers months, performing authorized routine more civil aviation authorities (la-
may be able to specify a time between maintenance and obtaining annual inspec- beled as compliant with FAA TSO-C13f,
overhaul (TBO) as long as 10 years un- tions by an approved service station. for example, and/or with a U.K. CAA
der some aircraft operators’ maintenance appliance-registration [AR] number
programs. In general, however, require- for non-U.K. equipment)18 are available
ments for inspection and maintenance Periodic Hands-on
in several styles for constant wear, for
must be determined for the specific life Training Develops long-term stowage or for carrying on the
vest model used by the aircraft operator. Life Vest Skills body for quick donning. Manufacturers’
When not carried on the aircraft, life standard/optional accessories vary but
vests typically must be stored according
to the manufacturer’s recommendations
in a dry environment.
S urvival specialists recommend that
aircraft operators conduct periodic
training on correct use of life vests and
may include a TSO-C85a–approved
survivor-locator light (standard equip-
ment with TSO-C13d/TSO-C13e/TSO-
other survival equipment for overwater C13f life vests), whistle, signaling mirror,
“Pilots often call us and ask about the operations. Hands-on experience in don- sea-dye marker, multilingual pull-tab in-
safety of carrying aboard their aircraft life ning, inflating and buoyancy-testing the structions, customized donning instruc-
vests that have not been not inspected life vest in water helps crewmembers and tions, orange color for crew life vests to
for many years and do not have extend- passengers to do the following: distinguish them from the international
ed TBOs,” Kalinowski said. “Because yellow color worn by passengers, and
urethane-coated fabric will deteriorate • Understand better why the life vest demonstration models for safety brief-
under conditions of high heat and high must be inflated outside the aircraft, ings). Examples include the following:
humidity, life vests in the United States the need to guard against snagging
must be inspected by a repair station that and punctures, and how the life vest • Durable constant-wear life vests,
has been certified by FAA to conduct this will perform; specifically designed for compat-
inspection.” (See “Physical Fitness for Life ibility with shoulder harnesses and
Rafts and Life Vests,” page 337.) In the • Ensure proper fit/adjustment so that safety belts. For example, one heli-
United States, the general rule is that life the chin is above the water surface copter crew vest — which weighs
vests carried in for-hire operations must and they can breathe easily; 2.60 pounds (1.02 kilograms)
be inspected every 12 months.15 — has an independent double-
• Ensure that all straps, zippers and chamber design, protection against
U.K. CAA recommends maintenance ties are fastened correctly and that neck chafing, adjustability for waist
of life vests at least every 12 months by loose strap ends are tucked in to size and chest size, a heavy-duty en-
an approved servicing organization or prevent snagging during egress; capsulation cover, heavy-duty wide
an appropriately licensed maintenance nylon webbing and pockets for sur-
technician, or more frequently if required • Relax the body in the water with vival equipment. The device has FAA
by the manufacturer.16 the head tilted back to minimize TSO-C13d approval and U.K. CAA
exertion; approval and provides 38.0 pounds
Maintenance technicians must not assume (17.2 kilograms) of buoyancy with
that they can inspect and repair life vests • Determine which of the recom- two 18-gram (0.63-ounce) carbon-
because they conduct maintenance using mended postures for slowing the dioxide gas cylinders;
similar materials. For example, FAA specifi- onset of hypothermia are possible
cally approves repair stations to inspect and while floating; • Double-chamber models that are
repair life vests because proper manufactur- folded into various configurations
er’s manuals, procedures, tools, materials, • Swim to a life raft in the water, which and sizes of fire-retardant storage
parts lists, test equipment and standards typically requires a back stroke; and, bags. For example, one life vest pro-
of shop cleanliness are required.17 vides 38 pounds (17 kilograms) of
• Become familiar with the operation buoyancy with two 16-gram (0.56-
U.S. helicopter operators and other aircraft of each oral-inflation tube, release ounce) carbon-dioxide cylinders,
operators that use constant-wear styles of valve and accessory. has a quick-don harness, weighs 1.4

354 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

pounds (0.6 kilograms) and is FAA- folded into various configurations carbon-dioxide gas cylinders.
approved as a TSO-C13f life vest; and sizes of fire-retardant storage When packed, the device weighs
bags. For example, one life vest pro- 2.1 pounds (0.95 kilogram).
• Models that are folded into a small vides 18 pounds (8.2 kilograms) of
pack to be worn around the waist buoyancy with two 16-gram carbon- Among manufacturers that produce
during flight. For example, one dioxide cylinders, has a quick-don aviation life vests are Air Cruisers
helicopter life vest — a double- harness and weighs 0.6 pounds (0.3 Co., Belmar, New Jersey, U.S.; Eastern
chamber design — is designed to be kilograms); and, Aero Marine, Miami, Florida; Hoover
donned with a one-handed motion Industries, Miami; Switlik Parachute Co.,
in less than 10 seconds and is FAA- • Infant–small child devices. For Trenton, New Jersey; and RFD Beaufort
approved as a TSO-C13e life vest; example, one model — which has of Merseyside, U.K.
FAA TSO-C13f approval and U.K.
• Single-chamber models that have CAA approval — has an interna- In summary, the best option when con-
FAA TSO-C13f approval and are tional yellow “survival capsule” ducting all overwater operations in air-
folded into various configurations design, constructed of flame-re- planes and helicopters is to use aviation
and sizes of fire-retardant storage sistant urethane-coated nylon. The life vests that incorporate the superior
bags. For example, one life vest pro- device incorporates an internal lifesaving technology of TSO-C13f (or
vides 37 pounds (17 kilograms) of thermal-protection vest, viewing equivalent standards), regardless of what
buoyancy with one 33-gram (1.16- window, towing bridle (72-inch civil aviation authorities require based
ounce) carbon-dioxide cylinder, has [183-centimeter] tether), lifting on aircraft distance from the nearest
a quick-don harness and weighs 0.96 handle, air-circulation ports, a shore. By voluntarily exceeding require-
pounds (0.44 kilograms); ballast bag and retroreflective ments, the aircraft operator increases the
tape. The device provides 40 probability that this equipment will be
• Single-chamber models that have pounds (18.2 kilograms) of buoyan- suitable for a ditching or other water-
FAA TSO-C72c approval and are cy with two 35-gram (1.23-ounce) contact accident. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Do not inflate a life vest before evacuating the aircraft.

• Many marine life vests have characteristics — such as water-activated inflation or inherently buoyant design
— that could trap pilots or passengers wearing them inside a sinking aircraft.

• Life vests help prevent drowning and slow the onset of hypothermia more effectively than other approved
flotation equipment such as buoyant aircraft seat cushions.

• Passenger briefings about all equipment for individual flotation are essential for every overwater flight.

• Life vests approved under Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C13f by the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (or equivalent standards of other civil aviation authorities) provide superior lifesaving
technology compared with those approved under TSO-C72c.

Notes March 3, 1988. FAA said that the pri-   2. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (U.K. CAA).
mary upgrades incorporated into TSO- Ditching. General Aviation Safety Sense
  1. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration C13e life vests involved donning features Leaflet 21A. 2000.
(FAA). “Cancelled Technical Standard and retention features. Although
Orders (TSOs).” <av-info.faa.gov/tso/ TSO-C13f is the most current standard,   3. International Civil Aviation Organization
TSOcan/Canceled.htm> January 2003. manufacturers may continue to produce (ICAO). Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft,
The standards for FAA-approved life and identify life vests that were approved Part II, International General Aviation
vests are in TSO-C13f. TSO-C13a, TSO- previously by FAA under TSO-C13d and – Aeroplanes. Paragraph 6.3.3, All [Land]
C13b and TSO-C13c were cancelled TSO-C13e. Aeroplanes on Extended Flights Over

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 355
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Water, says, “All airplanes when operated aviation life vests. The instructor pilot Virginia, U.S. April 15, 2003. Flight Safety
on extended flights over water shall be reached the harbor wall, climbed out of Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia. U.S.
equipped with, when the airplane may be the water and was rescued by the crew of a Switlik Parachute Co. is a U.S. manufac-
over water at a distance of more than 93 tug. A search-and-rescue helicopter began turer of life vests for aviation and PFDs
kilometers (50 nautical miles) away from an unsuccessful search for the student pilot for marine use.
land suitable for making an emergency a few minutes after the instructor pilot
14. Fanjul, Gus. Telephone interview
landing, one life jacket or equivalent indi- reached the wall; the body of the student
by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
vidual flotation device for each person on pilot was recovered several weeks later.
Virginia, U.S. Jan. 16, 2004. Flight Safety
board, stowed in a position easily acces-
  9. FAA. Seaplane Safety for 14 CFR Part 91 Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia. U.S.
sible from the seat or berth of the person
Operators.
for whose use it is provided.” 15. FAA. Seaplane Safety for 14 CFR Part 91
10. U.S. Coast Guard. “Federal Requirements Operators. FAA said, “Lifesaving equip-
  4. FAA. Seaplane Safety for 14 CFR Part 91
and Safety Tips for Recreational Boats.” ment must be maintained in service-
Operators. FAA Advisory Circular (AC)
<www.uscgboating.org> The Coast Guard able condition in accordance with the
91-69A Nov. 19, 1999.
said, “A Type I [personal flotation device manufacturer’s recommendations. Any
  5. U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation (PFD)] or offshore life jacket provides FAA-approved flotation gear used in op-
Safety: Advancements Being Pursued to the most buoyancy. It is effective for all erations for compensation or hire must
Improve Airliner Cabin Occupant Safety waters, especially open, rough or remote be inspected at least every 12 months
and Health. Report no. GAO-04-33. waters where rescue may be delayed. It is by persons authorized by [FARs Part]
October 2003. designed to turn most unconscious wear- 43. This inspection would be included
ers in the water to a face-up position. A in the annual or 100-hour inspec-
  6. Herwig, Roland; McLean, Garnet A.
Type II PFD or near-shore buoyancy vest tion for the aircraft or under any other
Telephone interview and e-mail communi-
is intended for calm inland water or where inspection program that the operator is
cation by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
there is a good chance of quick rescue. authorized to use.” Brodhead, Daniel W.
Virginia, U.S. Jan. 16, 2004. Flight Safety
… This type inflatable [PFD] turns [the “Saving Lives With Life Preservers.” Mech.
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia. U.S.
wearer to a face-up position] as well as a U.S. Naval Safety Center. Spring 2002.
Herwig is a public affairs representative
Type I foam [inherently buoyant] PFD. Brodhead said that a routine inspection
for the FAA Mike Monroney Aeronautical
A Type III PFD or flotation aid is good of one inflatable life vest worn by U.S.
Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, U.S.
for conscious users in calm inland water Navy aviators revealed that the device had
Dr. McLean is an engineering psycholo-
or where there is a good chance of quick been packed carelessly and that carbon-
gist and principal investigator for cabin
rescue. It is designed so wearers can place dioxide cartridges had not been attached
safety research at the FAA Civil Aerospace
themselves in a face-up position in the to actuators; further investigation
Medical Institute in Oklahoma City,
water.” revealed that four of seven life vests had
Oklahoma, U.S.
been packed and inspected incorrectly by
11. U.K. CAA. Ditching.
  7. U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch one inspector.
(AAIB). Bulletin no. 2/2002. Piper PA-28R- 12. FAA. Seaplane Safety for 14 CFR Part 91
16. U.K. CAA. Ditching.
200, July 23, 2001. The pilot ditched the Operators. FAA said, “In [AC 91-69A],
aircraft approximately one mile northeast seaplane refers to an airplane on floats 17. FAA. Seaplane Safety for 14 CFR Part 91
of Lihou Island off northwest Guernsey, (amphibious or nonamphibious) or a Operators.
England. The pilot and one of two passen- flying boat (water-only or amphibious).
18. Barrow, Cliff. Safety Regulation Group,
gers received minor injuries; the other pas- … Adherence to [U.S. Federal Aviation
U.K. CAA. E-mail communication
senger was not injured. They were rescued Regulations (FARs)] Part 91.115 should
with Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
from their life raft after the airplane sank. ensure compliance with the [U.S. Coast
Virginia, U.S. Dec. 8, 2003. Flight Safety
AAIB recommended that the U.K. General Guard] rules.” The U.S. Coast Guard (in
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia. U.K.
Aviation Safety Council provide informa- Navigation Rules, International-Inland),
CAA Specification no. 5, which provided
tion about aviation life vests that have the said, “The word ‘vessel’ includes every
requirements for life vests, has some
desired characteristics and to help pilots description of water craft, including
differences and additions compared
and aircraft operators to make informed nondisplacement craft and seaplanes, used
with FAA TSO-C13f, although aviation
choices of commercial products. or capable of being used as a means of
life vests can comply with both stan-
transportation on water.” A seaplane is a
  8. AAIB. Bulletin no. 6/98. Pierre Robin dards. “Under new arrangements within
marine vessel after it lands on the water
HR200/120B, Oct. 29, 1997. The instructor Europe, appliance-registration approvals
and is required to comply with U.S. Coast
pilot ditched the aircraft in the Cromarty [for non-U.K. equipment] are no longer
Guard navigation rules applicable to
Firth off Nigg Yard, Scotland; the aircraft granted, and the CAA specification is
marine vessels.
sank in about one minute, and the instruc- shortly to be cancelled on publication of
tor pilot and the student pilot attempted 13. Kalinowski, Kathleen. Telephone inter- a European TSO for [life vests],” Barrow
to swim to a harbor wall without their view by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, said.

356 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Cold Outside, Warm Inside

Cold-water immersion suits help survivors tolerate life-threatening
temperatures long enough for rescuers to arrive.

— FSF Editorial Staff

T
he fundamental problem in design- Authority (CAA) Specification no. 19, Helicopter
ing cold-water immersion suits (also Crew Members Immersion Suits, also has provided
known as survival suits, exposure suits, an example of required minimum immersion-suit
helicopter passenger suits, aircrew im- standards, including demonstration of underwater
mersion suits and helicopter offshore transport escape without snagging or entrapment caused by
suits) for flights over cold water has been how inherent suit buoyancy or air trapped in the suit.
to enable escape from a flooded/inverted cabin The European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)
or cockpit while providing sufficient insulation also has proposed standards for two types of “he-
to prevent cold shock and to delay the onset of licopter crew and passenger immersion suits” for
hypothermia (see “Is There A Doctor Aboard the use in operations to/from offshore helidecks (see
Life Raft?” page 187). “JAA Proposes Standards for Immersion Suits,”
page 361).
Immersion suits designed specifically for helicop-
ter occupants were introduced in 1974 by U.K. Typically, immersion suits have either a full neck
companies operating offshore oil and natural gas seal and a diagonal zip fastener across the front, or
production platforms in the North Sea. Canada a split neck seal and a vertical zip fastener down
published standards for “helicopter passenger trans- the front. Although government performance
portation suit systems” in 1988 and revised these standards may be applicable, the immersion
standards in 1999.1 Since 1991, U.K. Civil Aviation suits typically are not considered part of aircraft

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

s­ urvival equipment, such as aviation life vests; material and, in some models, inflation of an outer
typically, such immersion suits are provided by shell and/or internal chamber.
the helicopter operator to crews and by the em-
ployer to passengers under safety programs that Characteristics of some current insulated dry-suit
reflect an industry consensus about best practices, systems include donning/removal by means of a
said U.K. CAA.2 single waterproof zip fastener; rubber seals at the
wrist and neck to prevent water from penetrating
Immersion suits comprise wet suits, noninsulated into the dry interior of the suit; an insulated hood
dry suits and insulated dry suits. Wet suits provide stored in a pocket; gloves/mitts stored in pockets;
a thick layer of insulating material between the skin integral boots or attached socks for use with nor-
and surrounding water, and allow a small amount mal footwear; removable thermal liners; flame-re-
of water between the skin and the inner surface of tardant fabric; shoulder valves to expel trapped air;
the suit. They are less costly to manufacture than retroreflective tape; pockets with drain holes; and
dry suits, more comfortable to wear because rub- a splash guard to help protect the mouth and nose
ber seals are absent, and are used widely in some from ingesting water. (Retroreflective materials are
types of diving and in marine recreational activi- engineered to reflect light in the direction of its
ties. Noninsulated dry suits are worn over specified source and are most effective when the ambient
insulating garments that trap a layer of air between light is low.)
the skin and the inner surface of the waterproof
suit material. Insulated dry suits incorporate ma-
terials that are waterproof and provide insulation, Buying Time to Get
or include various types of linings for insulation. Out of the Water
Dry suits are more complex and costly to manu-
facture than wet suits, and their effectiveness can
be reduced somewhat by perspiration and reduced
significantly if water leaks into the suit and perme-
I mmersion suits are designed to be donned prior
to flight and are worn constantly throughout the
flight. Although typical offshore flights do not ex-
ates the garments worn under the suit. ceed 20 minutes, weather-related diversions and
other types of delays may require occupants to
Immersion-suit
The principles of dry suits (insulated and noninsu- wear immersion suits for many hours. Insulated
systems are designed
lated) most often have been applied in the design suits and noninsulated suits — and insulating
garments worn under them — therefore must to ensure compatibility
of immersion suits, which are intended for emer-
gency survival in offshore helicopter operations. be designed to provide adequate insulation to ex- of life vests and other
The primary reason is that cold water quickly tend survival time in cold water, minimal positive components.
conducts heat away from the body. Generally, an
immersion suit is a one-piece coverall garment
that provides layers of dry insulation to extend the
survival time of a wearer immersed in cold water. Insulated hood
Neck seal
Some current immersion suits must be worn with
a compatible life vest that is inflated manually after
Inflatable life vest Buddy line
evacuation; other immersion suits have integral
buoyancy systems (i.e., manual inflation from
cylinders of carbon-dioxide gas and oral inflation Retroreflective tape
valves) and do not require a separate life vest. Entry zipper
Wrist seal
The performance of various types of immersion
suits has been studied extensively during the past
20 years. To reduce the rate of cooling of the body,
insulated dry suits incorporate various materials Leg zipper
to maintain a layer of dry air between the skin
and the water. Typically, insulation depends on a
recommended combination of insulating under-
garments, the inner material of the suit that pro- Steel-toe rubber boots
vides a water-boundary layer, layer(s) of insulating

358 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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buoyancy (i.e., force that would cause a suits worn by survivors of a 1997 North “In most cases, helicopter immersion suits
survivor in a flooded aircraft to be lifted Sea helicopter accident, for example, the are leased or rented for the flight,” Rector
toward the water surface) and thermal additional weight of the water increased said. “They are worn one time, brought
comfort in flight. Thermal insulation is the time required by rescuers to transfer back from the oil rig to a coastal service
the primary design goal, but flotation and survivors from a life raft to a vessel.5 (The to be sanitized and tested, then used again.
self-righting also must be provided to added weight of water in the immersion The amount of time that they are used af-
the extent possible by inflation of the im- suit is an inherent problem of wet-suit fects the rate of wear, and maintaining the
mersion suit and/or life vest with carbon- designs.) suit often costs more than the suit itself.”
dioxide gas after emergency underwater
escape from a flooded cabin. One report on research in the United Previously, for North Sea operations,
Kingdom said, “Suits that retain air or are Norwegian manufacturers typically
U.K. CAA, in a 1995 report, said that inherently buoyant may trap the wearer in provided insulated suits and U.K. manu-
although passengers receive general the upturned helicopter filling with wa- facturers typically provided noninsulated
guidance on clothing to wear under an ter. It is almost impossible to dive down suits, he said. Currently, the combination
immersion suit, there may be no method through water to a submerged emergency of a minimally buoyant, insulated suit
of ensuring that passengers have provided exit in these circumstances. A well-fitting with a life vest typically is required or
sufficient thermal insulation to maintain suit minimizes buoyancy, and the drill preferred for helicopter passenger trans-
their body temperature in cold water even for adjusting the suit for emergency use port, he said.
when the uninsulated suit keeps the pas- includes the expulsion of as much air as
senger as dry as possible. The difficulty of possible. … Modern suits incorporate “Occupants of a helicopter must wear
providing a combination of immersion valves to assist in this maneuver.”6 the immersion suit in flight,” Rector
suit and undergarments with sufficient said. “With enough practice, an airplane
insulation and without in-flight over- In some helicopter water-contact ac- occupant carrying a SOLAS-approved
heating also was cited.3 cidents, survivors did not wear their marine-abandonment suit could don this
gloves or mitts (which often were stored suit in the water, but the suit would not be
“Aircrew suits are efficient in their role of in pockets), and, although wrist seals pre- as thermally efficient if the inside became
keeping the wearer dry, but are considered vented water leakage into the immersion wet. In darkness, I would say that there is
by many to be uncomfortable to wear for suit, they found that their hands were only a 50-50 chance of being able to don
long periods, especially in bright sunshine too numbed by the cold water to don this type of suit in the water — which
in warm ambient air temperatures; they can this hand protection or to assist in their shows the need for training. This type
be worn unzipped but would be difficult rescue by grasping objects such as ropes. of suit also will be more comfortable
to zip up while the [pilot or] passenger Another risk of penetration of water if donned out of water with some air
was coping with an aircraft emergency,” is significant reduction of the thermal trapped inside.”
the report said. “[A passenger’s suit] can protection provided by undergarments
be made relatively comfortable if the face and possibly by some of the insulating
seal is partially unzipped, but this will not materials of the immersion suit. Water Leakage
fulfill its function unless it is fully zipped up Is the Enemy
before immersion. This is, to some extent, Regulations for immersion suits vary in
addressed by the oil companies’ ‘hood up
zip up’ (HUZUP) rule, which requires suits
to be fully zipped during overwater arrivals
different countries, reflecting regional
accident experience and other factors,
said Carl Rector, owner of BayleySuit, a
R esearchers and industry groups
have identified, among other find-
ings, the following issues that affect the
and departures, on the assumption that if U.S. manufacturer of SOLAS-approved performance of an immersion suit:
an emergency occurs en route there would marine-immersion suits, diving suits
be sufficient time to zip up before impact and a few helicopter immersion suits.7 • Users should not assume that either
with the surface.”4 U.K. CAA Specification (International Convention for the Safety an insulated dry suit or a noninsu-
no. 19 requires that the immersion suit be of Life at Sea [SOLAS] sets international lated dry suit will be fully effective
capable of being sealed by crewmembers standards for procedures and equipment in preventing leakage. Because
within 10 seconds during flight and ad- used by specific types of large marine water leakage into immersion suits
justed without assistance. vessels). Helicopter operators therefore significantly reduces their insulat-
must know the applicable regulations ing properties and increases their
Minimizing water entry into the immer- in their country when selecting any weight, helicopter passengers must be
sion suit also is essential. When large type of immersion suit for use in flight trained to secure the seals of the suit
amounts of water entered all immersion operations. prior to immersion and to overcome

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

r­ eluctance to wear suits correctly because of All Repairs Require Expertise

the temporary in-flight discomfort;8

• The neck seal and wrist seals of immersion

suits must fit tightly enough to prevent wa-
S everal manufacturers said that immersion suits
worn in civil aircraft operations typically do not
have provisions for bodily functions. Helicopter
ter leakage into the suit but not so tightly as flights typically are not long enough to warrant
to constrict blood flow. Attempts to prevent this capability. Nevertheless, designs with a diago-
chafing of these seals against the skin, by nal front zip fastener help to accommodate bodily
wearing collars or sleeves between the seal functions of men prior to flight. A survivor wearing
and the skin, will allow water into the im- a suit in the water would be unable to open the suit
mersion suit;9 or to remove the suit; if required, bodily functions
are completed in the suit.
• Some tests conducted in helicopter underwater-
escape training have shown that a one-minute To prevent water from penetrating an immer-
warning of ditching was insufficient time for sion suit, the suit should be inspected as recom-
some participants to fully close their zip fas- mended by the manufacturer. Typically, before
teners, adjust neck and wrist seals and/or put Continued on page 363
on gloves and hood when these immersion
suits were worn in a half-zipped condition
for comfort during flight;10

• Compatibility of immersion suits and life

vests should be determined by testing in re-
alistic conditions the ability of a combination
to provide passive self-righting of an uncon-
scious wearer and to provide complete protec-
tion of the airway. Wearing a suit with a splash
guard (also called a face shield or sprayhood)
provided better protection against drowning
than use of a life vest alone. Performance of
equipment in calm water, however, could
not predict its performance in rougher sea
­conditions;11

• An immersion suit with integral buoyancy

or a combination immersion suit and life
vest must raise the head of the wearer above
the level of the rest of the body that is float-
Maximum
ing at the surface; otherwise, the flotation
protection against
angle may result in an inadequate distance
drowning and
between the wearer’s mouth and the water
surface to prevent drowning. With the head hypothermia
inclined at about 30 degrees, wearers have requires correct
a better opportunity to see incoming waves use of the life
and to turn their backs to the wave to help vest, splash guard
prevent inhalation of water; and,12, 13 over the nose
and mouth, and
• Immersion suits must be assessed for compat-
thermal insulation
ibility not only with life vests but also with the
of the head
seats and the restraint systems of helicopters,
other survival equipment such as emergency and hands, as
breathing devices, and the manual dexterity provided by this
required for underwater escape.14 immersion suit.

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JAA Proposes Standards for Immersion Suits

J
AA has proposed six Joint Technical 10 seconds. These actions shall – Due consideration shall be taken
Standard Orders (JTSOs) concerning be possible both when seated with of the possible temperature varia-
life vests, life rafts and safety equip- harness fastened and when in the tions during stowage, which may
ment for personnel involved in helicopter water with the suit inflated. range between –30 degrees C
operations. (For European Union member [Celsius] and 65 degrees C (–22
nations, it is expected that equivalent • Freedom of movement degrees F [Fahrenheit] and 149
European TSOs [ETSOs] will be adopted degrees F); [and,]
by the European Aviation Safety Agency – The design of the integrated suit
[EASA].) As part of the ongoing harmoni- shall allow tailoring to fit the indi- – The outer fabric used in the con-
zation between FAA and JAA, two of the vidual wearer or, where suits are not struction of the suit shall be of
proposed JTSOs for life rafts and life pre- individually tailored, the size range low flammability. It shall not have
servers largely parallel those to be found in must be satisfactory for all wearers a burn rate greater than 100 mil-
FAA TSOs, including TSO-C70a. The other whose significant body dimensions limeters per minute (four inches
proposed JTSOs, concerning helicopter range from the fifth percentile fe- per minute).
transport suits, have no parallel in FAA male to the 95th percentile male,
TSOs. A summary of the main provisions and adequate for most of the 5 • Evacuation. A person wearing the un-
of each proposed JTSO follows. percent at each extreme; [and,] inflated suit shall be able to exit the
helicopter through any emergency
– The inflated suit must not hinder exit or push-out window down to the
JTSO-2C502, Helicopter Crew
the boarding of a life raft with the minimum acceptable size of 430 mil-
and Passenger Integrated limeters by 355 millimeters (17 inches
sprayhood deployed, prevent the
Immersion Suits for Operations wearer from assisting others in the by 14 inches). This action shall be
to or From Helidecks Located in water or obstruct the wearer’s possible in air or under water.
a Hostile Sea Area field of vision.
• Buoyancy and floating position
An integrated immersion suit is defined as • Compatibility
an immersion suit which incorporates the – The buoyancy of the inflated suit
functionality of a life [vest]. The wearing of – The integrated suit shall be de- shall be sufficient to ensure that a
a separate life [vest] is not required. The signed, and the materials used in person wearing clothing and the
integrated suit comprises at least a dry its construction chosen, to have integrated suit shall have a floating
coverall and hand and head coverings. no features which would be likely position such that the angle be-
It is assumed that the suit is donned be- to have any detrimental effect on tween the body and the horizontal
fore boarding the helicopter. Among the the operation of any helicopter or is not greater than 60 degrees;
JTSO’s provisions are the following: its equipment. In particular, any
part of the suit which might pose – The mouth must be at least 120
• Donning a snagging hazard during flight, millimeters (4.7 inches) above the
emergency egress or recovery, waterline (mouth freeboard) and
– The integrated suit and any at- shall be suitably covered, pro- the nose freeboard shall not be
tached equipment shall be ca- tected or restrained; [and,] less than the mouth freeboard,
pable of being donned without even when the wearer is inca-
assistance and shall be capable – Any attached equipment shall not pacitated; [and,]
of being sealed and adjusted by compromise the basic survival
the wearer without assistance; function of the suit by causing – The inflated suit shall allow the
puncturing, fretting or distortion wearer to turn from a face-down
– Air retained inside the suit after of the material, or changes in its position into a stable face-up
donning which could adversely af- mechanical properties. floating position within five
fect egress, the maneuverability or ­seconds.
flotation attitude, shall be capable • Materials
of being exhausted, either auto- • Breathing protection — sprayhood
matically or by the wearer; [and,] – The materials used shall meet
the requirements of paragraph – The wearer shall be able to deploy
– It must be possible to complete all 4.14 of [European Committee for the sprayhood within 20 seconds
actions required to don the head Standardization] EN ISO 15027- when wearing the inflated suit in
covering … and seal the suit within 1:2002; or out of the water;

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

– The sprayhood will not be consid- water with the suit inflated. The • Testing. Test criteria are specified for
ered suitable if it can in any way lights shall activate automatically strength under pressure, buoyancy
retain water when deployed; and have a manually operated and performance.
on/off switch.
– The sprayhood, whether stowed JTSO-2C503, Helicopter
or deployed, should not cause • Inflation system
Crew and Passenger Immersion
inconvenience during winching
Suits for Operations to or
or other rescue and recovery – The primary means [of infla-
operations; [and,] tion] shall be a manually
From Helidecks Located in a
initiated stored-gas system to- Hostile Sea Area
– Means shall be provided to ensure gether with a standby oral-
that the level of carbon dioxide in inflation system capable of re- This proposed JTSO is for helicopter
the deployed sprayhood is within peated use. The required buoy- transport suits designed to be used with a
safe limits. ancy shall be obtainable by either life vest. Where relevant, the specifications
method; are the same as those in JTSO-2C502 for
• Thermal protection. The sealed integrated immersion suits. Specifications
integrated suit, including the head – After inflation by either method, for a sprayhood are in JTSO-2C504.
and hand coverings, shall be so it shall be possible to deflate the Some paragraphs that vary from JTSO-
constructed that, when worn in suit and then to reinflate it by 2C502 are as follows:
conjunction with recommended using the standby system. The
clothing, [the suit] shall provide insu- standby inflation system shall • The immersion suit shall be tested
lation as required by JAR–OPS [Joint be readily accessible, simple and with each type of life [vest] that the
Aviation Requirements — Operations] obvious in operation, and it shall suit is designed to be compatible
3.827. be impossible for any valve which with. If it is to be approved for use
may be used to be inadvertently with more than one type of life [vest],
• Water ingress. The integrated suit left open; the performance testing … shall be
shall be so constructed that not repeated with each additional type
more than 200 grams (seven ounc- – Location of the actuating means of life [vest]; [and,]
es) of water shall leak into the suit [of the stored-gas system] shall
when measured in accordance with be such that it can be operated by • The trapped buoyancy due to the
paragraph 3.7 of EN ISO 15027-3: either hand, in or out of the water; suit and recommended clothing,
2002. with the suit fully vented, shall be
– The amount of stored gas pro- no more than 150 Newtons (33.7
• Conspicuity and location aids vided shall be capable of inflating foot-pounds) when measured in ac-
the suit to achieve the correct cordance with paragraph 3.11.7.2 of
– To facilitate search-and-rescue buoyancy … within five seconds EN ISO 15027-3:2002.
operations, those parts of the of actuation at 20 degrees C (68
suit which will be visible when degrees F); JTSO-2C504, Helicopter
in the water shall be of a highly Constant-wear Life Jackets for
conspicuous color and comply – Adequate protection shall be Operations to or From Helidecks
with paragraph 4.5 of EN ISO provided to guard against any Located in a Hostile Sea Area
15027-1:2002; inadvertent initiation of an infla-
tion when the wearer is passing This proposed JTSO is for helicopter con-
– A passive light system of retrore- through an emergency exit or stant-wear life [vests]. Where relevant, the
flective material shall be provided; when the suit is dropped from specifications are the same as those in
[and,] a height of 1.5 meters (five feet); JTSO-2C502 for integrated immersion
[and,] suits. Specifications for a sprayhood
– The integrated suit shall be fit- closely follow those in JTSO-2C502.
ted with a light that meets the – The oral-inflation tube shall comply Some paragraphs that vary from JTSO-
requirements of paragraph 4.2 with the requirements of paragraph 2C502 are as follows:
of EN394:1994 Type B. An addi- 4.5 of EN396:1993 or equivalent. It
tional flashing light that flashes at shall be positioned such that it can • The correct method of donning
a rate between 50 and 70 flashes readily be used in and out of the the life [vest] shall be self-evident
per minute … shall also be fitted. water. After use, the device shall and means shall be provided to
The location of the lights shall be return to a position such that it will indicate that the life [vest] lobe(s)
such that maximum practical con- not produce facial injuries during a are correctly oriented. … A means
spicuity is achieved when in the jump into the water. of adjustment to make the life [vest]

362 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

fit securely shall be provided. The • Means shall be provided as neces- between the life [vest] and any ap-
wearer shall be able to make any sary in the design of the life [vest], proved immersion suit that is in-
readjustment without removing the whether it is worn with or without tended to be worn with it. … Where
life [vest]; an approved immersion suit, to a life [vest] is to be approved for use
­prevent it from riding up the body of with an immersion suit [or suits] then
• Subsequent to proper donning, the wearer; [and,] it shall be tested with each type of
inadvertent release or loosening of immersion suit that the life [vest] is
the life [vest] such that its flotation • Approval of a life [vest] and spray- designed to be compatible with. 
characteristics are unacceptably hood to this specification shall
altered, shall be prevented; take into account the compatibility — FSF Editorial Staff

each flight, the user will check for holes, Inflatable mitts are stowed and secured support the head and to keep the upper
tears, integrity of seals at the wrists and in pockets mounted on the sleeves of torso out of the water for protection
neck, operation of the waterproof zip the suit. The suit is also equipped with against hypothermia.
fastener, serviceable inflation mecha- SOLAS-approved retroreflective tape,
nism, puncture of the air bag, intact a whistle and a water-activated survi- Edward Alcock of Helly Hansen
seams and signs of excessive wear. vor-locator light. A removable thermal Spesialprodukter in Norway said that
More thorough annual inspections and liner provides buoyancy and hypother- the company’s immersion suits come
all repairs typically must be conducted mia protection. This modular system in six sizes. The appropriate size for
by certified technicians because of the consists of PVC [polyvinyl chloride each passenger is determined during
risk of loss of life if a suit fails to perform plastic] closed-cell foam contained in a training. The company also provides an
according to standards. nylon shell that will give a high level of emergency-breathing option for its im-
protection even in the event of leakage mersion suits.17
The combination of an immersion suit or damage to the suit.”
and life vest must be considered as one “On some models, we are using an
system, said Steve Portman, technical One of the design objectives was to pro- inner air chamber that previously
support manager of Mustang Survival vide comfort during flight between an oil was inflated manually at the surface
Corp.15 platform and a coastal base. to increase buoyancy and to provide
higher freeboard [distance between the
“Our system’s immersion suit is a cov- “Opening of the seals improves com- water line and the lowest point on the
erall-type garment designed using our fort and airflow; this, in turn, will help wearer’s mouth], but which now has a
‘nearly dry’ concept,” Portman said. “The reduce the problems with heat exhaus- double function,” Alcock said. “Basically,
outer shell provides waterproofness and tion,” Portman said. “We assume that the we connect a mouthpiece and hose to
is constructed from ­polyurethane-coated safety officer will determine the method the pocket, which then allows the user
nylon fabric with the seams taped to by which the suit will be worn during to rebreathe the air in the pocket; this
maintain watertightness . Entry and flight — such as seals loose or seals tight provides an extra 40 seconds or so of
closure of the suit is by means of a front with the main entry zipper open at the breathing time under water, sufficient to
vertical waterproof zipper fastener run- neck. The design allows for a number of evacuate a ditched helicopter.” (Exhaling
ning from the lower abdomen to under options.” into the pocket and rebreathing from the
the chin. The coverall is designed with pocket does not change the survivor’s
an adjustable ratchet-type neck seal and The system’s life vest provides approxi- buoyancy.)
adjustable neoprene wrist seals that are mately 140 pounds (64 kilograms) of
clamped shut by a Velcro strap. buoyancy — which compares with Alcock said that the suits were designed
35 pounds (16 kilograms) of buoy- not to impede the survivor’s ability
“The suit also incorporates fitted, ancy specified by the most recent U.S. to swim to a life raft or to enter a life
Canadian Standards Association– Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) raft. The design incorporates buoyancy
approved nonslip, steel-toe rubber technical standard order for adult ­inherent in the material, a sprayhood at-
boots. A neoprene hood with an ad- aviation life vests (see “FAA Technical tached to the collar area and the integrat-
justable mouth guard is stowed at the Standard Order (TSO)-C13f, Life ed rebreather system. Length of survival
rear neck portion of the suit and can be Preservers [Life Vests],” page 452). The time would depend on many variables
donned quickly using a retaining strap. purpose of the extra buoyancy is to such as sea temperature and wind chill.

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The company expects the typical suit to Offshore workers in Norway receive man- possible in many ditching scenarios in
be in service for 10 years to 15 years with datory training that includes donning the cold water when combined with appro-
regular maintenance. suit, purging air/water, preventing damage priate policies, procedures, training and
and snagging, performing maintenance and maintenance. 
“The suit is designed to be donned be- performing underwater escape, he said.
fore entering the helicopter,” Alcock said.
“Donning the suit in the water would be In summary, the evolving technol-
extremely difficult.” ogy of immersion suits makes survival

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Leakage of even small amounts of water into garments worn under cold-water immersion suits
significantly reduces protection against hypothermia.

• Individual components of the immersion suit — such as gloves/mitts or splash guards — can make
a life-or-death difference in cold-water survival.

• If uninsulated immersion suits are used, passengers must wear the required type of undergarments for
sufficient insulation.

• Penetration of water into an immersion suit can add weight and prevent a survivor from being lifted
into a life raft.

• Immersion suits must be compatible with life vests, seats, restraint systems, gloves/mitts and any
emergency breathing devices.

Notes Environmental Medicine. February 1979, and Immersion Suit Combinations.” U.K.
112. Health and Safety Executive Report no.
  1. Canadian General Standards Board. OTI 91 550, 1991.
  7. Rector, Carl. Telephone interview
“Helicopter Passenger Transportation Suit by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, 12. Herrman, Rolf. “Do We Survive With
Systems.” Document no. CAN/CGSB- Virginia, U.S. April 17, 2003. Flight Survival Suits?” Journal of the Royal
65.17-99. December 1999. Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, Navy Medical Service. Volume 74: 1988,
  2. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). U.S. 147–152.
Report of the Review of Helicopter Offshore
  8. Tipton, M.J. “Laboratory-based Evaluation 13. Brooks. 278.
Safety and Survival. Civil Aviation
of the Protection Provided Against Cold
Publication (CAP) 641. February 1995 14. U.K. Health and Safety Executive.
Water by Two Helicopter Passenger Suits.”
(reprinted May 2002). Compatibility Test Protocol for Lifejackets
Journal of the Society of Occupational
and Immersion Suits on Offshore
  3. U.K. CAA. Medicine, Volume 41 (Winter 1991),
Installations. Offshore Technology Report
161–167.
  4. U.K. CAA. no. OTO 2002/021. 2002.
  9. Brooks, C.J. “Ship/Rig Personnel
  5. FSF Editorial Staff. “Sikorsky S-76B Strikes 15. Portman, Steve. E-mail communication
Abandonment and Helicopter
Water During Approach to North Sea Oil with Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
Crew/Passenger Survival Suits: The
and Natural Gas Production Platform.” Virginia, U.S. May 7, 2003. Flight Safety
Requirements in the North Atlantic.”
Helicopter Safety, Volume 28 (January– Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Aviation, Space, and Environmental
February 2002).
Medicine. March 1986, 277–278. 16. Alcock, Edward. E-mail communication
  6. Leese, William L.B.; Norman, J. with Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
10. Brooks. 278.
Nelson. “Helicopter Passenger Survival Virginia, U.S. April 24, 2003. Flight
Suit Standards in the U.K. Offshore 11. Light, I.M.; Slater, P. “A Further In-water Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
Oil Industry.” Aviation, Space, and Performance Assessment of Lifejacket U.S.

364 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

HEED This
Emergency breathing devices come to the rescue
when one deep breath is not enough under water.

— FSF Editorial Staff

O
ne study of helicopter underwater would explain the [20–50 percent mortality rate in
evacuation — using a submerged survivable accidents]. Therefore, a new helicopter
trainer configured for 15 passengers standard should be developed requiring fuselage
to 18 passengers — found that the design to accommodate total evacuation within 20
breath-holding time required for the last passenger seconds from under water. For current helicopters,
to evacuate varied from 28 seconds to 92 seconds.1 where this cannot be achieved, passengers should
The buoyancy of the cold-water immersion suits be provided with some form of air supply, or, after
(also known as survival suits, exposure suits, he- ditching, the helicopter should be modified so that
licopter-passenger suits, aircrew immersion suits it will stay afloat on its side and retain an air space
and helicopter offshore transport suits) worn by in the cabin.”
participants hampered their escape, the report said
(see “Cold Outside, Warm Inside,” page 357). The study participants were highly experienced
instructors or U.S. Navy divers, the report said.
“Breath-holding times were too long for the later They were physically fit, healthy, uninjured,
subjects to escape without resorting to an emer- highly qualified by training, highly practiced and
gency breathing system, in spite of the fact that mentally and physically prepared for a breath-
they were highly trained,” the report said. “For hold before each simulated ditching-submersion
regular crew and passengers flying over water, this scenario.

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“The subjects all had very good generic training emergency breathing devices are serviceable before
and a lot of underwater-escape experience with flight and while preparing for a ditching.
groups of two, four or six people, but had never
experienced a mass evacuation, and it caught all
of them by surprise,” the report said. “[During the Hands-free Device
first daylight exercise,] they were astonished at the Gaining Acceptance
confusion inside the confined fuselage and the re-
quirement to queue to make an escape.”

Extending the time available to escape from a

T he helicopter aircrew breathing device (HABD)
can be configured for various applications,
said David Stancil, vice president, military and
submerged aircraft has driven research and de- professional operations, for Aqua Lung America,
velopment of several types of emergency breathing the manufacturer.3 Basic components are a small
devices during the past 20 years. Devices that have aluminum tank (bottle) of compressed air, a valve,
been adopted by military organizations and law- a high-pressure air hose and a regulator assembly
enforcement organizations also are used by com- with mouthpiece. Standard air pressure in a full tank
mercial helicopter operators in a few industries currently is 3,000 pounds per square inch (207 bar).
and by a few airplane operators, manufacturers The hose provides flexibility in wearing the device
said. They typically are not used by pilots conduct- on a survival vest that contains other equipment.
ing commercial passenger operations.
Changes in design over time have been prompted
Manufacturers use various names for their devices. primarily by evolving military requirements and
Most are not regulated by civil aviation authorities. by technological innovations that make the devices
Civil aviation authorities have approved specific ap- simpler.
plications of some devices with guidelines on safety
and training. For example, the U.K. Civil Aviation “The key issue is matching the placement of the
Authority has approved one device for use by bottle to the type of vest worn by varying the Shallow-water egress
trained helicopter passengers over the North Sea. hose length and the bottle size,” Stancil said. “For
training provides
example, some military helicopter pilots wear the
practice using some
A U.S. Navy survival publication said that to use any bottle over their right kidney with the hose over
device that requires underwater breathing from a cyl- the right shoulder as part of a survival vest with a emergency breathing

inder of compressed air, training is required to enable radio and other equipment. What is important is devices at a depth of
the user to prevent pulmonary barotrauma (injury to have training and to have this device mounted four feet (one meter).
to the lungs caused by expanding air as a human
body moves from below water to the water surface)
and/or cerebral arterial gas embolism (air embolism,
formation of air bubbles that block blood flow in the
brain).2 An air embolism is a risk whenever a person
inhales compressed air under water. The air in the
lungs expands during ascent to the surface and, if not
exhaled at the correct rate, may enter blood vessels
and sufficiently disrupt blood flow to the heart or
the brain to cause injury or death.

The primary risk factor for air embolism while

breathing from a compressed-air device is a rapid
uncontrolled ascent to the surface, which occurs
when a survivor under water inflates a life vest.
Therefore, training for helicopter emergency un-
derwater escape incorporates preventive measures.
For example, the U.S. Navy trains aircrews that
are using this type of device not to inflate their
life vests until they reach the surface. Training
also helps ensure that users will check that their

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properly on the person’s body — not on an air- One significant area of techno-

“A
frame, because a person is not going to have time logical development has been in
to find this device otherwise.” purging water from the regulator
mouthpiece while under water. person
The remote regulator/hose design leaves two hands
free to maneuver for egress and prevents the tank “In current designs, the user has should train to be
from striking the chin or other parts of the wearer’s to exhale enough air to purge
face during egress, he said. “Emergency breathing water remaining in the mouth- able to survive by
devices are relatively new survival equipment that piece before inhaling air in an
have been used only by a few commercial aircraft egress situation,” Stancil said. using one breath-
operators,” Stancil said. “Acceptance will remain “We are developing a new type
minimal until an infrastructure for the required that requires very little breath to hold to get out of
training makes more venues available.” clear the device.”
the aircraft.”
The HABD training requires a swimming pool. HABD has one of two types of
Some military aviators currently receive HABD indicators of air tank status: a
training at about 12 centers in different parts of the small dial indicator that points
world; the centers also provide training to some to a green zone to indicate that the air is in a range
law enforcement personnel. of full to 90 percent full, or a tactile gauge.

Commercial aircraft operators have a very difficult “The green zone is a ‘go’ indication,” he said. “The
situation if they want to add emergency breathing tank must be topped off before flight if not in the
devices to standard survival equipment, he said. green zone. The military uses a tactile gauge so
that the user can feel a needle sticking out of the
“A commercial helicopter tour operator, for ex- indicator.”
ample, cannot just hand to a passenger a life vest
and an emergency breathing device because train-
ing is required for safe use,” he said. One-piece Device
Reduces Size, Weight
Training is conducted in a shallow-water egress
trainer, simulating a submerged aircraft cabin in
which the wearer’s lungs are not deeper than four
feet (one meter) to help prevent an air-embolism
M any one-piece emergency breathing devices
remain in use and are the best-known type,
he said. Known as helicopter emergency egress
accident. A few accidents involving air embolism devices (HEED), they have a valve, regulator and
have been reported only in military-training set- mouthpiece assembly attached directly to the air
tings, he said. tank.

“A person should train to be able to survive by using The current generation of HEED — HEED III —
one breath-hold to get out of the aircraft,” Stancil evolved from a design that originally was for emer-
said. “The first part of training — currently required gency use by scuba divers, said Christeen Buban,
for crewmembers and passengers on some military vice president of marketing for Submersible
aircraft — teaches how to apply escape skills with- Systems, the manufacturer.4
out the use of emergency air. You apply basic skills to
find a reference point, release restraints and get out “The president of our company is an aerospace
of the aircraft in five seconds to 10 seconds — you engineer and a recreational diver who had an out-
cannot wait longer. Emergency air is a supplement of-air emergency,” Buban said. “He was shocked that
to breath-holding. If the seat belt is stuck or a per- nothing existed at the time for recreational divers
son has to cross the cabin to a secondary exit, it is other than carrying an additional full-size air tank
calming to know you have an extra minute or so with a separate regulator. He wanted an emergency
of air. HABD especially is valuable if submersion breathing device that would be streamlined and very
happens so fast that a person cannot take and hold small, but there were no small high-pressure tanks
a full breath. We have been told anecdotally that the available and no market for them. Early models of
HABD has saved lives.” small aluminum air cylinders were developed to

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contain air at a pressure of 1,800 of 1.7 cubic feet (48 liters) of air and provides the
pounds per square inch (124 bar). average user 38 breaths of air, enough to remain

“P
They met the same specifications less than four feet below the water surface for
as scuba tanks.” By comparison, two minutes to five minutes, she said. At greater
eople
HEED III uses aluminum cylin- depths, proportionately less breathing time will be
ders pressurized to 3,000 pounds available. Devices vary in length from nine inches
who are not
per square inch. (23 centimeters) to 13 inches (33 centimeters); the
largest device has a capacity of three cubic feet (85
in good physical
The next step was to design a liters) and provides the average user 57 breaths
condition require
simple regulator with perfor- close to the water surface.
mance characteristics different
more air.” from divers’ high-performance “Many factors will affect actual duration of air,
regulators, which are relatively such as physical condition, training, exertion
complex and designed for greater during egress, panic and temperature,” she said.
sensitivity (low breathing effort) “Everyone’s lung capacity is different, but the av-
at the deeper range of recreation- erage breath used in our calculations is 1.6 liters
al diving — a maximum depth of 130 feet (40 me- [0.06 cubic feet] of air. Some large people take five-
ters). The requirements were compact size and light liter [0.18 cubic feet] breaths; some small people
weight, readiness for daily use, and few parts for take breaths less than one liter [0.04 cubic feet].
reliability, long service life and affordability. People who are not in good physical condition
require more air.”
HEED currently is being replaced by HABD for
some military helicopters, but HEED III still is Pressure indicators are basically of two types:
used in some countries for military helicopter op- a pop-up white pin that indicates that refill-
erations and military fixed-wing operations, she ing is required before use or a dial gauge that
said. The device also is used by personnel in the shows 0-1-2-3, representing pressure from zero
engine rooms of some military vessels to escape pounds per square inch to 3,000 pounds per
from smoke or flooding. square inch.

The company has not marketed HEED to opera- Purging air from the mouthpiece of a HEED
tors of fixed-wing civil aircraft; nevertheless, re- III varies according to customer-specified re-
ports from distributors show that some corporate quirements. In some civilian configurations,
flight departments that have adopted HEED III the user presses a purge button so that air from
for pilots of their helicopters also have provided the cylinder clears water from the mouthpiece,
the device to crews of fixed-wing aircraft, Buban depleting a small amount of the supply available
said. Some individual pilots of fixed-wing aircraft for breathing in the process. One disadvantage is
— such as Canadian seaplane-charter pilots and that some users press the purge button, deplet-
pilots of seaplanes used in fishing — also have ing air, at times other than during emergencies,
bought the device, she said. Buban said. In typical military configurations, a
hard-purge system is used, requiring users either
The company supplies the HEED III in a nylon to expel their last breath to clear the regulator
holster. Most commonly, a pocket specifically or to swallow water in the mouthpiece while
designed for the HEED III is incorporated into submerged.
a survival vest.
The HEED III operating manual provides many
“In civil aviation, crew clothing is not standard- safety warnings — including the risk of air em-
ized, although most users prefer wearing a vest or bolism — and recommends that recreational
a flight suit with pockets in the arms and legs,” she divers receive scuba certification and that pilots
said. “We also have a waist-band-mounted device complete underwater-escape training with the
for those who do not wear a vest.” device before the device is carried for emergency
use, she said. For aviation uses, the manual cov-
The standard model of HEED III is less than 12 ers preflight checks, use during an emergency and
inches (30 centimeters) in length, has a capacity postflight actions.

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Passenger-oriented Devices including depth, temperature and personal

Aim for Simplicity attitude.”

The P-STASS integrates into life vests for he-

I n the United Kingdom, significant attention has
been focused on methods of providing emer-
gency air to passengers of military helicopters and
licopter aircrews and passengers, and can be
adapted to any current life vest. Alternatively,
civilian helicopters to complement the devices that the device can be carried in a pouch on a waist
have been carried by crewmembers. belt, a method that has been preferred by U.K.
firefighters, he said.
For example, the passenger–short term air sup-
ply system (P–STASS) was developed initially as
a military device, said Bill Batchelor, operations Rebreathing From Air Bag
manager for MSI-Defence Systems (Weymouth), Counteracts Cold Shock
which markets the device. 5 The P–STASS is
designed and manufactured by Apeks Marine
Equipment. O ther devices for passengers, developed in
the United Kingdom, are the Air Pocket
and the Air Pocket Plus helicopter emergency
“The P-STASS has first-stage and second-stage underwater-breathing systems, said Jane Nolan,
regulators,” Batchelor said. “These allow breath- chief executive officer of Shark Group. The device
ing down to a depth of 50 meters [164 feet]. was designed to help passengers overcome the The passenger
P–STASS has now completed a long series of effects of cold shock and to escape under water short-term air supply
trials. All service trials to date have been con- after a helicopter water-contact accident (see
system includes
centrated toward helicopter-passenger use, but “Is There a Doctor Aboard the Life Raft?” page
passenger briefings
certain operators are looking at fixed-wing use. 187). Air Pocket/Air Pocket Plus fits between
the buoyancy chambers of a life vest. The prin- and briefing cards
This would be civilian aircraft — mainly execu-
tive business jets or charter aircraft. The civilian ciple is that the user exhales through a mouth- to enable use
product is the same as the military version, but piece into a small air bag — rather than into the without training.
the cylinder size can be altered easily to increase
duration.”

The system — which has a central hose, low in-

herent breathing resistance, a double nonreturn
valve to prevent water ingress and a nose clamp
— was designed primarily for use by untrained
troops and passengers on helicopters. After fit-
ting the mouthpiece, the user’s hands are free.
The standard model provides two minutes of
emergency air at a depth of five meters (16 feet),
the manufacturer said.

“There is no in-water training of passengers; the

system depends fully upon passenger briefings
and briefing cards,” Batchelor said. “There is a
small risk of air embolism caused by surfacing
too fast and not breathing out during ascent. The
risk is always there. The options are drowning or
an embolism. The P-STASS can give up to four
minutes of extra escape time. This is dependent
on the element of panic that the user is in, but
it gives the user sufficient time to get over the
initial in-water shock and allows a breath to get
orientation correct and effect escape. The time
is therefore a combination of many factors,

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

surrounding water — and then rebreathes comprising a small air cylinder, valve, regulator
from the bag a few times until reaching the and mouthpiece. The participants, wearing im-
surface.6,7 mersion suits and aircrew helmets, traversed a
ladder positioned 1.25 meters (4.1 feet) below
“The original Air Pocket enabled the user to re- the surface of water at 15 degrees Celsius (C; 59
breathe the volume of air in his or her lungs on degrees Fahrenheit [F]) and at 5 degrees C (41
immersion,” Nolan said. “The second-generation degrees F).8
product, Air Pocket Plus, is fitted with a small
cylinder containing 3.5 liters [0.12 cubic feet] of “Both Air Pocket and Short Term Air Supply
breathing air, the equivalent of one breath, which System significantly extended the underwater-
is added automatically on immersion with manual survival time of individuals, when compared to
override to the counterlung [air bag]. This means their maximum breath-hold time,” the report
that even if the user is unable to breath-hold, there said. “It is clear from the measurements made
is air available during the underwater escape. We do of gas concentrations in Air Pocket, the volume
not quote an escape time, but underwater-escape of air used from Short Term Air Supply System,
experiments … during the development process and subjective responses that the 60-second
showed that the ability to rebreathe with Air Pocket ­submersions were achieved more easily with
after maximum breath-hold extended the average Short Term Air Supply System than with Air
survival time under water by a factor of 2.5.” Pocket. … It is concluded that in conditions
similar to those of the present experiment,
Air Pocket Plus has been designed to minimize Short Term Air Supply System will give longer
the risk of air embolism. The risk is reduced, underwater duration than Air Pocket, but this
compared with compressed-air systems, because benefit must be offset against the possible risk
the air bag is sized to contain the air charge plus of pulmonary barotrauma associated with the
any breath from breath-hold, without producing use of Short Term Air Supply System, as well
over-pressure, she said. as increased training and maintenance costs.
Irrespective of the emergency underwater-
Integration of a breathing device with flotation breathing aid which is provided, in-water
equipment simplifies training and increases the training, preferably including exposure to cold
probability of correct use under emergency con- water, will significantly improve the ability of
ditions, Nolan said. For example, Lifejacket Air an individual to use it.”
Pocket combines a life vest and an Air Pocket
Plus. Researchers who conducted the experiment on
breath-holding requirements for escape from a
A dry-training familiarization device replicates the flooded helicopter cabin occupied by 15 passen-
breathing resistance experienced when using Air gers to 18 passengers said that use of an emergency
Pocket Plus and provides practice, she said. breathing device — either a rebreather design or a
compressed-air design — is the most appropriate
A report on experiments com- method of providing sufficient evacuation time in
paring users’ ability to conduct current helicopters.
simulated helicopter underwa-

“T he equivalent
ter evacuations while remain-
ing submerged for 60 seconds
said that participants were able
“Indeed, our experiments demonstrate that an air
supply gives confidence to a passenger in an aisle
seat who is waiting for a colleague in the window
of one breath … to complete the immersions seat to escape, rather than causing mass panic
with the Air Pocket and the where there is a huge rush to the exit and no one
is added Short Term Air Supply System, escapes,” the report said.9 

automatically on

immersion.”

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 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Emergency breathing devices provide a backup system that supplements underwater escape with one
breath-hold.

• Duration of air from an emergency breathing device varies because of factors such as lung capacity,
physical condition, training, exertion, stress and water temperature.

• Breathing compressed air under water presents a risk of injury — caused by the expansion of air in the
body during ascent to the surface — and requires training.

• Retrieving emergency breathing devices from stowage typically is not practical for crewmembers in a
water-contact accident; they must be worn and used correctly.

• Integrating the emergency breathing device into a survival system simplifies training and helps survivors to
take correct actions under emergency conditions.

Notes

  1. Brooks, C.J.; Muir, H.C.; Gibbs, P.N.G. “The Basis   6. Nolan, Jane. E-mail communication with
for the Development of a Fuselage Evacuation Time Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
for a Ditched Helicopter.” Aviation, Space, and April 16, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Environmental Medicine. Volume 72, 2001, 553–561. Virginia, U.S.

  2. Swan, Brian D. “Survival — A Guide for the   7. Nolan said, “Cold shock, an involuntary physiologi-
Occasional Flyer.” U.S. Naval Aviation Medical cal response to immersion in cold water, drastically
Institute. 2001. <forum.nomi.med.navy.mil/cd/ reduces breath-hold, increases the heart rate and
CD013/DATA/operationalmed/Safety/Survival.htm>. constricts the blood vessels, causing blood pressure
to rise, thus increasing the risk of heart attack and
  3. Stancil, David. Interview by Rosenkrans, Wayne. stroke. Reflex gasping and hyperventilation can
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 11, 2003. Flight occur, so that the immersion victim may aspirate
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. water and drown.”

  4. Buban, Christeen. Interview by Rosenkrans, Wayne.   8. Tipton, M.J.; Franks, C.M.; Sage, B.A.;
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. April 16, 2003. Flight Redman, P.J. “An Examination of Two Emergency
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Breathing Aids for Use During Helicopter
Underwater Escape.” Aviation, Space, and
  5. Batchelor, Bill. E-mail communication with Environmental Medicine. Volume 68 (10), 1997,
Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. 906–913.
April 23, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
Virginia, U.S.   9. Brooks; Muir; Gibbs.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 371
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Upside down
in a ‘dunker’ for
underwater-escape
training.

Train to Survive the Unthinkable

Aircraft operators must go beyond basic regulatory requirements
in developing training programs that will keep their crewmembers and passengers
prepared to survive a ditching and the wait for rescue.

— FSF Editorial Staff

F
or most passengers, the preflight crewmembers the functions that they are to per-
briefing provides the only opportu- form in an emergency or in a situation requiring
nity for familiarization with the use of an emergency evacuation.1
flotation equipment and with evacu-
ation procedures. In the United States, specific “Annual training in accomplishing these functions
training on ditching procedures is required shall be contained in the operator’s training pro-
for commercial crews who conduct overwater gram and shall include instruction in the use of all
operations, but not for general aviation pilots emergency and lifesaving equipment required to
and cabin crewmembers (although many cor- be carried, and drills in the emergency evacuation
porate aircraft crewmembers receive overwater of the airplane,” said ICAO.
training).
Such training is not required by ICAO standards
The International Civil Aviation Organization and recommended practices for international
(ICAO) requires aircraft operators that con- general aviation flights, which include overwater
duct international commercial flights to assign to operations in corporate airplanes.

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Training Rules Vary coordination and two-way commu- Transition training on “the use of all
Among Countries nication,” JAA said; safety and emergency equipment and
procedures applicable to the aircraft

R egulations governing training for

overwater operations and the use
of emergency/survival equipment vary
• In Australia, crewmembers of air-
craft used for charter operations
and for regular public-transport
type or variant” also is required.11,12

Ditching Dropped From

among countries. Following are a few operations must pass annual profi-
Type-rating Requirements
examples: ciency tests on their assigned duties
in emergency situations (including
• In Europe, commercial pilots are re-
quired by Joint Aviation Requirements
ditching). To receive initial qualifica-
tion to conduct ditching procedures,
I n the United States, ditching no lon-
ger is specified by Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) practical test stan-
(JARs) to be trained and checked every crewmembers must demonstrate dards as an emergency procedure of which
12 months on “the location and use of competence in the use of a life vest adequate knowledge must be demonstrat-
all emergency and safety equipment in water and in removing a life raft ed by pilots seeking a type rating (which is
carried [aboard the airplane].”2 The from storage in the airplane and required to serve as PIC of a large airplane
annual training must include the deploying the life raft;7 or a jet) or an airline transport pilot (ATP)
donning of life vests and “instruction certificate (required to serve under U.S.
on the location and use of all types of • In Canada, crewmembers of tur- Federal Aviation Regulations [FARs] Part
exits.” Every three years, the training bine-powered, pressurized airplanes 135, the regulations governing on-demand
must include the operation of exits, and large airplanes involved in non- and commuter operations, as PIC of an
operation of pyrotechnics and dem- commercial passenger transporta- airplane with more than nine passenger
onstration of the use of life rafts;3 tion must receive initial training seats or as PIC of a jet in on-demand
and annual training in emergency operations, or as PIC of a multi-engine
JARs require flight attendants to re- procedures; flight attendants must airplane in commuter operations).13
ceive initial training in water survival receive training also in first aid.8
(including donning life vests and use Initial training and annual train- FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-70,
of life rafts in water), first aid and ing in emergency procedures also Oceanic Operations, says that to be
“methods used to motivate passen- are required for crewmembers of considered as qualified for overwater
gers and the crowd control necessary multi-engine aircraft with a maxi- operations, crewmembers must have a
to expedite an airplane evacuation.”4 mum takeoff weight (MTOW) of knowledge of subjects such as “emer-
Flight attendants are required to re- 8,618 kilograms (19,000 pounds) or gency procedures, including required
ceive annual training in “emergency less or with fewer than 19 passenger emergency equipment [and] search-
procedures, including pilot inca- seats, and turbojet airplanes with a and-rescue techniques.”
pacitation; evacuation procedures, maximum zero fuel weight of 22,680
including crowd-control techniques; kilograms (50,000 pounds) or less For most general aviation operators
touch drills … for opening normal used in air transport service;9 and, — including corporate aviation depart-
and emergency exits for passenger ments — no specific requirements for
evacuation; [and] the location and • In New Zealand, the pilot-in-com- training crewmembers in subjects such
handling of emergency equipment.” mand (PIC) of an aircraft is re- as ditching, evacuation, use of emergency
Every three years, the annual training quired before beginning a flight to equipment or water survival currently are
must include the opening of all nor- “be familiar with … the emergency included in the general operating and
mal and emergency exits, operation equipment installed on the aircraft, flight rules of Part 91.
of pyrotechnics and demonstration which crewmember is assigned to
of the use of life rafts;5 operate the emergency equipment Part 91 requires only that before each
and the procedures to be followed flight, crewmembers of large airplanes
The Joint Aviation Authorities for the use of the emergency equip- (with an MTOW of 12,500 pounds [5,670
(JAA) recommends that pilots and ment in an emergency situation.”10 kilograms] or more) and turbine-powered
flight attendants be trained to- Crewmembers of aircraft used in multi-engine airplanes must “become fa-
gether.6 “The successful resolution commercial operations are required miliar with the emergency equipment
of airplane emergencies requires to receive initial training in the lo- installed on the airplane to which the
interaction between flight crew and cation and operation of emergency crewmember is assigned and with the pro-
cabin crew, and emphasis should be equipment and the location and use of cedures to be followed for the use of that
placed on the importance of effective all normal exits and emergency exits. equipment in an emergency situation.”14

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 373
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

An amendment to Part 91, effective Nov. 17, 2003,

initiates specific training requirements for crew-
members of airplanes operated under fractional
(shared) ownership programs.15 The training must
include “individual instruction in the location,
function and operation of … equipment used in
ditching and evacuation [and] instruction in the
handling of emergency situations including …
ditching and evacuation.”

The new requirements for crewmembers conducting

fractional ownership operations include drills (i.e.,
hands-on training) in ditching procedures, emer-
gency evacuation, operation of emergency exits, don-
ning and inflation of life vests, removal of life rafts
from the aircraft, inflation of life rafts, use of lifelines
and boarding passengers and crew in life rafts.

The Right Thing to Do

D espite the absence of regulatory requirements

for other general aviation operators, most
companies that conduct overwater operations
have their crewmembers participate regularly in
specialized training, said David Tobergte, manager
of airplane operations for Procter & Gamble Co.,
which conducts about 60 flights a year outside
North America in its Gulfstream IV-SPs.16

“We send our cabin attendants and cockpit crews

to FlightSafety International in Savannah, Georgia,
for initial training and then recurrent training every
two years,” Tobergte said. “They cover ditching, fire
fighting, water survival and other topics. Most com-
panies operating long-range aircraft on international,
overwater missions take it upon themselves to get
this type of training from an outside vendor. We
go beyond regulatory requirements in many other
areas, such as crew duty-day [limits] and crew-rest
requirements because it is the right thing to do.”

The Texas Instruments aviation department, which

conducts about one-third of its flights over water
in its Challenger 604s, sends its crewmembers to
FACTS Training International to receive annual
emergency procedures training.

“We have FACTS bring their [mobile] simulator

to our facility for intensive recurrent training of
A portable egress trainer (‘dunker’) is easily assembled and lowered into our crewmembers at least every other year,” said
a swimming pool (top). The dunker provides practice in escaping from a Keith Rumohr, flight operations training coor-
submerged, overturned aircraft. dinator.17 “We feel that it is important to have

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all crewmembers participate, as a crew, in this “We do not spend much time on airmanship,” he
important training. Crew coordination, includ- said. “The course is designed to help individuals
ing the flight attendant, is extremely important prepare for and react to a ditching situation. The
during these acutely stressful emergency situa- course then focuses on water-survival skills. Specific
tions. In the years that FACTS does not come to topics include: preparation for the ditching; egress
our facility, our flight attendants attend training (including underwater escape); boarding life rafts;
separately. survival without a life raft; and improvised methods
for heat retention and flotation.”
“Why all the training and expense? Overwater
operations are not always the most forgiving of
environments. We want our crews to ‘get it right’ Emergency Drills on Syllabus
the first time and every time.” For On-demand Crews
At Citizens Communications, executives who
frequently are flown overwater in the company’s
Challenger 604 also receive training, said Jack
P art 135 includes the ICAO requirement that
operators assign to each crewmember the
functions that they are to perform in an emer-
Stockmann, director of aviation. 18 Every 24 gency or in a situation requiring emergency
months, the executives receive training in evacu- evacuation.20 Descriptions of these functions
ation procedures, don life vests, deploy a life raft must be included in the operations manual.
and become familiar with other emergency equip-
ment and survival equipment carried aboard the The regulations also require that the operator’s
airplane. Crewmembers receive annual training at training program include the following instruc-
FlightSafety International or at FACTS. tion for each crewmember for each type of aircraft
to which he or she is assigned:21
Increasing the
• “Instruction in emergency assignments and
Likelihood of Survival procedures, including coordination among
crewmembers;
S pecialized training is important for pilots,
flight attendants and passengers because it
increases the likelihood that they will survive,
• “Individual instruction in the location,
With no life raft
available, survivors

function and operation of emergency equip- must huddle to

said Roger Storey, an instructor at the FAA Civil conserve body heat
ment, including equipment used in ditching
Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) Airman
and evacuation, first aid equipment and its and provide a bigger
Education Programs Branch.19
proper use; [and,] target for SAR.

“Training will create — or reinforce — an ap-

preciation for the environment in which the
person flies,” he said. “It also will help to build
confidence in their ability to survive a harsh
environment — confidence in themselves,
as well as their ability to effectively use any
survival equipment stored in the aircraft.

“Training also can reduce time and mistakes

when evacuating the aircraft, boarding a life
raft, treating medical concerns, using signal
devices, procuring water, making decisions
and much more.”

Storey said that each year, about 160 people

attend CAMI’s Post Crash Survival Training
for General Aviation; the course is similar
to global survival training administered by
CAMI to FAA flight-inspection crews.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 375
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

In-water Training
Not Required

F AA does not require that the hands-

on training be conducted in a realistic
environment, however.

A professional pilot who has flown for sev-

eral on-demand operators said that some
operators conducted training in pools,
others conducted training in classrooms.

“Instruction in the pools included how to

climb into the life raft, which is not easy
with a life vest on, and how to turn the
life raft over if it inflated upside down,” he
said. “Other instructors inflated life rafts in
the classroom. We all stepped into the life
Practice in
rafts, then stepped out. Sad, isn’t it? And it
• “Instruction in the handling of emergency situ-
complies with the FAA regulations, which is just
donning life vests ations, including … ditching and evacuation.”
as disgusting.”
and inflating a
life raft is best The training program also must include “emer-
gency drills” unless the operator receives FAA Bill Gibson, president of Gibson Aviation, said
accomplished with that the Part 135 training regulations are vague
approval to conduct the training by demonstra-
in-the-water training. and that when his company used Learjets for
tion. The required emergency drills include the
following: on-demand overwater operations, he conducted
training in donning life vests and deploying life
• “Ditching, if applicable; rafts in indoor pools.23

• “Emergency evacuation; “We used a pool because it provides for a better

simulation than inflating a life raft on a hangar
• “Operation and use of emergency exits; floor,” he said. “I always had the more agile pi-
lots get into the life raft first and help the others
• “Removal of life rafts from the aircraft, in- aboard. It gave them a better idea of what they
flation of the life rafts, use of lifelines and would be up against in a ditching situation.”
boarding of passengers and crew, if appli-
cable; [and,] TAG Aviation USA, which operates a variety of
turbine airplanes in corporate operations and
• “Donning and inflation of life vests and the in on-demand operations, requires newly hired
use of other individual flotation devices, if crewmembers to get wet, said David Huntzinger,
applicable.” Ph.D., director of safety and security.24

FAA requires the training to alternate every 12 “We have both Part 91 and Part 135 crews here,
months between “instruction and demonstration” but they are trained to the same standard,” he
and “hands-on” training.22 This means that during said. “During new-hire training, all aspects of
a recurrent training session, a crewmember whose ditching are covered, from cabin preparation to
company conducts overwater operations might [crewmember] roles and responsibilities to sea
be told or shown how to operate the airplane’s survival. This includes a wet drill, where life vests
emergency exits, don and inflate a life vest, and are donned, a life raft is inflated and floated in a
remove, deploy and board a life raft. During the pool, and everyone gets wet. The wet drill is not
next recurrent session, the crewmember would done during annual recurrent training, but the
perform these actions. same topics are covered.”

376 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Several training companies use an egress trainer ‘One Error Could

(“dunker”) in a pool to teach people the basics of Cost Your Life’
how to escape from an airplane that is under water
and inverted (see “Train to Rise to the Top,” page 378,
and “If You Need It, They Have It,” page 382). I n-water training is especially important also for
crewmembers and passengers of helicopters,
which are likely to roll over during a ditching (see
Bryan Webster, president and head instructor at “ Imagine the Worst Helicopter Ditching — Now
Aviation Egress Systems, said that without this Get Ready for It,” page 85).
training, underwater escape after a ditching is
not likely.25 Helicopter underwater-escape training shows why
it is essential for a person to adopt the correct brace
“I would not want passengers hoping that the position, to take a breath of air and to understand
captain is going to get them out of the airplane if how the exit window operates, said Peter Gibbs,
he has not been trained, because he won’t,” he said. training and operations manager for Survival
“He probably won’t even get himself out.” Systems Training.26

Webster, who has more than 10,000 flight hours in During training, wearing the cold-water immer-
operations ranging from bush flying to corporate sion suit and life vest that will be used during
flying, said that even simple tasks, such as donning overwater flights and understanding the hazards
a life vest, are more difficult when a person is in of underwater escape for a particular cabin lay-
water — and likely impossible if the person has out are important. Training provides memory
not been trained. aids, orientation methods and practice, so that
actions are performed as “almost an instinctive
“The worst time to figure out how to put on a life response,” he said.
vest is outside a wrecked airplane with a bunch of
people who cannot swim,” he said. “Donning a life “A person may believe ‘I have unlatched this door
vest is simple, but when I put people in the pool thousands of times,’ but if you make one small
and say, ‘Here, put on the vest,’ they have no idea error or become snagged inside a helicopter cabin
how to do it. They’ve never opened the plastic bag under water, the error could cost you your life,”
to look at what’s inside.” Gibbs said. “Our training is sufficiently realistic
to just begin the panic sequence in a person. In
Webster said that in-water training is especially the modular egress training system, 17.5 metric
important for people who fly over cold water. tons [38,581 pounds] of water enter the cabin
in five seconds as the [simulator] rolls through
“The majority of people who ditch off Canada, 180 degrees.”
where the water is cold, die if the airplane over-
turns and submerges,” he said. “It is not because During their first attempt to get out of the
they are incapacitated; it’s because they cannot find egress trainer, students typi-
the door handle. Most people unfasten their seat cally become disoriented and
belt before the airplane has stopped. They cannot frightened, and have difficulty
see very well and cannot find the door handle.

“T
pointing to which way is up.
They become disoriented and panic. Their heart
rate skyrockets, and their ability to hold their “Loss of visual reference makes it he worst
breath goes down to three to five seconds. very easy to become disoriented;
the buoyancy felt by the person time to figure out
“If you stay in your seat belt until the airplane stops, increases this disorientation,”
then reach over and open the door, hold onto the Gibbs said. “Amazingly, students how to put on a life
door frame for a reference point and then — and become convinced after the first
only then — undo your seat belt, you will not be- rollover that the exit is located vest is outside a
come disoriented. We’ve proved this time and again on the other side of their body.
in the pool. If you remain calm and rational under By the fourth attempt, many wrecked airplane.”
water, your heart rate stays relatively low and your
breath-hold time goes up significantly.” Continued on page 380

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 377
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Train to Rise to the Top

F
light Safety Foundation identified passenger handling, and use of safety and shallow-water escape trainer; psychological
many companies worldwide that survival equipment. and physiological stressors and reactions;
include aircraft underwater escape, and use of life rafts, flotation devices, signal-
life raft use and water survival in their Cape Technikon Survival Centre ing devices and other survival ­equipment.
program curricula; some offer a broader P.O. Box 652
range of training programs. Cape Town 8000 South Africa Fleetwood Offshore Survival Centre
Telephone: +27 +21 460 3236 Fleetwood Nautical Campus
Contact specific companies to determine Fax: +27 +21 460 3698 Broadwater
program content, certification of partici- E-mail: <survival@ctech.ac.za> Fleetwood, Lancashire FY7 8JZ U.K.
pants or identification of programs that Internet: <www.ctech.ac.za> Telephone: +44 (0) 1253 779123
meet training requirements specified by Fax: +44 (0) 1253 773014
regulatory bodies. Only the training com- The center offers helicopter underwater- E-mail: <offshore@blackpool.ac.uk>
panies that responded to our requests for escape training (HUET) with an egress Internet: <www.blackpool.ac.uk/fosc/
information are listed below. trainer (dunker); aviation safety and survival index.htm>
training; HUET offshore; basic survival and
Aviation Egress Systems personal safety; basic sea survival; life raft Some courses incorporate HUET and
200 Hart Road proficiency; and use of water safety and emergency breathing systems; in-­water
Victoria, British Columbia survival equipment for marine, offshore and survival principles, difficulties and tech-
Canada V9C 1A1 aviation applications. niques; first aid; search and rescue;
Telephone: +1 (250) 704-6401 correct use of life rafts and other survival
Fax: +1 (250) 478-2678 CareFlight Safety Services equipment; and safety and emergency
E-mail: <dunkyou@hotmail.com> P.O. Box 15 training for offshore petroleum workers.
Internet: <www.dunk-you.com> Tugun, Queensland 4224 Australia
Telephone: +61 7 5506 8400 FlightSafety International
Highlights of initial and recurrent train- Fax: +61 7 5506 8401 110 Toffie Terrace
ing courses are aircraft ditching and E-mail: <marketing@careflight.org.au> Atlanta, GA 30309 U.S.
dynamics of water impact; pilot and Internet: <www.huet.com.au> Telephone: +1 (678) 365-2700
passenger impact preparation; use of a Fax: +1 (678) 365-2699
ditching simulator with adjustable angles CareFlight offers life raft and life vest train- E-mail: <brenda.seaman@FlightSafety.
of impact; underwater inversion and es- ing courses to individuals and as part of com>
cape; boarding a life raft and donning HUET. The curriculum provides theoretical Internet: <www.flightsafety.com>
a life vest while in water; and rescue of and practical learning through use of an
injured people. aircraft simulator, simulated threats and Programs are designed to provide flight
simulated sea-survival situations. Course crew, cabin crew and frequent passen-
CAE SimuFlite content may address obstructed exits; gers with knowledge and procedures for
P.O. Box 619119 rescue of injured persons; sea survival; emergency situations. Course curricula
2929 West Airfield Drive life raft and life vest use; life raft medicine may include ditching, exiting and water
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, and emergency medical services. evacuation, sea survival, and use of life
TX 75261 U.S. rafts, life vests and other survival equip-
Telephone: +1 (972) 456-8000 Centre d’Etude et de Pratique ment. Teaching aids may include class-
Fax: +1 (972) 456-8383 de la Survie room presentations, simulated training
E-mail: <info@simuflite.com> (Center for the Study and Practice devices, operationally oriented drills and
Internet: <www.caesimuflite.com> of Survival) in-water experiences.
37 Avenue des Colverts
CAE SimuFlite training centers offer flight 44380 Pornichet France Helicopter Survival Rescue Services
crewmembers of business aircraft and Telephone: +33 2 40 61 32 08 (HSRS)
helicopters courses tailored to popular Fax: +33 2 40 61 61 08 81 Ilsley Ave., Unit 7
aircraft models currently in production. E-mail: <contact@ceps-survie.com> Dartmouth, Nova Scotia
One of many ancillary courses arranged Internet: <www.ceps-survie.com> Canada B3B 1L5
by CAE SimuFlite is a program designed Telephone: +1 (902) 468-5638
to train cabin crewmembers in emergency Training for helicopter crews and offshore- Fax: +1 (902) 468-3083
(land and water) evacuation procedures industry passengers includes HUET E-mail: <aviation@hsrs.ca>
and safety procedures, crew coordination, and emergency-air breathing; use of a Internet: <www.hsrsaviation.ca>

378 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Courses include HUET using a por- which are drawn from, and available Billingham TS23 1PZ U.K.
table aircraft simulator/trainer, first aid to, academia, training schools, aviation Telephone: +44 (0) 1642 566656
and practical use of life rafts, life vests and maritime industries, equipment Fax: +44 (0) 1642 563224
and other survival equipment. HSRS manufacturers, and professional orga- E-mail: <teesside@nutecuk.com>
provides offshore and search-and-res- nizations. Its membership list identifies Internet: <www.nutecuk.com>
cue expertise to the offshore petroleum resources by country. Training providers/
industry. members offer programs on topics such Safety specialists with facilities worldwide
as sea survival, training techniques, and offer training for flight crewmembers and
Hota skills and competencies of emergency cabin crewmembers, offshore personnel
Malmo Road response. and others. Participants learn survival
Sutton Fields techniques and train in ditching pro-
Hull HU7 OYF U.K. LTR Training Systems cedures for helicopter and fixed-wing
Telephone: +44 (0) 1482 820567 230 East Potter Drive, Unit One aircraft, using shallow-water escape
Fax: +44 (0) 1482 823202 Anchorage, AK 99518 U.S. trainers and dunker systems.
E-mail: <info@hota.org> Telephone: +1 (907) 563-4463
Internet: <www.hota.org> Fax: +1 (907) 563-9185 Pro Aviation Safety Training
E-mail: <survival@alaska.net> 22143 Old Yale Road
Hota provides first-time and recurrent Internet: <www.survivaltraining.com> Langley, British Columbia
training to those who travel on water or Canada V2Z 1A3
over water, primarily in the petrochemi- LTR’s “Learn to Return” programs are Telephone: +1 (604) 514-1630
cal, maritime, academic and commer- “hands-on” and experiential. Its do- Fax: +1 (604) 514-1589
cial industries. Offshore courses may mestic and international programs may E-mail: <jackie@proaviation.ca>
include HUET and emergency breathing be customized, such as by developing Internet: <www.proaviation.ca>
systems, first aid, personal survival tech- instructor-trainer programs. Some topics
niques, and personal safety and social are helicopter and airplane underwater- Initial and recurrent training are available
­responsibilities. escape techniques and use of emergency to flight crewmembers and passengers,
breathing devices; ditching; in-water air- and courses can be tailored to specific
Industrial Foundation for craft escape simulators; ocean, coastal types of operations. Training may include
Accident Prevention (IFAP) and arctic water survival; living aboard a causal factors, preparation and proce-
128 Farrington Road life raft; and use of survival and rescue dures for aircraft ditching; aircraft egress
Leeming, Western Australia 6149 equipment. (dry, wet and underwater) techniques;
Australia use of an underwater-escape trainer;
Telephone: +61 8 9310 3760 Megamas Training Co. in-water simulation of life raft boarding;
Fax: +61 8 9332 3511 Integrated Safety Training Centre assisting the injured; minimizing effects
E-mail: <ifap@ifap.asn.au> Tol 3593, Jln Mumong/Kuala Balai of hypothermia; and other survival
Internet: <www.ifap.asn.au> Kuala Belait KD1132 skills.
Brunei Darussalam
IFAP’s international programs for the Telephone: +673-3-332842 STARK Survival Co.
offshore oil and gas industry include Fax: +673-3-332845 6227 East Highway 98
components such as helicopter ditch- E-mail: <info@megamas.com> Panama City, FL 32404 U.S.
ing preparation, HUET using an in-water Internet: <www.megamas.com> Telephone: +1 (850) 871-4730
helicopter simulator, water rescue by Fax: +1 (850) 871-0668
helicopter, life raft deployment, life vest The Integrated Safety Training Centre E-mail: <starkinc@aol.com>
use, short-term and long-term life raft provides specialized courses for civil Internet: <www.starksurvival.com>
management techniques and warm/cold aviation and the oil and gas industry in
water survival. South East Asia. Programs may include STARK (Sea, Tropical, Arctic and Regional
HUET; aircraft egress techniques; use Knowledge) offers classes to crewmem-
International Association for Safety of a modular egress training simulator; bers and passengers of aircraft be-
and Survival Training (IASST) in-water individual and group survival ing flown under U.S. Federal Aviation
Location: none listed on Internet site procedures; self-rescue with and with- Regulations (FARs) Parts 91, 121, 125 and
Telephone: +45 761104 76 out respiratory protection; use of life 135. Classes may include the following:
Fax: +45 751621 51 rafts, life vests and survival suits; and ditching preparation and procedures; use
E-mail: <kel@muv.dk> first aid. of a dunker for evacuation and ditching
Internet: <www.iasst.com> practice; HUET with emergency breath-
Nutec Centre for Safety (U.K.) ing apparatus; and open-water (Gulf of
IASST is a venue for the exchange Nutec Global Safety Group Mexico) training using life rafts and other
of maritime knowledge and expertise Haverton Hill Industrial Estate survival equipment.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 379
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

Survival Systems Training Training is tailored to the aviation, marine communication and location aids and
40 Mount Hope Ave. and offshore industries. Instruction in air- signaling; life raft boarding and righting;
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia craft ditching and escape procedures is and use of life vests, cold-water immer-
Canada B2Y 4K9 offered to pilots, cabin crewmembers and sion suits and other survival equipment.
Telephone: +1 (902) 465 3888 passengers. Courses may include HUET
Fax: +1 (902) 465 8755 using emergency breathing apparatus and U. S. Federal Aviation
E-mail: <sst@sstl.com> a modular egress-training simulator; per- Administration, Civil Aerospace
Internet: <www.survivalsystemsgroup. sonal survival techniques; launching and Medical Institute (CAMI)
com> operation of a life raft; and in-water survival
activities while wearing a cold-water im- CAMI Building, AAM-400A, Room 383
International programs are offered to flight mersion suit and life vest. P.O. Box 25082
crewmembers and to trainers of similar Oklahoma City, OK 73125 U.S.
survival programs. Program elements may The Marine Survival Training Center Telephone: +1 (405) 954-4837
include underwater-escape techniques; University of Louisiana at Lafayette Fax: none listed
survival and water-rescue skills; emergency P.O. Box 42890 E-mail: none listed
breathing system; and use of a helicopter- Lafayette, LA 70504 U.S. Internet: <www.cami.jccbi.gov/aam-
egress-training simulator and shallow-wa- Telephone: +1 (337) 262-5929 400/survival_intro.htm>
ter-egress trainer to replicate specific aircraft Fax: +1 (337) 262-5926
configurations in ditching situations. E-mail: <mstc@louisiana.edu> Basic survival training (water, desert and
Internet: <louisiana.edu/InfoTech/MSTC/ arctic) is offered to general aviation (GA)
Survival Systems USA index.html> flight personnel. Water-related topics
144 Tower Ave. may include the psychology of survival;
Groton, CT 06340 U.S. The training center is developing agree- underwater-escape training in a ditching
Telephone: +1 (860) 405-0002 ments with similar training facilities tank; search-and-rescue operations; heli-
Fax: +1 (860) 405-0006 around the globe to offer offshore and copter pickup devices; use of life rafts and
E-mail: <sstmail@survivalsystemsinc. aviation standardized courses. Current safety equipment carried aboard GA aircraft;
com> courses may include HUET using a and personal-survival-kit assembly. 
Internet: <www.survival dunker; personal survival techniques
systemsinc.com> and survival with or without equipment; —FSF Library Staff

students realize that they can cope with escape, underwater-breathing devices and Chapter 12, Cabin Crew. 12.1, “Assignment
disorientation and focus on correctly water survival. Then, I set up a portable of emergency duties.”
doing the escape maneuvers. The lesson dunker in a swimming pool. While it is   2. Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). Joint
is that you always must use a physical not a sophisticated system, it is sufficient to Aviation Requirements — Operations 1,
reference point to grasp the door lever provide the students with some practical Commercial Air Transportation (Aeroplanes).
or get to a window exit.” in-the-water experience that can make the Subpart N, Flight Crew. JAR-OPS 1.965,
difference between survival or death. “Recurrent training and checking.”

  3. JAA. JAR-OPS 1. Subpart N. Appendix 1 to

Taking Training to “When the students complete this JAR-OPS 1.965.
The Student training, I am confident that they have
  4. JAA. JAR-OPS 1. Subpart O, Cabin Crew.
sufficient training to take action to
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1005, “Initial

A lthough most aircraft operators

know the value of training, some are
reluctant to accept the costs and logistics
rescue themselves from a submerged
aircraft.” 
training.”

  5. JAA. JAR-OPS 1. Subpart O. Appendix 1 to

associated with sending crews to training JAR-OPS 1.1015, “Recurrent training.”
Notes
facilities. Some facilities, therefore, bring   6. JAA. JAR-OPS 1. Acceptable Means of
their training to the operator.   1. International Civil Aviation Organization Compliance (AMC) 1.965(d), “Emergency
(ICAO). International Standards and and safety equipment training.”
Recommended Practices. Annex 6 to the
“I bring the training directly to the opera-
Convention on International Civil Aviation:   7. Australian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
tor,” said Ken Burton, president of STARK Operation of Aircraft. Part 1, International Civil Aviation Orders Part 20, Section
Survival Co.27 “I conduct a thorough Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes. 20.11, Issue 10, Emergency and Lifesaving
ground school on ditching procedures, Chapter 9, Aeroplane Flight Crew. 9.2, Equipment and Requirements for Passenger
passenger preparation, exits, underwater “Flight crew member emergency duties.” Control in Emergencies.

380 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• Crewmembers on international commercial flights are required by the International Civil Aviation
Organization to receive training on emergency equipment and evacuation.

• In the United States, there are no specific requirements to train corporate airplane crewmembers on
ditching procedures, use of emergency equipment or water survival.

• Although it’s not required, many companies ensure that their pilots and flight attendants — and sometimes
even their passengers — regularly receive specialized overwater training.

• The “hands-on” training required for commuter/on-demand crewmembers can be accomplished, in part,
by deploying a life raft on a hangar floor and having the crewmembers step in and step out of the life raft.

• In-water training is especially important for those who fly offshore in helicopters, which are likely to roll
over during a ditching.

• You cannot depend on intuition for emergency actions. Specialized training is essential.

  8. Transport Canada (TC). Canadian Flight Rules. Subpart F, Large and Turbine- 21. FAA. FARs Part 135. Part 135.331,
Aviation Regulations Part VI, General powered Multiengine Airplanes. Part “Crewmember emergency training.”
Operating and Flight Rules. Subpart 4, 91.505, “Familiarity with operating limita-
22. FAA. Order 8400.10, Air Transportation
Private Operator Passenger Transportation. tions and emergency equipment.”
Operations Inspector’s Handbook. The
Part 604.73, “Training Programs.”
15. FAA. FARs Part 91. Subpart K, Fractional handbook provides “direction and guid-
  9. TC. Canadian Aviation Regulations Part Ownership Operations. Part 91.1083, ance” for FAA inspectors who oversee Part
VII, Commercial Air Services. Subpart “Crewmember emergency training.” 135 operations and Part 121 (air carrier
4, Commuter Operations. Part 704.115, and commercial) operations.
16. Tobergte, David. E-mail communica-
“Training Program.”
tion with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, 23. Gibson, Bill. Telephone interview by
10. New Zealand CAA. Civil Aviation Rules Virginia, U.S. Oct. 30, 2003. Flight Safety Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia,
Part 91, General Operating and Flight Rules. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. U.S. March 12, 2003. Flight Safety
Part 91.219, “Familiarity with operating Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
17. Rumohr, Keith. E-mail communica-
limitations and emergency equipment.”
tion with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, 24. Huntzinger, David. E-mail communica-
11. New Zealand CAA. Civil Aviation Rules Virginia, U.S. Nov. 11, 2003. Flight Safety tion with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
Part 135, Air Operations — Helicopters and Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Virginia, U.S. Nov. 6, 2003. Flight Safety
Small Aeroplanes. Part 135.557, “Initial Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
18. Stockmann, Jack. Interview by
training for crew members.” Part 135.559,
Werfelman, Linda. Hollywood, Florida, 25. Webster, Bryan. Telephone inter-
“Transition training for crew members.”
U.S. April 23, 2003. Flight Safety view by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria,
12. New Zealand CAA. Civil Aviation Rules Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Virginia, U.S. Dec. 1, 2003. Flight Safety
Part 125, Air Operations — Medium Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
19. Storey, Roger. E-mail communication with
Aeroplanes. Part 125.557, “Initial train-
Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia, 26. Gibbs, Peter. Interview by Rosenkrans,
ing for crew members.” Part 125.559,
U.S. Nov. 3, 2003, and Dec. 3, 2003. Flight Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
“Transition training for crew members.”
Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, April 11, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
13. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration U.S. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
(FAA). Airline Transport Pilot and
20. FAA. FARs Part 135, Operating 27. Burton, Ken. Interview by Rozelle, Roger.
Aircraft Type Rating Practical Test
Requirements: Commuter and On-demand Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Dec. 29, 2003.
Standards for Airplane. FAA-S-8081-5D,
Operations and Rules Governing Persons Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria,
February 2001.
On Board Such Aircraft. Part 135.123, Virginia, U.S.
14. FAA. U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations “Emergency and emergency evacuation
(FARs) Part 91, General Operating and duties.”

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 381
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

If You Need It, They Have It

M
any companies, in addition to Artex Aircraft Supplies Telephone: +61 3 9885 0444
those mentioned elsewhere in 14405 Keil Road Northeast Fax: +61 3 9885 5530
this publication, offer products Aurora, OR 97002 U.S. E-mail: <genenq@painswessex.com.au>
and services that can improve your odds Telephone: +1 (503) 678-7929 Internet: <www.painswessex.com.au>
of survival in a water-emergency situation. Fax: +1 (503) 678-7930
Flight Safety Foundation has compiled a E-mail: <info@artex.net>
selective list of those companies in four Internet: <www.artex.net> Pointer
categories: emergency radio beacons; 1027 North Stadem Drive
first aid kits and wilderness-oriented first Tempe, AZ 85281 U.S.
aid training; emergency rations and water; ELTA Telephone: +1 (480) 966-1674
and a wide variety of related equipment. BP 48 Fax: +1 (480) 968-8020
14 Place Marcel Dassault E-mail: <david.koster@att.net>
Each company is listed once, and may 31702 Blagnac Cedex Internet: <www.pointerinc.com>
offer products in categories besides that France
in which it is listed. The Foundation does Telephone: +33 5 34 36 10 00
Fax: +33 5 34 36 10 01 SERPE-IESM
not endorse the identified companies Zone Industrielle des Cinq Chemins
and organizations. Nevertheless, many E-Mail: <des@elta.fr>
Internet: <www.elta.fr> 56520 Guidel
of these companies’ Internet sites offer a France
useful starting point for educating yourself Telephone: +33 2 97 02 49 49
about these topics. Japan Radio Co. Fax: +33 2 97 65 00 20
Nittochi Nishi-Shinjuku Building E-mail: <contact@serpe-iesm.com>
Bringing Home the Beacon 10-1 Nishi-Shinjuku 6-chome Internet: <www.serpe-iesm.com>
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160-8328
Companies that manufacture or supply Japan
Telephone: +81 3 3348 3604 Seimac
emergency locator transmitters (ELTs),
Fax: +81 3 3348 3648 271 Brownlow Ave.
personal locator beacons (PLBs), emer-
E-mail: none listed Dartmouth, Nova Scotia
gency position-indicating radio beacons
Internet: <www.jrc.co.jp> Canada B3B 1W6
(EPIRBs) and automatic deployable emer-
Telephone: +1 (902) 468-3007
gency locator transmitters (ADELTs) are
Fax: +1 (902) 468-3009
printed below.
McMurdo E-mail: thensley@seimac.com
Silver Point Internet: <www.seimac.com>
More companies and resources are avail- Airport Service Road
able at the Internet site, Cospas-Sarsat Portsmouth PO3 5PB U.K.
International Satellite System for Search Telephone: +44 2392 623 900 Techtest
and Rescue <www.cospas-sarsat.org/ Fax: +44 2392 623 998 HR Smith Group of Companies
beacons/beacon_navigation_frame.html>. E-mail: <sales@mcmurdo.co.uk> Street Court, Kingsland
The site contains information about Internet: <www.pwss.com> Leominster, Herefordshire HR6 9QA
manufacturers; product reports; coding U.K.
protocols; an interactive beacon-message Telephone: +44 1568 708 744
protocol-selection tutorial; guidelines for Northern Airborne Technology Fax: +44 1568 708 713
coding, registration and type approval; 1925 Kirschner Road E-mail: <street@hr-smith.com>
and other information. Most of the docu- Kelowna, British Columbia Internet: <www.hr-smith.com>
ments are available in English, French Canada V1Y 4N7
and Russian. Telephone: +1 (250) 763-2232
Fax: +1 (250) 762-3374
Repair Kits for People
E-mail: <general@natech.com>
ACR Electronics First aid kits may be included in prepack-
Internet: <www.northernairborne.com>
5757 Ravenswood Road aged survival equipment packs (SEPs).
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312 U.S. Kits and specific items for kits also may
Telephone: +1 (954) 981-3333 Pains Wessex Australia be purchased separately.
Fax: +1 (954) 983-5087 P.O. Box 25
E-mail: <webmail@acrelectronics.com> Glen Iris, Victoria 3146 Some companies manufacture or sell first
Internet: <www.acrelectronics.com> Australia aid kits for use in water-related environments;

382 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

others offer components that can be E-mail: <lsi@lifesupportintl.com> Wilderness Safety Council
added to ready-made first aid kits for Internet: <www.lifesupportintl.com> 214 East Duncan Ave.
additional capability or used to assemble Alexandria VA 22301 U.S.
individualized kits. MedAire* Telephone: +(703) 836-8905
Corporate Headquarters E-mail: <Chris@wfa.net>
Also listed in this section are organiza- 80 East Rio Salado Parkway, Suite 610 Internet: <http://wfa.net>
tions that provide training programs for Tempe, AZ 85281 U.S.
first aid in a wilderness setting — and that Telephone: +1 (480) 333-3700 Back to Basics:
directly applies to the circumstances of Fax: +1 (480) 333-3592
Food and Water
a ditching. E-mail: <info@medaire.com>
Internet: <www.medaire.com>
Food rations and water rations appro-
Additional sources may be found at the *FSF member
priate for consumption and storage in
Internet site <www.equipped.org>.
water-related environments may be pur-
The Preparedness Center
chased from manufacturers, distributors
First aid kit suppliers Preparedness Industries
and retailers.
311 East Perkins St.
Adventure Medical Kits Ukiah, CA 95482 U.S.
Survival equipment packs (SEPs) may
P.O. Box 43309 Telephone: +1 (707) 472-0288
be customized by suppliers or by cus-
Oakland, CA 94624 U.S. Fax: +1 (707) 472-0228
tomers to reflect individual preferences.
Telephone: +1 (510) 261-7414 E-mail: <sales@preparedness.com>
Replacement food items and water
Fax: +1 (510) 261-7419 Internet: <www.preparedness.com>
items may be purchased from vendors
E-mail: <questions@adventuremedical in quantities from single items to case
kits.com> Wilderness Medical Systems
lots. Food and water rations also may be
Internet: <www.adventuremedicalkits. P.O. Box 584
purchased as part of prepackaged SEPs.
com> Absarokee, MT 59001 U.S.
Prepackaged SEPs typically contain sup-
Telephone: +1 (406) 328-7126
plies of food and water in predetermined
BCB International Fax: +1 (406) 328-6176
quantities (e.g, rations for six adults for
Clydesmuir Road E-mail: <kurtvn@wildernessmedical.com>
four days).
Cardiff CF24 2QS U.K. Internet: <www.wildernessmedical.com>
Telephone: +44 2920 433 700 In addition to companies listed here, more
Fax: +44 2920 433 701 First aid training for sources may appear at the Internet site
E-mail: <info@bcbin.com> wilderness environments <www.equipped.org/sources.htm>.
Internet: <www.bcbin.com>
Sirius Wilderness Medicine Compact AS
Exploration Products 300 Chemin de la Rivière Rouge Smoget
P.O. Box 32090 Harrington, Quebec N-5212 Søfteland, Bergen
Bellingham, WA 98228 U.S. Canada J8G 2S7 Norway
Telephone: +1 (360) 676-4400 Telephone: +1 (819) 242-2666 Telephone: +47 5630 3500
Fax: +1 (360) 676-4340 Fax: +1 (819) 242-4597 Fax: +47 5630 3540
E-mail: <epcamps@epcamps.com> E-mail: <info@siriusmed.com> E-mail: <info@compact.no>
Internet: <www.epcamps.com> Internet: <www.siriusmed.com> Internet: <www.compact.no>

First Aid Pak SOLO Datrex

3055 Brighton-Henrietta TL Road P.O. Box 3150 P.O. Box 1150
Rochester, NY 14623 U.S. Conway, NH 03818 U.S. 13878 Highway 165
Telephone: +1 (585) 427-2940 Telephone: +1 (603) 447-6711 Kinder, LA 70648 U.S.
Fax: +1 (585) 427-8666 E-mail: <info@soloschools.com> Telephone: +1 (337) 738-4511
E-mail: <contactus@firstaidpak.com> Internet: <www.soloschools.com> Fax: +1 (337) 738-5675
Internet: <www.firstaidpak.com> E-mail: <datrex@datrex.com>
Wilderness Medical Associates Internet: <www.datrex.com>
Life Support International 189 Dudley Road
Rittenhouse Circle Bryant Pond, ME 04219 U.S. Exploration Products
Building 4 West Telephone: (888) 945-3633 (U.S.); P.O. Box 32090
Bristol, PA 19007 U.S. +1 (207) 665-2707 Bellingham, WA 98228 U.S.
Telephone: +1 (215) 785-2870 E-mail: <office@wildmed.com> Telephone: +1 (360) 676-4400
Fax: +1 (215) 785-2880 Internet: <www.wildmed.com> Fax: +1 (360) 676-4340

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 383
 Equ i p m e n t a n d Tr a i n i n g

E-mail: <epcamps@epcamps.com> may be found at the Internet site Orion Safety Products
Internet: <www.epcamps.com> <www.equipped.org>. Customer Service
Rural Route 6, Box 542
F.A.S.T. First Aid & Survival Aqua Lung America Peru, IN 46970 U.S.
Technologies 2340 Cousteau Court Telephone: +1 (765) 472-4375
8850 River Road Vista, CA 92083 U.S. Fax: +1 (765) 473-3254
Delta, British Columbia Telephone: +1 (540) 459-4495. E-mail: <mcustomerservice
Canada V4G 1B5 Internet: <www.aqualung.com> @orionsignals.com>
Telephone: +1 (604) 940-3222 Internet: <www.orionsignals.com>
Fax: +1 (604) 940-3221 BoatUS
E-mail: <fast@fastlimited.com> 880 South Pickett St. Rescue Technologies Corp.
Internet: <www.fastlimited.com> Alexandria, VA 22304 U.S. 99-1350 Koaha Place
Telephone: +1 (703) 823-9550 Aiea, HI 96701 U.S.
Katadyn Products Fax: +1 (703) 461-2847 Telephone: +1 (808) 483-3255
Birkenweg 4 E-mail: <mail@boatus.com> Fax: +1 (808) 483-3254
8304 Wallisellen Switzerland Internet: <www.boatus.com> E-mail: <rescuetech@lava.net>
Telephone: +41 1 839 21 11
Fax: +41 1 830 79 42 Concorde AeroSales Submersible Systems
E-mail: <info@katadyn.ch> 2046 Madison St. 18072 Gothard St.
Internet: <www.katadyn.ch> Hollywood, FL 33020 U.S. Huntington Beach, CA 92648 U.S.
Telephone: +1 (954) 929-4200 Telephone: +1 (714) 842-6566 or U.S.
S.O.S. Food Lab Fax: +1 (954) 929-4241 toll-free (800) 648-3483
9399 Northwest 13th St. E-mail: <info@concordeaerosales.com> Internet: <www.submersiblesystems.com>
Miami, FL 33172 U.S. Internet: <www.concordeaerosales.com>
Telephone: +1 (305) 594-9933 West Marine
Fax: +1 (305) 594-7667 Lifesaving Systems Corp. P.O. Box 50070
E-mail: <sosfood@icanect.net> 220 Elsberry Road Watsonville, CA 95007 U.S.
Internet: <www.sos-rations.com> Apollo Beach, FL 33572 U.S. Telephone: +1 (831) 761-4800
Telephone: +1 (813) 645-2748 Fax: +1 (831) 761-4020
Fax: +1 (813) 645-2768 E-mail: <catintl@westmarine.com>
They Can Relate to That E-mail: <info@lifesavingsystems.com> Internet: <www.westmarine.com> 
Internet: <www.lifesavingsystems.com>
Companies offering a wide assortment
— FSF Library Staff
of related products directly to aviation MSI-Defence Systems
customers are listed here. Some are 10 Cambridge Road
marine outfitters that offer safety and Granby Industrial Estate,
survival products that are also Weymouth, Dorset DT4 9XA U.K.
useful in aviation water-contact Telephone: +1 44 (0) 1305 760 111.
accidents. Additional sources Internet: <www.msi-dsl.com>

384 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Regulations and
Recommendations
  Regulations and
Recommendations
387 Regulations, Judgment Affect
Overwater Equipment Decisions
389 A Loophole Big Enough for a
Life Raft to Fall Through

395 For Ditching Survival, Start With

Regulations, But Don’t Stop There
396 FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C70a,
Life Rafts (Reversible and Nonreversible)
404 International Civil Aviation Organization

406 European Joint Aviation Authorities

413 European Aviation Safety Agency

414 U.K. Civil Aviation Authority

414 Transport Canada

416 Civil Aviation Safety Authority–Australia

424 Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand

429 SAE International

430 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

452 FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C13f,

Life Preservers [Life Vests]
459 FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C72c,
Individual Flotation Devices
462 FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C85a,
Survivor Locator Lights
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

Regulations, Judgment Affect

Overwater Equipment Decisions
Several U.S. regulations provide specific guidance on emergency/survival equipment
that must be carried during overwater operations, but some requirements are vague
and give operators wide latitude in choosing equipment.

—FSF Editorial Staff

A
corporate aviation department or other If the airplane is flown more than 30 minutes Another life raft is
noncommercial aircraft operator that flying time or more than 100 nautical miles (185 stored behind the
flies a large multi-engine airplane kilometers) from the nearest shore, it is required one shown here.
(i.e., with a maximum certified take- to have “enough life rafts (equipped with an ap- Each has sufficient
off weight of more than 12,500 pounds [5,670 proved survivor-locator light) of a rated capacity overload capacity
kilograms]) or a turbine-powered (turbofan or and buoyancy to accommodate the occupants of
to accommodate all
turbojet) multi-engine airplane more than 50 the airplane.”
occupants of the
nautical miles (93 kilometers) from the near-
est shore is required by U.S. Federal Aviation “Approved” means approved by the U.S. Federal Falcon 50.
Regulations (FARs) 91.509, “Survival equipment Aviation Administration (FAA). Typically, FAA
for overwater operations,” to carry a life vest or approves equipment that meets the minimum
“an approved flotation means” for each occupant standards specified in applicable technical stan-
of the airplane. dard orders (TSOs) for design, materials and

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 387
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

performance (see “For Ditching Survival, devices that “have been accepted by an approved — that is, certified as meeting
Start With Regulations. But Don’t Stop agency of the U.S. government for sea- applicable TSO standards.
There,” page 395). rescue purposes” and that the portable
emergency radio signaling device be an Nevertheless, if the operation involves a
Aviation life rafts that meet TSO stan- automatic deployable emergency locator transport category airplane that is certi-
dards have a rated capacity and an transmitter (ADELT) that meets TSO fied for ditching, another regulation, Part
overload capacity. For example, a life standards (see “Stay Tuned: A Guide to 25.1415, “Ditching equipment,” applies
raft with a rated capacity of eight people Emergency Radio Beacons,” page 139). (see “Ditching Certification: What Does It
might have an overload capacity of 12 Mean?” page 66). The regulation requires
people. RTCA (formerly Radio Technical that life vests and life rafts carried aboard
Commission for Aeronautics) Document ditching-certified airplanes be FAA-
Part 91.509 requires that the following DO-183, Minimum O p e rat ional approved.
“survival equipment” be carried during Performance Standards for Emergency
overwater operations more than 30 min- Locator Transmitters, describes an ADELT Part 25.1415 also says that “unless excess
utes flying time or more than 100 nautical as an ELT that “is intended to be rigidly rafts of enough capacity are provided, the
miles from the nearest shore: attached to the aircraft before the crash buoyancy and seating capacity beyond the
and automatically ejected and deployed rated capacity of the rafts [overload capac-
• A life vest with an approved survi- after the crash force sensor has deter- ity] must accommodate all occupants of
vor-locator light for each occupant; mined that a crash has occurred.” The the airplane in the event of a loss of one
document says that an ADELT “should raft of the largest rated capacity.”
• At least one pyrotechnic signaling float in water and is intended to aid SAR
device for each life raft; [search-and-rescue] teams in locating This means that a ditching-certified
the crash site.” airplane must carry at least two life rafts
• “One self-buoyant, water-resistant, during overwater operations, said Aaron
portable emergency radio signaling Duncan, engineering manager for Garrett
device that is capable of transmis- Ditching Certification Aviation Services in Springfield, Illinois,
sion on the appropriate emergency Requires Backups U.S.1
frequency or frequencies and not
dependent upon the airplane power
supply”; and, P art 91.509 says that the required
life rafts, life vests and signaling de-
vices must be installed in “conspicuously
“The regulation says that you have to
assume that you are going to lose or
destroy one life raft, and it has to be the
• A lifeline (used by occupants to stay marked locations and easily accessible in largest-capacity raft,” he said. “So, if I have
on a wing after ditching). the event of a ditching without appre- a four-person life raft, a six-person life
ciable time for preparatory procedures.” raft and an eight-person life raft aboard
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-38A, the airplane, I have to assume that I’ll
Large and Turbine-powered Multiengine An amendment to Part 91.509, effective lose the eight-person life raft, and I have
Airplanes, Part 91, Subpart D, recom- Nov. 17, 2003, includes provisions for to ensure that I have enough overload
mends the use of pyrotechnic signaling managers of fractional (shared) aircraft- capacity with the remaining life rafts to
ownership programs to apply to FAA accommodate the maximum number of
for deviations from specific survival- people aboard.”
equipment requirements (see “A Loophole

A
Big Enough for a Life Raft to Fall Through,” For ditching-certified airplanes, Part
page 389). 25.1415 also requires the following equip-
ditching-
ment: a trailing line and a static line (i.e.,
Although Part 91.509 requires that mooring/inflation line) for each life raft;
certified airplane must
life vests be equipped with approved approved survival equipment attached to
carry at least two life survivor-locator lights and that life rafts each life raft; and an approved survival-
be equipped with approved “survival lo- type ELT for use in one life raft.
rafts during overwater cator lights” for overwater flights more
than 30 minutes flying time or 100 RTCA DO-183 describes a survival-type
operations. nautical miles from the nearest shore, ELT as an “ELT [that] does not normally
the regulation does not require that the activate automatically and is intended to
life vests and life rafts, themselves, to be Continued on page 390

388 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

A Loophole Big Enough for a Life Raft to Fall Through

C
iting the “proven reliability of turbine The amendment to Part 135.167 affects to “demonstrate and ensure the reliability
engines,” the U.S. Federal Aviation all the equipment requirements. The of the airplane engines” and comply with
Administration (FAA) has amended amendment allows operators to apply “other conditions and limitations … to
regulations on emergency/survival equip- for amendments to their operations ensure that safety and survivability are
ment, allowing more operators to apply specifications requiring “carriage of all or maintained.”
for deviations from requirements to carry any specific items” listed in Part 135.167
specific equipment — including life rafts or to apply for deviations from the equip- FAA said that guidance for approving
— during overwater operations. ment requirements for specific extended- deviations and exceptions from Part
overwater operations. 91.509 equipment requirements and
The amendments, which became ef- from Part 135.167 equipment require-
fective Nov. 17, 2003, affect airplanes FAA said that it received several public ments will be developed from existing
used in fractional (shared) ownership comments after the amendments were guidance to FAA operations inspectors
programs operated under U.S. Federal proposed in July 2001. Among com- for approving deviations to Part 121.339,
Aviation Regulations Part 91, Subpart K, ments opposing the revisions were the the emergency equipment requirements
and airplanes used in commuter opera- following:1 for overwater operations conducted by
tions and on-demand operations under air carriers.
Part 135. • “The change will jeopardize lives
because any survivors of a ditching The existing guidance includes the Air
The amendment to Part 91.509 affects would have no means of surviving in Transportation Operations Inspectors
requirements to carry life rafts, pyro- the water until they are rescued.” Handbook, which says that air carriers
technic signaling devices, emergency must provide the following information
radio signaling devices and lifelines. The • “The recent case where an Airbus when they apply for a deviation from Part
amendment allows managers of fractional A330 had a dual-engine flameout 121.339:2
ownership programs to apply to FAA for over the Atlantic Ocean because of
deviations from these equipment require- fuel problems is a perfect example • “Engine-reliability data for the air-
ments for a “particular overwater opera- of why this equipment should be on craft to be used, including total
tion” or to apply for amendments to their every overwater aircraft [see ‘The engine hours, number of in-flight
programs’ management specifications to Unthinkable Happens,’ page 3].” shutdowns and in-flight shutdown
require “the carriage of all or any specific rates. This information must include
items of the equipment.” • “It would decrease safety to allow fleetwide data and data pertinent to
flights beyond 50 nautical miles or 30 the operator’s aircraft;
The amendment to Part 91.509 was minutes flight time before requiring
generated during the establishment of safety devices.” • “Aircraft operational capabilities con-
Subpart K, a new body of Part 91 gen- cerning a diversion due to an engine
eral operating and flight rules governing • “Thirty minutes over water without failure. This information must include
fractional ownership programs. During safety equipment is too much time. If drift-down profiles, single-engine
the establishment of Subpart K, Part the [airplane] was on fire or had other cruise performance for two[-engine
135 regulations were reviewed, and reasons for an immediate landing, aircraft] and three-engine aircraft,
the amendment to Part 135.167 was the lack of a life raft could be fatal.” and two-engine cruise performance
generated. for four-engine aircraft;
FAA said that proponents of the amend-
“Many of the requirements in new Subpart ments “support the revision[s] because • “The areas of en route operation
K of Part 91 are based on requirements for the proven reliability of turbine engines and/or routes over which provisions
on-demand operations in Part 135,” FAA shows that there would be no compro- of the deviation will apply, including
said. “In the process of reviewing Part 135 mise of safety.” proposed minimum en route alti-
requirements, the [Fractional Ownership tudes and airports which could be
Aviation Rulemaking Committee] and the When FAA gave notice in September used if a diversion is necessary;
FAA determined that some of the current 2003 that it was adopting the amend-
Part 135 requirements needed to be up- ments, it said that operators who apply • “Navigation and communication
dated in accordance with new technology for deviations or exceptions to the equip- equipment requirements and ca-
and other changes.” ment requirements must have a program pabilities for normal flight conditions

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 389
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

and for engine-inoperative flight • “A description of search-and-res- Aircraft Ownership Programs and
conditions in the proposed areas of cue facilities and capabilities for On-demand Operations.” Final rule.
en route operation; the proposed areas of en route Federal Register, Part II Volume 68
operations.”  (Sept. 17, 2003): 54533.
• “Existing and/or proposed proce- — FSF Editoral Staff
dures for diversion contingency 2. FAA. Air Transportation Operations
planning and training curriculums Notes Inspectors Handbook. Order
for flight [crewmembers] and cabin 8400.10, Volume 3, Paragraph
crewmembers concerning ditching 1. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 87, “Part 121 Operations Without
without life rafts; [and,] (FAA). “Regulation of Fractional Certain Emergency Equipment.”

be removed from the aircraft and used to or recharged when the transmitter has inadvertent damage and “rapid detach-
assist SAR teams in locating survivors of been used more than one cumulative hour ment and removal [of the life rafts] for
a crash.” The document says that a sur- or when the batteries have accumulated 50 use at other than the intended exits.”
vival-type ELT “can be tethered to a life percent of their useful life, as established by
raft or [to] a survivor.” the battery manufacturer; and the date for AC 25-17, Transport Airplane Cabin
the next required replacement/recharging Interiors Crashworthiness Handbook, rec-
must be marked legibly on the outside of ommends that tests be conducted to dem-
Part 135 Equipment the transmitter. onstrate that the installation permits rapid
Must Be ‘Approved’ detachment and removal of life rafts.
“The battery useful life (or useful life

T he overwater emergency equipment

requirements for Part 135 com-
muter operators and on-demand opera-
of charge) requirements … do not ap-
ply to batteries (such as water-activated
batteries) that are essentially unaffected
“Two able-bodied adult males directed
by a trained crewmember may be used
[for the test], if the airplane configura-
tors are similar to those in Part 91.509. during probable storage intervals,” the tion permits use of that many persons,”
Part 135.167, “Emergency equipment: regulation says. the AC says.
Extended overwater operations,” applies
to flights of more than 50 nautical miles An amendment to Part 135.167, effec- Jeff Miller, a completions engineer
from the nearest shore in airplanes or in tive Nov. 17, 2003, includes provisions at Duncan Aviation, an airplane-
helicopters and to flights of more than 50 for Part 135 operators to apply to FAA refurbishment facility in Battle Creek,
nautical miles from an “offshore heliport for deviations from specific equipment Michigan, U.S., said that after his com-
structure” in helicopters. requirements. pany refurbishes the interior of a trans-
port category airplane, a life raft removal
Part 135.167 requires the following test is conducted by an FAA designated
equipment: Conspicuous and engineering representative (DER).2
Accessible
• An approved life vest equipped with “When we are ready to give the airplane
an approved survivor-locator light for
each occupant of the aircraft; and, P art 91 and Part 135 both require that
life rafts be stowed in “conspicuously
marked locations” and that they be “easily
back to the customer, the DER will come
here and look at our configuration,” he
said. “To ensure that the life rafts are readi-
• “Enough approved life rafts of a rated accessible.” ly accessible, we will do a mock evacuation.
capacity and buoyancy to accommo- The DER will take off the doors or covers
date the occupants of the aircraft.” More specific life raft stowage require- and remove the life rafts to make sure that
ments for operators of transport cat- they don’t get snagged on anything. We get
Each of the required life rafts must have egory airplanes are included in Part right up to the point of heaving the life
an approved survivor-locator light and an 25.1411, “[Safety Equipment] General.” rafts out the window.”
approved pyrotechnic signaling device. An The regulation says that life rafts must
approved survival-type ELT must be at- be “stowed near exits through which Stowage of life rafts can vary even in the
tached to one of the required life rafts. Part the rafts can be launched during an same airplane make and model. There is
135.167 includes specific requirements for unplanned ditching” and in a way that no standard installation in Gulfstreams,
the ELT batteries: They must be replaced allows protection of the life rafts from for example.

390 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

“Since each cabin layout can differ, the lo- said Jesse Villegas, purchasing agent for Duncan Aviation, however, does not
cation of the life rafts varies,” said Robert Associated Air Center in Dallas, Texas, U.S.6 install life rafts in aft baggage compart-
Baugniet, director of corporate commu- “There is no set place for them. The aircraft ments or in lavatories, Miller said.
nications for Gulfstream Aerospace.3 manufacturer does not dictate where they
“They are generally stowed under the want the life rafts to be stowed. Usually, Aaron Duncan said that Garrett Aviation
divan or in a dedicated storage area near our design department or engineering does not install life rafts in Class B bag-
the emergency-escape windows.” department makes the decision.” gage compartments.7

Jeff Miller said that if life rafts already “A Class B baggage compartment is one
The Customer Decides are installed in an airplane delivered that is accessible in flight, but it is the type
for refurbishment, Duncan Aviation of walk-in baggage compartment that
S everal airplane manufacturers said
that their customers choose the
types of life rafts they want and where
determines whether the life rafts meet
current regulatory requirements and are
you typically find in business aircraft,”
he said. “It usually is in the aft end of
suitable for the customer’s requests for the aircraft. You walk through the cabin,
they want them installed. the new interior. through the lavatory and open a door to
get into it.”
“Life rafts are available as an option for “Typically, if the life rafts are acceptable
the Hawker 800XP and [will be an op- — if they meet the regulations and are
Duncan said that his company primar-
tion for the] Hawker Horizon,” said Tim still suitable for the new installation — we
ily refurbishes Dassault Falcons, in which
Travis, manager of executive and cor- reinstall them,” he said. “If the old life
life rafts typically are stowed beneath
porate communications for Raytheon rafts are not going to work out because
divans.
Aircraft Co.4 “Location is up to the op- of size, we can either get them repacked
erator. We do have installations that have or buy new ones.”
already been engineered; however, most “With the models we are working on,
life rafts are sold as loose equipment and space is fairly limited, and there are few-
not as ‘installed equipment,’ meaning the Look Under the Divan er options than in the larger corporate
operator has his choice of location.” jets,” he said. “Dassault does not tell us:

M iller said that life rafts usually are ‘Here’s where the rafts have to go.’ But,
Michael Pierce, Citation marketing man- stored under divans (see photo, because the floor plans are fairly limited,
ager for Cessna Aircraft Co., said that cus- page 387). most of the airplanes have life rafts in
tomers usually purchase life rafts outside drawers or storage compartments be-
Cessna and stow them in existing storage “Divans typically are located near emer- low divans — usually, the single largest
compartments.5 gency exits,” he said. “If the airplane does space in which we can fit a typical life
not have a divan, we put the life rafts in raft dimension.”
“The customers purchase whatever type of closets or house them in spaces between
life raft they want to put in the airplanes,” seats that face away from each other. The If the airplane does not have a divan,
he said. “If they want a dedicated on-board regulations say that the life rafts must be life rafts might be installed in a Class A
storage compartment for a life raft, they’ll accessible, so we put them as close to baggage compartment or in a dedicated
give us the size of the life raft as it’s stowed, emergency exits as possible. Anywhere (specially built) compartment, Duncan
and our completion center will build a in the cabin pretty much is fair game.” said.
cabinet around it, if they want. That’s
pretty rare; most people will simply stow “In most mid-size aircraft, like the
them in available on-board storage.”

When an airplane is taken to a refur-

“T he aircraft
Hawkers and some of the Falcons, there
is an open storage area across from the
airstair door,” he said. “It’s a Class A bag-
bishment facility for installation of a manufacturer does not gage compartment because it’s an open
new cabin interior, the airplane owner compartment that is immediately acces-
and the designers/engineers at the facil- dictate where they sible to the crew.”
ity typically work together on life raft
stowage. want the life rafts If a customer requests a different in-
stallation, the company must ensure
“Life rafts are put in the best possible place to be stowed.” that the installation meets regulatory
based on the information that we have,” requirements.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 391
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

“Because these are Part 25 aircraft, we are required David Miller, director of engineering for Survival
to ensure that there are adequate stowage provi- Products, a life raft manufacturer based in
sions for the life rafts,” Duncan said. “If a customer Hollywood, Florida, U.S., said that customers
requests a specific installation, I have to evaluate who rent life rafts from the company typically
whether it is an adequate location — that it is are familiar with the regulatory requirements.8
readily accessible, that it would protect the life
raft from damage and that it meets all the other “They seem to know what they want,” he said.
Part 25 requirements.” “They call and say, ‘We need a 10-man raft with
Part 135 equipment.’ They usually do not come
to us and say, ‘We have a Falcon 50. What do we
Cabin Bulkheads Provide need?’ If they do, we tell them to check the regula-
Stowage tions and find out what they need. We don’t have
that information.”

D uncan said that airplane owners who do

not regularly conduct overwater operations
often opt for temporary stowage of life rafts on Have a Backup
cabin bulkheads.

“Operators usually do not want to carry the extra

weight [of life rafts] if they don’t have to,” he said.
M iller recommended that aircraft operators
go beyond regulatory requirements to
determine what they need to reduce the risk of
“So, when they do conduct overwater operations, overwater operations.
they use the space between the aft-facing seats
and the forward bulkhead or the space between “The regulations do not force you to carry equipment
the forward-facing seats and the aft bulkhead to unless you’re flying under certain rules or flying a
stow life rafts.” certain distance over the water,” he said. “What is the
difference whether you’re 100 miles offshore or 20
Life rafts are secured to the forward bulkhead or miles offshore? When you end up in the water, you’re
to the aft bulkhead with webbing or are enclosed in the water. I never could understand people who
in a specially built cabinet. take advantage of the rules to save a buck.”

“I’ve seen life rafts go both places,” Duncan said. Don Draper, inflatable shop manager for Safetech,
“These aircraft have fairly small cabins, so there an overwater survival equipment repair station
is pretty much equal distance from the overwing based in Dallas, said that most people who rent
exit, no matter where you put them.” life rafts from Safetech research their needs before-
hand.9 Nevertheless, he has copies of the regulations
Duncan said that many airplane owners do not to use as a reference if a customer requires help.
own life rafts; they rent them.
Draper said that most customers rent the mini-
“If an airplane shows up without life rafts and we mum number of life rafts required by regulations.
are changing the interior, we have to ask the owner For example, a Part 91 operator that has 12 people
what type of life rafts are carried aboard the airplane will rent a life raft that can
aboard the airplane,” he said. “Often, accommodate 12 people. Draper said that redun-
we’ll get the response that they do dancy — having a backup — is just as important

M
not own their own set of life rafts with overwater survival equipment as it is with
and that they just rent them. We will other airplane equipment and systems.
any airplane do some research, select a particular
life raft and say, ‘OK, we’ve evaluated “I would like to see these people get more than one
owners do not
the installation for this life raft; it has life raft,” he said. “But they are limited in terms of
adequate capacity, and the storage weight and space in some of these aircraft — and
own life rafts;
provisions are acceptable.’ But it is they tend to think of that more than anything
up to the operator to obtain those else. The life raft is considered an inconvenience.
they rent them.
life rafts when they are needed un- Chances are they are not going to touch any water,
der Part 91 or Part 135.” but you never know.”

392 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

Stock a Survival Kit • Life raft knife;

P art 91 and Part 135 require survival equipment

to accompany life rafts. Part 91.509 simply says
that a survival kit (also known as a survival equip-
• Carbon-dioxide cylinder for emergency
inflation;

ment pack [SEP] when associated with life rafts) • Inflation pump;
“appropriately equipped for the route to be flown” • Two oars;
must be attached to each required life raft.
• A 75-foot (23-meter) retaining line;
Some guidance on what might constitute an ap-
propriately equipped survival kit is provided by AC • Magnetic compass;
120-47, Survival Equipment for Use in Overwater
Operations. The AC says that “some of the items • Dye marker;
which could be included in the survival kit are:
triangular cloths; bandages; eye ointments; water- • Flashlight powered by at least two D-cell bat-
disinfection tablets; sun-protection balsam; heat- teries “or equivalent”;
retention foils; burning glass; seasickness tablets;
• A two-day supply of emergency food rations
ammonia inhalants; [and] packets with plaster.”
providing at least 1,000 calories per day for
David Catey, an FAA national resource special- each person;
ist for air carrier operations, said that a burning
• Two pints (one liter) of water or one
glass is a magnifying lens that can be used to focus
seawater-desalting kit for “each two

“I
sunlight to produce heat and start a fire.10 He said
persons the raft is rated to carry”;
that a burning glass is not intended to be used in
t is really
a life raft but, rather, on shore. • Fishing kit; and,
Catey said that the survival-kit items listed in up to the operator
• “One book on survival appropriate
AC 120-47 are recommendations; they are not for the area in which the aircraft is
required. to decide what is
operated.”

“Part 91 operators are given some latitude to deter- appropriate.”

(The Part 135 extended-overwater
mine what is appropriate,” he said “It is really up to
equipment requirements are almost
the operator to decide what is appropriate.”
identical to those in Part 125, which
Some operators, therefore, might construe the governs noncommercial operation of airplanes
absence of specific information in the regulation with 20 or more passenger seats or a maximum
as carte blanche to carry minimal survival equip- payload capacity of 6,000 pounds [2,722 kilo-
ment in their aircraft. grams] or more.)

Part 135.167 is more specific. The regulation says David Miller said that most Part 91 operators who
that each required life raft must be equipped with buy or rent life rafts from his company choose Part
or contain an appropriately equipped survival kit 135 survival kits. David Draper said that many of
or the following items: his company’s rental customers ask for Part 121
survival equipment.
• Canopy (to serve as a sail, a sunshade or a
rainwater collector); “A lot of these guys think that if they get a Part 121
• Radar reflector; life raft, that’s better,” Draper said. “But, there is
less in the survival kit for a Part 121 life raft [than
• Life raft repair kit; in a survival kit for a Part 135 life raft].”

• Bailing bucket; Part 121.339, “Emergency equipment for ex-

• Signaling mirror; tended over-water operations,” includes the
same requirement as Part 91.509: “A survival
• Police whistle; kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 393
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

flown, must be attached to each required between a ditching and the recovery of The ARP says that if the anticipated time
life raft.” survivors. between ditching and recovery exceeds 12
hours, the operator should consider ad-
Recommended minimum standards for For an anticipated period of 12 hours ditional items, including: 30 ounces (one
the contents and packaging of survival between ditching and recovery, the liter) of potable water; two water-storage
kits for life rafts carried by the airlines recommended items include: a survival containers with a capacity of three pints
during overwater operations are in- manual; operating instructions for any (1.4 liters) each; a device capable of produc-
cluded in SAE International Aerospace equipment “whose proper use is not ob- ing from seawater at least two quarts (two
Recommended Practice (ARP) 1282, vious”; signaling devices (mirror, whistle liters) of potable water per day; motion-
Revision A, Survival Kit — Life Rafts and a high-intensity flashing light); a sickness remedy for each person; a radio
and Slide/Rafts. The ARP says that the multi-purpose knife; life raft repair kit; transceiver; and thermal protection (“heat
contents of a survival kit should be pliers; a bailing device; blunt-nosed scis- insulating and/or heat-reflecting devices
appropriate for the anticipated time sors; and a waterproof flashlight. suitable for retaining body heat”). 

The bottom line, in our opinion … • Operators of ditching-certified airplanes

must assume that the life raft with the greatest
• Most water-contact accidents, including ditchings, rated capacity will be lost during a ditching/
occur close to shore; yet, U.S. regulations don’t evacuation and must ensure that there are
require life vests aboard a corporate jet or an on- enough additional life rafts aboard to
demand/commuter airplane unless it is flown more accommodate all the occupants.
than 50 nautical miles from the nearest shore.
• There is no standard storage area for life rafts
• Life rafts are not required aboard a corporate jet in most transport category airplanes. The regula-
unless it ventures more than 100 nautical miles or tions say only that they must be in “conspicuously
30 minutes’ flying time from the nearest shore. marked locations and easily accessible.”

• Recent amendments to the regulations allow • “What is the difference whether you’re 100 miles
fractional operators and on-demand/commuter offshore or 20 miles offshore? When you end up
operators to apply for deviations from some of the in the water, you’re in the water” … and without
overwater-survival-equipment requirements. overwater survival equipment, you’re in trouble.

Notes   5. Pierce, Michael. Telephone inter- hand fire extinguisher.” A Class A baggage
view by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, compartment is classified as one in which
  1. Duncan, Aaron. Telephone inter- Virginia, U.S. May 22, 2003. Flight Safety “the presence of a fire would be easily
view by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. discovered by a crewmember while at his
Virginia, U.S. Oct. 8, 2003. Flight Safety station and … is easily accessible in
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.   6. Villegas, Jesse. Telephone interview by flight.”
Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia,
  2. Miller, Jeff. Telephone interview   8. Miller, David. Telephone interview by
U.S. April 21, 2003. Flight Safety
by Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia,
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Virginia, U.S. Oct. 1, 2003. Flight Safety U.S. Oct. 10, 2003. Flight Safety
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.   7. U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Part 25.857, “Cargo compartment clas-
  3. Baugniet, Robert. E-mail communica-   9. Draper, Don. Telephone interview by
sification,” classifies transport category
tion with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia,
cargo/baggage compartments in terms
Virginia, U.S. July 3, 2003. Flight Safety U.S. Oct. 10, 2003. Flight Safety
of fire detection and fire suppression. A
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Class B baggage compartment is clas-
  4. Travis, Tim. E-mail communication sified, in part, as one for which “there 10. Catey, David. Telephone interview by
with Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, is sufficient access in flight to enable a Lacagnina, Mark. Alexandria, Virginia,
Virginia, U.S. May 1, 2003. Flight Safety crewmember to effectively reach any part U.S. Oct. 27, 2003. Flight Safety
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. of the compartment with the contents of a Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.

394 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

For Ditching Survival, Start

With Regulations, But Don’t
Stop There
Complying with regulations and recommendations for life rafts, life vests and
cold-water immersion suits will ensure that your water-survival equipment
meets minimum requirements. But if you’re forced to ditch, “minimum” is not
a comforting thought.

— FSF Editorial Staff

Y
ou are 50 miles from land, and your the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
aircraft has disappeared beneath the (FAA) and adopted by several other coun-
waves that you’re floating on. It’s cold, tries, by no means guarantees that you have
and darkness is imminent. But you’re a life raft that offers maximum protection.
alive! Moreover, you are wearing a life vest, and TSO’d life rafts are manufactured to good
the crew deployed a life raft that you should be material specifications, but from a design
able to reach. standpoint they can be quite minimal (see
FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C70a,
And you remember, gratefully, that your company Life Rafts [Reversible and Nonreversible], page
is scrupulous about going “by the book.” That in- 396);
cludes its attitude about safety equipment. You
know that the life raft and its survival equipment • If your flight has been conducted under U.S.
pack (SEP) meet all the applicable regulations. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 91,
the general operating and flight rules, your life
Nevertheless, there are some issues that your raft might not even be manufactured to a TSO
company might not have considered: — and it could still comply with the FARs;

• Regulations and recommendations differ • Neither Part 91 nor Part 135, the regulations
among various civil aviation authorities. governing commuter and on-demand opera-
Not all authorities and specialists in the field tors, ensures that you will have an emergency
agree about what you need to survive; radio beacon (see “Stay Tuned: A Guide to
Emergency Radio Beacons,” page 139) in the
• That your life raft is built to Technical life raft;
Standard Order (TSO)-C70a, published by Continued on page 402

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 395
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C70a, Life Rafts

(Reversible and Nonreversible)
Date: April 13, 1984 (6) Maintenance instructions including instructions regarding
inspection, repair and stowage of materials.
Department of Transportation
[U.S.] Federal Aviation Administration (7) The functional test specification to be used to test each
Office of Airworthiness production article to ensure compliance with this TSO.
Washington, D.C. [U.S.]
(d) Availability of Referenced Documents.
(a) Applicability.
(1) Appendix 1, “Federal Aviation Administration Standard
(1) Minimum Performance Standards. This Technical for Life Rafts,” of this TSO specifies certain test
Standard Order (TSO) prescribes the minimum perfor- methods that are contained in Federal Test Method
mance standards that life rafts must meet to be identi- Standard No. 191A unless otherwise noted. Federal
fied with the applicable TSO marking. This TSO has Test Method Standard No. 191A may be examined at
been prepared in accordance with the procedural rules the FAA Headquarters in the Office of Airworthiness,
set forth in Subpart O of Federal Aviation Regulations Aircraft Engineering Division (AWS-110), and at all
[FARs] Part 21. New models of life rafts that are to be Aircraft Certification Offices, and may be obtained (or
so identified and that are manufactured on or after the purchased) from the General Services Administration,
date of this TSO must meet the standards set forth in Business Service Center, Region 3, 7th and D Streets,
Appendix 1, “Federal Aviation Administration Standard S.W., Washington, D.C. 20407.
for Life Rafts,” of this TSO.
(2) Federal Aviation Regulations Part 21, Subpart O and
(2) Environmental Standard. None. Advisory Circular 20-110, Index of Aviation Technical
Standard Orders, may be reviewed at the FAA
(3) Test Methods. This TSO references Federal Test Headquarters in the Office of Airworthiness, Aircraft
Method Standard No. 191A dated 7/20/78. Engineering Division (AWS-110), and at all regional
Aircraft Certification Offices.
(b) Marking. In addition to the marking required in Federal
Aviation Regulations [FARs Part] 21.607(d), the part num- — J.A. Pontecorvo
ber, serial number, date of manufacture, weight and rated Acting Director of Airworthiness
and overload capacities of the life raft must be shown also.
The weight of the life raft includes any accessories required Appendix 1 — Federal Aviation Administration
in this TSO. Standard for Life Rafts

(c) Data Requirements. In accordance with [Part] 21.605, 1. Purpose. This standard provides the minimum
each manufacturer shall furnish the Manager, Aircraft performance standards for life rafts.
Certification Office (ACO), Federal Aviation Administration,
having geographical purview of the manufacturer’s facili- 2. Scope. This standard covers the following types of
ties, one copy each of the following technical data: life rafts:

(1) Operating instructions. • Type I — For use in any category aircraft.

• Type II — For use in nontransport-category
(2) Packing instructions. aircraft.

(3) A complete description of the device, including detail 3. Materials and Workmanship.
drawings, materials identification and specifications, and
installation procedures. 3.1 Nonmetallic Materials.

(4) Manufacturer’s TSO Qualification test reports. 3.1.1 The finished device must be clean and free from any
defects that might affect its function.
(5) Applicable installation limitations, including stowage area
temperatures. The manufacturer shall also provide the 3.1.2 Coated fabrics and other items, such as webbing,
purchaser with such limitations. subject to deterioration must have been manufactured

396 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

not more than 18 months prior to the date of delivery • Shear Strength (Seam Shear Test Method)
of the finished product. – 175 pounds/inch width at 75 degrees F;

3.1.3 The materials must not support fungus growth. – 40 pounds/inch width at 140 degrees F;
[and,]
3.1.4 Coated fabrics — General. Coated fabrics, • Peel Strength (Peel Test Method):
including seams, subject to deterioration used in
the manufacture of the devices must possess at – 5 pounds/inch width at 70 degrees F.
least 90 percent of their original physical properties
3.1.6 Seam Tape. If tape is used for seam reinforcement
after these fabrics have been subjected to the
or abrasion protection of seams or both, the tape
accelerated-aging test specified in paragraph 6.1 of
must have a minimum breaking strength (Grab
this standard. Material used in the construction of
Test Method) of 40 pounds/inch width in both the
flotation chambers and decks must be capable of
warp and fill directions. When applied to the seam
withstanding the detrimental effects of exposure to
area, the adhesion-strength characteristics must
fuels, oils and hydraulic fluids.
meet the seam-strength requirements in paragraph
3.1.4.1 Strength. Coated fabrics used for these applications 3.1.5.
must conform to the following minimum strengths
3.1.7 Canopy. Fabrics used for this purpose must be
after aging:
waterproof and resistant to sun penetration, must
• Tensile Strength (Grab Test): not affect the potability of collected water and must
– Warp 190 pounds/inch; meet the following minimum requirements in the
– Fill 190 pounds/inch; [and,] applicable tests prescribed in paragraph 6.1 of this
standard, except that in lieu of meeting the tensile-
• Tear Strength: strength requirements, a fabricated canopy may be
– Trapezoid Test: 13 [pounds/inch] x 13 demonstrated to withstand 35-knot winds and 52-
pounds/inch (minimum); or knot gusts:
– Tongue Test: 13 [pounds/inch] x 13 pounds/ • Tensile Strength (Grab Test):
inch (minimum).
– Warp 75 pounds/inch; [and,]
3.1.4.2 Adhesion. In addition to the requirements of 3.1.4.1, – Fill 75 pounds/inch;
coated fabrics must meet the following minimum
• Tear Strength:
strengths after aging:
– Trapezoid Test: 4 [pounds/inch] x 4 pounds/
• Ply Adhesion — 5 pounds/inch width at 70 inch; or
[degrees] ± 2 degrees F [Fahrenheit] at a pull
– Tongue Test: 4 [pounds/inch] x 4 pounds/
rate of 2.0 [inches/minute] to 2.5 inches/minute;
inch; [and,]
[and,]
• Coat Adhesion of Coated Fabrics:
• Coat Adhesion — 5 pounds/inch width at 70
[degrees] ± 2 degrees F at 2.0 [inches/minute] – 3.5 pounds/inch width at 70 [degrees] ± 2
to 2.5 inches/minute. degrees F at a separation rate of 2.0 [inches/
minute] to 2.5 inches/minute.
3.1.4.3 Permeability. For coated fabrics used in the
manufacture of inflation chambers, the maximum 3.1.8 Flammability. The device (including carrying case or
permeability to helium (Permeability Test Method) may stowage container) must be constructed of materials
not exceed 10 liters per square meter in 24 hours at which meet [Part] 25.853 in effect on May 1, 1972,
77 degrees F, or its equivalent using hydrogen. The as follows: Type I rafts must meet [Part] 25.853(b)
permeameter must be calibrated for the gas used. In and Type II rafts must meet [Part] 25.853 (b-3).
lieu of this permeability test, an alternate test may be
used provided the alternate test has been approved as 3.2 Metallic Parts. All metallic parts must be made
an equivalent to this permeability test by the manager of of corrosion-resistant material or must be suitably
the FAA office to which this TSO data is to be submitted, protected against corrosion.
as required in Paragraph (c), Data Requirements.
3.3 Protection. All inflation chambers and load-carrying
3.1.5 Seam Strength and Adhesives. Cemented or fabrics must be protected in such a manner that
heat-sealable seams used in the manufacture of the nonfabric parts do not cause chafing or abrasion
device must meet the following minimum strength of the material in either the packed or the inflated
requirements: condition.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 397
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

4. Design and Construction. 4.1.1.2.5 All participants must not have practiced, rehearsed
or have had the demonstration procedures described
4.1 Capacity. The rated and overload capacities of a to them within the past six months.
life raft must be based on not less than the following
usable sitting areas on the deck of the life raft: 4.2 Buoyancy. An average occupant weight of not less
than 170 pounds must be used in all applicable
• Rated Capacity — 3.6 feet2 per person
calculations and tests specified herein. In tests,
• Overload Capacity — 2.4 feet2 per person ballast in the form of sand bags or equivalent may
be used to achieve the 170-pound average, provided
4.1.1 Capacity — Alternate Rating Methods. In lieu of the the appropriate weight distribution within the raft is
rated capacity as determined by paragraph 4.1 of this maintained.
standard, one of the following methods may be used:
4.2.1 Type I Life Raft. Buoyancy must be provided by two
4.1.1.1 The rated capacity of a Type I or Type II life raft may independent buoyancy tubes each of which, including
be determined by the number of occupant seating the raft floor, must be capable of supporting the rated
spaces which can be accommodated within the and overload capacities in fresh water if the other tube
occupiable area exclusive of the perimeter structure is deflated. The life raft loaded to its rated capacity
(such as buoyancy tubes) without overlapping of the must have a freeboard of at least 12 inches with both
occupant seating spaces and with the occupant buoyancy tubes at minimum operating pressure. The
seating spaces located to provide each occupant life raft loaded to its rated capacity with the critical
with a back support of not less than eight inches tube deflated and the remaining tube at minimum
high. The occupant seating space may not be less operating pressure must have a freeboard of at least
than the following size: six inches. The life raft loaded to its overload capacity
with the critical tube deflated must have a measurable
Back Support Along This Side
freeboard.
39.4 inches

4.2.2 Type II Life Raft. When single-tube construction is

14.7 7.2 used to provide the buoyancy, internal bulkheads
inches inches must divide the flotation tube into at least two separate
chambers such that the life raft will be capable of
supporting the rated number of occupants out of
fresh water in the event that one chamber is deflated.
4.1.1.2 The rated capacity of a Type I or Type II life raft may The complete life raft loaded to its rated capacity must
be determined on the basis of a controlled-pool or have a freeboard of at least six inches.
freshwater demonstration which includes conditions
prescribed under Paragraph 6.2.3 of this standard 4.3 Inflation. The inflation system must be arranged so
and the following: that failure of one inflatable chamber or manifold will
not result in loss of gas from the other chambers.
4.1.1.2.1 The sitting area on the life raft deck may not be less The inflation equipment must be located so as not
than three square feet per person. to interfere with boarding operations. Components
of the inflation system must meet Department of
4.1.1.2.2 The life raft must have a back support for each Transportation Specification 3AA (49 CFR 178.37)
occupant of not less than 14.7 inches wide and or Specification 3HT (49 CFR 178.44) in effect May
eight inches high. 30, 1976, as applicable, or an equivalent approved
by the manager of the FAA office to which this TSO
4.1.1.2.3 At least 30 percent but no more than 50 percent of data is to be submitted, as required in paragraph
the participants must be female. (c), Data Requirements. The inflation system must
be constructed to minimize leakage due to back
4.1.1.2.4 Except as provided below, all participants must pressure after inflation. If an air aspirator system
select their sitting space without placement is used, the system must be constructed either to
assistance. Instructions, either identified on the raft or prevent the ingestion of foreign objects or to prevent
announced prior to the demonstration, may be used failure or malfunction as a result of ingestion of small
informing that each participant should have a back foreign objects. For Type I life rafts, there must be an
support. A raft commander, acting in the capacity independent inflation source for each primary flotation
of a crewmember, may direct occupant seating to tube, except that there may be a single inflation
the extent necessary to achieve reasonable weight source for all flotation tubes if data substantiating
distribution within the raft. the reliability of the single inflation source is approved

398 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

by the manager of the FAA office to which this TSO International Orange-Yellow or an equivalent high-
data is to be submitted, as required in Paragraph (c), visibility color.
Data Requirements.
4.11 Placards. Suitable placarding must be provided in
4.4 Life Raft Canopy. A canopy must be packed with contrasting colors in waterproof paint which is not
or attached to the raft. The erected canopy must detrimental to the fabric, that denotes use and location
be capable of withstanding 35-knot winds and 52- of the inflation systems, raft equipment, boarding aids
knot gusts in open water. The canopy must provide and righting aids. For reversible rafts, placement of the
adequate headroom and must have provision placarding must take into account usage of either side
for openings 180 degrees apart. Means must be of the raft. The letters used for such placarding must
provided to make the openings weathertight. If be at least two inches high except that details and
the canopy is not integral with the raft, it must be miscellaneous instructions may be of smaller lettering.
capable of being erected by occupants following Applicable placarding must take into account persons
conspicuously posted, simple instructions. It must boarding or righting the raft from the water.
be capable of being erected by one occupant of an
otherwise empty raft and by occupants of a raft filled 4.12 Lights. One or more survivor-locator lights must be
to rated capacity. For a reversible raft, attachment provided that are approved under TSO-C85. The
provisions must be installed to permit the canopy to lights must be automatically activated upon raft
be installed on either side of the raft. inflation in the water, and visible from any direction
by persons in the water.
4.5 Capsize Resistance. There must be water pockets
or other means to provide capsize resistance for an 4.13 Raft Sea Performance. The raft must meet the
empty or lightly loaded life raft. seaworthiness requirements in 6.2.3.2 and must be
capable with its equipment of withstanding a saltwater
4.6 Boarding Aids. For Type I life rafts, boarding aids marine environment for a period of at least 15 days.
must be provided at two opposing positions on the
raft. One boarding aid is sufficient for a Type II life 5. Life Raft Equipment. All lines must be suitably
raft. Boarding aids must permit unassisted entry stowed and secured to prevent entanglement during
from the water into the unoccupied raft and must launching/inflation of a life raft.
not at any time impair either the rigidity or the inflation
characteristics of the raft. Puncturing of inflatable 5.1 Mooring Line. A nonrotting mooring line at least
boarding aids must not affect the buoyancy of the 20 feet in length must be attached at one end of
raft buoyancy chambers. Boarding handles and/or the raft, with the remainder of the line held flaked to
stirrups used in conjunction with the boarding aids the carrying case (see 5.2). The mooring line must
must withstand a pull of 500 pounds. be capable of keeping the raft, loaded to maximum
rated capacity, attached to a floating aircraft, and not
4.7 Righting Aid(s). Means must be provided to right a endanger the raft or cause the raft to spill occupants
nonreversible life raft if it inflates in an inverted position. if the aircraft sinks. The line may be equipped with
The means provided for righting must be such that a mechanical release linkage. The breaking strength
they may be used by one person in the water. of the line must be at least 500 pounds, or 40 times
the rated capacity of the raft, whichever is greater,
4.8 Lifeline. A nonrotting lifeline of contrasting color and but need not exceed 1,000 pounds.
at least 3/8-inch diameter or 3/4-inch width must
encircle the life raft on the outside periphery so that 5.2 Life Raft Launching Equipment. A parachute ripcord
it can be easily grasped by persons in the water. grip and retaining pocket must form the primary inflation
The lifeline and its attachment must be capable of control. The ripcord grip or the attached static mooring
withstanding a minimum load of 500 pounds and line must be provided with means for attachment to
must not interfere with the life raft inflation. the aircraft. If the ripcord grip is designed to attach to
the aircraft, its strength may not be less than that of
4.9 Grasp Line. A grasp line, meeting the size and strength the static mooring line. The position of the ripcord grip
requirements for the lifeline, must be provided with must be standardized. When facing the release end
sufficient slack for use by life raft occupants to steady of the carrying case, the centerline of the ripcord-grip-
themselves when seated on the life raft deck with their retaining pocket must lie at 45 degrees in the right-upper
backs to the main flotation tube(s). quadrant of the end section. The outermost extremity
of the ripcord grip may not extend beyond the outer
4.10 Color. The color of the life raft’s surfaces, including margin of the carrying case. The line attached to the
the canopy surface, visible from the air must be an ripcord grip must serve both to retain the life raft and

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to actuate the gas release(s). The tension required properly fits the packed life raft must be provided.
to withdraw the static mooring line and to actuate the gas Carrying case materials must be of a highly visible
release mechanism(s) must be between 20 [pounds] and color, be fungus-proof and be resistant to aircraft fuels
30 pounds. The strength of the gas release and other fluids. The carrying case must provide chafe
mechanism(s), its fittings and its attachments may not protection to the life raft. The carrying case must be
be less than 100 pounds. provided with easily distinguishable handles so that it
may be carried by one person, carried by two persons
5.3 Sea Anchor. A sea anchor, or anchors, or other in tandem or dragged by either end; none of these
equivalent means must be provided to maintain the carrying operations must tend to pull the carrying case
raft, with rated capacity and canopy installed, on a open. Each handle must be easily grasped and its
substantially constant heading relative to the wind strength must be at least four times the total weight
and have the ability to reduce the drift to two knots of the life raft and case. Conventional zippers may not
in 17[-knot] to 27-knot winds. Unless analysis and/ be employed for closure. Location of and instructions
or test data substantiating the adequacy of a lower for use of the inflation handle must be clearly identified
breaking strength is approved by the manager of the and marked on the carrying-case surface.
FAA office to which this TSO data is to be submitted
as required in paragraph (c), Data Requirements, the 5.8 Knife. A hook-type knife secured by a retaining line
line securing a sea anchor to the raft must have a must be sheathed and attached to the liferaft adjacent
breaking strength of 500 pounds or 40 pounds times to the point of mooring line attachment.
the rated capacity of the raft, whichever is greater. The
attachment of the line to the raft must be capable of 6. Tests.
withstanding a load of 1.5 times the line rated strength
without damaging the raft. The line must be at least 6.1 Material Tests. The material tests required in
25 feet in length and must be protected to prevent it paragraph 3.0 of this standard must be determined
from being cut inadvertently by raft occupants. in accordance with the following test method or other
approved equivalent methods:
5.4 Heaving-Trailing Line. At least one floating heaving-
trailing line not less than 75 feet in length for Type I Test Method
rafts and not less than 35 feet in length for Type II
Federal Test Method Standard No. 191A Dated July 20, 1978
rafts, and at least 250 pounds strength, must be
Tests Required Notes
located on the main flotation tube near the sea-
anchor attachment. The attach point of the line must Accelerated Age Method 5850 Per Note (1)
withstand a pull of not less than 1.5 times the line Tensile Strength (Grab Test) Method 5100
rated strength without damage to the raft. A heaving- Tear Strength (Trapezoid Test) Method 5136 (4)
trailing line must be accessible in any inflated position Tear Strength (Tongue Test) Method 5134
of a reversible life raft. (Alternate to
Trapezoid Test: See
3.1.4.1)
5.5 Emergency Inflation. Means readily accessible to Ply Adhesion Method 5960
occupants of the raft, and having a displacement Coat Adhesion Method 5970
of at least 32 cubic inches per full stroke, must be Permeability Method 5460 (4)
provided to manually inflate and maintain chambers at Seam-shear Strength Per Note (2)
minimum operating pressure. Manual inflation valves, Seam-peel Strength Method 5960 Per Note (3)
with a nonreturn opening adequate for the size and Notes:
capacity of the inflation means, must be located to ( 1) Samples for the accelerated aging tests must be exposed to a
permit inflation of all chambers. The location must temperature of 158 [degrees] ± 5 degrees Fahrenheit for not less than 168
take into consideration occupancy of each side of [a] hours. After exposure, the samples must be allowed to cool to 70 [degrees]
± 2 degrees Fahrenheit for neither less than 16 hours nor more than 96
reversible raft. The inflation means and valves must hours before determining their physical properties in accordance with 3.1
have provisions to prevent inadvertent removal and of this standard.
loss when either stowed or in use. (2) Each sample shall consist of two strips two inches maximum width by
five inches maximum length bonded together with an overlap [0.75 inch]
maximum. The free ends must be placed in the testing machine described
5.6 Accessory-case Tiedowns. Provisions must be in Method 5100 and separated at a rate of 12 [inches] ± [0.5 inch] per
made for tiedowns to hold any accessory case. minute. The average value of two samples must be reported. Samples may
Each accessory case tiedown must withstand a pull be multilayered as required to provide adequate strength to ensure against
premature material failure.
of 250 pounds.
(3) Separation rate must be 2.0 [inches] to 2.5 inches per minute.
(4) Federal Test Method Standard No. 191 in effect Dec. 31, 1968.
5.7 Carrying Case. A carrying case which meets the
flammability requirements of this standard and which

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6.2 Life Raft Tests. 6.2.3.1.6 It must be demonstrated that the boarding aids are
adequate for the purpose intended and that it is
6.2.1 Pressure Retention. Under static conditions and possible for an adult wearing an inflated life [vest] to
when inflated and stabilized at the nominal operating board the life raft unassisted.
pressure, the pressure in each inflatable chamber
must not fall below the minimum operating pressure in 6.2.3.2 Sea Trials. The life raft must be demonstrated by tests
less than 24 hours. The minimum operating pressure or analysis, or a combination of both, to be seaworthy
is the pressure required to meet the minimum design- in an open sea condition of 17[-knot] to 27-knot winds
buoyancy requirements of paragraph 4.2 of this and waves of six [feet] to 10 feet. In tests, ballast in
standard. the form of sand bags or equivalent may be used
to achieve proper loading provided the appropriate
6.2.2 Overpressure Tests. weight distribution within the raft is maintained. If
analysis is used, the analysis must be approved by
6.2.2.1 The device must be shown by test to withstand a the manager of the FAA office to which the TSO data
pressure at least 1.5 times the maximum operating is to be submitted as required in paragraph (c), Data
pressure for at least five minutes without sustaining Requirements. For this seaworthiness demonstration,
damage. the following apply:

6.2.2.2 At least one specimen of the inflatable-device model 6.2.3.2.1 The life raft must be deployed to simulate deployment
must be shown by test to withstand a pressure at from an aircraft under the most adverse wind direction
least two times the maximum operating pressure and wave condition. If the life raft is an aspirated
without failure. Devices so tested must be clearly inflated type, it must be demonstrated that water
identified. ingested during inflation will not cause the raft to fail
to meet the requirement for buoyancy under rated
6.2.3 Functional Tests. Each life raft model must pass the capacity in 4.2.
following tests:
6.2.3.2.2 All required equipment must be aboard and the
6.2.3.1 Water tests. In either a controlled pool or fresh proper functioning of each item of equipment must
water, the life raft capacity and buoyancy must be be demonstrated.
demonstrated as follows:
6.2.3.2.3 The canopy must be erected for a sufficient time to
6.2.3.1.1 Both rated and overload capacities established in assess its resistance to tearing and the protection it
accordance with the requirements of paragraph 4.1 affords. The method of erection must be shown to
of this standard must be demonstrated with inflation be accomplished by one occupant of an otherwise
tubes at minimum operating pressure and with the empty life raft and by occupants of a life raft filled to
critical buoyancy chambers deflated. The resultant rated capacity.
freeboard in each case must meet the requirements
of paragraph 4.2 of this standard. 6.2.3.2.4 The stability of the life raft must be demonstrated
when occupied at normal rated capacity and at 50
6.2.3.1.2 Persons used in the demonstration must have percent rated capacity.
an average weight of not less than 170 pounds.
Ballast in the form of sand bags or equivalent may 6.2.3.3 Life Raft Drop Test. A complete life raft package
be used to achieve proper loading provided the must be dropped or thrown from a height of five
appropriate weight distribution within the slide/raft feet onto a hard surface floor after which it must be
is maintained. inflated and meet the pressure-retention requirements
of paragraph 6.2.1 of this standard.
6.2.3.1.3 Persons used in the demonstration must wear life
[vests] with at least one chamber inflated. 6.2.3.4 Portability Test. If the life raft is to be manually
deployed, it must be demonstrated that the complete
6.2.3.1.4 The required life raft equipment, including one life raft package can be moved from a typical stowage
emergency locator transmitter or a weight simulating installation by no more than two persons and then
a transmitter, must be aboard the life raft. deployed at another suitable exit.

6.2.3.1.5 It must be demonstrated that the life raft is self- 6.2.3.5 Carrying Case. It must be demonstrated at least 10
righting, or can be righted by one person in water, times that the carrying case will open satisfactorily
or while inverted can be boarded and provide flotation and cause no delay in the deployment and inflation
for the normal rated capacity. of the life raft.

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6.2.3.6 Gas-cylinder Releases. It must be demonstrated upon inflation must be determined. The temperature
that pulling the ripcord grip from any position will limitations must be submitted to the FAA and life raft
actuate the primary gas release(s). purchaser in accordance with the data requirements
of this TSO.
6.2.5 Temperature Exposure and Inflation. The
manufacturer shall determine the minimum 6.2.5.1 Test Procedure. The packed life raft assembly with
temperature at which the complete life raft assembly, its inflation bottles installed must be exposed to
with its inflation bottles, will be “rounded out” (i.e., each of the above temperatures for not less than
attain its design shape and approximate dimensions) 24 hours and must be inflated within five minutes
so that the life raft will be able to receive and to support after removal from such temperatures. The life
the first occupant within one minute after the start of raft must be allowed to return to a temperature of
inflation. Thereafter, the rate of inflation must progress approximately 70 [degrees] ± 5 degrees Fahrenheit
in such a manner and rate as to ensure a serviceable before being deflated, repacked and subjected to
and rigid life raft for boarding by the remainder of a second exposure. After the above tests have
the occupants. Similarly, a maximum environmental been completed, the life raft must be able to pass
temperature to which the life raft assembly may be tests required by paragraphs 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 of this
exposed and still remain in a seaworthy condition standard. 

• If your life raft, or the SEP, has not (See page 452 for TSO-C13f for life vests; Technical Commission for Aeronautics),
been maintained properly, its ability page 459 for TSO-C72c for individual flo- which publish technical standards based
to help you survive could be compro- tation devices; and page 462 for TSO-C85a on a consensus of specialists in the relevant
mised (see “Physical Fitness for Life for survivor-locator lights.) field. Provisions in such standards are re-
Rafts and Life Vests,” page 337); and, quirements, however, only insofar as civil
In addition to regulations, recommen- aviation authorities adopt them.
• There have been documented in- dations have been issued on topics such
stances in which a repair station as crewmember survival training and “The rationale for TSOs is that FAA needs
carried out improper maintenance preparation for ditching. Authorities to focus its limited resources on certify-
practices that could have put life raft have issued a variety of ditching-re- ing aircraft rather than equipment that
occupants at greater risk following lated documents. Table 2 summarizes is relatively aircraft-independent — suit-
a ditching (see “Physical Fitness for some English-language regulations and able for many aircraft types — and typi-
Life Rafts and Life Vests”). recommendations. cally not critical to flight safety,” said Hal
Jensen, aerospace engineer with the FAA
Regulations specify what survival equip- Civil aviation authorities generally do not Aircraft Certification Service. “The ini-
ment must be carried on what catego- certify emergency equipment, as they do tial stimulus to create a TSO often comes
ries of flights. (For U.S. regulations, see aircraft types and modifications. There from the air carriers or equipment manu-
Table 1, page 403, and Table 2, page 404; are too many products, some of which are facturers, but sometimes NTSB [the U.S.
for non-U.S. regulations, see Table 2.) replaced quickly with newer versions, for National Transportation Safety Board] or
a formal certification process to handle FAA personnel in the field suggest that
conveniently. In addition, assessing them one is needed. FAA generally has a repre-
TSOs Set Minimum requires specialized, non-aviation-related sentative on the committee established to
Performance Standards knowledge. Instead, the TSO provides a draft an industry standard. When a com-
for Equipment template for a manufacturer’s designs. To mittee such as RTCA or SAE publishes its
be permitted to label a product as conform- standard, we use it to the greatest possible

C ivil aviation authorities publish TSOs,

which have been defined as minimum
performance standards for specified mate-
ing to the applicable TSO, the manufacturer
must demonstrate to the civil aviation
authority that the product meets the stan-
extent as appropriate for our TSO.”2

rials, parts, processes and appliances.1 dards specified in that TSO. TSO’d Life Rafts Vary
Considerably
TSOs exist for life rafts, life vests and TSOs often are developed with the help of
other flotation devices, survivor-locator
lights and emergency locator transmitters
industry groups such as SAE International
(formerly the Society of Automotive A lthough TSO-C70a is detailed in some
respects, life rafts with equal rated
(ELTs; emergency radio beacons). Engineers) and RTCA (formerly the Radio Continued on page 450

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Table 1
Emergency and Survival Equipment Required, Overwater Operations, U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)
Overwater Operations

Extended Overwater Operations

<50 Nautical Miles From
Nearest Shore (Part 91: >50 to 100 Nautical Miles >100 Nautical Miles or More Than
Overwater and Beyond From Nearest Shore 30 Minutes Flying Time From
Gliding Distance From Shore) Nearest Shore
Operating Under Required Required by Required Required by Required Required by
FARs … Equipment FARs Part … Equipment FARs Part … Equipment FARs Part …
Part 91 Approved 91.205(b)(12) Life vests1 91.509(a)2 Life vests3 91.509(b)(1)2
(For hire) flotation gear Pyrotechnic 91.205(b)(12) Life raft(s) 91.509(b)(2)2
Pyrotechnic signaling device(s) Pyrotechnic 91.509(b)(3)2
signaling signaling device(s)
device(s) Emergency locator 91.509(b)(4)2
Part 91 transmitter (ELT)
(Not for hire) Lifeline 91.509(b)(5)2
Survival equipment 91.509(d)2
pack (SEP)
Part 135 Approved 91.205(b)(12) Life vests 135.167(a)(1)3 Life vests 135.167(a)(1)3
flotation gear Life raft 135.167(a)(2) Life raft(s) 135.167(a)(2)
Pyrotechnic SEP4 135.167(b)(3) SEP5 136.157(b)(3)
signaling Survival-type ELT 135.167(c) Survival-type ELT 135.167(c)
device(s)
Part 121 Life vests or 121.340(a) Life vests 121.339(a)(1) Life vests 121.339(a)(1)
approved Life rafts 121.339(a)(2) Life rafts 121.339(a)(2)
flotation Pyrotechnic 121.339(a)(3) Pyrotechnic 121.339(a)(3)
means signaling device(s) signaling device(s)
Survival-type ELT 121.339(a)(4) Survival-type ELT 121.339(a)(4)
SEP4 121.339(c) SEP4 121.339(c))
Airplanes Certificated for Unless excess rafts of enough capacity are provided, the buoyancy and seating capacity 25.1415(b)(1)
Ditching Under Part 25.801 beyond the rated capacity of the rafts must accommodate all occupants of the airplane in
the event of a loss of one raft of the largest rated capacity.
Each life raft must have a heaving/trailing line and a mooring/inflation line to hold the life 25.1415(b)(2)
raft near to the airplane but to release it if the airplane becomes totally submerged.
Approved survival equipment attached to each life raft 25.1415(c)
Survival-type ELT for use in one life raft 25.1415(d)
Airplanes Not Certificated for Airplanes not having approved life vests must have an approved flotation means for each 25.1415(e)
Ditching Under Part 25.801 occupant, within easy reach of each seated occupant and readily removable from the airplane.
Normal-category Rotorcraft Life raft 27.1415
Certificated for Ditching Life vests 27.1415
Under Part 27.801 Signaling device 27.1415
Transport Category At least two life rafts 29.1415
Rotorcraft Certificated for Approved survival equipment attached to each life raft 29.1415
Ditching Under Part 29.801 Approved survival-type ELT for use in one life raft 29.1415

Note: Shore is defined as the land adjacent to the water that is above the high water mark, excluding land areas that are intermittently under water.
1 For each occupant, a TSO-C13f life vest (see page 452) or a TSO-C72c life vest or other approved flotation means (see page 459).

2 Applies to large and turbine-powered multi-engine airplanes.

3 Requires, for each occupant, a TSO-C13f life vest with a TSO-C85a (see page 462) approved survivor-locator light.

4 SEP “appropriately equipped for the route to be flown.”

5 Either a SEP “appropriately equipped for the route to be flown” or 18 specific items: one canopy (for sail, sun shade or rain catcher); one radar reflector;

one life raft–repair kit; one bailing bucket; one signaling mirror; one police whistle; one raft knife; one CO2 [carbon dioxide] bottle for emergency inflation;
one inflation pump; two oars; one 75-foot retaining line; one magnetic compass; one dye marker; one flashlight having at least two D-cell batteries or
equivalent; a two-day supply of emergency food rations supplying at least 1,000 calories per day for each person; for each two persons the raft is rated to
carry, two pints of water or one seawater-desalting kit; one fishing kit; and one book on survival appropriate for the area in which the aircraft is operated.
Source: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures

This table of regulatory and advisory documents concerning safety equipment, training and other aspects of overwater flight has been
assembled from several sources. To the extent feasible, excerpts have been quoted directly from the documents. Care has been taken to
ensure that the regulations and advisories included were current at the editorial deadline, but such documents are continually evolving.
Refer to the appropriate civil aviation authority for the latest edition of any document.
The material is arranged as follows:

Source Page
International Civil Aviation Organization  . ...........................................................................................................................................................................   404
European Joint Aviation Authorities  . ....................................................................................................................................................................................   406
European Aviation Safety Agency  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................   413
U.K. Civil Aviation Authority  ......................................................................................................................................................................................................   414
Transport Canada  .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................   414
Civil Aviation Safety Authority–Australia  .............................................................................................................................................................................   416
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand  ..............................................................................................................................................................................   424
SAE International  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................   429
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration  .....................................................................................................................................................................................   430

International Civil Aviation Organization

Document: Annex 6, Part I: International Commercial Air Transport — [Airplanes]

Subject: Requirements for international commercial air transport airplanes flying over water more than 93 kilometers (50 nautical miles)
from the shore, on long-range overwater flights or under certain other conditions
Content: Seaplanes are required to carry the following:
• “One life [vest] or equivalent individual flotation device for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat
or berth;
• “Equipment for making the sound signals prescribed in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, where
applicable; [and,]
• “One sea anchor (drogue), when necessary to assist in maneuvering.”
Landplanes are required to carry the following:
• “One life [vest] or equivalent individual flotation device for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat
or berth of the person for whose use it is provided.”
On routes on which the airplane may be over water at more than a distance corresponding to 120 minutes at cruising speed or 740
kilometers (400 nautical miles), whichever is less, away from land suitable for emergency landing, or for some airplanes 30 minutes or 185
kilometers (100 nautical miles), the aircraft must carry the following:
• “Lifesaving rafts in sufficient numbers to carry all persons on board, stowed so as to facilitate their ready use in an emergency, provided
with such lifesaving equipment including means of sustaining life as is appropriate to the flight to be undertaken; [and,]
• “Equipment for making the pyrotechnical distress signals described in Annex 2.”
Other provisions include the following:
• “Each life [vest] and equivalent individual flotation device … shall be equipped with a means of electric illumination for the purpose
of facilitating the location of persons, except where the requirement … is met by the provision of individual flotation devices other
than life [vests];
• “Until 1 January 2005 all [airplanes] operated on long-range overwater flights … shall be equipped with at least two ELTs [emergency
locator transmitters];
• “All [airplanes] for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued after 1 January 2002, operated on long-range
overwater flights … shall be equipped with at least two ELTs, one of which shall be automatic;
• “From 1 January 2005, all [airplanes] operated in long-range overwater flights … shall be equipped with at least two ELTs, one of which
shall be automatic; [and,]
• “Recommendation — All [airplanes] should carry an automatic ELT.”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: Annex 6, Part II: International General Aviation — [Airplanes]

Subject: Requirements for international general aviation airplanes flying over water more than 93 kilometers (50 nautical miles) from the
shore, on long-range overwater flights or under certain other conditions
Content: Seaplanes are required to carry the following:
• “One life [vest] or equivalent individual flotation device for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat
or berth;
• “Equipment for making the sound signals prescribed in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, where
applicable;
• “One anchor; [and,]
• “One sea anchor (drogue), when necessary to assist in maneuvering.”
Landplanes are required to carry the following:
• “One life [vest] or equivalent individual flotation device for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat
or berth of the person for whose use it is provided.”
Landplanes, when over water and more than 185 kilometers (100 nautical miles) from shore, for single-engine airplanes more than 370
kilometers (200 nautical miles) from shore, for multi-engine airplanes capable of one-engine-inoperative flight, away from land suitable for
making an emergency landing, are required to carry the following:
• “Lifesaving rafts in sufficient numbers to carry all persons on board, stowed so as to facilitate their ready use in an emergency, provided
with such lifesaving equipment including means of sustaining life as is appropriate to the flight to be undertaken; [and,]
• “Equipment for making the pyrotechnical distress signals described in Annex 2.”
Provisions for ELTs are similar to those in Part I, except that only one ELT is required.
• “Recommendation — All [airplanes] should carry an automatic ELT.”

Document: Annex 6, Part III: International Operations — Helicopters

Subject: Requirements for Performance Class 1* and Performance Class 2** helicopters flying over water at a distance from land
corresponding to more than 10 minutes at normal cruise speed; Performance Class 3*** helicopters “flying over water beyond
autorotational or safe forced-landing distance from land”
Content: Performance Class 1 and Performance Class 2 helicopters are required to carry the following:
• “One life [vest] or equivalent individual flotation device for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat
or berth of the person for whose use it is provided;
• “Lifesaving rafts in sufficient numbers to carry all persons on board, stowed so as to facilitate their ready use in an emergency, provided
with such lifesaving equipment including means of sustaining life as is appropriate to the flight to be undertaken; [and,]
• “Equipment for making the pyrotechnical distress signals described in Annex 2.”
• Performance Class 3 helicopters “when operating beyond autorotational distance from land but within a distance from land specified
by the appropriate authority of the responsible State shall be equipped with one life [vest] or equivalent individual flotation device
for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat or berth of the person for whose use it is provided.”
Otherwise, Performance Class 3 helicopters must carry the same equipment as Performance Class 1 and Performance Class 2
helicopters;
• At least one automatic ELT is required on most overwater helicopter flights; [and,]
• “Recommendation — All helicopters should carry an automatic ELT.”
   * Performance Class 1: A helicopter that, “in case of a critical power-unit failure … is able to land on the rejected takeoff area or safely continue
the flight to an appropriate landing area, depending on when the failure occurs.”
  ** Performance Class 2: A helicopter that, “in case of critical power-unit failure … is able to safely continue the flight, except when the failure
occurs prior to a defined point after takeoff or after a defined point before landing, in which cases a forced landing may be required.”
*** Performance Class 3: “A helicopter with performance such that, in case of power-unit failure at any point in the flight profile, a forced landing
must be performed.”

Document: Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft

Subject: Airplanes certificated for ditching
Content: “Provisions shall be made in the design to give maximum practicable assurance that safe evacuation from the [airplane] of
passengers and crew can be executed in the case of ditching.”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

European Joint Aviation Authorities

Document: JAR-OPS 1.060 [Joint Airworthiness Requirements —Operations]

Subject: Ditching requirements
Content: “An operator shall not operate an [airplane] with an approved passenger seating of more than 30 passengers on overwater
flights at a distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing, greater than 120 minutes at cruising speed, or 400 nautical
miles, whichever is the lesser, unless the [airplane] complies with the ditching requirements prescribed in the applicable airworthiness
code.”

Document: JAR-OPS 1.820

Subject: Emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) in airplanes
Content:
“(a) An operator shall not operate an [airplane] first issued with an individual certificate of airworthiness on or after Jan. 1, 2002, unless it is
equipped with an automatic Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) capable of transmitting on 121.5 MHz [megahertz] and 406 MHz;
“(b) An operator shall not operate on or after Jan. 1, 2002, an [airplane] first issued with an individual certificate of airworthiness before
Jan. 1, 2002, unless it is equipped with any type of ELT capable of transmitting on 121.5 MHz and 406 MHz, except that [airplanes]
equipped on or before April 1, 2000, with an automatic ELT transmitting on 121.5 MHz but not on 406 MHz may continue in service
until Dec. 31, 2004; [and,]
“(c) An operator shall ensure that all ELTs that are capable of transmitting on 406 MHz shall be coded in accordance with ICAO Annex 10
and registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or another nominated agency.”

Document: JAR-OPS 1.825

Subject: Life vests in airplanes
Content:
“(a) Land [airplanes]. An operator shall not operate a land [airplane]:
“(1) When flying over water and at a distance of more than 50 nautical miles from shore; or
“(2) When taking off or landing at an [airport] where the takeoff or approach path is so disposed over water that in the event of a
mishap there would be a likelihood of a ditching, unless it is equipped with life [vests] equipped with a survivor-locator light,
for each person on board. Each life [vest] must be stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat or berth of the person
for whose use it is provided. Life [vests] for infants may be substituted by other approved flotation devices equipped with a
survivor-locator light; [and,]
“(b) Seaplanes and amphibians. An operator shall not operate a seaplane or an amphibian on water unless it is equipped with life [vests]
equipped with a survivor-locator light, for each person on board. Each life [vest] must be stowed in a position easily accessible from
the seat or berth of the person for whose use it is provided. Life [vests] for infants may be substituted by other approved flotation
devices equipped with a survivor-locator light.”

Document: JAR-OPS 1.830

Subject: Life rafts in extended overwater airplane flights
Content:
“(a) On overwater flights, an operator shall not operate an [airplane] at a distance away from land, which is suitable for making an
emergency landing, greater than that corresponding to:
“(1) 120 minutes at cruising speed or 400 nautical miles, whichever is the lesser, for [airplanes] capable of continuing the flight to an
[airport] with the critical power unit(s) becoming inoperative at any point along the route or planned diversions; or
“(2) 30 minutes at cruising speed or 100 nautical miles, whichever is the lesser, for all other [airplanes], unless the equipment
specified in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) below is carried;
“(b) Sufficient life rafts to carry all persons on board. Unless excess rafts of enough capacity are provided, the buoyancy and seating
capacity beyond the rated capacity of the rafts must accommodate all occupants of the [airplane] in the event of the loss of one raft
of the largest rated capacity. The life rafts shall be equipped with:
“(1) A survivor-locator light; and,
“(2) Lifesaving equipment including means of sustaining life as appropriate to the flight to be undertaken (see AMC OPS
1.830(b)(2)*); and,
“(c) At least two survival emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) capable of transmitting on the distress frequencies prescribed in ICAO
Annex 10, Volume V, Chapter 2. (See AMC OPS 1.380(c).**)”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

  * AMC (Acceptable Means of Compliance) OPS 1.830(b)(2) says that the following should be “readily available with each life raft”: means for
maintaining buoyancy; a sea anchor; lifelines and means of attaching one life raft to another; paddles for life rafts with a capacity of six or fewer;
means of protecting the occupants from the elements; a water-resistant torch [flashlight]; signaling equipment to make the pyrotechnical
distress signals described in ICAO Annex 2; 100 grams of glucose tablet for each four, or fraction of four, persons that the life raft is designed to
carry; at least two liters of drinkable water provided in durable containers or means of making seawater drinkable or a combination of both; and
first aid equipment. AMC OPS 1.830(b)(2) says that as far as is practicable, the items “should be contained in a pack.”
** AMC OPS 1.830(c):“1. A survival ELT (ELT[S]) is intended to be removed from the [airplane] and activated by survivors of a crash. An ELT(S) should be
stowed so as to facilitate its ready removal and use in an emergency. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g., by water activation).
It should be designed to be tethered to a life raft or a survivor.“2. An automatic portable ELT (ELT[AP]), as installed in accordance with JAR-OPS 1.820,
may be used to replace one ELT(S) provided that it meets the ELT(S) requirements. A water-activated ELT(S) as described above is not an ELT(AP).”

Document: JAR-OPS 1.835

Subject: Survival equipment in airplane flight where search and rescue would be especially difficult
Content: “An operator shall not operate an [airplane] across areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult unless it is
equipped with the following:
“(a) Signaling equipment to make the pyrotechnical distress signals described in ICAO Annex 2;
“(b) At least one ELT capable of transmitting on the distress frequencies prescribed in ICAO Annex 10, Volume V, Chapter 2 (see AMC OPS
1.830(c)); and,
“(c) Additional survival equipment for the route to be flown, taking account of the number of persons on board … .”

Document: JAR-OPS 1.965

Subject: Recurrent training and checking (flight crew)
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(d) Emergency and safety equipment training and checking. An operator shall ensure that each flight crewmember undergoes training
and checking on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried. The period of validity of an emergency and
safety equipment check shall be 12 calendar months in addition to the remainder of the month of issue. If issued within the final
three calendar months of validity of a previous emergency and safety check, the period of validity shall extend from the date of
issue until 12 calendar months from the expiry date of that previous emergency and safety equipment check.”

Document: Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.965

Subject: Recurrent training and checking (flight crew)
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) Recurrent training — Recurrent training shall comprise: …
“(3) Emergency and safety equipment training
“(i) Emergency and safety equipment training may be combined with emergency and safety equipment checking and shall
be conducted in an [airplane] or a suitable alternative training device.
“(ii) Every year the emergency and safety equipment training program must include the following:
“(A) Actual donning of a life [vest] where fitted;
“(B) Actual donning of protective breathing equipment where fitted;
“(C) Actual handling of fire extinguishers;
“(D) Instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the [airplane];
“(E) Instruction on the location and use of all types of exits; and,
“(F) Security procedures.”

Document: AMC [Acceptable Means of Compliance] OPS 1.965(d)

Subject: Emergency and safety equipment training conducted under JAR-OPS 1.965(d)
Content:
“1. The successful resolution of [airplane] emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and cabin crew, and emphasis
should be placed on the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all crew members in various
emergency situations;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“2. Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in [airplane] evacuations so that all who are involved are
aware of the duties other crewmembers should perform. When such practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin crew
training should include joint discussion of emergency scenarios; [and,]
“3. Emergency and safety equipment should, as far as is practicable, take place in conjunction with cabin crew undergoing similar
training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way communication between the flight deck and the cabin.”

Document: Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1005

Subject: Initial training (cabin crew)
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(c) Water survival training. An operator shall ensure that water survival training includes the actual donning and use of personal
flotation equipment in water by each cabin crewmember. Before first operating on an [airplane] fitted with life rafts or other similar
equipment, training must be given on the use of this equipment, as well as actual practice in water.
“(d) Survival training. An operator shall ensure that survival training is appropriate to the areas of operation (e.g., polar, desert, jungle or
sea).”

Document: Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1015

Subject: Recurrent training (cabin crew)
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(c) An operator shall ensure that, at intervals not exceeding three years, recurrent training also includes: …
“(4) Use of pyrotechnics (actual or representative devices); and,
“(5) Demonstration of the use of the life raft, or slide raft, where fitted.”

Document: JAR-OPS 3.825

Subject: Life vests in helicopter operations
Content:
“(a) An operator shall not operate a helicopter for any operations on water or on a flight over water:
“(1) When operating in Performance Class 3 [see ICAO Annex 6, Part III] beyond autorotational distance from land; or
“(2) When operating in Performance Class 1 or 2 [see ICAO Annex 6, Part III] at a distance from land corresponding to more than 10
minutes flying time at normal cruise speed; or
“(When operating in Performance Class 2 or 3 when taking off or landing at a heliport where the takeoff or approach path is
over water, unless it is equipped with life [vests] equipped with a survivor-locator light, for each person on board, stowed in an
easily accessible position, with safety belt or harness fastened, from the seat or berth of the person for whose use it is provided
and an individual infant flotation device, equipped with a survivor-locator light, for use by each infant on board.”

Document: JAR-OPS 3.827

Subject: Crew cold-water immersion suits in helicopter operations
Content:
“(a) An operator shall not operate a helicopter in Performance Class 1 or 2 on a flight over water at a distance from land corresponding
to more than 10 minutes flying time at normal cruising speed from land on a flight in support of or in connection with the offshore
exploitation of mineral resources (including gas) when the weather report or forecasts available to the commander indicate that
the sea temperature will be less than plus 10 degrees C [50 degrees F] during the flight or when the estimated rescue time exceeds
the calculated survival time unless each member of the crew is wearing [an immersion] suit; [and,]
“(b) An operator shall not operate a helicopter in Performance Class 3 on a flight over water beyond autorotational or safe forced-
landing distance from land when the weather report or forecasts available to the commander indicate that the sea temperature will
be less than plus 10 degrees C during the flight, unless each member of the crew is wearing [an immersion] suit.”

Document: JAR-OPS 3.830

Subject: Life rafts and emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) in extended overwater flights by helicopters
Content:
“(a) An operator shall not operate a helicopter on a flight over water at a distance from land corresponding to more than 10 minutes
flying time at normal cruising speed when operating in Performance Class 1 or 2, or three minutes flying time at normal cruising
speed when operating in Performance Class 3 unless it carries:

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(1) In the case of a helicopter carrying less than 12 persons, a minimum of one life raft with a rated capacity of not less than the
maximum number of persons on board;
“(2) In the case of a helicopter carrying more than 11 persons, a minimum of two life rafts sufficient together to accommodate all
persons capable of being carried on board. Should one life raft of the largest rated capacity be lost, the overload capacity of the
remaining life raft(s) shall be sufficient to accommodate all persons on the helicopter (see AMC OPS 3 3.830(a)(2));
“(3) At least one survival emergency locator transmitter (ELT) for each life raft carried (but not more than a total of two ELTs are
required), capable of transmitting on the distress frequencies prescribed in ICAO Annex 10. (See AMC OPS 3.830(a)(3))*;
“(4) Emergency-exit illumination; and,
“(5) Lifesaving equipment, including means of sustaining life as appropriate to the flight to be undertaken.”
   * AMC OPS 3.830(a)(3) says, “A survival ELT (ELT[S]) is intended to be removed from the helicopter and activated by survivors of a crash. An ELT(S)
should be stowed so as to facilitate its ready removal and use in an emergency. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g., by
water activation). It should be designed to be tethered to a life raft or a survivor.”

Document: AMC [Acceptable Means of Compliance] OPS 3.830(a)(2)

Subject: Specifications for life rafts required under JAR-OPS 3.830
Content:
“1. Each life raft required by JAR-OPS 3.830 shall conform to the following specifications:
“a. They shall be of an approved design and stowed so as to facilitate their ready use in an emergency;
“b. They shall be radar-conspicuous to standard airborne radar equipment;
“c. When carrying more than one life raft on board, at least 50 percent shall be jettisonable by the crew while seated at their
normal station, where necessary by remote control; [and,]
“d. Those life rafts which are not jettisonable by remote control or by the crew shall be of such weight as to permit handling by one
person. Forty kilograms [88 pounds] shall be considered a maximum weight;
“2. Each life raft required by JAR-OPS 3.830 shall contain at least the following:
“a. One approved survivor-locator light;
“b. One approved visual signaling device;
“c. One canopy (for use as a sail, sun shade or rain catcher);
“d. One radar reflector;
“e. One 20-meter [66-foot] retaining line designed to hold the life raft near the helicopter but to release it if the helicopter
becomes totally submerged;
“f. One sea anchor;
“g. One survival kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be flown, which shall contain at least the following:
“i. One life raft repair kit; ii. One bailing bucket; iii. One signaling mirror; iv. One police whistle; v. One buoyant raft knife; vi.
One supplementary means of inflation; vii. Seasickness tablets; viii. One first aid kit; ix. One portable means of illumination;
x. One half liter [0.13 U.S. gallon]; [and] xi. One comprehensive illustrated survival booklet in an appropriate language;
[and,]
“3. Batteries used in the ELTs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use
for more than one cumulative hour, and also when 50 percent of their useful life (or for rechargeable [batteries], 50 percent of their
useful life of charge), as established by the equipment manufacturer, has expired. The new expiration date for the replacement
(or recharged) battery must be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment. The battery useful life (or useful life of charge)
requirements of this paragraph do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during
probable storage intervals.”

Document: JAR-OPS 3.835

Subject: Survival equipment in helicopters
Content: “An operator shall not operate a helicopter in areas where search and rescue would be especially difficult unless it is equipped
with the following:
“(a) Signaling equipment to make the pyrotechnical distress signals described in ICAO Annex 2;
“(b) At least one [ELT] capable of transmitting on the distress frequencies prescribed in ICAO Annex 10 (see AMC OPS 3.830(a)(3)); and,
“(c) Additional survival equipment for the route to be flown, taking account of the number of persons on board.”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: JAR-OPS 3.837

Subject: Helicopters operating to or from helidecks in a hostile sea area
Content:
“(a) An operator shall not operate a helicopter on a flight to or from a helideck located in a hostile sea area at a distance from land
corresponding to more than 10 minutes flying time at normal cruising speed on a flight in support of, or in connection with, the
offshore exploitation of mineral resources (including gas) unless:
“(1) When the weather report or forecasts available to the commander indicate that the sea temperature will be less than plus 10
degrees C [50 degrees F] during the flight, or when the flight is planned to be conducted at night, all persons on board are
wearing [a cold-water immersion] suit (see IEM OPS 3.827)*;
“(2) All life rafts carried in accordance with JAR-OPS 3.830 are installed so as to be usable in the sea conditions in which the
helicopter’s ditching, flotation and trim characteristics were evaluated in order to comply with the ditching requirements for
certification (see IEM OPS 3.837(a)(2));
“(3) The helicopter is equipped with an emergency-lighting system having an independent power supply to provide a source of
general cabin illumination to facilitate the evacuation of the helicopter;
“(4) All emergency exits, including crew emergency exits, and its means of opening are conspicuously marked for the guidance of
occupants using the exits in daylight or in the dark. Such markings are designed to remain visible if the helicopter is capsized
and the cabin is submerged;
“(5) All non-jettisonable doors which are designated as ditching emergency exits have a means of securing them in the open
position so they do not interfere with occupants’ egress in all sea conditions up to the maximum required to be evaluated for
ditching and flotation;
“(6) All doors, windows or other openings in the passenger compartment authorized by the Authority as suitable for the purpose
of underwater escape, are equipped so as to be operable in an emergency; [and,]
“(7) Life [vests] are worn at all times; unless the passenger or crewmember is wearing an integrated [immersion] suit that meets the
combined requirement of the [immersion] suit and life [vest] which is acceptable to the Authority.”
*  IEM [Interpretative/Explanatory Material] OPS 3.827 provides formulas for calculating survival times in the water under various conditions.

Document: IEM (Interpretative/Explanatory Material) OPS 3.387

Subject: Additional requirements for helicopters operating to helidecks located in a hostile sea area
Content:
“1. Operators should be aware that projections on the exterior surface of the helicopter, which are located in a zone delineated by
boundaries which are 1.22 meters (four feet) above and 0.61 meters (two feet) below the established static water line could cause
damage to a deployed life raft. Examples of projections which need to be considered are aerials, overboard vents, unprotected split-
pin tails, guttering and any projection sharper than a three-dimensional right-angled corner;
“2. While the boundaries specified in paragraph 1 above are intended as a guide, the total area which should be considered should also
take into account the likely behavior of the life raft after deployment in all sea states up to the maximum in which the helicopter is
capable of remaining upright;
“3. Operators and maintenance organizations are reminded that wherever a modification or alteration is made to a helicopter within
the boundaries specified, the need to prevent the modification or alteration causing damage to a deployed life raft should be taken
into account in the design;
“4. Particular care should also be taken during routine maintenance to ensure that additional hazards are not introduced by, for
example, leaving inspection panels with sharp corners proud of [extending from] the surrounding fuselage surface, or allowing
door sills to deteriorate to a point where sharp edges become a hazard; [and,]
“5. The same considerations apply in respect of emergency flotation equipment.”

Document: JAR-OPS 3.840

Subject: Miscellaneous equipment for helicopters operating on water
Content:
“(a) An operator shall not operate on water a helicopter certificated for operating on water unless it is equipped with:
“(1) A sea anchor and other equipment necessary to facilitate mooring, anchoring or maneuvering the aircraft on water, appropriate
to its size, weight and handling characteristics; and,
“(2) Equipment for making the sound signals prescribed in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, where
applicable.”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: JAR-OPS 3.843

Subject: Ditching certification for helicopters on overwater flights
Content:
“(a) An operator shall not operate a helicopter in Performance Class 1 or 2 [see ICAO Annex 6, Part III] on a flight over water in a hostile
environment at a distance from land corresponding to more than 10 minutes flying time at normal cruise speed unless that
helicopter is so designed for landing on water or is certificated in accordance with ditching provisions;
“(b) An operator shall not operate a helicopter in Performance Class 1 or 2 on a flight over water in a non-hostile environment at
a distance from land corresponding to more than 10 minutes flying time at normal cruise speed unless that helicopter is so
designed for landing on water; or is certificated in accordance with ditching provisions; or is fitted with emergency flotation
equipment;
“(c) An operator shall not operate a helicopter in Performance Class 2, when taking off or landing over water, unless that helicopter
is so designed for landing on water; or is certificated in accordance with ditching provisions; or is fitted with emergency flotation
equipment. (See IEM OPS 3.843(c)*). Except where for the purpose of minimizing exposure, the landing or takeoff at a HEMS
[Helicopter Emergency Medical Service] operating site located in a congested environment is conducted over water — unless
otherwise required by the Authority; [and,]
“(d) An operator shall not operate a helicopter in Performance Class 3 [see ICAO Annex 6, Part III] on a flight over water beyond safe
forced-landing distance from land unless that helicopter is so designed for landing on water; or is certificated in accordance with
ditching provisions; or is fitted with emergency flotation equipment.”
  * IEM OPS 3.843(c) says, “When helicopters are operated in Performance Class 2 and are taking off or landing over water, they are exposed to a
critical-power-unit failure. They should therefore be designed for landing on water, certificated in accordance with ditching provisions or have
the appropriate floats fitted (for a nonhostile environment).”

Document: JAR [Joint Airworthiness Requirement] 25.801

Subject: Certification with ditching provisions for airplanes
Content: Equivalent to U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 25.801

Document: JAR 25.1411

Subject: Safety equipment for large airplane
Content: Includes the following subparagraphs:
“(d) Life rafts
“(1) The stowage provisions for the life rafts described in JAR 25.1415 must accommodate enough rafts for the maximum number
of occupants for which certification for ditching is requested;
“(2) Life rafts must be stowed near exits through which the rafts can be launched during an unplanned ditching;
“(3) Rafts automatically or remotely released outside the [airplane] must be attached to the [airplane] by means of the static line
prescribed in JAR 25.1415; [and,]
“(4) The stowage provisions for each portable life raft must allow rapid detachment and removal of the raft for use at other than the
intended exits;
“(e) Long-range signaling device. The stowage provisions for the long-range signaling device required by JAR 25.1415 must be near an
exit available during an unplanned ditching;
“(f) Life [vest] stowage provisions. The stowage provisions for life [vests] described in JAR 25.1415 must accommodate one life [vest] for each
occupant for which certification for ditching is requested. Each life [vest] must be within easy reach of each seated occupant; [and,]
“(g) Life-line stowage provisions. If certification for ditching under JAR 25.801 is requested, there must be provisions to store the life lines.
These provisions must —
“(1) Allow one life line to be attached to each side of the fuselage; [and,]
“(2) Be arranged to allow the life lines to be used to enable the occupants to stay on the wing after ditching. This requirement is
not applicable to [airplanes] having no overwing ditching exits.”

Document: JAR 25.1415

Subject: Ditching equipment to be used in airplanes to be certificated for ditching under JAR 25.801
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 25.1415, except for the following sections worded slightly differently:

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(a) Ditching equipment used in [airplanes] to be certified under JAR 25.801, and required by the National Operating Rules, must meet
the requirements of this paragraph:
“(c) Approved survival equipment must be attached to, or stored adjacent to, each life raft;
“(d) Survival-type emergency locator transmitters for use in life rafts must meet the applicable requirements of the relevant JTSO [joint
technical standard order] or an acceptable equivalent; [and,]
“(e) For [airplanes] not having approved life [vests], … .”

Document: JAR 25.1561

Subject: Marking of safety equipment for large airplanes
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 25.1561

Document: JAR 27.801

Subject: Certification with ditching provisions for small rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.801

Document: JAR 27.1411

Subject: Safety equipment for normal-category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.1411

Document: JAR 27.1415

Subject: Ditching equipment used in airplanes to be certificated for ditching under JAR 27.801
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.1415

Document: JAR 27.1561

Subject: Marking of safety equipment for small rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.1561

Document: JAR 29.807(d)

Subject: Ditching emergency exits for passengers
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 29.807(d)

Document: JAR 29.801

Subject: Certification of large rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 29.801

Document: JAR 29.807(d)

Subject: Ditching emergency exits for passengers
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 29.807(d)

Document: JAR 29.1411

Subject: Safety equipment for transport-category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 29.1411

Document: JAR 29.1415

Subject: Ditching equipment for large rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 29.1415

Document: JAR 29.1561

Subject: Marking of safety equipment for large rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 29.1561(a) and (b)

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: Joint Technical Standard Order (JTSO)-C69c

Subject: Emergency evacuation slides, ramps and slide/raft combinations
Content: Equivalent to FAA TSO-C69c

Document: JTSO-C72c
Subject: Individual flotation devices
Content: Equivalent to FAA TSO-C72c

Document: JTSO-C85a
Subject: Survivor-locator lights
Content: Equivalent to FAA TSO-C85a

Document: JTSO-2C91a
Subject: Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
Content: Incorporates by reference RTCA (formerly known as Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) DO-183, Section 2.0. This JTSO
supplements DO-183’s paragraph concerning modulation characteristics with the following:
• “To aid SAR [search-and-rescue] satellite detection, the ELT shall have clearly defined sideband components which are symmetric
about the output signal spectrum and distinct from the carrier component at both the 121.5 and 243 MHz frequencies. The ELT
spectrum at 121.5 MHz shall have at least 30 percent of its energy distribution within a bandwidth of ±30 Hz about a fixed reference
frequency corresponding to the carrier component over the audio/sweep modulation cycle. At 243 MHz 30 percent of the energy
distribution shall fall within a bandwidth of ±60 Hz; [and,]
• “All materials used, except small parts … that would not contribute significantly to the propagation of a fire, must be self-extinguishing
when tested in accordance with applicable requirements of JAR 25.1359(d) and Appendix F.”
The environmental standard incorporated by reference is European Organisation for Civil Aviation Electronics (EUROCAE)/RTCA document
ED-14C/DO-160C, “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment.”
• “If the equipment design implementation includes a digital computer, the computer software must be verified and validated in an
acceptable manner.” One acceptable means is outlined in EUROCAE/RTCA document ED-12A/DO-178A, “Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.”

Document: JTSO-2C126
Subject: 406-megahertz (MHz) emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
Content: Incorporates by reference European Organisation for Civil Aviation Electronics (EUROCAE) document ED-62, “MOPS for Aircraft
Emergency Locator Transmitters (121.5/243 MHz and 406 MHz).”
The environmental standard incorporated by reference is EUROCAE/Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) document
ED-14C/DO-160C, “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment.”
If the equipment design implementation includes a digital computer, the software must be developed in accordance with EUROCAE/RTCA
document ED-12B/DO-178B, “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.”

European Aviation Safety Agency

Document: European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)-C69c

Subject: Emergency evacuation slides, ramps, ramp/slides and slide/rafts
Content: Equivalent to U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) TSO-C69c

Document: ETSO-C72c
Subject: Individual flotation devices
Content: Equivalent to FAA TSO-C72c

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Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: ETSO-C85a
Subject: Survivor-locator lights
Content: Equivalent to FAA TSO-C85a

Document: ETSO-2C91a
Subject: Emergency locator transmitter (ELT) equipment
Content: Equivalent to European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) JTSO-2C91a

Document: ETSO-2C126
Subject: 406-megahertz (MHz) emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
Content: Equivalent to JTSO-2C126

U.K. Civil Aviation Authority

Document: Specification no. 2

Subject: Life rafts submitted for approval in accordance with the provisions of the Air Navigation Order
Content: Prescribes the minimum standards for life rafts. Expected to be replaced by forthcoming European Technical Standard Order
(ETSO) harmonized with FAA TSO-C70a.
Specification no. 2 is no longer enforceable by the CAA, although the new European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) may, if it chooses,
continue to require compliance with it until the new ETSOs are approved.

Document: Appendix to Specification no. 2

Subject: Life rafts designed specifically for helicopter use
Content: Modifies Specification no. 2 for helicopters supporting offshore energy-exploitation operations. Expected to be replaced by
forthcoming ETSOs.
Specification no. 2 is no longer enforceable by the CAA, although the new European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) may, if it chooses,
continue to require compliance with it until the new ETSOs are approved.

Document: British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR) Chapter A4-8

Subject: Aircraft equipment and accessories for which CAA has the primary responsibility for type approval of the product
Content: Sets out procedures whereby aircraft equipment and accessories may be approved, accepted and certified as suitable for
installation in aircraft for which a U.K. Certificate of Airworthiness is desired.

Document: BCAR Chapter B4-8

Subject: Aircraft equipment and accessories for which CAA does not have the primary responsibility for type approval of the product
Content: Sets out procedures whereby aircraft equipment and accessories may be approved, accepted and certified as suitable for
installation in aircraft for which a U.K. Certificate of Airworthiness is desired.

Transport Canada

Document: Airworthiness Manual, 537.103

Subject: Technical Standard Orders
Content: Adopts FAA Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) that include TSO-C13f, Life Preservers; TSO-C69b, Emergency Evacuation Slides,
Ramps and Slide/ramp Combinations; TSO-C70a, Life Rafts (Reversible and Nonreversible); TSO-C72c, Individual Flotation Devices; TSO-
C85a, Survivor-locator Lights; TSO-C91a, Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT); and TSO-C126, 406-MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter
(ELT).

Document: Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) 537.205

Subject: Helicopter-passenger [cold-water immersion suit] systems

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Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Content: Defined as “a personal immersion-suit system that reduces thermal shock upon entry into cold water, delays onset of hypothermia
during immersion in cold water and provides some flotation to minimize risk of drowning, while not impairing the wearer’s ability to
evacuate from a ditched helicopter.”
References Canadian General Standards Board standard CAN/CGSB-65.17-99.

Document: CARs 537.207

Subject: Emergency locator transmitters
Content: References FAA TSO-C91, TSO-C91a and TSO-C126.

Document: CARs 602.62

Subject: Life vests and flotation devices
Content: Includes the following provisions:
• “No person shall conduct a takeoff or a landing on water in an aircraft or operate an aircraft over water beyond a point where the
aircraft could reach shore in the event of an engine failure, unless a life [vest], individual flotation device or personal flotation device is
carried for each person on board;
• “No person shall operate a land [airplane], gyroplane, helicopter or airship at more than 50 nautical miles [93 kilometers] from shore
unless a life [vest] is carried for each person on board; [and,]
• “For aircraft other than balloons, every life [vest], individual flotation device and personal flotation device referred to in this section
shall be stowed in a position that is easily accessible to the person for whose use it is provided, when that person is seated.”

Document: CARs 602.63

Subject: Life rafts and survival equipment — flights over water
Content: Includes the following provisions:
“(1) No person shall operate over water a single-engined [airplane], or a multi-engined [airplane] that is unable to maintain flight with
any engine failed, at more than 100 nautical miles [185 kilometers], or the distance that can be covered in 30 minutes of flight at
the cruising speed filed in the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site
unless life rafts are carried on board and are sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board;
“(2) Subject to subsection (3), no person shall operate over water a multi-engined [airplane] that is able to maintain flight with any
engine failed at more than 200 nautical miles [370 kilometers], or the distance that can be covered in 60 minutes of flight at the
cruising speed filed in the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site
unless life rafts are carried on board and are sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board;
“(3) A person may operate over water a transport category aircraft that is an [airplane], at up to 400 nautical miles [741 kilometers], or the
distance that can be covered in 120 minutes of flight at the cruising speed filed in the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance
is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site without the life rafts referred to in subsection (2) being carried on board;
“(4) No person shall operate over water a single-engined helicopter, or a multi-engined helicopter that is unable to maintain flight with
any engine failed, at more than 25 nautical miles [46 kilometers], or the distance that can be covered in 15 minutes of flight at the
cruising speed filed in the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site
unless life rafts are carried on board and are sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board;
“(5) No person shall operate over water a multi-engined helicopter that is able to maintain flight with any engine failed at more than 50
nautical miles [93 kilometers], or the distance that can be covered in 30 minutes of flight at the cruising speed filed in the flight plan
or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site unless life rafts are carried on board and
are sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board;
“(6) The life rafts referred to in this section shall be
“(a) stowed so that they are easily accessible for use in the event of a ditching;
“(b) installed in conspicuously marked locations near an exit; and,
“(c) equipped with an attached survival kit, sufficient for the survival on water of each person on board the aircraft, given the
geographical area, the season of the year and anticipated seasonal climatic variations, that provides a means for
“(i) providing shelter;
“(ii) providing or purifying water; and,
“(iii) visually signaling distress;
“(7) Where a helicopter is required to carry life rafts pursuant to subsection (4) or (5), no person shall operate the helicopter over water
having a temperature of less than 10 degrees C [50 degrees F] unless

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(a) a helicopter-passenger [cold-water immersion] suit system is provided for the use of each person on board; and,
“(b) the pilot-in-command directs each person on board to wear the helicopter-passenger [immersion] suit system; [and,]
“(8) Every person who has been directed to wear a helicopter-passenger [immersion] suit system pursuant to paragraph (7)(b) shall
wear that suit system.”

Document: CARs 725.95

Subject: Survival equipment on life rafts
Content: “Where life rafts are required to be carried in accordance with Section 602.63 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations, they shall be
equipped with an attached survival kit containing at least the following:
“(a) a pyrotechnic signaling device;
“(b) a radar reflector;
“(c) a life raft repair kit;
“(d) a bailing bucket and sponge;
“(e) a signaling mirror;
“(f ) a whistle;
“(g) a raft knife;
“(h) an inflation pump;
“(i) dye marker;
“(j) a waterproof flashlight;
“(k) a two-day supply of water, calculated using the overload capacity of the raft, consisting of one pint of water per day for each
person or a means of desalting or distilling salt water sufficient to provide an equivalent amount;
“(l) a fishing kit;
“(m) a book on sea survival; and,
“(n) a first aid kit containing antiseptic swabs, burn dressing compresses, bandages and anti-motion-sickness pills.”

Document: Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB) CAN/CGSB-65.17-99

Subject: Helicopter-passenger cold-water immersion suits
Content: The standard applies to immersion-suit systems that reduce thermal shock on entry into cold water; delay the onset of
hypothermia during immersion in cold water; provide acceptable flotation and minimize the risk of drowning; and do not impair the
wearer’s ability to evacuate from a ditched helicopter.

Civil Aviation Safety Authority–Australia

Document: Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs) 252A

Subject: Commercial operations, emergency locator transmitters (ELTs)
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(1) On and after 31 July 1997, the pilot-in-command of an Australian aircraft that is not an exempted aircraft, may begin a flight only if
the aircraft:
“(a) Is fitted with an approved ELT:
“(i) That is in working order; and,
“(ii) Whose switch is set to the position marked ‘armed,’ if that switch has a position so marked; or
“(b) Carries, in a place readily accessible to the operating crew, an approved portable ELT that is in working order; …
“(4) For the purposes of this regulation, and subject to subregulation (6), an ELT is taken to be an approved ELT in relation to an aircraft
if, and only if, it is automatically activated on impact and meets any of the following requirements:
“(a) It is of a type that is authorized by the FAA [U.S. Federal Aviation Administration] in accordance with TSO [Technical Standard
Order]-C91a or TSO-C126; or
“(b) CASA [Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia] is satisfied that it meets the requirements of TSO-C91a or TSO-C126;
“(c) It was fitted to the aircraft before 5 December 1996 and meets either of the following requirements:

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(i) It is of a type that is authorized by the FAA in accordance with TSO-C91;

“(ii) CASA is satisfied that it meets the requirements of TSO-C91;
“(5) For the purposes of this regulation, and subject to subregulation (6), an ELT (whether or not automatically activated on impact) is
taken to be an approved portable ELT if, and only if:
“(a) It is a portable emergency position-indicating radio beacon of a type that meets the requirements of MS* 241, MS 309, AS/
NZS** 4330:1995 or AS/NZS 4280:1995; or
“(b) It is a portable ELT of a type that meets the requirements of TSO-C91, TSO-C91a or TSO-C126; [and,]
“(6) For the purposes of this regulation, an ELT is not taken to be an approved ELT or an approved portable ELT if it is fitted with a lithium-
sulfur dioxide battery that does not meet the requirements of TSO-C97. … ”
  * MS = Ministerial Standard issued under section 9 of the Radiocommunications (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act of 1992.
** AS/NZS = Australian/New Zealand Standard published jointly by Standards Australia or Standards New Zealand.

Document: CARs 253

Subject: Commercial operations, emergency and lifesaving equipment
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(1) An operator shall not assign a person to act as a crewmember of an aircraft, and a person shall not act as a crewmember of an
aircraft, unless the person is competent in the use of the emergency and lifesaving equipment carried in the aircraft;
“(2) An operator shall ensure that crewmembers are periodically tested as to competency in the use of the emergency and lifesaving
equipment carried in the aircraft to which they are assigned;
“(3) The operator of an aircraft which is used in overwater flights shall ensure that each crewmember is instructed in ‘ditching’ and
‘abandon ship’ procedures insofar as is practicable and that he or she is periodically tested as to his or her knowledge of those
procedures; [and,]
“(4) The operator of an aircraft shall detail a crewmember to ensure that passengers are made familiar with the location of emergency
exits in the aircraft in which they are traveling and the location and use of emergency equipment carried in the aircraft. … ”

Document: CARs 258

Subject: Flights over water
Content:
“(1) The pilot-in-command of the aircraft must not fly over water at a distance from land greater than the distance from which the aircraft
could reach land if the engine, or in the case of a multi-engined aircraft, the critical engine (being the engine the non-operation of which
when the other engines are in operation gives the highest minimum speed at which the aircraft can be controlled) were inoperative. … ”

Document: CARs 169

Subject: Prevention of collisions at sea
Content:
“(1) The pilot-in-command of an aircraft in flight, or in the process of maneuvering near the surface of the water, must, as far as
possible:
“(a) Keep clear of all vessels; and,
“(b) Not impede their navigation; …
“(2) Subject to this regulation, the pilot-in-command of an aircraft on the water must comply with the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea as set out in Schedule 3 to the Navigation Act 1912; …
“(3) In conforming with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the pilot-in-command of an aircraft must give due
regard to the fact that in narrow channels stem vessels cannot maneuver to avoid collision, and must, as far as possible:
“(a) Keep clear of such vessels; and,
“(b) Not impede their navigation; …
“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the pilot-in-command of an
aircraft must observe the following rules with respect to other aircraft and vessels:
“(a) When aircraft, or an aircraft and a vessel are approaching one another and there is a risk of a collision, the aircraft shall proceed
with careful regard to existing circumstances and conditions, including the limitations of the respective craft;
“(b) An aircraft which is converging with another aircraft or a vessel on its right shall give way so as to keep well clear of that aircraft
or vessel;

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Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(c) An aircraft approaching another aircraft or a vessel head-on, or approximately head-on, shall alter its heading to the right so as
to keep well clear of that aircraft or vessel; [and,]
“(d) An aircraft or vessel which is being overtaken has the right of way, and the one overtaking shall alter its heading to keep well
clear of the aircraft or vessel being overtaken; … [and,]
“(5) At a water [airport] which is a controlled [airport], the following additional rules shall apply:
“(a) The pilot-in-command of an aircraft must not take off or alight if the alighting area:
“(i) Has not been swept; or
“(ii) Is not clear of floating debris dangerous to the navigation of the aircraft; [and,]
“(b) The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall ensure that operations are conducted on the swept part of a water [airport] by
commencing his or her takeoff or landing run from such a position that the control launch is on his or her left at no greater
distance than 75 yards [69 meters]. … ”

Document: CARs 551.104

Subject: ELTs
Content: Airworthiness standards for installation approval of ELTs required by CARS 605.38.

Document: CARs 551.401

Subject: Lifesaving equipment over water — Life vests
Content: Standards of airworthiness for life vests required by CARs 602.62.

Document: CARs 551.402

Subject: Lifesaving equipment over water — Individual flotation devices
Content: Standards of airworthiness for individual flotation devices required by CARs 602.62.

Document: CARs 551.403

Subject: Lifesaving equipment over water — Personal flotation devices
Content: Standards of airworthiness for personal flotation devices (PFDs) required by CARs 602.62.

Document: CARs 551.404

Subject: Lifesaving equipment over water — Life rafts
Content: Standards of airworthiness for life rafts required by CARs 602.63. TSO-C70a is the current standard.

Document: CARs 602.63

Subject: Life rafts and survival equipment for flights over water
Content:
“(1) No person shall operate over water a single-engined [airplane], or a multi-engined [airplane] that is unable to maintain flight with
any engine failed, at more than 100 nautical miles, or the distance that can be covered in 30 minutes of flight at the cruising speed
filed in the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site unless life rafts are
carried on board and are sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board.
“(2) Subject to subsection (3), no person shall operate over water a multi-engined [airplane] that is able to maintain flight with any
engine failed at more than 200 nautical miles, or the distance that can be covered in 60 minutes of flight at the cruising speed filed in
the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site unless life rafts are carried
on board and are sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board.
“(3) A person may operate over water a transport category aircraft that is an [airplane], at up to 400 nautical miles, or the distance that
can be covered in 120 minutes of flight at the cruising speed filed in the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser,
from a suitable emergency landing site without the life rafts referred to in subsection (2) being carried on board.
“(4) No person shall operate over water a single-engined helicopter, or a multi-engined helicopter that is unable to maintain flight with
any engine failed, at more than 25 nautical miles, or the distance that can be covered in 15 minutes of flight at the cruising speed
filed in the flight plan or flight itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site unless life rafts are
carried on board and are sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board.

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(5) No person shall operate over water a multi-engined helicopter that is able to maintain flight with any engine failed at more than
50 nautical miles, or the distance that can be covered in 30 minutes of flight at the cruising speed filed in the flight plan or flight
itinerary, whichever distance is the lesser, from a suitable emergency landing site unless life rafts are carried on board and are
sufficient in total rated capacity to accommodate all of the persons on board;
“(6) The life rafts referred to in this section shall be
“(a) stowed so that they are easily accessible for use in the event of a ditching;
“(b) installed in conspicuously marked locations near an exit; and,
“(c) equipped with an attached survival kit, sufficient for the survival on water of each person on board the aircraft, given the
geographical area, the season of the year and anticipated seasonal climatic variations, that provides a means for
“(i) providing shelter;
“(ii) providing or purifying water; and,
“(iii) visually signaling distress;
“(7) Where a helicopter is required to carry life rafts pursuant to subsection (4) or (5), no person shall operate the helicopter over water
having a temperature of less than 10 degrees C [Celsius; 50 degrees Fahrenheit] unless
“(a) a helicopter-passenger [cold-water immersion suit] system is provided for the use of each person on board; and,
“(b) the pilot-in-command directs each person on board to wear the helicopter-passenger [immersion suit] system; [and,]
“(8) Every person who has been directed to wear a helicopter-passenger [immersion suit] system pursuant to paragraph (7)(b) shall
wear that suit system.”

Document: CARs 602.89

Subject: Passenger briefings
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(2) The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall ensure that all of the passengers on board the aircraft are briefed
“(a) in the case of an overwater flight where the carriage of life [vests], individual flotation devices or personal flotation devices is
required pursuant to Section 602.62, before commencement of the overwater portion of the flight, with respect to the location
of those items; …
“(3) The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, before takeoff, ensure that all of the passengers on board the aircraft are provided with
information respecting the location and use of
“(a) first aid kits and survival equipment;
“(b) where the aircraft is a helicopter or a small aircraft that is an [airplane], any ELT that is required to be carried on board pursuant
to section 605.38; and,
“(c) any life raft that is required to be carried on board pursuant to Section 602.63.”

Document: CARs 604.73

Subject: Private-operator training program
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(3) A private operator’s ground and flight training program shall include
“(a) for flight crewmembers …
“(ii) initial and annual training, including …
“(B) emergency procedures training; …
“(b) for flight attendants, initial and annual training, including …
“(ii) safety procedures training;
“(iii) emergency procedures training; … [and,]
“(v) first aid training.”

Document: CARs 605.38

Subject: ELTs
Content: Includes a table of types of ELT that must be carried on different categories of aircraft and exceptions to the rule.

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: CARs 605.39

Subject: Use of ELTs
Content:
“(1) An aircraft that is required to be equipped with one or more ELTs under section 605.38 may be operated without a serviceable ELT
if the operator
“(a) repairs the ELT or removes it from the aircraft at the first [airport] at which repairs or removal can be accomplished;
“(b) on removal of the ELT, sends the ELT to a maintenance facility; and,
“(c) displays on a readily visible placard within the aircraft cockpit, until the ELT is replaced, a notice stating that the ELT has been
removed and setting out the date of removal;
“(2) If an aircraft is required to have one ELT under section 605.38, the operator shall re-equip the aircraft with a serviceable ELT within
“(a) 10 days after the date of the removal, if the aircraft is operated under subpart [Commuter Operations] 4 or 5 [Airline Operations]
of Part VII [Commercial Air Services]; or
“(b) 30 days after the date of removal in the case of any other aircraft; [and,]
“(3) If an aircraft is required to have two ELTs under section 605.38, the operator shall
“(a) if one of the ELTs is unserviceable, repair or replace it within 10 days after the date of removal; and,
“(b) if both ELTs are unserviceable, repair or replace
“(i) one ELT at the first [airport] at which a repair or replacement can be accomplished; and,
“(ii) the second ELT within 10 days after the date of removal.”

Document: CARs 605.40

Subject: ELT activation
Content:
“(1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall activate an ELT except in an emergency;
“(2) A person may activate an ELT during the first five minutes of any hour UTC [coordinated universal time] for a duration of not more
than five seconds for the purpose of testing it; [and,]
“(3) Where an ELT has been inadvertently activated during flight, the pilot-in-command of the aircraft shall ensure that
“(a) the nearest air traffic control unit, flight service station or community [airport] radio station is so informed as soon as possible; and,
“(b) the ELT is switched off.”

Document: CARs 704.115

Subject: Commuter-operations training
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(2) An air operator’s ground and flight training program shall include
“(a) for flight crew members: …
“(v) initial and annual training, including …
“(C) emergency procedures training.”

Document: Civil Aviation Order (CAO) Section 20.11

Subject: Emergency and lifesaving equipment and requirements for passenger control in emergencies
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“5 Flotation Equipment for Overwater Flights
“5.1 Life [Vests]
“5.1.1 Aircraft shall be equipped with one life [vest] for each occupant when the aircraft is over water and at a distance from land:
“(a) In the case of a single-engine aircraft — greater than that which would allow the aircraft to reach land with the engine
inoperative; and,
“(b) In the case of multi-engine aircraft — greater than 50 miles; …
“5.1.2 Land aircraft that carry passengers and are engaged in:
“(a) Regular public transport operations; or
“(b) Charter operations shall be equipped with a life [vest] or flotation device for each occupant on all flights where the takeoff
or approach path is so disposed over water that in the event of a mishap occurring during the departure or the arrival it is
reasonably possible that the aircraft would be forced to land onto water;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“5.1.3 Where required by paragraph 5.1.1 or paragraph 5.1.2, a life [vest] or individual flotation device shall be stowed at or
immediately adjacent to each seat. In addition, sufficient additional life [vests] or individual flotation devices shall be carried
in easily accessible positions for use by infants or children for whom a life [vest] or individual flotation device is not available
or adjacent to their seated position;
“5.1.4 Amphibious aircraft when operating on water, helicopters equipped with fixed flotation equipment when operating on water,
and all seaplanes and flying boats on all flights shall be equipped with:
“(i) One life [vest] for each occupant; and,
“(ii) An additional number of life [vests] (equal to one-fifth of the total number of occupants) in a readily accessible
position near the exits;
“5.1.5 Life [vests] shall be so stowed in the aircraft that one life [vest] is readily accessible to each occupant and, in the case of
passengers, within easy reach of their seats;
“5.1.6 Life [vests] shall comply with the standards specified in Section 103.13 and flotation devices shall comply with the FAA
requirements TSO-C72b;
“5.1.7 Where life [vests] are required to be carried in accordance with subparagraph 5.1.1(a), each occupant shall wear a life [vest] during
flight over water. However, occupants of [airplanes] need not wear life [vests] during flight above 2,000 feet above the water;
“5.1.8 Where life [vests] are required to be carried in accordance with subparagraph 5.1.1(a), each occupant shall wear a life [vest]
during flight over water when the aircraft is operated beyond gliding distance from land or water, as appropriate, suitable for
an emergency landing. However, occupants need not wear life [vests] when the aircraft is taking off or landing at an [airport] in
accordance with a normal navigational procedure for departing from or arriving at that [airport], and occupants of [airplanes]
need not wear life [vests] during flight above 2,000 feet above the water; [and,]
“5.1.9 Notwithstanding paragraph 5.1.8 above, each occupant of a helicopter operating to or from an offshore landing site located
on a fixed platform or vessel shall wear a life [vest] during the entire flight over water, regardless of the class of operation or
the one-engine-inoperative performance capability of the helicopter;
“5.2 Life Rafts
“5.2.1 An aircraft that is flown over water at a distance from land greater than the permitted distance must carry, as part of the
emergency and lifesaving equipment, sufficient life rafts to provide a place in a life raft for each person on board the aircraft.
“5.2.1.1 For the purposes of paragraph 5.2.1, the permitted distance is:
“(a) In the case of an aircraft that has (i) four engines, or (ii) three turbine engines, or (iii) two turbine engines and is engaged in an
extended-range operation … : a distance equal to 120 minutes at normal cruising speed, or 400 miles, whichever is the less; or
“(b) In any other case — a distance equal to 30 minutes at normal cruising speed, or 100 miles, whichever is the less;
“5.2.2 Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph 5.2.1, CASA may require the carriage of life rafts on such other overwater
flights as CASA considers necessary;
“5.2.3 Life rafts carried in accordance with paragraphs 5.2.1 shall be in addition to life [vests] carried in accordance with paragraphs
5.1.1 and 5.1.2;
“5.2.4 Life rafts carried in accordance with this section shall be stowed so as to be readily accessible in the event of a ditching without
appreciable time for preparatory procedures. When life rafts are stowed in compartments or containers, such compartments
or containers shall be appropriately and conspicuously marked. … [and,]
“Life rafts shall comply with the standards specified in Section 103.15.
“5.3 Helicopter Flotation Systems
“5.3.1 A single-engine helicopter engaged in passenger-carrying charter operations shall be equipped with an approved flotation
system whenever the helicopter is operated beyond autorotative gliding distance from land; …
“5.3.2 A single-engine helicopter engaged in regular public transport operations shall be equipped with an approved flotation
system whenever the helicopter is operated beyond autorotative gliding distance from land; [and,]
“5.3.3 A multi-engine helicopter engaged in passenger-carrying charter or regular public transport operations over water and which
is not operated in accordance with one-engine-inoperative accountability procedures shall be equipped with an approved
flotation system.
“6 Signaling Equipment
“6.1 Aircraft on flights where the carriage of life rafts is required by paragraph 5.2.1, or on such other overwater flights as CASA
specifies, shall carry approved types of the following signaling equipment:
“(a) One emergency locator transmitter when one life raft is carried and at least two transmitters when more than one raft is
carried. The transmitters shall operate on frequencies of 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz, shall be an approved emergency locator
transmitter under regulation 252A … and shall be stowed so as to facilitate their ready use in an emergency; and,
“(b) A supply of pyrotechnic distress signals. …

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“7 Survival Equipment
“7.1 An aircraft shall carry survival equipment for sustaining life appropriate to the area being overflown on the following flights:
“(a) Where the carriage of life rafts [is] required by paragraphs 5.2.1 and 5.2.2; …
“8 Accessories for Water Operations
“8.1 Amphibious aircraft when operating over water and all seaplanes and flying boats shall carry at least one sea anchor (drogue)
and appropriate fittings shall be provided for the attachment of the sea anchor to the aircraft. …
“10 Emergency Procedures
“10.1 The operator of an aircraft engaged on charter or regular public transport operations shall specify in the aircraft’s operations
manual the procedures for handling: …
“(e) Ditching, where appropriate.
“14 Briefing of Passengers
“14.1 General
“14.1.1 The operator of an aircraft shall ensure that all passengers are orally briefed before each takeoff on: …
“(e) The use of flotation devices where applicable. …
“14.2 Overwater Operations
“14.2.1 In addition to the oral briefing required by paragraph 14.1.1, the operator of an aircraft required to carry life [vests] or other
individual flotation devices, and … appropriate life rafts, in accordance with paragraphs 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.4, 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, shall
ensure that all passengers are orally briefed by a crewmember on the location and use of any individual flotation devices,
including the method of donning and inflating a life [vest], and the location of life rafts. In the case of aircraft engaged on
charter or regular public transport operations required to carry life [vests] in accordance with paragraphs 5.1.1 or 5.1.4, this
briefing shall include a demonstration of the method of donning and inflating a life [vest].
“15 Demonstration of Emergency Evacuation Procedures
“15.2 Ditching Demonstration
“15.2.1 Before each type and model of aircraft with a seating capacity of more than 44 passengers is used for the carriage of
passengers on charter or regular public transport operations where life rafts are required by subsection 5, the operator
shall, unless specifically exempted by CASA, show by demonstration in accordance with Appendix II* of this section that the
ditching procedures allow for the removal of the rafts and the evacuation of the occupants from the aircraft in an orderly and
expeditious manner. … ”
*  Appendix II lists 19 criteria for a ditching demonstration.

Document: CAO Section 103.13

Subject: Equipment standards — Life vests
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“2 Approval
“2.1 Life [vests] certified by a Contracting State as complying with one of the following specifications, as appropriate, are
acceptable for use in Australian-registered aircraft subject to the life [vest] also complying with the additional requirements
specified in Subsection 3:
“(a) (U.S.) Federal Aviation Administration Technical Standard Order TSO-C13e, Life Preservers, or
“(b) A specification approved by the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom; [and,]
“2.2 Life [vests] not complying with the specifications listed at paragraph 2.1 may be approved by the Secretary when it can
be demonstrated that the life [vest] provides an equivalent standard of safety. A life [vest] so approved shall be clearly and
permanently marked ‘ANO 103.13 APPROVED.’
“3 Additional Requirements
“3.1 The life [vest] shall be of the inflatable type; [and,]
“3.2 A whistle in a suitable stowage shall be fitted to life [vests] other than infant life [vests].”

Document: CAO Section 103.15

Subject: Equipment standards — Life rafts
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“2 Approval
“2.1 Life rafts certified by a Contracting State as complying with one of the following specifications, as appropriate, are acceptable
for use in Australian-registered aircraft:

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(a) USA. Federal Aviation Administration Technical Standard Order TSO-C12c, Life Rafts (Twin-tube);
“(b) USA. Federal Aviation Administration Technical Standard Order TSO-C70a, Life Rafts [Reversible and Nonreversible];
“(c) USA. Federal Aviation Administration Technical Standard Order TSO-C69a, Emergency Evacuation Slides, Ramps and Slide/
raft Combinations;
“(d) A specification approved by the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom; [and,]
“2.2 Life rafts complying with the specifications listed in paragraph 2.1 may be approved by the Secretary when it can be shown
that they provide an equivalent standard of safety. A life raft so approved shall be clearly and permanently marked: ‘ANO
103.15 APPROVED.’”

Document: CAO Section 103.40

Subject: Equipment standards — Buoyant survival radio beacons operating on 121.5 megahertz (MHz) and 243 MHz
Contents: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“2 Design Requirements
“2.1 The equipment shall be buoyant unless it is designed to be either a part of, attached to or enclosed within, other survival
equipment which is buoyant. In all cases the equipment shall be self-righting to maintain the antenna substantially vertical;
“2.2 The equipment shall be designed with features which minimize any variation of radiation efficiency caused by the effects of
rough water;
“2.3 The equipment shall be fitted with a towline to enable it to be tethered to a life raft unless it is designed to be a part of, or
permanently attached to, a life raft. The towline shall be so attached to the equipment that it will not adversely affect the
buoyancy or self-righting characteristics of the equipment;
“2.4 The equipment shall be self-activating on flotation in water and shall function normally within 15 minutes of dropping into
water. Atmospheric moisture shall not cause the beacon to operate prematurely;
“2.5 The equipment shall be capable of activation without immersion in water, that is, in the event of it being required by survivors
on land;
“2.6 The equipment shall be capable of being set in operation by unskilled persons. Operation shall be initiated by a simple action,
and the equipment shall subsequently operate automatically;
“2.7 Simple operating instructions, preferably pictorial, in a clear and durable form, shall be permanently affixed to the
equipment;
“2.8 The date when the battery is to be replaced, to ensure the specified endurance, shall be clearly and durably marked on the
equipment and battery;
“2.9 The equipment shall be designed so that it can be stowed and used without prejudice to the safety of inflatable survival
equipment. When not in operation, the equipment shall have no sharp projections and should present a smooth external
contour;
“2.10 The equipment shall be designed so that it can be conveniently stowed in a manner appropriate to its intended method of
use in an emergency. Note: It is desirable that the equipment be designed for stowage and use as a single unit; [and,]
“2.11 Cables interconnecting units of the equipment shall be robust and terminated in a manner which prevents incorrect
connection and inadvertent or accidental disconnection;
“2.12 Reliability of operation shall be a principal design objective. Design and construction of the equipment shall be such that the
possibility of internal or external damage during stowage or use is minimal. The equipment shall be resistant to the chemical
effects of salt water and fungus growth;
“3 Minimum Performance Requirements
“3.1 The beacon shall be capable of meeting all minimum performance requirements specified in this subsection after being
repeatedly subjected to the altitude, temperature and vibration conditions for which the manufacturer has rated it. Further, the
beacon shall meet those minimum performance requirements under any possible combination of the following conditions:
“(a) Ambient … temperatures within the range of –20 degrees C [Celsius] to 55 degrees C [–26 degrees F (Fahrenheit) to 131
degrees F]; and,
“(b) When the beacon has functioned continuously for at least 48 hours using batteries which are at the end of their declared
non-operating life. Note: Manufacturers should take into account that the temperature under which the beacon may operate
could exceed 55 degrees C. It is recommended that beacons be designed to operate at higher temperatures and have surfaces,
that may be exposed, painted white to minimize solar heating;
“3.2 The carrier frequencies shall be 121.5 [MHz] and 243 MHz within a tolerance range, in each case, of ±0.005 percent;
“3.3 The radio frequency carrier(s) shall be amplitude modulated with an audio frequency tone swept downwards through at least
700 Hz [hertz] within the range 1600 [Hz] with a sweep-repetition rate of two [per second] to four per second;

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Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“3.4 The emission shall be type A2 or A9 with the following characteristics:

“(a) The modulation factor shall be at least 0.85;
“(b) The modulation may be essentially or entirely negative going and the modulation envelope may be essentially rectangular;
“(c) The level of any emission 12.5 KHz [kilohertz] or more removed from the carrier frequency (or frequencies) shall be at least
25 dB [decibels] below the level of the wanted emission, except that the level of any emission more than 37.5 KHz removed
from the carrier frequency (or frequencies) shall be at least 35 dB below the level of the wanted emission;
“(d) The modulated carrier(s) shall have a duty cycle of at least 33 percent; and,
“(e) The peak effective radiated power shall be at least 75 milliwatts on each frequency; [and,]
“4 Equipment Approval
“4.1 To gain approval for any model of survival radio beacon under the terms of this Section, the manufacturer shall certify to
the Secretary that all examples of that model will comply with the design requirements and [will] be capable of meeting the
minimum performance requirements specified herein when operated after prolonged stowage in aircraft;
“4.2 The manufacturer shall declare the permissible environmental conditions to which the equipment may be exposed during
stowage in aircraft. Note: The equipment should be capable of withstanding environmental cycling between –55 degrees C and 70
degrees C [–67 degrees F and 158 degrees F], atmospheric pressures equivalent to at least 50,000 feet and vibration throughout the
range from 10 to 2,000 Hz, 2.5 mm [millimeters] or 0.1 inch total excursion up to 10 g acceleration; [and,]
“4.3 The manufacturer or his agent shall provide the Secretary with descriptive information, a complete performance specification
and other such data as may be required to demonstrate that the equipment for which approval is sought is designed,
manufactured and capable of performance as specified in this Section. Note: The Secretary may require that a sample beacon be
made available for examination and nondestructive testing.”

Document: Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 252A-1 (0)

Subject: Installation of emergency locator transmitters (ELTs)
Content: Includes guidance about existing ELT installations, type approval, ELT installation, antenna installation, ELT remote controls,
activation monitor, placarding, environmental considerations, aircraft maintenance schedule, test requirements, registration of ownership
and recording/reporting.

Document: CAAP 253-1 (0)

Subject: Ditching
Content: Includes guidance on general technique, behavior of the airplane on impact, escape from the airplane, survival aspects of
ditching, checklist, ongoing survival considerations and rescue.

Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand

Document: Rule 91.211

Subject: Passenger briefing
Content: Contains, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) A person operating an aircraft carrying passengers must ensure that each passenger has been briefed on — …
“(4) When required to be carried by this Part —
“(i) the location of survival and emergency equipment for passenger use; [and,]
“(ii) the use of flotation equipment required under 91.525 for a flight over water; and,
“(5) Procedures in the case of an emergency landing … .”

Document: Rule 91.219

Subject: Familiarity with operating limitations and emergency equipment
Content: Contains, among other provisions, the following:
“Each pilot of an aircraft shall, before beginning a flight, be familiar with — …
“(3) The emergency equipment installed on the aircraft;
“(4) Which crewmember is assigned to operate the emergency equipment; and,
“(5) The procedures to be followed for the use of the emergency equipment in an emergency situation.”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: Rule 91.231

Subject: Right-of-way rules for overwater operations
Content: “Each pilot of an aircraft on the water shall comply with the requirements of the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea.”

Document: Rule 91.515

Subject: Communication and navigation equipment for visual flight rules (VFR) overwater flight
Content: “Each aircraft operating under VFR over water, at a distance that is more than 30 minutes flying time from the nearest shore, shall
be equipped with —
“(1) Communication equipment that —
“(i) meets level 1 or 2 standards specified in Appendix A, A.9; and,
“(ii) is capable of providing continuous two-way communications with an appropriate ATS [air traffic service] unit or aeronautical
telecommunications facility; and,
“(2) Navigation equipment that is capable of navigating the aircraft in accordance with the flight plan.”

Document: Rule 91.525

Subject: Equipment required for flights over water
Content:
“(a) An aircraft operated on overwater flights must be equipped with —
“(1) For single-engine aircraft, or multi-engine aircraft unable to maintain a height of at least 1,000 feet AMSL [above mean sea
level] with one engine inoperative, on flights more than gliding distance from shore, one life [vest] for each person on board
stowed in a position readily accessible from each seat or berth;
“(2) For multi-engine aircraft capable of maintaining a height of at least 1,000 feet AMSL with one engine inoperative, on flights
more than 50 nautical miles from shore, one life [vest] for each person on board stowed in a position readily accessible from
each seat or berth;
“(3) For single-engine aircraft, or multi-engine aircraft unable to maintain a height of at least 1,000 feet AMSL with one engine
inoperative, on flights of more than 100 nautical miles from shore —
“(i) sufficient life rafts with buoyancy and rated capacity to accommodate each occupant of the aircraft;
“(ii) a survivor-locator light on each life raft;
“(iii) a survival kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be flown, attached to each life raft;
“(iv) at least one pyrotechnic signaling device on each life raft; and,
“(v) one ELT(S) [survival ELT] or one EPIRB [emergency position-indicating radio beacon]; and,
“(4) For multi-engine aircraft capable of continuing flight with one or more engines inoperative, on flights of more than 200
nautical miles from shore, the equipment specified in paragraph (a)(3); and,
“(5) For aircraft in excess of 5,700 kilograms MCTOW [maximum certified takeoff weight], on flights more than 200 nautical miles
from shore, the equipment specified in paragraph (a)(3) and an additional ELT(S) or EPIRB;
“(b) Life rafts, life [vests] and signaling devices must be installed in conspicuously identified locations and must be easily accessible in
the event of a ditching of the aircraft.”

Document: Rule 91.527

Subject: Aircraft operations on water
Content: “An aircraft operating on water must be equipped with —
“(1) One life [vest] for each person on board, stowed in a position readily accessible from each seat or berth; and,
“(2) For each aircraft in excess of 5,700 kilograms MCTOW, one sea anchor.”

Document: Rule 91.529

Subject: Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:

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Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e) and 121.353(b), no person may operate an aircraft that does not have an automatic
ELT installed;
“(b) An aircraft may be ferried from the place where possession of the aircraft was taken to a place where the automatic ELT is to be
installed if no passengers are carried on the aircraft;
“(c) An aircraft with an inoperative ELT may be ferried from a place where repairs or replacement cannot be made to a place where the
repairs or replacement can be made if no passengers are carried on the aircraft; [and,]
“(d) An aircraft with an inoperative automatic ELT may be operated for a period of seven days inclusive if the aircraft is equipped with a
portable ELT that is accessible to each person on board the aircraft. … ”

Document: Rule 91.615

Subject: Emergency locator transmitter (ELT) tests and inspections
Content: “No person shall operate an aircraft unless the emergency locator transmitter required to be installed in that aircraft by
Subpart F has —
“(1) Been tested and inspected, within the preceding 12 calendar months, in accordance with Part 43, Appendix F; and,
“(2) had its batteries replaced or recharged —
“(i) when the transmitter has been in use for more than one cumulative hour; or
“(ii) when their useful life or, for rechargeable batteries, their useful life of charge, as established by the manufacturer, has
expired.”

Document: Part 91, Appendix A, A.14

Subject: Emergency equipment
Content:
“(a) Each life [vest] must have a light that meets the requirements of TSO-C85 and —
“(1) For inflatable life [vests] —
“(i) a minimum inflated buoyancy of 150 newtons; and,
“(ii) manually operated CO2 inflation with oral top-up; and,
“(2) For constant-wear anti-exposure coveralls, a minimum inherent buoyancy of 75 newtons provided by nonflammable closed-
cell buoyancy foam;
“(b) Each life [vest] must meet the requirements of —
“(1) For inflatable life [vests] —
“(i) TSO-C13; or
“(ii) European Norm EN 396; or
“(iii) Maritime rule 42A.18, made pursuant to the Maritime Transport Act of 1994; or
“(2) For constant-wear anti-exposure coveralls, U.S. Coast Guard Type V PFD;
“(c) Each life raft must meet the requirements of TSO-C70 and contain a survival kit;
“(d) Each survival kit must include —
“(1) one canopy;
“(2) one radar reflector or flare kit;
“(3) one life raft–repair kit;
“(4) one bailing bucket;
“(5) one signaling mirror;
“(6) one whistle;
“(7) one raft knife;
“(8) one compressed-gas bottle for emergency inflation;
“(9) one inflation pump;
“(10) one 25-meter retaining line;
“(11) one magnetic compass;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(12) one dye marker;

“(13) one flashlight having at least two ‘D’ cells or equivalent;
“(14) one fishing kit;
“(15) two oars or two glove paddles;
“(16) a two-day supply of food rations supplying at least 1,000 calories per day for each person the raft is rated to carry;
“(17) 1,200 milliliters of water for every two persons the raft is rated to carry, or one seawater-desalting kit;
“(18) one first aid kit suitable for treatment of minor injuries;
“(19) one book on survival appropriate for the area over which the aircraft is operated;
“(20) a sea anchor; and,
“(21) a water-collection bag or cups; [and,]
“(e) Each survival-locator light must meet the requirements of TSO-C85.”

Document: Part 91, Appendix A, A.15

Subject: Emergency locator transmitters
Content:
“(a) Except as provided in paragraph (f ), each automatic ELT must meet the requirements of —
“(1) TSO-C91a for transmitting on 121.5 MHz [megahertz]; or
“(2) TSO-C126 for transmitting on 406 MHz;
“(b) Each automatic ELT must —
“(1) be attached to the aircraft in such a manner that —
“(i) the probability of damage in the event of an accident or impact is minimized;
“(ii) mounting is to primary load-carrying structure but does not degrade the structural capability of the aircraft;
“(iii) a force of 450 newtons applied to the mount in the most flexible direction will not cause a static deflection greater than
2.5 millimeters relative to a section of adjacent structure located between 0.3 meters and 1.0 meter from the mount site;
“(iv) the transmitter and any external antenna can support a 100-g load in the plus and minus directions of the three principal
axes of the aircraft;
“(v) the transmitter and any external antenna are as close to each other as possible; and,
“(vi) for fixed and deployable automatic-type transmitters, the ELT is as far aft as possible;
“(2) have its crash-activation sensor —
“(i) located to prevent inadvertent operation; and,
“(ii) axis orientated to sense a primary crash pulse along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft;
“(3) have its antenna mounted —
“(i) to provide vertical polarization with the aircraft in normal flight;
“(ii) for an external antenna, no closer than 0.6 meter from any other VHF [very-high frequency] aerial unless specified by the
manufacturer; [and,]
“(iii) for an internal antenna, exposed to a window at least 0.3 meter square and insulated from metal parts;
“(4) be fitted with vibration-proof RF [radio-frequency] connectors on each end of the transmitter-antenna coaxial cable; and,
“(5) have its location identified near the point of access;
“(c) Each ELT(S) [survival ELT] and EPIRB [emergency position-indicating radio beacon] must —
“(1) be self-buoyant;
“(2) be water-resistant; and,
“(3) be portable.
“(d) Each ELT(S) must meet the requirements of —
“(1) TSO-C91a; or
“(2) TSO-C126;
“(e) Each EPIRB must meet the requirements of —
“(1) Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4330:2000; or
“(2) Australian Ministerial Standard MS241;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(f ) Each automatic ELT or ELT(S) installed prior to 1 April 1997 must —
“(1) meet the requirements of TSO-C91 or TSO-C91a; and,
“(2) when the automatic ELT or ELT(S) becomes unserviceable, be replaced with an automatic ELT meeting the requirements of TSO-
C91a or TSO-C126;
“(g) For the purposes of paragraph (f )(2), an automatic ELT or ELT(S) is not considered unserviceable when performing the maintenance
required by 91.615;
“(h) A portable ELT must be stowed in the aircraft so as to ensure that it is readily accessible to each person in the event of an emergency;
[and,]
“(i) Each portable ELT must meet the requirements of —
“(1) TSO-C91a for ELT(S) equipment; or
“(2) TSO-C126 for ELT(S) equipment; or
“(3) Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4330:2000; or
“(4) Australian Ministerial Standard MS241.”

Document: Rule 125.557

Subject: Initial training for crewmembers of medium airplanes
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) Each holder of an air operator certificate shall ensure that each of its crewmembers, who has not qualified and served as a
crewmember on an aircraft, complete initial training conducted —
“(1) in a structured manner; and,
“(2) in accordance with a syllabus that includes training applicable to — …
“(iv) location and operation of emergency equipment available for use by crewmembers; and, …
“(vi) location and use of all normal and emergency exits, including evacuation slides and escape ropes.”

Document: Rule 125.559

Subject: Transition training for crewmembers of medium airplanes
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(b) The transition training course shall address —
“(1) the use of all safety and emergency equipment and procedures applicable to the aircraft type or variant.”

Document: Rule 135.59

Subject: Emergency and survival equipment on helicopters and small airplanes
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) Each holder of an air operator certificate shall have available, for immediate communication to rescue-coordination centers,
information on the emergency and survival equipment carried on board each of its aircraft; [and,]
“(b) For air operations performed in excess of 10 nautical miles from shore, the information required by paragraph (a) shall include —
“(1) the number, color and type of life rafts;
“(2) whether pyrotechnics are carried;
“(3) details of emergency medical supplies and water supplies; and,
“(4) the type and operating frequencies of any emergency portable radio equipment.”

Document: Rule 135.87

Subject: Flights over water of helicopters and small airplanes
Content:
“(a) A person performing an air operation must not operate over water more than 10 nautical miles beyond gliding or autorotational
distance from shore unless —
“(1) life rafts are carried of sufficient capacity to carry all occupants of the aircraft; and,
“(2) a life [vest] is worn by each passenger;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(b) A person performing an air operation in a single-engine helicopter must not operate over water more than 10 nautical miles
beyond autorotational distance from shore unless —
“(1) the helicopter is equipped with an operable flotation device; or
“(2) the occupants are wearing immersion suits;
“(c) The operator of a multi-engine aircraft may, instead of the requirement in paragraph (a)(2), have life [vests] available for use in a
position accessible to each passenger; [and,]
“(d) Each person performing an air transport operation over water beyond 100 nautical miles from shore must conduct the flight under
IFR [instrument flight rules].”

Document: Rule 135.557

Subject: Initial training for crewmembers
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) Each holder of an air operator certificate shall ensure that each of its crewmembers, who has not qualified and served as a
crewmember on an aircraft, complete initial training conducted —
“(1) in a structured manner; and,
“(2) in accordance with a syllabus that includes training applicable to — …
“(iv) location and operation of emergency equipment available for use by crewmembers; and, …
“(vi) location and use of all normal and emergency exits, including evacuation slides and escape ropes.”

Document: Rule 135.559

Subject: Transition training for crewmembers changing to a different type or variant, or when new procedures or equipment are
introduced on an existing type or variant
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(b) The transition training shall address —
“(1) the use of all safety and emergency equipment and procedures applicable to the aircraft type or variant.”

SAE International

Document: Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP496

Subject: Stowage of cabin emergency-flotation equipment
Content: Recommendations for stowage of individual life vests; life raft; slide/raft; auxiliary flotation equipment such as seat cushions; and
slide.

Document: Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP1282

Subject: Recommendations for survival kit (survival equipment pack) to be carried with life rafts or slide/rafts on transport category
airplanes
Content: Recommended contents of survival kit.

Document: Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP1354

Subject: Individual inflatable life vests
Content: Recommendations for flotation attitude, donning of the life vest, general configuration, mechanical inflation system, oral inflation
system and attached equipment. An appendix describes a donning test.

Document: Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP1356

Subject: Life rafts
Content: Recommendations for operational environmental conditions, buoyancy, capacity ratings, inflation system, packaging, marking,
mooring line, sea anchor, canopy, heaving/trailing line, locator lights, survival equipment pack, boarding assists and knife.

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Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: Aerospace Standard AS4492

Subject: Survivor-locator lights
Content: Performance and design recommendations for steady-type lights (Type I) and flashing-type lights (Type II). Specifications are
given for configuration/design, materials, light characteristics, power source (battery), light activation, service-life limitations, attachment
provisions, moisture protection and tests.

Document: Aerospace Standard AS5134

Subject: Aviation distress signal
Content: Recommended minimum performance standards.

U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

Document: U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 23.237

Subject: Operation on water of normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter airplanes
Content: “A wave height, demonstrated to be safe for operation, and any necessary water-handling procedures for seaplanes and
amphibians, must be established.”

Document: FARs Part 23.239

Subject: Spray characteristics of normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter airplanes
Content: “Spray may not dangerously obscure the vision of the pilots or damage the propellers or other parts of a seaplane or amphibian
at any time during taxiing, takeoff and landing.”

Document: FARs Part 23.521, Part 23.523, Part 23.525, Part 23.527, Part 23.529, Part 23. 531, Part 23.533, Part 23.535 and Part 23.537
Subject: Water loads for normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter airplanes
Content: These sections provide design requirements for load factors for seaplanes and amphibians.

Document: FARs Part 23.751

Subject: Main-float buoyancy for normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter seaplanes or amphibian airplanes
Content:
“(a) Each main float must have —
“(1) A buoyancy of 80 percent in excess of the buoyancy required by that float to support its portion of the maximum weight of the
seaplane or amphibian in fresh water; and,
“(2) Enough watertight compartments to provide reasonable assurance that the seaplane or amphibian will stay afloat without
capsizing if any two compartments of any main float are flooded; [and,]
“(b) Each main float must contain at least four watertight compartments approximately equal in volume.”

Document: FARs Part 23.753

Subject: Main-float design for normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter seaplanes
Content: “Each seaplane main float must meet the requirements of [Part] 23.521.”

Document: FARs Part 23.755

Subject: Hull design of normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter seaplane and amphibian airplanes
Content:
“(a) The hull of a hull seaplane or amphibian of 1,500 pounds [680 kilograms] or more maximum weight must have watertight compartments
designed and arranged so that the hull auxiliary floats, and tires (if used), will keep the airplane afloat without capsizing in fresh water when —
“(1) For airplanes of 5,000 pounds or more maximum weight, any two adjacent compartments are flooded; and,
“(2) For airplanes of 1,500 pounds up to, but not including, 5,000 pounds [2,268 kilograms] maximum weight, any single
compartment is flooded; [and,]
“(b) Watertight doors in bulkheads may be used for communication between compartments.”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: FARs Part 23.757

Subject: Auxiliary floats for normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter seaplane and amphibian airplanes
Content: “Auxiliary floats must be arranged so that, when completely submerged in fresh water, they provide a righting moment of at least
1.5 times the upsetting moment caused by the seaplane or amphibian being tilted.”

Document: FARs Part 23.1411

Subject: Safety equipment for normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter airplanes
Content:
“(a) Required safety equipment to be used by the flight crew in an emergency, such as automatic life raft releases, must be readily
accessible;
“(b) Stowage provisions for required safety equipment must be furnished and must —
“(1) Be arranged so that the equipment is directly accessible and its location is obvious; and,
“(2) Protect the safety equipment from damage caused by being subjected to the inertia loads resulting from the ultimate static
load factors specified in [Part] 23.561(b)(3) [‘Emergency landing conditions’] of this part.”

Document: FARs Part 23.1415

Subject: Ditching equipment for normal, utility, acrobatic and commuter airplanes
Content:
“(a) Emergency flotation and signaling equipment required by any operating rule in this chapter must be installed so that it is readily
available to the crew and passengers;
“(b) Each raft and each life [vest] must be approved;
“(c) Each raft released automatically or by the pilot must be attached to the airplane by a line to keep it alongside the airplane. This line
must be weak enough to break before submerging the empty raft to which it is attached; [and,]
“(d) Each signaling device required by any operating rule in this chapter must be accessible, function satisfactorily and must be free of
any hazard in its operation.”

Document: FARs Part 25.239

Subject: Spray characteristics, control and stability on water of transport category seaplanes and amphibious airplanes
Content:
“(a) For seaplanes and amphibians, during takeoff, taxiing and landing, and in the conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of this section,
there may be no —
“(1) Spray characteristics that would impair the pilot’s view, cause damage or result in the taking in of an undue quantity of
water;
“(2) Dangerously uncontrollable porpoising, bounding or swinging tendency; or
“(3) Immersion of auxiliary floats for sponsons, wing tips, propeller blades or other parts not designed to withstand the resulting
water loads;
“(b) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section must be shown —
“(1) In water conditions, from smooth to the most adverse condition established in accordance with [Part] 25.231 [‘Longitudinal
stability and control’];
“(2) In wind and crosswind velocities, water currents and associated waves and swells that may reasonably be expected in operation
on water;
“(3) At speeds that may reasonably be expected in operation on water;
“(4) With sudden failure of the critical engine at any time while on water; and,
“(5) At each weight and center-of-gravity position, relevant to each operating condition, within the range of loading conditions for
which certification is requested; [and,]
“(c) In the water conditions of paragraph (b) of this section, and in the corresponding wind conditions, the seaplane or amphibian must
be able to drift for five minutes with engines inoperative, aided, if necessary, by a sea anchor.”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: FARs Part 25.521, Part 25.523, Part 25.525, Part 25.527, Part 25.529, Part 25. 531, Part 25.533, Part 25.535 and Part 25.537
Subject: Water loads for transport category airplanes
Content: These sections provide design requirements for load factors for transport category seaplanes and amphibious airplanes.

Document: FARs Part 25.563

Subject: Structural strength for ditching provisions for transport category airplanes
Content: “Structural-strength considerations of ditching provisions must be in accordance with [Part] 25.801(e).”

Document: FARs Part 25.751

Subject: Main-float buoyancy for transport category seaplanes and amphibious airplanes
Content: “Each main float must have —
“(a) A buoyancy of 80 percent in excess of that required to support the maximum weight of the seaplane or amphibian in fresh water; and,
“(b) Not less than five watertight compartments approximately equal in volume.”

Document: FARs Part 25.753

Subject: Main-float design for transport category seaplanes and amphibious airplanes
Content: “Each main float must be approved and must meet the requirements of [Part] 25.521.”

Document: FARs Part 25.755

Subject: Hulls for transport category seaplanes and amphibious airplanes
Content:
“(a) Each hull must have enough watertight compartments so that, with any two adjacent compartments flooded, the buoyancy of
the hull and auxiliary floats (and tires, if used) provides a margin of positive stability great enough to minimize the probability of
capsizing in rough, fresh water; [and,]
“(b) Bulkheads with watertight doors may be used for communication between compartments.”

Document: FARs Part 25.801

Subject: Certification with ditching provisions for transport category airplanes
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) The airplane must meet the requirements of this [Part] and [Parts] 25.807(e) [‘Emergency exits’], 25.1411 and 25.1415(a);
“(b) Each practicable design measure, compatible with the general characteristics of the airplane, must be taken to minimize the
probability that in an emergency landing on water, the behavior of the airplane would cause immediate injury to the occupants or
would make it impossible for them to escape;
“(c) The probable behavior of the airplane in a water landing must be investigated by model tests or by comparison with airplanes of
similar configuration for which the ditching characteristics are known. Scoops, flaps, projections, and any other factor likely to affect
the hydrodynamic characteristics of the airplane, must be considered;
“(d) It must be shown that, under reasonably probable water conditions, the flotation time and trim of the airplane will allow the
occupants to leave the airplane and enter the life rafts required by [Part] 25.1415. If compliance with this provision is shown by
buoyancy and trim computations, appropriate allowances must be made for probable structural damage and leakage. If the
airplane has fuel tanks (with fuel jettisoning provisions) that can reasonably be expected to withstand a ditching without leakage,
the jettisonable volume of fuel may be considered as buoyancy volume; [and,]
“(e) Unless the effects of the collapse of external doors and windows are accounted for in the investigation of the probable behavior
of the airplane in a water landing (as prescribed in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this [Part]), the external doors and windows must be
designed to withstand the probable maximum local pressures.”

Document: FARs Part 25.1411

Subject: Safety equipment for transport category airplanes
Content:
“(a) Accessibility. Required safety equipment to be used by the crew in an emergency must be readily accessible;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(b) Stowage provisions. Stowage provisions for required emergency equipment must be furnished and must —
“(1) Be arranged so that the equipment is directly accessible and its location is obvious; and,
“(2) Protect the safety equipment from inadvertent damage;
“(c) Emergency exit descent device. The stowage provisions for the emergency exit descent device required by [Part] 25.809(f ) must be at
the exits for which they are intended;
“(d) Life rafts.
“(1) The stowage provisions for the life rafts described in [Part] 25.1415 must accommodate enough rafts for the maximum number
of occupants for which certification for ditching is requested;
“(2) Life rafts must be stowed near exits through which the rafts can be launched during an unplanned ditching;
“(3) Rafts automatically or remotely released outside the airplane must be attached to the airplane by means of the static line
prescribed in [Part] 25.1415; [and,]
“(4) The stowage provisions for each portable life raft must allow rapid detachment and removal of the raft for use at other than the
intended exits;
“(e) Long-range signaling device. The stowage provisions for the long-range signaling device required by [Part] 25.1415 must be near an
exit available during an unplanned ditching;
“(f ) Life [vest] stowage provisions. The stowage provisions for life [vest(s)] described in [Part] 25.1415 must accommodate one life
[vest] for each occupant for which certification for ditching is requested. Each life [vest] must be within easy reach of each seated
occupant; [and,]
“(g) Life line stowage provisions. If certification for ditching under [Part] 25.801 is requested, there must be provisions to store life lines.
These provisions must —
“(1) Allow one life line to be attached to each side of the fuselage; and,
“(2) Be arranged to allow the life lines to be used to enable the occupants to stay on the wing after ditching.”

Document: FARs Part 25.1415

Subject: Ditching equipment used in airplanes to be certificated for ditching under Part 25.801
Content:
(a) “Ditching equipment used in airplanes to be certificated for ditching under [Part] 25.801, and required by the operating rules of this
chapter, must meet the requirements of this [Part];
(b) “Each life raft and each life [vest] must be approved. In addition —
(1) “Unless excess rafts of enough capacity are provided, the buoyancy and seating capacity beyond the rated capacity of the rafts
must accommodate all occupants of the airplane in the event of a loss of one raft of the largest rated capacity; and,
(2) “Each raft must have a trailing line, and must have a static line designed to hold the raft near the airplane but to release it if the
airplane becomes totally submerged;
(c) “Approved survival equipment must be attached to each life raft;
(d) “There must be an approved survival-type emergency locator transmitter for use in one life raft; [and,]
(e) “For airplanes not certificated for ditching under [Part] 25.801 and not having approved life [vest(s)], there must be an approved
flotation means for each occupant. This means must be within easy reach of each seated occupant and must be readily removable
from the airplane.”

Document: FARs Part 25.1561

Subject: Marking of safety equipment for transport category airplanes
Content:
“(a) Each safety-equipment control to be operated by the crew in an emergency, such as controls for automatic life raft releases, must
be plainly marked as to its method of operation;
“(b) Each location, such as a locker or compartment, that carries any fire extinguishing, signaling or other lifesaving equipment must be
marked accordingly;
“(c) Stowage provisions for required emergency equipment must be conspicuously marked to identify the contents and facilitate the
easy removal of the equipment;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(d) Each life raft must have obviously marked operating instructions; [and,]
“(e) Approved survival equipment must be marked for identification and method of operation.”

Document: FARs Part 27.239

Subject: Spray characteristics for water-based normal category rotorcraft
Content: “If certification for water operation is requested, no spray characteristics during taxiing, takeoff or landing may obscure the vision
of the pilot or damage the rotors, propellers or other parts of the rotorcraft.”

Document: FARs Part 27.521

Subject: Float-landing conditions for normal category rotorcraft
Content: “If certification for float operation is requested, the rotorcraft, with floats, must be designed to withstand the following loading
conditions (where the limit load factor is determined under [Part] 27.473(b) [‘Ground loading conditions and assumptions’] or assumed to
be equal to that determined for wheel landing gear):
“(a) Up-load conditions in which —
“(1) A load is applied so that, with the rotorcraft in the static level attitude, the resultant water reaction passes vertically through the
center of gravity; and,
“(2) The vertical load prescribed in paragraph (a)(1) of this section is applied simultaneously with an aft component of 0.25 times
the vertical component; [and,]
“(b) A side-load condition in which —
“(1) A vertical load of 0.75 times the total vertical load specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section is divided equally among the
floats; and,
“(2) For each float, the load share determined under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, combined with a total side load of 0.25 times
the total vertical load specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, is applied to the float only.”

Document: FARs Part 27.563

Subject: Structural ditching provisions for normal category rotorcraft
Content: “If certification with ditching provisions is requested, structural strength for ditching must meet the requirements of this [Part]
and [Part] 27.801(e).
“(a) Forward speed landing conditions. The rotorcraft must initially contact the most critical wave for reasonably probable water
conditions at forward velocities from zero up to 30 knots in likely pitch, roll and yaw attitudes. The rotorcraft limit vertical-descent
velocity may not be less than five feet per second relative to the mean water surface. Rotor lift may be used to act through the
center of gravity throughout the landing impact. This lift may not exceed two-thirds of the design maximum weight. A maximum
forward velocity of less than 30 knots may be used in design if it can be demonstrated that the forward velocity selected would not
be exceeded in a normal one-engine-out touchdown;
“(b) Auxiliary or emergency float conditions —
“(1) Floats fixed or deployed before initial water contact. In addition to the landing loads in paragraph (a) of this [Part], each
auxiliary or emergency float, or its support and attaching structure in the airframe of the fuselage, must be designed for the
load developed by a fully immersed float unless it can be shown that full immersion is unlikely. If full immersion is unlikely,
the highest likely float-buoyancy load must be applied. The highest likely buoyancy load must include consideration
of a partially immersed float creating restoring moments to compensate the upsetting moments caused by side wind,
unsymmetrical rotorcraft loading, water wave action, rotorcraft inertia and probable structural damage and leakage
considered under [Part] 27.801(d).
“Maximum roll and pitch angles determined from compliance with [Part] 27.801(d) may be used, if significant, to
determine the extent of immersion of each float. If the floats are deployed in flight, appropriate air loads derived from
the flight limitations with the floats deployed shall be used in substantiation of the floats and their attachment to the
rotorcraft. For this purpose, the design airspeed for limit load is the float-deployed airspeed-operating limit multiplied by
1.11; [and,]
“(2) Floats deployed after initial water contact. Each float must be designed for full or partial immersion prescribed in paragraph
(b)(1) of this [Part]. In addition, each float must be designed for combined vertical and drag loads using a relative limit speed
of 20 knots between the rotorcraft and the water. The vertical load may not be less than the highest likely buoyancy load
determined under paragraph (b)(1) of this [Part].”

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: FARs Part 27.751

Subject: Main-float buoyancy for normal category rotorcraft
Content:
“(a) For main floats, the buoyancy necessary to support the maximum weight of the rotorcraft in fresh water must be exceeded by—
“(1) 50 percent, for single floats; and,
“(2) 60 percent, for multiple floats; [and,]
“(b) Each main float must have enough watertight compartments so that, with any single main float compartment flooded, the main
floats will provide a margin of positive stability great enough to minimize the probability of capsizing.”

Document: FARs Part 27.753

Subject: Main-float design for normal category rotorcraft
Content:
“(a) Bag floats. Each bag float must be designed to withstand —
“(1) The maximum pressure differential that might be developed at the maximum altitude for which certification with that float is
requested; and,
“(2) The vertical loads prescribed in [Part] 27.521(a), distributed along the length of the bag over three-quarters of its projected
area; [and,]
“(b) Rigid floats. Each rigid float must be able to withstand the vertical, horizontal and side loads prescribed in [Part] 27.521. These loads
may be distributed along the length of the float.”

Document: FARs Part 27.755

Subject: Hulls for normal category rotorcraft taking off from, and landing on, water
Content: “For each rotorcraft with a hull and auxiliary floats that is to be approved for both taking off from and landing on water, the
hull and auxiliary floats must have enough watertight compartments so that, with any single compartment flooded, the buoyancy of
the hull and auxiliary floats (and wheel tires if used) provides a margin of positive stability great enough to minimize the probability of
capsizing.”

Document: FARs Part 27.801

Subject: Certification with ditching provisions for normal category rotorcraft
Content:
“(a) If certification with ditching provisions is requested, the rotorcraft must meet the requirements of this [Part] and [Parts] 27.807(d),
27.1411 and 27.1415;
“(b) Each practicable design measure, compatible with the general characteristics of the rotorcraft, must be taken to minimize the
probability that in an emergency landing on water, the behavior of the rotorcraft would cause immediate injury to the occupants
or would make it impossible for them to escape;
“(c) The probable behavior of the rotorcraft in a water landing must be investigated by model tests or by comparison with rotorcraft of
similar configuration for which the ditching characteristics are known. Scoops, flaps, projections, and any other factor likely to affect
the hydrodynamic characteristics of the rotorcraft must be considered;
“(d) It must be shown that, under reasonably probable water conditions, the flotation time and trim of the rotorcraft will allow the
occupants to leave the rotorcraft and enter the life rafts required by [Part] 27.1415. If compliance with this provision is shown
by buoyancy and trim computations, appropriate allowances must be made for probable structural damage and leakage. If the
rotorcraft has fuel tanks (with fuel jettisoning provisions) that can reasonably be expected to withstand a ditching without leakage,
the jettisonable volume of fuel may be considered as buoyancy volume; [and,]
“(e) Unless the effects of the collapse of external doors and windows are accounted for in the investigation of the probable behavior
of the rotorcraft in a water landing (as prescribed in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this [Part]), the external doors and windows must be
designed to withstand the probable maximum local pressures.”

Document: FARs Part 27.807

Subject: Emergency exits for normal category rotorcraft

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Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Content:
“(a) Number and location. Rotorcraft with closed cabins must have at least one emergency exit on the opposite side of the cabin from
the main door;
“(b) Type and operation. Each emergency exit prescribed in paragraph (a) of this [Part] must —
“(1) Consist of a movable window or panel, or additional external door, providing an unobstructed opening that will admit a 19-
[inch] by 26-inch ellipse;
“(2) Be readily accessible, require no exceptional agility of a person using it and be located so as to allow ready use, without
crowding, in any probable attitudes that may result from a crash;
“(3) Have a simple and obvious method of opening and be arranged and marked so as to be readily located and operated, even in
darkness; and,
“(4) Be reasonably protected from jamming by fuselage deformation.
“(c) Tests. The proper functioning of each emergency exit must be shown by test;
“(d) Ditching emergency exits for passengers. If certification with ditching provisions is requested, one emergency exit on each side of the
fuselage must be proven by test, demonstration or analysis to —
“(1) Be above the waterline;
“(2) Have at least the dimensions specified in paragraph (b) of this [Part]; and,
“(3) Open without interference from flotation devices whether stowed or deployed.”

Document: FARs Part 27.1411

Subject: Safety equipment for normal category rotorcraft
Content:
“(a) Required safety equipment to be used by the crew in an emergency, such as flares and automatic life raft releases, must be readily
accessible; [and,]
“(b) Stowage provisions for required safety equipment must be furnished and must —
“(1) Be arranged so that the equipment is directly accessible and its location is obvious; and,
“(2) Protect the safety equipment from damage caused by being subjected to the inertia loads specified in [Part] 27.561.”

Document: FARs Part 27.1415

Subject: Ditching equipment for normal category rotorcraft
Content: Specifies required ditching equipment:
• “Each [life] raft and each life [vest] must be approved and must be installed so that it is readily available to the crew and passengers.
The storage provisions for life [vest(s)] must accommodate one life [vest] for each occupant for which certification for ditching is
requested;
• “Each [life] raft released automatically or by the pilot must be attached to the rotorcraft by a line to keep it alongside the rotorcraft.
This line must be weak enough to break before submerging the empty raft to which it is attached; [and,]
• “Each signaling device must be free from hazard in its operation and must be installed in an accessible location.”

Document: FARs Part 27.1561

Subject: Marking of safety equipment for normal category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 25.1561(a) and (b)

Document: FARs Part 29.239

Subject: Spray characteristics for water-based transport category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.239.

Document: FARs Part 29.519

Subject: Water loads for water-based and amphibious transport category rotorcraft

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Content:
“(a) General. For hull-type rotorcraft, the structure must be designed to withstand the water loading set forth in paragraphs (b), (c) and
(d) of this [Part] considering the most severe wave heights and profiles for which approval is desired. The loads for the landing
conditions of paragraphs (b) and (c) … must be developed and distributed along and among the hull and auxiliary floats, if used,
in a rational and conservative manner, assuming a rotor lift not exceeding two-thirds of the rotorcraft weight to act throughout the
landing impact;
“(b) Vertical landing conditions. The rotorcraft must initially contact the most critical wave surface at zero forward speed in likely pitch
and roll attitudes which result in critical design loadings. The vertical descent velocity may not be less than 6.5 feet per [1.9 meters]
second relative to the mean water surface;
“(c) Forward speed landing conditions. The rotorcraft must contact the most critical wave at forward velocities from zero up to 30 knots
in likely pitch, roll and yaw attitudes and with a vertical descent velocity of not less than 6.5 feet per second relative to the mean
water surface. A maximum forward velocity of less than 30 knots may be used in design if it can be demonstrated that the forward
velocity selected would not be exceeded in a normal one-engine-out landing; [and,]
“(d) Auxiliary float immersion condition. In addition to the loads from the landing conditions, the auxiliary float, and its support and
attaching structure in the hull, must be designed for the load developed by a fully immersed float unless it can be shown that full
immersion of the float is unlikely, in which case the highest likely float buoyancy load must be applied that considers loading of the
float immersed to create restoring moments compensating for upsetting moments caused by side wind, asymmetrical rotorcraft
loading, water wave action and rotorcraft inertia.”

Document: FARs Part 29.521

Subject: Float-landing conditions for transport category rotorcraft
Content: “If certification for float operation (including float amphibian operation) is requested, the rotorcraft, with floats, must be designed
to withstand the following loading conditions (where the limit load factor is determined under [Part] 29.473(b) or assumed to be equal to
that determined for wheel landing gear):
“(a) Up-load conditions in which —
“(1) A load is applied so that, with the rotorcraft in the static level attitude, the resultant water reaction passes vertically through the
center of gravity; and,
“(2) The vertical load prescribed in paragraph (a)(1) of this [Part] is applied simultaneously with an aft component of 0.25 times the
vertical component; [and,]
(b) A side load condition in which —
“(1) A vertical load of 0.75 times the total vertical load specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this [Part] is divided equally among the floats;
and,
“(2) For each float, the load share determined under paragraph (b)(1) of this [Part], combined with a total side load of 0.25 times the
total vertical load specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this [Part], is applied to that float only.”

Document: FARs Part 29.563

Subject: Structural ditching provisions for transport category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.563

Document: FARs Part 29.751

Subject: Main-float buoyancy for transport category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.751.

Document: FARs Part 29.753

Subject: Main-float design for transport category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.753.

Document: FARs Part 29.755

Subject: Hull buoyancy for water-based transport category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.755.

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: FARs Part 29.757

Subject: Hull and auxiliary-float strength for water-based transport category rotorcraft
Content: “The hull, and auxiliary floats if used, must withstand the water loads prescribed by [Part] 29.519 with a rational and conservative
distribution of local and distributed water pressures over the hull and float bottom.”

Document: FARs Part 29.801

Subject: Certification with ditching provisions for transport category rotorcraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 27.801

Document: FARs Part 29.807

Subject: Certification for ditching of transport category rotorcraft
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(d) Ditching emergency exits for passengers. If certification with ditching provisions is requested, ditching emergency exits must
be provided in accordance with the following requirements and must be proven by test, demonstration or analysis unless the
emergency exits required by paragraph (b) of this section already meet these requirements.
“(1) For rotorcraft that have a passenger seating configuration, excluding pilots’ seats, of nine seats or less, one exit above the
waterline in each side of the rotorcraft, meeting at least the dimensions of a Type IV exit;
“(2) For rotorcraft that have a passenger seating configuration, excluding pilots’ seats, of 10 seats or more, one exit above the
waterline in a side of the rotorcraft meeting at least the dimensions of a Type III exit, for each unit (or part of a unit) of 35
passenger seats, but no less than two such exits in the passenger cabin, with one on each side of the rotorcraft. However, where
it has been shown through analysis, ditching demonstrations or any other tests found necessary by the Administrator, that the
evacuation capability of the rotorcraft during ditching is improved by the use of larger exits, or by other means, the passenger
seat to exit ratio may be increased; [and,]
“(3) Flotation devices, whether stowed or deployed, may not interfere with or obstruct the exits.”

Document: FARs Part 29.1411

Subject: Safety equipment for transport category rotorcraft
Content:
“(a) Accessibility. Required safety equipment to be used by the crew in an emergency, such as automatic life raft releases, must be readily
accessible;
“(b) Stowage provisions. Stowage provisions for required emergency equipment must be furnished and must —
“(1) Be arranged so that the equipment is directly accessible and its location is obvious; and,
“(2) Protect the safety equipment from inadvertent damage;
“(c) Emergency-exit-descent device. The stowage provisions for the emergency-exit-descent device required by [Part] 29.809(f ) must be
at the exits for which they are intended;
“(d) Life rafts. Life rafts must be stowed near exits through which the rafts can be launched during an unplanned ditching. Rafts
automatically or remotely released outside the rotorcraft must be attached to the rotorcraft by the static line prescribed in [Part]
29.1415;
“(e) Long-range signaling device. The stowage provisions for the long-range signaling device required by [Part] 29.1415 must be near an
exit available during an unplanned ditching; [and,]
“(f ) Life [vest(s)]. Each life [vest] must be within easy reach of each occupant while seated.”

Document: FARs Part 29.1415

Subject: Ditching equipment for transport category rotorcraft
Content: Specifies required ditching equipment:
• “Each life raft and each life [vest] must be approved. In addition —
– “Provide not less than two rafts, of an approximately equal-rated capacity and buoyancy to accommodate the occupants of the
rotorcraft; and,
– “Each raft must have a trailing line, and must have a static line designed to hold the raft near the rotorcraft but to release it if the
rotorcraft becomes totally submerged;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

• “Approved survival equipment must be attached to each life raft; [and,]

• “There must be an approved survival-type emergency locator transmitter for use in one life raft.”

Document: FARs Part 29.1561

Subject: Marking of safety equipment for transport category aircraft
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 25.1561.

Document: FARs Part 91.115

Subject: Right-of-way rules for water operations
Content:
“(a) General. Each person operating an aircraft on the water shall, insofar as possible, keep clear of all vessels and avoid impeding their
navigation, and shall give way to any vessel or other aircraft that is given the right-of-way by any rule of this section;
“(b) Crossing. When aircraft, or an aircraft and a vessel, are on crossing courses, the aircraft or vessel to the other’s right has the right-of-way;
“(c) Approaching head-on. When aircraft, or an aircraft and a vessel, are approaching head-on, or nearly so, each shall alter its course to
the right to keep well clear;
“(d) Overtaking. Each aircraft or vessel that is being overtaken has the right-of-way, and the one overtaking shall alter course to keep well
clear; [and,]
“(e) Special circumstances. When aircraft, or an aircraft and a vessel, approach so as to involve risk of collision, each aircraft or vessel shall
proceed with careful regard to existing circumstances, including the limitations of the respective craft.”

Document: FARs Part 91.205

Subject: Instrument and equipment requirements for powered civil aircraft with standard category U.S. airworthiness certificates
Content: For visual flight rules (VFR) flight during the day, required equipment includes the following:
“(b) (12) If the aircraft is operated for hire over water and beyond power-off gliding distance from shore, approved flotation gear readily
available to each occupant and at least one pyrotechnic signaling device. As used in this section, ‘shore’ means that area of the land
adjacent to the water which is above the high-water mark and excludes land areas which are intermittently under water.”

Document: FARs Part 91.207

Subject: Emergency locator transmitters (ELTs)
Content:
“(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (e) and (f ) of this section, no person may operate a U.S.-registered civil airplane unless —
“(1) There is attached to the airplane an approved automatic-type emergency locator transmitter that is in operable condition for
the following operations, except that after June 21, 1995, an emergency locator transmitter that meets the requirements of
TSO-C91 may not be used for new installations:
“(i) Those operations governed by the supplemental air carrier and commercial operator rules of Parts 121 and 125;
“(ii) Charter flights governed by the domestic and flag air carrier rules of Part 121 of this chapter; and
“(iii) Operations governed by Part 135 of this chapter; or
“(2) For operations other than those specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, there must be attached to the airplane an
approved personal type or an approved automatic type emergency locator transmitter that is in operable condition, except
that after June 21, 1995, an emergency locator transmitter that meets the requirements of TSO-C91 may not be used for new
installations;
“(b) Each emergency locator transmitter required by paragraph (a) of this section must be attached to the airplane in such a manner
that the probability of damage to the transmitter in the event of crash impact is minimized. Fixed and deployable automatic type
transmitters must be attached to the airplane as far aft as practicable;
“(c) Batteries used in the emergency locator transmitters required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section must be replaced (or
recharged, if the batteries are rechargeable) —
“(1) When the transmitter has been in use for more than one cumulative hour; or
“(2) When 50 percent of their useful life (or, for rechargeable batteries, 50 percent of their useful life of charge) has expired, as
established by the transmitter manufacturer under its approval.

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“The new expiration date for replacing (or recharging) the battery must be legibly marked on the outside of the transmitter and
entered in the aircraft maintenance record. Paragraph (c)(2) of this section does not apply to batteries (such as water-activated
batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals;
“(d) Each emergency locator transmitter required by paragraph (a) of this section must be inspected within 12 calendar months after
the last inspection for —
“(1) Proper installation;
“(2) Battery corrosion;
“(3) Operation of the controls and crash sensor; and,
“(4) The presence of a sufficient signal radiated from its antenna;
“(e) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section, a person may —
“(1) Ferry a newly acquired airplane from the place where possession of it was taken to a place where the emergency locator
transmitter is to be installed; and,
“(2) Ferry an airplane with an inoperative emergency locator transmitter from a place where repairs or replacements cannot be
made to a place where they can be made.
“No person other than required crewmembers may be carried aboard an airplane being ferried under paragraph (e) of this
section; [and,]
“(f ) Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to —
“(1) Before January 1, 2004, turbojet-powered aircraft;
“(2) Aircraft while engaged in scheduled flights by scheduled air carriers;
“(3) Aircraft while engaged in training operations conducted entirely within a 50-nautical-mile [93-kilometer] radius of the airport
from which such local flight operations began;
“(4) Aircraft while engaged in flight operations incident to design and testing;
“(5) New aircraft while engaged in flight operations incident to their manufacture, preparation, and delivery;
“(6) Aircraft while engaged in flight operations incident to the aerial application of chemicals and other substances for agricultural
purposes;
“(7) Aircraft certificated by the Administrator for research and development purposes;
“(8) Aircraft while used for showing compliance with regulations, crew training, exhibition, air racing or market surveys;
“(9) Aircraft equipped to carry not more than one person;
“(10) An aircraft during any period for which the transmitter has been temporarily removed for inspection, repair, modification or
replacement, subject to the following:
“(i) No person may operate the aircraft unless the aircraft records contain an entry which includes the date of initial
removal, the make, model, serial number and reason for removing the transmitter, and a placard located in view of the
pilot to show ‘ELT not installed.’
“(ii) No person may operate the aircraft more than 90 days after the ELT is initially removed from the aircraft; and,
“(11) On and after January 1, 2004, aircraft with a maximum payload capacity of more than 18,000 pounds [8,165 kilograms] when
used in air transportation.”

Document: FARs Part 91.505

Subject: Familiarity with emergency equipment on large and turbine-powered multi-engine airplanes
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(b) Each required member of the crew shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with the emergency equipment installed on
the airplane to which that crewmember is assigned and with the procedures to be followed for the use of that equipment in an
emergency situation.”

Document: FARs Part 91.509

Subject: Survival equipment for large and turbine-powered multi-engine airplanes
Content:
“(a) No person may take off an airplane for a flight over water more than 50 nautical miles [93 kilometers] from the nearest shore unless
that airplane is equipped with a life [vest] or an approved flotation means for each occupant of the airplane;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, no person may take off an airplane for a flight over water more than 30 minutes
flying time or 100 nautical miles [185 kilometers] from the nearest shore unless it has on board the following survival equipment:
“(1) A life [vest], equipped with an approved survivor-locator light, for each occupant of the airplane;
“(2) Enough life rafts (each equipped with an approved survival locator light) of a rated capacity and buoyancy to accommodate
the occupants of the airplane;
“(3) At least one pyrotechnic signaling device for each life raft;
“(4) One self-buoyant, water-resistant, portable emergency radio signaling device that is capable of transmission on the
appropriate emergency frequency or frequencies and not dependent upon the airplane power supply; [and,]
“(5) A lifeline stored in accordance with [Part] 25.1411(g) of this chapter;
“(c) A fractional-ownership program manager under subpart K [Fractional Ownership Operations] of this Part may apply for
a deviation from paragraphs (b)(2) through (5) of this section for a particular overwater operation or the Administrator
may amend the management specifications to require the carriage of all or any specific items of the equipment listed in
paragraphs (b)(2) through (5) of this section;
“(d) The required life rafts, life [vest(s)] and signaling devices must be installed in conspicuously marked locations and [be] easily
accessible in the event of a ditching without appreciable time for preparatory procedures;
“(e) A survival kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be flown, must be attached to each required life raft; [and,]
“(f ) As used in this [Part], the term shore means that area of the land adjacent to the water that is above the high-water mark and
excludes land areas that are intermittently under water.”
Editorial note: Wording in bold type is an amendment effective Nov. 17, 2003.

Document: FARs Part 91.511

Subject: Radio equipment for overwater operations for large and turbine-powered multi-engine airplanes
Content:
“(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (c), (d) and (f ) of this section, no person may take off an airplane for a flight over water more than
30 minutes flying time or 100 nautical miles from the nearest shore unless it has at least the following operable equipment:
“(1) Radio communication equipment appropriate to the facilities to be used and able to transmit to, and receive from, any place
on the route, at least one surface facility:
“(i) Two transmitters;
“(ii) Two microphones;
“(iii) Two headsets or one headset and one speaker;
“(iv) Two independent receivers; [and,]
“(2) Appropriate electronic navigational equipment consisting of at least two independent electronic navigation units capable of
providing the pilot with the information necessary to navigate the airplane within the airspace assigned by air traffic control.
However, a receiver that can receive both communications and required navigational signals may be used in place of a separate
communications receiver and a separate navigational signal receiver or unit.
“(b) For the purposes of paragraphs (a)(1)(iv) and (a)(2) of this section, a receiver or electronic navigation unit is independent if the
function of any part of it does not depend on the functioning of any part of another receiver or electronic navigation unit;
“(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a person may operate an airplane on which no passengers are
carried from a place where repairs or replacement cannot be made to a place where they can be made, if not more than one of each
of the dual items of radio communication and navigational equipment specified in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (iv) and (a)(2) of this
[Part] malfunctions or becomes inoperative;
“(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, when both VHF [very-high frequency] and HF [high frequency]
communications equipment are required for the route and the airplane has two VHF transmitters and two VHF receivers for
communications, only one HF transmitter and one HF receiver is required for communications;
“(e) As used in this section, the term shore means that area of the land adjacent to the water which is above the high-water mark and
excludes land areas which are intermittently under water; [and,]
“(f ) Notwithstanding the requirements in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, a person may operate in the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea
and the Atlantic Ocean west of a line which extends from 44° 47 min 00 sec N / 67° 00 min 00 sec W to 39° 00 min 00 sec N / 67° 00
min 00 sec W to 38° 30 min 00 sec N / 60° 00 min 00 sec W south along the 60° 00 min 00 sec W longitude line to the point where
the line intersects with the northern coast of South America, when:

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(1) A single long-range navigation system is installed, operational and appropriate for the route; and,
“(2) Flight conditions and the aircraft’s capabilities are such that no more than a 30-minute gap in two-way radio very high
frequency communications is expected to exist.

Document: FARs Part 91.519

Subject: Passenger briefing
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) Before takeoff, the pilot-in-command of an airplane carrying passengers shall ensure that all passengers have been orally briefed
on — …
“(4) Location of survival equipment; [and,]
“(5) Ditching procedures and the use of flotation equipment required under [Part] 91.509 for a flight over water … ; [and,]
“(d) For operations under subpart K [Fractional Ownership Operations] of this Part, the passenger briefing requirements of
[Part] 91.1035 apply, instead of the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section.”
Editorial note: Wording in bold type is an amendment effective Nov. 17, 2003. Paragraphs (a)(5) and (a)(6) in Part 91.1035 are worded identically
to paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5), respectively, in Part 91.519.

Document: FARs Part 91.1083

Subject: Crewmember emergency training in fractional-ownership operations
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) Each training program must provide emergency training under this section for each aircraft type, model and configuration, each
crewmember, and each kind of operation conducted, as appropriate for each crewmember and the program manager.
“(b) Emergency training must provide the following:
“(1) Instruction in emergency assignments and procedures, including coordination among crewmembers; [and,]
“(2) Individual instruction in the location, function and operation of emergency equipment including —
“(i) Equipment used in ditching and evacuation; …
“(c) Each crewmember must perform at least the following emergency drills, using the proper emergency equipment and procedures,
unless the Administrator finds that, for a particular drill, the crewmember can be adequately trained by demonstration:
“(1) Ditching, if applicable;
“(2) Emergency evacuation; …
“(3) Instruction in the handling of emergency situations including —
“(iii) Ditching and evacuation; …
“(4) Operation and use of emergency exits, including deployment and use of evacuation slides, if applicable; …
“(6) Removal of life rafts from the aircraft, inflation of the life rafts, use of lifelines and boarding of passengers and crew, if applicable;
[and,]
“(7) Donning and inflation of life vests and the use of other individual flotation devices, if applicable.”

Document: FARs Part 121.339

Subject: Emergency equipment for extended overwater operations on flights conducted under Part 121
Content:
“(a) Except where the Administrator, by amending the operations specifications of the certificate holder, requires the carriage of all
or any specific items of the equipment listed below for any overwater operation, or upon application of the certificate holder, the
Administrator allows deviation for a particular extended overwater operation, no person may operate an airplane in extended
overwater operations without having on the airplane the following equipment:
“(1) A life [vest] equipped with an approved survivor-locator light, for each occupant of the airplane;
“(2) Enough life rafts (each equipped with an approved survivor-locator light) of a rated capacity and buoyancy to accommodate
the occupants of the airplane. Unless excess rafts of enough capacity are provided, the buoyancy and seating capacity beyond
the rated capacity of the rafts must accommodate all occupants of the airplane in the event of a loss of one raft of the largest
rated capacity;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(3) At least one pyrotechnic signaling device for each life raft; [and,]
“(4) An approved survival-type emergency locator transmitter. Batteries used in this transmitter must be replaced (or recharged,
if the battery is rechargeable) when the transmitter has been in use for more than one cumulative hour, or when 50 percent
of their useful life (or for rechargeable batteries, 50 percent of their useful life of charge) has expired, as established by
the transmitter manufacturer under its approval. The new expiration date for replacing (or recharging) the battery must
be legibly marked on the outside of the transmitter. The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) requirements of this
paragraph do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable
storage intervals;
“(b) The required life rafts, life [vests] and survival-type emergency locator transmitter must be easily accessible in the event of a
ditching without appreciable time for preparatory procedures. This equipment must be installed in conspicuously marked,
approved locations; [and,]
“(c) A survival kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be flown, must be attached to each required life raft.”

Document: FARs Part 121.340

Subject: Emergency flotation means on flights conducted under FARs Part 121
Content:
“(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no person may operate an airplane in any overwater operation unless it is
equipped with life [vests] in accordance with [Part] 121.339(a)(1) or with an approved flotation means for each occupant. This
means must be within easy reach of each seated occupant and must be readily removable from the airplane; [and,]
“(b) Upon application by the air carrier or commercial operator, the Administrator may approve the operation of an airplane over
water without the life [vests] or flotation means required by paragraph (a) of this section, if the air carrier or commercial operator
shows that the water over which the airplane is to be operated is not of such size and depth that life [vests] or flotation means
would be required for the survival of its occupants in the event the flight terminates in that water.”

Document: FARs Part 121.351

Subject: Radio equipment for extended overwater operations and for certain other operations on flights conducted under Part 121
Content:
“(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, no person may conduct an extended overwater operation unless the airplane is
equipped with the radio communication equipment necessary to comply with [Part] 121.349, an independent system that complies
with Part 121.347 (a)(1), and two long-range navigation systems when VOR [very-high-frequency omnidirectional radio] or ADF
[automatic direction finder] radio navigation equipment is unusable along a portion of the route;
“(b) No certificate holder conducting a flag or supplemental operation or a domestic operation within the State of Alaska may conduct
an operation without the equipment specified in paragraph (a) of this section, if the Administrator finds that equipment to be
necessary for search-and-rescue operations because of the nature of the terrain to be flown over; [and,]
“(c) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, installation and use of a single LRNS [long-range navigation
system] and a single LRCS [long-range communication system] may be authorized by the Administrator and approved in the
certificate holder’s operations specifications for operations and routes in certain geographic areas. The following are among the
operational factors the Administrator may consider in granting an authorization:
“(1) The ability of the flight crew to reliably fix the position of the airplane within the degree of accuracy required by ATC,
“(2) The length of the route being flown, and
“(3) The duration of the very high frequency communications gap.”

Document: FARs Part 121.417

Subject: Crewmember emergency training for flights conducted under Part 121
Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:
“(a) Each training program must provide the emergency training set forth in this section with respect to each airplane type, model, and
configuration, each required crewmember, and each kind of operation conducted, insofar as appropriate for each crewmember and
the certificate holder;
“(b) Emergency training must provide the following: …
“(2) Individual instruction in the location, function, and operation of emergency equipment including —

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(i) Equipment used in ditching and evacuation; …

“(ii) First aid equipment and its proper use; … [and,]
“(iv) Emergency exits in the emergency mode with the evacuation slide/raft pack attached (if applicable), with training
emphasis on the operation of the exits under adverse conditions;
“(3) Instruction in the handling of emergency situations including — …
“(iii) Ditching and other evacuation, including the evacuation of persons and their attendants, if any, who may need the
assistance of another person to move expeditiously to an exit in the event of an emergency; … [and,]
“(c) Each crewmember must accomplish the following emergency training during the specified training periods, using those items of
installed emergency equipment for each type of airplane in which he or she is to serve (alternate recurrent training required by
[Part] 121.433(c) of this part may be accomplished by approved pictorial presentation or demonstration):
“(1) One-time emergency drill requirements to be accomplished during initial training. Each crewmember must perform — …
“(iii) An emergency evacuation drill with each person egressing the airplane or approved training device using at least one
type of installed emergency evacuation slide. The crewmember may either observe the airplane exits being opened in the
emergency mode and the associated exit slide/raft pack being deployed and inflated, or perform the tasks resulting in the
accomplishment of these actions; [and,]
“(2) Additional emergency drill requirements to be accomplished during initial training and once each 24 calendar months during
recurrent training. Each crewmember must —
“(i) Perform the following emergency drills and operate the following equipment:
“(A) Each type of emergency exit in the normal and emergency modes, including the actions and forces required in
the deployment of the emergency evacuation slides; …
“(D) Donning, use and inflation of individual flotation means, if applicable; and,
“(E) Ditching, if applicable, including but not limited to, as appropriate:
“(1) Cockpit preparation and procedures;
“(2) Crew coordination;
“(3) Passenger briefing and cabin preparation;
“(4) Donning and inflation of life [vests];
“(5) Use of life-lines; and
“(6) Boarding of passengers and crew into raft or a slide/raft pack; [and,]
“(ii) Observe the following drills:
“(A) Removal from the airplane (or training device) and inflation of each type of life raft, if applicable;
“(B) Transfer of each type of slide/raft pack from one door to another;
“(C) Deployment, inflation, and detachment from the airplane (or training device) of each type of slide/raft pack; and,
“(D) Emergency evacuation including the use of a slide.”

Document: FARs Part 121.573

Subject: Briefing passengers in extended overwater operations conducted under Part 121
Content:
“(a) In addition to the oral briefing required by [Part] 121.571(a), each certificate holder operating an airplane in extended overwater
operations shall ensure that all passengers are orally briefed by the appropriate crewmember on the location and operation of
life [vests], life rafts and other flotation means, including a demonstration of the method of donning and inflating a life [vest];
“(b) The certificate holder shall describe in its manual the procedure to be followed in the briefing required by paragraph (a) of this
section;
“(c) If the airplane proceeds directly over water after takeoff, the briefing required by paragraph (a) of this section must be done before
takeoff; [and,]
“(d) If the airplane does not proceed directly over water after takeoff, no part of the briefing required by paragraph (a) of this section has
to be given before takeoff, but the entire briefing must be given before reaching the overwater part of the flight.”

Document: FARs Part 135.117

Subject: Passenger briefing
Content: Equivalent to FARs Part 91.519

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: FARs Part 135.123

Subject: Emergency and emergency evacuation duties on flights conducted under Part 135
Content:
“(a) Each certificate holder shall assign to each required crewmember for each type of aircraft as appropriate, the necessary functions
to be performed in an emergency or in a situation requiring emergency evacuation. The certificate holder shall ensure that those
functions can be practicably accomplished, and will meet any reasonably anticipated emergency including incapacitation of
individual crewmembers or their inability to reach the passenger cabin because of shifting cargo in combination cargo-passenger
aircraft; [and,]
“(b) The certificate holder shall describe in the manual required under [Part] 135.21 [‘Manual requirements’] the functions of each
category of required crewmembers assigned under paragraph (a) of this section.”

Document: FARs Part 135.165

Subject: Radio and navigational equipment for extended overwater or instrument flight rules (IFR) operations conducted under Part 135
Content:
“(a) No person may operate a turbojet airplane having a passenger seating configuration, excluding any pilot seat, of 10 seats or
more, or a multi-engine airplane in a commuter operation, … under IFR or in extended overwater operations unless it has at least
the following radio communication and navigational equipment appropriate to the facilities to be used which are capable of
transmitting to, and receiving from, at any place on the route to be flown, at least one ground facility:
“(1) Two transmitters, (2) two microphones, (3) two headsets or one headset and one speaker, (4) a marker-beacon receiver, (5) two
independent receivers for navigation, and (6) two independent receivers for communications;
“(b) No person may operate an aircraft other than that specified in paragraph (a) of this section, under IFR or in extended
overwater operations unless it has at least the following radio communication and navigational equipment appropriate to
the facilities to be used and which are capable of transmitting to, and receiving from, at any place on the route, at least one
ground facility:
“(1) A transmitter, (2) two microphones, (3) two headsets or one headset and one speaker, (4) a marker-beacon receiver, (5) two
independent receivers for navigation, (6) two independent receivers for communications, and (7) for extended overwater
operations only, an additional transmitter;
“(c) For the purpose of paragraphs (a)(5), (a)(6), (b)(5) and (b)(6) of this section, a receiver is independent if the function of any part of it
does not depend on the functioning of any part of another receiver. However, a receiver that can receive both communications and
navigational signals may be used in place of a separate communications receiver and a separate navigational-signal receiver; [and,]
“(d) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, installation and use of a single long-range navigation
system and a single long-range communication system, for extended overwater operations, may be authorized by the Administrator
and approved in the certificate holder’s operations specifications. The following are among the operational factors the Administrator
may consider in granting an authorization:
“(1) The ability of the flight crew to reliably fix the position of the airplane within the degree of accuracy required by ATC [air traffic
control];
“(2) The length of the route being flown; and,
“(3) The duration of the very-high-frequency communications gap.”

Document: FARs Part 135.167

Subject: Emergency equipment required for extended overwater operations conducted under Part 135
Content:
“(a) Except where the Administrator, by amending the operations specifications of the certificate holder, requires the carriage
of all or any specific items of the equipment listed below for any overwater operation, or, upon application of the certificate
holder, the Administrator allows deviation for a particular extended overwater operation, no person may operate an
aircraft in extended overwater operations unless it carries, installed in conspicuously marked locations easily accessible to
the occupants if a ditching occurs, the following equipment:
“(1) An approved life [vest] equipped with an approved survivor-locator light for each occupant of the aircraft. The life [vest] must
easily be accessible to each seated occupant;
“(2) Enough approved life rafts of a rated capacity and buoyancy to accommodate the occupants of the aircraft;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(b) Each life raft required by paragraph (a) of this [Part] must be equipped with or contain at least the following:
“(1) One approved survivor-locator light;
“(2) One approved pyrotechnic signaling device;
“(3) Either —
“(i) One survival kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be flown; or
“(ii) One canopy (for sail, sun shade or rain catcher);
“(iii) One radar reflector;
“(iv) One life raft–repair kit;
“(v) One bailing bucket;
“(vi) One signaling mirror;
“(vii) One police whistle;
“(viii) One raft knife;
“(ix) One CO2 [carbon dioxide] bottle for emergency inflation;
“(x) One inflation pump;
“(xi) Two oars;
“(xii) One 75-foot [23-meter] retaining line;
“(xiii) One magnetic compass;
“(xiv) One dye marker;
“(xv) One flashlight having at least two size D cells or equivalent;
“(xvi) A two-day supply of emergency food rations supplying at least 1,000 calories per day for each person;
“(xvii) For each two persons the raft is rated to carry, two pints of water or one seawater-desalting kit;
“(xviii) One fishing kit; and,
“(xix) One book on survival appropriate for the area in which the aircraft is operated; [and,]
“(c) No person may operate an airplane in extended overwater operations unless there is attached to one of the life rafts … an approved
survival-type emergency locator transmitter. …”
Editorial note: Wording in bold type is an amendment effective Nov. 17, 2003.

Document: FARs Part 135.183

Subject: Performance requirements for land aircraft in overwater operations conducted under Part 135
Content: “No person may operate a land aircraft carrying passengers over water unless —
“(a) It is operated at an altitude that allows it to reach land in the case of engine failure;
“(b) It is necessary for takeoff or landing;
“(c) It is a multi-engine aircraft operated at a weight that will allow it to climb, with the critical engine inoperative, at least 50 feet [15
meters] a minute, at an altitude of 1,000 feet above the surface; or
“(d) It is a helicopter equipped with helicopter-flotation devices.”

Document: FARs Part 135.331

Subject: Crewmember emergency training for airplanes operating under Part 135
Content: Emergency training must provide instruction in the handling of “ditching and evacuation.” Each crewmember must perform
emergency drills, including:
• “Ditching, if applicable;
• “Removal of life rafts from the aircraft, inflation of the life rafts, use of lifelines and boarding of passengers and crew, if applicable; [and,]
• “Donning and inflation of life vests and the use of other individual flotation devices, if applicable.”

Document: FARs Part 135.349

Subject: Initial and transition ground training for flight attendants in aircraft operating under Part 135

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Content: Includes, among other provisions, the following:

“Initial and transition ground training for flight attendants must include instruction in at least the following— …
“(b) For each aircraft type —
“(1) A general description of the aircraft emphasizing physical characteristics that may have a bearing on ditching, evacuation, and
in-flight emergency procedures and on other related duties. … ”

Technical Standard Orders (TSOs)

Document: FARs Part 21.607

Subject: Holders of TSO authorizations
Content: “Each manufacturer of an article for which a TSO authorization has been issued under this part shall —
“(a) Manufacture the article in accordance with this part and the applicable TSO;
“(b) Conduct all required tests and inspections and establish and maintain a quality control system adequate to ensure that the article
meets the requirements of paragraph (a) of this [Part] and is in condition for safe operation;
“(c) Prepare and maintain, for each model of each article for which a TSO authorization has been issued, a current file of complete
technical data and records in accordance with [Part] 21.613 [‘Recordkeeping requirements’]; and,
“(d) Permanently and legibly mark each article to which this [Part] applies with the following information: (1) The name of the
manufacturer. (2) The name, type, part number or model designation of the article. (3) The serial number or the date of manufacture
of the article or both. (4) The applicable TSO number.”

Document: TSO-C13f
Subject: Life [vest(s)] to be identified with the TSO marking
Content: The basic TSO providing U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications for life [vest(s)]. For complete provisions, see
“FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) C13f, Life Preservers [Life Vests],” page 452.

Document: TSO-C69c
Subject: Emergency evacuation slides, ramps, ramp/slides and slide/rafts
Content: The basic TSO providing U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications for emergency evacuation slides, ramps, ramp/
slides, and slide/rafts

Document: TSO-C70a
Subject: Life rafts (reversible and nonreversible) to be identified with the TSO marking
Content: The basic TSO providing U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications for life rafts. For complete provisions, see “FAA
Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C70a, Life Rafts (Reversible and Nonreversible),” page 396.

Document: TSO-C72c
Subject: Individual flotation devices to be identified with the TSO marking
Content: The basic TSO providing U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications for individual flotation devices. For complete
provisions, see “FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C72c, Individual Flotation Devices,” page 459.

Document: TSO-C85a
Subject: Survivor-locator lights to be identified with the TSO marking
Content: The basic TSO providing U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications for survivor-locator lights. For complete
provisions, see “FAA Technical Standard Orders (TSO)-85a, Survivor-locator Lights,” page 462.

Document: TSO-C91a
Subject: Emergency locator transmitter (ELT) equipment to be identified with the TSO marking
Content: The basic TSO providing U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications for ELT equipment

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: TSO-C126
Subject: Emergency locator transmitter (ELT) equipment operating at 406 MHz [megahertz] to be identified with the TSO marking
Content: The basic TSO providing U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specifications for 406-MHz ELT equipment

Air Carrier Operations Bulletins (ACOBs)

Document: ACOB 8-80-2

Subject: Crewmember survival training
Content: Outlines recommended crewmember survival training based on the Flight Crew Survival Course conducted by the Aeromedical
Education Branch, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aeronautical Center.
[Part] F, “Survival Equipment,” lists the following:
• Minimum survival gear;
• First aid kit;
• Life [vest] operation;
• Rafts;
• Water survival kits;
• Operation of radios; and,
• Flotation-type cushions/life vests.
Section K, “Ditching and Water Survival,” lists the following:
• Preparation-for-ditching phase;
• Alert phase;
• Rescue phase;
• Raft actions;
• Survival needs;
• Water-connected medical problems;
• Signaling techniques; and,
• Recovery operations.

Advisory Circulars (ACs)

Document: AC 25-17
Subject: Transport airplane cabin interiors crashworthiness
Content: Includes guidance for FARs Part 25.801 (ditching certification for transport category airplanes); Part 25.1411 (safety equipment);
Part 25.1415 (ditching equipment); and Part 25.1561 (safety equipment).

Document: AC 27-1B
Subject: Certification of normal category rotorcraft
Content: Offers guidance for FARs Part 27.801 on ditching certification.

Document: AC 29-2C
Subject: Certification of transport category rotorcraft
Content: Offers guidance for FARs Part 29.801 on ditching certification.

Document: AC 43.13-1B
Subject: Acceptable methods, techniques and practices for aircraft inspection and repair
Content: Includes guidance on inspection and repair for life rafts, survival equipment packs and life vests.

Document: AC 91-38A
Subject: Large and turbine-powered multi-engine airplanes, FARs Part 91, Subpart D
Content: Includes guidance for survival equipment on overwater flights under Part 91. Dated 1978, the AC includes information that is not
current.

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Overwater Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

Document: AC 91-44A
Subject: ELTs required by FARs
Content: Clarifies operational and maintenance practices for emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) and receivers.

Document: AC 91-58A
Subject: Part 91 oceanic flights
Content: Lists current U.S. Coast Guard approved pyrotechnic visual distress signaling devices.

Document: AC 91-69A
Subject: Seaplane safety for Part 91 operators, generally in not-for-hire operations
Content: Offers guidance about seaplane preflight, oral briefings for seaplane passengers, the use of safety belts and shoulder harnesses,
escape/egress after capsizing, water survival and flotation gear for seaplane occupants.

Document: AC 91-70
Subject: Oceanic operations
Content: Chapter 11, “General Aviation Short-range Aircraft Oceanic Operations,” includes specific guidance for Part 91 operations.

Document: AC 120-47
Subject: Recommended survival equipment to be carried on overwater flights
Content: “The recommended equipment should meet [the] applicable TSO. This equipment includes, but is not limited to, the following:
“a. Life [vest] for each occupant of the aircraft;
“b. Rafts or slide/rafts with appropriate buoyancy and sufficient capacity for everyone on board the aircraft and which have a boarding
station; [and,]
“c. Rafts (and slide/rafts where appropriate) should be equipped with the following:
“(1) Lines, including an inflation/mooring line with a snaphook, rescue or life line, and a heaving or trailing line;
“(2) Sea anchors;
“(3) Raft-repair equipment such as repair clamps, rubber plugs and leak stoppers;
“(4) Inflation devices, including hand pumps and cylinders (i.e., carbon dioxide bottles), for emergency inflation;
“(5) Safety/inflation relief valves;
“(6) Canopy and appropriate equipment to erect the canopy;
“(7) Position lights;
“(8) Hook-type knife, sheathed and secured by a retaining line;
“(9) Placards that give the location of raft equipment and are consistent with placard requirements;
“(10) Propelling devices such as oars, or in smaller rafts, glove paddles;
“(11) Water-catchment devices, including bailing buckets, reincatchment equipment, cups and sponges;
“(12) Signaling devices including:
“(i) At least one approved pyrotechnic signaling device;
“(ii) One signaling mirror;
“(iii) One spotlight or flashlight (including a spare bulb) having at least two ‘D’-cell batteries or equivalent;
“(iv) One police whistle;
“(v) One dye marker;
“(vi) Radio beacon with water-activated battery; [and,]
“(vii) Radar reflector;
“(13) One magnetic compass;
“(14) A two-day supply of emergency food rations supplying at least 1,000 calories a day for each person;
“(15) One salt water desalting kit for each two persons the raft is rated to carry or two pints of water for each person the life raft is
rated to carry;

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Table 2
Regulations and Recommendations Concerning Life Rafts, Water-survival Equipment,
Certification for Water Operations and Related Procedures (continued)

“(16) One fishing kit;

“(17) One book on survival, appropriate for any area; [and,]
“(18) A survival kit, appropriately equipped. Some of the items which could be included in the survival kit are:
“(i) Triangular cloths;
“(ii) Bandages;
“(iii) Eye ointments;
“(iv) Water disinfection tablets;
“(v) Sun-protection balsam;
“(vi) Heat-retention foils;
“(vii) Burning glass;
“(viii) Seasickness tablets;
“(ix) Ammonia inhalants; [and,]
“(x) Packets with plaster.”

Document: AC 150/5200-31A
Subject: Airport emergency plans
Content: Section 8 prescribes procedures for responding to water rescue situations.

Document: AC 150/5210-13A
Subject: Airport emergency plans
Content: Offers guidance in preparing for water rescue operations.

Airworthiness Directives (ADs)

(Effective date of 1989 or later)

Document: AD 89-06-01
Subject: Switlik TSO-C13 life [vests] and TSO-C72 individual flotation devices
Content: Inspect the carbon dioxide inflators for cracks and chipping. Replace if necessary.

Document: AD 89-02-05
Subject: BF Goodrich seven-person life raft
Content: Inspect cylinders to eliminate cylinders that might leak because of certain material used in their fabrication.

Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs)

Document: NPRM 64 FR 61042

Subject: Certain Air Cruisers emergency evacuation slide/rafts.
Content: Proposes a new airworthiness directive that would require a one-time repacking and repetitive folding of all affected slide/rafts.

capacities that differ considerably from such refinements as a three-position SEP does not come as standard equipment,
one another can meet the standard. TSO’d canopy that can be adjusted according to although an SEP is required to be carried on
life rafts include a single-tube life raft in the weather and “a cool-blue interior.” extended overwater operations by FARs Part
which the canopy is stowed with SEP items 91.509 and Part 135.167. A hand-operated
in an accessory case; a double-tube life Round, octagonal and oval designs have water maker may be standard or optional.
raft that includes a foam-insulated floor been manufactured to the TSO. The canopy
designed to protect against hypothermia; may be automatically erected or manually Such variations are possible because
and a double-tube life raft that features erected. In at least one TSO’d life raft, the manufacturers are permitted to modify

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their life rafts, as long as the rafts meet Of course, options add weight, volume flown.” Part 135.167, “Emergency equip-
TSO requirements, in any way that they and cost to a life raft pack. Moreover, ment: Extended overwater operations,”
believe is beneficial (and marketable). some operators may balance financial requires the life raft to contain either a
considerations against life raft enhance- route-appropriate SEP or 18 specific items
The operator who purchases a life raft has ments that most operators consider (see Table 2, page 404), which include a
a variety of choices. unlikely to be used. bailing bucket, a signaling mirror and a
flashlight. The “appropriately equipped”
The most basic is a standard or “off-the- Changes are pending for TSO-C70a, provision in both regulations gives the air-
shelf ” model, available in sizes that are Life Rafts (Reversible and Nonreversible), craft operator the option of including or
rated to accommodate various numbers the U.S. standard since 1984, and TSO- excluding almost any item that it chooses.
of occupants. Some models offer little C13f, Life Preservers, both of which also
beyond what is specified in the appli- have been adopted by civil aviation Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs),
cable TSO. A minimal TSO’d life raft authorities in Australia, Canada and although adopting FAA TSOs, take a
can satisfy the legal requirements, but New Zealand. The SAE International different position concerning survival
operators should consider seriously Safety Equipment and Survival Systems equipment on life rafts. CARs 725.95 (page
whether it is in the best interest of the Subcommittee — which comprises 416) lists 14 equipment items that must be
crew and passengers. representatives from manufacturers, carried, at a minimum, in an SEP.
air carriers, pilots, flight attendants, in-
Even with “off-the-shelf ” life rafts, the The Civil Aviation Authority of New
customer has some choices, primarily Zealand also, while adopting FAA
concerning the SEP to be carried in the TSO-C70a, specifies the equipment

R
life raft (e.g., for Part 91 operations or Part that must be carried in the life raft SEP
135 operations) and the packing configu- (Part 91, Appendix A, A.14, page 426).
ration. Many manufacturers are willing to egulations are European Joint Aviation Authorities
devise means of packing their rafts to fit (JAA) Joint Airworthiness Requirements
the storage space aboard an operator’s not specific about the — Operations (JAR-OPS) 1.830 (for
aircraft. One manufacturer says of its in- airplanes in extended overwater flight)
minimum requirements.
dividualized packing techniques, “We are lists, under its “acceptable means of
limited only by the laws of physics.” compliance” (AMC) section, a number
of specific items that should be “readily
The next level in adapting the life raft available with each life raft” and as far
and SEP to the operator is selection from as is practicable “should be contained in
dustry groups and regulators (including
the variety of options offered by many a pack” (page 406). The AMC for JAR-
FAA and Transport Canada), as well as
manufacturers to enhance the life raft’s OPS 3.830 (for helicopters in extended
individuals — has been commissioned by
performance or the occupants’ comfort. overwater flight) lists specific items that a
FAA to revise both TSOs. Gustavo Fanjul,
Examples include dual floors (which SEP, at a minimum, “shall” contain (AMC
chairman of the subcommittee, estimates
provide insulation, especially in cold wa- OPS 3.830(a)(2), page 409).
that it will be at least another year before
ter), plastic view ports, storage pouches,
the proposed new TSOs will be ready for
extra rations, a hand-operated water The language of FARs Part 135.167 speci-
FAA review.3
maker, anti-seasickness tablets, bandages, fies “approved life rafts” — meaning life
sunscreen, specialized flares or a 406- rafts built to TSO-C70a. Part 91.509
megahertz emergency radio beacon such requires only “life rafts,” although it
as a survival-type ELT or an emergency
Operators Determine adds, “(each equipped with an approved
position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB; If SEP Is ‘Appropriately survivor-locator light).” Thus, a flight
see “The Search-and-rescue System Will Equipped’ conducted under Part 91, in an aircraft
Find You — If You Help,” page 111). that has not been certificated for ditching

An even greater level of adaptation al-

lows personal items to be inserted in
R egulations are not specific about the
minimum requirements.
under Part 25 — the certification stan-
dards for transport category airplanes
— could be technically in compliance
the life raft package. Such items include For example, FARs Part 91.509, “Survival while carrying a life raft that satisfies
medications, eyeglasses, reading or writ- equipment for overwater operations,” says only the flight operator’s purchasing
ing materials and other nonrequired only that the “survival kit” (SEP) must be manager.
equipment. “appropriately equipped for the route to be Continued on page 458

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FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C13f,

Life Preservers [Life Vests]
Includes, among other provisions, the following: • Tensile Strength (Grab Test):
– Warp 210 pounds/inch;
“Minimum Performance Standards. This technical standard
– Fill 180 pounds/inch; [and,]
order (TSO) prescribes the minimum performance standards that
life [vests] must meet in order to be identified with the applicable • Tear Strength:
TSO marking. This TSO has been prepared in accordance with – 10 x 10 pounds/inch (Tongue Test); or,
the procedural rules set forth in Subpart O of the Federal Aviation
– 10 x 8 pounds/inch (Trapezoid Test);
Regulations (FARs) Part 21. New models of life vests that are to
be so identified and that are manufactured on or after the date of
3.1.4.2 Adhesion. In addition to the requirements of 3.1.4.1,
this TSO must meet the standard set forth in Appendix l, Federal
coated fabrics must meet the following minimum
Aviation Administration Standard for Life Preservers [Life Vests],
strength after aging:
as amended and supplemented by this TSO. …
• Coat Adhesion:
Appendix 1. Federal Aviation Administration – 10 pounds/inch width at 70 [degrees F] + 5
Standard for Life Preservers [Life Vests] degrees F [Fahrenheit] at a separation rate of
2.0 [inches/minute] to 2.5 inches/minute.
1. Purpose. This standard provides the minimum
performance standards for life [vests]. 3.1.4.3 Permeability. For coated fabrics used in the
manufacture of inflation chambers, the maximum
2. Scope. This standard covers inflatable (Type I) permeability to helium may not exceed five liters
and noninflatable (Type II) life [vests]. Both Type I per square meter in 24 hours at 77 degrees F or
and Type II life [vests] are divided into the following its equivalent using hydrogen. The permeameter
four categories: “Adult,” “Adult–Child,” “Child” and must be calibrated for the gas used. In lieu of this
“Infant–Small Child”. permeability test, an alternate test may be used
provided the alternate test has been approved as
3. Materials. The materials used must be of a quality an equivalent to this permeability test by the manager
which experience and/or tests have demonstrated of the FAA ACO [Aircraft Certification Office] to which
to be suitable for use in life [vests]. this TSO data is to be submitted, as required in
Paragraph (c), Data Requirements.
3.1 Nonmetallic Materials.
3.1.5 Seam Strength and Adhesives. Cemented or
3.1.1 The finished device must be clean and free from any heat-sealable seams used in the manufacture of the
defects that might affect its function. device must meet the following minimum strength
requirements:
3.1.2 Coated fabrics and other items, such as webbing,
subject to deterioration must have been manufactured 3.1.5.1 Cemented Seams. Seams using adhesive on coated
not more than 18 months prior to the date of delivery fabrics must be sealed with tape having a minimum
of the finished product or requalified per paragraph width of 1 3/16 inches. Devices manufactured with
5.1, Material Tests, of this standard. cemented seams must meet the following minimum
strength requirements:
3.1.3 The materials must not support fungus growth.
• Seam-shear Strength (Grab Test):
3.1.4 Coated fabrics, including seams, subject to – 175 pounds/inch width at 75 degrees F;
deterioration used in the manufacture of the devices – 40 pounds/inch width at 140 degrees F;
must retain at least 90 percent of their original physical [and,]
properties after these fabrics have been subjected
to accelerated aging test specified in paragraph 5.1, • Peel Strength (Peel Test):
Material Tests, of this standard. – 10 pounds/inch width at 70 degrees F.

3.1.4.1 Strength. Coated fabrics used for these applications 3.1.5.2 Heat-sealed Seams. The application of tape over
must conform to the following minimum strengths heat-sealed seams is optional. Devices manufactured
after aging: with heat-sealed seams used in the manufacture of

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the device must meet the following minimum strength in such a manner that metallic or nonmetallic parts
requirements: do not cause chafing or abrasion of the material in
either the packed or inflated condition
• Seam Strength (Grab Test):
– 45 pounds/inch width at 70 degrees F; 4.1.4 Inflation, Type I Life [Vest].
[and,]
– 30 pounds/inch width at 140 degrees F. 4.1.4.1 Oral Inflation. A means must be provided by
which the wearer, excluding child and infant–small
3.1.6 Seam Tape. If tape is used, the fabric used for the child wearers who would require adult assistance,
seam tape must have a minimum breaking strength without previous instruction, may inflate each
(Grab Test) of not less than 50 pounds/inch width flotation chamber by blowing into a mouthpiece. The
in both the warp and fill directions. When applied to mouthpiece for oral inflation must be readily available
the seam area, the adhesion-strength characteristics to the wearer without interfering with the wearer’s face
must meet the seam-strength requirements in or body. For infant–small child and child life [vests],
paragraph 3.1.5. the oral inflation means must be readily available to
assisting persons.
3.1.7 Materials Other Than Coated Fabrics.
4.1.4.2 Oral Inflation Valve. The opening pressure of the
3.1.7.1 Webbing. Webbing used to attach the life [vest] to oral inflation valve, with no back pressure applied
the wearer must have a minimum tensile strength of to the valve, may not exceed 0.44 pounds per
230 pounds. square inch gauge (psig). The oral inflation valve
may not leak when back pressure throughout the
3.1.7.2 Thread. Thread used in the life [vest] must be Size E range from zero psig through 10 psig is applied.
nylon or equivalent with a minimum tensile strength The joint between the oral inflation valve and the
of 8.5 pounds. flotation chamber may not fail when a 100-pound
tensile load is applied for at least three seconds
3.1.8 Flammability. The device (including packaging) must outwardly from, and perpendicular to, the surface
be constructed of materials which are in compliance of the flotation chamber at the point of valve
with FARs [Part] 25.853(a) [Appendix F, Part I (a)(1)(iv)] attachment. To support the flotation chamber
in effect on July 20, 1990. fabric during load application, an adapter having
an inside diameter at least 3/4 inch larger than
3.1.9 Molded Nonmetallic Fittings. Molded nonmetallic the outside diameter of the valve at the point of
fittings must retain their physical characteristics when attachment must be used.
subjected to temperatures of –60 [degrees F] to +160
degrees F. 4.1.4.3 Manual Mechanical Inflation. A means must be
provided by which the wearer, or person assisting a
3.2 Metallic Parts. All metallic parts must be made child or infant–small child wearer who would require
of corrosion-resistant material or must be suitably adult assistance, without previous instruction, may
protected against corrosion; inflate each flotation chamber of the life [vest] by
manual operation.
4. Detail Requirements.
4.1.4.3.1 Gas Reservoir. A reservoir containing a suitable
4.1 Design and Construction. compressed gas must be provided to inflate each
flotation chamber of the life [vest]. If carbon dioxide
4.1.1 Reversibility. The life [vest] must perform its intended [CO2] cylinders are used, the standards of [Military
function when reversed, unless the design of the [life Specification] MIL-C-601G, Amendment 1, dated
vest] precludes the probability of improper donning. Aug. 31, 1972, or the equivalent are acceptable
notwithstanding any size or weight limitations.
4.1.2 Compartmentation, Type I Life [Vest]. An inflatable
life [vest] may have one or more separate gas-tight 4.1.4.3.2 Pull-cord Assembly. The mechanical-inflation
flotation chambers. Each separate flotation chamber means must have a pull-cord assembly for each gas
must meet the inflation requirements of paragraph reservoir. The pull cords must be identical in length,
4.1.4. clearly visible and extend between 1 1/2 to three
inches below the edge of the life [vest]. The end of
4.1.3 Protection Against Abrasion and Chafing, Type I each pull-cord assembly must be attached to a red
Life [Vest]. The flotation chambers must be protected pull knob or tab having rounded edges.

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4.1.5 Deflation, Type I Life [Vest]. A means by which the from the vertical position at an angle of 30 degrees
wearer, or the person assisting a child or infant–small minimum.
child wearer who would require adult assistance,
may quickly deflate each flotation chamber must 4.1.9.2 Infant–Small Child Life [Vests]. The life [vest] must
be provided. Use of the deflation means may not prevent contact of the wearer’s upper torso (i.e.,
preclude subsequent reinflation of the flotation from the waist up) with the water. There must be a
chamber by either oral or mechanical inflation means. means to confine the wearer in the proper position
Inadvertent deflation of the flotation chamber must for utilization of the life [vest] and prevent the wearer
be precluded. In particular, inadvertent deflation from releasing the confining means. With the wearer
from movement of a child or infant–small child and in the most adverse condition of weight and position
deliberate deflation by a child or small child must be attainable when the confining means are properly
precluded. used, there must be no tendency of the life [vest] to
capsize or become unstable, take on water or allow
4.1.6 Functional Temperature Range. The life [vest] must contact of the upper torso with water. Means must be
be cable of satisfactory inflation after exposure to provided to prevent the entrapment of rain or choppy
the temperature range from –40 [degrees F] to +140 water.
degrees F for a minimum period of five minutes.
4.1.10 Tether Infant–Small Child Category Life [Vest].
4.1.7 Overpressure Protection, Type I Life [Vest]. A A tether, not less than 72 inches in length, must
flotation chamber, when orally inflated to an operating be attached to the infant–small child life [vest]. The
pressure not less than one psig, must not burst upon attach point must be located such that the flotation
subsequent discharge of the mechanical inflation attitude specified in paragraph 4.1.9.2 is maintained
system. when the line is under sufficient tension to remove
the slack as when held by an adult in the water. With
4.1.8 Buoyancy. The life [vest] must provide a buoyant the life [vest] on the infant–small child, there must
force not less than that shown in Table I, Minimum be provisions for stowing or securing the tether in
Buoyant Force. The buoyant force of the life [vest] a manner that it remains readily accessible and will
is equal to the weight of the volume of fresh water not dangle loosely so as to pose a hazard during an
displaced by the life [vest] when totally submerged. emergency evacuation.
Buoyancy must be demonstrated using the standard
gas reservoirs described in 4.1.4.3.1 without further 4.1.11 Life [Vest] Retention and Donning Characteristics.
oral inflation, starting from a vacuumed-flat unit. The means of retaining the life [vest] on the wearer,
excluding infant–small child wearers, must require
Table 1 that the wearer secure no more than one attachment
Minimum Buoyant Force and make no more than one adjustment for fit. It
must be demonstrated, in accordance with the
Minimum buoyant
donning tests specified in paragraph 5.9, that at
force in fresh water
Weight at 70 [degrees F] least 75 percent of the total number of test subjects
Category of of wearer ± 5 degrees F and at least 60 percent of the test subjects in each
[life vest] (pounds) (pounds) age group specified in paragraph 5.9 can don the
life [vest] within 25 seconds unassisted, starting with
Adult Above 90 35
the life [vest] in its storage package. Percentage
Adult–Child 35 and above 35 calculations may not be increased when rounded
Combination off. It must be demonstrated that an adult unassisted
Child 35 to [no figure] 25 can install an appropriate life [vest] on another
adult or a child within 30 seconds. It also must be
Infant–Small Child Under 35 20
demonstrated, in accordance with the donning tests
specified in paragraph 5.9, that 60 percent of the
4.1.9 Flotation Attitude. adult test subjects can install an infant–small child
dummy in an infant–small child life [vest] within 90
4.1.9.1 Adult, Adult–Child and Child Life [Vests]. The life seconds.
[vest] must, within five seconds, right the wearer,
who is in the water in a face-down attitude. The life 4.1.12 Comfort, Fit and Adaptability. The design of the life
[vest] must provide lateral and rear support to the [vest] must be such that:
wearer’s head such that the mouth and nose of a
completely relaxed wearer [are] held clear of the water 4.1.12.1 After donning, inadvertent release by the wearer is
line with the trunk of the body inclined backward not likely.

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4.1.12.2 Adjustment may be made by the wearer, or the person For written instructions, an acceptable means of
assisting a child or infant–small child wearer, while in complying with this requirement is by use of bold
the water. lettering approximately 0.22 inch (5.6 millimeters
[mm]) high with a stroke width of 0.047 inch (1.2
4.1.12.3 Unobstructed view by the wearer, excluding infant– mm).
small child wearers, is allowed in both the forward and
sideward directions. An observation window must be 4.2.3 Date of manufacture of fabric (month and year).
provided for viewing of an infant–small child wearer
by the assisting person if the life [vest] is enclosed. 4.2.4 Size category: “Adult,” “Adult–Child,” “Child” or
“Infant–Small Child,” as appropriate and weight
4.1.12.4 Blood circulation of the wearer is not restricted. limitation of each category.

4.1.12.5 The wearer’s breathing is not restricted. 4.2.5 The life [vest] package must clearly indicate that it
contains a life [vest], the size category and the weight
4.1.13 Survivor-locator Light. The life [vest] must be limitation of the life [vest]. The package also must be
equipped with a survivor-locator light which meets marked with the life [vest] TSO and part number or the
the requirements of TSO-C85. The light must be information must be visible through the package.
automatically activated. This can be accomplished
upon contact with water, upon inflation or by any 5. Tests.
other means not requiring additional user action.
5.1 Material Tests. The material properties specified in
4.1.14 Life [Vest] Package. A package must be provided paragraph 3 of this standard must be conducted in
for the life [vest] for storage of the life [vest] on board accordance with the following test methods or other
the aircraft. The means of opening the package must approved equivalent methods:
be simple and obvious, and must be accomplished in
one operation without the use of any tool or excessive Accelerated Age Method 5850(9)(1)
physical force. Tensile Strength (Grab Test) Method 5100(9)(7)

4.1.15 Color. The color of the life [vest] must be an approved Tear Strength (Trapezoid Test) Method 5136(9)(5)
international orange-yellow or similar high-visibility Tear Strength (Tongue Test) Method 5134(9)
color. The color of the flight crew life [vests] may (Alternate to Trapezoid Test:
be an approved red-orange or similar high-visibility see 3.1.4.1)
contrasting color. Ply Adhesion Method 5960(9)(3)
Coat Adhesion Method 5970(9)(8)
4.2 Marking. The following information and instructions
must be shown: Permeability Method 5460 (5)(6)
Seam Shear Strength (9)(2)
4.2.1 Pictorial Presentation. The proper donning procedure
Seam Peel Strength Method 5960(9)(3)
and other operational instructions on the use of the life
[vest] must be simple, obvious and presented primarily Flammability FARs Part 25,
pictorially with minimum use of words. Appendix F, Part I(b)(5),
Horizontal Burn Rate (4)
4.2.1.1 Orientation of Instructions. Instructions pertaining (1) Samples of coated fabric and seams for the accelerated aging tests
to operations which would normally be accomplished must be exposed to a temperature of 158 [degrees F] + 5 degrees
after the life [vest] has been donned must be oriented F for not less than 168 hours. After exposure, the samples must be
allowed to cool to 70 [degrees F] + 2 degrees F for neither less than
so that the wearer, or the person assisting a child or
16 hours nor more than 96 hours before determining their physical
an infant–small child wearer, may read them while in properties in accordance with paragraph 3.1 of this standard;
the water.
(2) Samples must consist of two strips of material two inches
maximum width by five inches maximum length. Strips must be
4.2.1.2 Readability in Emergency Lighting Conditions. bonded or heat-sealed together along the width with an overlap
Size, position and contrast of instructions must of 3/4 inch maximum. Heat-sealed seams must have a 1/8 +
be such that the pictorial descriptions and written 1/32 inch width minimum heat-seal bead with the heat seal
1/4 inch from each end. The free ends must be placed in the
instructions are easily distinguishable and readable in
testing machine described in [Federal Test Method Standard]
low-level illumination. The markings and instructions 191A, Method 5100 and separated at a rate of 2 [inches/
must be readable by a person having 20/20 vision minute] + 0.5 inches/minute. The average value of two samples
at a minimum viewing distance of 24 inches with must be reported. Samples may be multilayered to ensure
illumination no greater than 0.05 foot-candle.

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water containing not more than 200 parts per million

against premature material failure. Samples may be gripped across
the full two inches of width. of solids. The spray solution must be kept from
exceeding this level of solids throughout the test. The
(3) Separation rate must be 2.0 [inches/minute] to 2.5 inches/minute.
Sample shall be one inch. spray solution must be maintained at a specific gravity
of from 1.126 to 1.157 and a pH between 6.5 and 7.2
(4) The material must meet the flammability requirements of FARs [Part]
25.853(a) [Appendix F, Part I (a) (l) (iv)] in effect July 20, 1990.
when measured at 95 [degrees F] ± 2 degrees F.

(5) Federal Test Method Standard No. 191 in effect Dec. 31, 1968.
5.6 Inflator Test, Type I Life [Vest].
(6) ASTM Method D1434-82, Procedure V, approved July 30, 1982,
is an acceptable alternate method.
5.6.1 Operating Force. The force necessary to operate
(7) Use of pneumatic grips, for holding test samples, is an acceptable the mechanical inflation means may not exceed 15
alternate to the mechanical grips described in Method 5100.
pounds when applied through the pull cord.
(8) The sample shall be prepared using the adhesive and construction
methods used to manufacture the life [vest]. Separation rate must
be 2.0 [inches/minute] to 2.5 inches/minute.
5.6.2 Pull Cord Strength. The pull cord may not fail or
separate from the mechanical inflation means when
(9) Federal Test Method Standard No. 191A dated July 20, 1978.
a minimum tension load of 60 pounds is applied to
the cord for at least three seconds. If the pull cord is
5.2 Leakage Test, Type I Life [Vest]. The life [vest] may designed to separate from the mechanical inflation
not lose more than 1/2 psig per flotation chamber after means when operated, the pull cord shall be capable
each flotation chamber has been inflated to not less than of withstanding a minimum tension load of 30 pounds
two psig and hung in a rack for at least 12 hours. for three seconds without failure.

5.3 Overpressure Test, Type I Life [Vest]. Each flotation 5.6.3 Proof Pressure. The mechanical inflation means
chamber of the life [vest] must withstand an inflation must withstand a hydrostatic pressure of not less
pressure of not less than 10 psig for at least five than 1,500 psig without deformation or leakage.
minutes. The mechanical inflation means may not leak when
subjected to two psig air pressure and may not lose
5.4 Submersion Test. The life [vest] must be submerged more than 0.5 psig when subjected to 40 psig air
in fresh water at 72 [degrees F] ± 5 degrees F so that pressure. Each test pressure must be applied for not
no part of it is less than 24 inches below the surface. less than 30 seconds.
The buoyancy of the [vest] must not be less than the
value specified in paragraph 4.1.8 of this standard. 5.6.4 Mechanical Inflation Valve. The mechanical inflation
Submersion must continue for at least eight hours, valve must allow a minimum flow of four liters of air per
except that the test may be discontinued in less minute at 40 psig inlet pressure. The valve may not leak
than eight hours if buoyancy measurements taken when subjected to a vacuum of 12 inches of water
at four successive 30-minute intervals show that the applied so as to reduce the seating spring pressure
buoyancy of the [life vest] has stabilized at a value at and with atmospheric pressure on the opposite side.
least equal to the value specified in paragraph 4.1.8 The joint between the valve and the flotation chamber
of this standard. may not fail when a 250-pound load is applied, for at
least three seconds, outwardly from and perpendicular
5.5 Salt Spray Test. to the surface of the flotation chamber at the point of
valve attachment. To secure the joint during application
5.5.1 Salt Spray Test Procedure. All metal parts must of the load, an adapter having an inside diameter at
be placed in an atomized salt solution spray for a least 3/4 inch larger than the outside diameter of the
period of not less than 100 hours. The solution must valve at the point of attachment must be used.
be atomized in the chamber at a rate of three quarts
per 10 cubic feet of chamber volume per each 24- 5.7 Jump Test.
hour period. The temperature in the chamber must
be maintained at 95 [degrees F] ± 2 degrees F 5.7.1 Adult, Adult-Child or Child. An inflated adult, adult-
throughout the test. child or child Type I or Type II life [vest], excluding infant-
small child life [vests], must remain attached and not
5.5.2 Salt Spray Solution. The salt used must be sodium cause injury to the wearer when the wearer jumps into
chloride or equivalent containing not more than 0.2 the water at any attitude from a height above the water
percent of impurities on the dry-weight basis. The of at least five feet. There must not be any damage to
spray solution must be prepared by dissolving 20 ± the [vest] following the jump. Minor skin chafing is not
2 parts by weight of salt in 80 ± 2 parts by weight of considered an injury in this respect.

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5.7.2 Infant-Small Child. An infant-small child life [vest] subjects in each of the following age groups: 20–29
must remain inflated and undamaged and the infant- years; 30–39 years; 40–49 years; 50–59 years; and
small child dummy, specified in paragraph 5.9.1, must 60–69 years. Not more than 60 percent of the test
remain properly secured when an adult holding the subjects in any age group may be of the same sex.
dummy, with the [life vest] installed on the dummy, The number of test subjects in any age group may
jumps into the water from a height above the water not exceed 30 percent of the total number of test
of at least five feet. The adult must be wearing an subjects. Infant-small child donning tests must be
inflated life [vest] for the test. performed by a minimum of five adult test subjects
of both sexes between the ages of 20 and 40. Tests
5.8 Fire Protection Test. Materials used in the life [vest] must be performed using an articulating infant-small
and the storage package for the life [vest] must be child dummy, as described below. Adult test subjects
tested by the horizontal burn-rate test prescribed in must have no prior experience in donning tests of life
paragraph 5.1 of this standard. [vests].

5.9 Donning Test. 5.9.2 Infant-Small Child Test Dummy. The dummy to
be used in the donning tests must have the basic
5.9.1 Test Subjects. There must be a minimum of 25 physical characteristics for a composite 50th
test subjects. There must be a minimum of five test percentile unisex child of 24 months with a height of

Table 2
Anthropometric Characteristics of Two-year-old Child
Body Segment Length (inches) Weight (grams) Volume (%)
Top of Head (ref.)–Top of Shoulder/Upper Arm Pivot 7.5* 1, 591.6 12.9
Elbow Pivot 6.0 876.0 (2) 7.1
Wrist Pivot 5.0 530.5 (2) 4.3
Finger Tip 3.5 123.5 (2) 1.0
Top of Shoulder/Upper Arm Pivot–Crotch/ Thigh Pivot 13.0* 5, 564.4 45.1
Knee Pivot 5.5* 579.9 (2) 4.7
Bottom of Foot 8.0* 481.1 (2) 3.9
Total *34.0 Height 12,338.0 (27.2 pounds) 100.0
Shoulder Breadth 9.2
Chest Breadth 6.6
Chest Depth 4.6 14.5
Waist Breadth 5.9
Waist Depth, seated 5.9
Hip Breadth 7.3 7.5
6.0
Foot 5.2
5.0 13.0
Circumferences 34.0
Head 19.2 3.5
Neck 9.2
Chest 19.2
Waist 18.1
Hip 8.0
18.5
Mid-thigh 9.9 5.5
Calf 7.7
Ankle 5.3
Upper Arm 5.9
5.2
Forearm 5.8
Wrist 5.1

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34 inches and weighing 27.2 pounds. The dummy the adult performing the donning test. Subjects must
shall have articulating joints and, if used for water receive no donning information other than a typical
testing, must not absorb water. The anthropometric preflight briefing and donning demonstration on the
values for the dummy are presented in Table II. use of life [vests].
These data are considered valid for the stated
chronological age plus or minus three months and 5.9.4 Test Procedure. The donning test must be begun
are representative of U.S. children, as reported by with the life [vest] contained in the storage package
the University of Michigan from 1975–1985. required by paragraph 4.1.14, and the package
held in the test subject’s hand. Separate timing
5.9.3 Test Arrangement. Subjects must be seated in actual must be kept for each test subject. Timing starts
or simulated air carrier coach class seating with a seat on signal when the test subject has both hands
row in front of the subjects creating a seat row pitch on the packaged life [vest] and stops when the life
not exceeding 31 inches. Each subject must have the [vest] is properly donned, secured and adjusted for
seat belt fastened. Subjects may be tested singularly fit. During the test, the test subject may release the
or in groups seated side by side. Infant-small child life seat belt and rise from the seat but may not move
[vest] donning tests must be performed with adults to any extent from the area immediately in front of
in adjacent seats who must not assist or hamper the seat. 

TSOs Are Not TSO and Specification no. 2 illustrates has two classifications: Type I rafts,
‘The Last Word’ how equivalent standards can differ, for use in any aircraft, and Type II
with one being stricter in certain rafts, for use in aircraft other than

A TSO does not define the optimum aspects, and the other stricter in other transport category aircraft.
design for a piece of equipment. aspects.
Each TSO takes into account the needs • Inflation. Specification no. 2 says,
and viewpoints of different affected par- In general, Specification no. 2 empha- “The packed life raft shall be designed
ties — predominantly regulators, manu- sizes design and capability, whereas the to inflate by means of its primary
facturers and operators. Compromises in FAA TSO emphasizes test methods for inflation system and be suitable for
TSOs are inevitable, because a standard materials and function. Both provide boarding in respect of buoyancy and
for an ideal piece of equipment (assum- for emergency inflation of all inflation stability within 30 seconds of the start
ing anyone knows what that would be) chambers — the Specification describing of inflation.”
could make such a product prohibitively the means as a “hand-operated pump,” the
expensive for most users. In addition, a TSO prescribing “means readily accessible TSO-C70a has a similar provision
standard must be flexible enough to allow to occupants of the [life] raft.” Some other but specifics that the life rafts must
innovative improvements. standards, although worded differently or ready to support the first occupant
including minor variations, are essentially within one minute after inflation
Different technical specialists, con- equivalent in the two documents. But starts.
fronted with the same task of codifying there are also significant differences:
standards, have differed somewhat in • Floor insulation. Areas of the life
their conclusions. • Types. Specification no. 2 includes raft floor with which occupants
an appendix containing provisions come in contact must contain in-
For example, until recently, the U.K. Civil for helicopter life rafts for opera- sulation equal to that given by a 25-
Aviation Authority (CAA) had its own tions within helicopter search-and- millimeter (one-inch) air cushion,
Specification no. 2, Inflatable Liferafts. rescue (SAR) coverage and where all according to Specification no. 2.
(Specification no. 2 is no longer enforced aircraft occupants wear cold-water
by the CAA because aviation safety in immersion suits (also known as sur- The FAA standard has no equivalent
the European Union is now under the vival suits, exposure suits, helicopter requirement.
jurisdiction of the European Aviation passenger suits, air crew immersion
Safety Agency [EASA]. EASA can still suits and helicopter offshore trans- • Occupancy ratings. Specification
enforce Specification no. 2 until it port suits). no. 2 assumes an average occu-
approves its own TSO, which is expected pant weight of 91 kilograms (200
to be modeled after FAA TSO-C70a.) TSO-C70a has no separate specifi- pounds).
A comparison of the FAA life raft cations for helicopter life rafts, but Continued on page 461

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FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C72c, Individual Flotation Devices

Includes, among other provisions, the following: 4.0 General Requirements.

1.0 Purpose. 4.0.1 Materials and Processes. Materials used in the

finished product must be of the quality which
To specify minimum performance standards for indi- experience and tests have demonstrated to be
vidual flotation devices other than life [vests] defined suitable for the use intended throughout the service
in the TSO-C13 series. life of the device. The materials and process must
conform to specifications selected or prepared by the
2.0 Types and Description of Devices. manufacturer which will [ensure] that the performance,
strength and durability incorporated in the prototype
This standard covers the following two categories of
are continued or exceeded in subsequently produced
individual flotation devices:
articles.
a. Inflatable types (compressed gas inflation).
4.0.2 Fungus Protection. Materials used in the finished
b. Noninflatable types. product must contain no nutrient which will support
fungus growth unless such materials are suitably
2.0.1 Description of Inflatable Types. Inflation must
treated to prevent such growth.
be accomplished by release of a compressed gas
contained in a cartridge into the inflation chamber. 4.0.3 Corrosion Protection. Metallic parts exposed to the
The cartridge must be activated by a means readily atmosphere must be corrosion resistant or protected
accessible and clearly marked for its intended against corrosion.
purpose. The flotation chamber must also be
capable of oral inflation in the event of failure of the 4.0.4 Fire Protection. If the device is not used as part of a
gas cartridge. seat or berth, materials used in the device, including
any covering, must meet Paragraph 6.0.2 of this
2.0.2 Description of Noninflatable Types. Seat cush- standard. If the device is to be used as part of a seat
ions, head rests, arm rests, pillows or similar aircraft or berth, all materials used in the device must meet
equipment are eligible as flotation devices under this Paragraph 7.0.3 of this standard.
standard provided they fulfill minimum requirements
for safety and performance. Compression through 4 0.5 Temperature Range. Materials used in the
extended service use, perspiration and periodic construction of the device must be suitable for the
cleaning must not reduce the buoyancy charac- intended purpose following extended exposures
teristics of these devices below the minimum level through a range of operating temperatures from –40
prescribed in this standard. degrees F to +140 degrees F.

2.1 Instructions for Use. Where the design features of 4.1 Design and Construction.
the device relative to its purpose and proper use are
not obvious to the user, clear instructions must be 4.1.1 General. The design of the device, the inflation means
visible under conditions of emergency lighting. if provided and straps or other accessories provided
for the purpose of donning by the user must be simple
3.0 Definitions. and obvious, thereby making its purpose and actual
use immediately evident to the user.
The following are definitions of terms used throughout
the standard: 4.1.2 Miscellaneous Design Features. The devices must
be adaptable for children as well as adults. The devices
a. Buoyancy. The amount of weight a device must have features which enable the users to retain
can support in fresh water at 85 degrees F them when jumping into water from a height of at least
[Fahrenheit]. five feet. Attachment straps must not pass between
the user’s leg for retention or restrict breathing or blood
b. Flame Resistant. Not susceptible to combustion circulation.
to the point of propagating a flame beyond safe
limits after the ignition source is removed. 5.0 Performance Characteristics.

c. Corrosion Resistant. Not subject to deteriora- 5.0.1 Buoyancy Standard. The device must be shown by
tion or loss of strength as a result of prolonged the tests specified in paragraph 7.0.1 to be capable
exposure to a humid atmosphere. of providing not less than 14 pounds of buoyancy

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in fresh water at 85 degrees F for a period of eight 7.0 Test Requirements.

hours.
7.0.1 Buoyancy Testing. The flotation device, including
5.0.2 Utilization. The device must be capable of being all dress covers, fire blocking layer (if used) and
utilized by the intended user with ease. straps that would normally be used by a survivor in
an emergency, must be tested in accordance with
5.0.3 Function Under Temperature Limits. The de- either subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph, as
vice must function from –40 degrees F to +140 applicable, or an equivalent test procedure. The test
degrees F. may be conducted using nonfresh water, or at a tem-
perature other than 85 degrees F, or both, provided
6.0 Standard Tests.
the result can be converted to the standard water
condition specified in Paragraph 5.0.1. The test may
6.0.1 Salt Spray Test Solution. The salt used must be
be conducted in open (ocean or lake) or restricted
sodium chloride or equivalent containing on the dry
(swimming pool) water. The test specimen of noninflat-
basis not more than 0.1 percent of sodium iodide
able devices, such as pillows or seat cushions, must
and not more than 0.2 percent of impurities. The
either be preconditioned to simulate any detrimental
solution must be prepared by dissolving 20 ±2 parts
effects on buoyancy resulting from extended service
by weight of salt in 80 parts by weight of distilled
or an increment must be added to buoyancy standard
or other water containing not more than 200 parts
in paragraph 5.0.1 sufficient to offset any reduction in
per million of total solids. The solution must be kept
buoyancy which would result from extended service
free from solids by filtration decantation, or any other
use.
suitable means. The solution must be adjusted to
be maintained at a specific gravity of from 1.126 a. Test Procedures Applicable to Inflatable
to 1.157 and a pH of between 6.5 and 7.2 when Devices and to Noninflatable Devices Made
measured at a temperature in the exposure zone From Closed Cell Material. The device must be
maintained at 95 degrees F. tested by submerging it in water so that no part
of it is less than 24 inches below the surface. It
6.0.2 Flame Resistance. Except for devices required to be must be shown that the buoyancy of the device is
tested in accordance with 7.0.3 the following applies: at least equal to the value specified in paragraph
Three specimens, approximately four inches wide and 5.0.1 after submersion for at least eight hours,
14 inches long, must be tested. Each specimen must except that the test may be discontinued in less
be clamped in a metal frame so that the two long than eight hours if buoyancy measurements taken
edges and one end are held securely. The frame must at four successive 30-minute intervals show that
be such that the exposed area of the specimen is at the buoyancy of the device has stabilized at a value
least two inches wide and 13 inches long with the free at least equal to the value specified in Paragraph
end at least one-half inch from the end of the frame for 5.0.1.
ignition purposes. In case of fabrics, the direction of
the weave corresponding to the most critical burn rate b. Test Procedures Applicable to Noninflatable
must be parallel to the 14-inch dimension. A minimum Devices Made from Open Cell Material. The
of 10 inches of the specimen must be used for timing device must be completely submerged and must
purposes, and approximately one and one-half inches either support a human subject or be attached to
must burn before the burning front reaches the timing a mechanical apparatus that simulates the move-
zone. The specimen must be long enough so that the ments characteristic of a nonswimmer. During the
timing is stopped at least one inch before the burning test, the device must be subjected to a squeezing
front reaches the end of the exposed area. action comparable to that caused by the move-
ments characteristic of a nonswimmer. It must be
The specimens must be supported horizontally and shown that the buoyancy of the device is at least
tested in draft-free conditions. The surface that will equal to the value specified in Paragraph 5.0.1 after
be exposed when installed in the aircraft must face testing for at least eight hours, except that the test
down for the test. The specimens must be ignited may be discontinued in less than eight hours if the
by the Bunsen or Tirrell burner. To be acceptable, buoyancy measurements taken at four successive
the average burn rate of the three specimens must 30-minute intervals show that the buoyancy of the
not exceed four inches per minute. Alternatively, if device has stabilized at a value at least equal to the
the specimens do not support combustion after value specified in Paragraph 5.0.1.
the ignition flame is applied for 15 seconds or if the
flame extinguishes itself and any subsequent burning 7.0.2 Salt Spray Testing. All metallic operating parts must
without a flame does not extend into the undamaged be placed in an enclosed chamber and sprayed with
areas, the material is also acceptable. an atomized salt solution for a period of 24 hours.

460 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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The solution must be atomized in the chamber at 7.0.3.1 Test for Fire Blocking of Seat Cushions. Tests must
a rate of three quarts per 10 cubic feet of chamber be conducted in accordance with Appendix F, Part II
volume per 24-hour period. At the end of the test of FARs Part 25.
period, it must be demonstrated that the parts oper-
ate properly. 7.0.4 Extreme Temperature Testing. Tests must be
performed to demonstrate that the device is oper-
7.0.3 Test for Fire Protection of Materials. Materials able throughout the temperature range specified in
used in flotation devices that are to be used as paragraph 5.0.3. In performing these tests, precon-
part of a transport category aircraft seat or berth ditioning of tests, specimens must be accomplished
must comply with the self-extinguishing fire protec- to simulate conditions of immediate use of the device
tion provisions of section 25.853(b) of FARs [U.S. following an aircraft takeoff.
Federal Aviation Regulations] Part 25. In all other
applications, the materials in the flotation devices Note: An acceptable procedure for preconditioning may involve
must be tested in accordance with paragraph 6.0.2 storage of the device for eight hours at the extreme temperatures
of this standard to substantiate adequate flame- specified, followed by exposure to room temperature conditions
resistant properties. for a period of time not to exceed 10 minutes. 

A minimum average occupant TSO-C70a says, “If the canopy is not lifting handles for moving the packed
weight of 170 pounds (77 kilograms) integral with the [life] raft, it must be life raft within the aircraft.
must be used in all tests and calcula- capable of being erected by occupants
tions for TSO-C70a. following conspicuously posted, sim- TSO-C70a specifies that a complete
ple instructions. It must be capable life raft package must be drop tested
• Seaworthiness. Specification no. 2 of being erected by one occupant of by dropping it from a height of five feet
says, “The life raft shall be capable of an otherwise empty [life] raft and by (1.5 meters) onto a hard floor, after
withstanding, without any malfunc- occupants of a [life] raft filled to rated which it must be inflated and meet
tion of the life raft or its equipment, capacity.” There is no requirement for the pressure-retention requirements
sea and wind conditions of at least collecting rainwater. of the standard. The TSO says, “It
Sea State 6 and 60 kilometers per must be demonstrated that the com-
hour (40 miles per hour) respec- • Righting aids. Both standards re- plete life raft package can be moved
tively.” Sea State 6 (page 46) is a near quire a righting aid to be provided from a typical stowage installation by
gale with winds of 28 knots to 33 for use if the raft inflates in the in- no more than two persons and then
knots (50 kilometers per hour to 61 verted position. deployed at another suitable exit.”
kilometers per hour) and an average
wave height of 14 feet (four meters) Specification no. 2 requires that the • Attached equipment. Specification
with a maximum wave height of 18 aid be capable of righting the raft in no. 2 includes a provision for an in-
feet (5.5 meters). conditions of at least Sea State 6 and ternal light that will enable all printed
winds of 60 kilometers per hour. instructions on the life raft’s internal
Under TSO-C70a, “the life raft must surfaces or attached equipment to be
be demonstrated by tests or analy- TSO-C70a does not specify wind or read in darkness. Specification no. 2
sis, or a combination of both, to be sea conditions that must be met for requires an external light that pro-
seaworthy in an open-sea condition righting, but notes that the means vides “maximum practical conspi-
of 17[-knot] to 27-knot winds and provided for righting must be usable cuity” for SAR operations, including
waves of six [feet] to 10 feet [1.8 by one person in the water. both a vertical light beam and a hori-
meters to three meters].” zontal light beam. The output of the
• Valise or container. Specification light must be visible at night in clear
• Canopy. “The canopy shall be no. 2 requires that the packed life atmospheric conditions for at least
automatically erected in sequence raft be capable of being dropped two nautical miles (four kilometers)
with the inflation of the life raft,” from a height of three meters (10 for at least 12 continuous hours.
says Specification no. 2. “Facilities feet) onto a hard surface without
shall be provided for the collection adversely affecting performance. TSO-C70a specifies that survivor-
and retention of rainwater from the Specification no. 2 provides that locator lights must be approved under
external surface of the canopy.” the valise or container shall include Continued on page 463

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 461
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C85a,

Survivor-locator Lights
a. Applicability. (vii) The quality-control inspection and functional-test
specification to be used to test each production ar-
(1) Minimum Performance Standards. This technical stan- ticle to ensure compliance with this TSO, as required
dard order (TSO) prescribes the minimum performance by reference in [Part] 21.605(a)(3) to [Part] 21.143.
standards that survivor-locator lights must meet in order
to be identified with the applicable TSO marking. New (2) In addition, the manufacturer must furnish, to each
models of survivor-locator lights that are to be so identified person receiving for use one or more of the articles
and that are manufactured on or after the date of this TSO manufactured under an authorization of this TSO, one
[May 7, 1996] must meet the standard set forth in Society copy of the following:
of Automotive Engineers Inc. (SAE), Aerospace Standard
(i) The technical data and information specified in para-
(AS) 4492, Survivor-locator Lights, dated January 1995.
graphs (c)(1)(ii) through (c)(1)(v) of this TSO and any
[Editorial note: SAE is now called SAE International.]
other data or information that are necessary for con-
(2) Environmental Standards. SAE AS 4492 incorpo- tinued airworthiness of the survivor-locator lights.
rates by reference the environmental test procedures (ii) A note with the following statement:
specified in RTCA Inc. (RTCA) Document No. DO-160C,
“The conditions and test required for TSO approval of
“Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for
this article are minimum performance standards. It is
Airborne Equipment,” dated December 1989. A more
the responsibility of those desiring to install the article
recent version of this standard and tests may be substi-
either on or within a specific type or class of aircraft to
tuted, if approved by the manager of the aircraft certification
determine that the aircraft installation conditions are
office (ACO), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), having
within the TSO standards, the article may be installed
geographical purview over the manufacturer’s facilities.
only if further evaluation by the applicant documents
(3) Previously Approved Articles. Survivor-locator lights ap- an acceptable installation and is approved by the
proved prior to the date of this TSO may continue to Administrator.”
be manufactured under the provisions of their original
d. Availability of Referenced Documents.
approval.
(1) Copies of SAE AS 4492 may be purchased from [SAE
b. Marking. Each survivor-locator light must be marked in ac-
International], Department 331, 400 Commonwealth
cordance with [U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part]
Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096.
21.607(d).
(2) Copies of RTCA Document No. DO-160C may be pur-
c. Data Requirements.
chased from the RTCA Inc., 1140 Connecticut Avenue
(1) In addition to the documentation specified in [Part] NW, Suite 1020, Washington, DC 20036-9325.
21.605(a), the manufacturer shall furnish or have available
(3) Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 21, Subpart O,
for review, at the discretion of the manager of the ACO,
and Part 25, Subpart D, may be purchased from
FAA having geographical purview of the manufacturer’s
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
facilities, one copy each of the following technical data:
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325. [Editorial
(i) A complete description of the survivor-locator light, note: The FARs are available at the Internet site <http:
including detail drawings or drawing list, material //www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/cfrassemble.cgi?title=20
identification and process specification. 0314>.]
(ii) Operating instructions and limitations.
(4) Advisory Circular 20-110H, “Index of Aviation Technical
(iii) Installation instructions and limitations, including Standard Orders,” or latest revision may be obtained
stowage area temperatures. from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Subsequent
(iv) Packaging instructions and limitations. Distribution Office, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341
Q 75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785. [Editorial note:
(v) Maintenance instructions, including information
Advisory Circulars are also available at the Internet site
regarding inspection, repair, stowage of materials,
<http://www.faa.gov/regulations/index.cfm>.]
recommended inspection intervals and service life.
(vi) Manufacturer’s TSO qualification test report with an — /S/ John K. McGrath
environmental qualification form, as described in Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division,
RTCA/DO-160C. Aircraft Certification Service 

462 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

TSO-C85. TSO-C85 (page 462) is • Carrying case. The ARP says, • Water collection. The ARP says, “A
largely concerned with require- “Opening of the carrying case shall means for the collection and storage
ments for manufacturers to submit be automatic upon activation of the of rainwater shall be provided.”
data to FAA. Performance standards [life] raft’s inflation means.”
for survivor-locator lights manufac- The TSO has no equivalent provision.
tured after March 7, 1996, are refer- The TSO has no equivalent provi-
enced to SAE International Aerospace sion. • Accessory-case tiedowns. The ARP
Standard (AS) 4492, Survivor-locator has no recommendation for a means
Lights. TSO-C70a requires one or • Canopy strength. The ARP says, of tying an accessory case to the life
more lights to be automatically ac- “The canopy, when erected, shall be raft.
tivated when the life raft enters the capable of withstanding sea condi-
water, and for the lights to be visible tions of 27-knot winds and waves of The TSO says, “Provisions must
from any direction by persons in the 10 feet (three meters).” be made for tiedowns to hold any
water. accessory case. Each accessory case
The TSO says, “The erected canopy tiedown must withstand a pull of
• Helicopter life rafts. Specification must be capable of withstanding 250 pounds [113 kilograms].”
no. 2’s appendix, Helicopter Liferafts, 35-knot winds and 52-knot gusts in
applies to life rafts used within he- open water.”
licopter SAR range and where all Compare Life Rafts,
the helicopter’s occupants wear • Canopy openings. The ARP says, “As Not Standards
immersion suits. Some provisions a minimum, the canopy shall be pro-
of Specification no. 2 — such as
a requirement for floor insulation
and for a rainwater-collecting
vided with closable openings at each
of the boarding stations and adjacent
to the static-line attach point. These
A life raft built to TSO-C70a can
exceed the TSO requirements.
Nevertheless, the most important com-
facility — are omitted under the openings shall be at least 39.4 inches parisons are among life rafts, not among
assumption that the life raft will be (one meter) wide and sufficiently the various standards under which life
occupied for a relatively short time high to permit unrestricted boardings rafts can be approved.
and that the immersion suits will of an adult with life [vest] donned.
afford extra protection. But a Canopy openings shall be from the Indeed, a life raft can be approved under
helicopter life raft must be fully bottom up, and shall be resistant to more than one standard. One manufac-
reversible, unless it can be demon- jamming and corrosion. The open- turer’s corporate-aviation life rafts, for
strated that it is self-righting when ings shall provide cross-ventilation example, are approved by FAA, the U.K.
fully inflated. Furthermore, the of the raft interior.” CAA, and the French Direction Générale
container must be capable of be- de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC). The choice
ing moved to, and launched from, The TSO says, “The canopy … must of which standard or standards a com-
an emergency exit by one person have provision for openings 180 de- pany meets depends on where the raft is
(male or female). grees apart.” to be marketed.

TSO-C70a has no helicopter-specific • Survivor-locator lights. The ARP The European Joint Aviation Authorities
requirements for life rafts. says, “Approved survivor-locator (JAA) has proposed six Joint Technical
lights (which comply with TSO- Standard Orders (JTSOs) for life vests,
C85, Survivor-locator Lights) easily life rafts and safety equipment for per-
SAE Recommended seen from the water and above the sonnel involved in helicopter operations.
Practice Offers Another [life] raft shall be permanently in- (For European Union member nations,
Viewpoint stalled near each boarding station.” it is expected that equivalent European
TSOs [ETSOs] will be adopted by EASA.)

S AE International’s Aerospace
Recommended Practice (ARP) 1356,
Life Rafts, provides other opportunities
The TSO says, “One or more survi-
vor-locator lights must be provided
that are approved under TSO-C85.
As part of the ongoing harmonization of
FAA and JAA regulations, two of the pro-
posed JTSOs for life rafts (JTSO-C70a)
for comparison with the TSO. Some ar- The lights must be automatically and life vests (JTSO-C13f) largely par-
eas in which the ARP (a purely “model” activated upon [life] raft inflation allel those to be found in FAA TSOs
standard that has no regulatory force) in the water, and visible from any TSO-C70a and TSO-C13f, respectively.
and the TSO differ are as follows: direction by persons in the water.” Proposed JTSO-2C505 is for life rafts to

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 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

be carried on helicopters operating to or One reason for the discrepancy is that amount of space allotted to each oc-
from helidecks located in a hostile-sea higher quality is to some extent correlated cupant of a life raft in the same way
area. Its specifications closely follow with more weight, and weight is a less- as aviation life raft specifications do.
those of the Specification no. 2 appendix, important factor for most marine vessels The TSO requires life rafts to have
Helicopter Liferafts. than for aircraft. Moreover, the maritime a rated capacity of 3.6 square feet
industry is more attuned to actual condi- (0.3 square meter) per person and
The other proposed JTSOs, concerning tions that survivors in a life raft will en- an overload capacity of 2.4 square
immersion suits for helicopter occu- counter than are aviation authorities and feet (0.2 square meter) per person.
pants (see “Cold Outside, Warm Inside: pilots. Phrases in marine life raft specifi- Based on that ratio and the provi-
Immersion Suits,” page 357), and for cations such as “capable of being opened sions in JAR-OPS 1.830 and FARs
helicopter constant-wear life vests (see and resealed easily and used with cold, wet, Part 25.1415 requiring that “the
“Your Life Vest Can Save Your Life … If numbed hands” and “must work when wet buoyancy and seating capacity be-
It Doesn’t Kill You First,” page 346), have and be capable of being applied during yond the rated capacity of the rafts
no parallel in FAA TSOs. violent motion” suggest that those who must accommodate all occupants
wrote them were working from the “cold, of the airplane in the event of a loss
Marine Life Raft wet, numbed” hands-on experience of [“the loss” in JAR-OPS 1.830] of one
Regulations Offer Insight maritime survivors. raft of the largest rated capacity,” the
aviation life raft industry has settled
Into Conditions of Use Safety requirements for large commercial on a standard overload capacity that
ships in international waters are contained is 1.5 times the rated capacity of each
A nother way to look at the regulations
for aviation life rafts is to compare
them with those for marine life rafts (that
in the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),6 and the
life raft. For example, a life raft with
a rated capacity of eight is designed
SOLAS Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) for an overload capacity of 12.
is, life rafts carried aboard and launched
Code.7 Corporate airplanes and racing
from seagoing vessels).
yachts share a common design goal: speed. ISAF specifications do not discuss
Therefore, the dimensions and weight of the concept of overload capacity.
“Once you ditch, you’re no longer an
aviator, you’re a marine survivor,” said life rafts are important factors for both.
ISAF defines the number of people
Howard Kaufmann, president, RFD/ a life raft may accommodate as the
Life rafts manufactured to specifications
Revere. “Judge your life raft from a ma- least among three formulas, derived
published by the International Sailing
rine perspective. And improvements have from SOLAS:
Federation (ISAF) for life rafts carried
been incorporated into the standards for
on racing yachts8 include a similar capac-
marine life rafts more frequently than – “The greatest whole number ob-
ity range — four persons to 12 persons
they have been in those for aviation life tained by dividing by 0.096 the
— as the aviation rafts carried on many
rafts.”4 volume, measured in cubic me-
helicopters and corporate aircraft.
ters, of the main buoyancy tubes
Martin Schwartz, chief engineer, EAM, (which for this purpose shall in-
The following are some provisions of the
agreed that standards for marine life rafts clude neither the [canopy] arches
ISAF specifications not found in, or dif-
have been revised more often than those nor the thwarts [crosspieces], if
ferent from, FAA TSO C70a:
for aviation life rafts. “But I don’t believe fitted) when inflated; or,
that has much relevance to the way you • Strength. “Every life raft shall be so
should judge an aviation [life] raft,” he constructed as to be capable of with- – “The greatest whole number ob-
said. “The marine and aviation industries standing exposure for 20 days afloat in tained by dividing by 0.372 the
have different requirements, goals and all sea conditions, in air temperatures inner horizontal cross-sectional
expectations. There are many things both between –15 [degrees C] to 65 degrees area of the life raft measured in
industries can learn from each other.”5 C [5 degrees F to 149 degrees F].” square meters (which for this
purpose may include the thwart
Marine life rafts serve the same purpose • Viewing ports. “The canopy shall be or thwarts, if fitted) measured
as aviation life rafts, have many of the provided with at least one viewing to the innermost edge of the
same features and may appear similar port such that a viewing horizon of buoyancy tubes; or,
to aviation life rafts. Nevertheless, many 360 degrees is available.”
marine life rafts have superior equipment – “The number of persons
and may be subject to more demanding • Carrying capacity. The ISAF specifi- [with an average weight of 75
regulations. cations do not specify the minimum kilograms (165 pounds)] that

464 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

can be seated with reasonable material with drain holes and provided – “Impervious to water and rust;
comfort and headroom without with Velcro flaps, appropriately fixed
interfering with any of the life to a canopy arch tube. [The] purpose • “Every package shall have readily re-
raft’s equipment.” is to stow loose equipment where it can sealable closures of Velcro, large zips,
be seen and kept readily available but captive [attached] elastic shockcord
In practice, the industry standard for ma- safe against loss and as far as possible loops, shockcords or cords with jamb
rine life rafts is four square feet per oc- away from constant wetting.” cleats, or other suitable materials;
cupant. “Our civilian marine life rafts are
designed to the four-square-feet standard, • “Portable items shall be capable of
ISAF Life Raft being fitted into installed pockets
and I believe that all other manufacturers’
are as well,” said David Williams, senior
Equipment Specifications provided in the interior of the life
technical representative of Winslow More Stringent raft;
LifeRaft Co. “Any marine life raft with
less space for each occupant would be at
a competitive disadvantage.”9 T he ISAF specifications list 20 items of
standard life raft equipment, a list that
ISAF says “closely but not precisely follows
• “Portable items shall have lanyard
or tape ‘tails’ with Velcro self-seal
strips at the ends to facilitate mak-
• Ballast pockets. ISAF also provides that of SOLAS B.” Some are not included ing [them] captive without tying
details on water-ballast pockets (also in U.S., U.K. or Canadian aviation regula- knots;
called water-ballast bags) and equip- tions or recommendations (see Table 2,
ment pockets. “The life raft shall be page 404). In addition, the ISAF specifi- • “Portable items shall (except where
fitted with water-ballast pocket(s) cations for survival equipment specifica- essential) be without sharp corners,
complying with the following tions are more detailed and often mandate sharp edges and unnecessary protru-
requirements: higher quality standards than those for sions which could injure survivors or
comparable aviation life raft items. cause damage to the life raft fabric;
– “The pocket(s) shall fill to at [and,]
least 60 percent of its/their For example, FAA Advisory Circular
capacity within 25 seconds of (AC) 120-47 recommends only that the • “The equipment pack shall be inher-
deployment; aviation life raft carry “one spotlight or ently buoyant, brightly colored and
flashlight (including a spare bulb) having captive by a line to the inside of the
– “The pocket(s) shall have an ag- raft. Instructions shall be marked on
at least two D-cell batteries or equivalent.”
gregate capacity of at least 220 each item as appropriate.”
Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs)
liters [58 U.S. gallons] for life
725.95 specifies “a waterproof flashlight.”
rafts certified to carry four to 10 Some of the other items that must be
ISAF requires “two waterproof sealed-
persons and an aggregate capac- packed inside the life raft according to the
for-life torches [flashlights]. Each torch
ity of at least 240 liters [63 U.S. ISAF specifications are the following:
shall be sealed in clearly marked packag-
gallons] for life rafts certified to
ing which prevents the operation of the
carry 10 to 12 persons; • First aid kit. “A basic first aid kit
torch until the packaging is removed.
shall include at least two tubes of
– “If more than one pocket, they Torch packaging shall be clearly marked
sunscreen and one tube of sunburn-
shall be positioned symmetri- with the [expiration] date of the torch.
treatment cream. If water is not in-
cally [around] the circumfer- Each torch shall be capable of providing
cluded in the life raft kit, at least 0.5
ence of the life raft. If only a continuous light of six hours.”
liter [0.53 U.S. quart] to aid taking
one pocket, its periphery shall
General provisions of the ISAF specifica- seasickness or analgesic tablets, etc.,
be positioned symmetrically
tions for equipment packed inside the life shall be provided in a soft plastic
[around] the circumference of
raft include the following: drinking pack with a built-in valve.
the life raft; [and,]
Small bottle caps, etc., shall if pos-
– “Where appropriate, means • “Every package, closure and item of sible be captive to aid the action of
shall be provided to enable air to equipment shall be resealing. All dressings shall if pos-
readily escape from underneath sible be capable of being effectively
the life raft.” – “Capable of being opened and used in wet conditions. The first aid
resealed easily and used with kit shall be clearly marked and, it
• Equipment pockets. “At least two cold, wet, numbed hands and is recommended, should fit into a
equipment pockets shall be provided, without an implement of any prepared and clearly marked stow-
made from transparent flexible plastic kind; [and,] age pocket.”

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 465
 Re g u l at i o n s a n d Re c o m m e n d at i o n s

• Flares. “Three hand flares, in accor- connections (loose parts must be situation. Aviation life rafts are designed
dance with SOLAS regulation 36.” captive to the main apparatus), to be “fail-safe”: If a malfunction of the
ready for instant use to enable inflation system occurs, the cylinder
• Survival bags. “Two thermal protec- persons with numbed, wet, cold vents into the atmosphere, not into
tive aids, in accordance with SOLAS hands to pump air into the inflat- the raft.10
LSA 2.5 (waterproof, and designed able compartments including, e.g.,
to reduce convective and evaporative buoyancy tubes, inflatable floor (if This overview of some regulations and
heat loss from the wearer’s body).” fitted), inflatable canopy support advisories suggests that they are not an
(if fitted), inflatable boarding ramp exact science and should be considered as
• Repair outfit. “To enable persons (if fitted). The air pump must be one factor in survival planning, but not
with numbed, wet, cold hands to re- designed and built specifically for the only factor.
pair leaks in the inflatable compart- easy operation by hand.”
ments, including, e.g., buoyancy tubes, Each operator should base its survival-
inflatable floor (if fitted), inflatable Another difference between aviation equipment decisions on the typical
canopy support (if fitted), inflatable life rafts and marine life rafts derives characteristics of its own flights, such as
boarding ramp (if fitted). Repair from the environment in which they whether they are within helicopter SAR
systems must work when wet and be are carried. If a marine life raft infla- range, whether they are conducted over
capable of being applied during vio- tion cylinder malfunctions, the gas relatively benign bodies of water or in
lent motion. The repair outfit shall is released into the raft, inflating the extreme cold-water environments and
include at least six leak-stop plugs.” raft. An inadvertent inflation of a raft the SAR capabilities along the routes.
aboard an aircraft could be disastrous, That analysis will enable the operator to
• Air pump. “Must be simple, robust however, making the raft impossible to determine the equipment best suited for
and complete with all necessary remove from the aircraft in a ditching its operations. 

The bottom line, in our opinion …

• That a life raft is manufactured to a technical standard order (TSO) does not ensure that it will be of the
highest quality.

• Operators of extended overwater flights conducted under U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 91
and Part 135 have considerable leeway in what they include in the life raft’s survival equipment pack (SEP).
Canada, New Zealand and the European Joint Aviation Authorities are more specific about SEP contents.

• FAA advisory circulars, JAR-OPS acceptable means of compliance and SAE aerospace recommended prac-
tices provide guidance on compliance with the regulations or recommendations by industry specialists in
water-survival equipment.

• Regulations are not all that matter. The minimum requirements leave ample room for the operator to fur-
ther strengthen overwater safety.

Notes   4. Kaufmann, Howard. Telephone interview   7. Life-Saving Appliances, 2003 Edition.

by Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, London, England: International Maritime
  1. U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) U.S., Jan. 19, 2004. Flight Safety Organization, 2003.
Part 21.601(b)(1). Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,   8. Minimum Specifications for Yachtsmen’s
U.S. Liferafts. Special Regulations, Appendix A,
  2. Jensen, Hal. Telephone interview by
Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia,   5. Schwartz, Martin. E-mail communication part 2. Southampton, England:
U.S., Nov. 18, 2003. Flight Safety to Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, International Sailing Federation, 2002.
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S., Jan. 22, 2004. Flight Safety   9. Williams, David. Telephone interview by
U.S. Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.,
U.S. Dec. 4, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation,
  3. Fanjul, Gustavo. Telephone interview by
Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.,   6. SOLAS Consolidated Edition, 2001. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Nov. 18, 2003. Flight Safety Foundation, London, England: International 10. General Aviation Safety Sense Leaflet 21A:
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Maritime Organization, 2001. Ditching. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority, 2000.

466 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • Waterproof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Aviation
Statistics
  Aviation Statistics

469 About 75 Percent of Airplane

Occupants and More Than 87
Percent of Helicopter Occupants
Survived Ditchings, Data Show
 AVIATION STATISTICS

About 75 Percent of Airplane

Occupants and More Than
87 Percent of Helicopter Occupants
Survived Ditchings, Data Show
Although nonditching water-contact accidents resulted in larger percentages of
fatalities than ditching accidents, more than 37 percent of airplane occupants and
more than 61 percent of helicopter occupants survived.

— FSF Editorial Staff

T
he majority of occupants sur­ fatalities, compared with 64.78 percent
vived in ditching accidents of airplane nonditching accidents. In wa­
involving airplanes (Figure
1, page 470) and helicopters
(Figure 2, page 471), according to data
ter-contact accidents for which airplane
damage was reported, ditchings resulted
in 52.45 percent of the airplanes being
… D itchings

compiled and analyzed by Flight Safety destroyed; nonditching accidents resulted resulted in 52.45
Foundation. The data include water­ in 65.55 percent of the airplanes being
contact accidents from Jan. 1, 1976, to destroyed. percent of airplanes
July 8, 2003, for airplanes (Table 1, page
473) and from Jan. 1, 1980, to Feb. 23, 2003, Of the total number of known occu­ being destroyed.
for helicopters (Table 2, page 594). pants in the airplane-ditching accidents,
24.92 percent were killed. In airplane-
In accidents for which sufficient data nonditching accidents, 62.09 percent
were available, the data show that the were killed.
majority of airplane ditchings and the
majority of helicopter ditchings involved In helicopter ditchings for which the num­
no fatalities, and that most nonditching ber of fatalities is known, 19.29 percent
water-contact airplane accidents involved resulted in one or more fatalities, com­
one or more fatalities. pared with 46.03 percent of nonditching
accidents. In water-contact accidents for
In airplane ditchings for which the num­ which helicopter damage was reported, the
ber of fatalities is known, 18.20 percent helicopter was destroyed in 53.62 percent
of the accidents resulted in one or more Continued on page 472

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 469
 Stat i s t i c s

Figure 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 20031

Percentage of Accidents Involving Fatalities and Serious Injuries

Airplane Accidents Airplane Accidents
All Airplane Accidents (Ditching Only) (Nonditching Only)
70 70 70
64.78%
60 60 60
Percentage of Accidents

Percentage of Accidents

Percentage of Accidents
50 48.04% 50 50

40 40 40

30 30 30

20 20 18.20% 20 16.53%
13.58%
10 10 8.35% 10

0 0 0

Accidents Involving Fatalities2 Accidents Involving Serious Injuries3

Damage to Aircraft
Airplane Accidents Airplane Accidents
All Airplane Accidents (Ditching Only) (Nonditching Only)
16 2 14
(1.23%) (0.43%) (1.68%)

273
494 221 (32.77%)
(37.94%) (47.12%)
792 246 546
(60.83%) (52.45%) (65.55%)

Destroyed4 Substantial Damage4 Major Partial/Minor/None4

Casualty Types
Airplane Accidents Airplane Accidents
All Airplane Accidents (Ditching Only) (Nonditching Only)

385
(24.92%) 3,013
(33.57%)
4,088
(38.86%)
5,958 85
(5.50%) 5,573
(56.63%) (62.09%)
1,075 389
(69.58%) (4.33%)
474
(4.51%)

Fatal5 Serious Injury5 Minor/None5

1Thissummary is derived from the airplane water-contact accident database in Table 1.

2Percentage refers to accidents in which the number of fatalities is known.
3Percentage refers to accidents in which the number of serious injuries is known.
4Percentage refers to accidents in which the damage to the aircraft is known.
5Percentage refers to accidents in which the distribution of casualty types is known.

Source: Flight Safety Foundation

470 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Figure 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 20031

Percentage of Accidents Involving Fatalities and Serious Injuries

Helicopter Accidents Helicopter Accidents
All Helicopter Accidents (Ditching Only) (Nonditching Only)
50 50 50
46.03%
Percentage of Accidents

Percentage of Accidents

Percentage of Accidents
40 40 40
34.65%

30 30 30 26.46%
24.85% 22.70%
19.29%
20 20 20

10 10 10

0 0 0

Accidents Involving Fatalities2 Accidents Involving Serious Injuries3

Damage to Aircraft
Helicopter Accidents Helicopter Accidents
All Helicopter Accidents (Ditching Only) (Nonditching Only)
8 6 2
(2.45%) (4.35%) (1.06%)
60
(31.75%)

118
(36.09%) 74
201 58 (53.62%)
(61.47%) (42.03%) 127
(67.20%)

Destroyed4 Substantial Damage4 Major Partial/Minor/None4

Casualty Types
Helicopter Accidents Helicopter Accident
All Helicopter Accidents (Ditching Only) (Nonditching Only)
86
(12.37%)
852 333
54 247
(63.96%) (25.00%)
(7.77%) (38.78%)
297
(46.62%)
147
(11.04%) 555
(79.86%)
93
(14.60%)
Fatal5 Serious Injury5 Minor/None5

1Thissummary is derived from the helicopter water-contact accident database in Table 2.

2Percentage refers to accidents in which the number of fatalities is known.
3Percentage refers to accidents in which the number of serious injuries is known.
4Percentage refers to accidents in which the damage to the aircraft is known.
5Percentage refers to accidents in which the distribution of casualty types is known.

Source: Flight Safety Foundation

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT Operations • September 2003–February 2004 471
 Stat i s t i c s

of the ditchings and in 67.20 percent of the non­ Data in Table 1 and Table 2 included 1,304 air­
ditching accidents. plane accidents and 332 helicopter accidents. For
a few accidents, information about the number of
Of the total number of known occupants in people killed, seriously injured or incurring minor
­helicopter-ditching accidents, 12.37 percent were injury or no injury was partial; in those accidents,
killed; 38.78 percent were killed in helicopter- any numbers provided by the source were used
­nonditching accidents. in the calculations. Percentages were calculated
using only accidents for which the required data
Jet transport water-contact accidents represent were available.
a special category. Analysis of data from various
sources about 57 jet transport water-contact acci­ No claim is made that the tables represent every
dents (in 28 of which there were survivors), includ­ water-contact accident during the periods studied.
ing some accidents that predated the time frame of Moreover, the sample is likely skewed in favor of
Table 1, yielded the following observations: accidents investigated by authorities whose re­
ports were published in English (and were readily
• With one exception, the water-contact ac­ available for analysis). Although the sources are
cidents with survivors occurred within 5.2 considered reliable, total accuracy cannot be es­
nautical miles (9.6 kilometers) of shore. The tablished. Nevertheless, the numbers of accidents
exception was a ditching that occurred 26 in the tables are large enough to be reasonably
nautical miles (48 kilometers) from shore; representative of water-contact accidents in their
and, respective categories.

• Life rafts were not used in most of the jet Sources include Airclaims World Aircraft Accident
transport water-contact accidents with Summary; Australian Transport Safety Bureau
survivors. (ATSB); The Boeing Co.; Civil Aviation Authority
of New Zealand; New Zealand Transport Accident
In six of the 28 jet transport water-contact acci­ Investigation Commission; Robert E. Breiling
dents in which there were survivors, life rafts were Associates; Transportation Safety Board of Canada
used; in five of these six accidents, the airplane was (TSB); U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); U.S.
resting in very shallow water or remained afloat Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) National
while all occupants were rescued. In two of the 28 Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center (NASDAC);
accidents, the airplane was so close to shore that and the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
occupants were evacuated without life rafts. In 11 (NTSB).
of the 28 accidents, the airplane was less than 100
feet (30 meters) from shore. As used in this publication, water-contact
accident means any occurrence in which an air­
In two accidents, the airplane sank while survivors craft struck or came to rest in a body of water
were using or attempting to use life rafts: such as an ocean, bay, river, lake, shore, reservoir
or swamp. Accidents in which runway-surface
• In the accident that occurred 26 nautical condition was a causal factor but the aircraft
miles from shore, while crewmembers tried did not become immersed in water were ex­
to deploy one of the five life rafts, the raft cluded from the database. In a few instances, an
inflated inside the airplane and blocked occurrence could be considered an incident
the galley-door exit. Most occupants did, rather than an accident, according to some
however, use flotation devices, primarily definitions.
life vests; and,
A water-contact accident was classified as a ditch­
• In a water-contact accident during approach, ing if the accident was so described in the source.
one of two 26-person life rafts aboard the air­ An accident also was classified as a ditching if the
STATS plane was deployed and was used by some of narrative said or implied that the pilot intended
the occupants while awaiting rescue. There or attempted to conduct a controlled water land­
were 56 survivors and 24 fatalities among the ing, even if the resulting water impact appeared
crew and passengers. to have been uncontrolled. 

472 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/14/76* Sabreliner FAA Recife, Brazil Government 1 0 2 Destroyed
ferry

The airplane was ditched in the South Atlantic Ocean after fuel exhaustion resulting from a navigational error.

2/4/76 Douglas DC-6 Lineas Aereas Santa Marta, Colombia Cargo 3 0 0 Destroyed
del Caribe

The airplane struck the sea shortly after takeoff for a flight to Curacao.

4/2/76 Douglas DC-3 SATENA Puerto Asis, Colombia Passenger 5 11 0 Destroyed

The airplane struck a lake while approaching to land following a flight from Florencia.

6/6/76 A.S.T.A. (GAF) Sabah Air Kota Kinabulu, Malaysia NA 11 0 0 Destroyed

Nomad N22B

At a late stage in the approach, the pilot was reportedly instructed to conduct a go-around because of an obstruction on the runway. The
pilot began to conduct the missed approach but apparently lost control and the aircraft struck the sea about three kilometers from the
airport.

7/28/76 Ilyushin IL-18 CSA Bratislava, Scheduled 76 3 0 Destroyed

Czechoslovakia passenger

During the final approach, the aircraft speed was greater than normal, and reverse thrust was applied on the no. 2 and no. 3 engines below
3,281 feet AGL. As a result, the no. 3 engine failed and, by mistake, the no. 4 propeller was feathered. At 164 feet above the threshold, above
the centerline, instead of continuing the landing on two engines, the pilot decided to overshoot; the no. 4 engine was restarted at 131 feet
AGL. The aircraft’s right bank increased, control of the aircraft could not be maintained, and the aircraft struck the water in a 60-degree right
bank and 60-degree nose-down attitude.

9/16/76 Curtiss C-46 NA Caribbean Scheduled cargo 2 0 0 Destroyed

Takeoff was at 1025 hours, with the pilot estimating Aruba at 1230 hours. At 1047, the pilot notified Tiburon that the flight would reach
Riohacha, Colombia, at 1120 hours. There were no further communications. An extensive search-and-rescue operation by 23 aircraft covered
28,000 square miles without success.

10/6/76 Douglas DC-8-40 Cubana Bridgetown, Barbados Scheduled 73 0 0 Destroyed

passenger

Nine minutes after departure, the crew advised ATC that there had been an explosion onboard and shortly afterward requested clearance
to return to the airport. The aircraft apparently began a right turn toward land but struck the sea before arriving at the airport.

Note: The water-accident data in this table were compiled from several sources, but completeness cannot be claimed. Information has been
transcribed faithfully from the sources, but some information may not be accurate. Military accidents have been excluded.
*Ditching accident
AGL = above ground level ARTCC = air route traffic control center ATC = air traffic control ATR = Avions de Transport Regional
EGT = exhaust-gas temperature ELT = emergency locator transmitter FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
FARs = U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations FL = flight level fpm = feet per minute GAF = Government Aircraft Factory
IFR = instrument flight rules ILS = instrument landing system IMC = instrument meteorological conditions
MBB HFB = Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm Hamburger Flugzeugbau MD = McDonnell Douglas MDA = minimum descent altitude
MEL = minimum equipment list mph = miles per hour MSL = mean sea level NDB = nondirectional beacon PIC = pilot-in-command
rpm = revolutions per minute SAR = search and rescue VFR = visual flight rules VMC = visual meteorological conditions
VOR-DME = very high frequency omnidirectional radio–distance-measuring equipment

Source: Airclaims World Aircraft Accident Summary; Australian Transport Safety Bureau; The Boeing Co.; Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand; New Zealand Transport
Accident Investigation Commission; Robert E. Breiling Associates; Transportation Safety Board of Canada; U.K. Civil Aviation Authority; U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center; U.S. National Transportation Safety Board.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT Operations • September 2003–February 2004 473
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/5/76* Douglas DC-3 NA En route, Curacao to NA 2 0 0 Destroyed
Port-au-Prince, Haiti
The aircraft was reported missing while flying between Curacao and Port-au-Prince and was believed to have been ditched.
11/12/76 Cessna 500 Taxi Aéreo Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Nonscheduled 0 0 8 Destroyed
Citation I Jaragua cargo
During the landing roll, the aircraft began to aquaplane on the wet runway and could not be stopped before the runway end. The aircraft fell
into Guanabara Bay.
11/22/76* Shorts Skyvan Gulfair Da Island Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
passenger
The airplane was ditched in the sea after a reported engine malfunction. Both occupants evacuated safely.
12/16/76* De Havilland Airwest Airlines Strait of Juan de Fuca, Scheduled 0 0 16 Destroyed
DHC-6 Twin Otter Canada passenger
On arrival at the destination, the pilot found the area blanketed by a low fog layer. While in descent to get below the fog bank, the aircraft
struck the water heavily, damaging both floats. The pilot conducted a successful landing, but the aircraft capsized and sank after the
occupants had evacuated.
2/8/77* Curtiss C-46 Argo SA San Juan, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
Puerto Rico, U.S. cargo
Shortly after takeoff, an engine failure occurred. The pilot depressed the affected propeller-feathering button. Nevertheless, the propeller
continued to rotate, and the aircraft began to lose altitude and airspeed. The pilot attempted to return to the airport; then, seeing that the
airplane’s altitude and airspeed were too low to make a safe return, he ditched the aircraft in about 15 feet of water about one mile north
of the airport.
3/1/77 Douglas DC-3 Alyemda Aden Scheduled 19 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The airplane struck the sea shortly after takeoff for a flight to the Ghuraf airport in Yemen.
5/6/77* Curtiss C-46 Inter Air Hollywood, Florida, U.S. NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
Two previous attempts to fly the aircraft to San Juan, Puerto Rico, had been canceled due to a malfunction in the right engine. Shortly after
takeoff, at about 300 feet, the right engine began to overheat and power was lost. The pilot attempted to feather the right propeller but
could not keep it feathered. Being unable to maintain altitude, he elected to ditch the aircraft at sea rather than fly over heavily populated
areas to return to the airport.
The aircraft was ditched in 15 feet of water, about 900 feet east of the shore at Hollywood, Florida. It floated for about 20 minutes, and the
pilots exited safely.
5/28/77 Yakovlev Yak-40 Avioligure Genoa, Italy NA 0 0 4 Substantial
During the landing roll, the aircraft reportedly began to veer to the left and ran off the side of the runway, eventually coming to rest partly in
the sea.
6/30/77 Lockheed 188CF Aero Servicios East of Panama Canal Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
Electra Punterarenas Zone cargo
The aircraft disappeared from radar shortly after the pilot had requested vectoring out of an area of “extreme turbulence.” There was no
further contact with the flight and the aircraft was assumed to have broken up and fallen into the sea.
7/6/77 Let 410A Air Service Veszprem, Hungary NA 1 0 3 Destroyed
Turbolet Hungary
The aircraft crew had departed Budaors, Hungary, with the intention of taking photographs in the vicinity of Lake Balaton. On arrival, the
crew found that the weather was not suitable. The pilot elected to return and decided to fly along the lake at an altitude of about 1,000 feet
AGL. It appears that, unrecognized by the crew, the aircraft descended gradually and eventually struck the water. The aircraft immediately
inverted and sank.

474 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

7/8/77 Antonov An-24 Aeroflot Korovgrad, Crew training 6 0 1 Destroyed

Ukraine, USSR

After takeoff, the pilot’s attention was distracted, and the aircraft descended into the sea.

7/17/77* Nikkon Philippine Air Cebu, Philippines Scheduled 0 0 25 Destroyed

Aeroplane Lines passenger
YS‑11A

While on approach, the left engine apparently began to fail. The pilot attempted to apply power but this proved ineffective. Attempts to
feather the left propeller were also unsuccessful, and with the aircraft yawing to the left, descending and becoming uncontrollable, the
pilot elected to ditch the aircraft.

8/8/77 Cessna 404 NA Christchurch, Cargo 1 0 NA Destroyed

New Zealand

Immediately after receiving clearance to descend from 10,000 feet, the pilot reported that he had lost control of the aircraft. It struck the sea
45 miles north of Christchurch.

8/24/77* Curtiss C-46 Societe Goyave, Guadeloupe Unscheduled 0 0 4 Destroyed

Quarterwinds Cargo

The port engine was heard to misfire and had to be throttled back, while power was increased on the starboard engine. The port engine
stopped a few minutes later, and a drop in oil pressure on the starboard engine forced the pilot to reduce power. As the aircraft could no
longer maintain its cruising speed, the pilot ditched in the sea as near the coast as possible. The aircraft floated for a few minutes, and the
occupants were rescued by boat.

9/2/77 Canadair Transmeridian Waglan Island, Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed

CL44-D4 Air Cargo Hong Kong cargo

Shortly after takeoff from Hong Kong, the aircraft’s no. 4 propeller was feathered. The crew reported that an engine had failed and had been
shut down. Five minutes after takeoff, the crew reported an engine on fire, and three minutes later, there was an interrupted transmission
“We’re going in — the engine’s come off.” There were no further transmissions from the aircraft. Witnesses said that the aircraft was on fire
when it struck the sea about eight minutes after takeoff.

10/31/77* NA NA Wanganui, New Zealand Cargo 1 0 NA Destroyed

The pilot reported that the aircraft’s engine had failed. The aircraft was ditched in darkness in rough sea conditions. The main aircraft
wreckage was not located.

11/7/77 Rockwell Mechanical New Orleans, Business 3 0 1 Destroyed

Sabre 40 Equipment Co. Louisiana, U.S.

Following a night takeoff from Runway 35, the aircraft was flown to approximately 300 feet, then began a left turn and a slow descent to the
Lake Pontchartrain surface. Upon contact with the water, an explosion was heard and a brief fire was observed. The wreckage was located 1.5
miles from the runway and 500 feet left of the runway centerline. The pilot survived with minor injuries.

11/19/77 Learjet 25B Taxi Aero Matila Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
passenger

There were several puddles of water on the runway. During the takeoff run, the left engine flamed out because of water ingestion. The
pilot discontinued the takeoff 300 meters before the runway end. The aircraft aquaplaned, overran the runway and went into the sea.

12/18/77 Aerospatiale Societe de Funchal, Madeira, Unscheduled 36 21 0 Destroyed

SE.210 Caravelle Transport Portugal passenger
10R Aerien

During an NDB approach at night, the aircraft apparently descended below a safe altitude and struck the sea shortly after turning onto base
leg. The impact with the sea apparently was relatively gentle, but the aircraft broke up and sank rapidly.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 475
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/1/78 Boeing 747 Air India Bombay, India Scheduled 213 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
After takeoff, the aircraft was identified by approach radar, and the crew was instructed to climb on track to FL 310 and report leaving FL
80. The crew acknowledged this message. The last message recorded on ATC tape was from the pilot to the approach radar controller:
“Happy New Year to you, Sir. Will report leaving 80; 855.” The aircraft was observed on radar up to 4.5 nautical miles; thereafter, the radar
echo disappeared. There was no further contact with the aircraft. The aircraft had struck the sea off the Bombay coast 5.3 nautical miles from
Bombay Airport reference point about 20 seconds after the last transmission.
1/2/78* Douglas DC-3 NA Rio Grande, Scheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S. passenger
While cruising at 2,000 feet on an air taxi flight, a power loss on the no. 1 engine occurred about 12 miles east of San Juan. The pilot identified
the engine and conducted the engine-out procedure. While securing the no. 1 engine, the crew observed a loss of power on the no. 2 engine.
The pilot attempted unsuccessfully to restore power on the no. 1 engine while advising San Juan Approach Control about the impending
ditching.
The aircraft was ditched about 1,000 feet offshore from Rio Grande, Puerto Rico. There was no fire and all occupants were evacuated safely in
accordance with the airline operating manual.
2/22/78 Learjet 35 NA Palermo, Sicily, Italy NA 3 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane was reported missing while approaching to land at Palermo.
3/3/78 Hawker Siddeley Linea Macuto, Venezuela Scheduled 47 0 0 Destroyed
HS 748 Aeropostal passenger
Venezolana
Two minutes after takeoff, the pilot declared an emergency and informed approach that he was returning to the airport because of
difficulties with the artificial horizon. The aircraft struck the sea 2.8 nautical miles from Punta Mulatoa. The depth of the water at the accident
site made it impossible to recover major parts of the aircraft.
3/25/78 Douglas DC-3 Dominica Air Grand Turk, Turks and NA 1 0 2 Destroyed
Services Caicos Islands
The airplane struck the sea shortly after takeoff. Reports said that immediately after takeoff, there was a fire on board and considerable
smoke.
4/1/78* DV240 NA Unguia, Colombia NA 0 0 2 Substantial
The airplane was ditched in a lagoon. The crew was rescued.
5/8/78 Boeing 727 National Airlines Pensacola, Florida, U.S. Scheduled 3 4 51 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft struck Escambia Bay during a surveillance radar approach to Runway 25 at Pensacola Regional Airport. The accident occurred
about three nautical miles from the east end of Runway 25, and the airplane came to rest in about 12 feet of water. There were 52 passengers
and a crew of six on board; three passengers drowned.
5/12/78* CV440 NA Shippingport, Ferry 0 0 3 Substantial
Pennsylvania, U.S.
The airplane was ditched following failure of one engine and partial power loss on the other. Improper in-flight decisions were also a factor.
7/22/78* Curtiss C-46 NA Opa Locka, Florida, U.S. Instructional 0 0 3 NA
Both engines quit during final approach, and the pilot ditched the aircraft.
9/3/78 De Havilland Airwest Airlines Vancouver Harbour, Scheduled 11 2 0 Destroyed
DHC-6 Canada
A Twin Otter operating as a scheduled VFR flight departed from Victoria Harbour, British Columbia, with Vancouver Harbour water-airport
as destination. The estimated time en route was 20 minutes. The flight proceeded normally until landing clearance was given to the flight
by the Harbour Tower. The approach continued, and when the aircraft was approximately 175 feet above the surface, the two surviving
passengers heard a noise. Power was subsequently applied, and the aircraft yawed left, rolled in the same direction and plunged into the
harbor in a left-wing-down and nose-down attitude, 2,500 feet from the intended landing area.

476 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/21/78 Douglas DC-3 NA Matanzas, Cuba Ferry 4 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was to pick up 21 passengers to return to the United States. The flight was reported to be routine in good weather at 6,000 feet
when the aircraft disappeared from U.S. air traffic radar at the approximate position stated.
10/1/78* Douglas DC-3 NA Ft. Walton, Florida, U.S. Miscellaneous 1 0 3 Destroyed
The pilot ditched the aircraft after becoming lost/disoriented following an electrical system failure with an unknown cause.
10/23/78 Antonov An-24 Aeroflot Gulf of Sivash, Scheduled 26 0 0 Destroyed
Ukraine, USSR passenger
After takeoff, while the aircraft was in a climb through 2,400 meters, the left engine flamed out, followed 14 seconds later by the right
engine. The aircraft struck the sea. The engine failures were “probably due to icing.”
11/5/78 Douglas DC-3 WEPCO Mediterranean Unscheduled 17 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft is believed to have struck the sea shortly after takeoff for Alexandria, Egypt.
11/8/78 De Havilland Air Guadeloupe Marie Galante, Scheduled 15 5 0 Destroyed
DHC-6 Guadeloupe passenger
The aircraft struck the water with the left wing tip. The wreckage stayed afloat for a very brief period, then sank in 13 meters of water.
11/18/78 DHC-6 Air Guadeloupe Marie Galante, Scheduled 15 5 0 Destroyed
Twin Otter 300 Guadeloupe/St. passenger
Barthelemy
The aircraft was destroyed when it was flown into the sea while en route from Guadeloupe to Marie Galante. After departure, the weather
had apparently deteriorated very rapidly because of approaching storms.
11/29/78 CV240 NA Miami, Florida, U.S. Instructional 1 1 0 Destroyed
While on a local training flight, the pilot in the right seat gave the copilot trainee a simulated single-engine emergency, retarding the left throttle
at V2 (takeoff safety speed). The trainee lost directional control, which he failed to regain by reapplying the left throttle. The aircraft touched down,
with its landing gear extended, left of the runway pavement and continued 1,000 feet before coming to rest in a canal. Fire erupted immediately.
Both occupants evacuated the wreckage successfully, but burning fuel on the water surface impeded their efforts to reach the canal bank.
12/23/78 McDonnell Alitalia Palermo, Sicily, Italy Scheduled 108 0 21 Destroyed
Douglas DC-9-32 Passenger
During the final stages of a VOR/DME approach to Punta Raisi Airport, Palermo, the aircraft undershot the runway, striking the surface of the
sea some three nautical miles short of the runway threshold. The accident happened in darkness and poor weather.
1/22/79 Partenavia P68 Business AT Lydd, England Passenger 3 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck the sea during a radar approach. The cause was not determined.
1/30/79 Boeing 707 Varig Pacific Ocean Scheduled cargo 5 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was reported missing during a flight from Tokyo, Japan, to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and was presumed to have struck the sea.
2/17/79 Fokker F27 Air New Manukau Harbour, Unscheduled 2 0 2 Destroyed
Zealand New Zealand passenger
The aircraft descended into the sea short of the threshold of Runway 05 at Auckland Airport during a daylight visual approach toward a
band of heavy rain.
3/10/79* Nord 262 Swift Aire Lines Los Angeles, Scheduled 3 0 4 Destroyed
California, U.S. passenger
The aircraft was ditched in Santa Monica Bay, near Marina Del Rey, California, shortly after takeoff from Los Angeles International Airport. The
aircraft was being flown on a scheduled commuter airline passenger flight from Los Angeles, California, to Santa Maria, California, with four
passengers and three crewmembers on board. The crewmembers and one passenger died when they were unable to get out of the aircraft.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 477
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/17/79 De Havilland NA Barbados Ferry 2 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-4 Caribou
During a ferry flight, the pilot radioed that an engine had failed and that the other engine was overheating. He gave his position as 68
nautical miles south of Barbados and said he was diverting to that island. Forty-four minutes later, he made his last transmission and
reported that the airplane was at 50 feet. No trace of the aircraft was found, despite an intensive search mounted by Barbados.
The only overwater survival equipment on board was four life vests.
5/17/79* Douglas DC-4 NA Gulf of Mexico NA 0 0 3 Destroyed
The airplane caught fire and was ditched in the Gulf of Mexico.
6/9/79 Beech 99 Skystream Chicago, Illinois, U.S. Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
Airlines
The aircraft struck Lake Michigan during the final segment of a visual approach to Meigs Field, Chicago. The accident happened in daylight
but in poor weather, with low cloud and visibility of one mile or less.
6/11/79* Douglas DC-3 NA Selway River, Idaho, U.S. NA 9 0 3 Destroyed
One engine caught fire and separated from the aircraft. The pilot conducted a forced landing on the Selway River.
6/14/79* Douglas DC-4 NA Eagle Lake, Maine, U.S. NA 0 0 NA Substantial
The pilot reported fire on the flight deck. The aircraft was landed on the lake and was towed to shore.
6/17/79 De Havilland NA River Trent, England Demonstration- 0 0 2 Substantial
Tiger Moth Racing
The aircraft struck a wire across the River Trent and landed in the river.
7/7/79* Vega 37 Ventura NA Aruba, North Atlantic Practice 0 0 3 Destroyed
While flying over clouds, all aircraft electrical systems failed and the pilot became lost because of a faulty magnetic compass and integrated
flight system. He got one generator functioning and determined his position to be 60 nautical miles northwest of Aruba.
The aircraft was ditched because of fuel exhaustion 30 nautical miles west of Aruba.
7/10/79* Beagle A61 NA NA Practice 0 0 2 Substantial
The engine failed on takeoff, and the aircraft was ditched in four feet of water.
7/15/79* Piper PA-25 Harvest West Cliff Bay, U.K. Aerial 0 0 1 Substantial
Pawnee application
The aircraft was spraying an oil slick with detergent when the engine failed and the aircraft was ditched.
7/20/79 Douglas DC-6 Kimex Kingston, Jamaica Cargo 2 0 2 Destroyed
The airplane struck the sea while approaching to land.
7/30/79 Fuji 200 NA NA Personal 2 0 2 Minor
The aircraft was being used to film a tall-ship race when the engine failed and the aircraft struck the sea. The pilot and front-seat passenger
escaped; one of the two rear-seat passengers was released before the aircraft sank but died later.
7/31/79 Hawker Siddeley Dan-Air Sumburgh Airport, U.K. Unscheduled 17 2 28 Destroyed
748 passenger
The aircraft was being flown on a charter flight from Sumburgh Airport to Aberdeen, Scotland, with 44 passengers and a crew of three.
During takeoff on Runway 09, the aircraft failed to become airborne and struck the sea about 50 meters offshore and approximately in line
with the end of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed and 17 people, including both pilots, died by drowning.
8/11/79 Learjet 35 NA En route Athens, NA 5 0 0 Destroyed
Greece/Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia
The airplane was reported missing during a flight from Athens to Jeddah.

478 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/12/79 Piper PA-25 Harvest Bantry Bay, Ireland Demonstration- 0 0 1 Destroyed
Pawnee Racing
The pilot was demonstrating spraying for oil pollution over the sea. The engine failed when the airplane was steeply banked. The pilot
recovered from a spin, but the aircraft stalled and hit the water.
8/13/79 Volmer NA Dornoch, U.K. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The amphibian was landed hard in a rough sea. The hull was punctured, and the aircraft sank.
8/14/79* Rockwell 112 NA Cliffy Island, Victoria, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Australia
The engine ran rough during an overwater crossing at 2,000 feet and failed at 1,200 feet. The pilot ditched the airplane in two-foot waves
in Bass Strait with flaps and landing gear retracted. The pilot had difficulty escaping the sinking aircraft and floated for 15 minutes before
being rescued.
9/3/79 Aerospatiale Sterling Nice, France Unscheduled 10 0 0 Destroyed
Corvette 601 Airways passenger
About 20 minutes before arrival at Nice, the pilot broadcast a distress call, advised ATC that the right engine had failed and requested a
straight-in approach. Intermittent power failure occurred on the left engine and by the time of arrival at Nice, both engines had failed.
The pilot began an approach but lost control of the aircraft while attempting to turn onto final, and the aircraft struck the sea about 1,500
meters short of the runway threshold.
9/11/79 Boeing 707 China Airlines Taoyuan, Taiwan, China Training 6 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane struck the sea shortly after takeoff for a crew training flight.
11/1/79 De Havilland Austin Airways Big Trout Lake, Canada Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-6
A witness on the ground said that he heard the aircraft and then saw it heading toward a 150-foot radio beacon tower. He then saw the
aircraft bank in an apparent attempt to avoid the tower, but it struck either the supporting wires or the tower, which then collapsed. The
aircraft fell into the lake.
12/3/79* Cessna U206 NA Dog Island, Passenger 0 0 NA Destroyed
New Zealand
After takeoff, the pilot reduced power, and severe engine vibrations followed. He checked the engine instruments, which indicated normal
operation, and then the engine failed. After an unsuccessful attempt to restart the engine, the aircraft was ditched. The pilot evacuated
without serious injury after being struck on the head by an unrestrained tin of paint.
1/30/80 Dassault Kellogg Co. Chicago, Illinois, U.S. Personal 2 4 0 Destroyed
Falcon 10
The aircraft failed to attain takeoff speed, continued off the end of the runway in a nose-high attitude and came to rest in shallow water
about 300 feet beyond the departure end of the runway.
3/6/80* Piper PA-31 NA Nice, France Commercial 0 0 1 Destroyed
An engine failed, and the aircraft was flown with one engine. The operating engine overheated, and manifold pressure dropped. The pilot
declared an emergency and ditched the airplane in the sea while some power remained. He was rescued by helicopter within two minutes
of entering the water.
5/13/80 Ilyushin IL-14 Cubana Varadero, Cuba Training 3 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane struck the sea approximately 1,500 feet offshore during a crew-training flight.
5/19/80 Learjet 25D Northeast Jet Gulf of Mexico Ferry 2 0 0 Destroyed
Co.
About two and one-half minutes after the aircraft was reported at FL 430, the Jacksonville, Florida, U.S., Air Route Traffic Control Center
received an unusual staccato sound transmission over the frequency, followed 18 seconds later by a report from the copilot that said,
“Can’t get it up. … It’s in a spin.” About 33 seconds after the first staccato sounds, radio and radar contact were lost about 104 miles west of
Sarasota, Florida. Floating debris was located by a search aircraft and later recovered; the flight crew was not found. There were no known
witnesses to the accident.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/15/80* Piaggio 149 NA Tees estuary, England Private business 1 0 3 Destroyed
The aircraft ran out of fuel and was ditched. Life vests were stored in a compartment beneath four cases and three rifles. Before a signal
could be fired, the aircraft sank.
6/27/80 MD DC-9 Itavia Palermo, Sicily, Italy Scheduled 81 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft flew normally until an unidentified object crossed from west to east, at high speed. The object did not collide with the aircraft.
Radar echoes demonstrated that a large part of the aircraft preserved longitudinal stability, confirming the presence of airfoil surfaces.
Airport fragment laboratory tests and pathological examinations demonstrated that the aircraft was damaged either by collision with an
unidentified object or by explosion and not by airframe failure. The aircraft did not collide with another aircraft.
8/2/80* Jodel DR105 NA Dee estuary, U.K. Personal 3 0 1 Destroyed
Thirty-nine minutes after takeoff, the pilot declared mayday and said that power was failing. Later, he said that he was ditching the airplane.
A ship found the aircraft wreckage and one survivor. Bodies of the pilot and two infants were later recovered. None wore life vests prior to
the ditching.
8/7/80 Tupolev Tu-154 Tarom Nouadhibou, Mauritania Scheduled 2 NA NA Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft was being flown on a scheduled flight from Bucharest, Romania. During the final approach to land, the pilots undershot the
runway and the airplane struck the sea 300 meters short. One passenger was killed and one was missing.
9/12/80 Boeing 727 Olympic Corfu, Greece Scheduled 0 0 115 Substantial
Airways passenger
During landing roll on Runway 35, the right-main landing gear leg detached, dragged underneath the wing and then hit the no. 3 engine
on the lower part of the cowling. This moved the engine 45 degrees upward, and the aircraft veered to the right.
The aircraft came to rest to the right of the runway, having run 1,100 meters. The aircraft entered a lake located beside runway, from the
nose to the front main door, with the water reaching the height of the nose leg. Evacuation took place within five minutes, by the two left-
hand emergency windows, as well as by the aft right-hand and left-hand main doors.
9/12/80 Douglas DC-3 Florida Freeport, Bahamas Unscheduled 34 0 0 Destroyed
Commuter passenger
Airlines
The airplane departed from West Palm Beach International Airport, Palm Beach, Florida, U.S., for Freeport, Grand Bahama Island, Bahamas, on
a passenger flight. The aircraft struck the Atlantic Ocean about 3.5 nautical miles southwest of West End Settlement, Grand Bahama Island.
The last radio transmission received was when the first officer said that the aircraft was descending from 3,000 feet and acknowledged
clearance for the VOR Runway 24 approach at Freeport. The aircraft was not recovered.
9/15/80 Douglas DC-6B NA Haiti Other 3 1 0 Destroyed
The aircraft departed from Nassau, Bahamas, on a VFR flight plan to South Caicos, Turks and Caicos Islands. The aircraft experienced high oil
consumption en route. The crew shut down the no. 1 engine near the destination and subsequently lost radio contact and diverted. Two
more engines were shut down.
A Haitian fisherman rescued one of the aircraft’s occupants from the ocean.
9/24/80* Piper PA-23 NA English Channel Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
The power failed on the port engine, which was shut down. Then power gradually began to fail on the starboard engine. The pilot declared
mayday and ditched the aircraft.
10/13/80* Fokker F.27-400 Pelita Air Irian Jaya, Indonesia Unscheduled 0 0 4 Destroyed
Services cargo
A navigational error caused the captain to assume wrongly that an island in sight was the flight’s destination. A descent in preparation
for landing was commenced, but the crew was unable to see the destination airport. The crew elected to circle in an attempt to find the
airport, but without success, and after one hour, 40 minutes, with fuel running low, the captain decided to conduct a forced landing in
shallow water just off the island. The ditching took place some 80 nautical miles from the intended destination.

480 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/28/80 Douglas DC-6A NA Bimini, Bahamas NA 4 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft flew into the sea for unknown reasons. The aircraft broke up on impact with the water. Identity of the wreckage was confirmed.
12/3/80* Piper PA-23 Intra Exmouth, England Private business 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot declared pan-pan and said that one engine had failed and the other was running roughly. The aircraft was ditched in 10 feet of
water near a beach with the landing gear and flaps retracted and both propellers feathered.
2/24/81 Embraer EMB-110 Vortec Taxi Belem, Brazil Scheduled 12 2 0 Destroyed
Bandeirante Aereo passenger
During a visual approach, the pilot allowed the aircraft to descend below a safe altitude and it collided with the mast of a ship in dry dock
1.6 kilometers short of the runway threshold. After the initial impact, the aircraft struck a second vessel and fell into the river. The accident
was attributed to the pilot’s continued flight into adverse weather.
3/28/81* Douglas DC-4 Tuky Air St. Croix, Virgin Islands Unscheduled 1 0 1 Destroyed
Transport cargo
En route, the no. 3 engine caught fire. Efforts to feather the propeller and extinguish the fire were successful. Control difficulties led to
the pilot’s decision to ditch the aircraft. The crew evacuated the aircraft. When a rescue boat arrived several minutes later, the copilot had
drowned. The aircraft floated 45 minutes before sinking.
4/21/81 Douglas DC-3 NA Mediterranean Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
Passenger
Radar contact was lost 15 miles north of Andraitx, Spain, and communication with the aircraft could not be restored. A six-day search of
a large area of the Mediterranean was unsuccessful. The only indication of what happened is from radar recordings that indicate that the
aircraft lost speed and altitude and disappeared from radar screens.
5/7/81 BAC 1-11 Austral Lineas River Plate Estuary, Scheduled 30 0 0 Destroyed
Aereas Argentina passenger
The aircraft, on a scheduled passenger flight from Tucuman, Argentina, struck the River Plate near the Emilio Mitre canal about 15.2
kilometers east-southeast of Buenos Aires’ Jorge Newbery Airport.
There were no survivors among the 30 occupants, and only about 55 percent to 65 percent of the aircraft was salvaged from the river. The
flight and voice recorders were not found after 42 days of searching.
6/10/81 Swearingen NA Cameron, Louisiana, U.S. Other 2 0 0 Destroyed
SA226T
The crew conducted an uncontrolled descent into the sea during flight in severe thunderstorms. The aircraft was loaded with
marijuana.
6/17/81 Douglas DC-3 NA Miraflores, Colombia Scheduled 2 7 3 Destroyed
passenger
Shortly before landing, the pilot advised ATC that he had feathered one propeller. He then made a general broadcast to other aircraft to
clear the area because of the emergency. Another aircraft landed at Miraflores ahead of the Douglas DC-3, forcing it to overshoot and
reposition to land in the opposite direction. Control was lost during this maneuver, and the aircraft struck a lake.
8/15/81 De Havilland NA Ancona, Italy Demonstration- 1 0 0 Destroyed
Chipmunk Racing
The aircraft struck the sea during an air display.
10/3/81* Rockwell 112 Eastern Air Floddaymore, U.K. Private business 1 0 1 Destroyed
Executive
A rough-running engine, which the investigation attributed to fuel starvation, led to the ditching. The aircraft floated on the water at first,
but the port door would not open because the left wing was distorted. The aircraft sank. The pilot climbed onto a rock and was rescued,
but the passenger was washed back into the water by a wave and drowned.
10/26/81* American NA Bateau Bay, New South Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Aircraft AA-1C Wales, Australia
While the airplane was in cruise flight 600 feet over the sea, the engine failed. Unable to restore power, the pilot decided to ditch in the sea
rather than attempt a landing on the rocky shore. The pilot and passenger were rescued by a surfboard rider.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/26/81 Constellation Argo St. Thomas, Unscheduled 3 2 0 Destroyed
HI-328 U.S. Virgin Islands cargo
The crew received clearance for a landing on Runway 09. Approaching the centerline, the pilot reported, “Runway in sight.” On radar, the
aircraft was seen to enter a right turn. Radio contact was then lost. The aircraft struck the water about three kilometers south of the airport.
The wreckage sank the following day while being towed to shore.
11/8/81 Aero Commander NA Merimbula, New South Other aerial work 1 0 0 Substantial
500-S Wales, Australia
The pilot was returning the airplane to the point of origin because of an engine malfunction. The aircraft was incorrectly positioned on
final approach. A go-around was initiated from a low altitude. The pilot misjudged the height above the water, and the wing struck the
water surface. The airplane cartwheeled and sank.
11/15/81* Piper PA-24-250 NA Coolangatta, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Queensland, Australia
The engine failed during the climbout, and the pilot conducted an emergency landing in the sea.
12/3/81* Piper PA-24 NA English Channel Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Comanche
The aircraft was ditched and sank following a power failure. The pilot and passenger were rescued by helicopter.
1/13/82 Boeing 737 Air Florida Washington, D.C., U.S. Scheduled 74 5 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft stalled following takeoff, with snow/ice on airfoil surfaces. The aircraft then struck a bridge 0.75 miles from takeoff and fell into
the Potomac River.
1/17/82* Convair 440 Island Airlines Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Scheduled cargo 0 0 3 Destroyed
Hawaii
After liftoff, the pilot called for the landing gear to be raised. As the pilot flew the airplane through about 100 feet AGL, there was a loss
of power in the right engine. The pilot observed a fire. Ground witnesses heard a muffled explosion and saw smoke and fire trailing from
the right engine. The right engine was feathered, and the pilot attempted to return to the airport, but was unable to maintain altitude. The
airplane was ditched near Pearl Harbor.
1/23/82 MD DC-10-30CF World Airways Boston, Scheduled 2 4 206 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S. passenger
Following a nonprecision instrument approach to Runway 15R at Boston Logan International Airport, the aircraft touched down about 2,800
feet beyond the displaced threshold of the 9,191-foot usable part of the runway. The aircraft veered to avoid the approach light pier at the
departure end of the runway and slid into the shallow water of Boston Harbor. The nose section separated from the fuselage in the impact
after the aircraft dropped from the shore embankment. Of the 212 persons on board, two persons were missing and presumed dead. The
other persons on board evacuated the aircraft, some with injuries.
1/24/82* Falcon 10 NA South America Corporate/ 0 0 5 Substantial
Executive
Fuel exhaustion occurred during a flight from Houston, Texas, U.S., to South America. The crew conducted an emergency landing in a swamp.
The three passengers and two crewmembers were not injured, and the aircraft was recovered.
1/26/82* Cessna 175 NA Portsmouth, England Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Skylark
The aircraft was over the Solent River when the engine ran roughly and then failed. The pilot declared mayday and ditched the aircraft. He
was rescued by helicopter.
2/8/82 Douglas DC-8-61 Japan Airlines Tokyo, Japan Scheduled 24 95 63 Destroyed
passenger
During the final stage of an approach, the aircraft suddenly descended and struck Tokyo Bay 510 meters short of the runway threshold.
It was reported that the pilot had disengaged the autopilot, pushed the control wheel forward and attempted to reduce power to the
engines. The copilot attempted a recovery but without success. The pilot’s actions apparently resulted from a “mental abnormality.”

482 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
2/20/82* Grumman G-21A NA North Cape Yakataga, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
Alaska, U.S. passenger
Both engines failed while the aircraft was being flown at 6,500 feet about 10 miles offshore. The crew was unable to restart the engines,
and the aircraft was ditched into 12-foot to 15-foot waves with a 40-knot surface wind. The right float was torn off, and both engine mounts
broke. The aircraft sank and was not recovered.
2/25/82 Cessna 210L NA Hilton Head, Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
South Carolina, U.S. passenger
The pilot requested and received vectors to the Hilton Head airport. The pilot was told that his gyro might be about 30 degrees off and
was given a revised heading. About two minutes later, the controller transmitted, “Turn right now, heading two five zero.” The pilot’s
acknowledgement was the last transmission received. A search ensued, but no major pieces of wreckage were recovered. Three pieces of
wreckage washed up on shore.
2/27/82* Cessna 152 NA Miami Beach, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
While the pilot was flying the airplane over the ocean, the engine began to vibrate. The pilot decided to return to the airport. The engine-oil
pressure decreased to zero, and the aircraft was ditched in the ocean.
3/2/82 Cessna 182E NA Forster, New South Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
Wales, Australia
The pilot did not obtain a weather forecast prior to departure. He was advised by pilots of other aircraft of poor weather at the destination
but continued with the flight. The pilot reported heavy rain at the destination. The aircraft wing apparently hit the water during a turn. The
pilot was not rated for IMC.
3/8/82* Cessna T188C NA Block Island, Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Rhode Island, U.S.
The engine began to run roughly. After the airplane was turned back toward Block Island, the fuel pressure began to fluctuate and
decrease, along with the manifold pressure. The pilot performed an emergency-system fuel check, but the engine lost all power, and the
aircraft was ditched.
3/11/82 De Havilland Wideroe Ganvik, Norway Scheduled 15 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-6 passenger
While being flown at 2,000 feet in VMC along the coastline in moderate turbulence, the aircraft struck the sea. The fin and rudder separated
in flight because of overload forces. The reason for breakup in flight could not be determined, but it was suggested that the overload
resulted from a combination of clear air turbulence and pilot control input.
3/17/82 Cessna 150 Pilot/owner Tilghman Island, Instructional 1 0 0 Destroyed
Maryland, U.S.
The student pilot conducted a takeoff from his farm to fly the aircraft to a meeting with an instructor. Heavy fog moved in. Crewmembers
of an oyster boat near the island heard an aircraft being flown low overhead. Shortly afterward, they saw the airplane emerge from the
overcast in a right bank, then level just before striking the water. A blood-alcohol level of 0.14 percent was found in the pilot’s body.
3/18/82* Hawker Siddeley Calm Air Churchill, Scheduled 0 0 21 Destroyed
748 Srs. 2A Manitoba, Canada passenger
During takeoff, the starboard engine failed at rotation. As the crew prepared to land on another runway, the port engine also failed. A
gear-up landing was conducted in the Churchill River.
4/3/82* Piper PA-18 NA Hollywood, Florida, U.S. Banner towing 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot was towing a banner along a beach when the aircraft engine failed. The pilot landed the airplane in the water just offshore and
escaped without injury. The aircraft was destroyed by the surf.
4/17/82 Beech B19 NA College Park, Personal 0 0 2 Minor
Maryland, U.S.
The stall warning was sounding during the takeoff. The pilot turned the aircraft into the wind, but because of buildings in the flight path, he
turned the airplane 360 degrees. The aircraft would not climb, so the pilot lowered the nose to gain airspeed. The aircraft collided with trees
and landed in a creek.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 483
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/20/82* Cessna 150K NA Santa Barbara, Fish spotting 0 0 1 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The engine failed while the pilot was spotting fish at night. He was unable to restart the engine or glide the airplane to shore. The airplane
was ditched about 3.5 miles from shore and was not recovered.
4/21/82 Cessna 172 NA English Channel Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot declared mayday while the aircraft was over the English Channel when the engine failed because of fuel exhaustion. A full search-
and-rescue effort was maintained for two days, but the aircraft and its occupants were not found.
5/6/82 Learjet 23 Ibex Corp. Savannah, Georgia, U.S. Business 4 0 0 Destroyed
While in cruise flight en route to Orlando, Florida, U.S., from Teterboro, New Jersey, the flight crew was cleared by the Jacksonville Air Route
Traffic Control Center to descend from FL 410 to FL 390. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance, and ATC observed the radar target
descend. About two minutes later, the aircraft struck the Atlantic Ocean from a steep, high-speed descent about 12 miles from Savannah,
Georgia. The air traffic controller made several unsuccessful attempts to contact the pilots, who had reported no difficulties in any of their
radio transmissions.
5/9/82 De Havilland Alyemda Aden, Yemen Scheduled 23 0 26 Destroyed
DHC-7 passenger
The pilot reported the runway in sight at a distance of nine nautical miles and was cleared to report on final for Runway 26. The pilot
reported the airplane on short final, the airplane was observed by the tower, and the pilot was cleared to land. The aircraft then was seen
losing altitude. It struck the sea one nautical mile from the runway threshold.
5/10/82 Piper PA-12 NA Dunbar, Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
West Virginia, U.S.
The pilot conducted a takeoff toward power lines that crossed a river. The aircraft was at about 100 feet and was being turned left, away from
the power lines, when it nosed over and struck the river.
5/13/82 Cessna A185F NA Houma, Louisiana, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot was distracted during the approach and did not use the checklist. He landed the aircraft wheels-down in water, and the aircraft
nosed down.
5/13/82 Volmer Aircraft NA Muskegon, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Amphibian Michigan, U.S.
The pilot returned to land on a lake after conducting touch-and-go landings at an airport. He said that he conducted a water landing with
the landing gear extended. During touchdown, the amphibious aircraft nosed over.
5/15/82 DHC-6 Twin Otter Kenn Borek Air Nanisivik, Northwest Unscheduled 0 0 9 Destroyed
300 Territories, Canada passenger
After landing on snow-covered sea ice, the landing gear broke through the surface and the aircraft began to sink. The crew and passengers
evacuated safely but the aircraft was lost.
5/23/82 Cessna 180 NA North Cordova, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Alaska, U.S.
The pilot was conducting a landing diagonally into a strong headwind. After touchdown, the left wing lifted up and the aircraft began a
gentle turn to the right. Witnesses heard the engine power increase and observed an attempted go-around. The main landing gear struck
two waves, and the airplane struck the water in a nose-down pitch attitude.
5/30/82 Thurston Teal NA Methuen, Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
TSC-1A Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings on a river in an amphibious aircraft. After a landing in rough water, the pilot began a high-
speed taxi takeoff. When violent shaking began, the pilot reduced power, pulled back the stick and landed. The aircraft nosed over. The
landing gear was found in the down position.

484 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/7/82 Cessna 172M NA Thomasville, Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
Georgia, U.S.
The aircraft was being flown for a survey of farm crops. Reports said that as the aircraft passed along the side of a 20-acre farm lake, it circled
and descended, then came out of the turn. Witnesses saw the aircraft at an altitude of 10 feet to 30 feet, after which it struck the water with
no change in engine sound. Divers found no bodies in the cockpit. The seat belts and shoulder harnesses were found hanging loose with no
damage and no evidence that they had been latched during impact.
6/8/82 Cessna 150 Sherburn Flamborough, England Instructional 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck the sea during a cross-country exercise. The pilot’s body was later recovered.
6/16/82* Cessna 152 NA Tulsa, Oklahoma, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The engine failed during climb at 1,300 feet and would not restart. The pilot conducted an emergency landing in the Arkansas River.
6/18/82 Cessna 185F NA Chinitna B, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 1 0 2 Destroyed
cargo
The pilot began a takeoff, but the aircraft would not get on the step. Examination of the right float revealed that the second compartment
from the front was full of water. While taxiing to a sand beach three miles to five miles away, the nose of the aircraft sank. The occupants
exited with difficulty. A short time later, the aircraft rolled over, and a hole was observed in the no. 2 compartment next to the keel. One
passenger stayed with the airplane until rescued. The other passenger is presumed to have drowned as he and the pilot swam toward
shore.
6/21/82* Cessna 310 NA Horseshoe, Florida, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot said that during an overwater flight, he observed that the right engine fuel flow indication was fluctuating, the engine was
cutting in and out and intense white smoke was coming out of the louvers on top of the engine cowling. The pilot saw a fishing boat in
the vicinity and ditched the aircraft near the vessel. The aircraft sank in deep water, and the pilot was rescued by the crew of the fishing
boat.
6/26/82* Downer NA Llano, Texas, U.S. Test flight 0 0 1 Substantial
Republic RC-3
As the landing gear was being lowered to land at the airport, a “pop” was heard. Reportedly, the noise occurred when the clevis on the
rod end of the retract/extend cylinder failed. The pilot reported that the landing gear would not retract or extend but swung freely in
a trailing position. He decided to conduct a water landing, believing that the gear would trail behind. The aircraft bounced on its first
touchdown. The wheels were knocked back hard, then bounced fully forward and locked. Subsequently, the aircraft flipped forward
onto its back.
7/4/82* Cessna 182 NA Madison, Indiana, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Destroyed
The pilot said that the airplane’s engine gradually failed on a dark night. The pilot landed the airplane upwind on the Ohio River. After
ditching, the occupants egressed and swam to shore, but the airplane sank and was not recovered.
7/5/82* Beech 60 NA Santa Monica, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
California, U.S.
At 700 feet, the pilot said that his left engine had failed. He immediately feathered the left propeller and continued to climb, planning
to restart the engine before returning to land. At 1,000 feet, the pilot determined that the aircraft was no longer climbing. His airspeed
was below the single-engine best-rate-of-climb speed, and he felt a power loss in the right engine. He put the airplane’s nose down and
feathered the right propeller. The aircraft struck the water 6,000 feet from the Santa Monica Pier. Lifeguards were on the scene with a
rescue boat when the pilot surfaced.
7/5/82* Beech B23 NA North Castle, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
New York, U.S.
The aircraft was ditched and sank in a reservoir in 20 feet of water after the engine failed in flight.
7/16/82* Republic RC-3 NA Southwick, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
After the engine began running roughly during flight, the pilot decided to land the amphibious airplane in a field, and he extended the
landing gear. When he saw that the aircraft would not clear trees, he decided to land on a nearby lake. There was no time to retract the gear,
and during the landing, the airplane flipped over.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/18/82* Cessna 150 NA Englewood, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot initiated a descent to wave to someone on a beach, then initiated a climb. As he advanced the throttle, the engine responded
momentarily, then failed. He maneuvered to land on the beach, but the beach was crowded, so he ditched the airplane in the ocean.
7/20/82* Cessna 150M NA Orinda, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot reported a loss of climb power at 2,000 feet near the San Pablo Reservoir. Witnesses said that they observed the aircraft gliding
toward the east end of the reservoir at 200 feet, entering a sharp 180-degree right turn and landing in the reservoir.
7/26/82 Ercoupe 415C NA Port Sheldon, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Michigan, U.S.
During a VFR flight along the Lake Michigan shoreline, the pilot encountered a lowering ceiling. The pilot attempted to conduct a 180-
degree turn to return to the airport, but during the turn, he encountered a fog bank. The pilot descended to avoid the fog bank, and the
airplane struck the lake.
8/1/82 Cessna A185F NA Friday Harbor, Executive/ 0 0 1 Substantial
Washington, U.S. Corporate
The pilot said that while he was conducting a water landing, everything was normal until after touchdown. As the aircraft decelerated, the
right float rose off the water as if it had traveled over a swell or had encountered an object. When the float contacted the water again, the
right front wheel dug into the water, the right wing tip contacted the water, and the aircraft pivoted 180 degrees before coming to rest. The
aircraft then overturned as the pilot exited.
8/3/82 Cessna 150H NA Anchorage, Alaska, U.S. Instructional 0 2 0 Substantial
While conducting a takeoff from a lake, the instructor reduced the power at 200 feet AGL to simulate a forced landing. The student turned
the aircraft 180 degrees and raised the nose; the aircraft entered a stall and spin and struck the water.
8/6/82* Beech 65 NA Andros Island, Bahamas Personal 0 0 3 Destroyed
The right engine failed and was feathered. The pilot said that the left engine partially failed and the aircraft would not maintain altitude.
Communication was maintained until the pilot reported ditching about 40 miles south of Nassau, Bahamas. A U.S. Navy vessel rescued the
pilot and two passengers.
8/6/82 Aeronca 11BC NA Long Lake, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
New York, U.S.
The pilot flew his airplane in a 360-degree turn to survey a lake landing area when airspeed decreased and the airplane stalled. The aircraft
sank in 15 feet of water.
8/21/82* Piper PA-30 NA Santa Catalina, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The aircraft’s right-engine power failed following departure from Santa Catalina. Unable to fly the aircraft to airport altitude, the pilot
decided to proceed over the open sea to San Clemente. About 19 miles from the island, the pilot switched fuel tanks and the left engine
stopped. The pilot ditched the aircraft.
8/22/82* Piper PA-22 NA Houston, Minnesota, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
During a go-around, the pilot applied power and retracted the flaps. The aircraft’s ability to climb and accelerate was negligible. To avoid
hitting trees, the pilot landed the airplane in a river near the end of the field.
8/22/82 Cessna 150L NA Kalispell, Wyoming, U.S. NA 1 0 1 Substantial
The aircraft struck Little Bitterroot Lake during a night flight. The pilot exited the airplane, but the passenger was incapacitated after impact
and drowned when the airplane sank. The pilot left the accident site and was not located, but he made telephone calls from New York and
Texas to a friend in Canada and indicated the location of the accident site.
8/27/82 De Havilland Tiger C Camber, U.K. Flight club 0 0 1 Destroyed
Tiger Moth
The floatplane pilot was practicing turns, completing one to the right and entering one to the left, when the aircraft’s nose dropped rapidly
and the aircraft plunged into the sea.

486 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/2/82 Champion 7EC NA Isleton, California, U.S. Observation 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was being used to observe and photograph the passenger’s boat. Witnesses said that the aircraft was circling the area when it
struck unmarked power lines that crossed the river. After impact, the aircraft struck the water and sank.
9/8/82* Cessna T210N NA St. Petersburg, Business 0 0 2 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The pilot contacted the tower for landing and advised that the airplane was low on fuel. Shortly thereafter, the engine failed. The aircraft was
ditched in shallow water at night in an inland waterway.
9/9/82* Cessna 172M NA Cheboygan, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Michigan, U.S.
The engine stopped during a flight over Lake Huron. Unable to glide to the airport, the pilot ditched the aircraft at the shoreline.
9/10/82 Boeing 707 Sudan Airways Khartoum, Sudan Positioning 0 0 11 Substantial
The aircraft was being returned empty from a flight to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, when it was landed in the River Nile three miles short of the
runway at Khartoum. The aircraft was substantially damaged, and three of the 11 crewmembers were slightly injured.
9/11/82 Piper PA-18-150 NA Wasilla, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
On takeoff, after reaching about 100 feet AGL, the airplane would not climb. Subsequently, the airplane struck power lines along a road that
divided Anderson Lake and King Lake. The aircraft then struck King Lake.
9/16/82* Wassmer 41 Alderney Alderney, Private business 0 0 1 Destroyed
Channel Islands, U.K.
The pilot reported a loss of oil pressure. The engine failed, and the pilot declared mayday. The aircraft was ditched, and the pilot was
rescued from his life raft.
9/17/82 Cessna U206F NA Nondalton, Alaska, U.S. NA 3 1 1 Destroyed
Shortly after takeoff from Hudson Lake, the left wing tip contacted the water, causing the aircraft to cartwheel. The aircraft came to
rest inverted and floated for a short time before sinking. A witness said that the waves on the lake were at least four feet high and were
breaking over the floats.
9/18/82* Piper PA-28-140 NA Gisborne, New Zealand Personal 0 0 NA Substantial
The aircraft’s engine failed as the pilot was turning onto final for Runway 32. The pilot ditched the aircraft 180 meters offshore and was
picked up by a jet rescue boat crew 12 minutes later.
10/5/82* Piper PA-23-250 NA Lake Placid, Florida, U.S. NA 2 0 0 Substantial
The aircraft was transporting marijuana and, during an attempted landing on a road at Lake Placid, collided with wires, damaging the
landing assembly. The pilot flew the aircraft north about four miles and ditched in a lake. The aircraft sank with both occupants and cargo.
10/10/82 Bellanca 7GCBC NA Peo, Oregon, U.S. Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
During a pleasure flight over the Willamette River, the aircraft began to climb and turn east. After a sudden jolt, the airplane began to spin
and struck the water.
10/12/82 Lake LA-4-200 NA Coeur d’Alene, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Idaho, U.S.
At dusk, under glassy water conditions, the airplane was flown on a final approach. After touchdown, the aircraft bounced back into the air
and a go-around was initiated. During the go-around, the aircraft drifted left. The left wing struck a boom piling, and the airplane struck the
water and sank.
11/20/82* Cessna 337 NA Andros, Bahamas Business 0 0 2 Substantial
Sixty miles from its destination, the flight was diverted to Nassau because of approaching darkness and the lack of an IFR flight plan. The
pilot said he was not IFR rated and did not have enough fuel for the flight to Nassau. The accident report said that ATC in Nassau “insisted
until it was dark and then relented” by giving the pilot clearance to land anywhere. No land was in sight, so the pilot landed near the light
of a ship and was rescued by the Coast Guard. The aircraft sank in 4,000 feet of water.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
12/9/82 Piper PA-31-350 NA 500 nautical miles east Ferry 2 0 0 Destroyed
of Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.
The pilot told ATC that the left engine was slowly losing oil pressure, that he had shut down the engine and that the airplane was unable
to maintain 6,000 feet. A descent was begun. In his last transmission, the pilot said that the airplane was at 500 feet, barely maintaining
altitude. Radio contact then was lost. The crew of a search aircraft observed floating debris and a body. A marker buoy was deployed, but
no recovery was accomplished. The aircraft was presumed to have been destroyed and both occupants were presumed to have been killed.
The aircraft struck the ocean in moderate sea conditions with wave heights estimated at three feet to five feet.
12/14/82* Cessna 185A NA Sawmill Bay, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Destroyed
The aircraft encountered gusty wind, and power was lost during takeoff. The aircraft landed hard on the water and nosed over but did not sink.
12/18/82 Cessna 182N NA Ringwood, Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
New Jersey, U.S.
The pilot declared an emergency because of power loss, and the aircraft struck a reservoir.
1/6/83* Teal TSC-1A NA Port Sulphur, Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
Louisiana, U.S.
The engine failed during a pull-up from a low pass over the airport. The pilot conducted an emergency landing in the icy Mississippi River
with the landing gear down. The amphibian struck a submerged object in the river and flipped over. The pilot and passenger attempted to
swim to shore, but because of the exceedingly cold water temperature, only the pilot reached the shore.
1/15/83* Cessna 336 NA Key Largo, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot requested vectors to the nearest airport because of fuel problems. The aircraft was ditched 0.5 mile south of Key Largo, Florida.
1/21/83* BE-90 NA Aruba Business 0 0 2 Substantial
During a flight from Haiti to Aruba, the aircraft ran out of fuel. A successful ditching was accomplished in the harbor three miles north of
the airport. The aircraft was towed in and salvaged. There were no injuries to the businessman pilot or passenger.
2/13/83 Learjet 35A Upali USA Strait of Malacca Business 6 0 0 Destroyed
The crew reported that the airplane was climbing through FL 270 for FL 390. This was the last radio communication from the aircraft. Some
small pieces of the aircraft were found by fishermen in the Strait of Malacca.
2/18/83* Cessna C-182P NA Bahia Honda, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The aircraft was ditched in the Bay of Florida after the engine failed at 1,000 feet. The pilot and passenger swam to shore without
injury.
2/21/83 Lake LA-4-200 NA Renmark, South Unscheduled 0 0 4 Substantial
Australia, Australia passenger
Takeoff and climb were normal until the aircraft reached riverside treetop height of 50 feet AGL. Climb attitude was maintained while
the aircraft was banked 25 degrees, turning right at a sharp bend. Speed decayed, altitude was lost and the starboard float hit water,
causing a yaw.
3/6/83 Cessna 182Q NA Lake Powell, Utah, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was seen being flown erratically before plunging into the lake during a landing attempt.
3/18/83* American Aircraft NA Nambucca Heads, New Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
AA-5B South Wales, Australia
The pilot began the takeoff run on a wet and boggy strip. The aircraft failed to accelerate normally and was ditched in a river about 50
meters off the end of the strip.
3/27/83 Cessna 185F NA Int. Coastal City, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S. passenger
The landing gear was not retracted after takeoff from the airport. When the pilot attempted to land on water, the aircraft flipped over and
sank. The landing gear is built into the floats, and during the retraction cycle, the landing gear retracts into the floats.

488 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/30/83* Cessna 182RG NA Palm Beach, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean five miles east of Palm Beach, Florida, after an electrical fire and engine failure.
4/19/83 Grumman G-44 NA Fond du Lac, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Wisconsin, U.S.
The pilot became preoccupied with a minor electrical problem and did not retract the landing gear before making a landing on water. On
water contact, the landing gear created enough drag to push the aircraft, nose first, into the water.
5/1/83 Cessna 177B NA Port Aransas, Texas, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The non-instrument-rated pilot found himself in instrument meteorological conditions. Radar contact was lost when the aircraft was about
two miles from the airport. Both occupants and aircraft debris were found near the Gulf of Mexico shore.
5/18/83 Learjet ATE Jet Service North Atlantic Ocean Commercial 3 0 0 Destroyed
training
The aircraft was on a crew-training flight from Vienna, Austria, to Hamburg, Germany. The aircraft was observed by radar on a track across
Germany, the Netherlands, the North Sea and Scotland; the aircraft disappeared from radar after its fuel was exhausted. Military aircraft sent
to intercept the flight reported no sign of the three crewmembers.
5/23/83 Piper PA-18-150 NA Anchorage, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
While being landed on a lake, the aircraft suddenly veered right, submerging the right float tip and inverting the aircraft.
5/25/83 Lake LA-4-200 NA Vinalhaven, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
Before departure, an attempt was made to remove water from the tail section of the aircraft. The water had accumulated because of a
missing rear plug in the fuselage. Witnesses said that after several unsuccessful takeoff attempts, the aircraft took off but climbed slowly
and appeared to be out of control. The aircraft struck a lake.
5/29/83* Embraer EMB-110 Tavina Barranquilla, Colombia Scheduled 0 0 7 Destroyed
Bandeirante passenger
The aircraft collided with a Colombian Air Force T-33 shortly after takeoff. The pilot of the Bandeirante elected to conduct an immediate
forced landing in a saltwater marsh some three miles from the airfield.
6/4/83 Mooney M20B NA Lakeville, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The aircraft struck the smooth water of a reservoir while flying low, about 1,000 feet offshore. The aircraft sank in 15 feet to 20 feet of
water.
6/6/83 Fairchild Packet NA Taiwan Strait Unscheduled 38 NA NA Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft crew reported an engine fire after takeoff, and the airplane struck the sea.
6/16/83* Cessna 182H NA Petersburg, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
The inexperienced student pilot was on a night flight when the weather deteriorated and the pilot became unsure of his position. He
spent several hours trying to determine his position. When fuel was nearly depleted, he ditched the aircraft near a ship whose lights he had
spotted. He was rescued by ship personnel.
6/19/83 Cessna 172PII NA Richmond Beach, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
During the pilot’s attempt to land, the aircraft contacted the water in a nose-low attitude and twisted clockwise. The right float filled with water,
and the pilot and passenger donned life vests. Both occupants exited the left door of the aircraft. The aircraft rolled inverted and filled with water.
7/8/83 Grumman AA-1 NA Manitowoc, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Wisconsin, U.S.
The aircraft disappeared from radar contact while over Lake Michigan. Part of the aircraft with the data plate containing the serial number
was found on a beach of the lake.
7/11/83* Piper PA 32R-300 NA Islamorada, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 2 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in a bay after the engine malfunctioned.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/12/83 Cessna 305A NA North Myrtle Beach, Banner towing 0 0 1 Substantial
South Carolina, U.S.
The aircraft stalled and struck an inland waterway shortly after takeoff.
7/17/83* Rockwell 685 NA Bass Strait, Victoria, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Australia
Because of a low-fuel warning, the pilot conducted an emergency descent. The aircraft continued on track toward the Victoria coast. The
ditching may have been conducted with the engines operating.
7/23/83 Bellanca Citabria NA Seward, Alaska, U.S. Aerial 0 0 1 Substantial
7GCBC observation
The pilot said that he was flying the aircraft 200 feet AGL, about 65 miles per hour in a left turn, spotting fish for a fishing vessel when a
map that was on his lap fell to the floor. When he reached for it, his left hand hit the throttle, reducing power. Before he could recover, the
aircraft struck the water.
8/7/83* Piper PA-23 NA Tangier, Morocco Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched off the coast following a double engine failure. The crew had difficulty leaving the aircraft, which sank in 90
seconds. The crew swam three miles to shore, then walked for five hours to civilization.
8/9/83* Aerostar 600 NA Pahokee, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 6 Substantial
While the pilot was flying the aircraft in a climb through 5,000 feet, the left engine failed and began surging, the oil-temperature gauge
failed, and smoke came from under the instrument panel. The pilot reduced power to the left engine and requested vectors to the nearest
airport. When he realized the airplane could not reach the airport, the pilot ditched the airplane in Lake Okeechobee.
8/13/83 Pierce GS-1 NA Sand Springs, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Oklahoma, U.S.
The pilot initiated a 30-degree to 40-degree bank and the aircraft stalled, and then struck the lake and sank in 37 feet of water. The aircraft
was recovered the following day.
9/4/83 Cessna U206F NA Lake Taupo, Unscheduled 0 0 NA Substantial
New Zealand passenger
The aircraft was departing on a scenic flight from Lake Taupo. During the takeoff run, the aircraft struck a large swell and become airborne
prematurely at too low an airspeed to continue flying. The aircraft descended in a nose-high attitude and struck another large swell. The pilot
closed the throttle and discontinued the takeoff.
9/8/83* Beech H18S NA Kailua-Kona, Hawaii, U.S. Scheduled 0 1 9 Destroyed
passenger
About one minute after takeoff, between 400 feet and 500 feet and during the first power reduction, the right engine backfired. Following
more violent backfires, the rpm decreased to zero. The right engine was restarted, but the problem recurred. The pilot attempted to feather
the right propeller but to no avail. The aircraft was then deliberately ditched to avoid an outcropping of lava and came to rest in about 25
feet to 30 feet of water.
9/10/83 Cessna 180A NA Stake Island, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Gulf of Mexico
While flying over the Gulf, the pilot forgot to set his altimeter and believed that the aircraft was at 200 feet when it contacted the water. The
floats were ripped off, and the aircraft sank. The pilot and passenger held onto a float until morning and then swam to shore.
9/10/83 Piper PA-28-140 NA Big Bear, California, U.S. Personal 1 0 3 Substantial
After takeoff, the airplane climbed only 150 feet to 250 feet above the lake, then descended and struck the water at 60 knots. Investigation
revealed that the aircraft was at least 294 pounds over maximum gross weight.
9/14/83 De Havilland NA Davenport, NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
B-206 California, U.S.
The aircraft struck the water while attempting to evade U.S. Customs officials, who had been following the aircraft from Mexico. Three days
after the accident, two bags of marijuana washed ashore, and a week after the accident, the pilot’s body washed ashore.

490 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/17/83* Cessna U-206FG NA Jones Beach, Personal 4 0 0 None
New York, U.S.
The aircraft was ditched in the ocean after an engine failure caused by misjudgment of the fuel supply.
9/18/83* Piper PA-32R-300 NA Kieta, Papua Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed
New Guinea
The engine failed after takeoff, and the pilot ditched the airplane. Investigation revealed that takeoff had been attempted with the aircraft
loaded in excess of the maximum weight recommended for the length of strip available.
9/21/83 Cessna 185 NA Valdez, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 2 0 0 Substantial
passenger
During a descending left turn with 15 degrees to 20 degrees of left bank, the aircraft struck the water with the left float, then bounced
high above the water. The aircraft pitched down abruptly and struck the water. Witnesses saw the two occupants climb onto the floating
wreckage. The witnesses began building a log raft to rescue the occupants, but before the raft was completed, the occupants had drifted
out of sight in fog and rain. The occupants were not found and were presumed to have drowned.
9/23/83 Lake LA-4-200 NA Eastsound, Personal 2 1 0 Destroyed
Washington, U.S.
The aircraft struck the glassy water during a low-altitude maneuver. The occupants were recovered by a sailboat, but only one of the three
survived. There were considerable feathers among the wreckage.
10/6/83 Cessna U206G NA Meyers Chuck, Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Alaska, U.S.
During takeoff, the aircraft struck a large wave, which broke the front struts. The right wing then struck the water, and the aircraft nosed
over.
10/21/83* Piper PA-23 NA Gulf of Mexico Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The pilot said that the compass had malfunctioned and that, fearing fuel exhaustion, he had made two passes around a freighter before
ditching across the ship’s bow.
11/4/83 Cessna A185F NA Freemason Island, Personal 1 0 3 Destroyed
Louisiana, U.S.
The aircraft was at 200 feet AGL and was being flown at 90 knots when the pilot initiated a 10-degree to 15-degree right bank. The aircraft
then struck the water and sank in about 15 feet of water. The passenger in the right front seat was not found after the accident and was
presumed to have drowned.
11/8/83 Lake LA-4-200 NA St. Michaels, Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
Maryland, U.S.
The water was glassy at the time of the landing, and the pilot believed that his approach was perfect and that he was about five feet above
the water. As he began the flare, the amphibious aircraft struck the water. Both occupants were pulled from the water, but the passenger,
who had gone through the windshield, died later.
11/9/83 Gazelle Specialist Flight Talkin Tarn, U.K. Commercial 0 0 1 Destroyed
Training training
At the end of a third low-level pass over a lake, the aircraft was pulled up, apparently to avoid trees, before descending and striking the
water in a level attitude. The aircraft broke up and was destroyed.
11/26/83* Cessna 172P NA Jackson, Mississippi, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
The aircraft was ditched in a reservoir at night following a loss of power. The occupants exited and swam to shore without injury.
12/8/83 Cessna C-500 Transeurch Stornoway, Scotland Personal 10 0 0 Destroyed
Citation
The aircraft was seen on radar descending from FL 330. The radar return disappeared as the aircraft struck the sea near Stornoway. Seven
bodies and some small pieces of wreckage were recovered.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 491
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
12/14/83 Cessna 310R NA Buffalo, New York, U.S. Unscheduled, 1 0 0 Destroyed
purpose
unknown
The aircraft struck Lake Erie during an ILS approach to Runway 05 at Buffalo. The Coast Guard located wreckage associated with the aircraft
about two hours later, 12 miles from the airport.
12/17/83 Cessna C-172M NA Chesapeake, Virginia, U.S. Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
The pilot was distracted by a passenger door that would not stay latched. The pilot said that he was trying to help the passenger close the
door and was distracted by reflections in the water when the aircraft struck the water. The pilot’s next conscious moment occurred in the
water, still strapped to the seat. The passenger was unconscious and drowned.
12/23/83* Cessna 210 NA Ft. Myers, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed
During the takeoff roll, about half way along the runway, the pilot observed that the aircraft was not accelerating normally. After liftoff, he
attempted to return to the airport but was forced to ditch the aircraft in the Caloosahatchee River because of power loss.
12/26/83* King Air BE-90 Airmore Copenhagen, Denmark Cargo 0 0 1 Destroyed
The airplane was ditched two nautical miles short of the runway after both engines failed. The pilot left the airplane and was rescued by helicopter.
1/8/84 Cessna 182Q NA Hana, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft disappeared from radar about eight miles north of Hana, Hawaii, while on an overwater flight. The aircraft was not found in the
ensuing search. The pilot and passengers, who were reported to have been drinking at a bar before the flight, were presumed to have died
from injuries and/or drowning.
2/16/84* Cessna 150F NA Folsom Lake, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
A power loss occurred because of fuel exhaustion. To avoid rough, unsuitable terrain, the pilot decided to ditch the aircraft in a nearby lake.
2/28/84 DC-10-30 SAS New York, New York, U.S. Scheduled 0 0 177 Substantial
passenger
The aircraft touched down about 4,700 feet beyond the threshold of the 8,400-foot runway and could not be stopped on the runway. The
crew steered the aircraft to the right to avoid the approach light pier at the departure end of the runway, and the aircraft came to rest in a tidal
waterway about 600 feet from the departure end of the runway. The 163 passengers and 14 crewmembers evacuated the aircraft safely, but a
few received minor injuries.
3/1/84 Cessna U206 NA Stevenson, Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
Washington, U.S.
While the pilot was maneuvering at low altitude, the aircraft struck a river, whose water was reported to have been “glassy smooth.” The
aircraft sank in 65 feet of water and was not recovered.
3/3/84* Cessna C-172F NA Pascagoula, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Mississippi, U.S.
The pilot ditched the aircraft after a complete loss of power.
3/11/84 Cessna 150G NA Kingsville, Texas, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The pilot and passenger said that, while flying over a water basin, they felt an updraft. They said that the next thing they remembered was
climbing out of the aircraft, which was inverted and under water.
4/7/84* Beech BE-18D NA Egegik, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 2 Destroyed
The pilot said that the engines failed as a result of snow ingestion and carburetor icing upon entering clouds at 9,000 feet. The airplane
remained in IMC until approximately 100 feet to 300 feet AGL, then entered VMC. After ditching the aircraft, the pilot and passenger swam
to shore. The aircraft washed out to sea and was not recovered.
4/22/84 Piper-28-140 NA Panacea, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck water shortly after takeoff. One witness said that the aircraft entered the water in a steep left bank at a high rate of
descent.

492 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/24/84* Piper PA-32R-300 NA Venice, Florida, U.S. NA 0 0 1 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in the Gulf of Mexico after being followed by U.S. Customs. The pilot did not tell authorities his departure point or
destination.
5/4/84* Cessna 180B NA Galveston, Texas, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
observation
The aircraft was being flown about 300 feet over the bay when the pilot made a turn to fly downwind and the aircraft began to stall. The
pilot said that he advanced the throttle, but the engine did not respond. He lowered the aircraft’s nose to regain flying speed, then flared so
that touchdown in the water was in a normal landing attitude.
5/7/84 Colonial C-2 NA Stone Lake, Personal 1 0 0 Minor
Wisconsin, U.S.
A witness saw the aircraft in a wide, gradually descending left turn around an island. The aircraft was later found inverted in 15 feet of water,
300 feet from shore. The pilot was found 150 feet from the shore. He had drowned.
5/15/84 Learjet 35 Argentine Near Ushuaia, Argentina Public use 12 0 0 Destroyed
Government
The aircraft disappeared from radar while on approach to its destination in low visibility and a snowstorm. The wreckage was located two
days later in the Bay of Ushuaia.
5/15/84* Cessna 182P NA Douglas Island, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Alaska, U.S.
The pilot reported a complete loss of power, with oil visible on the left side of the windscreen. The pilot was unable to glide the airplane to
land, and the airplane was ditched in deep water about 100 yards from shore.
5/23/84 Piper PA-38-112 NA St. Petersburg, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
Witnesses said that the aircraft appeared to bank very steeply to the left, then pitch down into the water.
5/28/84 Cessna U-206-GII NA Kenmore, Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Washington, U.S.
The pilot said that he was attempting a landing, with a left quartering crosswind, in water made rough by considerable boat activity. The
left float dug into the water, and the aircraft sank.
6/14/84 Lake 250 NA Key Largo, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed
As the pilot flew the approach over the ocean, a big wave appeared. The pilot pulled the nose of the aircraft up and added power. The
aircraft nevertheless struck the wave crest and was catapulted upward in a nose-high attitude. The aircraft then struck the water with its
left wing, which separated from the aircraft. The aircraft sank in 12 feet of water after about 35 minutes.
6/16/84 Cessna 152 NA Houston, Texas, U.S. Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
Shortly after touchdown during a touch-and-go landing, directional control was lost. The aircraft veered off the left side of the runway and
came to rest in a waterway used by seaplanes.
6/16/84* Cessna 172 NA Boulogne, France Flight club 0 0 4 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in the sea after the engine failed.
6/19/84* Cessna 206 NA Barbers Point, Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Hawaii, U.S.
Fuel exhaustion forced the pilot to ditch about 10 miles from the Hawaiian coast. The pilot was rescued by the Coast Guard.
6/24/84 Lake LA-4-200 NA Mears, Michigan, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
The pilot said that after the amphibious aircraft reached eight feet to 10 feet AGL during takeoff, a crosswind gust caused the left sponson
to contact the water surface. This caused a loss of control, and the airplane struck the lake inverted.
6/25/84 Lake LA-4-200 NA Levenworth, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Washington, U.S.
The amphibious aircraft started to “porpoise” in the air after takeoff and stalled about 25 feet above the water. The aircraft dragged a wing,
struck the water and sank. The pilot said that water in the hull had caused the unstable condition.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 493
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/25/84 Champion 7KCAB NA Egg Harbor Town, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
New Jersey, U.S.
At 350 feet to 400 feet AGL and about 85 knots, the aircraft abruptly pitched nose-down. Impact occurred in 30-foot-deep water.
6/25/84 Cessna 206 NA Montauk, New York, U.S. Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
The float-equipped airplane had approached nose-high, and upon initial touchdown on the lake, the airplane skipped and bounced. The
aircraft nosed over and sank.
6/30/84 Lake LA-4-200 NA Marathon, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Destroyed
The pilot said that he was flying the airplane low and in level flight over the ocean when the airplane struck the wake from a large boat
and flipped over. Witnesses said that the aircraft began a right turn while flying low, then the right wing hit the water, and the aircraft
cartwheeled and struck the ocean. A check of the pilot’s blood showed an alcohol level of 0.16 percent.
6/30/84 Maule M-5-235C NA Millinocket Lake, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Maine, U.S.
The aircraft was landed hard on the glassy-smooth surface of a lake. After touchdown, the left float split open, and the aircraft sank in 40
feet of water.
7/4/84 Cessna 172P NA St. Joseph, Missouri, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Pieces of wreckage and the body of the pilot were recovered from Lake Michigan about four miles southwest of St. Joseph. Weather
conditions had deteriorated into IMC along the route of flight.
7/4/84 Cessna 172M NA St. Croix, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
U.S. Virgin Islands
Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft struck the water about 200 yards off the northwest shore of St. Croix. Witnesses said that the aircraft
appeared to be in straight and level flight with the engine running until it suddenly pitched straight down into the ocean.
7/6/84 Champion 7ECA NA Juneau, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
The cowling of the aircraft came loose, and the pilot reduced power because of the vibration. An emergency was declared, and the pilot
attempted a 180-degree turn at an altitude of 400 feet AGL. The aircraft stalled and hit a channel where the water was about 10 feet deep.
7/17/84* Beech H18S NA Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Unscheduled, 0 0 1 Destroyed
otherwise
unknown
During takeoff, about 50 feet AGL and 4,000 feet down Runway 4R, the right engine failed. The aircraft banked right, and the pilot
maintained control of the aircraft until impact with the water.
7/21/84 Grumman G-21A NA Ouzinkie, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled, 4 0 0 Destroyed
otherwise
unknown
The pilot obtained a special VFR clearance for departure, then circled the airplane over Monashka Bay while waiting for the weather over
the narrow strait to improve. Eventually, the pilot radioed that the weather appeared to be getting better and that he was going to take
a look. The aircraft struck the waters of a narrow strait northwest of Monashka Bay. Witnesses said that the weather was IFR. The accident
aircraft was not equipped for instrument flight, nor was the pilot current to conduct IFR operations.
8/1/84 Aeronca 7CCM NA Kotzebue, Alaska, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Witnesses said that they saw the aircraft being flown in an erratic manner and buzzing the shoreline. On Aug. 6, 1984, the aircraft was
located in a small lake near the Noatak River. An examination of the wreckage revealed damage that was typical of impacting in a stall or
spin. Toxicology checks of the pilot’s and passenger’s blood revealed alcohol levels of 0.15 percent and 0.21 percent, respectively.
8/4/84 BAC1-11 PAL Tacloban Airport, Scheduled 0 0 80 Destroyed
Philippines passenger
The aircraft overran the runway on landing and came to rest in the sea.

494 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/5/84 F27 Bangladesh Zia, Dhaka, Bangladesh Scheduled 49 0 0 Destroyed
Biman passenger
The pilot conducted a VOR approach to Runway 32 but did not have visual contact and conducted a missed approach. The pilot received
clearance for an ILS approach to Runway 14, and again no visual contact was established. On the second ILS approach to Runway 14, the
aircraft struck water 550 meters west of the runway threshold.
8/7/84 F27 Rio Sul Servicos Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Training 0 0 7 Substantial
Aereos
Regionais
The airplane overran the runway on landing and was partially submerged in Guanabara Bay.
8/18/84* De Havilland Unknown Tuktoyaktuk, Canada Survey 0 0 6 Substantial
DHC-6 Twin Otter
When the pilot switched from the main fuel tanks to wing tip fuel tanks, both engines failed. The pilot ditched the aircraft.
8/18/84 Starduster Too NA Whidbey Island, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Washington, U.S.
Witnesses said that the aircraft was being flown on an aerobatic flight before it struck the water and was destroyed.
8/19/84 Piper PA-28-235 NA Put In Bay, Ohio, U.S. Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
The pilot attempted a go-around, making a sharp right turn described as a 90-degree bank. The aircraft struck the water in a right-wing-low
attitude.
8/22/84 Cessna 206 NA Viekoda Bay, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft had been flown to about 30 feet AGL when the pilot saw the silhouette of a fishing vessel’s rigging through the glare of the
sun. The aircraft hit a mast on the vessel and struck the bay.
8/29/84* Cessna 210M NA Howell, Michigan, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 1 Destroyed
Cargo
The pilot said that about 10 minutes after takeoff, the fuel flow fluctuated and slowly decreased to zero. He conducted a forced landing in a
lake, exited the aircraft and swam to shore.
9/3/84 Aero Commander NA Bridgeport, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
680V Connecticut, U.S.
The aircraft descended into the water 6.5 miles southwest of Bridgeport. The aircraft was on an ILS approach to Runway 6. The controller
was giving the final approach instructions to the pilot, after having issued instructions for some turns and changes in airspeed for spacing
behind landing traffic, when radar contact and radio contact were lost. Post-accident fuel calculations showed about six gallons of fuel
remaining; the typical amount of unusable fuel for this aircraft is 13 gallons.
9/6/84* Piper PA-31-350 NA Marathon, Florida, U.S. NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
The Coast Guard was alerted to a ditched aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean and found the wreckage of a PA-31, with 27 bales of marijuana in
and around the wreckage. Two men in a life raft were arrested.
9/7/84* Beech J35 NA Hyannis, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The engine ran roughly and then stopped. The landing-gear-down forced landing was made in salt water about six minutes’ flying time
from the destination airport.
9/18/84 Piper PA-12 NA Dadina Lake, Alaska, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
The pilot had been hunting moose. After takeoff, the pilot lost control of the aircraft, which struck the water in a right-wing-down attitude.
The pilot drowned. Divers found moose horns that had been tied to the float lift struts. The pilot did not have a seaplane rating.
9/20/84 Cessna A185F NA Fort Peck, Montana, U.S. Personal 1 0 2 Substantial
The aircraft struck several waves during the takeoff run from a reservoir. The right wing tip dragged in the water, causing the aircraft to
invert and to become partially submerged. The pilot pulled his son and daughter from the aircraft before he drowned.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 495
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/26/84 Cessna 172P NA Webbers Falls, Public use 2 0 0 Destroyed
Oklahoma, U.S.
The aircraft’s left wing tip struck an electrical transmission line 80 feet above water during a wildlife survey. The aircraft struck the river 0.13
mile downstream from the wire.
9/27/84 Robin 100 NA North Sea NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck water following loss of oil pressure. No wreckage was found.
10/3/84 Cessna A185E NA Morgan City, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S.
After 100 yards to 150 yards of landing roll, the right float struck a submerged object. The float filled with water and the aircraft rolled
inverted before sinking.
10/5/84* Citation NA Skiathos, Greece NA 0 0 10 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in the sea shortly after takeoff. All occupants were rescued.
10/7/84 Grumman NA Corinth, New York, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
American AA5A
The pilot became disoriented and flew an approach to an area that he mistakenly identified as his planned destination. During the
approach, the aircraft struck wires and descended out of control into a river.
10/7/84 Lake LA-4-200 NA Waurika, Oklahoma, U.S. Personal 0 1 2 Destroyed
Witnesses said that the aircraft’s nose was too low at touchdown, and the nose and right pontoon dug into the water. The aircraft swerved
abruptly to the right, inverted and sank.
10/13/84 Catalina PBY-6A NA Port Isabel, Texas, U.S. Demonstration 6 4 0 Destroyed
The pilot of the aircraft, which was being photographed by individuals in another aircraft, conducted a simulated water landing. The
aircraft struck a fishing net supported by metal stakes. The stakes ripped through the fuselage and the aircraft nosed over into shallow
water. The aircraft broke apart on impact.
10/16/84* Cessna 210 NA San Pedro, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
The aircraft was on a 3.5-mile final approach to Torrance Airport when an engine failed. The pilot ditched the aircraft in the Los Angeles
West Basin Harbor.
10/23/84* De Havilland Newcal Aviation Sable Island, Ferry 1 1 0 Destroyed
DHC-4 North Atlantic Ocean
Navigational aids failed, the fuel supply was exhausted and the aircraft was ditched 150 miles south of Sable Island. The aircraft sank. The
pilot was missing, and the copilot was rescued from a raft.
10/26/84 Cessna 150M NA Providence, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Rhode Island, U.S.
The aircraft struck the waters of Narragansett Bay. When the aircraft was located the next morning, divers from the Coast Guard found a
woman’s body in the aircraft. The drowned pilot’s body was found on a beach about two weeks later.
10/31/84 Douglas DC-3 NA Davao/Manila, Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
Philippines cargo
The aircraft was reported missing on a flight from Davao to Manila.
11/6/84 Piper PA-18-150 NA Omaha, Arkansas, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
The aircraft struck an unmarked power line about 85 feet above a lake. The aircraft then struck the water and sank. The pilot
drowned.
11/10/84 Cessna C337 NA Taunton, Personal 1 0 3 Minor
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot said that during a go-around, the aircraft began to descend because of wind shear, turbulence and downdrafts. The aircraft
descended into a pond beyond the end of the runway. One passenger drowned.

496 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/10/84 Gates Learjet 24F NA St. Thomas, Business 2 1 1 Destroyed
U.S. Virgin Islands
While conducting a night visual approach to Runway 9 in VMC, the aircraft descended and struck water two miles short of the runway. The
pilot was not familiar with the airport and did not use a full ILS or the visual approach slope indicator, which were operational for Runway 9.
The aircraft was equipped with a radar altimeter system that also was not used by the pilot. Neither the pilot-in-command nor the copilot
was properly certificated for the flight.
11/16/84* Piper J3C-65 NA Stuart, Florida, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
observation
The aircraft was being flown low over water to film a television commercial. The pilot said that the engine did not respond when he
advanced the throttle lever for additional power. There was insufficient power to maintain level flight, and the pilot ditched the aircraft,
which sank.
11/16/84 Piper PA-28-236 NA Atlantic City, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
New Jersey, U.S.
During the approach, the pilot suffered a disabling heart attack and the aircraft descended, entering the water at a nose-down angle of
about 80 degrees.
11/19/84 Cessna 180J NA Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The aircraft sank after a hard landing on water. The pilot said that the aircraft bounced during landing and that wind beneath the upwind
wing caused the aircraft to roll.
12/1/84 Cessna 182H NA Provo, Utah, U.S. Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
The left-seat noninstrument private pilot was being checked out in a flying club aircraft by a commercial pilot. The aircraft was being flown
over a Utah lake on a dark night, on final approach to the Provo airport. The private pilot maneuvered the aircraft for spacing from a second
aircraft. A witness said that two aircraft were over the lake and that one turned toward the airport and went straight down. Investigation
revealed that the aircraft struck the water in a left-wing-down, nose-low attitude.
2/3/85 Piper PA-23-250 NA Key Largo, Florida, U.S. NA 2 0 0 Substantial
The aircraft struck the Atlantic Ocean and sank nose-first into 15 feet of water. On impact, the 25 bales of marijuana located in the cabin of
the aircraft shifted forward and pinned the pilot and passenger in the aircraft.
2/10/85* Cessna 172 NA Alderney, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Channel Islands, U.K.
The pilot had just reported being 12 miles from Alderney when he declared mayday and said that he would ditch the aircraft within two
minutes to three minutes because of an engine problem. A full air and sea search failed to find the wreckage, but more than a year later, the
aircraft’s engine and propeller were netted by a trawler.
2/11/85* Cessna 210N NA Georges River, New Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
South Wales, Australia
The engine surged and then failed. The pilot moved the fuel selector to all fuel-tank positions, but power was not restored. The pilot
ditched the aircraft in a river. Neither pilot had visually checked the fuel tanks, and there was no fuel in the starboard tank.
2/24/85 Grumman GA-7 NA Ventnor, Isle of Wight, Personal 1 2 1 Destroyed
Cougar England
The pilot intended to fly VFR around the Isle of Wight. He flew the airplane to 100 feet above the sea and followed the coastline offshore.
The pilot asked the passenger in the right seat to find a radio frequency printed on an aeronautical chart. When the pilot glanced briefly at
the chart, the aircraft struck the sea. The aircraft sank with life vests stowed in the rear cabin.
3/1/85* Rockwell 680E NA Key West, Florida, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
A Coast Guard Falcon aircraft was on the scene when the aircraft was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean because of fuel exhaustion. A life
raft and marker were dropped by the Coast Guard aircraft. A search was conducted all day March 1 and was called off at sunset March 2.
The occupants were presumed to have been fatally injured or drowned. The aircraft was presumed to have been destroyed.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 497
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/8/85 Cessna P210N NA Santa Barbara, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
A controller observed the aircraft’s radar target climb to 600 feet, then descend to 500 feet before disappearing from the radar scope
about one mile south of the airport. Two ground witnesses observed the aircraft strike the water after descending out of the clouds.
4/13/85* Cessna 152 NA Franklin, Louisiana, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck a crawfish pond during a ditching at night following a power loss caused by fuel exhaustion.
4/14/85* Mitsubishi MU2J NA Patterson, Louisiana, U.S. Business 0 0 4 Substantial
On visual final approach to the airport at night, the aircraft entered ground fog. Reflection of the landing lights in the fog was distracting to
the pilot, who landed the aircraft in the adjacent seaplane-landing area instead of on the hard-surface runway.
4/14/85 Cessna 150G NA Stevens Point, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Wisconsin, U.S.
During flight over a river at 300 feet AGL, the pilot initiated a turn to reverse direction. The aircraft struck the water during the descending
turn and nosed over.
4/14/85* Cessna 150G NA Daytona Beach, Banner towing 0 0 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The aircraft was ditched as a result of a loss of power. During landing, the aircraft nosed over and sank.
4/19/85 Cessna 140 NA Hawesville, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Kentucky, U.S.
The aircraft struck the Ohio River and sank following a wing separation caused by a wire strike.
4/19/85 Bellanca 8KCAB NA Clearwater, Florida, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot was observed performing low-level aerobatics. In an inverted dive over water, he attempted to fly the airplane in an outside loop.
The aircraft struck the water inverted after the onset of a stall.
4/25/85* Beech A-36 NA Afton, Oklahoma, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The aircraft was ditched in 60-foot-deep to 80-foot-deep water following a loss of power after takeoff. The pilot was rescued by a bass boat
before the aircraft sank.
5/7/85 Cessna 310H NA Avinger, Texas, U.S. Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
Witnesses saw the aircraft over the lake at a low altitude. They said that the right wing struck the water and the aircraft cartwheeled to the
right and sank.
5/18/85* Cessna 172F NA Curl Beach, New South Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Wales, Australia
When engine power was applied, the engine ran roughly. The pilot failed to apply carburetor heat because of insufficient knowledge of
carburetor icing. The pilot positioned the aircraft over the sea and ditched in shallow water five meters from shore. The aircraft came to rest
inverted.
5/21/85 Cessna TR-182 NA Grand Island, Sightseeing 3 1 0 Destroyed
New York, U.S.
The flight had been a local sightseeing tour over Niagara Falls. The pilot said that he would demonstrate to his passengers how fast the
aircraft appeared to be traveling when near the water. The pilot then began a left descending turn over the Niagara River. The right-seat
passenger said that he turned in his seat to speak to his wife, and the next thing he knew, he was in the water.
5/24/85* Cessna U206F NA Piney Point, Business 0 0 1 Substantial
Maryland, U.S.
When the engine failed at an altitude of 3,800 feet to 4,000 feet, the pilot requested vectors toward land and the nearest airport. When the
aircraft emerged from clouds at about 1,000 feet AGL, the aircraft was still over water. Unable to reach land, the pilot ditched the aircraft in
the mouth of the Potomac River about 0.75 mile from shore.

498 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/31/85* Cessna 172 NA Columbia, South Business 0 0 1 Substantial
Carolina, U.S.
A power loss occurred over a dense forest, and the pilot ditched the aircraft in a lake. The aircraft sank in 14 feet of water.
6/8/85 Ercoupe 415-C NA Daytona Beach, Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
During a low-altitude turn, the aircraft’s left wing struck water, and the aircraft sank in less than one minute. The pilot received a head injury
and drowned. Toxicology tests showed that the alcohol level in the pilot’s blood was 0.128 percent.
6/13/85* Cessna T210J NA Moab, Utah, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Destroyed
The pilot and a passenger conducted a low-level pass over the Colorado River to drop a package to friends, who were rafting on the river.
The pilot said that the engine failed when the aircraft was in the canyon, and he ditched the airplane in the river.
6/20/85 Grumman G-44 NA Dillingham, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 3 Substantial
The amphibious aircraft struck water as the pilot was landing on glassy water at the inlet of Nerka Lake. Subsequently, the aircraft sank and
came to rest inverted at the bottom of Wood River
6/22/85 Anderson Skybolt NA Escanaba, Michigan, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Witnesses reported that during a turning maneuver over water, the aircraft struck the surface. A toxicology check of the pilot’s blood showed
an alcohol level of 0.225 percent.
6/23/85 Boeing 747 Air India Atlantic Ocean, Scheduled 329 0 0 Destroyed
off Ireland Passenger
During the flight from Montreal, Quebec, Canada, to London, England, the aircraft disappeared from radar and struck the Atlantic Ocean
southwest of Ireland. The incident has been attributed to an explosion in the forward cargo hold, caused by sabotage.
6/24/85* Piper PA-23-250 NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
During an overwater flight at 10,500 feet, a fire began in the forward section of the aircraft. The pilot ditched the aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean
and was rescued by the Coast Guard about four hours later.
6/27/85 McDonnell American San Juan, Scheduled 0 3 267 Substantial
Douglas DC-10 Airlines Puerto Rico, U.S. passenger
During takeoff, at about the V1 speed of 141 knots, the captain rejected the takeoff using maximum braking. (V1 is the maximum speed in
the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop distance.) Unable to stop the aircraft
on the remaining runway, he angled the aircraft to the safest area. The aircraft stopped with its nose in a lagoon.
6/30/85 Beech 65-A90 NA Apalachicola, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The pilot flying, who was being checked out by another pilot, was conducting a takeoff after a touch-and-go landing. The aircraft lost
altitude and struck water. The pilot flying said that he was looking for the flap control when the accident occurred.
7/2/85 Pitts Special NA Bognor Regis, England Aerobatic 1 0 0 Destroyed
display
The pilot was performing aerobatic maneuvers about 0.5 mile offshore. The pilot appeared to have attempted a stall while in a turn,
during which a decrease in engine noise was heard. Witnesses said that the aircraft entered a rotational descent and flew into the
sea.
7/14/85* Cessna 177B NA Cedar Key, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
While the aircraft was being flown at 1,400 feet, there was a strong odor of fuel in the cabin, and the engine failed. The pilot was unable to
restart the engine and subsequently ditched the aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico. The aircraft was recovered from 20 feet of water.
7/17/85 Piper PA-28-235 NA Monterey, California, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
On a training flight, 12 miles offshore and about 12 minutes after takeoff, the pilot declared “mayday, rough engine.” The aircraft’s radar
target vanished from the controller’s screen at an altitude of 1,300 feet. The Coast Guard recovered a few pieces of debris from the
aircraft.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 499
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/19/85 Aerostar 601 NA Erie, Pennsylvania, U.S. Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
During a normal IFR cruise flight, the pilot did not respond to ATC instructions. The flight continued for 40 minutes with no reply and
without deviation in altitude or heading until the discrete target disappeared from radar over Lake Erie. The pilot had not slept for about 30
hours before the loss of communication.
7/21/85 Piper PA-11 NA Moultonboro, Personal 0 3 0 Destroyed
New Hampshire, U.S.
During a turn at 150 feet AGL, the aircraft nosed down after rolling right. The aircraft struck water in a steep nose-down attitude.
7/21/85 Lake LA-4 NA Snowpond, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
The aircraft was on step with indicated airspeed of about 45 knots. The aircraft then encountered a boat wake and began flying. The aircraft
“porpoised” two or three times and then struck the water in an estimated 10-degree to 15-degree nose-down attitude.
7/27/85 Cessna TU206G NA Taohoma, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
The float-equipped Cessna landed on choppy water, nosed over and sank at the seaplane base.
8/3/85* Cessna 152 NA Hilton Head, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
South Carolina, U.S.
The commercial pilot and a passenger were flying the aircraft just offshore at about 700 feet when the engine failed. The pilot landed the
aircraft in the ocean, and both occupants swam to shore. The aircraft was located but was not recovered.
8/13/85 Taylorcraft BL-65 NA Ottumwa, Iowa, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The aircraft collided with utility wires that crossed the Des Moines River and struck the river.
8/16/85* Cessna R182RG NA Hilo, Hawaii, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched at sea about 200 miles from Hawaii following fuel starvation.
8/17/85 Cessna C-305A NA Brooklyn, New York, U.S. Banner towing 1 0 0 Destroyed
Witnesses heard the engine sputtering, then observed the airplane in a steep right bank and diving into the water.
8/19/85 Cessna 172M NA St. Thomas, Business 4 0 0 Destroyed
U.S. Virgin Islands
The aircraft was being flown slowly at 200 feet to allow passengers to photograph a group of sailboats. As the pilot began a left turn to
reverse course, the aircraft stalled and nosed down, striking the water in a near-vertical attitude.
8/21/85 Piper PA-18-95 NA Millinocket, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Departing from South Twin Lake in 12-knot winds gusting to 20 knots, the pilot began a slight turn as the aircraft lifted off from the
water. A gust of wind simultaneously lifted the nose and a wing, causing the aircraft to stall. It touched down on the lake and was
damaged.
8/23/85 Cessna 150 NA Newport Beach, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The aircraft was being flown in circles to photograph a sailboat race. The accident report said that when the pilot attempted to roll out of
the turn, the “aircraft flight controls did not respond.” To prevent a stall, the pilot applied full power and pushed the nose down. The aircraft
struck the ocean and sank.
8/31/85* Cessna A150K NA Avalon, California, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
observation
During a commercial fish-spotting flight, the engine began to run roughly, then quit. The pilot could not restart the engine and conducted
a power-off ditching at sea. After ditching, the aircraft sank in 300 feet to 400 feet of water and was not recovered.
9/13/85 Mooney M20F NA Aripeka, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
The student pilot became lost and disoriented in darkness. Flying low to try to identify a familiar landmark, the pilot flew the aircraft over the
shore of the Gulf of Mexico and inadvertently descended into the water.

500 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/16/85 Pitts S-2A NA Carlsbad, California, U.S. Aerial 1 0 0 Destroyed
photography
After completing a spin over the Pacific Ocean during the filming of a movie, the pilot flew his aircraft back to the entry altitude and
initiated a flat inverted spin. The spin continued through the recovery altitude, at which time the pilot radioed, “I have a problem, I have a
real problem.” Neither the pilot nor the aircraft was recovered.
9/17/85* Metro II Duke Leasing Gulf of Mexico Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft presumably was ditched in the Gulf of Mexico, 145 miles South of Grand Isle, Louisiana, U.S. The pilot made at least two distress
calls. He first reported an engine problem and then reported the aircraft at 1,500 feet and said that he was preparing to ditch. Aircraft in the
vicinity heard both distress calls. No wreckage was found.
9/23/85 Piper PA-28-140 NA Gulfport, Mississippi, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Approach control told the pilot that lines of rain showers existed across the flight path. The pilot said that he believed that could avoid the
bad weather. Later, the pilot said that the ride was bouncy and that he was in rain. The aircraft disappeared from radar, and radio contact
was lost. The bodies of the pilot and passengers were recovered from the Gulf of Mexico.
9/28/85* Grumman AA-5B NA Manchester, Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
During cruise flight at 1,200 feet over water, the engine power decreased and the pilot was unable to maintain altitude. He began a
descent toward land, but had insufficient altitude to glide to land and ditched the aircraft.
10/3/85* Cessna 152 NA Lake Charles, Banner towing 0 0 1 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S.
An engine failure occurred because of fuel exhaustion, and the pilot ditched the aircraft in a lake.
10/6/85 Cessna 500 Air Charter Skiathos, Greece Unscheduled 0 0 10 Destroyed
Citation I (Austria) passenger
The aircraft reportedly failed to gain altitude after takeoff from Skiathos and struck the sea just beyond the runway end.
10/10/85 Cessna C-182N NA Winterport, Maine, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
A witness saw the aircraft being flown under power lines that crossed a river. There was no indication of an accident. Twenty-two days later,
the aircraft was located 150 feet south of the power lines at the bottom of the river. The landing gear and propeller had been gouged and
scraped.
10/10/85 Israel Aircraft Pel-Air Sydney, Australia Cargo 2 0 0 Destroyed
Industries IAI
1124 Westwind
After an evidently normal takeoff, the crew contacted ATC, advised that they were flying the aircraft to FL 370 and requested to fly the
aircraft direct to Brisbane, Australia. Approximately two minutes later, the crew did not respond to ATC calls, and the aircraft disappeared
from radar. The aircraft was seen diving steeply toward the water.
10/23/85* Cessna 185 NA Block Island, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Rhode Island, U.S.
The floatplane’s engine failed, and the pilot tried unsuccessfully to restart the engine. The pilot contacted the control towers at three
airports and advised them of his location and that he would be ditching the aircraft. The aircraft sank and was not recovered.
11/1/85* Piper PA-32-300 NA New York, New York, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
A pilot was giving a student pilot night-flight instruction. The pilot smelled an odor associated with a hot engine and observed an engine-
oil-pressure-gauge reading of zero. He contacted Newark (New Jersey) International Airport to advise them of the emergency. During
the flight to Newark, the engine seized, and the pilot decided to ditch the airplane. After the ditching, the Coast Guard rescued the two
occupants, who had exited the aircraft and were standing on the wings.
11/4/85* Cessna T188C NA Hilo, Hawaii, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
The engine failed while the aircraft was over the Pacific Ocean, about 900 miles from its destination. The pilot restarted the engine but
estimated that there was not enough fuel remaining to reach the destination. He sought assistance from Navy and Coast Guard aircraft to
locate a ship near which he might ditch. A ship was located, and the pilot ditched his aircraft about 700 miles short of his destination.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 501
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/6/85 Piper NA San Diego, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
PA-32R-301T California, U.S.
When the flight was on a two-mile final at 2,000 feet, the controller initiated a missed approach. The pilot responded and then said that he
would prefer to return to the departure airport. A clearance was issued, and then radio contact and radar contact were lost.
11/14/85 Cessna 182Q NA Edenton, Business 1 1 0 Substantial
North Carolina, U.S.
Witnesses said that visibility was 15 feet in fog. The pilot was reportedly flying the airplane on an NDB approach and descended below MDA.
The aircraft flew into the Albemarle Sound and sank in 18 feet of water. The pilot was en route to a business meeting with company executives.
11/19/85 Cessna 182R NA Bryson City, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
North Carolina, U.S.
On landing, the aircraft veered to the left of the runway centerline. The aircraft was spun around after the left wing contacted a tree. The
aircraft fell into the river about 200 feet below.
12/11/85* Cessna 150K NA Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Five minutes after takeoff, the engine went into uncommanded idle-power operation, and attempts to restore full power were
unsuccessful. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude and ditched the airplane about 75 feet from shore.
12/25/85* Douglas DC-3 Aero Ejecutivos Cumana, Venezuela NA NA NA NA Destroyed
The aircraft was believed to have been ditched following a loss of power in both engines and to have sunk.
1/29/86* Cessna P210N NA Keflavik, Reykjavik, Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
Iceland
There was adverse weather at the intended destination in Greenland and at the alternate. The pilot continued the flight to Reykjavik. He
extended the estimated arrival time by more than one hour and indicated that the aircraft was low on fuel and in icing conditions. U.S. Air
Force and Icelandic aircraft and ships were dispatched in search-and-rescue procedures before the aircraft ran out of fuel. Fuel exhaustion
occurred as the pilot was flying a descent from 15,000 feet. A U.S. Air Force C-130 flew to the aircraft location, lighted the ocean with flares
and gave ditching advice. The pilot ditched his aircraft in high seas about 36 miles from Keflavik, Iceland, with winds gusting to 35 knots. An
Air Force helicopter arrived three minutes later, but the airplane occupants were never observed to emerge from the aircraft.
2/1/86 Cessna 152 NA Berthoud, Colorado, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
The student pilot had rented the aircraft from a flying club. The aircraft was observed by witnesses approaching the lake from the southern
end at a low altitude and striking water with the right-main landing gear and right wing tip. The aircraft nosed over. The water was glassy,
and the sun had set.
2/9/86* Piper PA-23-250 NA San Francisco, Ferry 0 0 2 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The flight originated in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. A fuel leak was discovered after seven hours of flight. The pilot attempted to isolate the leak
but could not. The fuel cross-feed selector and aircraft fuel selector became difficult to move. The aircraft was ditched after nine hours, 45
minutes of flight because of fuel exhaustion.
2/16/86 Boeing 737 China Airlines Pescadores Islands, Scheduled 13 0 0 Destroyed
Taiwan, China passenger
Contact with the aircraft was lost three and one-half minutes after the crew conducted a go-around while attempting to land at Makung,
an island off the coast of Taiwan, China. The aircraft was presumed to have struck the sea.
2/19/86* Lake LA-4-200 NA Auburndale, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
The pilot said that the engine rpm began to fluctuate. He selected auxiliary fuel tanks, but the rpm continued fluctuating. He decided to
ditch the aircraft on a small lake. Not having enough altitude to turn the airplane for a landing into the wind, he conducted a downwind
landing. On touchdown, the aircraft flipped and sank in 14 feet of water.
2/20/86 Cessna 172N NA Andover, Instructional 1 0 0 Destroyed
New Jersey, U.S.
The student pilot attempted a go-around, and the aircraft entered a departure stall and spin off the departure end of the runway. The
aircraft collided vertically with a frozen lake bed. The student had been working steadily for three days before the accident, and the
toxicology report indicated positive for cocaine.

502 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/2/86 Piper PA-28-181 NA Newport Beach, Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
Witnesses observed the aircraft being flown low over a pier at Newport Beach, then entering a right climbing turn. As the turn continued,
the aircraft descended to the ocean, cartwheeled and sank.
3/5/86 Learjet 35 Flight Pacific Ocean NA 2 0 0 Destroyed
International
The crew lost control and the aircraft struck the sea after colliding with a second Flight International Learjet, 27 nautical miles southeast of
San Clemente Island, off southern California, ,U.S.
3/5/86 Learjet 35 Flight Pacific Ocean NA 2 0 0 Destroyed
International
The aircraft collided with the other Learjet in the accident listed above and struck the sea at the same location.
3/12/86* Cessna A150K NA Hanakuli, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in the Pacific Ocean after the engine failed. The ditching occurred one mile from shore, and the occupants were
rescued after 20 minutes in the water.
3/17/86 Jodel DR1050 NA Orkney, U.K. Private business 0 1 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was approaching 300 feet when the oil-filler-inspection cover began flapping in the slipstream. A witness said that the
aircraft entered a steep turn and then dived into the sea. The pilot received serious injuries and could not remember the descent.
3/29/86 Cessna 150L NA Kailua Kona, Hawaii, U.S. Instructional 1 0 0 Destroyed
Witnesses observed the aircraft’s spiral into the Pacific Ocean. Neither the pilot nor the aircraft was recovered.
4/16/86 Cessna 172D NA Garden Grove, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S.
During a rejected takeoff, the aircraft continued past the end of the runway into a pond.
5/6/86* Piper PA-28-181 NA Madison, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
The engine failed during takeoff, and the pilot conducted a forced landing in the river.
5/22/86 Cessna 180 NA Iliamna, Alaska, U.S. Personal 1 1 0 Substantial
The pilot said that at the time of the accident, the wind was 30 knots, gusting to 35 knots. After touchdown on the water, the pilot lost
control of the aircraft, which flipped onto its back and sank.
6/1/86 Grumman G21A Channel Flying Hobart Bay, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
passenger
The pilot did not retract the landing gear after departure from the airport. During a landing on water with the landing gear still extended,
the aircraft’s nose separated, and the aircraft flipped over and sank.
6/3/86 Beech A-23 NA Charlotte, Vermont, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
On takeoff, the aircraft was at the end of the runway and over water at an altitude of 15 feet to 20 feet. At about 30 feet, the aircraft
stopped climbing. A 20-degree change of direction was made to avoid a collision with a sailboat. The aircraft lost lift and struck the
water.
6/3/86 Cessna 152 NA Middletown, Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
The aircraft ran out of fuel about 15 miles short of the destination, and the pilot conducted a forced landing on the Connecticut River.
6/7/86 Taylorcraft NA Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Destroyed
BCM-12D-85
The pilot felt a sudden hard jolt while in cruise flight. Power inputs and control inputs did not correct the aircraft’s nose-low, left-wing-
down attitude. The aircraft struck the water shortly after the loss of control.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 503
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/19/86 Cessna A185F NA New Orleans, Business 0 0 1 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S.
The pilot decided to land because of rain shortly after departure. He had forgotten to retract the landing gear after takeoff and made a water
landing with the gear down, causing the aircraft to invert and sink.
7/14/86* Piper PA-28R-200 NA Marathon, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
After a loss of engine oil and subsequent seizing of the engine, the pilot ditched the aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico.
7/20/86* Cessna 177RG NA Dania, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
While flying the airplane along a beach, the pilot observed that the engine was steadily losing power. The pilot then ditched the aircraft.
7/22/86 Douglas DC-3 Borinquen Air Isla Verde, Unscheduled 1 1 0 Destroyed
Puerto Rico, U.S. cargo
Shortly after takeoff, the pilot told ATC that he was returning to the airport on a right downwind for Runway 10; he received clearance to
land. The right propeller was stopped. The pilot flew a descent and turned the airplane onto a base leg at low altitude in a right vertical
bank. The airplane struck a lagoon.
7/26/86* Grob G109 NA Isles of Scilly, U.K. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The aircraft’s engine failed at 2,500 feet. At about 200 feet, a final ditching call was transmitted, the aircraft was turned into the wind, the
systems were shut down, and the propeller was feathered. A gentle water contact was achieved, with the aircraft remaining upright and
settling only slightly in the water.
7/29/86* Beech BE-35 NA Frejus, France NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
Bonanza
The aircraft was ditched in the sea shortly after takeoff because of engine failure.
8/3/86 De Havilland LIAT Kingstown, St. Vincent Passenger 13 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-6
The aircraft struck the sea while approaching to land in poor weather.
8/17/86 Piper PA-30 NA Bowley’s Quarters, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Maryland, U.S.
The pilot said that he was having trouble controlling the aircraft during the approach. The pilot’s last transmission was to acknowledge that
he would turn the aircraft 180 degrees to abandon the approach. Witnesses saw the aircraft emerge from clouds in a steep dive and strike
water that was 10 feet to 15 feet deep one mile from the airport.
8/23/86 De Havilland Lindbergh’s Air Sangster Lake, Ontario, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
DHC-3 Otter Service Canada passenger
While landing, the pilot misjudged the height of the aircraft above the water because of the dark-night visual conditions. The force of
the water strike separated the floats and their attachments from the aircraft. The passengers had not been briefed before the flight on
emergency-evacuation procedures or on the use of life vests.
8/18/86 Cessna 172 NA Oroville, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot flew the airplane low over a reservoir with the engine stopped. The aircraft was observed to make a right turn, stall and
descend into the water. The uninjured pilot exited the sinking aircraft and was rescued by nearby fishermen. The aircraft sank in 300 feet
of water.
8/20/86 Republic RC-3 NA Keego Harbor, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Michigan, U.S.
Preparing to land on a lake at an altitude of 100 feet, the pilot noticed that he did not have full flaps extended. He then reached down and,
by error, extended the landing gear instead of the flaps. During touchdown, the aircraft immediately flipped over. The wings and hull were
substantially damaged.
8/27/86* Piper PA-25 NA Myrtle Beach, Banner towing 0 0 1 Destroyed
South Carolina, U.S.
At 500 feet AGL, the engine failed. The pilot turned the aircraft out to sea and ditched in the ocean. The pilot swam to shore, and the aircraft sank.

504 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/30/86* Cessna 182B NA La Jolla, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
The airplane was ditched in the ocean after a loss of engine power.
8/31/86* Piper PA-22-150 NA Dennis Port, NA 0 0 1 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot said that he was flying the airplane at 800 feet along the coastline and was switching from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank
when the engine failed. The aircraft was then ditched in 14-foot-deep water.
9/1/86 BN-2A Trislander Kondair North Sea Cargo 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot, having had two hours of sleep, was en route to Stansted Airport, England. He fell asleep, and the airplane hit the sea in a level
attitude, sustaining considerable damage to the landing gear. The airplane became airborne again and was flown to Stansted, where the
pilot conducted a normal landing.
9/8/86 MU-2F Private Inagua Island, Bahamas NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was discovered floating in the ocean by a passing ship. One occupant was observed protruding through the windscreen. The
aircraft subsequently sank in 230 meters of water.
9/9/86 Merlin 3 ORD McLainstown, NA NA NA NA Destroyed
Grand Bahama
The aircraft was reported to have struck a swampy area eight miles from McLainstown.
9/24/86* Cessna 152 NA Deltona, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
While in cruise flight, the engine failed, and the pilot ditched the airplane on a lake.
9/26/86* De Havilland NA Harwich, U.K. Aerobatic 0 0 1 Destroyed
Chipmunk display
The engine failed while the pilot was practicing aerobatics over the sea. The pilot declared mayday before ditching the aircraft. The pilot
was rescued by personnel of a sailing craft.
10/9/86* McDonnell U.S. Agency for Dakar, Senegal Aerial 3 1 0 Destroyed
Douglas DC-7 International application
Development
During the takeoff roll, smoke was seen from the no. 3 engine. After gear retraction, the no. 4 engine fire alarm sounded, but no fire was
observed. The engine was stopped, and the propeller was feathered. The aircraft was ditched shortly afterward.
10/10/86* Piper PA-30 NA Oceanside, Positioning 0 0 1 Destroyed
California, U.S.
Just south of Los Angeles International Airport, the aircraft’s right engine ran roughly. Power in the left engine began decreasing and the
propeller automatically feathered. The pilot attempted a restart with no success. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilot ditched the aircraft
about two miles offshore.
10/11/86* Cessna C-152 NA Port Jefferson, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
New York, U.S.
While the aircraft was being leveled at 1,800 feet, there was a power loss. The student pilot escaped without injury after the aircraft was
ditched in Long Island Sound.
10/14/86 Let 410M Aeroflot Ust-Maya, Russia, USSR Scheduled 14 0 0 Destroyed
Turbolet passenger
The aircraft’s left engine failed during a left turn shortly after takeoff, and the aircraft struck a river.
10/18/86 Lake LA4-180 NA Folsom, California, U.S. Personal 0 2 2 Substantial
The pilot attempted a landing on Lake Folsom. On touchdown, the aircraft began settling in the water and nosed over and sank.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 505
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/28/86 G73 Mallard Virgin Islands St. Croix, Virgin Islands Scheduled 1 5 9 Substantial
Seaplane passenger
Shuttle

Shortly after takeoff from the water, the aircraft rolled left and could not be leveled with full right aileron. The aircraft then stalled, and the
wings leveled. After stall recovery, the aircraft again rolled left and descended, striking the water.

11/3/86 Cessna 150J NA Memphis, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed

Tennessee, U.S.

Before its discovery on May 20, 1987, this aircraft had last been seen on the crosswind leg on climb-out after a touch-and-go at DeWitt
Spain Airport. Parts of the aircraft were recovered from the Mississippi River northwest of the airport.

11/25/86 Piper PA-34-200T NA Isabela, Puerto Rico, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed

The aircraft was reported missing while on a personal flight from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. The pilot’s last radio
contact was with Aguadilla tower, requesting an alternate airport to land because the aircraft was in heavy rain. The Coast Guard initiated a
search and found two seats, four seat cushions and other debris that was identified as being from the missing aircraft.

11/27/86* Navion H NA Fort Pierce, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Substantial

Electrical failure was followed by engine failure. The pilot ditched the aircraft in the Indian River.

11/29/86 Cessna 182L NA Oceano, Florida, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed

The aircraft made a sharp descending turn and struck the ocean. The reason for the occurrence could not be determined.

12/5/86* Cessna T210L NA Miami, Florida, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Destroyed

The engine failed while the aircraft was in cruise flight at 6,000 feet over the Atlantic Ocean. When the engine could not be restarted, the
aircraft was ditched. The pilot was rescued by the Coast Guard about 2.5 hours after the accident.

12/11/86 Piper PA-28R-200 NA North Manitou Island, Instructional 2 0 0 Substantial

Michigan, U.S.

The pilot had received a weather briefing that included a sigmet on in-flight icing. En route, during flight over a large body of water, he
experienced an aircraft power loss. The airplane’s altitude was too low for the pilot to glide the airplane to shore. The pilot tried to land on
an island but struck a lake.

12/17/86* CASA 212-200 Latin Air Punta Patuca, Honduras NA 0 0 3 Destroyed

Services

According to unconfirmed reports, the aircraft was ditched for unreported reasons in the Caribbean Sea while en route from Key West,
Florida, U.S., to Panama. The occupants were rescued by an ocean vessel.

12/23/86* Douglas DC-4 NA Pacific Ocean Training 0 0 2 Destroyed

The pilot said that he ditched his DC-4 in the Pacific Ocean after experiencing an uncontrollable no. 3 engine fire at the conclusion of a
training flight. The ditching occurred in dark-night conditions with minimal 10-foot swells approximately every 10 seconds. The aircraft was
reported to have remained afloat approximately 10 minutes after the ditching.

12/27/86 Piper PA-34 NA Fort Lauderdale, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed

Florida, U.S.

While on approach, the aircraft disappeared from radar and struck the Atlantic Ocean in 800 feet of water. The accident occurred in night
IMC with rain, thunderstorms and heavy turbulence.

1/10/87 Aerostar 601 NA Pahokee, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial

During an overwater approach, the pilot observed an abnormal loss of altitude and airspeed, which he attributed to failure of the right engine,
although the rudder pedals did not feel as though the engine had malfunctioned. He added power to maintain correct airspeed, then full
power when he did not get the expected response in thrust or airspeed. The flaps were then retracted, and the aircraft struck the lake.

506 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/12/87* Britten-Norman Trillium Air Toronto Island Airport, Unscheduled 1 1 0 Substantial
BN2A-20 Islander Ontario, Canada passenger
The aircraft was being flown on a day VFR flight when both engines failed. The pilot ditched the aircraft in Lake Ontario, 3.5 miles from the
Toronto Island Airport. Both occupants were recovered from the water, suffering from hypothermia. The passenger survived, but the pilot
died. Rescue was delayed because the aircraft occupants did not have effective signaling devices and authorities had difficulty locating the
survivors on the rough water surface.
1/26/87* Cessna 337D NA Savannah, Georgia, U.S. Aerial 0 0 5 Destroyed
observation
The airplane had fuel in the auxiliary fuel tanks at takeoff, and the pilot switched to the auxiliary tanks about 20 miles offshore. He flew
several legs of a whale-search pattern before the engine quit. The pilot turned the airplane toward the shore and switched to the main fuel
tank; the front engine also quit. The aircraft was ditched in the ocean and sank about two minutes after impact. It was not recovered.
2/6/87 Embraer Talair East Coast of Scheduled 15 0 3 Destroyed
Bandeirante Papua New Guinea Passenger
The aircraft struck the sea in bad weather en route from Rabaul to Hoskins Airport in the province of West New Britain.
2/7/87 DHC-6 Inter Atoll Air Lhaviyani Atoll, Maldives Unscheduled 0 0 16 Destroyed
Twin Otter 300 passenger
During a landing in “moderate seas” the aircraft’s right float was lost and the aircraft came to rest in a right-wing-low attitude. The
passengers and crew evacuated safely. The aircraft was blown out to sea and sank in deep water.
2/20/87 Cessna 172M NA Cedar Key, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
In an attempted go-around after an encounter with an unexpectedly strong tailwind, the aircraft was blown off the runway, collided with
trees and came to rest in the Gulf of Mexico.
3/2/87 Cessna 150M NA Porter, Texas, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
The pilot was flying the airplane at about 50 feet AGL over the San Jacinto River. During a descending right turn, the aircraft struck a power
line and then the river.
3/8/87 Beech C24R NA Milton, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
The aircraft struck a river about one mile west of the pilot’s alternate landing location after the engine failed because of fuel exhaustion
during the descent for the approach.
3/10/87* Cessna TR182 NA North Atlantic Ocean Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot departed from Canada on a North Atlantic ferry flight to Shannon, Ireland, after jump-starting the aircraft because he had left
the master switch on overnight. About 750 miles west of the Irish coast, the electrical system failed, and he could not transfer fuel from the
ferry tanks. The engine failed, and the aircraft was ditched and sank. The pilot was rescued.
3/11/87* Piper PA-24-250 NA Navarre, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Shortly after takeoff at an altitude of about 250 feet with the fuel selector positioned to the right tank, the engine quit. The pilot ditched
the aircraft in an intercoastal waterway with the landing gear extended.
3/13/87 Cessna P210R NA Block Island, Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
Rhode Island, U.S.
The aircraft disappeared from radar while the pilot was receiving radar vectors. The aircraft was missing until March 20, 1987, when
fishermen pulled part of the wreckage out of ocean waters near Block Island.
3/25/87 Cessna 310Q NA Half Moon Bay, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The controller observed that the aircraft was losing altitude rapidly and gave the pilot vectors toward the shoreline. The pilot responded,
“We’re going in.” No further transmissions were received from the pilot. Coast Guard helicopters arrived over the area of the accident, and the
helicopter aircrews found an oil slick, a landing gear and other remnants of the aircraft, but the major portion of the aircraft sank and was not
recovered.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 507
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/28/87 Piper PA-32-300 NA Many, Louisiana, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
The pilot said that he landed long and fast over trees at the runway threshold and delayed initiating a go-around until it was too late. The
aircraft subsequently departed the end of the runway into a lake.
4/5/87* Piper PA-18-125 NA Fort Lauderdale, Banner towing 0 0 1 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The pilot said that while the aircraft was towing a banner 200 yards to 300 yards offshore at 500 feet, the engine sputtered, then quit.
Attempts to restart it were unsuccessful. The pilot released the banner and ditched the aircraft in the ocean.
4/9/87 Piper PA-28-161 NA Malibu, California, U.S. Personal 2 2 0 Destroyed
The pilot and his three passengers met at a bar and decided to go on a local night scenic flight. Subsequently, the aircraft struck the ocean
as the pilot was demonstrating low flight over the water. The pilot and one passenger were hospitalized and treated for injuries and
hypothermia. The other two passengers died from drowning.
4/10/87* Piper PA-18 NA Dinard, France Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot declared mayday before the ditching. Two bodies in life vests were recovered.
4/12/87 Grumman G-44A NA Ventura, California, U.S. Personal 0 2 1 Destroyed
During a descent, the aircraft stalled. The pilot lowered the nose and abruptly added power. The engines did not respond in time to regain
altitude and airspeed. The aircraft then struck the water left-wing first.
4/25/87* Cessna 182G NA Groote Eylandt, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
Northern Australia, passenger
Australia
Shortly after takeoff, the engine sound changed. The pilot attempted to return to the landing strip, but the engine failed. The aircraft was
ditched at low speed and floated in a 60-degree nose-down attitude. The pilot and passengers exited the aircraft, which sank and was not
recovered.
4/25/87 Piper PA-28-181 NA Valley, Nebraska, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck power lines, then struck the Platte River. The wreckage came to rest in the main channel of the river in about 25 feet of
water.
4/28/87 Piper PA-18-135 NA Greenville, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The pilot was conducting a takeoff from a lake in windy conditions. The aircraft stalled shortly after takeoff about 60 feet above the surface
and struck the water.
5/8/87 Cessna 337E NA San Juan, Puerto Rico, U.S. Instructional 0 1 0 Substantial
During the base leg with flaps two-thirds extended, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled left bank, spun to the left, struck the ocean and
sank in about 23 feet of water.
6/5/87* Piper PA-32-300 NA Santa Barbara, Instructional 0 0 3 Destroyed
California, U.S.
During an ILS approach that was partially over water, the engine failed just after the final approach fix. The pilot ditched the airplane in the
ocean about four miles west of the airport.
6/6/87* Lake LA-4-200 NA Fife Lake, Michigan, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot said that the engine started to run roughly during cruise flight. Efforts to restore normal operation failed, and the pilot decided to
conduct a precautionary ditching on Fife Lake. The aircraft landed normally, but the landing was followed by a loud noise, and water began
to enter the cockpit. The aircraft sank in 25 feet to 30 feet of water. The pilot did not have a seaplane rating.
6/12/87 Taylorcraft NA Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
BC12-D
The pilot made a hard landing while attempting to land on smooth, glassy water. The landing-gear float rigging broke on impact, which
allowed the aircraft to enter the water. The aircraft filled with water and sank.

508 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/15/87* Cessna 152 NA Long Beach, Instructional 0 0 2 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The aircraft was ditched in the Pacific Ocean during a VFR instructional flight. The student pilot said that she was unable to open her door
or unfasten her seat belt, although she was not injured. The instructor and the student pilot treaded water for about 15 minutes before
they were rescued by a boat. Both pilots said that there were no flotation devices aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident.
6/20/87* Stinson 108-1 NA Big Sandy Lake, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Minnesota, U.S.
The engine failed for undetermined reasons after the pilot made a wide-circle turn. During a ditching on a lake, the aircraft nosed over.
6/22/87* Cessna 310R NA Kailua, Hawaii, U.S. Ferry 0 0 2 Destroyed
The no. 2 engine failed during cruise flight at 8,000 feet. The aircraft was unable to maintain altitude and was ditched in the ocean about 45
minutes later, about 500 nautical miles southwest of Hawaii.
6/25/87* De Havilland NA Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
DHC-2
During the approach, the pilot advanced the throttle lever but the engine did not respond. The pilot could not see the runway and
conducted a water landing with the landing gear down. During the landing, the aircraft flipped over.
6/27/87 Cessna 180 NA Bull Shoals, Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Arkansas, U.S.
The pilot landed his airplane in a smooth-water cove and was taxiing across the lake when a strong wind lifted the right wing, and the left
wing struck the water. The airplane capsized and sank.
7/13/87 Champion 7EC NA Lake Monroe, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Indiana, U.S.
The copilot began a right turn at 200 feet to 250 feet. Then, he said, he “was not able to get the wing up, and by the time I realized we had
a problem, there was not enough time or altitude to try to do anything.” Reportedly, the aircraft settled and struck the water with its right
wing, then sank. An investigation revealed that the aircraft had a history of leaking floats.
7/13/87 De Havilland Harbour Air Witherby Point, British Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver Columbia, Canada passenger
The aircraft was being turned onto final approach when it struck the water and nosed over. Life vests were available to the passengers but
were not being worn at the time of the accident. The occupants could not remember how they got out of the aircraft, but recalled kicking
and pushing the doors and windows. They were rescued by people in a nearby boat. The ELT activated when the aircraft struck the water
but did not transmit because it was submerged in the water.
7/18/87 Consolidated Government of Lac Cache, Quebec, Training 1 0 1 Destroyed
Vultee PBY5-A Quebec Canada
Canso
The crew of the Canso water bomber was practicing touch-and-go landings as part of a periodic-training requirement. On the third
landing, with the captain at the controls, the aircraft nosed down. The captain was ejected without serious injury as the aircraft broke up
and sank. The copilot drowned.
7/24/87* Davis Starship NA Burley, Idaho, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Alpha
Engine power was lost after takeoff, at 100 feet AGL. Because of obstacles in the flight path, the pilot ditched the airplane in a river.
7/29/87* Piper PA-23-160 NA St. Petersburg, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
As part of the instruction, the instructor turned off fuel to the left engine. The student followed the correct procedures but could not restart
the left engine, and the aircraft descended. The pilots could not reach the airport, so they ditched the aircraft in a bay.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 509
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/31/87 Lake LA-4-250 NA Westport, New York, U.S. Personal 0 1 2 Substantial
During the takeoff run on a lake, the amphibian encountered rough water and became airborne prematurely. The aircraft then settled onto
the water in a slightly nose-high attitude and touched down in front of a large wave. The aircraft’s nose encountered the wave head-on.
Within seconds, the aircraft became inverted. The occupants exited through a window that had come out during the impact. The aircraft
continued to float, although the cabin area was completely submerged.
8/1/87 Piper PA-23-250 NA Imperial, Texas, U.S. Personal 1 2 3 Destroyed
Witnesses observed the aircraft being flown at a very low altitude over a reservoir before the aircraft struck the water. As the aircraft began
to sink, five occupants exited. The sixth occupant had been killed.
8/1/87 Piper PA-18S NA Brewster, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The airplane stalled during an instructional flight, and there was insufficient altitude to recover airspeed. The aircraft struck the water in a
wings-level attitude.
8/2/87 Piper J3 NA Vermillion Lake, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Minnesota, U.S.
While the pilot was attempting to return for landing after a loss of power, the right wing tip struck the water and the aircraft flipped upside
down into the lake.
8/7/87 Cessna 150M NA Newport Beach, Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
California, U.S.
On a dark night, the pilot conducted a low-altitude pleasure flight 0.25 mile offshore. The aircraft entered a gradual descent and struck the
ocean, and the pilot drowned.
8/14/87* Piper PA-28-235 NA Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
The pilot reported that the engine failed during takeoff. He switched fuel tanks and tried to restart the engine but could not. The aircraft
was ditched and sank in a river.
8/18/87 Bellanca 8GCBC NA Martha’s Vineyard, Commercial 1 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S. fishing
Attempting to herd fish into a net, the pilot placed his airplane in a dive, then pulled up abruptly. Witnesses heard a loud crack and
observed the left wing collapse rearward. The airplane spun into the ocean.
8/18/87* Piper PA-28-140 NA Aurora, Personal 1 0 2 Destroyed
North Carolina, U.S.
The pilot ditched the aircraft after the fuel supply was depleted. The pilot’s failure to file a flight plan resulted in a delay of several hours in
the search for the aircraft. There was no record that the pilot had declared mayday. The two passengers were rescued by a ferry boat about
13 hours after the accident.
8/20/87* Cessna 182P NA Highland Beach, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The pilot said that the aircraft was at 1,000 feet about two miles offshore when the engine failed. He ditched the aircraft in the ocean about
40 feet from the beach.
8/30/87* Cessna 152 NA Kapiti Island, New Personal NA NA NA Destroyed
Zealand
The engine failed after a negative-g pitch-over maneuver. The aircraft was ditched at sea but was not recovered.
8/30/87* Piper PA-25 NA Myrtle Beach, Business 0 0 1 Substantial
South Carolina, U.S.
The pilot ditched the aircraft after the cabin filled with smoke and the engine began to lose power.
8/31/87 Boeing 737 Thai Airways Phuket, Thailand Scheduled 83 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft was being flown on approach to Phuket at 3,000 feet. At the same time, another B-737 was on approach at 2,500 feet. The first
aircraft suddenly pitched nose down and dived into the sea.

510 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/11/87* Piper PA-28-180 Newair Flight Riverhead, New York, U.S. Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
Fuel exhaustion occurred while the aircraft was flown over the Long Island Sound. The pilot successfully ditched the aircraft, and both
occupants exited the aircraft without injury. After some time in the water, they voluntarily separated, and one was rescued after being in
the water for three hours. The other drowned.
9/11/87 Partenavia P68C NA New Orleans, Executive/ 0 1 0 Destroyed
Louisiana, U.S. Corporate
While flying the airplane on a night ILS approach, the pilot perceived that the aircraft was over the end of the runway and he prepared
to flare. About that time, the aircraft struck water, well short of the runway. As the aircraft sank, the pilot escaped through a hole in the
windshield. He was found by passing fishermen. The pilot believed that he had a false perception of the runway location because of the
reflection of lights off the calm lake water.
9/19/87 Commonwealth NA St. Petersburg, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
185/Beech 23 Florida, U.S.
The pilot of the Commonwealth erroneously reported his position to the tower for landing instructions. He then failed to follow the
instructions, and his airplane collided with the Beech 23 that was on downwind to land. Both aircraft fell into Tampa Bay about one mile
east of the airport.
9/26/87 Beech B35 NA Kissimmee, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 1 1 Destroyed
On takeoff, the left wing of the aircraft hit the top of a tree about 50 feet AGL. Subsequently, the aircraft struck a lake near the end of the
runway.
9/26/87* Cessna 411 NA North Atlantic Ocean NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched for unknown reasons 35 miles southeast of Cat Island on a flight to Freeport, Bahamas. The aircraft was not
recovered, and attempts to contact the pilot and registered owner were unsuccessful.
9/30/87 Beech 95-B55 NA Manteo, Personal 5 0 0 Destroyed
North Carolina, U.S.
Witnesses observed the aircraft settle into the ocean during low-level cruise flight near a beach. An IFR flight plan had been filed, but no
contact was made with ATC.
10/11/87* Falcon 20D Drenair Jet 45 miles west of Iceland Passenger/ferry 0 0 6 Destroyed
Aviation
The aircraft was low on fuel, and the crew declared an emergency. After a loss of power, the aircraft was ditched in heavy seas as the aircraft
disappeared in troughs behind waves. The passengers and crew launched and boarded a life raft and were rescued by a ship in less than
two hours.
10/12/87* Piper PA-23-250 NA St. Thomas, Personal 1 1 4 Substantial
U.S. Virgin Islands
After departure, the pilot reported to the tower that the airplane was returning because of a loss of left-engine power. He secured the
engine and returned the airplane to land. On short final, the pilot was unable to extend the landing gear normally; instead, he conducted
manual extension procedures and pumped the gear until it had extended. While on base leg and turning to final approach, the pilot told
the tower that he was ditching the aircraft.
10/30/87 Cessna 150E NA Aguadilla, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Puerto Rico, U.S.
Witnesses saw the aircraft being maneuvered at low altitude over the ocean near a shoreline. They saw a pull-up over a boat dock, and then
the aircraft struck the water in a nose-low, right-wing-low attitude. The aircraft sank in 30 feet of water.
10/31/87* Piper J5A NA Devil’s Lake, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
North Dakota, U.S.
Witnesses saw the aircraft about 100 feet over a waterfowl-production lake. The pilot said that during a turn and pull-up, the engine failed,
and the aircraft was ditched in the lake.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 511
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/4/87 Piper PA-32-260 NA Fulton, Texas, U.S. Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was flown from the airport in conditions of low ceiling and visibility with a student pilot and a passenger on board. Witnesses
on the beach, about 0.5 mile from the airport, saw the aircraft strike the water in a right bank and disappear.
11/9/87 Piper PA-28-161 NA St. Petersburg, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The aircraft touched down about 528 feet from the departure end of the runway, and as it approached the seawall, the pilot applied full-up
elevator. The aircraft became airborne momentarily, flew over the seawall and landed in Tampa Bay in about 18 feet of water.
11/12/87* Mooney M20A NA Southport, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
North Carolina, U.S.
The airplane lost engine power shortly after takeoff. The pilot ditched the airplane in a nearby waterway.
11/12/87* Cessna 172B NA Jamestown, Sightseeing 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
During a sightseeing flight over a lake, the pilot said that the engine failed. The pilot conducted an emergency landing on the lake, where
the aircraft sank.
11/15/87* Cessna 172A NA Dayton, Ohio, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot said that the engine began to sputter and lose power shortly after takeoff. The pilot subsequently conducted a forced landing in a
nearby river. The aircraft nosed over on landing and came to rest partially submerged in about four feet of water.
11/17/87* Cessna 150M NA Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Aerial 0 0 1 Destroyed
observation
The pilot said that the engine failed while he was flying the airplane low over the ocean on a fish-spotting flight. Subsequently, he ditched
the airplane in the ocean.
11/20/87 Cessna A185F NA Silvan Reservoir, Victoria, Personal 2 0 1 Substantial
Australia
Lacking low-level flight training, the pilot made an unauthorized low-level flight and misjudged the altitude over a glassy-water surface.
The aircraft struck the water. The pilot was fatigued and impaired by alcohol.
11/22/87* Bellanca 8GCBC NA San Diego, Towing 0 0 1 Destroyed
California, U.S.
As the pilot was completing a banner-towing flight, the aircraft’s engine failed, and the cockpit filled with smoke. The pilot released the
banner, and ditched the aircraft in rough water.
11/25/87 Beech H35 NA Port Mansfield, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Texas, U.S.
The aircraft struck Laguna Madre in about a 10-degree nose-down attitude.
11/27/87 Cessna 208A NA Haumuri Bluffs, Scheduled cargo 2 0 0 Destroyed
New Zealand
The aircraft, on a scheduled night flight from Christchurch, New Zealand, to Wellington, New Zealand, continued to fly in icing conditions at
11,000 feet until it stalled and spun into the sea.
11/28/87 Boeing 747 South African Mauritius Scheduled 159 0 0 Destroyed
Airways passenger
A Boeing 747-244B Combi of South African Airways departed from Taipei (Taiwan, China) Chiang Kai-Shek Airport for Mauritius’ Plaisance
Airport. In the main deck cargo hold, six pallets of cargo had been loaded. Some nine hours out and some 46 minutes before the estimated
time of arrival at Plaisance, the flight deck informed the approach control at Plaisance that there was a smoke problem in the airplane and
that an emergency descent to FL 140 had begun. The last radio communication was at 00:04. About 00:07, the airplane struck the sea. A fire
in the right hand front pallet in the main deck cargo hold led to the accident.

512 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

11/29/87 Boeing 707 Korean Air Andaman Sea Scheduled 115 0 0 Destroyed
passenger

The flight crew last reported the aircraft’s position while flying over Burma. There was no further contact with the crew. The main wreckage
was not found, but one partially inflated life raft was retrieved from the Andaman Sea. The life raft later was identified as the 25-person life
raft installed at the no. 2 storage compartment in the forward cabin.
The event was a result of an in-flight explosion caused by terrorist sabotage.

12/8/87 F27 Peruvian Lima, Peru Unscheduled 42 1 0 Destroyed

Military passenger

The crew of the aircraft, being flown on a civil charter flight, conducted a low fly-by to have a possible landing-gear malfunction inspected
from the ground. After ATC said that the landing gear appeared to be extended, the aircraft was being positioned for another landing
approach when it struck the sea six miles northwest of Lima.

12/18/87 Beech 58 NA Wedron, Illinois, U.S. Cargo 1 0 0 Destroyed

The airplane struck trees and descended out of control into a river while the crew attempted a night emergency landing after the airplane’s
fuel supply was depleted. The airplane was found under water on the fifth day of a search, after two boys found debris from the airplane on
the river bank.

12/21/87* Douglas DC-6 Aeronica Northern Costa Rica Unscheduled 0 0 6 Destroyed

cargo

During cruise, the crew heard an explosion and saw that the no. 3 engine had separated. Following a fire warning on the no. 4 engine, the
crew attempted to extinguish the fire. They tried unsuccessfully to feather the propeller. The pilot decided to unload the cargo and ditch
the aircraft in a river. The crew then evacuated the aircraft.

1/10/88 Nikkon Aeroplane Toa Miho, Japan Scheduled 0 0 52 Substantial

YS-11 passenger

The copilot, at the controls, found the elevator control too heavy to rotate the aircraft and rejected the takeoff. The aircraft overran Runway
25 and dropped into the sea.

1/16/88* Pitts S-2A NA Portsea, Victoria, Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed

Australia

The aircraft collided with another aircraft. The pilot was able to gain some control before ditching.

2/11/88 Fairchild Metro Air Niagara Hamilton, Ontario, Ferry 2 0 0 Destroyed

SA226TC Metro II Express Canada

While on a long final approach at Hamilton, the aircraft suddenly disappeared from radar and all contact with the flight was lost. The
aircraft was later found to have struck the water of Lake Ontario about 10 miles short of the runway.

2/18/88 Beech S35 NA Lake Charles, Business 2 0 0 Destroyed

Louisiana, U.S.

The aircraft struck a lake shortly after being vectored onto the final approach. No evidence of mechanical malfunction or abnormal trim
settings was found on the aircraft during the investigation. Local ornithologists said that large flocks of birds were known to be airborne at
the time of the accident.

2/18/88 Piper PA-28-161 NA Stuart, Florida, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed

The pilot said that he was having a problem with weather and wanted to turn the airplane to the south. The controller gave the pilot a
vector and told him to maintain VFR. The pilot replied that he was not in visual conditions and asked if the controller wanted him to climb.
The controller told the pilot that he could climb at his discretion. Soon afterward, radar contact with the aircraft was lost and the aircraft
struck the ocean.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 513
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
2/19/88 Piper PA-34-200T NA Stratford, Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
Connecticut, U.S.
The pilot and pilot-rated passenger received vectors for multiple ILS approaches in deteriorating weather conditions. On the first attempt, the
aircraft was off course and not in a position to land. The second attempt was rejected before the aircraft reached the airport. During the third
attempt, radar service was terminated, and the pilot was given a frequency change. The aircraft struck water about one mile from the runway.
2/19/88 Fairchild Metro AV Air Raleigh-Durham, Scheduled 12 0 0 Destroyed
SA227AC North Carolina, U.S. passenger
Metro III
The aircraft was flown into the waters of a reservoir shortly after takeoff. The accident happened at night in poor weather.
3/13/88* Cessna P210N NA Outer Harbour, South Personal 1 0 4 Destroyed
Australia, Australia
The pilot declared mayday when the engine failed over open water because of fuel exhaustion. The aircraft was ditched.
3/27/88 Cessna 172RG NA Malibu, California, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
observation
The flight’s purpose was to enable the passenger to photograph yachts sailing off the Malibu coast. The pilot said that he initiated a turn at
300 feet AGL and the aircraft stalled and struck the water.
4/1/88 Cessna 150J NA Guntersville, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Alabama, U.S.
The airplane was in a gradual right turn about 100 feet above the water when a large spider dropped in front of the pilot and distracted
him. The pilot attempted to swat the spider and inadvertently allowed the airplane to descend into the water. The airplane flipped over and
came to rest inverted. The pilot exited the airplane as it sank; he was rescued by a fisherman.
4/18/88* Beech 23 NA Brighton, Michigan, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
During a go-around, engine power decreased and the airplane descended. The aircraft struck the top of a large tree and then contacted a
smaller tree before descending into the lake. The pilot and passengers exited the aircraft before it sank.
4/23/88 Hernandez NA Palos Verdes, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Thorp T-18 California, U.S.
The aircraft was being demonstrated for a prospective buyer. Witnesses reported observing the aircraft in a dive toward the water. Aircraft
debris was found on the beach.
4/27/88 Champion 7KCAB NA Dracut, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot said that while he was making a normal approach for a glassy-water landing on a lake, he flared the aircraft high, and it stalled with
the right wing low before striking the water.
5/24/88 Boeing 737-300 TACA Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Ferry 0 0 2 Destroyed
International
Airlines
The aircraft apparently undershot the runway while on approach to Santos Dumont Airport, touching down in Guanabara Bay some 500
meters short of the runway threshold.
5/24/88 Cessna 320F NA San Angelo, Texas, U.S. Instructional 0 1 1 Substantial
A touch-and-go landing was being performed by the left-seat pilot, who was receiving instruction. As power was added, the aircraft drifted
to the right despite the application of full-left rudder. The PIC did not discontinue the takeoff because he believed that the swerve was
pilot-induced or a result of mismatched throttle-lever settings. The PIC took control of the airplane at rotation, but the aircraft rolled left.
The PIC feathered the left propeller, and the airplane stalled and struck a lake.
5/27/88 Cessna 150K NA Gary, Indiana, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot was flying the airplane 150 feet above the water along the shoreline. The pilot’s attention was diverted from flying the airplane by
navigation duties, and he failed to maintain sufficient visual lookout. The airplane entered an unnoticed gradual descent, struck the water
and sank.

514 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/27/88 Beech A-23-19 NA Big Island, Arkansas, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot suffered an incapacitating medical event that resulted in loss of aircraft control during the initial segment of the takeoff. The
aircraft struck the Mississippi River and sank to a depth of about 12 feet. Autopsy findings listed the cause of death as “drowning in
association with arteriosclerotic heart disease.”
5/28/88 Cessna 172K NA Bismark, Missouri, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
The accident aircraft was observed in several low passes over Lake Bismark. Witnesses said that, following the last pass, the aircraft struck
the water and sank. The pilot’s blood alcohol content was 0.14 percent.
6/28/88 Champion 7GCB NA Fairbanks, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
During takeoff, the 70-hour private pilot conducted the liftoff prematurely. The pilot banked the airplane to the right, then overcorrected
by banking to the left. The airplane stalled, pitched down and struck an adjacent seaplane pond.
7/1/88 Rockwell 112A NA Sandusky, Ohio, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
The pilot reported that the landing airspeed was fast and that the aircraft bounced on touchdown. Directional control of the aircraft was
lost. The pilot attempted a go-around and applied partial power. The aircraft struck a tree during climbout and came to rest in a bay.
7/2/88* Cessna 152 NA Marathon, Florida, U.S. Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
The student pilot was on his first solo cross-country flight. While he was flying the airplane over the Gulf of Mexico, the engine failed. The
pilot ditched the airplane near a small boat and believed that its occupants had observed the ditching. The boat was sailed away. The pilot
had declared mayday before the ditching and was rescued by the Coast Guard shortly afterward.
7/10/88 Champion 7GCB NA Staten Island, Banner towing 0 0 1 Destroyed
New York, U.S.
The pilot said that after flying the airplane into a thunderstorm, he encountered strong turbulence, heavy downdrafts and rain, which
forced the airplane into the water.
7/16/88 Lake LA-4-200 NA Candlewood Lake, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
The pilot said that he discontinued the takeoff because a person on a jet ski was in the way. As the pilot tried to turn the aircraft to the
right, a wing dug into the water and the aircraft “water looped.” The pilot and two passengers were rescued by boaters, and the aircraft
sank within 15 seconds.
7/17/88* Cessna 150K NA Dana Point, Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
California, U.S. observation
During a fish-spotting operation, the engine began to run roughly and to vibrate. The engine then failed completely, and the airplane was
ditched in the ocean.
7/17/88 Beech 95 NA Destin, Florida, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot received clearance for a visual approach. Witnesses saw the aircraft on left downwind and said that it was flown into a
thundershower. The pilot was not heard from again. The aircraft wreckage was found in the bay 1.25 miles north of the runway.
Examination showed that the aircraft had struck the water with its left wing low.
7/20/88 Cessna 180K NA Eastsound, Positioning 0 0 1 Destroyed
Washington, U.S.
While the aircraft was in cruise flight 200 feet over the water, the pilot looked down to get a chart that was under his seat. As he did, the
aircraft descended and struck the water.
7/24/88* Piper PA-28-151 NA La Grange, Georgia, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot said that a hardover in the single-axis autopilot caused the aircraft to constantly bank right. Because of the continuous bank, he
conducted a precautionary ditching in a lake.
7/25/88 Cessna U206F NA Lake Minchumina, Personal 1 1 2 Substantial
Alaska, U.S.
The pilot was taxiing the floatplane from a windy, wavy location to a small protected cover for a final preflight. While he taxied the
aircraft, the top cap of the left float was open and the float began filling with water. Subsequently, the floatplane rolled over and
sank.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/28/88 Piper PA-18 NA Forsyth, Montana, U.S. Aerial 0 0 1 Substantial
observation
Flying the airplane toward the setting sun at low altitude, the pilot did not see the power lines ahead until there was insufficient time to take
evasive action. The aircraft struck three cables about 30 feet AGL and fell into a river. The pilot exited and clung to the aircraft until he was rescued.
7/30/88* Cessna 172L NA North Kingston, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Rhode Island, U.S.
After several approaches to different airports, all of which were unsuitable because of weather conditions, the pilot was receiving vectors
to Providence, Rhode Island. Fuel exhaustion forced the pilot to ditch the aircraft in Narragansett Bay.
8/7/88* Ryan Navion NA Cumming, Georgia, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Because of heavy rain over the destination airport, the pilot diverted to an alternate. On the way to the alternate, the engine failed from
fuel starvation, and the pilot ditched the airplane in Lake Lanier.
8/12/88 Cessna TU206G NA White Lake, Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
New York, U.S.
The pilot of the float-equipped aircraft conducted multiple takeoff attempts on a lake. On the final takeoff run, after the aircraft became airborne,
the pilot flew it into an inlet with insufficient room to turn around. The pilot began a left turn, and the airplane was observed to strike the water
in a nose-low, left-wing-low attitude. Rescuers removed both occupants from the submerged aircraft within 10 minutes after the accident. Both
occupants wore seat belts without shoulder harnesses. The aircraft was more than 80 pounds over maximum gross weight at takeoff.
8/26/88* Piper PA-28R-200 NA Gary, Indiana, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Destroyed
While the aircraft was in cruise flight over Lake Michigan at night, oil pressure was lost, followed by an engine failure. The pilot performed
emergency procedures and prepared for a ditching. He was able to glide the aircraft to shore, but because of “industrial terrain” along the
shoreline, he decided to ditch the aircraft in Lake Michigan near the shore. After the ditching, the pilot exited the aircraft and swam to a
breakwater. He was rescued about five hours later and was treated for hypothermia.
8/28/88* American AA-1A NA Fairhope, Alabama, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot said that the engine failed without warning as he and his passenger were flying the airplane over water near the shore at 500 feet.
He performed emergency procedures and regained partial power but not enough to continue flight. He maneuvered toward the shore,
then ditched the aircraft to avoid obstructions and people on the beach.
8/31/88 Trident 2E CAAC Hong Kong Scheduled 7 13 69 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft was being flown on an approach in heavy rain when the right outer flap struck an approach light and the right-main landing
gear struck the runway lip. A tire burst, and the right-main landing gear was torn away. When the aircraft bounced, the right wing struck
the ground, and the aircraft left the runway to the right, slewed and came to rest in water just off the runway. The flight deck area was half
detached and submerged. Most passengers evacuated in the first 10 minutes.
9/4/88 Cessna 172P NA Boyne City, Aerial 1 1 0 Destroyed
Michigan, U.S. observation
The pilot and passenger were flying the airplane low over a sailboat regatta to photograph sailboats. Maneuvering the airplane for a
photograph, the pilot reduced power and banked the aircraft steeply. The aircraft stalled with insufficient altitude to recover. The aircraft
struck the water in a left-wing-low, nose-down attitude and sank almost immediately. The passenger escaped with a serious injury. He tried
to help the pilot, but the pilot had received a fatal head injury.
9/4/88 Cessna 172E NA Petersburg, Alaska, U.S. Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot received a weather briefing for marginal VMC. Witnesses to the departure observed a fog bank offshore from the airport.
Witnesses near the accident site, 10 miles from the airport, heard the aircraft and sounds of impact. They reported fog on the water and
glassy-water conditions.
9/26/88 B-737 Aerolineas Ushuaia, Argentina Scheduled 0 0 62 Substantial
Argentinas passenger
The aircraft was landed with excessive speed and touched down three-quarters of the way along the runway. About 200 meters before the
end of the runway, the aircraft veered left, overran the runway and descended a five-meter escarpment before coming to rest in the sea,
partially submerged.

516 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/30/88 Bellanca 14-13-2 NA Sodus Bay, Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
New York, U.S.
While on a low-level pleasure flight over water, the pilot failed to maintain adequate terrain clearance, and the left wing contacted the
water. The aircraft struck the water and remained upright. The pilot and passengers exited the aircraft and were rescued by occupants of a
passing boat.
10/6/88* Piper PA-23-250 NA La Belle, Florida, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Substantial
During the ferry flight, the no. 4 cylinder of the left engine failed, and the airplane began to descend. The pilot ditched the aircraft in a
lake.
10/6/88* Republic RC-3 NA Miami, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
The pilot was having difficulty with the elevator trim and decided to land the amphibious aircraft in the bay. He lowered the landing gear
before attempting to land on the water. The aircraft flipped inverted upon touchdown.
10/28/88 Piper PA-34-200 NA Ocean City, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Maryland, U.S.
Witnesses observed the aircraft about two miles north of the destination airport at an altitude of about 600 feet AGL. They observed the
aircraft as it was flown across the shoreline and over water. Witnesses said that the aircraft began descending after a turn to the south; the
descent continued until the aircraft struck the water.
10/31/88 Piper PA-28-181 NA Alexander City, Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
Alabama, U.S.
The pilot reported a loss of engine power. He received vectors toward an airport, but radar contact was lost. On Nov. 16, 1990, the aircraft
was found in 65 feet of water in Martin Lake.
11/1/88 Douglas DC-3 Air Ontario Pikangikum Lake, Cargo 2 1 0 Destroyed
Ontario, Canada
The aircraft was heard as it was flown over the town, then sounds of an accident were heard. The DC-3 was later found to have struck
the lake.
11/1/88 Piper PA-31/A1 NA Stanwell Park, New Drogue towing 3 0 0 Destroyed
South Wales, Australia
The pilot declared mayday and said that the aircraft had an engine problem. Shortly afterward, the aircraft struck the sea.
11/12/88* Cessna 337E NA Kahului, Hawaii, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot shut down the rear engine because it was running roughly and oil temperature was too high. Subsequently, the front engine
failed. The pilot, unable to restore power to either engine, ditched the airplane in the ocean.
11/22/88* Piper PA-28-181 NA Palmyra, New York, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
The pilot said that the airplane lost power because of fuel exhaustion. He ditched the aircraft in a canal, and the pilot and the two
passengers swam to shore.
11/28/88 Piper PA-28-180 NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The student pilot filed an international flight plan to the Bahamas. He did not request a weather briefing, and none was given. The pilot
later contacted ATC, said that the aircraft was in IMC and requested assistance. ATC located the aircraft on radar and attempted to assist the
pilot, but the aircraft disappeared from radar over the Atlantic Ocean and there was no further contact with him.
12/5/88 De Havilland NA Bundaberg, Instructional 3 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-2 Queensland, Australia
The aircraft sustained severe damage to the right float, wings and cockpit area, consistent with striking the water in a right-wing-low
attitude and then overturning. The accident may have been caused by control difficulties in an excessive crosswind.
12/21/88 Cessna 310L NA Cedar Key, Florida, U.S. Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
An in-flight fire burned through a fuel-crossfeed line that could not be shut off by the pilot. The aircraft struck water in a left-wing-low
attitude.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
12/21/88 Piper PA-24-250 NA Elephant Butte, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
New Mexico, U.S.
During a return flight after having maintenance performed on the aircraft, the pilot flew the airplane in a low pass near his home, which
was located on a point of land overlooking Elephant Butte Reservoir. During the maneuver, while in a steep turn, the left wing struck
the water and separated from the aircraft. The aircraft cartwheeled and sank. Weather was VMC, and the water surface was smooth and
glassy.
12/27/88* Cessna 172H NA Hot Water Beach, Personal NA NA NA Substantial
New Zealand
During a flight at 250 feet above the sea, the aircraft’s engine failed. The aircraft was ditched successfully. The engine was not recovered.
1/15/89 Mooney M20 NA Malmo, Minnesota, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Destroyed
The non-instrument-rated pilot inadvertently flew the aircraft into IMC in whiteout conditions. He lost control of the aircraft, which struck a
frozen lake.
2/4/89* Stolp-Adams NA Indian Rocks, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
SA 100 Florida, U.S.
While the pilot was performing inverted aerobatic maneuvers near the coastline, the engine (which did not have an inverted fuel
system or inverted oil system installed) failed because of fuel starvation. Unable to restart the engine, the pilot ditched the aircraft near
the shore.
2/6/89 Vickers 950 Inter Ciel Marseille, France Scheduled cargo 3 0 0 Destroyed
Vanguard Service
On takeoff, the aircraft was flown to about 50 feet before descending and striking the waters of Etang de Berre close to the end of the
runway. This was reportedly the aircraft’s second takeoff attempt, the first having been rejected for unspecified reasons.
2/11/89* Cessna 172M NA San Juan, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S.
Shortly after takeoff, about 500 feet above the airport, the pilot reported that the engine failed. Unable to return to the airport for landing,
he ditched the aircraft.
2/14/89* Piper 31-350 Southern Cross Pacific Ocean Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Aviation
During cruise flight, the right engine suddenly lost oil pressure. The pilot shut down the engine, but because of high gross weight, the
aircraft was unable to maintain altitude on the one remaining engine. The aircraft was ditched in the ocean and was not recovered.
2/28/89 Mitsubishi NA San Diego, Public use 1 0 0 Destroyed
MU-2B-20F California, U.S.
Radar data showed that the aircraft descended from 22,500 feet and struck the ocean. No distress calls were made.
3/1/89* Douglas DC-3 NA Isla Verde, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S. cargo
On base leg, the left engine failed. The pilot retracted the landing gear but did not feather the propeller. The right engine did not respond
immediately. The pilot could not maintain altitude and ditched the airplane in a lagoon two miles from the airport.
3/4/89* John C. Corby NA Rottnest Island, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
CJ-1 Western Australia
While the pilot performed turning stalls, the aircraft’s engine failed. The pilot could not restart the engine and ditched the aircraft in
the bay.
3/8/89* Piper PA-32-300 NA Atlantic Ocean Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot was ferrying the airplane from St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada, to Shannon, Ireland. The area controller received a distress call
from the pilot, who reported an engine problem and said that he was preparing to ditch. Eleven aircraft and two surface vessels searched
the area, but neither the pilot nor the aircraft was found. The pilot was presumed to have died from injuries or drowning after ditching the
aircraft in heavy sea conditions.

518 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/12/89 Piper PA-28-161 NA New Orleans, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Louisiana, U.S.
The aircraft struck water about 4,000 feet beyond the departure end of the runway. The accident report said that the probable cause was
that the pilot diverted his attention from flying the aircraft while complying with departure control instructions and allowed the aircraft to
descend into the water.
3/16/89 Beech H35 NA Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
An air-oil separator kit had just been installed on the airplane, reportedly by uncertified maintenance technicians. The airplane was
observed to land on the river, short of the airport. Both occupants exited the airplane and swam toward shore. The pilot reached the
shore but swam back out to help his passenger. Water temperature was 48 degrees Fahrenheit. Both bodies were recovered later.
3/24/89 Piper PA-38-112 NA Mayflower, Arkansas, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
The student pilot and his student-pilot-rated passenger were flying the airplane low over the Arkansas River, as observed by witnesses. The
witnesses said that the aircraft was flown directly overhead and was pulled up sharply into a climb. At the top of the climb, the right wing
stalled and the aircraft descended rapidly, nose-down, and struck the water. The aircraft rapidly sank in 30 feet of water.
3/25/89 Bellanca 7KCAB NA Daytona Beach, Banner towing 1 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
While being flown offshore southbound at 300 feet to 400 feet, the pilot of the banner-towing Bellanca passed another banner-towing
aircraft to the right. The pilot initiated a “very tight” right turn to return northbound. While descending eastbound with the banner
attached, the main landing gear struck a wave, causing the aircraft to nose into the water.
3/28/89 Cessna 172 NA Santa Barbara, Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
California, U.S.
The student pilot said that he was flying the airplane toward the water at 400 feet per minute to 600 feet per minute when the engine
backfired. He said that he applied carburetor heat, but the engine continued to run roughly and produced only 1,200 rpm. He flew the
airplane at this power setting for a mile or more, just above the water, and struck the tops of waves at times. Then the wheels struck the
water and the airplane bounced and nosed into the water.
4/2/89 Piper 601B NA Wollongong, New South Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
Wales, Australia passenger
The pilot was flying the aircraft in heavy rain and low clouds to Wollongong to pick up charter passengers. The aircraft and pilot were lost
at sea and were not recovered.
4/8/89* Beech F-33A NA Reddington Beach, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The instructor pilot and the rated pilot/owner were flying the aircraft during a dual instrument-training flight when the engine failed. They
both attempted engine starts but were unsuccessful. They ditched the airplane.
4/29/89* Beech 35 NA Daytona Beach, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
During normal cruise flight just offshore, the engine failed. The pilot ditched the aircraft in 10 feet of water.
5/2/89 Douglas DC-3 NA Summerland Key, Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S. application
When the aircraft did not return from a routine spraying flight, the Coast Guard initiated a search. The aircraft was located in the water near
Summerland Key about nine hours later.
5/9/89 Piper PA-44-180 FlightSafety Fort Pierce, Florida, U.S. Instructional 3 0 0 Destroyed
International
The aircraft’s ground speed slowed to 37 knots, which resulted in an inadvertent stall and spin and subsequent loss of engine power,
possibly because of interruption of fuel supply. The aircraft then struck the ocean.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/22/89 Britten Norman NA Derby, Western Australia, Unscheduled 0 2 1 Substantial
BN-2A-26 Australia passenger
The aircraft was flown in two low passes over a boat. The aircraft was banked right, and the right wing tip struck water. The aircraft
cartwheeled and crashed in the water, its fuselage breaking apart on impact. The pilot and passengers surfaced 400 meters from the boat
and were rescued by the boat crew.
5/23/89 Cessna 180 NA Green Island, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 1 2 Substantial
passenger
The float-equipped airplane flipped over while landing. The pilot believed that the airplane may have inadvertently encountered a boat’s
wake. A crewmember from a nearby boat dived into the water and helped the pilot and passengers to escape.
5/27/89 Mooney M20J NA Big Pine Key, Florida, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was being flown in a normal descent until, according to radar data, the aircraft’s heading began to change constantly, and the
aircraft began to climb and descend. After these maneuvers had continued for about four minutes, contact with the aircraft was lost, and
search-and-rescue effects were begun. An oil slick was found near the aircraft’s last known position. A Coast Guard ship recovered debris
from the aircraft, but the aircraft’s main wreckage and the occupants were not located.
5/28/89 Cessna 172M NA Oakland, Arkansas, U.S. Personal 0 2 0 Substantial
The accident aircraft was seen at a very low altitude over a lake. Witnesses said that the pilot rocked the wings several times, as if
waving to someone on the lake. The aircraft struck wires about 45 feet above the lake surface. Aircraft control was lost, and the aircraft
struck the lake.
5/29/89 De Havilland NA Angoon, Alaska, U.S. NA 1 0 0 Substantial
DHC-2
The pilot landed the amphibious aircraft on water with the wheels extended, and the aircraft flipped over to an inverted position.
6/3/89 Stinson 108-2 NA Wasilla, Alaska, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
Immediately after takeoff from the water, the pilot conducted a low-altitude steep left turn, which resulted in a stall and a spin into the lake.
6/10/89* Piper PA-24 NA Naked Island, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
After an engine failure, the pilot ditched the aircraft in Prince William Sound near Naked Island. The pilot and passenger were rescued by
occupants of a nearby boat and were treated for hypothermia.
6/11/89* Cessna 150L NA Alexander River, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Alaska, U.S.
The airplane was landed long on an unimproved landing strip. It touched down hard, and the propeller struck the ground. A go-around
was attempted, but there was insufficient thrust from the damaged propeller. The pilot intentionally swerved the airplane into the adjacent
river to avoid people and equipment on the far end of the landing strip.
6/17/89 Cessna 150M NA Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S. Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
The student pilot, making a practice solo flight, discontinued the takeoff after she observed the instruments indicating that the engine was
not developing full power. The airplane veered off the runway and continued over the grass surface into the river and lake surrounding the
airport.
6/19/89* Ercoupe 415C NA Canaan, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
The pilot was flying the airplane back to its departure airport when the engine failed. The pilot could not land the airplane on a highway
because trees were in the flight path, so he ditched in a lake.
6/26/89* Douglas DC-3 NA Petersburg, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 0 0 2 Substantial
On takeoff, the pilot experienced loss of aileron control. He could not fly the airplane back to the airport for landing and ditched the aircraft
eight kilometers south of Petersburg. The aircraft had not undergone a current annual inspection and was being flown on a ferry permit.
6/28/89 Cessna U206 NA Eveleth, Minnesota, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
Witnesses observed the aircraft bounce hard on the first landing attempt on Ely Lake and then settle right-wing-low and right-float-low and
strike the water again. During the subsequent water strike, the aircraft flipped inverted. The pilot had not maintained currency in the aircraft.

520 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/4/89 Cessna 180 NA Port Alsworth, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Alaska, U.S.
The engine failed on final approach. After hitting the water, the airplane flipped inverted.
7/5/89 De Havilland NA Cape Richards, Nonscheduled 0 0 7 Destroyed
DHC-2 MK 1 Queensland, Australia passenger
During takeoff, the overweight aircraft’s right float hit a wave, causing the left wing to strike the water and the aircraft to cartwheel.
7/9/89 Pitts S-1 NA Butler, Tennessee, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
During an aerobatic maneuver, the pilot did not maintain clearance from the water surface, and the aircraft was flown into the lake.
7/13/89 Piper PA-28 NA Naknek, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The student pilot reported that during takeoff, the airplane was flown to 100 feet AGL, then stalled. The airplane struck a lake near the
departure end of the runway.
7/13/89 Cessna 210N NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
The pilot told ATC that he was having a “little trouble breathing.” Military aircraft in the area were vectored to intercept and escort the
airplane. The intercepting pilots observed a person in the aircraft with his head back in a reclining position and moving very little. Aircraft
speed slowed, and the aircraft began descending and then entered a descending spiral. The aircraft touched down in the ocean in a
wings-level attitude. After stopping, the aircraft sank, but rescue personnel retrieved the pilot. He was in shock with a gunshot wound in his
abdomen, rib cage and left arm. He was hospitalized with indications of fully developed peritonitis.
7/16/89* Piper PA-32-300 NA Luquillo, Business 0 0 2 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S.
While flying the airplane over the ocean, the pilot smelled something burning. Shortly afterward, the engine failed. The pilot glided the
aircraft to about 0.5 mile from shore, then ditched it in the ocean.
7/24/89 Piper PA-28-161 NA Stonington, Personal 0 1 1 Destroyed
Connecticut, U.S.
The pilot said that after takeoff, when the aircraft had reached 200 feet MSL, he suddenly realized that the fog was denser than he had
expected. He said that he experienced vertigo and lost control of the aircraft, which hit the tops of trees and then struck the Pawcatuck
River. As the aircraft sank, the occupants exited and swam to a dock.
7/31/89 Allison Convair Air Cargo NZ Auckland, New Zealand Scheduled cargo 3 0 0 Destroyed
340/580
After an apparently normal takeoff on a dark, drizzly night, the aircraft climbed, then descended and struck an airport boundary embankment
in nearly level attitude. The aircraft broke apart after striking water in an adjacent harbor.
8/3/89 Cessna 172 NA Apalachicola, Aerial 0 0 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S. observation
While returning from a fish-spotting trip, the pilot flew the airplane at an altitude of about 50 feet. The aircraft was flown into the water
about 1,500 feet from the shore. During the impact, the pilot’s seat belt failed, and he was ejected from the aircraft, which sank.
8/6/89 Cessna 172H NA Dana Point, Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
Witnesses observed the airplane being flown in slow circles when the nose dropped and the engine sound increased. The nose of the
airplane then rose to a near-vertical climb, and the airplane “looped over” onto its back. It then dived nearly vertically while rotating 180
degrees and struck the Pacific Ocean nose-first.
8/11/89 Lake LA-250 NA Bullfrog, Utah, U.S. Personal 0 2 1 Substantial
The pilot was practicing “splash and go” landings on Lake Powell. During a landing run, the aircraft struck an unseen submerged object.
The aircraft sank in 130 feet of water. The object penetrated the hull between the rudder pedals and broke both of the pilot’s legs. All three
occupants were rescued by a passing ski boat. The pilot was airlifted for emergency medical treatment.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 521
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/13/89 Cessna 172P NA Pass-a-Grille, Florida, U.S. Unknown 4 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was being used to demonstrate flight characteristics. During a flight over the Gulf of Mexico, the aircraft entered a descent
and struck the water about three miles from land. A witness said that the airplane was spinning in a nose-down attitude. The aircraft sank
almost immediately in 28 feet of water.
8/15/89 AN 24 CAAC Shanghai, China Scheduled 34 NA NA Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft overran the runway into a river on takeoff.
9/3/89 150 NA Grafton, New South Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Wales, Australia
The pilot was returning to the airstrip after an aerobatic flight. On crosswind, the aircraft was seen descending to 700 feet before its nose
dropped and the aircraft dived into the river. The pilot had failed to report a previous heart attack.
9/7/89 Piper PA-32-260 NA Lake Havasu City, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
Witnesses observed the aircraft approach at a low altitude and circle a point on the lake. They said that the airplane was in a right bank and
gradually descended during the turns until it struck the water.
9/8/89 Lake LA-4-200 NA Klawock, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 1 2 Destroyed
While turning from base leg to final approach for a lake landing, the pilot misjudged the aircraft height above the smooth, glassy
surface of the water. The left wing struck water, and the aircraft cartwheeled. About five minutes later, the aircraft sank in 50 feet of
water.
9/16/89 Rockwell 112B NA La Grange, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The pilot filed a VFR flight plan but found himself in IMC. The aircraft was seen by a witness diving as it descended below clouds. The
aircraft struck a lake.
9/19/89 De Havilland NA Sleepy Bay, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 5 Substantial
DHC-6
The pilot said that he overflew the intended landing area and observed two-foot to three-foot swells. He decided to land parallel to the swells
and into a quartering headwind. Touchdown was reported to have been smooth. The aircraft then entered a large swell, four feet to five feet
high, and became airborne. The aircraft struck the water hard, and the front spreader bar and strut system on the floats failed.
9/20/89 Boeing 737 USAir Flushing, New York, U.S. Scheduled 2 3 58 Destroyed
passenger
As the first officer began the takeoff on Runway 31, he felt the airplane drift left. The captain observed the left drift and used the nosewheel
tiller to help steer. As the takeoff run progressed, the flight crew heard a bang and a continual rumbling noise. The captain took over and
rejected the takeoff but did not stop the airplane before it ran off the end of the runway into Bowery Bay.
9/23/89 Learjet 25D Province of Posadas, Argentina Public use 2 0 5 Destroyed
Misiones
During a nonprecision approach, the aircraft undershot the runway, striking the river about a mile short of the runway. The accident
happened in daylight with low cloud and reduced visibility in heavy rain.
9/23/89 Dornier 228-200 Indian Airlines Pandharpur, India Scheduled 11 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft struck the reservoir behind the Ujani Dam on the Bhima River some 30 minutes after takeoff. Prior to impact, the aircraft was
seen in a steep dive that apparently continued until it struck the water.
9/29/89* Bellanca 17-30A NA Palo Alto, California, U.S. Instructional 2 0 1 Substantial
During the turn to final, the engine failed and the aircraft was ditched in a bay short of the runway.
10/6/89* Aero Commander NA Port Hedland, Western Unscheduled 0 0 4 Substantial
500-S Australia, Australia passenger
Just after takeoff, the right engine surged and failed. The pilot was unable to maintain the aircraft’s altitude and ditched the aircraft.

522 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/14/89 Cessna 172H NA Bay City, Michigan, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Touchdown was farther down the runway than the pilot had planned. The aircraft departed the end of the runway, went up and over a dike
and landed in a river.
10/26/89 Beech F35 NA Lake Berryessa, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
While the airplane was being flown over Lake Berryessa, it struck two transmission wires that spanned the lake. The airplane then struck the
water.
11/1/89* Skyvan RV Aviation Aland Island, Finland Cargo 0 0 2 Destroyed
About an hour after takeoff, the aircraft’s right engine failed. The crew declared an emergency and began to divert toward Aland Island, the
nearest airfield. While the crew flew the airplane at 2,000 feet and positioned for an approach, the left engine also failed. The aircraft was
ditched just offshore and the crew was rescued without injury.
11/2/89 Aerostar 600 NA Apopka, Florida, U.S. Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
cargo
About 30 minutes from the destination airport (Orlando, Florida), the aircraft struck the water of Lake Apopka while apparently in a shallow
descent with a slight left-wing-low attitude.
11/5/89* Gulfstream NA Windmill Point, Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
American AA-5B Virginia, U.S.
The student pilot said that at an altitude of 3,500 feet, the oil pressure decreased and the engine failed. The aircraft was over the
Chesapeake Bay and the student was unable to glide the aircraft to land, so he ditched it in the bay. The student reported that
the aircraft stayed afloat for about 20 minutes after the ditching, then sank. He swam for about 40 minutes, then was rescued by a
sailboat crew.
11/9/89 Cessna 310I NA Provo, Utah, U.S. Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
observation
The Cessna was one of two airplanes being flown to produce a video. The aircraft were flown at a low altitude over Utah Lake, which was
calm in light winds. The Cessna struck the lake and sank in 12 feet of water. The medical examiner reported that although both occupants
had suffered blunt-force trauma, their deaths were caused by drowning.
11/14/89 Beech A36 NA Shell Lake, Business 3 0 0 Destroyed
Wisconsin, U.S.
The airplane was flown on an approach to an uncontrolled airport during moderate snow conditions. The airplane was flown into a lake
during the descent.
11/15/89* Douglas DC-3 Victoria Air Barualite, Philippines NA 0 0 5 Substantial
The aircraft was ditched. No other details were available.
11/22/89* Cessna 210E NA Gulf of Mexico Personal 3 0 1 Destroyed
During cruise flight, the propeller assembly separated from the engine. The pilot ditched the airplane next to an oil platform about 10 miles
from land. The pilot, his wife and two small children exited and attempted to swim to the platform. The sea was rough, and no life raft or life
vests were on the airplane. The pilot’s wife and children were lost at sea.
11/28/89 Britten-Norman NA Block Island, Unscheduled 8 0 0 Destroyed
BN-2 Rhode Island, U.S. passenger
For an undetermined reason, the aircraft struck water in Block Island Sound, three miles to five miles from Block Island. The main wreckage
was found in 130 feet of water.
12/24/89* Mooney M20 NA Fort Lauderdale, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The pilot reported that during an overwater flight, he observed a partial loss of manifold pressure and engine power. He initiated emergency
procedures, but was unable to restore power or maintain altitude. The airplane was ditched at sea, and the pilot was rescued by the Coast
Guard.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/2/90* IPTN 212-200 Pelita Air In Java sea, off Unscheduled 9 0 7 Destroyed
Service Pabelokan Island, passenger
Indonesia
During flight at 9,500 feet about 50 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft’s right engine reportedly failed. The crew shut down the engine and
feathered the propeller; altitude could not be maintained, despite the jettisoning of luggage, and the aircraft was ditched.
1/16/90 Cessna 310R NA Burlington, Vermont, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was being vectored to an ILS approach at night in IMC and was flown into Lake Champlain.
2/10/90 Cessna 172C NA Prue, Oklahoma, U.S. Personal 0 2 1 Substantial
The airplane struck high-voltage power lines and then struck a lake.
3/1/90 Beech B36TC NA Inver Grove, Ferry 1 0 0 Substantial
Minnesota, U.S.
During a takeoff in an airplane with a heavy gross weight in unfavorable winds, the liftoff was premature, and the pilot did not attain or
maintain adequate airspeed. An inadvertent stall/mush resulted, and the aircraft struck the river.
3/4/90* Cessna 172 NA Portrush, U.K. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Following an engine failure, the pilot attempted an emergency landing on Portrush Beach but was not able to maintain altitude. The aircraft was
ditched 0.5 mile short of the beach and sank in two minutes to three minutes. The pilot swam ashore and was hospitalized for hypothermia.
3/8/90 Piper PA-30 NA Dayton, Tennessee, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot reported an autopilot malfunction. There were no further communications with the pilot, and the aircraft struck a river at a steep
angle almost directly below the last reported position.
3/17/90* Cessna 177 NA English Channel Private business 0 0 1 Destroyed
Cardinal
In cruise flight at 4,500 feet, engine-oil temperature began to increase and oil pressure decreased. The pilot flew the aircraft to 2,500 feet and
reduced power. The aircraft descended into the sea 15 nautical miles from Ramsgate, England. The pilot was rescued.
3/18/90 Douglas DC-3 Tan-Sahsa Roatan Island, Honduras Scheduled 0 0 32 Substantial
passenger
The aircraft overran the runway on landing and continued into the sea.
3/30/90* Cessna 150L NA Vieques, Puerto Rico, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
The instructor pilot took control of the airplane over water when the student pilot said that he could not get the engine to produce more
than idle power. The instructor had the same problem and ditched the airplane.
4/4/90 DHC-6 Twin Otter Islena Airlines Utila, Honduras Scheduled 0 0 20 Destroyed
200 passenger
On final approach in a westerly direction, the two pilots reportedly were blinded by the sun and allowed the aircraft to undershoot the
runway. The aircraft struck the sea 175 feet short of the runway threshold.
4/5/90* Lockheed Aerolineas Levittown, Ferry 1 0 2 Destroyed
1049 Super Mundo SA Puerto Rico, U.S.
Constellation
Shortly after takeoff on a cargo flight, the aircraft’s no. 3 engine failed and the aircraft was returned to the departure airport for landing.
After off-loading the cargo, the crew conducted a takeoff for a three-engine ferry flight back to the base. About 20 minutes after departure,
the pilot said that the no. 2 engine was on fire and the crew was turning back. The crew shut down the no. 2 engine and attempted
unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire. The engine eventually separated from the aircraft. The no. 1 engine reportedly also failed, and the pilot
ditched the aircraft just off the shoreline.
4/12/90 DHC-6 Widerøe’s Lofoten Islands, Norway Scheduled 5 0 0 Destroyed
Twin Otter 300 Flyveselskap passenger
Following what appeared to be a normal takeoff and initial climb, the aircraft was seen to enter clouds at an altitude estimated between
1,000 feet and 1,100 feet. Shortly afterward, the pilot apparently lost control of the aircraft, which struck the sea in a nose-down, left-bank
attitude.

524 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/18/90 DHC-6 Twin Otter Aeroperias Contadora Island, Scheduled 20 0 2 Destroyed
200 Panama passenger
On takeoff, the aircraft flew through a flock of birds and apparently sustained a number of strikes on the starboard engine. The pilot was
unable to maintain altitude and the aircraft struck the sea about one mile off the coast, some two minutes after departure.
4/19/90 Cessna 177B NA North Captiva, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
Witnesses said that after takeoff, the aircraft was flown in a steep climb and that the engine failed as the aircraft was over water at 200
feet to 300 feet. An immediate left turn was made, followed by a nose-down descent. About 100 feet above the water, engine power was
restored, but the aircraft struck the water.
4/26/90 American Aircraft NA Rottnest Island, Western Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
AA-5B Australia, Australia
The pilot decided to return the airplane for landing after weather deteriorated, but he was unable to avoid entering a cloud. The pilot
conducted an instrument descent and flew the aircraft out of clouds just above the sea. While the pilot was turning the aircraft sharply to
miss a boat, a wing struck water. The aircraft landed safely.
4/28/90* Cessna 172D NA Isla Grande, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S.
Flying the airplane at about 4,500 feet, the pilot reduced the throttle setting to idle for an extended descent and did not apply sufficient
carburetor heat. The engine failed, and the pilot ditched the airplane short of the airport.
5/7/90 Piper PA-18-125 NA Rogerson, Idaho, U.S. Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
The aircraft was flown into a reservoir after striking a tent and a vehicle during the second of two low passes over a camp site. The
passenger drowned after the aircraft sank and his coveralls could not be cut free.
5/24/90 Cessna 185 Markair Express Uganik Bay, Alaska, U.S. Passenger/cargo 0 0 3 Substantial
The pilot said that, immediately after a water takeoff, the aircraft encountered a downdraft and gusty winds. It then entered an
uncommanded roll and descent. The pilot leveled the wings, but the aircraft struck the water before he could stop the descent.
5/25/90 Piper PA-18-150 NA Wasilla, Alaska, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
Several witnesses said that they heard a power reduction from the airplane’s engine about one minute after takeoff. The airplane was
turned steeply, as if for a landing on the lake, and then stalled and spun into the water.
5/29/90* Piper PA-28-181 NA Lake, Burragorang, New Instructional 0 0 3 Substantial
South Wales, Australia
The aircraft was being operated in high relative humidity and with a rich mixture setting. There was an engine failure, probably caused by
carburetor icing. The aircraft was ditched into the lake, 10 meters from shore.
5/31/90* Cessna 404 Titan Northair Colonsay, Scotland Aerial 0 1 2 Destroyed
observation
The aircraft was ditched in the sea after the pilot reported a right-engine problem. The crew was immersed in the sea, and the life raft took
on water before the crew was able to get in. All three crewmembers suffered from the onset of hypothermia before rescue by helicopter 40
minutes later.
6/1/90 Cessna 441 NA In sea off Marathon Key, NA NA NA NA Destroyed
Conquest Florida, U.S.
The wreckage of the aircraft was found, but the circumstances of the accident have not been established.
6/5/90* Piper PA-32 NA Libreville, France Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched after a reported fuel blockage.
6/6/90 Cessna 172N NA Chandeleur Island, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S.
When attempting to conduct a takeoff from the rough, sandy beach, the pilot lifted the nose landing gear off the ground prematurely to
avoid damaging the nose-landing-gear fairing. After liftoff, he overcontrolled the airplane and allowed it to stall. The wing dragged on the
ground, and the airplane cartwheeled into the water inverted.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/14/90* Piper PA-34 BAE NA Commercial 0 0 1 Destroyed
Seneca
The airplane was ditched after a reported fuel shortage and sank.
6/16/90 Grumman G-21A NA Long Beach, Test flight 0 1 1 Substantial
California, U.S.
The pilot conducted an inadvertent wheels-down landing in water, and the aircraft nosed over.
7/1/90 Osprey NA Iron Mountain, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Michigan, U.S.
Witnesses observed the airplane entering a shallow left bank shortly after takeoff. The bank gradually increased to about 60 degrees. The
airplane’s nose dropped, and the airplane entered a descending spiral until it struck a river.
7/1/90 North American NA Buffalo, New York, U.S. Aeronautic 1 0 0 Destroyed
AT-6 display
While performing aerobatic maneuvers in an air show, the pilot began to roll the airplane. After 270 degrees of roll, the rate decreased
considerably. The aircraft nose dropped, and the airplane struck the water in a 40-degree nose-down, 45-degree right-wing-low attitude.
7/2/90* Cessna 337 NA Bedford, New York, U.S. Ferry 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot was operating the airplane on a ferry permit when there was a double power loss caused by fuel starvation. He ditched the
airplane in a reservoir.
7/12/90 Lake LA-4-200 NA Bellingham, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Washington, U.S.
The pilot and his passenger were performing a series of landings on Lake Whatcom. During the second takeoff run, the amphibious aircraft
struck an unseen object, tearing a hole in the hull. The aircraft sank a few minutes after the occupants exited.
7/14/90 Cessna U206F NA Augusta, Maine, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
Witnesses said that the pilot was landing his aircraft on a lake with variable crosswind and quartering tailwind conditions. The airplane was
said to have touched down in the water, tipped slightly and righted itself. The downwind float then submerged, and the airplane nosed
over.
7/29/90 Cessna 210N NA Lake Eyre, South Nonscheduled 0 0 6 Substantial
Australia, Australia passenger
During a scenic flight over Lake Eyre, the water’s glassy surface resulted in diminished horizon definition. The aircraft contacted the lake in
a near-level attitude and in cruise configuration.
8/6/90 Cessna 150L NA Holland, Michigan, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot and passenger departed on a local night flight in clear weather. After about 15 minutes, the aircraft struck Lake Michigan, about
one mile from shore. Two days later, wreckage of the aircraft was found in about 50 feet of water. The passenger was still strapped in the
aircraft. The pilot’s body was found Aug. 18, 1990, after it had washed onto shore. There was evidence that both occupants had died from
drowning.
8/12/90 Piper PA-18-150 NA Aniak, Alaska, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
The float-equipped airplane was found floating upside down in a lake near the area where the pilot and passenger had been hunting.
There had reportedly been strong winds, rough swells and water spouts.
8/12/90 Cessna 185F NA Wrangell, Alaska, U.S. Aerial 1 1 0 Destroyed
observation
While turning the airplane, the pilot did not maintain adequate airspeed. Following a descending left turn, the airplane struck water just
offshore.
8/14/90 Cessna 172M NA Kewaunee, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Wisconsin, U.S.
The aircraft was being flown from West Bend, Wisconsin, to Washington Island, Wisconsin. The aircraft did not arrive and was presumed to
have struck the water of Lake Michigan. The bodies of the pilot and passenger later washed ashore.

526 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/14/90 Bellanca 7GCAA NA Saltaire, New York, U.S. Positioning 1 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane was seen in a right turn over the water. The airplane struck the water with the right wing, and the wing separated from the
airplane. The airplane sank, and the wreckage and the pilot’s body were not recovered.
8/25/90 Champion NA Clark Lake, Michigan Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
7GCAA
The pilot was flying the aircraft in aerobatic maneuvers in low flight. Following what was described as a steep pull-up, the aircraft was
observed to impact water in a steep descent. Toxicology checks showed that the pilot had a blood alcohol level of 0.26 percent.
8/28/90 Cessna 152 NA Provincetown, Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S. observation
Witnesses on a boat saw the airplane being maneuvered while on a fish-spotting mission and observed it entering a spin and striking the
water. Bodies of the occupants were found several weeks later.
8/30/90 Beech A23A NA St. Paul, Minnesota, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
About 1.5 hours after takeoff, the pilot reported an engine failure. When asked about her position, the pilot said that she was “over the
river.” A witness saw the aircraft at an estimated 500 feet to 800 feet AGL. He said that the aircraft’s nose rose to a high angle, then the right
wing dropped and the aircraft went into a spin and dove into the Mississippi River.
9/5/90 Boeing B75N1 NA Marseilles, Illinois, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Substantial
While the pilot was intentionally conducting a low-level flight, the aircraft struck a wire. With the wire attached, the aircraft descended into
a river. The passenger reported that the pilot was reading a chart at the time of the wire strike.
9/7/90 Piper NA Glacier Island, Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
PA-32RT-300T Alaska, U.S.
About 20 minutes after takeoff, the pilot reported a rough-running engine and smoke in the cabin. He then reported that he was losing
visibility because of the smoke and declared an emergency. Radio contact with the pilot was lost, and it was presumed that the aircraft
struck Prince William Sound. Four days later, the passenger’s body was recovered. A post-mortem examination revealed that the passenger
had drowned.
9/11/90* Boeing 727-200 Faucett North Atlantic, SE of Ferry 16 0 0 Destroyed
Newfoundland, Canada
During a ferry flight from Malta to Miami, Florida, U.S., the aircraft disappeared and is presumed to have struck the sea. The last contact with
the crew occurred when they told ATC that they had low fuel and that they were descending through 10,000 feet with the intention of
ditching.
9/22/90* Commander Westport Air North Castle, NA 0 0 6 Destroyed
690B Travel New York, U.S.
Media reports said that the pilot declared an emergency and ditched the aircraft in Byram Reservoir, seven miles northeast of White Plains,
New York.
10/4/90 Cessna 152 NA Kearny, Arizona, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot said that the aircraft landed fast and did not stop before reaching the end of the 1,665-foot runway. The aircraft ran off the
departure end of the runway and struck a small lake. The aircraft sank, and the two occupants extricated themselves and swam to shore.
10/10/90* De Havilland DH- NA Takapuna Beach, Personal 1 1 NA Destroyed
82A Tiger Moth New Zealand
The pilot became incapacitated, and the aircraft was ditched.
10/15/90 Piper PA-28-161 NA Everglades City, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The non-instrument-rated pilot departed on a night VFR flight over water. Witnesses saw the airplane being flown to 125 feet to 300 feet
AGL and being leveled. The airplane was then seen in a left turn descending in a 20-degree nose-down attitude, right-wing-low, after which
it struck the water.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/20/90 Stinson SR8C NA Lakeville, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot was maneuvering his airplane at a low altitude while sightseeing and taking pictures over a lake. He turned the airplane left in
order to avoid the reflection of the sun on the glassy surface of the lake. The airplane descended and struck the water.
10/25/90* Piper PA-28-181 NA Orlando, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 5 Substantial
When the airplane was six miles from the destination airport, the engine failed because of fuel exhaustion. Because of unsuitable terrain, the
pilot ditched the aircraft in a lake short of the airport.
11/14/90 Cessna 172A NA Brigham City, Utah, U.S. Personal 0 2 0 Substantial
Shortly after takeoff from a peninsula in night VMC, the pilot reported that he turned the airplane onto downwind after he lost sight of the
horizon. The next thing the pilot remembered was the airplane striking the water and nosing over.
11/16/90* Piper PA-32-301R NA Alton, Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
New Hampshire, U.S.
The passenger said that as soon as the pilot disconnected the autopilot, the engine failed. The pilot conducted a forced landing in Lake
Winnipesaukee. The passenger said that she and the pilot climbed out on the wing of the airplane and attempted to swim to shore. The
passenger said that when she arrived at the shore, she could not locate the pilot.
11/17/90* Cessna 172P NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 2 0 2 Destroyed
The pilot became lost. He circled his airplane above a ship and ditched the airplane because of low fuel supply. Two passengers were
rescued by ship personnel. The aircraft was equipped with a four-person life raft and four life vests, but a passenger inflated the life raft
before ditching. He punctured it to regain space. The life vests were not located by the occupants.
12/12/90* Piper PA-28-151 NA Jupiter, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
During cruise flight about 0.5 mile offshore at an altitude of 500 feet, the pilot heard a knocking sound and the engine failed. Unable to
maintain the airplane’s altitude, the pilot ditched the aircraft.
12/15/90* PBN BN-2A-7 Royal Hong Tolo Harbour, Instructional 0 0 2 Destroyed
Islander Kong Auxiliary Hong Kong
Air Force
Media reports said that the aircraft was ditched in Tolo Harbour, apparently after an engine failure during a crew-training flight.
12/21/90 Cessna 152 NA Camden, New South Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
Wales, Australia
The aircraft failed to return from a training flight and was later located in 47 meters of water.
1/2/91 Cessna 172P NA Rattlesnake Island, Instructional 1 0 2 Substantial
Ohio, U.S.
The runway was covered with one inch of snow. After touchdown, the flight instructor attempted to conduct a go-around. The airplane
failed to climb and struck the water about 100 feet beyond the departure end of the runway. The occupants attempted to swim to shore,
but the student pilot drowned.
1/9/91 Cessna 182K NA Hobart, Tasmania, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Australia
While being flown over a lake at low altitude, the aircraft struck a power line. The aircraft dragged the power line about 500 meters before
diving into the water.
1/15/91 Cessna 172RG NA Hayward, California, U.S. Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot failed to maintain altitude on the approach to the Hayward airport, and the aircraft descended into San Francisco Bay.
1/18/91 Cessna 180K Aquatic Patterson, Louisiana, U.S. Unscheduled 1 0 2 Minor
Aviation passenger
The pilot noticed that the left float was sinking because of several missing bilge plugs. After shutting down the engine, he attempted to
pump out the float and plug the holes with wadded paper. When the airplane began to list, he told his passengers to don life vests. The
passengers exited the airplane. When they looked around for the pilot, he had disappeared. He was last seen holding onto his life vest and
treading water. He was presumed drowned. His inflated life vest was recovered.

528 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
2/20/91 British Aerospace LAN Chile Santiago, Chile NA 20 2 50 Destroyed
146-200
Following a VOR approach, the aircraft reportedly aquaplaned and overran the end of the runway and struck the Beagle Channel. The
aircraft came to rest partly submerged some 20 meters offshore.
3/2/91 Cessna 182P NA Pacoima, California, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
The flight instructor and private pilot/instrument student were departing on an instrument training flight. About 250 feet AGL, the engine
failed and the instructor conducted an emergency landing in a flood-control basin.
3/5/91 Cessna 150 NA Chesapeake, Instructional 0 1 0 Substantial
Virginia, U.S.
The pilot was performing touch-and-go landings when directional control was lost. The airplane went off the side of the runway and came
to rest in water.
3/10/91 Beech F33A NA Sterling, Colorado, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
A young pilot and his passenger were observed “buzzing” a reservoir in an airplane. The witnesses said that the aircraft was skimming the
glassy surface of the water when it struck the water, pitched up abruptly, then nosed down to strike the water again and sink.
3/30/91* Cessna 172N NA Bar Harbor, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Substantial
During the approach, the engine failed. The pilot advanced the throttle with no change. He added carburetor heat, and power was restored
for one minute, then the engine failed again. The pilot ditched the aircraft in the harbor. The pilot and passenger exited the aircraft and
clung to it until they were rescued about 45 minutes later.
4/4/91 Douglas DC-3 Central Lake Thutade, British Passenger 6 1 0 Destroyed
Mountain Air Columbia, Canada
Services
The aircraft struck the frozen lake after appearing to have struck the ice with a wingtip during a turn at low altitude and to have
cartwheeled.
4/16/91 Waco ASO NA Lake Apopka, Aerial 3 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S. observation
The purpose of the flight was to observe alligators in a lake. A witness observed the biplane being dived toward the lake and pulled up
multiple times. On the last pull-up, the airplane slowed and entered a spin at an altitude too low to allow recovery. The airplane struck the
lake.
4/19/91* Dornier 228 Air Tahiti Nuku Hiva, Scheduled 10 8 2 Destroyed
French Polynesia passenger
The airplane was ditched in the sea near the airport after both engines failed on approach. The aircraft floated and was towed to shore.
4/25/91 Cessna 150J NA Kure Beach, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
North Carolina, U.S.
The pilot flew the airplane at low altitude over the surface of the ocean. A witness said that the landing gear struck a wave, then the aircraft
nosed over. The pilot was rescued, but the passenger drowned. The pilot had flown the aircraft without the owner’s consent, and toxicology
testing revealed that he had a blood-alcohol level of 0.165 percent.
5/7/91 Cessna 172K NA Bunnell, Florida, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
The accident report said that after takeoff, the flight instructor and student pilot were “unable to push the control column.” The instructor
reduced power; the aircraft stalled, struck a lake and came to rest inverted.
5/9/91 Cessna TU-206G NA Gulf of Mexico Positioning 1 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane did not arrive at its destination on a positioning flight. After a search, the airplane was found three weeks later on the floor of
the Gulf of Mexico.
5/24/91 Rockwell S-2R NA Larsen Bay, Alaska, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane struck the bay one mile offshore and sank in 185 feet of water. Witnesses said that the airplane was being flown near the water
in conditions of low ceiling and fog.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/30/91 Piper PA-24-250 NA Long Boat Key, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
While over water at night, the airplane disappeared from radar and radio contact was lost. Witnesses on the beach observed the airplane in
a spin until it struck water.
6/1/91* A.S.T.A. (GAF) Agape Flight Matthewtown, Great Unscheduled 2 0 1 Destroyed
Nomad N24A Inagua, Bahamas passenger
About 30 minutes after departure while the airplane was in cruise at FL 90, one of the aircraft’s engines failed. The pilot diverted to
Matthewtown on Great Inagua Island. Later, he declared an emergency and said that the aircraft was losing altitude and that the second
engine was “rough.” The aircraft continued toward Matthewtown but eventually was ditched in the sea about 1.25 miles off Great Inagua Island.
6/1/91 Lake LA-4-200 NA Battle Creek, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
Michigan, U.S.
While the aircraft was being taxied on step, it encountered a power boat’s wake and became airborne. The student pilot reduced the
power, and the aircraft pitched down. The instructor took over the controls but was unable to arrest the descent. The aircraft struck the
water nose-down. The aircraft nose filled with water, and the aircraft sank.
6/5/91 Piper PA-38-112 NA South Port, Florida, U.S. Instructional 1 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane struck electrical transmission lines that crossed a lake.
6/9/91 Piper PA-28-181 NA East Haddam, Personal 3 0 0 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
At liftoff, the engine sputtered. Witnesses heard the engine running intermittently and roughly. The airplane was found in 10 feet of water
in a pond beyond the end of the runway. The airplane door was damaged when the airplane struck the water, preventing the occupants
from escaping.
6/18/91* Grumman Pacific Flying In Pacific Ocean Ferry 0 1 2 Destroyed
HU-16E Albatross Fish
During cruise flight, oil pressure failed on the no. 2 engine. Flight could not be sustained using the remaining engine. According to the pilot,
the temperature of the remaining engine exceeded the normal range. The pilot elected to ditch the aircraft. During the landing, the aircraft
received substantial damage and almost immediately was flooded, causing the aircraft to sink. The crew evacuated but did not have time
to retrieve emergency equipment. They were rescued after about 20 hours in the water.
6/18/91 Taylorcraft BC-65 NA Kakhonak, Alaska, U.S. Personal 2 1 0 Substantial
Shortly after takeoff, the airplane was banked left. It stalled and struck the lake about 200 yards offshore.
6/28/91 Mitsubishi NA Goleta, California, U.S. Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
MU-2B-36A
The pilot became spatially disoriented after continuing VFR flight into IMC, resulting in a near-collision with another aircraft. The pilot
began a left turn over the shoreline, as if to circle for spacing, but his aircraft descended and struck the ocean.
7/7/91 DHC-2 Beaver NA Sabaskong Bay, Ontario, Personal 0 0 1 Major partial
(Turbo) Canada
The pilot forgot to retract the wheels of the amphibious float-equipped aircraft. During the subsequent water landing, the aircraft nosed
over.
7/7/91 Piper PA-22 NA Ventnor, Isle of Wight, Banner towing 0 2 0 Destroyed
England
The banner-towing airplane descended, following a partial power failure, into the sea. The pilot freed himself from the aircraft and was able
to release his passenger as the aircraft sank. Both occupants were rescued by personnel of a trawler after about 10 minutes.
7/13/91 De Havilland Kabeelo Jubilee Lake, Ontario, Unscheduled 0 0 1 Destroyed
DHC-2 Beaver Airways Canada passenger
The pilot turned the airplane onto the final-approach path to the lake and flew the airplane toward the surface of the water. As the floats
contacted the water, a violent “water loop” developed, and the resultant forces tore the floats and wings from the aircraft. The aircraft sank
rapidly. The pilot experienced difficulty escaping from the aircraft, which was 15 feet below the surface before he struggled free. He swam
to the surface and was rescued by fishermen.

530 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/15/91* Piper PA-28R-200 NA South Lake Tahoe, Business 0 0 5 Substantial
California, U.S.
The engine failed while the aircraft was above Lake Tahoe in cruise flight. The pilot ditched the airplane in the lake.
7/20/91 Piper PA-11 NA Eagle Lake, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot was conducting touch-and-go landings on a lake. The pilot said that he was making a slight bank correction when the left float
dragged in the water. The airplane cartwheeled and sank in 130 feet of water. The pilot said that his depth perception was poor because of
“glassy water” conditions.
7/21/91 Piper PA-20 NA Ione, Washington, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
While being flown low over a river, the airplane struck a power line. The airplane then struck the water and sank.
7/25/91* Cessna 177RG NA Ashland, Kentucky, U.S. Business 0 0 2 Substantial
The airplane was being flown through 300 feet AGL, soon after takeoff, when the engine failed. The pilot unsuccessfully tried to restart the
engine. Because he was beyond gliding distance to land, he ditched the airplane in the Ohio River.
8/6/91 PBN BN-2A-9 Avalki Air Rarotonga, Cook Islands Scheduled 6 0 4 Destroyed
Islander passenger
The aircraft struck the sea shortly before its scheduled arrival at Rarotonga.
8/9/91 Piper PA-18 NA Anchorage, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The airplane’s left wing began to rise during the takeoff run on the lake and the pilot lost directional control of the airplane. The airplane
nosed over onto its back and sank in 20 feet of water.
8/9/91* Cessna 210 NA Delavan, Wisconsin, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
On final approach, the engine failed because of fuel exhaustion. The pilot made an emergency water landing about 1,000 feet from shore.
The aircraft sank in about 10 feet of water.
8/11/91* Cessna 152 NA Bear Mountain, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
New York, U.S.
After about three hours of flight, the engine failed because of fuel exhaustion. The pilot made a forced landing on a river.
8/13/91 Bellanca 17-30A NA Boyne City, Business 1 0 0 Substantial
Michigan, U.S.
The pilot was flying over a lake to disperse ashes from cremated remains. Witnesses observed the aircraft in low-level flight before seeing it
descend and strike the surface of the lake.
8/14/91 De Havilland NA Ugashik, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver passenger
During the takeoff on the water, the pilot lost control of the airplane and the left wing tip struck the water. The airplane nosed over onto its
back and sank into the lake.
8/16/91 Beech 58 NA Brookhaven, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
New York, U.S.
The pilot had been treated for seizures. He became incapacitated in flight and his airplane descended and struck the water.
8/20/91* Piel CP301 NA Point of Ayre, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Emeraude Isle of Man, U.K.
Following an engine failure, the pilot declared mayday and attempted to glide the aircraft back to land. A successful ditching was
subsequently carried out and the pilot was later rescued from the floating wreckage.
8/29/91* Cessna 150 NA Atlantic Ocean Instructional 0 0 1 Destroyed
The student pilot missed several key landmarks on a solo cross-country flight. Becoming disoriented, he flew east from the mouth of
Chesapeake Bay out to the Atlantic Ocean. Sixty miles east of the coast, fuel was exhausted and the pilot successfully ditched the airplane
in the ocean. He was rescued by personnel on a pleasure boat.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/7/91 Commander Occidental de In sea off San Andreas NA 9 0 0 Destroyed
690A Aviación Island, Colombia
While inbound to San Andreas Island, the pilot advised ATC that he was encountering “very bad weather conditions.” This was the last
contact with the flight. An air and sea search was launched for the missing aircraft but was called off after a week with no results.
9/21/91 Lake LA-4 NA Wilton, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot said that when he landed the airplane on rough water, the airplane bounced and the right wing tip struck the water. The airplane
nosed over and sank.
9/28/91 Christen Eagle II NA Incline Village, Aeronautic 2 0 0 Destroyed
Nevada, U.S. display
The pilot failed to recover from an aerobatic maneuver in a timely manner and the airplane struck the water.
9/29/91 Cessna 172N NA Knoxville, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Tennessee, U.S.
The pilot conducted a takeoff in fog. He aborted the takeoff but there was insufficient runway distance to safely stop the airplane. The
airplane skidded off the departure end of the runway and sank in a river.
10/11/91 Boeing 737-300 Cayman Georgetown, Scheduled 0 0 67 Substantial
Airways Cayman Islands passenger
After touchdown, the aircraft could not be brought to a halt and it overran into the sea, eventually coming to rest some 100 feet beyond
the runway end.
10/15/91* Piper PA-18 NA Montague Island, Business 0 0 1 Substantial
Alaska, U.S.
The engine seized without warning while the airplane was in cruise flight. With no suitable landing area on the beach, the pilot ditched the
airplane in the ocean and swam about 0.5 mile to shore.
11/3/91 Piper L-3 NA Plymouth, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The non-instrument-rated pilot continued VFR flight into IMC at low altitude, resulting in collision with water.
11/16/91 Cessna 208B Federal Express Destin, Florida, U.S. Scheduled cargo 1 0 0 Destroyed
Caravan I Corp. (Baron
Aviation
Services)
The aircraft struck the water of Choctawhatchee Bay during the final stages of the approach, some three miles short of the runway. The U.S.
National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause to be the pilot’s failure to follow IFR procedures by disregarding the
minimum descent altitude and failing to maintain clearance from the terrain.
12/8/91 Cessna 177B NA Dalmatia, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Pennsylvania, U.S.
The pilot said that while flying above a river his attention was diverted and he did not see power lines until it was too late to avoid them.
The airplane struck the river and the pilot swam to shore.
12/17/91 NA NA Anglesea, Victoria, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Australia
The aircraft encountered IMC in the Anglesea area and struck water off the coast.
12/27/91 Cessna 172M NA Sanford, Michigan, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was seen in low-level cruise flight over a lake. The aircraft’s vertical stabilizer struck wires about 50 feet above the lake. The
aircraft departed controlled flight and struck the water.
12/28/91 Beech 1900C Business Block Island, Training 3 0 0 Destroyed
Express Rhode Island, U.S.
The aircraft struck the sea during a night training flight.

532 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/8/92* Cessna 210 NA Hamilton Island, Personal 0 0 6 Substantial
Queensland, Australia
The pilot reported an engine failure at 1,200 feet on final approach. Restart attempts were unsuccessful. The aircraft was ditched short of
Runway 32.
1/13/92 Piper PA-28-161 NA Homestead, Florida, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The non-instrument-rated pilot was flying his airplane over Biscayne Bay at night in IMC. Witnesses on a sailboat reported seeing the
airplane descend in a 45-degree nose-down attitude into the bay.
1/13/92 Cessna 421C Meade J. In sea off Georgia, U.S. Personal 5 0 0 Destroyed
Golden Eagle Williamson
ATC radar data and radar communications indicated that the aircraft entered a thunderstorm, then made a 180-degree turn to exit the
storm. Aircraft debris was found in the sea off of Georgia, U.S. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable
cause of the accident was the pilot’s inadequate weather evaluation and his continued flight into known adverse weather conditions.
1/13/92* Cessna 172G NA Atlantic Ocean Public use 1 0 1 Substantial
During cruise flight at 1,200 feet, the engine began to miss. Attempts at correction were unsuccessful. The condition continued and the
aircraft began to shake violently and oily smoke entered the cockpit. The pilot ditched the aircraft. Both occupants exited with no injuries,
but the passenger reportedly lost his life vest during the evacuation. The aircraft was equipped, as required, with a four-person life raft
and manually operated emergency position-indicating radio beacon, both of which were in the baggage compartment and were not
recovered before the aircraft sank.
1/14/92 Cessna 310Q Jim Meyers Co. Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 5 0 0 Destroyed
The flight departed Honolulu and, for about one hour, recorded radar data showed the aircraft northeast of Molokai, Hawaii, and Maui,
Hawaii, at altitudes varying from 100 feet to 13,600 feet before it disappeared from radar. The aircraft was not recovered. Other pilots in the
area reported IMC.
1/23/92 Beech 99 Nature Island Canefield, Dominica Crew training 2 0 0 Destroyed
Express
Following an apparently normal takeoff roll and initial climb, the aircraft began to lose altitude and struck the sea some 300 yards from the
airport. According to unconfirmed reports, an engine failure had been simulated during the takeoff and initial climb with the operating
engine then being shut down inadvertently.
1/27/92 Beech 3T (C18S) Air Rainbow Nanaimo, British Unscheduled 7 2 0 Destroyed
Columbia, Canada passenger
The float-equipped aircraft became airborne after a takeoff run of about 2,000 feet. It climbed gradually to an altitude of about 50 feet
above the water surface. After turning 30 degrees to the right, the aircraft began rolling rapidly from side to side and its altitude suddenly
decreased. The left wing tip and the left float struck the water and caused the aircraft to cartwheel. The aircraft then burst into flames and
erupted in a fireball. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada determined that the aircraft had encountered turbulence and downdrafts
after takeoff, and had stalled at an altitude too low for the pilot to recover.
2/8/92* Cessna 150M NA Stuart, Florida, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
After flying the aircraft from 1,500 feet to 2,000 feet, the flight instructor said, the engine rpm decreased and the engine began to run
roughly. The flight instructor ditched the aircraft offshore.
2/23/92 Taylorcraft NA Gibson Island, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
BC-12D Maryland, U.S.
The pilot said that he had descended out of 1,200 feet to 350 feet over a river. He flew the aircraft along the river and began a turn to the
right. The pilot said, “I was looking to the left in the turn when I heard the airplane strike the water.”
3/11/92 SX300 NA Okeechobee, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
A witness observed the airplane roll into a 90-degree bank to the right and then descend nose-low and left-wing-low until impact with the
water.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/14/92* Cessna 182A NA Norfolk, Virginia, U.S. Personal 2 2 0 Destroyed
The pilot was flying the airplane over Chesapeake Bay, descending to the destination, when the engine failed. The pilot could not restart
the engine and ditched the airplane in the bay.
3/22/92 Fokker F28-4000 USAir Flushing, New York, U.S. Scheduled 27 9 15 Destroyed
Passenger
During an attempted takeoff from Runway 13 at La Guardia Airport, the aircraft landed upside down in about four feet of water at the end
of Bowery Bay. Eighteen of those who died reportedly drowned while in their seats.
3/22/92 Rans S-12 NA Cabo Rojo, Personal 0 1 1 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S.
While attempting to perform a precautionary landing on a beach following a partial engine failure during cruise flight, the non-FAA-
certified pilot inadvertently stalled the airplane. The airplane descended uncontrolled and collided with the water in a nose-low and right-
wing-low attitude.
4/1/92* Cessna 303 NA English Channel Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Crusader
Fumes were detected in the cockpit and a return to the airport was initiated. When the fumes and smoke increased from the instrument
panel, the pilot descended the aircraft and declared mayday. A ditching, 15 miles offshore, was successfully conducted into the wind in a
swell of eight feet to 10 feet. The occupants evacuated without injury, while the aircraft floated for about 1.5 minutes. The occupants had
difficulty inflating the life raft, but were rescued by helicopter.
4/3/92 Grob G115 NA Loch Muick, U.K. Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck Loch Muick. Wreckage and bodies were subsequently recovered.
4/10/92* PBN BN-2A-26 Taiwan Airlines Orchid Island, Unscheduled 7 0 3 Destroyed
Islander Taiwan, China passenger
After takeoff from Orchid Island, soon after reaching its en route height of 1,500 feet, power was apparently lost on the aircraft’s no. 1
engine. Attempts were made to restart the engine but without apparent success. The aircraft descended and was ditched.
4/22/92 Navion A NA Monteverde, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The non-instrument-rated pilot attempted VFR flight and encountered IMC en route. He lost control of the airplane, which struck a lake.
4/22/92 Piper PA-18-150 NA St. Augustine, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
Witnesses said that the airplane made two passes about 100 feet above a marina. On the second pass, the airplane was pulled up sharply,
and the engine power was heard increasing. At 400 feet, the airplane stalled and entered a spin to the left into the water.
5/9/92 Cessna 150G NA Samburg, Personal 1 1 0 Substantial
Tennessee, U.S.
The aircraft was observed in a maneuver similar to a hammerhead stall. When the maneuver was repeated, the airplane did not level off
and struck the water.
5/23/92 Cessna 150E NA North Myrtle Beach, Banner towing 0 0 1 Destroyed
South Carolina, U.S.
The airplane was 400 feet from the shoreline at 400 feet AGL when a Piper Cub flew within 100 feet of the Cessna’s right wing. The Piper
then was turned left in front of the Cessna and the Cessna pilot lost control of the airplane, which struck the water.
5/26/92* Bellanca 17-30A NA Graford, Texas, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
After takeoff for an instrument-flight instruction trip, the landing gear did not retract. The pilot at the controls was attempting to land at the
departure airport when the engine failed. The instructor pilot then took over control and made an emergency forced landing on the water.
5/31/92 Cessna A150L NA Cocoa Beach, Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The flight was conducted for instruction in aerobatics. Witnesses reported seeing the aircraft four miles offshore, at an estimated 500 feet, in
a 45-degree nose-down attitude diving toward the water. The aircraft was descending at high speed and was not spinning. The aircraft struck
the water.

534 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/22/92* Stinson 108-3 NA Corbett, Oregon, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
After a takeoff from rough water and a climb to 200 feet, the pilot of the floatplane heard a loud “pop” in the right front of the aircraft. A
severe vibration followed. The pilot decided to make a precautionary landing, but did not realize that the floats had separated from the
airplane. The airplane fuselage struck the water and the airplane sank.
6/25/92 IPTN 212-100 Dirgantara Air Datu Island, Indonesia Ferry 3 0 0 Destroyed
Service
The pilot advised ATC that the aircraft’s right engine had failed. The flight continued but apparently altitude could not be maintained on
one engine. The aircraft descended at a rate of about 200 feet per minute. The last contact with the aircraft crew occurred some 30 minutes
later when it was at 3,500 feet. The aircraft struck the ocean.
6/28/92* Rans S-12 NA Saluda, Virginia, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
observation
The pilot was circling the airplane at 100 feet AGL so that the passenger could photograph a lighthouse. The engine failed and the pilot
ditched the airplane in the water, from where the occupants were rescued by personnel on a nearby boat.
6/28/92 Piper PA-28-180 NA Mokane, Missouri, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Witnesses saw the accident airplane being flown at low altitude along a river toward suspended power-transmission lines. The witnesses saw
the airplane roll just before it struck the top wire in the array. The right wing was torn away and the airplane descended into the river and
sank.
6/28/92 Piper PA-23-250 Caribbean Air St. Thomas, Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
Carrier U.S. Virgin Islands passenger
Soon after takeoff, the pilot radioed the tower and advised of an engine fire. The flight was cleared to return but the aircraft struck water
about five miles west of the airport.
7/9/92* Cessna U206F NA Portland, Maine, U.S. Business 1 0 1 Substantial
During an ILS approach at the destination, there was a total loss of electrical power. The pilot decided to descend below the clouds into
VMC, which he encountered about 400 feet over Casco Bay. The pilot said that he was reading a chart to locate the destination airport
when the engine failed. The pilot ditched the airplane in the bay, escaped from the airplane and was rescued by the Coast Guard. The
passenger did not escape from the airplane.
7/30/92 Teal TSC-1A2 NA Oshkosh, Wisconsin, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
Waves on the lake were two feet to three feet when the pilot of the amphibian attempted to land. The airplane “porpoised” on initial
touchdown and the porpoising continued, becoming more severe with each bounce. The last entry into the water was on the nose of the
airplane. The bow of the hull collapsed aft and the airplane inverted and sank.
7/30/92* Cessna 150F NA Granbury, Texas, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The student pilot noted a 200-rpm drop on the engine tachometer at an estimated 120 feet AGL. Houses were below the airplane, so the
pilot continued toward the lake. After clearing the residential area, the airplane was descended over the lake and the pilot ditched the
airplane at 50 miles per hour. Before the airplane sank, the pilot and passenger exited. They were rescued by a nearby boater.
7/31/92 Yakovlev Yak-42 China General Jiangsu, China Scheduled 108 0 18 Destroyed
Aviation passenger
After takeoff, the aircraft reportedly climbed to about 60 meters before descending and touching down again. The aircraft overran the
airport perimeter wall and came to rest in a water-filled ditch some 600 meters beyond the runway.
8/6/92* Beech C90 NA Pontiac, Michigan, U.S. Executive 0 0 1 Substantial
corporate
The aircraft was on final approach when a fuel-crossfeed warning light illuminated. Trying to troubleshoot the fuel system, the pilot
inadvertently discontinued fuel to both engines. The aircraft was ditched in the lake short of the airport.
8/8/92 Cessna 310M NA Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was being flown along the Oahu coast. While in a turn, the aircraft began a descent, and a loss of radar contact occurred at about
700 feet. The aircraft struck the ocean. Thunderstorms and lightning were reported near the accident area.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 535
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/8/92* Piper PA-28R-201 NA Baltimore, Maryland, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
An engine failure caused by fuel starvation occurred after takeoff at an altitude of 300 feet. The pilot ditched the airplane in the water.
8/9/92* Cessna 210J NA Groton, Connecticut, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Engine-oil temperature began to increase while the airplane was at 6,000 feet. The pilot asked ATC for vectors to the nearest airport. About
eight nautical miles from the airport, the engine-oil pressure dropped to zero and the engine failed. The pilot made a forced landing in the
ocean and evacuated the airplane, after which the airplane sank.
8/12/92 De Havilland Alaska West Air Crescent Lake, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver Service Alaska, U.S. passenger
About five seconds after the pilot leveled the wings on final approach for a glassy-water landing on a large lake, the airplane landed
prematurely and hard. The floats were separated and the airplane sank immediately. The pilot said that because of the flat lighting and
glassy water, he lost his depth perception and misjudged his altitude. He said that when the airplane hit the water, he thought he was still
70 feet to 80 feet above the water.
8/13/92* Beech 76 NA Nantucket, Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The airplane was in cruise flight at 2,500 feet when the left engine failed, followed shortly by the right engine. The pilot made a quick,
unsuccessful attempt to restart the engines and then concentrated on executing a forced landing in the ocean.
8/16/92 Piper PA-31-310B Copenhagen Karlstad, Sweden Unscheduled 5 0 3 Destroyed
Navajo Air Taxi passenger
While approaching Karlstad, the pilot reported that he was low on fuel. The pilot commenced a straight-in approach but while the aircraft
was still some seven nautical miles from the airfield, both engines failed because of fuel exhaustion and the aircraft struck Lake Vanem.
8/18/92 Convair 440 SASA La Paz, Bolivia Passenger 10 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft failed to arrive at its destination after taking off in bad weather. The wreckage was subsequently found in a lake 28 miles from
La Paz. No survivors were reported.
8/22/92* Piper PA-32-260 NA Newburyport, Ferry 0 0 1 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The airplane was in cruise flight 200 feet offshore at about 75 feet above the ocean when the engine failed. The pilot said that he
unsuccessfully tried to restart the engine several times before ditching the airplane in the ocean. The airplane sank in 45 feet of water.
8/25/92* Helio H-391B NA Edmonds, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Washington, U.S.
The pilot increased power to initiate a climb and the engine power was reduced. He ditched the aircraft in Puget Sound when he was
unable to reach an airport or the shore for an emergency landing.
9/4/92* Cessna 425 Marina Malaga, Spain Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Corsair Aeroservice
Following fuel exhaustion during final approach, the pilot was forced to land the aircraft in the sea some 70 meters to 80 meters from the
shore.
9/9/92 Cessna 182R NA Westerly, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Rhode Island, U.S.
Before takeoff, the non-instrument-rated 79-year-old pilot was advised that VFR flight was not recommended. During the flight, the pilot
indicated in his last radio transmission that he was descending into Westerly, Rhode Island. The aircraft did not reach the destination
airport. A search was initiated after debris was found by a fisherman. The aircraft was located five days later in 50 feet of water, five miles
from the airport.
9/15/92 Piper PA-28R-200 NA Avalon, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot said that while the aircraft was en route between the mainland and Santa Catalina Island, the engine failed and the aircraft struck
the water.

536 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/18/92 Douglas DC-6A Aeroejecutivos Curacao, Unscheduled 3 0 0 Destroyed
Netherlands Antilles cargo
The aircraft struck the sea off Curacao while on a flight to Miami, Florida, U.S.
10/25/92* Piper PA-32-300 NA Fort Pierce, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot reported an engine failure and conducted a forced landing in a canal.
11/4/92 Cessna 172P NA Doughboy Bay, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
New Zealand
The report said only, “Taxiing, became airborne, [struck the] sea.”
11/5/92* Douglas DC-7CF Aerochago Dania Beach, Florida, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
cargo
On takeoff, the aircraft’s no. 4 engine reportedly failed just after rotation. The takeoff was continued and the aircraft climbed away safely.
However, while fuel was being dumped prior to returning to the airport, the no. 2 engine began to overheat and eventually failed. The
DC-7 was unable to maintain altitude on two engines and the crew was forced to ditch in shallow water off the beach.
11/29/92 Piper PA-31 San Rafael Chaiten, Chile NA 8 0 0 Destroyed
Navajo
The aircraft reportedly struck the sea “immediately after takeoff.”
12/5/92 Aeronca 7AC NA Medford, Oregon, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot flew the aircraft to a low altitude to “buzz” a private residence and the aircraft struck electrical wires above a lake. The aircraft
struck water in an uncontrolled descent and sank in the lake.
12/6/92 Helio H-700 NA Shelton, Personal 1 0 2 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
The amphibious airplane was being landed on the water. The pilot said, “Landed on river … immediate pitch-forward to inverted.”
12/10/92* Cessna 172 NA English Channel Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Following fuel exhaustion, the aircraft was turned toward land and the pilot declared mayday. The aircraft was ditched about 100
meters in front of a fishing vessel. Despite two activations of the carbon-dioxide cylinder, the passenger’s life vest required inflation by
mouth. The passenger door jammed in the ditching. The floor-level pilot-seat travel limiter was impossible to locate quickly, and the
seat, which was fully forward, partially blocked the door. The occupants were rescued by personnel on the fishing vessel.
12/14/92 Piper PA-31P NA Oceanside, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The pilot flew the airplane after takeoff to 5,200 feet. Recorded conversations between the pilot and control tower did not reveal anything
out of the ordinary. Radar data showed that the airplane descended at an excessive rate until it struck the ocean about one mile offshore.
12/22/92* Velocity HXB NA Savannah, Georgia, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The engine failed during cruise flight at 6,500 feet. The airplane was landed in the Savannah River.
12/25/92* CJ-1 NA Lake Thompson, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Western Australia
The pilot reported that he was conducting aerobatics over Lake Thompson when, at the top of a vertical climb during the entry to a stall
turn, the propeller stopped rotating and the engine failed. Although the aircraft was made to dive to its maximum speed, the propeller
did not turn over and start the engine. Because there were no suitable forced-landing areas available, the pilot elected to ditch the
aircraft in the lake.
12/31/92 Piper PA-28-140 NA Brilliant, Alabama, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The takeoff was in night IMC. The wreckage of the aircraft was located Jan. 31, 1993, in a lake.
1/1/93* Beech 19A NA Moorabbin, Victoria, Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
Australia
The engine failed when the aircraft was outbound from Moorabbin. Being unable to return safely, the pilot elected to ditch the aircraft
about 200 meters from the shoreline of Port Phillip Bay.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 537
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/2/93* Dornier 228-100 Indian Bay of Bengal, off Demonstration 4 0 2 Destroyed
Coastguard Paradip, India
The aircraft was ditched in the sea while en route to Calcutta, coming down about 300 kilometers southwest of its destination.
1/5/93* Mitsubishi NA Nome, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
MU-2B-35
While the aircraft was in night cruise flight at FL 200, the right-engine fuel-filter-bypass warning light illuminated, followed by the same
warning light for the left engine. Both engines failed. The pilot made a forced landing on a moving ice pack in the Bering Sea.
1/16/93* Vari-eze NA Portland, Texas, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
While the airplane was being maneuvered over water, the engine failed because of carburetor ice. The pilot attempted to correct the
problem, without success. He attempted to glide the airplane to land, but was unable to do so. He elected to land the airplane in the
water.
1/28/93 Cessna 182 NA Belfast, Ireland NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
Skylane
The aircraft struck water during an instrument approach to Belfast following a diversion resulting from poor weather.
2/7/93* Piper PA-23-250 NA Atlantic Ocean Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot was ferrying the airplane from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, U.S. He expressed confidence that he could
complete the flight without making a refueling stop. After about 6.5 hours of flight time, the pilot reported that both engines had failed
and that he was going to ditch the airplane. The airplane wreckage and pilot were not recovered.
2/7/93* Piper PA-28-151 NA New Cumberland, Instructional 1 0 0 Substantial
Pennsylvania, U.S.
After a touch-and-go landing, the student pilot began a climb to prepare for another approach. At 800 feet, the engine failed. The pilot
made a forced landing in the river.
2/18/93 Cessna 172C NA Coffs Harbour, New Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
South Wales, Australia
The pilot reported that he had no visibility and was returning to land at Coffs Harbour. Soon after the pilot was cleared to join the circuit for
landing, communication with the aircraft was lost. The aircraft had struck the sea in a heavy rainstorm.
2/26/93 Learjet 31 Lider Taxi Aéreo Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Unscheduled 0 0 6 Destroyed
passenger
During the final stage of the approach, the aircraft undershot the runway, touching down in the water some 300 feet short of the runway
threshold. The accident happened in daylight with poor weather including reduced visibility and heavy rain.
2/28/93 Dornier 228-200 Formosa Lan Yu, Taiwan, China Unscheduled 6 0 0 Destroyed
Airlines passenger
The aircraft disappeared shortly before it was scheduled to land and was believed to have struck the sea.
3/16/93 Piper PA-34-200 Sky’s the Limit Carpenteria, Personal 6 0 0 Destroyed
Seneca California, U.S.
About 27 minutes after departure, in darkness with good visibility and no low cloud, the aircraft struck the sea about one mile offshore.
Radar data showed the aircraft begin a descent of about 300 feet per minute until it disappeared from the screen.
3/19/93* Piper PA-12-150 NA Anchorage, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Destroyed
After the engine failed and the pilot had attempted without success to restart it, he was forced to land the airplane in the waters of Knik
Arm.
4/2/93 McDonnell LAV-Aeropostal Isla de Margarita, Test 11 0 0 Destroyed
Douglas DC-9-15 Venezuela
During a flight test following routine maintenance, the aircraft struck the sea off Isla de Margarita. Flight operations appeared to have
been normal until some nine minutes after the beginning of test maneuvers when a brief “mayday” was received by ATC.

538 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/2/93* Cessna 172 NA Mussleburgh, Scotland Business 0 0 2 Substantial
On initial approach to Edinburgh, Scotland, engine-oil pressure decreased. The engine subsequently failed. The aircraft was ditched 50
meters from shore, and the two occupants swam ashore.
4/4/93 Lake LA-4-200 NA Gold Bar, Personal 4 0 0 Substantial
Washington, U.S.
The airplane was found submerged in 40 feet of water about 40 feet from the shore of Lake Isabel. Impact damage indicated a near-vertical
nose-down attitude at impact.
4/17/93 Lake LA-4 NA Superior, Wisconsin, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot and passenger departed Duluth, Minnesota, U.S., on a cross-country flight. When the pilot was reported missing, a search was
initiated. Investigation determined that the airplane had not reached the destination. Six days after the flight left Duluth, the body of the
passenger was found on the shore of Lake Superior. After about two months, the body of the pilot was found washed up on the lake shore.
The airplane was not found and was presumed to be in Lake Superior.
4/19/93 Van’s Aircraft NA Kingston, Tennessee, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Substantial
RV-6
A pilot who witnessed the accident said that the accident airplane was in a left turn from the base leg to the final approach course when it
stalled and entered a spin. He then saw a splash on the lake.
4/22/93 Piper PA-28-140 NA Carters Beach, Westport, Other 1 0 0 Destroyed
New Zealand
An unqualified pilot stole the aircraft, which dove into the sea.
4/25/93 Champion NA Duluth, Minnesota, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
7GCBA
Following a landing, the pilot added power for another takeoff in a light crosswind and the airplane became airborne in a slight right
bank. The pilot was unable to maintain directional control and his airplane’s right wing tip struck the water in a nearby lake, substantially
damaging the airplane and causing it to turn 180 degrees from its intended heading as it came to rest.
4/25/93* Cessna TU-206D NA Culebra, Puerto Rico, U.S. Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
During flight about 2,000 feet over water, the engine failed. The pilot could not restart the engine. He ditched the airplane at the mouth of
a bay in ocean waters.
5/6/93 Shorts 330-100 Atlantic Air Tortola, British Virgin Scheduled 0 0 30 Destroyed
Islands passenger
During the takeoff run, the aircraft reportedly “didn’t feel right” to the pilot, who elected to reject the takeoff. The aircraft could not be
stopped before the end of the runway, and it overran the runway and struck the sea.
5/17/93 Commander Líneas Aéreas Sepahua, Peru Unscheduled 1 1 0 Destroyed
690A Covitrans passenger
Arriving at Sepahua, the crew discovered that there was a “light fog” across the runway. The pilot elected to make a low pass along the
runway to assess the situation and determine if a landing would be possible. During this pass, the aircraft suddenly banked hard to the
right. The right bank increased until the aircraft became inverted. The aircraft descended and struck the river. Unconfirmed information said
that during the pass, the pilot noticed at the last moment a radio antenna located 50 yards from the runway and attempted an extreme
maneuver to avoid striking the antenna.
5/17/93* Piper PA-28-140 NA Canton, Kentucky, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Following the engine’s failure because of fuel exhaustion, the pilot ditched the airplane in a shallow lake about four miles from the
destination airport.
6/13/93 Thorp T18C NA South Lake Tahoe, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The engine failed and the pilot initiated an emergency descent for a forced landing. Witnesses saw the descending airplane. One
witness saw the airplane between 400 feet and 500 feet above water, approaching the shoreline and rolling into a left bank turn. The
bank angle increased until the airplane was upside down. The airplane then descended in a near-vertical nose-low attitude until it
struck the lake.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 539
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/13/93 Rutan Long EZ NA San Pedro Bay, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
A witness reported seeing the airplane being flown between 200 feet and 300 feet above the water. The airplane was put into a steep right
bank turn, descended into the water and cartwheeled.
6/13/93 Thorp T-18 NA Chatham, Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot was flying passes over jet skiers on the water. About 25 feet above the water, a 360-degree aileron roll was performed. At the
completion of the roll, the right wing contacted the water, followed by the fuselage. The airplane broke up and sank in 18 feet of water.
6/23/93* Grumman NA Comet Mine, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
American AA5A
An engine failure occurred over terrain unsuitable for an emergency landing. The pilot ditched the airplane, which then sank.
6/25/93 Mooney M20K NA Hobart, Indiana, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot and airplane failed to arrive at the destination. The southern part of Lake Michigan and the adjacent land were searched without
result. Pieces of an airplane were later found along the Michigan, U.S., lakeshore that matched the missing airplane’s interior and exterior
colors. The pilot was presumed dead.
6/26/93* Piper PA-38 NA St. Petersburg, Instructional 0 2 0 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
Following a power failure, the flight instructor took control of the airplane from the student pilot and initiated a turn back to the airport
from which the flight had originated. The instructor leveled the wings and ditched the airplane in Tampa Bay. After 10 seconds to 15
seconds, the aircraft sank. The instructor and the student exited the aircraft and were rescued by boaters.
7/1/93 Cessna 180K NA Webster, New Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Hampshire, U.S.
Soon after takeoff from a lake, about 40 feet above the lake’s surface, the airplane stalled. It then struck the water in a nose-down attitude
and nosed over.
7/2/93 Maule M-7-235 Ontario Ministry Porcupine Lake, Ontario, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
Super Rocket of Natural Canada
Resources
The pilot inadvertently landed the amphibious aircraft on the water with the landing gear extended. On touchdown, the aircraft nosed over
and came to rest partially submerged and inverted. The pilot exited the aircraft by kicking out the right mid-cabin window and was rescued.
7/2/93* Piper PA-24-180 NA Malibu, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The engine failed during cruise flight. The pilot conducted the required emergency procedures, but was unable to restart the engine. The pilot
elected to ditch the airplane into the Pacific Ocean about two miles offshore. The airplane sank to a 20-foot depth after the pilot was rescued.
7/10/93* Piper PA-31 NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The left engine and, soon afterward, the right engine failed because of fuel exhaustion. The airplane was ditched and the occupants were rescued.
7/11/93 Maxair MU532 NA Fox Lake, Illinois, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
The pilot reported that while he was maneuvering his airplane over a lake about 50 feet above the water, a gust of wind forced the nose of
the airplane downward and it struck the water.
7/18/93* Cessna 172N NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed
Inaccurate fuel-consumption calculations by the pilot contributed to engine failure because of fuel exhaustion. A descent was initiated and
the airplane was ditched about seven nautical miles from the destination airport.
7/23/93 British Aerospace China Yinchuan, China Scheduled 55 16 42 Destroyed
146-300 Northwest passenger
Airlines
On takeoff at Yinchuan, the aircraft failed to become airborne, struck earth banks just beyond the end of the runway and broke up. It came
to rest in shallow water. A report said that the takeoff had been conducted with flaps retracted although the correct flap setting had been
selected.

540 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/23/93 Cessna 175B NA Blythe, California, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane was seen being flown along the Colorado River, “buzzing” onlookers from an altitude no more than 50 feet above the water.
The airplane struck a cable that spanned the river and struck the river.
7/24/93* Cessna 152 NA St. Augustine, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The airplane was in cruise flight when there was an uncommanded reduction in engine power. The carburetor heat was turned on and an
increase in engine rpm was noticed, followed by a decrease in engine rpm. The pilot conducted a forced landing on the ocean adjacent to
the beach.
7/25/93* Beech D18S NA Kodiak, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Substantial
About 10 minutes after takeoff, during cruise at 800 feet AGL, the right-engine oil pressure began decreasing and temperature began
increasing. About two minutes later, the right engine began running roughly and backfiring, and the pilot shut it down. Meanwhile, the
pilot inadvertently turned the airplane into a small bay rather than toward the departure airport. When the airplane got into a low-speed
buffet, and the pilot believed the airplane was about to go inverted, he cut power on the left engine, leveled the wings and ditched the
airplane in the shallow water near the shoreline.
7/28/93 DHC-2 Beaver Aero Golfe Lac Allard, Quebec, Unscheduled 5 0 1 Destroyed
Canada passenger
Shortly after takeoff from the lake, the aircraft’s right engine failed. The pilot, apparently believing that there was not enough space to
conduct a forced landing straight ahead, attempted a turn. While in the turn, the aircraft stalled and struck the lake.
7/30/93 Cessna 170 NA Dry Bay, Alaska, U.S. Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot conducted a takeoff from a beach for a destination about 40 miles away. The weather along the route of flight was reported to
have been marginal VFR, with visibility less than 0.5 mile. The next day, pieces of airplane wreckage identified as being from the accident
airplane were found about four miles offshore near the point of departure.
7/31/93 Sea Ray NA Oshkosh, Wisconsin, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot of the amateur-built amphibian said that the airplane was not going to clear trees on takeoff, so he initiated a low-level right turn.
While in the descending turn, the passenger abruptly moved the control to the right, the right float dug into the water and the airplane
struck the water.
8/1/93* Cessna 180 NA Naubinway, Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
Michigan, U.S.
The pilot was flying his float-equipped airplane along the northern shore of Lake Michigan when he encountered deteriorating weather.
He elected to make a precautionary landing in the lake because of the reduced visibility and low ceiling. The passenger said that the water
was rough and that the airplane was landed hard, dug in the right float and nosed over. With the pilot’s assistance, she was able to escape
through the passenger window and swim to the surface. She went back to help the pilot (her husband) but he was stuck halfway out of the
window and she could not free him.
8/2/93 Cessna 208 MarkAir Express Kodiak, Alaska, U.S. NA 0 0 1 Destroyed
Caravan I
The aircraft inverted during an attempted water landing. The amphibious aircraft was equipped with floats and apparently touched down
with the wheels extended. The pilot said that he had not used the aircraft checklist because he was distracted and preoccupied by other
mission-related factors such as radio communication, crosswinds, the weather and remaining fuel.
8/5/93* Piper PA-18-150 NA Cape Canaveral, Banner towing 0 0 1 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The engine failed during a banner-towing flight while the airplane was just offshore. The aircraft was ditched in the ocean and nosed
over.
8/6/93 Lake LA-4 NA Blair Lake, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
The pilot of the amphibian encountered a “porpoising” loss of control while step taxiing in choppy lake conditions. Porpoising progressed to
wing-float pitching and striking the water. The airplane sank.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 541
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/11/93 Piper J3C65 NA Stonington, Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
The pilot was maneuvering at a low altitude in conditions of high humidity when the engine failed. The pilot said that he had used
carburetor heat before the maneuver. After the engine failure, the pilot said, the airplane entered a spin and he regained control, but not in
time to avoid striking the water.
8/15/93 Cessna 305A Aerial Beach Haven, Banner towing 0 0 1 Substantial
Advertising New Jersey, U.S.
This was the pilot’s third banner-towing flight of the day. Unknown to the pilot, the third banner was 50 feet to 75 feet longer than the
previous ones. The pilot was unable to release the banner, and it dragged on the ground and then in the water of a nearby bay. The pilot
reported that when the banner went into the water, the resultant drag was too strong for the airplane to overcome. Flight could not be
sustained, and the airplane struck the water.
8/17/93 Swearingen Aviation Hartford, Positioning 2 0 0 Destroyed
SA-226-TC Services Connecticut, U.S.
The airplane touched down with the landing gear retracted, and the propeller blades contacted the runway. The second-in-command, who
was the pilot flying, initiated a go-around. Witnesses saw the airplane in a steep left bank just before it struck a river next to the airport.
8/20/93* Bellanca 17-30A NA Hilton Head Island, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
South Carolina, U.S.
The pilot reported that the engine had failed at 1,500 feet AGL, about six miles north of Hilton Head Airport. Unable to reach the airport, the
pilot force-landed the airplane in the ocean, and both occupants were recovered.
8/25/93* Piper NA McCaysville, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
PA-22-108/U Georgia, U.S.
Following a takeoff that had been aborted because of engine problems, the pilot attempted another takeoff. As the airplane was flown
through 200 feet AGL, the engine developed a rough condition again. The pilot attempted to restore full power, which included the
application of carburetor heat. The pilot made an emergency landing in a nearby river.
8/27/93 Yakovlev Yak-40 Tajik Air Khrong, Tajikstan Scheduled 82 4 0 Destroyed
passenger
The Yak-40, which is normally configured for 38 passengers, had 81 passengers on board. On takeoff, the aircraft failed to become airborne
and overran the runway at high speed. After striking an earth embankment and a concrete pillbox, the aircraft fell into the Pyanj River and
was destroyed.
8/28/93* Champion NA Fire Island, New York, U.S. Banner towing 0 0 1 Substantial
Citabria 7-GCBC
A partial engine failure occurred while the airplane was towing a banner at 1,300 feet above the water. To avoid hitting people on the beach
with the banner, the pilot flew the airplane to 400 feet to drop the banner. Because of the beach crowd, he also elected to make a water landing.
9/12/93 Boeing 747-400 Air France Papeete, Tahiti, French Scheduled 0 0 270 Major partial
Polynesia passenger
Following a VOR/DME approach to Faaa Airport, Papeete, the aircraft was landed “long and fast.” After touchdown, the thrust reverser for
one engine failed to deploy, and the engine remained at “high forward thrust.” As the aircraft slowed, it veered to the right, ran off the
runway and came to rest in a shallow saltwater lagoon to the side of the runway.
9/13/93 Taylorcraft NA Puget Bay, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
BC12-D
The pilot misjudged his altitude above the water while on short final approach for a glassy-water landing. As he made a minor correction in
order to land directly into the wind, the left float hit the water. The floats were torn from the aircraft, which sank immediately. The pilot had
not filed a flight plan, and was not rescued until nine days later.
9/19/93 Socata TB 10 NA Aguadilla, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Puerto Rico, U.S.
A preflight weather briefing was not obtained before departure. Thunderstorms with heavy rain showers were forecast. The flight proceeded
toward the thunderstorm, according to witnesses, but there were no witnesses to the accident. The airplane minus the right wing was recovered.

542 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/1/93 Cessna 182H NA Clear Lake Reservoir, Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
California, U.S.
The pilot said that while making a turn over the glassy water of the reservoir, the water, sun, haze and color of the background terrain resulted
in an optical illusion. He said that he lost reference to the horizon, and the airplane struck the water about halfway through the turn.
10/3/93* Cessna 150G NA Osceola, Missouri, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
During cruise flight, there was a complete loss of engine power. The pilot was forced to ditch the airplane in a nearby lake.
10/11/93* Cessna 172 NA Blountville, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Tennessee, U.S.
While the pilot was receiving vectors for an IFR approach to the destination airport, the engine failed. The pilot elected to ditch the airplane
in a nearby lake.
10/12/93 Piper PA-23-250 Aviation Little Exuma, Bahamas Personal 5 0 0 Destroyed
Aztec C Associates
The aircraft disappeared while en route to Nassau (Bahamas) International Airport and later was found to have struck the sea off Hog
Key, Little Exuma. Weather at the time of the accident is believed to have included a depression centered over the Exuma Cays, producing
strong winds, low cloud and heavy rain.
10/16/93 Cessna 172M NA Culebra, Puerto Rico. U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot was practicing low flight over water and took evasive action to avoid a bird. During the evasive maneuver, the left wing struck the
water.
10/25/93 Piper PA-28-180 NA Centerville, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Maryland, U.S.
After 1.5 hours of flight, the pilot switched from the right fuel tank to the left tank. The engine began to run roughly and power decreased.
The pilot was not able to correct the problem, and he could not maintain altitude. The airplane descended until it struck water and sank.
10/29/93 Grumman NA Richmond Hill, Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
American AA5A Georgia, U.S.
Witnesses observed the airplane flying over the Ogeechee River. The airplane appeared to dive toward the river. It appeared that a right
turn was being attempted when the airplane hit the water. The investigation determined that the pilot had been physically impaired by
medications.
10/29/93 Beech A36 NA Ormond Beach, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The pilot was observed departing a bar about 0230 with a 12-pack of beer and two people who were later identified as passengers of the
accident airplane. The pilot’s body and those of the two passengers washed ashore the next day, along with a few parts of the airplane.
Toxicology tests found alcohol, tranquilizers, cocaine and other drugs in the pilot’s blood.
11/1/93* Cessna P210N NA Fort Lauderdale, Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The pilot reported an engine failure during descent. He conducted a forced landing on the water. The airplane sank and was not
recovered.
11/1/93 Cessna A188B/A1 NA Ballidu, Western Aerial 0 0 1 Substantial
Australia application
The pilot was flying the aircraft at a low altitude over the lake when the wheels struck the water. The aircraft came to rest inverted in
the lake.
11/4/93 Boeing 747-400 China Airlines Hong Kong Scheduled 0 1 295 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft touched down normally during the landing but did not decelerate normally. It departed the runway end and fell into Hung
Hom Bay. The probable cause of the accident was determined to be the captain’s inadvertent advance of the thrust levers when the thrust
reversers were not deployed.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 543
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/13/93* Cessna 152 NA Riverhead, New York, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
During a flight over the Long Island Sound, the engine failed. The pilot said that the engine could not be restarted and that the airplane did
not have enough airspeed or altitude to reach land. The pilot ditched the airplane.
11/19/93* Cessna U206F Red Baron Tampa, Florida, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
Aviation cargo
After departure, while on initial climb, the engine failed. The pilot conducted a forced landing on water.
11/28/93 Cessna 150H NA Dardanelle, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
During initial climb, the pilot said, a previously hidden “cell of virga” was encountered. The pilot said that he turned the airplane away from
the cell, but encountered strong turbulence and wind shear, accompanied by a downburst. Unable to arrest the sink rate, the airplane
contacted the water in a “high rate of descent.”
11/29/93* Cessna 152 NA Port Stephens, New Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
South Wales, Australia
The pilot declared mayday when the engine failed over Port Stephens. The aircraft had insufficient altitude to reach the shore and the pilot
ditched it in the water. Both occupants escaped from the aircraft before it sank.
12/4/93 Piper PA-28R-200 NA New Haven, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Connecticut, U.S.
During a night approach in adverse weather, the aircraft struck the water 4.5 miles from the airport. Another pilot who had just landed said
that conditions were “rough and turbulent, especially at traffic-pattern altitude.”
12/4/93 Mooney M20J NA Jones Beach, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
New York, U.S.
After departure, the pilot attempted to gain clearance from ATC for a transition flight through Class B airspace at 1,000 feet. The pilot declined
the clearance ATC gave him, canceled his request and planned to return to the airport. It was a dark night, with weather marginal for VFR at
times, and a pilot reported fog in the area. Radar data showed an airplane maneuvering over the Atlantic Ocean, then radar contact ended. The
search of the waters off of the south shore of Long Island and alert notice were canceled on December 22. For several weeks after the accident,
pieces of aircraft debris — one of which had the accident aircraft’s registration number — washed up on the beach.
12/9/93 DHC-6 Air Senegal Dakar, Senegal Scheduled 3 0 0 Destroyed
Twin Otter 300 passenger
The Twin Otter collided with a Gambia Airways YS-11 (C5-GAA) an altitude between 2,700 feet and 2,900 feet. The crew of the Twin Otter
lost control and the aircraft struck the sea. Although the YS-11’s left wing was damaged, the pilot was able to maintain control and to safely
conduct a landing.
1/13/94* Beech 90 King Air Charles Marseille, France Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Kuykendall
As the aircraft was flown to the south of Martigues, France, smoke began emerging from the control pedestal. Because of the large quantity
of fuel on board, the pilot elected to ditch the aircraft immediately. The aircraft later sank in deep water. The pilot was rescued by helicopter.
1/14/94 Aero Commander Newcastle Sydney, New South Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
690 Aviation Wales, Australia cargo
The aircraft disappeared from radar during final approach and later was found to have struck the sea about 10 nautical miles south of the
airfield and about 500 meters to the right of the extended centerline of the runway.
1/15/94* Consolidated B. Emeny Pacific Ocean Ferry 0 0 8 Destroyed
PBY-5A Catalina
While the aircraft was in flight at 5,000 feet, its port engine began to “backfire.” The pilot altered course toward Christmas Island and
reduced power on the port engine. Eventually, the engine had to be shut down. Attempts were made to feather the propeller, but it
continued to “windmill.” The aircraft weight was reduced but, with the propeller windmilling, altitude could not be maintained and the
pilot prepared for a forced landing in darkness and at maximum landing weight. Without a local altimeter setting, the pilot could not
ascertain the actual altitude, and the aircraft forcefully struck the water at an indicated altitude of 200 feet. After being landed on the water,
the aircraft began to develop leaks. The occupants bailed water for some time but became exhausted; they then decided to abandon the
aircraft, which sank several hours later. The occupants were rescued by the crew of a container ship.

544 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/17/94* Piper PA-28-180 NA Boynton Beach, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
After departure, the airplane was flown to 1,000 feet. There was an uncommanded reduction in engine power and the engine began to
backfire. The pilot repositioned the fuel selector and turned on the auxiliary fuel pump, but the airplane was unable to maintain altitude
and the pilot ditched the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean.
1/18/94* Cessna 140 NA Lopez, Washington, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
On the first flight after an oil change, an engine failure occurred when the oil-temperature-sensing bulb nut backed out of its attach point,
and all of the engine oil was lost from the engine. The aircraft was ditched in the waters off Lopez Island.
1/20/94* Cessna 152 NA Osprey, Florida, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
During cruise flight, the engine failed. The instructor took control of the airplane and performed a forced landing just offshore because of
obstructions on the intended touchdown location.
1/24/94 Cessna 425 Aero West Rorschach, Switzerland Unscheduled 5 0 0 Destroyed
Corsair passenger
The aircraft struck Lake Constance during the final stage of an approach and sank in 160 meters of water.
1/29/94 Beech 35 NA Leesburg, Florida, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
While in the traffic pattern, on base leg to final leg, the pilot lost visual contact with the runway when he encountered low-level fog. The
airplane continued to descend and struck a lake.
2/7/94 Cessna 310R Pacific Air La Jolla, California, U.S. Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
Charter cargo
In conditions of dark night, moderate to severe turbulence and heavy rain, control was lost and the aircraft entered a dive from 4,400 feet
to the ocean. The wreckage was located 1,000 feet below sea level.
2/25/94* Piper PA-28-140 NA Miami, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 1 2 Substantial
The pilot said that while he was flying the airplane through 600 feet to 800 feet after takeoff, the engine failed. Attempts to restart the
engine were unsuccessful and the aircraft was ditched in a lake.
2/27/94* De Havilland NA Surfers Gardens, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
DH-82 Queensland, Australia passenger
The pilot reported that the engine power decreased to idle. He made a forced landing in the ocean, about 15 meters from the shore.
3/8/94* Cessna TU-206F NA Crystal River, Florida, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Substantial
While in cruise flight, the pilot noted a loss of oil pressure followed by a reduction of power. He turned to the nearest land and initiated a
forced landing. When he realized that he would not reach land, he ditched the airplane in the sea.
3/18/94 Grumman G73 Chalk’s Key West, Florida, U.S. Ferry 2 0 0 Destroyed
Turbo Mallard International
Airlines
On takeoff, the aircraft was seen to climb apparently normally to an altitude of about 100 feet. Then, “the engines made an unusual sound.”
The aircraft yawed to the right, rolled left and struck the sea.
3/20/94 Piper PA-28R-200 Sunshine Flying Sarasota, Florida, U.S. Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Club
On final approach, the airplane deviated laterally through the final approach course, as if the pilot was overcorrecting. About 400 feet
altitude and one mile from the runway, the flight deviated to the left and a nonstandard missed approach began. An alternate IFR missed-
approach procedure was issued, but the instruction was not followed. Radar data showed that the airplane flew south about 2.5 miles, then
began turning and radar contact ended. Witnesses saw the airplane descending through fog in a steep, nose-down, right-bank attitude.
The plane struck water in a boat-docking area.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 545
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/26/94 Cessna U206G Key West Key West, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Seaplane
Service
The pilot said that the aircraft performance was sluggish for the weight conditions during the takeoff run and initial climb from a channel.
After takeoff, the aircraft had a shallow rate of climb, and as the aircraft approached land, glassy water and a downdraft were encountered.
As the pilot initiated a right turn to remain over water, the right float struck the water and the aircraft cartwheeled and came to rest
inverted in the water.
3/27/94* Piper PA-28 NA Bognor Regis, England Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The engine ran rough and oil pressure was low. The aircraft was ditched in the sea 100 yards offshore.
4/4/94* Piper PA-28R-200 NA White Plains, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
New York, U.S.
During a forced landing, the pilot attempted to stop the airplane with heavy braking, but there was insufficient runway available and there
were trees off the end of the runway. The pilot lifted the airplane off the runway, retracted the gear and tried to increase engine power, but
there was no response. He elected to ditch the airplane in a lake.
4/17/94 Pitts S-2A Tsunami Kahuku, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Aviation Hawaii
The pilot was performing a weekly air show for guests of a waterfront hotel. After completing two rolls at an altitude of 200 feet to 300 feet,
the airplane slowly rolled inverted and descended in an arc into the water.
4/24/94* Douglas C-47A South Pacific Sydney, New South Unscheduled 0 1 24 Substantial
(DC-3) Airmotive Wales, Australia passenger
Following takeoff, during climb through 200 feet AGL, the left engine reportedly failed. The engine was shut down and the propeller was
feathered. The pilot apparently then was unable to climb or maintain altitude on one engine. The aircraft began to descend, and the pilot
elected to ditch the aircraft in Botany Bay, just beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft came to rest some 100 meters from the shore. All
occupants successfully evacuated the aircraft before it sank and were rescued by the crews of fishing boats.
4/28/94 Piper PA-28 NA English Channel NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft disappeared from radar while crossing the English Channel. No trace of the aircraft or pilot was found by the rescue
services.
5/1/94* Beech 35 NA Gustavus, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot switched from his auxiliary fuel tank to his left-main fuel tank when the engine stopped producing power. He had to ditch the
airplane in the bay.
5/7/94* Piper PA-46-310P NA Gulf of Mexico Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed
During cruise flight, engine-oil pressure declined to zero. The pilot shut down the engine and made a forced landing in the Gulf of
Mexico near a ship. The airplane remained afloat for five minutes to seven minutes. During this time, the emergency exit was opened.
All occupants donned life vests, exited and boarded the life raft, which the pilot had deployed. All were rescued by personnel from
the ship.
5/21/94 Mid State Ultra NA Islamorada, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 2 Substantial
Light Challenger II
While the airplane was on final approach for landing at 75 feet to 150 feet AGL, the airplane rolled to the left and the nose pitched
down. The pilot attempted a recovery procedure without success. The airplane struck water in a nose-down attitude.

5/22/94* Ercoupe 415D NA Boynton Beach, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial

Florida, U.S.
While on the approach, the pilot said, he inadvertently pulled the mixture control instead of the carburetor heat control. After realizing his
mistake, he pushed in the mixture control but the engine did not respond. Unable to land at the airstrip, he ditched the aircraft into a canal
short of the airstrip.

546 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/24/94* Cessna 152 NA Kenai, Alaska, U.S. Instructional 0 0 1 Destroyed
The student pilot was completing an extended cross-country flight. Fuel exhaustion occurred two minutes before landing, and the pilot
ditched the airplane.
5/26/94 Mitsubishi Air Oceana Papeete, Tahiti, French Medical 5 0 0 Destroyed
Mu-2B-60 Tahiti Polynesia evacuation
During the final stage of an ILS approach, the aircraft struck the sea. Just before the accident, the pilot had reported the airfield in sight.
There was no indication of a problem and no distress call was received.
5/28/94* Cessna A150L Airplane Sales Leonardtown, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
and Service Maryland, U.S.
The pilot was making low-level circular passes over a residence when the engine failed. The pilot adjusted the throttle and mixture
but could not restart the engine. He ditched the aircraft in a pond behind the residence. The pilot exited the airplane as the airplane
sank.
5/28/94* Cessna P210N D.C. Leasing Milwaukee, Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Wisconsin, U.S.
The pilot told ATC that the airplane’s fuel gauges were “dipping” while he was flying the airplane to his home airport. He asked ATC for a
diversion to a closer airport. While the pilot was talking to ATC, the airplane’s engine stopped functioning and the airplane was ditched in a
lake.
5/31/94 Cessna 172N Venture Roosevelt, Arizona, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
Aviation
Witnesses in boats said that the aircraft was flown in a low pass over an airstrip, then was flown out over the lake surface at an estimated
50 feet AGL. The aircraft was flown for about a mile over the water, then was seen to begin a turn. The left wing tip struck the water and the
aircraft cartwheeled into the lake. The witnesses said that the lake surface was glassy smooth.
5/31/94* Cessna 210L Mercy Flight Pahokee, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot was practicing an instrument approach. His improper positioning of the fuel selector valve caused an engine failure because of
fuel starvation at an altitude that was too low for restart procedures. The pilot made a forced landing on a lake.
6/6/94* Beech 24R Vest Air Leasing Nantucket, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot advised ATC that the airplane engine had failed, he was unable to maintain altitude and was ditching the airplane. Initial
attempts to locate the wreckage and rescue the pilot and passenger were unsuccessful. There was no survival equipment aboard the
airplane.
6/12/94* Dale Tiny Two Pilot Hesperia, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The engine failed and the pilot, after unsuccessfully attempting to restart the engine, ditched the aircraft in a lake. The aircraft sank in 30
feet of water.
6/19/94* Waco YMF5 NA Put-in-Bay, Ohio, U.S. Business 0 0 3 Substantial
While the airplane was in cruise flight at 1,700 feet over a lake, the engine failed. The pilot was unable to restart the engine and was forced
to ditch the airplane. The pilot said that the shore of the lake was heavily covered with trees and he had not thought it would be safe to
attempt a landing there.
6/19/94 Cessna 152 West Valley Half Moon Bay, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Flying Club California, U.S.
The pilot and passenger departed a coastal airport as the return portion of a night cross-country flight. The departure route placed the
airplane over an ocean bay. Weather was reported as an 800-foot to 1,000-foot overcast. Witnesses heard the aircraft engine and then
observed the airplane descending from the bottom of the overcast in a spin. The airplane struck the water in a near-vertical, nose-down
attitude.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 547
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/22/94 De Havilland Wings of Alaska Juneau, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 7 4 0 Substantial
DHC-3 passenger
The accident aircraft, a floatplane, was one of five to depart a lodge. The pilot of the first aircraft radioed to the pilots of the other aircraft
to cross the river to the east shoreline. A passenger in the accident aircraft said that when the aircraft was over the middle of the river, she
could not see either shore through the fog. The pilot of the accident aircraft said that he encountered deteriorating weather and began a
descent, intending to make a precautionary landing. He began to level the aircraft, expecting conditions to improve. The floatplane struck
the surface of “glassy water.”
6/25/94 Skybolt NA Penzance, England Commercial 2 0 0 Destroyed
aircraft test
The pilot failed to recover from an aerobatic maneuver and the aircraft struck the sea.
6/30/94* Piper PA-30 NA Sandy Hook, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
New Jersey, U.S.
During cruise flight, the no. 1 engine failed. The pilot’s attempts to restart the engine were unsuccessful. The pilot was unable to feather the
propeller, and ditched the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean. The airplane came to rest in about 200 feet of water, and was not recovered.
6/30/94 Lake LA-250 NA Jefferson City, Maintenance 0 0 2 Destroyed
Missouri, U.S. test
During the takeoff run on the Missouri River, the airplane “porpoised” on the choppy water, became airborne, then descended nose-
first into the water. The pilot and passenger escaped through the popped-out windshield and were later rescued. The airplane was not
recovered from the river.
7/3/94 Kitfox NA Cranfield, England Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
observation
The aircraft struck the surface of a lake during air-to-air photography of another aircraft.
7/6/94 Consolidated Erickson Group Lincoln City, Oregon, U.S. Crew training 0 0 2 Major partial
PBY-5A Catalina
During the takeoff run on Devil’s Lake in strong crosswinds, gusting up to 30 knots, the pilot was unable to maintain directional control and
elected to abort the takeoff. He then found that there was only limited steering because the aircraft was not equipped with a water rudder.
The aircraft struck a boat house.
7/6/94* Cessna U206G NA Whyalla, South Australia, Aerial 1 0 1 Destroyed
Australia observation
The aircraft was flown in a survey flight between 110 feet and 600 feet AGL. At 83 kilometers south of Whyalla, the pilot declared mayday,
advising of an engine failure, but did not have time to give the exact location. After an extensive search, the passenger was found alive in
Spencers Gulf by fishermen, and a short time later the body of the pilot was found in the same area.
7/8/94 Cessna T210M NA Beaver Island, Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
Michigan, U.S.
The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger, neither of whom had an instrument rating, attempted to take off the aircraft from an island in
Lake Michigan. Weather was reported as dense fog and low ceilings. The airplane struck the lake less than one mile from the departure end
of the runway.
7/8/94* Piper PA-32-260 NA Gulf of Mexico Personal 1 3 0 Destroyed
While the airplane was over water, an engine failure occurred. Before ditching, the pilot advised ATC of his position. The airplane was
ditched at sea, and the four occupants egressed from the sinking plane. The pilot reported that three life vests were aboard the airplane,
but they were not recovered before the airplane sank. (The pilot had not briefed the passengers about the life vests before the flight.)
About three minutes after ditching, a Coast Guard airplane flew overhead and found the four survivors. A rescue boat and a helicopter
were dispatched to the area, but one of the survivors drowned before help arrived.
7/15/94 Cessna 172XP NA Indian Shores, Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
The airplane was seen flying about 200 feet above the water along the beach. A large bird collided with the airplane in the windshield area.
The airplane rolled inverted and struck the water.

548 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/24/94* Ted Smith Island Air Export Atlantic Ocean Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
Aerostar 601
Smoke and heat began coming from under the instrument panel, and the communication radios failed. The pilot turned off the master
battery switch, and smoke “poured” out from under the instrument panel. He elected to ditch the airplane near a boat.
7/29/94 Bellanca 17-30 Wooden Waterford, Michigan, U.S. Personal 0 3 0 Substantial
Airplane Co.
During the climbout, the engine ran roughly, then failed. The pilot reported that during the descent he attempted to switch fuel tanks. The
airplane struck a lake.
8/12/94 Piper PA-18-150 NA Grand Lake Stream, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Maine, U.S.
While the airplane was flying just above the surface of Lake Pocumcus, the pilot initiated a vertical climb. A witness said that the
airplane gained about 300 feet altitude and airspeed declined severely. The airplane descended straight down and struck the water.
8/14/94 Piper PA-601P NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane struck the Atlantic Ocean. Thunderstorms and IMC prevailed. A portion of the airplane and its occupants were located on, and
recovered from, the ocean floor on Oct. 1, 1994.
8/18/94 Piper PA-23 NA San Juan, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S.
The pilot said that during the takeoff the left engine failed. The aircraft drifted to the left and did not climb high enough to clear a
construction crane to the left of the runway. The left wing of the aircraft struck the crane and the aircraft descended and struck the
water in an upright attitude.
8/26/94 Dassault DA 200 Aerocorp Lake Pontchartrain, Corporate/ 0 0 7 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S. executive
The captain initiated an abort late in the takeoff roll, but the aircraft accelerated 12 knots past VR (rotation speed) before deceleration
began. During the abort, the airplane ran off the end of the runway and into the lake.
8/28/94* Grumman S2F Conair Aviation Quesnel, British NA 0 0 1 Destroyed
FireCat Columbia, Canada
While the aircraft was in cruise flight at 6,500 feet, the pilot noted that the power from the no. 1 engine was considerably reduced from
normal. The aircraft then began to vibrate and oil was seen to be streaming from the no. 1 engine breather pipe. The pilot elected to shut
down the no. 1 engine and feather the propeller. During the shutdown procedure, the pilot inadvertently activated the firewall shutoff
switches to the no. 2 engine. With no power being produced by either engine, the pilot decided to conduct a forced landing in the Fraser
River.
9/16/94 Piper PA-28-236 Pilot Vernon, New Jersey, U.S. Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
The instrument-current pilot was cleared to fly the airplane to 6,000 feet. Radar data showed that the airplane began a right turn and
climbed to 3,300 feet, then descended to 3,200 feet and continued the right turn. The turn and descent continued until radar contact with
the airplane ended. One witness saw the airplane descend into the water.
9/17/94 DHC-6 Pacific Coastal Port Hardy, north Unscheduled 3 1 0 Destroyed
Twin Otter 100 Airlines of British Columbia, passenger
Canada
On takeoff, as the flaps were being retracted after the aircraft became airborne, the aircraft suddenly pitched up “violently.” Control was not
regained by the pilot and the aircraft struck the water and sank. The loss of control apparently followed the failure of the down-elevator-
control cable, resulting from salt-water–induced corrosion.
9/21/94* Cessna 177RG NA Massacre Point, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Queensland, Australia
The pilot reported that the engine failed during cruise at 8,500 feet. The aircraft was over water and the pilot initiated a glide toward the
coast. The airplane was ditched in the Gulf of Carpentaria. Both occupants were rescued by SAR helicopter.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 549
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/23/94 Lockheed 100-30 Pelita Air Hong Kong, China Ferry 6 4 2 Destroyed
Hercules Service
Following a normal takeoff, the pilot heard a “high-pitched noise” from the right and the aircraft began to yaw and bank toward the right.
The pilot attempted to control this movement by applying left aileron, then left rudder, but was unsuccessful. Control was not regained; the
aircraft lost altitude and struck the waters of Kowloon Bay.
9/26/94* Yakovlev Yak-40 Cheremshanka Vanavara, Russia Scheduled 28 0 0 Destroyed
Airlines passenger
After three missed approaches were conducted at the scheduled destination because of weather, the flight was diverted to the
alternate airport, Vanavara. As the pilot neared Vanavara, some 3.5 hours after departure, the fuel exhaustion occurred and all three
engines failed. The pilot attempted to conduct a forced landing on the Chamba River but apparently the aircraft struck the river bank
and was destroyed.
10/5/94* Rutan VariViggen NA Lake Rotorua, Personal 0 0 NA Substantial
New Zealand
The report said only, “Canopy detached, hit propeller, aircraft ditched.”
10/18/94* Piper PA-28 NA English Channel Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The engine failed twice, recovered each time, then failed and could not be restarted. The pilot declared mayday and ditched the aircraft in
the sea. The aircraft sank three minutes later. The life raft could not be inflated. The pilot was rescued by the coast guard and was treated for
mild hypothermia.
10/20/94* Piper PA-28-140 NA Mana Island, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
New Zealand
The report said only, “Engine failure, aircraft ditched.”
10/27/94 United NA Fremont Lake, Instructional 2 0 0 Substantial
Consultant Corp. Wyoming, U.S.
UC-1
The private pilot was receiving instruction to obtain a multiengine sea rating. Witnesses reported hearing what sounded like an explosion.
The airplane was later found submerged in the lake. A pilot who flew over the lake shortly after the accident reported rough and turbulent
conditions with severe downdrafts. He also reported that the lake was choppy, with whitecaps.
10/30/94 Cessna 175 NA Irish Sea Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Skylark
Radio contact with the aircraft was lost as it was flown over the Irish Sea. SAR was deployed but was unable to locate the wreckage. Eight
days later small pieces of the aircraft and the passenger’s body were found. No life vest was worn.
11/5/94 Boeing A-75N1 Pilot Sayville, New York, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Several witnesses, both on the ground and in flight, saw the airplane being maneuvered. The ground witnesses reported that the airplane
completed a loop and then struck the water in a nose-low attitude. The in-flight witness reported that the airplane was in a steep left turn,
entered a left spin, recovered and struck the water in a nose-low, wings-level attitude.
11/9/94 Learjet 55 Líder Taxi Aéreo Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft overran the runway on landing and fell into the waters of Guanabara Bay.
11/12/94* Pezetel 106A NA Gulf of Mexico Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
The agricultural airplane was equipped with a kit that extended its fuel range to 10 hours. It was being transported to Caracas, Venezuela,
from Americus, Georgia, U.S. According to the Coast Guard, the airplane circled a Liberian-registered ship for about 10 minutes with an
intermittent rough-running engine, until the airplane was ditched in the sea with eight-foot to 10-foot waves. The vessel was not able to
rescue the pilot or to recover the wreckage.

550 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
12/2/94* Britten-Norman Southern Cross Pacific Ocean Ferry 0 1 0 Destroyed
Islander BN2B-20 Aviation
The airplane was being operated as part of a flight of two on a ferry flight from the Marshall Islands to Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. About two
hours after departure, while at an altitude of 7,000 feet, the accompanying airplane’s pilot noticed smoke emerging from the accident
airplane’s left engine. The accident airplane’s pilot declared an emergency. The left engine failed and the pilot feathered the propeller. The
pilot was unable to maintain level flight and the aircraft was ditched in rough water and sank. The pilot launched and boarded a raft and
was rescued 20 hours later.
12/10/94* Piper PA-28-235 NA Seattle, Washington, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in Puget Sound following an engine failure caused by fuel exhaustion.
12/30/94* Piper PA-32R-300 NA Bermagui, New South Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Wales, Australia
The pilot reported that he was flying at 500 feet, taking photographs of a boat, when there was a sudden and severe engine
vibration. Concerned that the engine might break its mounts, the pilot shut down the engine and ditched the aircraft in the sea.
1/2/95 Cessna 208 Taquan Air Craig, Alaska, U.S. Scheduled 0 0 8 Major partial
Caravan I Service passenger
After landing, just after the float-equipped aircraft came off the step and the pilot began to taxi, its right float struck a partially submerged
log. The aircraft sustained substantial damage to its floats and left wing.
1/10/95 DHC-6 Twin Otter Merpati Flores Island, Indonesia Scheduled 14 0 0 Destroyed
300 Nusantara passenger
Airlines
The aircraft disappeared while en route and was believed to have struck the Malo Strait between Flores and Rinja Island. The accident
happened in daylight but in “bad weather.”
1/11/95 Learjet 35 Canada Jet Dixon Entrance, Queen NA 5 0 0 Destroyed
Charters Charlotte Island, Canada
The aircraft apparently was flown into the waters of Dixon Entrance while the pilot conducted an NDB approach to Masset, Queen
Charlotte Island.
1/11/95 McDonnell Intercontinental Maria la Baja, Colombia Scheduled 51 1 0 Destroyed
Douglas DC-9-14 Colombia passenger
The aircraft struck the water of Maria la Baja while positioning for a VOR/DME approach to a runway at Cartagena. No problems had been
reported by radio.
2/9/95 Cessna 172G NA Pope Valley, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The airplane was seen flying in a nose-level attitude over a lake. The airplane struck high-tension wires that spanned the lake, plunged into
the water and sank.
2/12/95 Cessna 182Q San Carlos San Francisco, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Flight Center California, U.S.
The aircraft struck the ocean about five miles west of San Francisco under undetermined circumstances.
2/20/95* Piper PA-32-260 NA Caribbean Ocean Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
While the aircraft was being climbed through 1,700 feet, the pilot said, there was a total engine failure. The pilot notified the tower of the
emergency, attempted to restart the engine unsuccessfully, and made a forced landing in the Caribbean Sea.
3/3/95* Cessna 175 NA Quantico, Virginia, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The failure of a connecting rod resulted in engine failure and a zero oil-pressure indication. The pilot ditched the airplane in the Potomac
River.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/12/95 Piper PA-32R-300 Excelair Services Mediterranean Sea Unscheduled 6 0 0 Destroyed
Lance passenger
The aircraft disappeared while en route and was believed to have struck the sea. The accident happened in darkness and in “bad weather.”
3/12/95 Boeing 737-200 Cameroon Douala, Cameroon Scheduled 72 6 0 Destroyed
Airlines passenger
The aircraft was destroyed when it struck a mangrove swamp while on approach to Douala. According to unconfirmed reports, the
accident occurred during a go-around.
3/16/95* DHC-6 Great Barrier Pacific Ocean Ferry 0 0 3 Destroyed
Twin Otter 200 Airlines
While the aircraft was in normal cruise flight at 12,000 feet, some 400 miles from Hawaii, U.S., the pilot declared an emergency and reported
“fuel transfer problems.” The flight was continued toward Hawaii but, when still some 175 miles from the islands, the pilot was forced to
ditch. The aircraft later sank; the three occupants were rescued.
3/24/95 Aeronca 7AC NA Dauphin Island, Personal 0 2 2 Substantial
Alabama, U.S.
According to witnesses, the airplane was flying about 10 feet above the water, and about 150 yards from the shore. The airplane then
climbed abruptly and the engine noise stopped. The airplane nosed over and struck the water, nearly straight down.
3/28/95 Cessna 172N NA Venice, Florida, U.S. Personal 2 1 1 Substantial
After takeoff, the aircraft was observed to be flown into the fog several times and the aircraft was flown over the airport three times. After
the third pass, the pilot told the passengers that he was going to land on the next attempt. The aircraft was again seen entering the fog
and the survivors later said that they heard the stall-warning horn. The pilot applied power but the aircraft descended nose-low and right-
wing-low, then struck the water.
4/8/95 Cessna 172F NA Seneca, Personal 1 1 0 Substantial
South Carolina, U.S.
After takeoff, the pilot turned south toward Lake Keowee. As the flight approached the lake, the pilot decided to circle his brother’s lakeside
home. As the pilot maneuvered the airplane, it struck a set of utility lines that crossed the lake. The airplane fell 140 feet into the lake.
4/22/95 Bombardier Pelican Corp. Orlando, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Searey
The pilot was taxiing the airplane after landing and observed an alligator to his left. He said that he abruptly applied aileron flight-control
input and the right wing struck the water. The airplane sank.
4/23/95* Mooney M20J NA Cleveland, Ohio, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
During the approach, the engine began to run roughly. As the airplane neared the airport, the roughness ended. The pilot elected to overfly
the airport and land on a different runway. As the airplane turned to final approach, the engine failed and there was insufficient altitude to
reach the runway. The pilot ditched the airplane in Lake Erie.
4/24/95 Cessna 185E Harbour Air Surf Inlet, British Unscheduled 1 0 2 Destroyed
Columbia, Canada passenger
The float-equipped aircraft had been chartered to meet with a tug boat. The aircraft capsized, probably when the pilot attempted to turn
it while operating in extremely rough water and in a strong wind. Water had also leaked into the floats. After the aircraft capsized, the pilot
gave both passengers a life vest, took one himself, and all three men jumped into the water. The two passengers reached the shore, but
they said that the pilot was swept away by the current and that he slipped from his life vest. He was presumed to have drowned.
4/29/95* Piper PA-28 NA North Sea Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was ditched in the sea after engine failure. The pilot evacuated the aircraft uninjured, but in the 19 hours before SAR services
located him, he died of drowning or hypothermia because of inadequate survival protection.
5/5/95 Piper PA-32-260 R&D Aero North Miami Beach, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Service Florida, U.S.
Soon after takeoff, the pilot observed that the oil pressure began decreasing. He turned the airplane to return to the departure airport, but
the engine failed and the airplane struck a lake near the airport.

552 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/12/95* Cessna 310K NA Sequim, Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Washington, U.S.
After about 50 minutes of flight, while over the water at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet, the right engine developed a strong vibration.
In response, the pilot shut down the right engine. According to the pilot, he was then unable to obtain sufficient power to maintain level
flight in single-engine operation. He could not reach a suitable landing area. The airplane was ditched at sea on “glassy” water and sank in
about 150 feet of water.
5/16/95* BAe Nimrod R.1P Royal Air Force Moray Firth, Scotland Test 0 0 7 Destroyed
About 30 minutes after takeoff on a test flight, while the aircraft was flying at 15,000 feet, a fire broke out on the no. 4 engine. Attempts to
extinguish the fire proved unsuccessful and it apparently quickly spread to the no. 3 engine. The pilot declared an emergency and diverted
to RAF Lossiemouth, but the situation rapidly worsened with the fire spreading to the wing. The pilot subsequently decided to carry out
an immediate ditching in the Moray Firth some four miles off Lossiemouth. The aircraft touched down at relatively low speed in a nose-up
attitude. Despite the sea being described as “calm,” the aircraft bounced twice and its fuselage aft of the wing trailing edge failed and broke
away shortly after it came to rest. Nevertheless, the main part of the aircraft remained afloat for some 20 minutes, allowing the crew to escape.
5/21/95 Cessna 310Q Air Southwest Atlantic Ocean Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
Florida Corp.
The aircraft was over the ocean at night when the pilot reported a lack of fuel, and both engines failed. The airplane struck the ocean about
37 miles west of the Portuguese coastline.
5/29/95* Piper PA-31 Senegalair Dakar, Senegal Unscheduled 6 3 1 Destroyed
Navajo passenger
About 40 minutes after takeoff, the pilot asked Dakar ATC for clearance to descend to FL 040 because of a technical problem and said that
the aircraft was being flown on one engine. This was the last contact with the flight. The pilot subsequently attempted to ditch just off the
shore close to Mbour. The aircraft came down about 500 meters from the beach and sank in shallow water.
5/30/95 Piper PA-28-151 NA Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot reported an engine failure to ATC. The pilot reported that he had less than 10 U.S. gallons of fuel and that there were three people
on board. ATC radio and radar contact with the aircraft ended. A pilot flying in the vicinity reported seeing the aircraft inverted in the water.
The bodies of two victims were recovered from the water and the third was missing.
6/1/95 Aero Commander Pilot (co-owner) North Bend, Oregon, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
680
About two minutes after takeoff, witnesses saw the airplane being pulled up sharply into a steep climb from underneath an 800-foot
ceiling. The airplane then went into an uncontrolled, nearly vertical dive and struck a river.
6/2/95* Cessna 402B-II Líneas Aéreas River Plate, Buenos Aires, Personal 6 0 1 Destroyed
Entre Rios Argentina
Shortly after takeoff, power reportedly failed on one engine. The pilot apparently elected to return to the departure airport and initiated
a 180-degree left turn. The aircraft began to lose altitude and was ditched in the river some 2,700 meters from the shore, about three
minutes after takeoff. The aircraft subsequently sank.
6/2/95 Piper PA-32-260 Corporate Vieques, Puerto Rico, U.S. Unscheduled 1 0 0 Substantial
Charter Services cargo
The airplane was observed to depart and fly at a low altitude until it disappeared. The airplane was located on the sea bottom about one
month later. The pilot was not located.
6/14/95* Vans RV6 NA Sligo Bay, Ireland NA 0 0 1 Destroyed
The engine failed because of fuel starvation, subsequently found to be the result of an unapproved modification to the fuel system. The
aircraft was ditched in the sea.
6/20/95 De Havilland NA Nondalton, Alaska, U.S. Business/ 5 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-2/Piper Personal
PA-12
The float-equipped De Havilland, on a local-business flight transporting fishing-lodge clients, collided with the Piper PA-12, on a personal
flight. Both aircraft descended into a river in the remote area.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/24/95* Piper PA-36-300 Cooperativa de Atlantic Ocean Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Elet LTDA
The pilot said that he had just changed the fuel selector to the hopper tank when the engine failed. He switched the fuel selector
back to the main tank but was unable to restart the engine. He ditched the airplane and was picked up by a passing boat.
7/5/95 Piper PA-18 NA Nulato, Alaska, U.S. Personal 1 2 0 Substantial
The pilot was flying the airplane low along the Yukon River when he elected to maneuver at low altitude. The airplane struck the water
when the airplane was at low airspeed during a turn. An investigation revealed that the passenger who was killed had been sitting in the
extended baggage compartment, which was not equipped with a seat or a seat-restraint system.
7/5/95 Mooney M20F NA Cedar Key, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Radar data indicated that the airplane was on a heading of 123 degrees. The controller suggested that the airplane be flown south
for about 25 miles to avoid thunderstorms. Radar data for the next seven minutes indicated that the airplane’s heading was changed
only to 148 degrees. The pilot advised the controller that the flight was experiencing turbulence. The airplane then entered a rapid
descent from 9,200 feet to 1,100 feet, after which radio and radar contact ended. Wreckage from the airplane was located in the Gulf
of Mexico.
7/10/95 Cessna A185F Mount Lake Air Elliot Lake, Ontario, Unscheduled 3 1 0 Destroyed
Skywagon Service Canada passenger
The pilot performed an aerobatic maneuver at low altitude in a heavily loaded floatplane with insufficient altitude to complete the
maneuver. One passenger was thrown from the airplane at impact, after which a helicopter operating in the area evacuated him to a
hospital.
7/11/95* Piper PA-18-150 NA McCall, Idaho, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
During the climb phase of a go-around, the airplane encountered downdrafts. The airplane could not be flown so as to clear the terrain and
the pilot maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in a river.
7/12/95 DHC-6 Twin Otter Milne Bay Air Alotau, Papua New Scheduled 15 0 0 Destroyed
300 Guinea passenger
About half an hour after takeoff, the aircraft was seen in a steep dive after an apparent loss of control. Control was not recovered and the
aircraft struck shallow water just offshore. The investigation found indications of an in-flight fire in the rear of the fuselage.
7/14/95 Cessna 172A/ Pilot/owner Naknek, Alaska, U.S. Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
Piper PA-18 observation
Two float-equipped airplanes, both on fish-spotting missions, collided while maneuvering about 400 feet above the water. After the
collision, both airplanes broke apart and fell into the water.
7/29/95 Cessna 421C Business Flying Cordova, Alaska, U.S. Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Enterprises
The pilot radioed ATC and said that his airplane’s right engine had come apart. The pilot attempted to fly to and land at Middleton Island,
Alaska. During the flight, the airplane consistently descended. He flew past the island and was southeast of the island when radar contact
ended. Flight crewmembers of rescue aircraft said that they saw bubbles, an oil slick and airplane debris in the ocean about three miles south
of the Middleton Island airport.
8/2/95* Cessna 206G Rust’s Flying Skwentna, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 4 Substantial
Service passenger
About 45 seconds after takeoff from a remote lake, the engine of the float-equipped airplane failed. The pilot performed an emergency
landing in an adjacent creek.
8/12/95* Cessna 177B NA Seattle, Washington, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
While the airplane was in cruise flight approaching the final destination in a three-segment recreational flight, the engine failed. The pilot
ditched the airplane offshore.
8/18/95* Beech P-35 NA Bend, Oregon, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Substantial
During cruise flight, the pilot observed a reduction in oil pressure, which was followed by a total engine failure. The pilot elected to ditch
the airplane in Lava Lake, because no other suitable forced-landing site was available.

554 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/26/95* Cessna 172 NA Atlantic Ocean Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
The engine power began to decrease while the airplane was over the ocean, about 35 miles east of the destination of West Palm Beach,
Florida. The pilot initiated a glide and prepared for ditching. Just before impact, he observed oil on the windshield and cowling. After the
ditching, the pilot exited the airplane, inflated his life vest, and was soon rescued.
8/28/95 Beech E-18S Caribbean Atlantic Ocean Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
Leasing Co. cargo
While en route at 6,000 feet, 46 miles from Freeport, Bahamas, his destination, the pilot radioed the Miami (Florida, U.S.) Flight Service Station
and requested a weather briefing for Freeport. The pilot then reported an emergency. When asked its nature, he replied,“Fire onboard.” No
further transmissions from the flight were received and efforts to contact the flight were unsuccessful. SAR efforts were initiated. Two and one-
half hours later, an oil slick, the accident aircraft’s left-main landing gear and debris were found floating on the ocean surface 40 miles from
Freeport. The main wreckage was not recovered.
9/3/95 Cessna 172M NA Orr, Minnesota, U.S. Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
A witness said that the airplane appeared “fast” on final approach and was not flared before striking the water. On impact the airplane
“nosed over to the right.” The witness noted that the water was “glassy smooth” at the time of the accident. The pilot-rated passenger
reported that the pilot flew a “steep” final approach.
9/3/95 Druine D31 NA Rye, England Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Turbulent
The aircraft was seen by witnesses to fly overhead and then enter a spin to the right, going through 270 degrees before striking a river at a
steep angle of descent. The pilot, who had no recollection of the accident, was rescued from the river bank.
9/4/95 Gillet C.P. 328 Pilot Fire Island, New York, U.S. Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
The pilot/owner departed with another pilot for a local flight in the kit airplane designed for aerobatics. About 25 minutes later, witnesses
0.75 mile offshore saw the airplane strike the water in a spin. The second pilot had been seen two hours earlier that day in another airplane
performing aerobatics over the water near the area of the accident.
9/10/95* Cessna 180A Alaska Air Glennallen, Alaska, U.S. Public use 0 0 1 Destroyed
Ventures
The pilot of the float-equipped airplane was departing from a remote lake after deplaning two hunters. Winds from a nearby glacier produced
choppy waves, three feet to four feet high. The wind was estimated at 30 knots. During the takeoff run, the floats received several hard impacts
from the waves that were washing over the tops of the floats. The pilot aborted the takeoff. The left float began to fill with water and the
airplane rolled over. The pilot exited the airplane and climbed onto the inverted airplane floats. The floating airplane was spotted by a passing
float-equipped airplane that landed to lend assistance. The pilot had developed symptoms of hypothermia. The pilot was unable to retrieve a
rope from the other airplane but did manage to grab a sleeping bag. The second airplane departed to radio for more assistance.
The pilot received serious injuries during a rescue attempt and subsequent accident to a helicopter that came to the pilot’s aid. The airplane
sank after the rescue.
9/20/95 DHC-3 Otter Walston Air Kenora, Ontario, Canada Unscheduled 6 0 0 Destroyed
Services passenger
The aircraft appeared to have been making a normal approach until its right wing suddenly dropped. Control was not recovered and
the aircraft struck the water in a nose-down, right-wing-low attitude, about 0.25 mile short of the expected touchdown point.
9/24/95 Snyded Pitts S1E NA Somers, New York, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot said that he “saw the water and went down to get a closer look.” The airplane struck power lines during the descent. The pilot
said that he “put the plane down on the water.” Although the pilot received only minor injuries, a 46,000-volt power line fell into the
water, resulting in three persons being ejected from their boat. The three boat occupants attempted to swim to shore, but two were killed,
apparently by electrical shock.
10/1/95* Mooney M20E Pilot Long Beach, Personal 1 0 2 Destroyed
California, U.S.
While flying the airplane over the ocean, the pilot reported to the radar sector controller that the engine failed. The engine restarted, but
did not sound like it was in good condition. Then the pilot reported that the engine had failed again and that he was going to ditch the
airplane in the ocean. The sector controller immediately initiated SAR procedures. The two passengers were rescued; neither the pilot nor
the airplane was recovered.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 555
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/2/95 Cessna 172M NA Fillmore, California, U.S. Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
The engine failed in flight because of fuel exhaustion. During the landing roll, the airplane nosed over when it struck a river.
10/17/95* SIAI Marchetti NA Atlantic Ocean Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
SF.260
The pilot reported that the engine had failed for unknown reasons. The pilot ditched the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean about 129 miles
southeast of Great Exuma, Bahamas. He was rescued by the Coast Guard, but the aircraft was not recovered.
10/18/95 Dornier 228-200 Air Maldives Male, Maldives Scheduled 0 1 7 Destroyed
passenger
At touchdown or shortly after touchdown, the aircraft yawed toward the left. The co-pilot, who was the pilot flying, reportedly
overcorrected for the yaw and the aircraft turned “abruptly” to the right. The captain then attempted to regain control but the aircraft ran
off the side of the runway. It continued across the grass and fell into the sea.
10/18/95* Piper PA-31-350 East Coast Atlantic Ocean Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
Aviation passenger
Services
While the airplane was being flown from 5,000 feet to 3,000 feet, the pilot informed ATC that the left engine had failed and the engine
cowling was open. The flight crew was unable to arrest a descent of 300 feet per minute to 500 feet per minute. The crew informed ATC
that they would be landing in the water. All the occupants exited from the left-front pilot’s emergency door. The survivors were in the water
for about 30 minutes before being rescued.
10/26/95 Beech 65-B80 Dana Lisa Paint Rock, Texas, U.S. Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
Nyerges cargo
Witnesses observed the airplane strike the water while “buzzing” a lake, “emerge from a cloud of water” and enter a climb trailing white
vapor.” As the airplane approached the lake shore, the right propeller stopped turning and the airplane entered a steep right bank and
struck the ground.
11/10/95 Piper PA-23-250 Fairbank Farms Ashville, New York, U.S. Executive- 1 0 0 Destroyed
Corporate
The aircraft was being flown on final approach to a private airport at night, with crosswinds present. The runway had no electronic or visual
glideslope. The aircraft struck trees and came to rest, inverted, in a reservoir abeam of the approach end of the runway.
11/19/95 Beech 58 NA Cleveland, Ohio, U.S. Personal 3 2 0 Destroyed
After the airplane was airborne following takeoff, the tower controller instructed the pilot to contact departure control. The pilot
acknowledged, and there was no further communication from the pilot. The airplane struck a lake north of the airport. The pilot of another
airplane, who departed soon after the accident flight, reported being disoriented after departure because there was no visible horizon,
overcast clouds blocked light from above and there were no lights from below.
11/23/95 Cessna 150 Jersey Club Sea, northwest of France Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was being flown under VFR when radar and radio contact ended. The wreckage and the pilot’s body were found at sea.
11/25/95 Bellanca NA Kings Bay, Georgia, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
BL-17-30A
On the approach to Jacksonville, Florida, in dark-night conditions, the pilot became disoriented and said to the approach controller, “10
miles east-northeast inbound landing, circle around out here and get a heading or give me vector.” The airplane was assigned a discrete
transponder code and the pilot was given the altimeter setting, wind information and the active-runway information. There was no further
radio contact with the pilot. Radar data indicated that the airplane began a left descending turn. The engine was heard to be operating
normally before the airplane struck the water.
11/27/95* Cessna 182P NA Dent Island, Queensland, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Australia
The pilot reported a total power failure when the aircraft was flying a circuit at Hamilton Island airport. The aircraft was outside gliding
range to the runway and the pilot was forced to ditch the aircraft in shallow water.

556 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/29/95* De Havilland NA Perth, Western Australia, Unscheduled 0 2 0 Substantial
DH-82A Australia passenger
The pilot declared mayday to the Perth approach controller, advising of an engine failure. The pilot also reported that he was attempting
a forced landing. Soon afterward, the aircraft was seen by several witnesses to be apparently out of control and descending rapidly. The
aircraft struck the Swan River.
12/16/95 Cessna 150M Private owner South Padre Island, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Texas, U.S.
Witnesses observed the airplane, whose pilot was non-instrument-rated, descend out of the “broken fog” 500 feet to 550 feet above the
water. They said that the airplane circled 360 degrees as though trying to “avoid flying into the fog.” The airplane was destroyed by impact
with the water.
12/26/95* Cessna 152 Jack’s Aircraft Long Beach, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
While the airplane was being descended on an overwater flight, engine rpm decreased to idle. After checking the mixture and fuel selector
with no improvement, the pilot ditched the airplane.
12/27/95* Stinson ST-108-2 Student Lake Dallas, Texas, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Destroyed
pilot under
instruction
The student pilot was at the controls after takeoff when, at about 500 feet AGL, the engine failed. The instructor pilot took over control
of the airplane for an emergency descent and landing at the airport. The instructor pilot decided to ditch in a lake to avoid descent in a
residential area. Both pilots exited the aircraft and swam to shore. The aircraft sank.
1/5/96 Cessna 172N NA Bribie Island, Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
Queensland, Australia
Several pieces of aircraft wreckage were found on a beach on Bribie Island, and a woman’s body was washed up about 35 kilometers
farther north. The pilot’s body was recovered from the ocean the next day. The main aircraft wreckage was not located.
1/6/96 Mooney M20F NA Cape Charles, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Virginia, U.S.
The pilot was advised that VFR flight was not recommended. He radioed approach control in Norfolk, Virginia, and requested permission to
transition through their airspace. The pilot indicated that he intended to fly along the coast in an attempt to avoid the approaching winter
storm. Radio contact with the airplane ended while it was being flown over Chesapeake Bay.
1/7/96 Cessna 172P Gulf Aircraft Nassau, Bahamas Personal 5 1 0 Destroyed
Leasing
The pilot advised ATC that he was losing control of the aircraft. The aircraft failed to arrive at its destination and was later found to have
struck the sea.
1/7/96* Piper PA-34-300T NA Gulfport, Mississippi, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
Inadequate preflight planning and preparation by the pilot resulted in fuel exhaustion and failure of both engines while the airplane was
over water. The airplane was ditched about 1.25 miles from shore.
1/8/96* PBN BN-2A-27 Mustique Bridgetown, Barbados Unscheduled 1 0 9 Destroyed
Islander Airways passenger
About 40 minutes after takeoff, while in normal cruise flight at 7,000 feet, the aircraft had a sudden power failure on the right engine.
Following the failure of the right engine, the pilot was apparently unable to maintain height on the remaining engine and the aircraft
entered a gradual descent. At the time of the engine failure the aircraft was about 90 kilometers from Barbados, but was unable to reach
land and eventually was ditched about 30 kilometers from the coast.
1/8/96* Cessna 172N NA Lantana, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
During an overwater flight, the engine failed, and the pilot was unable to glide the airplane to land. He ditched the airplane in the ocean
about one mile from land. He and the passenger were rescued by the Coast Guard.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/9/96 Partenavia Aspen Pacific Ocean Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
AP68TP-300S Helicopter
Spartacus
The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and struck the sea while en route from Oxnard, California, U.S., to San Diego, California. There
was no distress call and the last contact with the pilot had been routine.
1/13/96 Anderson EA-1 NA Lake Te Anau, Instructional 0 0 2 NA
Kingfisher New Zealand
The amphibious airplane was being flown in circuits at a land airport when the pilot was requested to vacate the airspace for a glider
launch. The airplane was landed on the lake with the wheels still down.
1/17/96 Piper PA-32 NA Milwaukee, Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
Wisconsin, U.S.
The pilot was flying the airplane at night over Lake Michigan when he informed Milwaukee approach control that the engine had failed.
From about 20 miles northeast of Milwaukee, the pilot was able to glide about 12 miles before the airplane struck the water. The body of
the pilot and the wreckage of the airplane were recovered about two months after the accident.
1/18/96 Piper PA-28-140 NA Harwich, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The non-instrument-rated pilot encountered IMC and the airplane struck water. The airplane was found submerged one mile from the
shoreline.
1/19/96* Piper PA-28-236 NA Seal Beach, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
California, U.S.
An improperly installed magneto resulted in an engine failure during overwater flight. The pilot, unable to reach land, ditched the airplane
in the ocean.
1/28/96* Beech 77 NA Grand Prairie, Texas, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
When nearing the destination airport, the engine began producing reduced power. Because he detected a strong odor of fuel, the
pilot was concerned about a possible in-flight fire and he elected to execute a forced landing in Joe Pool Lake.
2/1/96 Lake LA-4-200 NA Motuihe Island, Passenger 0 0 3 Substantial
New Zealand
While the amphibian was being taxied, it hit two small waves, bounced about 12 feet into the air, descended steeply and came to a sudden
stop on the water. The airplane took on water and was taxied to shore in time to prevent its sinking.
2/3/96* Cessna 182 NA Mediterranean Sea Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Skylane
The airplane was ditched at sea off Rome, Italy, following engine failure.
2/6/96 Boeing 757-200 Birgenair Puerto Plata, Dominican Unscheduled 189 0 0 Destroyed
Republic passenger
The aircraft was destroyed when it apparently stalled, lost altitude and struck the sea five miles off the coast some five minutes after
takeoff. Investigation indicated that the airplane had a blocked pitot tube, and that the flight crew became confused by false airspeed
indications and did not respond to a stall warning.
2/21/96 Piper PA-30-160 NA St. Petersburg, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The pilot said that, while on final approach, he became distracted by the passenger, and the airplane struck water.
2/23/96 North American North American West Palm Beach, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
SNJ-5 Top Gun Florida, U.S.
During a low-level overwater aerobatic maneuver, the tail section of the airplane struck water.

558 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/4/96* Cessna 172 NA Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
During a demonstration, the engine became unresponsive and then produced only partial power. The airplane descended and the
pilot declared an emergency by radio. He selected an emergency-landing area near the shore of an island, but noticed that the
beach area contained large rocks. The pilot then ditched the airplane about 30 yards from shore. Both pilots swam to shore, and the
airplane sank.
3/4/96 Piper PA-23-250 NA Sulphur Springs, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Texas, U.S.
Following a partial engine failure in cruise flight, the pilot decided to make a precautionary landing. While maneuvering to the airport,
he noted that the “GEAR DOWN” indicator lights did not illuminate when he placed the gear handle down. After manually extending the
landing gear, the pilot realized that he did not have enough altitude to reach the airport. A witness saw the airplane strike the surface of a
lake and, subsequently, sink.
3/7/96 Piper PA-28-180/ Private/Phoenix Flagler Beach, Instructional/ 6 0 0 Destroyed
Piper PA-44-180 East Aviation Florida, U.S. Sightseeing
The airplanes collided at about 600 feet in visual meteorological conditions. The airplanes and airplane parts plunged into the ocean.
3/12/96* Cessna 182P CAVU Flying Darrington, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Club Washington, U.S.
The pilot reported to ATC that the airplane’s engine had failed. He said that he initiated an emergency descent through clouds, broke out
of the clouds at an altitude about 400 feet AGL and ditched the airplane in a shallow river because of unsuitable surrounding terrain. The
airplane flipped over during the ditching.
3/17/96 Cessna U206G Key West Key West, Florida, U.S. Unscheduled 5 1 0 Destroyed
Seaplane passenger
Service
After takeoff, according to radar data, the airplane was flown to 200 feet, then was descended to 100 feet. The pilot was advised to turn
right to pass behind the approach corridor for a departing airplane. Witnesses saw the airplane flying toward buildings and said that the
airplane, which was 50 feet to 100 feet above the water, started banking to the right, and that the bank angle increased to nearly 90 degrees.
The airplane then pitched nose-down and struck the water nose-low and right-wing-low, rolled inverted and sank in about six feet of water
about 20 yards from a seawall.
3/29/96 Helio H295 L.A.B. Flying Angoon, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 2 Minor
Service passenger
The airplane had taken off from water in gusty winds. At an estimated altitude of 15 feet, a gust caused the pilot to lose control of the
aircraft, which then struck the water. The right float was damaged and began to sink. The pilot and passenger remained on top of the
left float until they were rescued. The airplane rolled to an inverted position, was towed to shallower water and was recovered.
4/1/96 Cessna P210N NA Marathon, Florida, U.S. Business 2 0 0 Substantial
During an overwater approach at night, the airplane descended into the water about seven nautical miles northeast of the airport.
4/5/96 Dornier 228-200 Formosa Matsu Island, Taiwan, Scheduled 6 0 11 Destroyed
Airlines China passenger
The aircraft apparently undershot the runway during the final stage of a visual approach to Matsu Island and struck the sea just offshore.
According to press reports, the aircraft descended below the correct altitude because of inadequate crew coordination.
4/7/96* PBN BN-2A-21 Island Air Gold Currumbin, Queensland, Unscheduled 0 2 8 Destroyed
Islander Coast Australia passenger
Flying at 3,000 feet and about 10 nautical miles from the coast, the pilot reported that the aircraft’s right engine had failed. The pilot altered
course toward land, intending to fly toward Coolangatta, Australia. Shortly afterward, he conducted a forced landing in the surf on Curumbin
Beach.
4/14/96 Cessna U206G Signal Air Venice, Louisiana, U.S. Personal 1 2 1 Destroyed
According to one passenger in the accident aircraft, the airplane was about 300 feet above the ground when fog was encountered. The
pilot made a right turn and began to descend the airplane, which struck water and came to rest inverted.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/19/96 Cessna 150F NA Mackinac Island, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Michigan, U.S.
The student pilot departed on a four-mile flight in marginal VMC with fog moving into the area. Two days later, the airplane was found in 20
feet of water near the intended island destination.
5/3/96 Cessna 310D NA Los Angeles, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The pilot elected to go around because of an unsafe-gear indication during a night landing. The airplane was flown into a cloud layer and
was later seen descending out of the clouds in a nose-down attitude. The airplane struck the ocean about three miles west of the airport.
5/5/96* Cessna P206D NA Harrison, New York, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Separation of a connecting-rod bolt resulted in engine failure. The pilot said, “I realized that we could not make it to the runway and we then
quickly decided to head for the water.” The airplane was ditched in a reservoir.
5/9/96 Lake LA-4-200 New Hampshire Sunapee, NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
Civil Air Patrol New Hampshire, U.S.
During an attempt to land on water, the airplane flipped over and sank in the lake. The pilot lacked currency in type and did not follow the
requirement to have a flight instructor aboard during water landings.
5/11/96 McDonnell ValuJet Miami, Florida, U.S. Scheduled 110 0 0 Destroyed
Douglas DC-9-32 passenger
The aircraft had just departed Miami International Airport when an intense fire erupted in the forward cargo compartment. As soon as the
crew detected the fire, they immediately turned back toward Miami, but the fire burned through the aircraft’s control cables and the crew
could not maintain control. The aircraft struck water in the Florida Everglades, a swamp.
5/15/96 Cessna 320A Pilot/owner Utah Lake, Provo, Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
Utah, U.S.
The owner and flight instructor were advised of a fuel leak from the underside of the right engine. One of the pilots examined the left engine
and re-entered the aircraft, and the aircraft was taxied for takeoff. The first takeoff was aborted for undetermined reasons. The aircraft then
departed. About 40 minutes later, a radio transmission from the aircraft indicated an engine fire. The aircraft was seen diving toward the
surface of Utah Lake, and struck water that was about 12 feet deep.
5/24/96* Piper PA-18 NA Kivalina, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot said that he was taking off when the right wheel struck a hole in the ground. He heard the propeller strike a rock. He completed the
takeoff and, after liftoff, the airplane began to vibrate. The pilot was forced to land the airplane in a river. The airplane became submerged in
the water and nosed over.
5/31/96* Piper PA-28-161 CAVU Flying Seattle, Washington, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Club
The pilot told the controller that his airplane’s engine power had failed over Elliott Bay and he was attempting to restart the engine. Radar
and radio contact ended. An oil slick was found on the water by Coast Guard searchers near the last reported radar position. The pilot later
pleaded guilty to charges of fraudulent insurance claims and making a false distress signal.
6/3/96 Cessna 310C NA Winslow, Maine, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane was in cruise flight at 18,000 feet when radar and radio communication ended. Radar data indicated that the airplane made a
180-degree turn before descending into a river.
6/5/96 Aeronca O-58B NA Greenville, Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
South Carolina, U.S.
The pilot had flown the airplane into the area, picked up a passenger and departed the airport. The airplane struck a power line that crossed
a lake. The airplane struck the lake and sank.
6/7/96 Piper PA-32R-300 Condor Air Goleta, California, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot flying became spatially disoriented, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent, leading to the airplane striking the water.

560 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/10/96 Aeronca 65-CA Private owner Lonoke, Arkansas, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
The airplane struck the water following a loss of control. A witness reported seeing the airplane “shoot straight up into the sky, up to about
150 feet,” after which it turned nose-down and struck the water.
6/13/96 Piper PA-24-250 NA Big Bear City, Personal 2 1 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
During the initial climb after takeoff, the aircraft’s engine abruptly failed when the aircraft was about 200 feet AGL. Witnesses reported that
the aircraft continued forward until its nose pitched up, the left wing dropped and the aircraft fell into the shallow water of a lake.
6/24/96 Beech P-35 NA St. Petersburg, Personal 1 1 1 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
About five miles north of the airport, the pilot radioed the tower controller and reported that the engine had failed and that he did not think
he could reach the runway. The controller observed the airplane turn left, enter a nose-high attitude and strike the water nose-low and left-
wing-low.
7/2/96 Lake LA-4-200 NA Wolfeboro, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
New Hampshire, U.S.
The aircraft nosed over and submerged in water during a landing on Lake Wentworth.
7/5/96* Cessna 210 NA Boston, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
A fracture failure of the crankcase resulted in separation of a cylinder, loss of engine power and a ditching.
7/7/96* Piper PA-23-250 NA Harrisburg, Personal 0 0 3 Destroyed
Pennsylvania, U.S.
The aircraft’s right engine failed shortly after takeoff. The pilot made an emergency landing in the Susquehanna River.
7/12/96 Piper PA-46-310P NA Hartford, Personal 0 2 4 Destroyed
Connecticut, U.S.
The airplane stalled after takeoff because of incorrect airspeed and descended into the Connecticut River.
7/14/96 Smith RV4 Private owner Mandeville, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Arkansas, U.S.
While on short final, the pilot advanced the engine throttle to maintain glide path, but the engine did not respond. The airplane came to rest
in water about 200 yards from the approach end of the runway.
7/15/96 Aeronca 7CGB Private owner Fairhope, Alabama, U.S. Personal 1 1 0 Substantial
Witnesses observed the aircraft being descended toward the water, then being pulled up into a steep climb. After reaching 200 feet, the right
wing and nose dropped, and the aircraft descended nose-first until impact with the water of Weeks Bay.
7/17/96 Boeing 747-100 Trans World Moriches Inlet, Scheduled 230 0 0 Destroyed
Airlines New York, U.S. passenger
After takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, New York, the aircraft appeared to be climbing normally. As the aircraft
passed through 13,800 feet, an explosion occurred, resulting in a catastrophic breakup of the aircraft. The pieces of the aircraft struck the
sea off Moriches Inlet. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was an explosion
in the center wing fuel tank, resulting from the ignition of the flammable air-fuel mixture in the tank.
7/17/96 Piper PA-23-250 LCE St. Petersburg, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
After departure, the pilot reported that the right engine was “running rough.” The control tower cleared him for an emergency landing at
the departure airport. While returning, the pilot was unable to maintain altitude, and the airplane struck water about one mile south of the
airport.
7/22/96* Cessna 210L Gallops Fort Myers, Florida, U.S. Positioning 0 0 2 Substantial
On final approach, the airplane’s engine failed, and a forced landing was made in a river about 2.5 miles from the runway.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/24/96 Piper PA-28-181 NA Sea Bright, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
New Jersey, U.S.
The non-instrument-rated pilot departed on a local flight in VMC. A witness heard the airplane’s engine overhead in “very foggy” conditions.
Reportedly, the airplane re-entered the fog, made an abrupt 180-degree turn and struck the water.
7/29/96 Kis NA Calais, France Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck the sea one nautical mile off Calais.
7/30/96 Canadair CL-215 SISAM Lercara Friddi, Italy Fire suppression 1 0 1 Destroyed
While landing on a lake to pick up water for fighting a forest fire, the aircraft appeared to touch down hard. The impact ruptured the
aircraft’s hull, which rapidly filled with water, and the aircraft sank.
8/4/96 Pitts Special S-1S NA Pittsburgh, Aerobatic 1 0 0 Destroyed
Pennsylvania, U.S.
At an air-show aerobatic exhibition, the pilot initiated his first maneuver, a double snap roll. Airspeeds greater than the manufacturer-
recommended maneuvering airspeeds exceeded the airplane’s design limits, resulting in the failure of a wing spar. The airplane descended
until it struck the water in an inverted attitude.
8/9/96 Beech A36 Fly Inc. Atlantic Ocean Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was destroyed and its pilot killed in an in-flight collision with water. The pilot had not obtained a preflight weather briefing or
in-flight weather-avoidance assistance, and inadvertently encountered a level-three thunderstorm.
8/12/96 DHC-6 Bradley Air Baffin Island, Northwest Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
Twin Otter 300 Services Territories, Canada cargo
The aircraft touched down several times, with full braking that continued to the end of the landing strip. A go-around apparently then
was attempted. Power was applied and the aircraft became airborne, continuing in flight without gaining altitude before striking a rock. It
continued in flight for another 500 feet before apparently stalling and striking the sea in a right-wing-low attitude.
8/13/96 Cessna TR182 Private owner Port Isabel, Texas, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
During an intentional low-altitude flight maneuver, the aircraft struck a concrete bridge pylon and column, then descended uncontrolled
into the water.
8/14/96* Douglas DC-4 Basco Flying Bronson Creek, Unscheduled 1 0 2 Destroyed
Service British Columbia, cargo
Canada
Following a fire near engine no. 2, the engine separated from the aircraft and was believed to have struck the propeller of the no. 1 engine.
The aircraft became very difficult to control, and the crew decided to conduct a forced landing in the Iskuit River. After the landing, all three
occupants evacuated from the aircraft. The first officer and the flight engineer reached the river bank. The captain was missing, and was
believed to have drowned in the fast-flowing river.
8/17/96 Cessna 172H Pilot/owner St. Petersburg, Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
Witnesses to the accident said that the engine was not operating at the time of the accident, and that it appeared that the pilot was
attempting to land the airplane on a fishing pier. The airplane hit a light pole and the fishing-pier guardrail and tumbled into the bay.
8/19/96 Cessna 180 NA Duxbury, Minnesota, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The airplane struck the water while maneuvering to avoid trees along the water’s edge.
8/23/96* American AA-5 NA Annapolis, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Maryland, U.S.
The pilot reported that during takeoff climb, he started a left turn at 700 feet. The engine then failed. The pilot tried unsuccessfully to
restart the engine, then ditched the aircraft in a creek.
8/28/96* Cessna 150M MRM Oklahoma City, Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
International Co. Oklahoma, U.S.
While the student pilot was returning to the airport after a solo training flight at night, the engine failed. The student saw trees and
maneuvered to avoid a collision, then landed the airplane in a small lake.

562 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/31/96 Cessna 206 Totem Air Yakutat, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 1 0 0 Substantial
The operator reported that the pilot was planning to land in an area known as Halibut Cove to pick up several passengers. The flight did not
return and was reported overdue. The airplane was located floating upside down by search aircraft. After arrival at the scene, search personnel
reported that the airplane’s windshield was broken out of the airframe and the pilot’s seat belt was unbuckled. The pilot was not located.
9/1/96 Karr Titan NA Union Pier, Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
Tornado Michigan, U.S.
The aircraft was being flown in aerobatics over Lake Michigan. During the fifth successive “hammerhead turn,” the airplane departed
controlled flight and struck the surface of the lake.
9/7/96 Cessna 180J Wayco Aviation Knot Lake, British Positioning 1 0 0 Destroyed
Columbia, Canada
The airplane did not complete a 35-mile flight to Knot Lake. A search flight sent to look for the missing airplane received an ELT signal
but could not find the source. The rescue coordination center was notified and the missing airplane was found later, sinking in Knot Lake.
The pilot’s body was recovered from the water the next day. The pathological examination determined that the pilot had received a head
laceration and had drowned.
9/20/96 Piper PA-18 NA Minto, Alaska, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
The pilot intended to land the float-equipped airplane in the area to pick up fellow hunters. Witnesses saw the airplane fly low
over trees and make a turn to align with the landing area on the water. They heard the engine power increase, saw the nose of the
airplane rise, watched as the airplane banked 60 degrees to the right and then saw the airplane descend nose-low into the water.
9/24/96 De Havilland Branch River Air King Salmon, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 2 2 Substantial
U-6A Service passenger
The pilot failed to maintain sufficient airspeed during the initial climb after takeoff, which resulted in an inadvertent stall that ended with
the airplane striking water.
9/25/96 Piper PA-28 Woodvale Southport, England Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
Aviation
The aircraft was deliberately spun as part of a flying instructor candidate’s training. The entry altitude, location and weather were all
suitable for the exercise but the aircraft failed to recover and struck the sea. The aircraft floated for a short time but sank inverted. Both
occupants were incapacitated and subsequently drowned.
9/30/96 De Havilland Castle Rock Portage Lake, Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-2 Beaver Exploration Co. Labrador, Canada passenger
The pilot apparently encountered deteriorating weather en route to Goose Bay. He landed on a pond to await improved conditions. In his
last radio transmission, the pilot indicated that he would be departing the pond soon. When the aircraft did not arrive at the destination, a
search was commenced. Seven days later, an oil slick and paddle with the company name on it were found on the pond. Divers located the
aircraft wreckage in 120 feet of water. The bodies of the pilot and passenger were found inside the wreckage.
10/2/96 Boeing 757-200 Aero Peru Ancon, Peru Scheduled 70 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
Following an apparently normal takeoff from Lima, Peru, and initial climb, the first officer advised ATC of problems and requested
clearance to return to the airport. The first officer told ATC that the airspeed was “too low,” the aircraft altitude was increasing “too
slowly” and the wind shear warning had sounded for no apparent reason. ATC began to provide radar vectors to position the aircraft for
landing. When the aircraft was approximately on the base leg for the landing, the crew apparently experienced loss of control and the
aircraft struck the sea.
10/3/96* Grumman Private owner Kona, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
American AA-1B
The pilot reported that the engine failed and that he was forced to ditch the aircraft. After exiting the aircraft, he remained in the water
until he was located by the Coast Guard.
10/7/96* Cessna 152 NA Gulf of Mexico Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The airplane exhausted its fuel while flying over the Gulf of Mexico. The pilot declared mayday to the Galveston Airport tower, informing
controllers that he would ditch near an oil platform. After the ditching, both airplane occupants swam to the platform and were rescued.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/25/96 Bellanca 8KCAB NA Sheffield, Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot’s abrupt control of the airplane resulted in an inadvertent stall, uncontrolled descent and subsequent in-flight collision with water.
11/3/96* Piper PA-23-250 NA Cairns, Queensland, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
Australia passenger
The pilot declared mayday about 15 miles from Cairns. He advised, “I think I’ve run out of fuel, going in.” The aircraft was ditched a short
time later, two nautical miles off the coast of Wangetti Beach. All five persons on board were rescued.
11/23/96* Boeing Ethiopian Grande Comore Island, Scheduled 127 5 43 Destroyed
767-200ERM Airlines Comoros passenger
The aircraft was destroyed when it broke up and sank during an attempted ditching following fuel exhaustion. The aircraft had been
hijacked, and the pilot apparently attempted a ditching in the shallow, sheltered waters of a small bay about 500 meters off Le Galawa
beach, on the northern tip of Grande Comore Island. During the ditching, the aircraft broke up and sank.
12/11/96 Beech 18G Tol-Air Caribbean Ocean, off Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
Puerto Rico, U.S. cargo
The pilot feathered the left engine because of the loss of the engine cowling but did not declare an emergency. Shortly thereafter, the pilot
declared that he was losing altitude at a rate of 300 feet per minute. He said that he was going to attempt to restart the engine, and that he
was nearing the water. The pilot informed ATC that the airplane would not be able to reach land. The pilot was told that SAR personnel were
responding, which he acknowledged. There was no further radio contact with the pilot. The wreckage was located in the ocean, but the pilot
was not found.
12/12/96 De Havilland Taquan Air Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
DHC-2 Beaver Service passenger
The pilot’s inadequate compensation for gusty-wind conditions and failure to maintain adequate airspeed resulted in an inadvertent stall
and collision with water.
12/20/96* Stinson ST-108-2 Yelm Aviation Friday Harbor, Business 0 0 1 Destroyed
Washington, U.S.
After takeoff, the airplane was being flown through 2,500 feet when the engine began to vibrate severely. It then failed and the pilot was
unable to restart it. Because he was too far from shore to glide to land, he chose to ditch the airplane next to a fishing trawler. The airplane
sank to a depth of about 300 feet after the pilot had safely egressed.
12/26/96 Champion 7GCB Benson & Kobe Fort Lauderdale, Aerobatic 2 0 0 Substantial
Aviation Florida, U.S.
The pilot performed an aerobatic maneuver at an altitude that did not allow for recovery from the maneuver, and the airplane struck the water.
1/10/97* Beech C24R NA Santa Cruz Island, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
California, U.S.
Following a total engine failure, the pilot ditched the airplane in the ocean and swam about 0.5 mile to shore.
1/19/97 Cessna 180J NA Lopez, Washington, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Immediately after takeoff, the aircraft unexpectedly entered IMC in the form of clouds and fog. The pilot lost sight of the terrain and became
disoriented. The airplane struck trees and then descended into the water.
1/20/97 Harbin Y-12-II Helitours Palalay, Sri Lanka Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft was believed to have struck the sea while investigating a ship off the northeast coast of Sri Lanka. The last contact with the
aircraft occurred when the pilot reported that he had found the ship and was descending to identify it.
1/27/97* Piper PA-28R-180 NA Wynyard, Tasmania, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Australia
The engine was reported to have failed during initial climb. The aircraft was ditched near the airport.

564 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
2/8/97 Cessna 402C Tropical St. Thomas, Scheduled 2 0 3 Destroyed
Transport U.S. Virgin Islands passenger
Service
While making a visual approach at night over water in “black-hole” conditions, the pilot allowed the aircraft to descend until it struck the sea.
2/9/97* Cessna 150F NA Winter Haven, Instructional 0 0 1 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
While downwind on a second approach for landing, the student pilot observed that the airplane seemed to be performing differently than it
had previously. After turning on final, the pilot observed that he was below the normal glide path. Advancing the throttle lever and getting
no response, he realized that he would not reach the runway, and decided to land in a nearby lake.
2/13/97* Cessna 172F NA San Pablo Bay, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
California, U.S.
A few minutes after takeoff, the engine began to run roughly and failed, forcing the pilot to ditch the airplane. The airplane partially sank
in the shallow bay. The pilot had sprained his ankle during the water landing and decided to stay with the aircraft. He was located the
following morning after manually activating the ELT.
3/2/97 Cessna 402A Chapi Air Travel Maiquetia, Venezuela Unscheduled 6 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft disappeared from radar shortly after takeoff and debris believed to have come from the aircraft later was found in the sea
about 90 kilometers north of the airport.
3/7/97* Buesing SX-300 Pilot/owner Sitka, Alaska, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
During cruise flight at 14,000 feet and 19 miles from the nearest airport, the homebuilt airplane’s pilot encountered a low-engine-power
condition. He declared an emergency and was given vectors to the airport. The airplane was capable of gliding about 24 miles from 14,000
feet, but was ditched in the ocean about five miles from the airport.
3/11/97* American AA-5A NA North Bend, Oregon, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot flew the airplane into forecast icing conditions, where structural ice accumulated on the induction air filter and partially blocked
the flow of induction air. The engine failed, and the pilot had to ditch the airplane in Coos Bay.
3/19/97 Cessna 421 MTK Jet League City, Texas, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
The right engine failed because of fuel exhaustion, and the pilot did not maintain adequate airspeed during the single-engine landing
approach, which resulted in a stall and spin. The airplane struck the center of a lake.
3/24/97 Beech V35 NA Marco Island, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
Inadvertent flight into severe thunderstorms led to the exceedance of the design stress limits of the airplane. Subsequently, the airplane
broke up in flight, and descended uncontrolled into water.
3/27/97* Piper PA-23-250 NA Rio Negro, Guatemala Unscheduled 5 0 5 Destroyed
Aztec passenger
While the aircraft was en route and being flown at 1,300 feet AGL, one of the engines failed. The aircraft subsequently descended on one
engine and, because of the rough, wooded terrain, the pilot elected to conduct a forced landing in the Rio Negro.
3/30/97* Piper PA-32-260 NA Atlantic Ocean Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
While the airplane was being descended for an approach to land, the engine failed. After failing to restart the engine, the pilot ditched the
airplane about five nautical miles from the shore.
3/31/97 H-295 NA Moruya, New South Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Wales, Australia
The pilot reported that, soon after departure in strong gusty-wind conditions, the aircraft encountered turbulence and descended into the
ocean. Both occupants evacuated the aircraft without injury.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 565
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/1/97 Cessna 182F Skydive Mokuleia, Hawaii, U.S. Parachutist 0 0 5 Destroyed
Academy of transportation
Hawaii
An in-flight loss of control occurred during takeoff. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane lift off and climb steeply. One wing suddenly
lowered and the airplane rapidly descended. The airplane struck trees and was destroyed when it sank in 15-foot-deep water near the
shoreline.
4/3/97 Beech 58 Baron Avair St. Vincent, St. Vincent Personal 6 0 0 Destroyed
and the Grenadines
Becoming airborne following takeoff, the aircraft was seen to climb to about 100 feet but it then entered a left roll and dived into the sea.
The aircraft struck the water some 300 meters beyond the end of the runway, slightly to the left of the extended centerline.
4/4/97* Chance Vought Collings New Smyrna Beach, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
F4U Children’s Trust Florida, U.S.
A total engine failure occurred in flight, and the pilot ditched the airplane in the water adjacent to New Smyrna Beach.
4/10/97 Cessna 208B Hageland Wainwright, Alaska, U.S. Scheduled 5 0 0 Destroyed
Aviation passenger
Services
Although operating under visual flight rules, the pilot flew into IMC and failed to maintain altitude/clearance from terrain. The airplane
struck the frozen Arctic Ocean while maneuvering near its destination, Wainwright.
4/13/97* De Havilland Corporate Air Hilo, Hawaii, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
DHC-6
Twin Otter 300
As the aircraft neared its destination, Honolulu, Hawaii, the pilot became concerned about his fuel state. He subsequently declared an
emergency and diverted towards Hilo, Hawaii. About one hour later the aircraft’s fuel was exhausted and the pilot was forced to ditch some
63 nautical miles northeast of Hilo. The Coast Guard later rescued the pilot.
4/27/97 Piper Aerostar NA Klamath Falls, Personal 1 0 0 Substantial
601P Oregon, U.S.
The pilot reported a “fuel problem” to ATC and was later heard by the pilot of another aircraft to say that both engines had failed. The
airplane struck the water of Lake of the Woods.
4/29/97 Christen Eagle II Pilot/owner Half Moon Bay, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The pilot and pilot-rated passenger did not return from a scenic flight. Witnesses saw an aircraft strike the Pacific Ocean while maneuvering
in a known practice area of the pilot/owner. The aircraft was not found.
5/20/97 Capstaff NA Southern Pines, Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
Challenger II North Carolina, U.S.
The airplane struck power lines after takeoff and descended into a pond. The passenger escaped from the aircraft, but he reported that he
was unable to release the pilot’s lap belt. The pilot received multiple internal injuries and drowned.
5/22/97* Convair 240 Tolair Services San Juan, Ferry 0 0 3 Destroyed
Puerto Rico, U.S.
While in normal cruise flight at 3,000 feet, the aircraft’s left engine began to overheat and its oil pressure began to fluctuate. The crew shut
down the engine as a precautionary measure but shortly after this action, the right engine started “banging” and power declined. The crew
restarted the left engine but by this time the aircraft was descending through 500 feet. The crew declared mayday and conducted a forced
landing in shallow water next to a beach.
5/25/97* Cessna 177 NA Rota, Northern Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
Mariana Islands
The aircraft was in cruise flight at 4,500 feet when fuel pressure and engine power failed. The pilot ditched the aircraft in the ocean.

566 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/7/97* Gardan 80 NA Alderney, Channel Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Islands, U.K.
The aircraft fuel supply was exhausted and the aircraft was ditched in the sea about two nautical miles off Alderney. The pilot escaped from
the aircraft, which sank fairly rapidly, and was rescued by the crew of a nearby fishing boat within eight minutes.
6/30/97* Convair 240 Silver Express San Juan, Unscheduled 0 0 3 Destroyed
Co. Puerto Rico, U.S. cargo
During the climb through about 400 feet AGL after takeoff, as the first power reduction was being conducted, the left engine began to “backfire”
and its power decreased. The engine was shut down and maximum power was selected on the right engine. The pilot apparently decided to
return to San Juan for an emergency landing at the airport but the aircraft could not maintain altitude. The pilot then decided to conduct a
forced landing in shallow water close to the beach. The aircraft touched down next to a reef parallel to the beach. On impact with the water,
both of the aircraft’s wings separated. The fuselage remained substantially intact and the occupants were able to escape without serious injury.
7/2/97 Piper PA-32R-301 Corporate St. Paul, Minnesota, U.S. Business 3 1 1 Substantial
Aviation
After takeoff in gusty winds, the forward baggage door opened. The pilot attempted to return to the airport, but the airplane struck trees
and descended into the river.
7/2/97 Piper PA-28R-180 NA Penobscot, Maine, U.S. Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot and passengers were returning from a sightseeing flight when a witness observed the airplane in a steep right turn before it
descended, struck water and sank to a depth of about 70 feet.
7/3/97 Cessna 500 Riana Taxi Aéreo Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
Citation I passenger
Following a rejected takeoff, the aircraft overran the runway and fell into the bay.
7/3/97 Fokker F.27-600 Elbee Airlines Mumbai, India Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
cargo
After takeoff from Mumbai, during climb through about 1,200 feet, the pilot reported that he was altering course to the left to avoid “bad
weather.” Shortly afterward, the flight crew contacted ATC and was instructed to climb to FL 170 and report passing FL 080. This instruction
was acknowledged but there was then no further contact with the aircraft crew. Loss of control apparently occurred and the aircraft struck
the sea in a dive.
7/3/97* Piper PA-32 Haines Airways Skagway, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 4 0 2 Destroyed
passenger
When the airplane was about 1,200 feet above water and 1.5 miles from the airport to which it was returning from a sightseeing flight, the
engine failed. The aircraft was ditched about 100 feet from shore. Passengers exited first into 39-degree Fahrenheit (4-degree Celsius) water,
but none exited with life vests. The pilot threw one life vest out and exited as the aircraft sank. With help from her husband, a passenger
donned the life vest that was thrown out; she partially inflated it using the oral inflation tube, although it had a carbon-dioxide cylinder for
rapid inflation. A rescue helicopter arrived in about 10 minutes. The passenger with the life vest and the pilot were rescued, two passengers
drowned and the other two passengers were not found. The surviving passenger did not recall being briefed about the location or use of
life vests. Life vests were stored in seat-back pouches, but the pouch openings were covered by slip-cover type seat covers.
7/6/97* Cessna P210N NA Destin, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The airplane struck water during an emergency landing following what the pilot reported as a loss of engine power after takeoff.
7/6/97* Piper PA-34-200 NA Fajardo, Puerto Rico, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot reported that he had been doing touch-and-go landings when he experienced a loss of elevator control during climbout. He said
that the airplane had been flown to 400 feet when the control yoke stuck. Efforts to regain control of the airplane failed. The airplane was
ditched in 130 feet of water, 200 meters east of the shoreline.
7/6/97 Mooney M20A NA White Bear, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Minnesota, U.S.
During flight, the pilot was incapacitated by an intracerebral hemorrhage (stroke). Witnesses said that the airplane descended into the
water from an altitude of about 50 feet.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 567
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/8/97 Grumman Pilot/owner Jones Beach, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
American AA-5B New York, U.S.
The non-instrument-rated pilot departed from an airport that was in VMC. Witnesses observed the airplane fly into a fog bank. The airplane
then struck the water.
7/9/97 Grumman NA Susanville, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
American AA-5B California, U.S.
During the landing, the pilot encountered unexpectedly strong crosswind gusts and the aircraft was not properly aligned with the runway.
The airplane ultimately went through a barbed-wire perimeter fence before coming to rest in a lake.
7/11/97 Antonov An-24RV Cubana Santiago de Cuba, Cuba Scheduled 44 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft was destroyed when it struck the sea shortly after takeoff. The accident happened in darkness and “normal” weather.
7/13/97 Cessna TR182 NA Seaside Heights, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
New Jersey, U.S.
While maneuvering over the ocean on a dark, moonless night, the pilot began a left turn. During the turn, the airplane descended, struck
the water and sank 0.5 mile offshore in the Atlantic Ocean.
7/13/97* Piper PA-28-181 NA Jersey City, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
New Jersey, U.S.
After the airplane had been flown for 2.2 hours, the engine failed from fuel starvation and the pilot ditched the airplane in the Hudson
River. Investigation determined that the pilot had failed to switch fuel tanks when one tank became exhausted.
7/20/97 Piper J3C-65 NA Leesburg, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot was demonstrating stalls to his son. He initiated the second stall over a lake. While attempting to recover, he advanced the throttle
lever but the engine failed to return to full power, and the airplane entered a spin. The right wing tip struck the water, and the airplane
cartwheeled and sank.
7/24/97* Beech 65 M R Aircraft Atlantic Ocean Personal 0 0 5 Destroyed
Sales and Rental
At a cruising altitude of 9,000 feet, the left engine failed. The flight crew feathered the left propeller and turned toward the nearest airport,
which was 80 miles away. The altitude could not be maintained and the aircraft entered a 500-feet-per-minute descent. The airplane was
ditched in the ocean about 50 miles from the nearest airport.
7/25/97 Cessna 208 NA Nadi, Fiji Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
passenger
The aircraft was fitted with floats for charter operations around the Fijian islands. On takeoff, just before liftoff, the right float struck a swell.
The pilot, believing that the impact was not severe, continued with the takeoff. Later examination showed that the firewall had been
damaged in the water strike.
8/1/97 Consolidated Airborne Fire Moreno, California, U.S. Fire suppression 0 0 2 Destroyed
PBY-5A Catalina Attack
During a water pickup, the aircraft’s nose dipped and struck the water. The aircraft cartwheeled and came to rest inverted.
8/9/97 Grumman NA Lower Brule, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
American AA-5 South Dakota, U.S.
A witness said that the airplane passed overhead at a low altitude and that there was no noise from the engine. He reported that the
airplane then struck water, nosed over and sank a short time later.
8/9/97* Cessna 150G NA Palos Verdes, NA 0 0 1 Substantial
California, U.S.
The engine failed and the pilot subsequently ditched the aircraft in the Pacific Ocean. In a statement to FAA inspectors, the pilot reported
that he had forgotten to switch the fuel selector, resulting in fuel starvation.

568 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/11/97 Cessna U206G NA Halibut Cove, Alaska, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed

The float-equipped airplane departed from water into gusting winds downwind of high, steep terrain. Witnesses said that the airplane did
not climb above 200 feet AGL, which was insufficient to clear terrain at the upwind end of the lake. The airplane entered a steep left bank
and turned within the confines of the upwind end of the lake. The turn was in a downwind direction, directly downwind of a 2,600-foot-high
peak. The airplane abruptly pitched nose-down, struck the water in a vertical attitude and immediately sank.

8/17/97* Piper PA-34-200T Aero Club, Kernville, California, U.S. Unscheduled 0 1 4 Destroyed
Van Nuys, passenger
California, U.S.

Seconds after takeoff, the engines lost partial power. Witnesses saw black smoke trailing from the airplane. The pilot ditched the airplane,
which sank in 20-foot-deep water.

8/17/97 Cessna 180H Pilot/owner Arctic Village, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed

Alaska, U.S.

The airplane was at maximum gross weight and was departing a lake at 3,000 feet. After takeoff, in winds of 15 knots gusting to 25 knots,
the pilot began to retract flaps when the airplane had accelerated to 75 mph. The pilot said that the airspeed dropped to 40 mph, and the
airplane stalled at 50 feet to 60 feet AGL, then descended into the water.

8/24/97 Classic Aircraft Ocean Aerial Ocean City, Sightseeing 3 0 0 Destroyed

Corp. YMF-5 Ads Maryland, U.S.
(Waco Classic)

The pilot performed an aerobatic maneuver at a low altitude, which resulted in an inadvertent stall and spin. The aircraft struck the water in
a 45-degree nose-down attitude.

8/24/97* Beech H35 NA Goleta, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed

The engine failed when the airplane was about 150 feet AGL. The pilot reported that he switched fuel tanks and attempted a restart, which
was not accomplished. He maneuvered to avoid a boat, then ditched the airplane in the ocean. The pilot and passenger exited the airplane
before it sank.

9/1/97 Agusta SF600 Philippine Between Fortune Demonstration 5 0 0 Destroyed

Canguro National Police and Lubang Islands,
Philippines

Contact with the aircraft ceased during its flight and the aircraft later was found to have struck the sea.

9/5/97* Mooney M20E NA Gulf of California Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed

The pilot topped off the aircraft with fuel before departing from Tucson, Arizona, U.S., for Mexico and had four hours’ worth of fuel aboard
after refueling. The pilot estimated that the aircraft had been airborne for 2.5 hours when the engine failed over the Gulf of California. The
pilot declared mayday and ditched the aircraft. All four occupants exited the aircraft wearing life vests. One passenger swam 10 miles to
shore and alerted authorities. The remaining three occupants of the aircraft spent about 20 hours in the water before Mexican authorities
rescued them.

9/11/97 Mooney M20F B J Aviation Coral Springs, Business 1 1 0 Substantial

Florida, U.S.

While the airplane was being flown through 1,000 feet to 1,500 feet, oil pressure decreased to zero momentarily, then returned to normal.
There was a loud sound from the engine and the pilot initiated a descent for a forced landing on an open field. While the airplane was in a
nose-low and right-wing-low attitude, the right wing collided with water in a pond and the airplane cartwheeled to the right and began
sinking. The commercial pilot and an unrestrained dog were killed. The passenger exited the airplane by the cabin-entry door.

9/19/97 Cessna 177RG NA Sebring, Florida, U.S. Business 2 0 0 Destroyed

The flight was being operated in an area of thunderstorms. While en route at 6,000 feet, the pilot was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet. He
acknowledged the clearance; there was no further radio communication with the pilot. Radar contact soon ceased. Witnesses heard the
aircraft descending rapidly, and it struck a lake.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 569
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/9/97* Piper PA-18A-150 Seashore Gulf of Mexico Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
Advertising
Corp.
The engine failed during overwater flight, 120 nautical miles from the destination. The pilot conducted a forced landing at sea when he saw
a military airplane flying in circles and a freighter ship on the surface. After the ditching, the freighter passed him by, and the military airplane
kept circling. The pilot entered his life raft and the airplane sank. After about 20 minutes, the pilot was rescued by a Coast Guard aircraft.
10/11/97 Piper PA-28-180 NA Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane was seen by several witnesses after takeoff from an airport at which the tower had closed for the day. The witnesses
said that the airplane was about 200 feet AGL in a nose-high attitude. There were indications that the airplane had stalled. Witnesses
said that the wings were rocking, and then the airplane was turned left, went into a nose-low descent and struck the Tennessee River.
10/12/97 Long-EZ NA Pacific Grove, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The experimental airplane struck the Pacific Ocean.
10/29/97* Robin 200 NA Cromarty, Scotland Instructional 1 0 1 Destroyed
The aircraft had a roughly running engine because of a blockage in the carburetor. The aircraft was ditched in sheltered waters about 200
meters from shore. The instructor pilot and student pilot escaped from the inverted floating aircraft but were not wearing the life vests
provided. The instructor and the student swam for the shore. The instructor reached land and raised the alarm. The student’s body was
recovered several weeks later.
11/6/97 Piper PA-28 NA Bournemouth, Instructional 1 0 0 Destroyed
England
The student pilot on his first solo flight completed one circuit, made a touch-and-go landing and then flew the airplane out to sea, where it
struck water. The inquest found that the pilot had committed suicide.
11/8/97 Cessna 208B Hageland Barrow, Alaska, U.S. Scheduled 8 0 0 Destroyed
Caravan Aviation passenger
Services
The aircraft struck the sea while in a left turn shortly after takeoff from Barrow. Another aircraft crew reported hearing a brief “mayday” call
but the message contained no information about the nature of the problem.
11/17/97 Canadair CL-415 Securite Civile La Ciotat, France Crew training 1 1 0 Destroyed
The pilot reported “heavy vibration.” This was the last contact with the aircraft, which later was found floating inverted.
11/18/97* Cessna 402B-II S.K. Griessels Off Vilanculos, Personal 6 0 1 Destroyed
& R. D. Makin Mozambique
Partnership
The aircraft was destroyed when it was ditched while attempting to land.
11/26/97* Piper PA-32-300 Pacific Island Saipan, Marianas NA 0 0 1 Destroyed
Aviation Protectorate
The engine failed for undetermined reasons, which resulted in the pilot ditching the aircraft into the ocean.
11/27/97 Maule M-7-235 NA Rose Bay, New South Unscheduled 0 0 1 Substantial
Wales, Australia passenger
The pilot of the floatplane began the approach directly into the wind. A witness reported that just as the aircraft was flared, it yawed
sharply to the right, and the right wing lifted until the left wing tip hit the water. The aircraft cartwheeled, coming to rest inverted. The pilot
climbed out of the cockpit unaided and was rescued by the police.
12/9/97 Cessna 172M NA New Salem, Personal 1 1 0 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
While the airplane was being flown over a reservoir, the passenger believed that the airplane was low and asked the pilot, “Why don’t you
pull up a little bit?” The pilot said that the view was better down low and asked the passenger, “What, are you scared?” The airplane’s wheels
then struck the water and the airplane flipped over.

570 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
12/19/97 Boeing 727-300 Silk Air Musi River, Indonesia Scheduled 104 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
While en route between Jakarta, Indonesia, and Singapore, in apparently normal cruise flight at FL 350, the aircraft appeared to have
suddenly departed from level flight. The aircraft entered a steep dive, descending from cruising altitude to 19,500 feet in 32 seconds. This
“extreme descent” continued until impact. Following the accident, there was speculation that the captain had disabled the flight recorders
and had initiated the dive. The Indonesian authorities’ final report did not reach any conclusion about the cause.
1/5/98 Maule M-7-235 NA Lady Musgrave Island, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
Queensland, Australia passenger
The pilot reported that the aircraft flipped over and sank during an attempted takeoff.
1/9/98 Lake LA-4-200 NA King Fisher Bay, Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
Queensland, Australia passenger
During the takeoff run, the aircraft struck an unseen submerged object. The impact launched the aircraft out of the water prematurely. The
pilot placed the aircraft back into the water and continued the takeoff run. The pilot then noticed that water was entering the cabin behind
the front seats and that the aircraft began to vibrate. He rejected the takeoff and stopped the engine before evacuating his passengers and
himself. The aircraft sank about 15 minutes later.
2/6/98 GA 1159A Jet Aviation Chambery, France Personal 0 0 5 Destroyed
Gulfstream III International
The aircraft undershot during the final stage of an ILS approach to Chambery, striking Lac le Bourget about 1.5 miles from the shore. After
impact, the aircraft floated long enough to allow the occupants to escape before sinking in 90 feet of water.
2/6/98 Pitts S-2A NA Floraville Station, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Queensland, Australia
A helicopter conducting an aerial patrol along a power line that had failed found a break in the line where it crossed a river. Debris, later
identified as parts of a Pitts Special aircraft, was found downstream from the break. Several days later, the wreckage of the aircraft was
located by police divers. It had come to rest upside down in about six meters of water, about 160 meters downstream from the wire
strike.
2/9/98 McDonnell Swissair Peggy’s Cove, Scheduled 229 0 0 Destroyed
Douglas MD-11 Nova Scotia, Canada passenger
While in cruise flight about 56 minutes after takeoff, at FL 330, the flight crew reported smoke in the cockpit and requested a clearance to
divert for an emergency landing. While being vectored to the airport at Halifax, Nova Scotia, the aircraft struck the water some five nautical
miles off Peggy’s Cove. The investigation found that the fire was associated with arcing from wiring for the in-flight entertainment system,
which ignited a nearby thermal acoustic insulation blanket, above the rear cockpit ceiling.
2/14/98 Aviat A-1 Aerial Billboard Clearwater, Florida, U.S. Banner towing 0 0 2 Substantial
Corp.
While maneuvering to pick up a banner, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed. A stall, loss of altitude and water strike followed.
2/22/98* Cessna 150A Island City Gulf of Mexico Aerial 0 0 1 Destroyed
Flying Service observation
While the airplane was on a fish-spotting flight, the engine failed. The pilot made a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico, about 10 miles
from Key West, Florida, U.S.
2/25/98 Lake LA-4-200 Sea Flight Lake Murray, Personal 0 3 0 Substantial
South Carolina, U.S.
The amphibious airplane struck a partially submerged object during a water landing that ripped and crushed the hull below the water line.
The airplane subsequently nosed over and submerged in the water.
3/2/98 Cessna 401 Aerochaiten La Puntilla, Chile Unscheduled 5 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The aircraft struck the sea “a few minutes” after takeoff from Chaiten. Witnesses reported seeing the aircraft “flying low and on fire” just
before it entered the water.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 571
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/18/98 Saab 340B Formosa Hsinchu, Taiwan, China Scheduled 13 0 0 Destroyed
Airlines passenger
One minute and 45 seconds after takeoff, when power was reduced while the aircraft was climbing over the sea, the aircraft began to veer
toward the right. The pilot attempted a correction but shortly afterward, loss of control apparently occurred. The aircraft entered a steep dive
that continued until impact with the water.
3/23/98 Cessna 152 MC Airlease Dauphin Island, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
Alabama, U.S.
While flying the airplane at 3,500 feet, the instructor simulated an engine failure. The student initiated a descent for a forced landing at a nearby
airport, and once a safe landing was ensured, at 600 feet AGL, the instructor advised the student to go around. The student was slow to apply
power. The instructor applied full power and, as the instructor was completing communications with ATC, the student applied full left rudder and
full aft elevator input. The airplane then began a turn to the left, from which the instructor was unable to recover before impact with the water.
4/2/98 Piper PA-28-235 North American New Orleans, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Flight Academy Louisiana, U.S.
The airplane struck a lake following an uncontrolled descent after the pilot experienced spatial disorientation at night.
4/19/98 De Havilland NA English Channel Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Tiger Moth
The aircraft was reported missing on a flight over the English Channel.
4/26/98 Piper PA-18 Advertising Air St. Petersburg, NA 0 0 1 Substantial
Force Florida, U.S.
During the initial climb, the engine partially failed and black smoke was noted coming from the exhaust. While the pilot maneuvered to
return, the airplane stalled and struck the water.
5/17/98* Great Lakes NA Tower, Minnesota, U.S. Business 0 0 2 Substantial
2T-1A-2
The pilot said that after takeoff, the airplane was in a turn when the engine rpm became intermittent. The pilot began a turn back toward the
airport when the engine finally failed. The airplane was over a lake at the time. The pilot said that he turned to fly parallel to the shoreline,
and the airplane touched down in the water about 100 feet from shore.
5/20/98* Cessna T210M NA Santa Barbara, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The pilot selected the left fuel tank. He was flying the airplane on final approach when the engine failed and he believed he was out of fuel.
Unable to restart the engine, he turned away from the beach and ditched the airplane. Aircraft recovery personnel found the fuel tanks and
discovered 15 gallons of fuel in the right tank.
5/22/98 Piper PA-28-161 Inbound Half Moon Bay, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Aviation California, U.S.
The non-instrument-rated pilot lost control of the aircraft because of spatial disorientation in dark night conditions. No one saw the accident,
but the following day, wreckage from the airplane and human remains washed up on shore.
6/2/98 GA 1159A Jet Aviation Chambery, France Personal 0 0 5 Destroyed
Gulfstream III International
Following an ILS approach to the airport at Chambery, the aircraft undershot the runway, striking Lac le Bourget about 0.6 miles from the
runway threshold. After impact, the aircraft floated for a few minutes, enabling the occupants to evacuate before it sank in 90 feet of water.
6/4/98 Cessna 182R Transit Aviation Bradenton, Florida, U.S. Aerial 3 0 0 Destroyed
of Lake Charles observation
Postaccident examination showed that the aircraft had collided with trees and then struck a river while descending in a nose-down attitude
at a slow speed.
6/6/98 Maule M-5-220C NA Kettle Falls, Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Washington, U.S.
The airplane was destroyed when it struck Lake Roosevelt. Witnesses described the airplane performing maneuvers that were described as
aerobatic prior to impact. This airplane was not approved for aerobatic maneuvers.

572 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/7/98 Cessna U206G NA Berowra Waters, New Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
South Wales, Australia passenger
After making a normal approach to the landing area, the pilot of the amphibious airplane closed the throttle and flared the aircraft. As the
floats touched the water, the aircraft tipped forward and the nose of the aircraft dived under water, which caused the windshield to shatter.
Water flooded the cabin and the aircraft came to rest inverted. The pilot and the two passengers evacuated the submerged cabin through
the left cabin door. The pilot observed that the float-mounted landing gear was extended, not the correct position for a water landing.
6/9/98* Cessna 207A Wings of Alaska Juneau, Alaska, U.S. Scheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
passenger
Following an in-flight fire, the pilot ditched the airplane along the shoreline of a small island.
7/13/98 Ilyushin IL-76M ATI Aircompany Khaimah, United Arab Unscheduled 8 0 0 Destroyed
Emirates cargo
A longer-than-normal takeoff roll occurred, and after becoming airborne, the aircraft never climbed above 200 meters. The aircraft then
gradually descended until it struck the water.
7/15/98 De Havilland Air Rainbow Saturna Island, British Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver Midcoast Columbia, Canada passenger
The float-equipped airplane was en route on a VFR flight plan from Campbell River, British Columbia, to Renton, Washington, U.S. The pilot
was following another Air Rainbow Beaver that was also proceeding to Renton. When the two airplanes approached Samuel Island, the
weather deteriorated to such an extent that the pilots decided to land on the water and wait for conditions to improve. The lead airplane
was landed first and, almost immediately, the pilot reported that he could see that the weather was clear ahead and that they should
continue. The pilot of the accident airplane lost control of the aircraft during the rejected landing. The airplane stalled and struck the water
in a steep, nose-down, left-wing-low attitude. The pilot of the other airplane returned when radio contact with the accident airplane was
lost and rescued the occupants of the accident airplane.
7/18/98 Piper PA-14 NA Big Lake, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
During takeoff from a lake, the pilot’s seat slipped aft, and he lost his grip on the flight controls. The airplane struck the water and sank.
7/18/98 Cessna A185F NA Moneta, Virginia, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
The amphibious airplane lifted off from a lake after a normal takeoff run. During a turn to avoid terrain, the airplane descended and the
right float struck the water. The airplane then cartwheeled, flipped over and sank.
7/23/98 Cessna 175 NA Sheboygan, Personal 0 2 1 Substantial
Wisconsin, U.S.
After takeoff, the engine sputtered. Witnesses reported hearing engine rpm increase and decrease before the airplane descended, stuck
the water in a left-wing-low attitude and overturned.
7/27/98 Consolidated Plane Sailing Air Southampton, England Personal 2 0 16 Destroyed
PBY-5A Catalina Displays
During a touch-and-go landing, the initial touchdown was believed to have been smooth and straight. But as power was applied to
complete the maneuver, the aircraft began to veer to the left. The veering motion developed rapidly and the aircraft came to a sudden stop
in the water. It then began taking on water and started to sink. The aircraft floated submerged to the wings.
7/29/98* Embraer EMB-110 Selva Taxi Aéreo Manacapuru River, Brazil Unscheduled 5 0 18 Destroyed
Bandeirante passenger
The aircraft was destroyed after it apparently was ditched in the Manacapuru River while the pilot attempted to return to Manaus, Brazil.
The aircraft had departed Manaus but the pilot reported that there was an engine problem and that he was returning.
7/30/98 Beech Commuter Proteus Air Vannes, France Scheduled 15 0 0 Destroyed
1900D System passenger
Loss of control occurred and the aircraft struck the Baie de Quiberon after colliding with a Cessna 177.
8/1/98 Cessna 340A NA Chicago, Illinois, U.S. Personal 1 0 3 Substantial
The pilot said that the airplane decelerated during the takeoff roll. The airplane cleared the end of the runway and then stalled into Lake
Michigan. One passenger drowned.

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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/4/98* De Havilland Harbour Air Kincolith, British Unscheduled 5 0 0 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver Columbia, Canada cargo
On arrival at Kincolith, the aircraft touched down first on its right float and overturned. The occupants did not evacuate from the
submerged aircraft. The water was described as “choppy.”
8/7/98* Mooney M20A Pilot/owner Marathon, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 2 0 Substantial
The airplane was on short final approach when the engine failed. The runway was beyond glide range, and the pilot conducted a forced
landing in a bay.
8/10/98* Cessna 188 Airplane Parts Atlantic Ocean Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
and Avionics
After 30 minutes in flight, the pilot observed that the oil pressure was zero. The pilot reported the problem to ATC and said that he was
returning to the airport. About five minutes later, the engine failed. The pilot said that he would conduct an emergency landing on the
Atlantic Ocean close to a large ship. After landing, the airplane floated for about 30 minutes and then sank. The pilot reported being in the
water for 15 minutes before being rescued by the Coast Guard.
8/15/98 Cessna 172N Searcy Air Taxi Cord, Arkansas, U.S. Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
The airplane was being maneuvered at low altitude when it struck a power line, descended into a river and sank.
8/19/98* Cessna 402C NA Invercargill, Passenger 5 5 0 Destroyed
New Zealand
The airplane had a double engine failure. It was successfully ditched, and all 10 occupants evacuated; however, five people — four of whom
did not have life vests — died before rescuers reached the scene about an hour later.
8/19/98* Cessna 402C Southern Air Foveaux Strait, Stewart Scheduled 5 5 0 Destroyed
Island, New Zealand passenger
About four minutes after takeoff, the pilot declared mayday and reported that both engines had failed. The pilot subsequently
conducted a successful ditching, and the airplane floated for about four minutes to five minutes. The cabin apparently was not
damaged and none of the occupants was seriously injured, but not all the passengers apparently found or had time to don their life
vests and exited the airplane without them. The pilot reportedly attempted to re-enter the airplane to find additional life vests, but by
this time the airplane was sinking and he was not successful. At the time of the ditching, there was an estimated three-meter swell and
the sea temperature was 11 degrees Celsius.
8/29/98 Beech T-34B NA Quantico, Virginia, U.S. Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane departed on a local training flight. Witnesses reported that after the airplane became airborne, it did not climb as expected.
While over the water and beyond the departure end of the runway, at an estimated height of 150 feet to 200 feet above the water, the
airplane was observed to enter a shallow left turn. The bank angle increased, the nose dropped and the airplane struck the water.
9/7/98* Piper PA-31-350 NA Homer, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Substantial
Immediately after takeoff, the right engine failed. The pilot said that he feathered the right propeller and began a wide right turn away
from terrain in an attempt to return to the airport. Airspeed and altitude decreased, and the airplane was ditched on smooth water.
9/11/98 Taylorcraft NA Big Lake, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
BC-12D
The pilot was conducting touch-and-go landings in the float-equipped airplane. The pilot said that during an approach, the airplane
developed a sink rate that “felt mushy.” The pilot increased engine power and aligned the airplane with the water. The right wing dropped,
and the tip of the right float dug into the water. The airplane sank.
9/18/98* GAF Nomad N22S U.S. Customs Borinquen, Scheduled 1 0 1 Destroyed
Service Puerto Rico, U.S. passenger
The airplane was being flown in formation with another U.S. Customs Service Nomad from Borinquen to Curacao, Netherlands
Antilles. About 70 minutes after takeoff, about 162 miles southwest of Puerto Rico, the accident airplane’s rudder was damaged
when it was struck by the other airplane’s nose. Control was maintained, and the crew decided to return to Borinquen. During the
return flight, the airplane became increasingly difficult to control and eventually was ditched near Mona Island, about 60 miles from
Borinquen.

574 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/24/98* Convair 240 Trans Florida Loiza, Puerto Rico, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
Airlines cargo
Shortly after takeoff from San Juan, Puerto Rico, the pilot advised ATC that he was returning. The aircraft was directed toward Runway 28
but, on the base leg, the aircraft began descending. The aircraft struck a mangrove swamp some three miles from the threshold of Runway
28 and came to rest in 15 feet of water.
9/24/98* Piper PA-22-150 NA Lancaster, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
South Carolina, U.S.
The pilot said that at 200 feet AGL during takeoff, “the engine went to idle as if the throttle had been pulled full out.” He switched from the
right fuel tank to the left fuel tank and applied carburetor heat. The pilot said that the engine regained power and the airplane was flown
to 200 feet. When the pilot turned back toward the runway, the engine failed. The pilot ditched the airplane in a lake.
9/25/98* HEDARO NA Mitilini, Greece Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Commonwealth
CA25N
The engine failed during initial climb, and the airplane was ditched at sea, close to the runway.
9/26/98 Boeing 737-200 Aerolíneas Ushuaia, Argentina Scheduled 0 0 62 Destroyed
Argentinas passenger
During the landing roll, when about 200 feet from the runway end, the aircraft veered to the left and ran off the side of the runway. The
aircraft fell down a deep slope into the waters of the Beagle Channel.
10/2/98 Douglas DC-3C Servivensa Canaima, Venezuela Unscheduled 1 1 25 Destroyed
passenger
While in cruise flight at 3,000 feet MSL, the pilot reported that the no. 2 engine had failed. The aircraft continued toward Canaima, but
during the approach, the no. 1 engine failed. The aircraft lost altitude, struck trees and struck a flooded area next to the Carrao River 1.6
statute miles from the airfield.
10/9/98 Grumman NA Provincetown, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
American AA-5 Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot began an ILS approach in IMC, at night, from over water. After tracking the localizer and glideslope for part of the approach,
the airplane descended and flew at 100 feet for about 12 seconds before a loss of ATC radar contact occurred. The airplane struck water.
10/10/98* Cessna 210A NA Provo, Utah, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The airplane was low on approach to the runway, and the pilot abruptly moved the throttle lever, which caused the engine to flood and
to fail. The pilot attempted to restart the engine but failed to follow emergency procedures in the airplane flight manual. The airplane was
ditched in Utah Lake.
10/21/98* Aero Commander NA Horn Island, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
500S Queensland, Australia passenger
The airplane was ditched about 400 meters from Runway 14 at Horn Island after both engines failed. The airplane came to rest in about
two meters of water, about 200 meters from shore.
11/15/98* Cessna 172 NA Essex, Maryland, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Nearing the destination on a dark night, the pilot conducted a descent from 3,500 feet to 1,000 feet, entered the downwind leg, applied
carburetor heat and began a left base turn at 700 feet. The pilot reported that rpm decreased and that he was unable to reach the airport.
He ditched the airplane in a river.
11/16/98 Mooney M20J NA San Angelo, Texas, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The airplane was in cruise flight at 9,500 feet, about 12 miles east of the destination, when the pilot reported an engine failure. The airplane
was at 2,200 feet when the pilot reported that he would not be able to land on the runway. During the off-airport landing, the airplane
struck a tree and descended into the water.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 575
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/16/98 Cessna 182P NA Santee, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
South Carolina, U.S.
The pilot continued VFR flight into IMC, became spatially disoriented and did not maintain control of the airplane. Witnesses said that there
was fog near the destination and the airplane appeared to be circling around the lake at a “very low” altitude. Soon thereafter, a witness
was moving his boat to a different fishing spot when he encountered debris floating in the lake and saw the tail of the airplane protruding
from the water.
11/20/98 Cessna 414A NA Mattapoisett, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The airplane was level at 2,000 feet in IMC, when the pilot reported, “We’ve just lost our artificial horizon.” About five minutes later, ATC
radar contact and radio contact ceased. The wreckage of the airplane was found in 25 feet of water.
11/29/98* Beech A90 BPI Aerospace Port de Paix, Haiti Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
King Air
While en route from North Perry, Florida, U.S., to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, the pilot declared an emergency, reported that he had a “dual engine
failure” and that he was ditching. The pilot was rescued from a life raft about 10 hours later.
12/7/98 PBN BN-2A-26 Air Satellite Baie Comeau, Quebec, Scheduled 7 3 0 Destroyed
Islander Canada passenger
The aircraft was destroyed after striking the St. Lawrence River about two miles from the takeoff runway. The accident occurred in driving
snow and strong winds.
12/8/98 Cessna 402B Southern Pride Pahokee, Florida, U.S. Instructional 3 0 0 Substantial
Aviation
The flight reportedly was a training session for the two front-seat occupants. ATC radar contact was lost when the airplane was descending
through 1,300 feet AGL. Eight days later, the wreckage of the airplane and the bodies of the three occupants were recovered from the bottom
of a lake.
12/24/98 Jet Provost NA Bradwell, England Aerobatic 1 0 0 Destroyed
display
The airplane entered a spin during an aerobatic maneuver. The pilot ejected successfully from the airplane but died from drowning or
thermal shock before he could be rescued from the sea. He was not wearing a life vest.
1/6/99 SeaRey NA Brisbane Water, New Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
South Wales, Australia
The pilot reported that after touching down normally on calm water, the cockpit suddenly began to fill with water and the airplane
overturned. Police rescued the pilot and passenger.
1/13/99* Cessna 210N K.P. Cleary and Hallandale Beach, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Associates Florida, U.S.
While the airplane was being flown through 1,500 feet during climb, engine rpm began to fluctuate as the throttle lever was moved. After
advising ATC of the problem, the pilot was cleared to return to the departure airport. The engine then failed, and the pilot switched tanks
several times. The pilot extended the flaps and ditched the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean. The airplane sank in 30 feet of water.
2/5/99 Cessna 210J Aero Jet Naples, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Service Center
The airplane struck the Gulf of Mexico while on approach to land at Naples Municipal Airport.
2/6/99 Falco F8l Series 1 NA Hauraki Gulf, Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
New Zealand observation
The pilot conducted several low passes over a yacht. On the last pass, the airplane was observed entering a turn, then suddenly rolling and
descending in a steep nose-down attitude into the sea.
2/25/99 Dornier 328-100 Minerva Italy Genoa, Italy Scheduled 4 2 25 Destroyed
passenger
Landing at Genoa, the pilot reportedly touched down “long and fast” with a tail-wind component. Near the end of the runway, the pilot
apparently attempted to turn the aircraft off one side of the runway. The aircraft overran the runway and fell into the Golfo de Genoa.

576 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
2/28/99* Cessna P210N Pilot Services Near Maui, Hawaii, U.S. Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
International
The pilot was ferrying the airplane from Thailand to the United States mainland. After departing Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S., the airplane
was 810 nautical miles northeast of Hawaii when the pilot observed that engine-oil pressure was decreasing. He reversed course
to fly the airplane back to Hawaii. During the next three hours, the pilot reported decreasing oil pressure, increasing engine
temperatures and decreasing manifold pressure. The pilot told the flight crew of an escorting Coast Guard HC-130 that an engine
failure was imminent and that he would need to ditch the airplane. The pilot made an emergency descent and ditched the airplane.
The airplane bounced off a swell, then hit another and nosed down. The airplane remained upright about 45 minutes before sinking.
The airplane doors were not opened and the pilot was not observed in the water after ditching. The HC-130 loitered over the ditched
airplane until it disappeared.
3/3/99* Piper PA-32-260 J. Franklin Corp. Near Cat Island, Business 0 0 1 Destroyed
Bahamas
The airplane was in cruise flight at 4,500 feet when the pilot reported that the engine-oil temperature increased rapidly to the redline. About
14 minutes later, oil pressure decreased, the engine ran roughly and the pilot could not maintain altitude. He elected to ditch near a boat.
About 50 feet above the water, the propeller stopped. The airplane sank after it was ditched, and the pilot was picked up from the water by the
occupants of the boat.
3/18/99* Cessna 206 Air Chathams Pitt Island, New Zealand Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
passenger
The passengers were surveying and photographing Pitt Island. The pilot flew around the island and was just about to ask whether they
wanted to make another orbit when the engine failed. The pilot turned toward shore for an emergency landing. He told the passengers
to prepare for a ditching, to tighten their seat belts and to crack open the doors. The airplane struck the relatively calm sea about
800 meters from shore. The occupants reported that the aircraft nosed down during the ditching, became inverted and sank quickly.
Although life vests and a life raft were aboard the airplane, no one was able to locate and don a life vest during the approximately 30
seconds between the engine failure and the ditching, and the life raft was not deployed. The occupants swam to shore in about one
hour. Island occupants, including a doctor and a nurse, tended to the survivors, who recovered from varying degrees of hypothermia
and shock.
3/27/99* De Havilland NA Picton, New Zealand Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
DHC-1A-1
The engine failed in cruise flight, and the pilot ditched the airplane in Whatamango Bay. The airplane nosed over on landing, but the pilot
escaped uninjured.
4/14/99* Piper PA-31 Tokyo Monterey, California, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
International
Trading America
An undetermined system malfunction in the right engine led to an increase in fuel usage beyond the pilot’s planned fuel-consumption
rate and to eventual fuel exhaustion. The pilot ditched the aircraft in the ocean. He exited the aircraft, deployed a life raft and was rescued
by the Coast Guard after about 30 minutes.
4/22/99 SeaRey NA Selby Beach, Personal 1 1 0 Substantial
Maryland, U.S.
The homebuilt airplane was damaged substantially during a water landing. A boater arrived at the accident site and saw the pilot and
passenger in the water. The passenger was unconscious and face-down. The pilot was conscious and requesting help. The boater threw a
life ring to the pilot, but the pilot was unable to hold on to it. The boater repositioned his boat, then threw a rope to the pilot and asked
him to hold the passenger’s head out of the water. The pilot was unable to do so. The boater then went below deck to get three life vests,
one of which he put on. When he returned, the pilot was below the surface of the water. The boater dived into the water, released the extra
life vest and swam about 15 feet to the two men. He lifted their heads out of the water and waited for another boat to arrive. The two
injured men were pulled aboard and taken to shore. The passenger did not survive.
5/5/99* Piper PA-28-181 NA Cleveland, Ohio, U.S. Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
As the airplane neared the destination, the engine began to run roughly. The pilot turned on the boost pump, and there was a momentary
power surge. The engine then failed, and the pilot declared an emergency. The airplane was ditched in a lake.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 577
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/7/99* Aeronca 15AC NA Pedro Bay, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
The pilot reported that while the airplane was being flown through 7,000 feet during climb, he smelled smoke, and the engine began to run
roughly. During an emergency descent, smoke and flames entered the cockpit from under the floor adjacent to the rudder pedals. The pilot
said,“My legs were on fire, and I just wanted to put the fire out and get the airplane on the ground.” He ditched the airplane in shallow ocean
water near a beach.
5/7/99 Cessna T303 NA San Diego, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The airplane struck San Diego Bay and sank following a loss of power in both engines during a missed approach to Runway 27 at Lindbergh Field.
5/8/99 DHC-6 Vanair Port Vila, Vanuatu Scheduled 7 0 5 Destroyed
Twin Otter 300 passenger
The aircraft was destroyed when it flew into the sea while descending inbound to Port Vila. According to surviving passengers, the flight
had appeared to be proceeding normally until impact with the water. The accident happened in darkness and heavy rain.
5/22/99 Beech B90 Pacific Mokuleia, Hawaii, U.S. Parachuting 1 0 0 Destroyed
King Air International
Skydiving
Center
The aircraft had transported parachutists to the jump site, and the pilot had begun to return to base. The aircraft was seen in a descending
turn toward the shore. The descent continued, apparently without a level-off, until it struck the sea.
5/29/99* Beech D-45 Travis Air Force Lake Berryessa, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Base Aero Club California, U.S.
The engine failed during cruise flight, and the airplane was ditched in Lake Berryessa.
6/13/99 Buccaneer II NA Panacea, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Substantial
The pilot continued operation of the homebuilt airplane with known deficiencies in the pitot system and erroneous airspeed indications.
An inadvertent stall occurred on takeoff, and the airplane descended out of control into the water.
6/20/99* Cessna 182Q NA Rising Sun, Personal 0 1 3 Destroyed
Maryland, U.S.
The airplane was in level flight at 4,000 feet on a dark night in IMC when the engine failed. The pilot conducted a forced landing on a river.
6/23/99* Cessna 185E NA East Haddam, Personal 0 1 1 Substantial
Connecticut, U.S.
During initial climb, the engine began to fail and the pilot attempted a forced landing in a river. The airplane stalled, struck the water
nose-down and sank.
6/26/99 SeaRey NA Hastings, Victoria, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Australia
The pilot reported that he was attempting to take off in near-perfect sea conditions. Airspeed was 40 knots to 45 knots when the
amphibious aircraft settled and became partially submerged. As the pilot was exiting the aircraft, he observed that the flaps were
retracted, although the flap-selector handle was in the position for 20 degrees (full) flaps, which is the normal setting for takeoff.
7/9/99* Grumman AA-5 NA Iceland Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
The engine failed because of fuel starvation. The pilot ditched the airplane and swam to shore. The passenger’s body was found after a
two-hour search.
7/16/99 Piper PA-32R-301 NA Vineyard Haven, Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The airplane struck the Atlantic Ocean about 7.5 miles southwest of Martha’s Vineyard during a descent at night and in haze.
7/17/99 Piper J-3C NA Maple Lake, Personal 0 2 0 Substantial
Minnesota, U.S.
The float-equipped airplane was flown from one lake to another, where the pilot picked up a passenger. The pilot reported that during
takeoff, he encountered pitch problems during climb. At 50 feet to 100 feet, the airplane began turning left, the nose pitched down, and
the airplane descended into the lake.

578 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/21/99 Hodre-Buull-Kolb NA Plymouth, Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed
Mark III Minnesota, U.S.
The pilot reported that the experimental amphibious airplane was at 200 feet during initial climb when a loss of rudder control occurred
The pilot said that he tried to turn the airplane away from a beach populated with swimmers and sunbathers. The airplane struck the water
nose-first.
7/28/99* Fairchild SA- KAL Aviation Near Rhodes, Greece Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
227AC Metro III – Calavia cargo
Both engines reportedly failed during the final stage of the approach to Diagoras Airport, and the aircraft subsequently was ditched in the sea
just off the coast.
9/20/99* Cessna 177A NA Big Bear City, Maintenance 0 0 1 Substantial
California, U.S. test
The engine failed because of fuel-system contamination, which resulted from a maintenance technician’s failure to fully inspect and verify
the serviceability of the fuel system before returning the aircraft to service for a maintenance test flight. The pilot attempted to return to the
departure airport but was not able to glide to the runway and ditched the airplane.
9/22/99 Beech 200 Cia Aerospace Bimini, Bahamas Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
King Air de Venezuela
While en route and flying at FL 210, the pilot advised Miami (Florida, U.S.) ATC that he had an emergency. Shortly afterward, the flight
disappeared from radar. A small amount of floating debris later was recovered from the sea in the general area of the flight’s last
reported position.
9/23/99 Cessna 208 Air Tindi Hoar Frost River, Canada Personnel 0 0 3 Major partial
Caravan I positioning
Shortly after touchdown, the front strut of the aircraft’s left float failed and the float rotated and struck the propeller. The pilot shut down
the engine, and he and his passengers were rescued by boat. The aircraft did not sink but was further damaged by being blown against
rocks on the shoreline before it could be salvaged. The water was “rough” with an estimated three-foot swell.
9/27/99 Piper PA-28-140 NA Clinton, Iowa, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane struck the Mississippi River. The non-instrument-rated pilot had chosen to conduct the flight although the automated
weather briefing advised that VFR flight in the area was not recommended because of the low clouds, rain and a dark night.
10/4/99 SOCATA TB-10 Servicios Pisco, Peru Personal 5 0 0 Destroyed
Tobago Turísticos Levol
The aircraft was destroyed when it struck the sea shortly after takeoff. The accident happened in daylight with strong winds, rain and fog.
10/9/99 Cessna 172I NA North East Carry, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Maine, U.S.
During takeoff in gusty winds and on rough water, the airplane became airborne, the right wing dipped and the right float hit a wave. The
airplane became airborne again, then rolled right and overturned.
10/13/99* Cessna 208B Skylink Express Pointe aux Pins, Ontario, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
Caravan I Canada cargo
While the aircraft was flying over Lake Erie, there was a loud “bang” and the aircraft’s propeller stopped “abruptly.” The pilot shut down the
engine and conducted a forced landing in the lake.
10/15/99 Cessna 208B Wasaya Airways Red Lake, Ontario, Unscheduled 0 1 0 Destroyed
Caravan I Canada cargo
While the aircraft was overflying Ranger Lake, a large flock of birds flew into the flight path of the aircraft and the pilot commenced a
descending turn to avoid the birds. During the turn, the right wing of the aircraft struck the surface of the lake, and the aircraft struck the
water. The surface of the lake was flat and “glassy,” and the pilot’s depth perception was affected.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 579
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/17/99 McDonnell FedEx Olongapo, Philippines Scheduled cargo 0 0 2 Destroyed
Douglas MD-11F
Following a manually flown VOR/DME approach, the aircraft reportedly “landed long.” The aircraft was not stopped before the end of the
runway. After the overrun, the aircraft fell into the waters of the bay, broke up and sank.
10/24/99 Learjet 35A Avioriprese Jet Carnigoli, Italy Unscheduled 3 0 0 Destroyed
Executive passenger
The aircraft was destroyed when it apparently struck the sea while on approach to Genoa, Italy. The accident happened in daylight but in
poor weather with low cloud and heavy rain.
10/30/99 Cessna T310R Southern Aerial Key West, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Photography Florida, U.S.
The airplane struck the Atlantic Ocean about 10 miles from Key West while being flown in dark-night conditions.
10/31/99 Boeing EgyptAir North Atlantic Ocean Scheduled 217 0 0 Destroyed
757-300ER passenger
After the aircraft had reached its initial cruise altitude of FL 330 following takeoff, radar showed the aircraft descending in a steep, high-
speed dive. It struck the sea and was destroyed. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause
of the accident was a relief first officer’s control inputs, which reduced power and initiated the dive. The Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority
disputed NTSB’s finding of probable cause.
11/11/99 Beech 200 Jaymar Ruby Chicago, Illinois, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
King Air
The aircraft struck Lake Michigan, about 300 feet from the departure end of the runway. During the takeoff roll, the aircraft did not appear
to rotate and did not become airborne.
11/24/99 Cessna U206A NA Queensland, Australia Unscheduled 6 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
Soon after departure, the pilot reported that he was encountering adverse weather and was diverting the flight. No further radio
transmissions were heard, and a subsequent search found numerous small items from the aircraft floating on the water.
11/27/99 De Havilland NA Washougal, Personal 4 0 0 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver Washington, U.S.
Witnesses reported that after taking off from the Columbia River and climbing about 100 feet to 400 feet above the water, the airplane
entered a left turn of about 45 degrees bank. Most witnesses said that after the airplane had turned about 180 degrees when the nose
abruptly dropped and the airplane struck the water. The airplane became inverted and the cabin submerged. Efforts to enter the cabin to
provide assistance were unsuccessful because of airplane damage. Rescue divers found the deceased occupants in the airplane. Autopsies
indicated that they had drowned.
12/5/99 Osprey 2 NA Chula Vista, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
California, U.S.
The pilot exceeded the design stress limits of the airplane, resulting in wing overload and separation. The airplane struck Lower Otay Lake
Reservoir.
12/29/99 Antonov An-28 Guinee Inebolu, Turkey Ferry 6 0 0 Destroyed
Ecuatorial
Airlines
Contact was lost with the crew while the aircraft was en route; the aircraft was believed to have struck the Black Sea some 50 kilometers off
Inebolu, 250 kilometers from its destination.
1/5/00 Cessna 172 Airline Training St. Augustine, Instructional 1 0 0 Destroyed
Academy Florida, U.S.
The airplane struck the Atlantic Ocean about four miles east of the St. Augustine airport. In his last radio transmission, the pilot said, “I
haven’t any direction finder. I don’t see anything.”

580 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/13/00* Shorts 360-300 AVISTO Marsa el Brega, Libya Unscheduled 22 13 6 Destroyed
passenger
During an approach, as the aircraft was descending through about 2,000 feet about 4.5 miles from the airport, the left engine flamed out.
About 30 seconds later, the right engine flamed out. The pilot conducted a forced landing in the sea some distance from the coast. The
airplane was substantially damaged on impact and sank within minutes.
The airplane was not equipped with life vests; the seat cushions were intended for use as flotation aids. Nevertheless, the passenger
briefing cards aboard the airplane described the use of life vests, and there was a placard on each seat stating, “Life Vest Under Your Seat.”
The passengers were not told that the airplane was being ditched.
1/21/00* Cessna 182Q NA Verona Sands, Unscheduled 0 0 4 Destroyed
Tasmania, Australia passenger
The engine failed during cruise flight. The pilot was unable to restart the engine. There was no suitable landing area on a nearby island, so
the pilot ditched the aircraft about one kilometer from shore. Three of the four occupants exited the aircraft, and the fourth occupant was
pulled out by the pilot. All then made their way to the shoreline.
1/30/00 Airbus A310-300 Kenya Airways Abidjan, Ivory Coast Scheduled 169 0 10 Destroyed
passenger
During takeoff, the aircraft crew used more of the runway than normal and the aircraft was “still very low” as it flew over the sea wall some
500 meters beyond the runway end. The aircraft apparently did not gain altitude and struck the water about one mile offshore.
1/31/00 McDonnell Alaska Airlines Point Mugu, Scheduled 88 0 0 Destroyed
Douglas MD-83 California, U.S. passenger
Loss of control occurred and the aircraft struck the Santa Barbara Channel some 20 miles south of Point Mugu while being vectored for an
approach to Los Angeles (California, U.S.) International Airport. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board determined that inadequate
lubrication during maintenance had led to failure of the jackscrew assembly in the aircraft’s horizontal-stabilizer-trim system. The failure
caused the horizontal stabilizer to jam in a position that caused the aircraft to enter a nose-down pitch attitude from which recovery was
not possible.
2/3/00 Boeing 707-320C Trans Arabian Mwanza, Tanzania Ferry 0 0 5 Destroyed
Air Transport
The aircraft crew apparently undershot the runway on the approach to Mwanza, striking Lake Victoria about two nautical miles short of the
runway threshold.
2/21/00 Piper PA-31 Cape Smythe Chukchi Sea Scheduled 0 1 0 Destroyed
Air Service passenger
The aircraft apparently undershot the runway during the final stage of a GPS approach to Kotzebue, Alaska, U.S., striking the sea some four
miles short of the runway.
3/8/00* Cessna P206C NA Kingscote, South Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
Australia, Australia
The pilot advised ATC of an engine failure and that the airplane would be ditched. ATC requested that the crew of a Royal Australian
Air Force aircraft divert to the area to assist with SAR. The air force aircraft remained in the area, about 104 kilometers east-southeast of
Kingscote, until a rescue helicopter arrived and winched the passenger aboard.
3/18/00* Cessna 210E NA Moorabbin, Victoria, Personal 1 0 2 Substantial
Australia
The aircraft was observed to climb briefly after liftoff and then to slowly descend. The pilot ditched the aircraft in a disused quarry. A
passenger drowned after leaving the aircraft.
3/26/00 SeaRey Tail Feather Kill Devil Hill, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
North Carolina, U.S.
The airplane stalled during final approach and entered an uncontrolled descent into the water.
3/26/00 Piper PA-24-260 NA Panama City, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The airplane struck water when the pilot experienced spatial disorientation while reversing course on a dark night.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 581
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/3/00 Beech M35 Fisher Global Near Lake Charles, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Development Louisiana, U.S.

The airplane was flown into severe weather conditions over the Gulf of Mexico. Recorded ATC radar data indicated that there were
excursions in altitude and airspeed consistent with flight in moderate to severe turbulence. Radio contact and radar contact were lost, and
an extensive sea and air search for the airplane was unsuccessful.

4/12/00 Piper PA-28 Pilot/owner Aleknagik, Alaska, U.S. Ferry 0 0 2 Substantial

The pilot said that during cruise flight at 500 feet AGL, the horizon became indistinguishable from the snow-covered mountains and
ground. The airplane descended into a snow-covered lake.

4/15/00 Cessna 172S NA Muskegon, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial

Michigan, U.S.

The non-instrument-rated pilot became disoriented while flying the airplane over Lake Michigan and was issued a heading by ATC to
return to the airport. The pilot said that he was trying to keep the airplane level and was looking for VMC when the airplane “belly flopped”
into the lake. The pilot and his son sat in the airplane for about one minute before it started to sink. They exited the airplane through the
left-side window and held on to a floating tire until they were rescued by the Coast Guard. They were treated for hypothermia.

4/28/00 Cessna 172P Pacific Flight Chester, California, U.S. Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Services

The airplane struck the surface of Lake Alamanor and sank. There were no witnesses. Investigators determined that the airplane had
encountered wind shear at a low altitude, which resulted in loss of control and a stall/spin.

4/30/00 McDonnell DAS Air Entebbe, Uganda Unscheduled 0 0 7 Destroyed

Douglas cargo
DC-10-30F

During the landing roll, the crew apparently saw that the aircraft could not be stopped on the remaining runway. The pilot steered the
aircraft to the left to avoid striking the ILS antenna and the approach lights. The aircraft continued across grass for some 100 meters before
falling down a steep bank into Lake Victoria.

5/19/00* Aero Commander NA Horn Island, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial

500-S Queensland, Australia passenger

When the aircraft was approximately three nautical miles from the runway, both engines surged and the aircraft yawed right. The
pilot began engine failure procedures and retracted the flaps. He tried several times to determine which engine was failing by
retarding the throttle for each engine. He decided that the right engine was failing. The pilot shut down that engine and feathered
the propeller. Soon thereafter, when the aircraft was approximately 200 feet above the water, the left engine failed. The pilot
established the aircraft in a glide, advised the passengers to prepare for a ditching and declared mayday before the aircraft struck
the sea.
During impact, the passenger in the rear seat was thrown over the center seats into the right front seat, which was unoccupied. The
passenger in the center right seat received a back injury. Both windshields were shattered. The cabin rapidly filled with water. The four
other occupants then swam ashore, assisting the injured passenger to shore.
The aircraft quickly filled with water, sank and settled on the seabed.

5/23/00* Beech Calico Ventures Near San Diego, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed

King Air 200 California, U.S.

The pilot ditched the airplane in the Pacific Ocean about 160 miles southwest of San Diego after he became ill from the delayed effects of
pesticide he had sprayed. The Coast Guard rescued the pilot, and the aircraft sank.

5/31/00* Piper PA-31-350 Whyalla Airlines Whyalla, South Australia, Scheduled 8 0 0 Destroyed
Australia passenger

Soon after beginning a descent to Whyalla, the pilot declared mayday and advised ATC that both engines had failed. The aircraft was
ditched and sank in Spencer Gulf, about 28 kilometers southeast of Whyalla Airport.

582 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/3/00 DHC-6 Maxwell W. Yellowknife, Northwest Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed
Twin Otter 300 Ward Territories, Canada
During a crosswind landing, the aircraft “porpoised” on touchdown and became airborne again. The aircraft bounced twice more and, on
the third touchdown, its left float dug into the water. The aircraft veered to the left, and then its right wing struck the water and was torn
away. The aircraft eventually came to rest on its floats.
6/14/00 Piper PA-31 Air Navigation Liverpool, England Air ambulance 5 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft struck the River Mersey during an ILS approach to Runway 9 at Liverpool.
6/24/00* Cessna 172N NA Near Freeport, Bahamas Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
During descent to land in Freeport, the engine failed. The pilot ditched the airplane near a commercial boat.
6/30/00 Cessna 337C Missionary Marshall, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 1 0 0 Destroyed
Aviation Repair
Center
Before takeoff, the pilot was unable to start the rear engine but said that he had conducted single-engine takeoffs. He selected a
point on the runway where he would reject the takeoff if the airplane was not airborne. A witness said that as the airplane passed the
abort point, the nosewheel was lifting off the runway The airplane climbed about 50 feet, the wings rocked slightly, and the airplane
descended into a lake.
7/14/00 Aeronca 11BC NA Wasilla, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Following a takeoff from Three Mile Lake, the airplane was observed “doing a U-turn and dropping straight down into the lake.” The pilot
said that the engine was producing only partial power and that as he turned the airplane left, the nose dropped and the airplane struck
the water in a nose-low, upright attitude.
8/1/00 SeaRey NA Tulsa, Oklahoma, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
The pilot reported that during cruise flight at 1,100 feet to 1,200 feet in the vicinity of a lake, she “blacked out.” Her medical records
indicated that she had a heart condition. The experimental amphibious airplane struck the lake and came to rest floating upside down.
8/12/00* Cessna 150 NA Carlsbad, California, U.S. Aerial 0 0 1 Destroyed
observation
During a fish-spotting flight, the engine failed and the aircraft was ditched in the Pacific Ocean about 20 miles offshore.
8/14/00 Cessna 208 Royal Canadian Teslin Lake, British Public 2 0 0 Destroyed
Caravan Mounted Police Columbia, Canada
The amphibious airplane was being used to transport members of an emergency-response team to a site on the south end of Teslin
Lake. Soon after takeoff, the airplane was observed to pitch up into a steep climb, stall and then descend at a steep angle into the water.
8/15/00 Cessna 208 Royal Canadian Teslin Lake, British Ferry 2 0 0 Destroyed
Caravan I Mounted Police Columbia, Canada
Air Service
During the previous afternoon, the aircraft had brought a number of police officers to Teslin Lake and had landed near the mouth of the
Jennings River. While being maneuvered for takeoff on the accident flight, the aircraft became stuck on a sand bar. The aircraft was freed
and the takeoff was conducted. Shortly afterward, the aircraft was seen in a steep descent which continued until impact with the water.
8/17/00 Cessna 185 Whistler Air Green Lake, British Sightseeing 0 0 5 Substantial
Services Columbia, Canada
The floatplane remained low over the surface of Green Lake after liftoff. As it approached the end of the lake, it was turned right to avoid
trees on the shoreline. Soon thereafter, it was turned right again to avoid the shoreline. During the second turn, the floatplane descended
into the water.
8/18/00* Piper PA-32R-301 Pilot/owner Kennebunkport, Personal 2 2 1 Substantial
Maine, U.S.
The airplane was in cruise flight at 9,000 feet when a loud bang was heard from the engine compartment and the windshield became
covered with oil. The pilot said that the engine then produced partial power before failing. The pilot ditched the airplane in the ocean.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 583
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/18/00* Fairchild 24G Pilot/owner Cascade Locks, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Oregon, U.S.
After takeoff, the engine began to run roughly, and the pilot began a turn back toward the runway. After about 90 degrees of turn, the
engine failed. Knowing that he could not land at the airport, the pilot rolled out of the turn and set up to ditch the airplane near the
shore of a river. After the airplane touched down, the pilot and his passenger exited through the pilot-side door and were rescued by a
passing boat.
8/18/00 Aero L29 Delfin NA Eastbourne, England Aerobatic 1 0 0 Destroyed
display
The aircraft was in a vertical, rolling climb when it stalled and then spun into the water.
8/23/00 Airbus A320-210 Gulf Air Manama, Bahrain Scheduled 143 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
Following a go-around, ATC instructed the flight crew to turn left to a heading of 300 degrees and to climb to 2,500 feet. The aircraft’s
landing gear was retracted and engine thrust was increased to maximum. The aircraft began a left turn and climbed to about 1,000 feet
in a five-degree nose-up attitude. The airspeed exceeded 185 knots and the master warning sounded. The first officer said “Overspeed
limit,” and apparently this callout quickly was followed by a forward movement of the captain’s side stick. The aircraft’s pitch gradually
decreased to 15 degrees nose-down. The aircraft descended rapidly and struck shallow water about one mile north of the runway.
8/25/00* Piper PA-31-350 Big Island Air Hilo, Hawaii, U.S. Unscheduled 1 0 8 Substantial
passenger
The engine failed during cruise flight, and the airplane was ditched in the ocean. The airplane began to take on water immediately.
After exiting, the pilot moved to the rear-main cabin door to assist the passengers. The right-front seat passenger remained by the left
cockpit door to assist any passengers who might use that exit. A passenger reported that water pressure against the right emergency
window exit prevented its use. As the nose sank first, the airplane began a gradual roll to the right, disappearing below the water
within 60 seconds. The pilot attempted to dive below the water to check for any remaining passengers but reported that the murky
water impaired his vision. The pilot signaled for the passengers to remain in a group. Within about 15 minutes, a Hilo fire department
helicopter and rescue personnel arrived. One passenger was missing. Subsequently, the body of the missing passenger was located in
the airplane.
9/11/00 Piper PA-18 Anderson Sleetmute, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 1 1 Substantial
Wilderness
Guide Service
The pilot said that immediately after takeoff, he had difficulty lowering the float-equipped airplane’s nose. The airplane stalled and struck
the water.
9/23/00 De Havilland NA Gosford Broadwater, Unscheduled 1/1/04 0 1 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver New South Wales, passenger
Australia
On touchdown, the floatplane’s left sponson dipped into the water, causing the aircraft to slew left. The left wing tip struck the water,
causing substantial wing damage. The aircraft remained afloat, and the pilot exited the aircraft uninjured.
10/23/00 Cessna P210N Kampala Entebbe, Uganda Personal 5 0 0 Destroyed
Aero Club
The aircraft struck the water of Lake Victoria, about 300 meters from the shore, during the final stage of an approach.
11/1/00 De Havilland West Coast Air Vancouver, British Scheduled 0 0 17 Destroyed
DHC-6 Twin Otter Columbia, Canada passenger
The aircraft was on a flight from Vancouver to Victoria, British Columbia. Soon after takeoff, there was a loud bang and a noise similar to
gravel hitting the aircraft. Simultaneously, flame emerged from the no. 2 engine, which then lost power. The aircraft struck the water about
25 seconds later in a nose-down, right-wing low attitude. The aircraft remained upright and partially submerged while the occupants
exited through the main door and the two pilot doors. They were taken ashore by several maritime vessels that arrived at the scene within
minutes. The aircraft subsequently sank.

584 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/11/00* Airparts Fletcher NA Myanmar Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
FU-24
The pilot declared an emergency as a result of engine surging during a flight from Malaysia to India. The pilot activated the aircraft’s ELT
and the ELT attached to his life vest. He prepared the aircraft and himself for a water landing. The aircraft was ditched in Myanmar territorial
waters. The pilot later was rescued by a naval patrol vessel.
11/15/00 Beech 23 NA Everglades City, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The pilot said that he encountered strong, gusty winds that forced the airplane to bounce on the runway during landing. The pilot said
that he began to conduct a go-around with full power, but the airplane would not attain flying speed and settled into the bay at the
end of the runway.
1/6/01 Cessna 152 Pilot/owner Spanish Fork, Utah, U.S. Personal 0 1 1 Destroyed
The non-instrument-rated pilot continued VFR flight into IMC and became disoriented. The airplane struck a frozen lake, skidded about 300
feet and fell through the ice. While the pilot clung to the airplane’s wing, which remained above the water, the passenger walked across
the lake’s thin ice and eventually reached the Provo, Utah, airport. When the pilot was rescued, he was suffering from hypothermia, had
fractured both ankles and had sustained a serious head injury.
1/13/01* Mooney M20C NA Somerset, Personal 0 1 0 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The airplane struck high-tension cables while flying above a river. The vertical stabilizer and the rudder separated, and the pilot ditched the
airplane in the river.
1/14/01 Beech Skydive Salt Lake Point, Utah, U.S. Personal 9 0 0 Destroyed
King Air A90 Lake
The pilot and eight parachutists were returning from a skydiving competition. The pilot obtained a weather briefing, which advised of IMC
at the destination, and filed a VFR flight plan that was never activated. Witnesses heard, but did not see, a twin-turboprop airplane fly over
the airport, heading north over the Great Salt Lake. They said that weather conditions included a low ceiling and 0.25-mile visibility in light
snow, haze and fog. The airplane struck the water about 0.5 mile offshore.
1/15/01 Piper PA-22-108 NA Falmouth, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The airplane departed from Norwood, Massachusetts, and was last observed in the vicinity of Falmouth. The body of the pilot was
found in Buzzards Bay, about three miles north of Cuttyhunk Island. IMC prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the flight.
2/1/01 Piper PA-32-300 Aerolease of Marathon, Florida, U.S. Public use 2 0 0 Destroyed
America
The pilot was conducting a night intercept training mission with a Coast Guard airplane when the airplane struck Florida Bay, 12.7 nautical
miles from Marathon.
2/6/01 Cessna 152 Southeastern Platter, Oklahoma, U.S. Instructional 2 0 0 Destroyed
Oklahoma State
University
The airplane collided with a Cessna 172P and descended into Lake Texoma.
2/18/01 Beech 36 P S and W Tybee Island, Personal 4 0 0 Destroyed
Enterprises Georgia, U.S.
The airplane entered a descending right turn for undetermined reasons and struck the ocean.
2/24/01 Cessna 206 Josua Rojas Higuerote, Venezuela Parachuting 7 0 0 Destroyed
The aircraft lost altitude and struck the sea just off the coast shortly after takeoff.
2/27/01* Shorts 360 Loganair Edinburgh, Scotland Scheduled cargo 2 0 0 Destroyed
After takeoff from Edinburgh, the pilot declared mayday and reported that both engines had flamed out. Soon thereafter, he said that
he would ditch the airplane. The airplane struck the Firth of Forth hard in a nose-down attitude about 65 meters offshore.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 585
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/3/01 Piper S. and E. Gulfport, Mississippi, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
PA-32RT-300T Aviation
While en route, the pilot was advised by ATC not to continue VFR flight. The pilot accepted the advice, and ATC recommended a heading.
ATC radar indicated that the airplane was turned to a different heading and began a rapid descent. Communications ceased, and the crew
of a Coast Guard helicopter sighted wreckage in the Gulf of Mexico.
3/21/01 De Havilland NA Hayman Island, Unscheduled 0 0 1 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver Queensland, Australia passenger
When the amphibious aircraft arrived at the island, the pilot saw several yachts, small sailing craft and powerboats operating in the usual
landing area. The pilot elected to land shorter than normal. The pre-landing checks were not fully completed, and the aircraft touched
down on the water with the landing gear still extended from the floats. The aircraft decelerated rapidly and capsized, but the pilot
evacuated the aircraft unharmed.
3/31/01* Cessna 150J NA Fortuna, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The engine failed, and the pilot ditched the airplane about 20 yards offshore.
4/4/01* Douglas DC-3A Roblex Aviation San Juan, Crew training 0 0 2 Major partial
Puerto Rico, U.S.
Following a practice ILS approach, as part of a crew-training exercise, the right engine was failed as power was being increased to initiate
a go-around. The pilot conducted the emergency procedures for engine failure and noticed that the left engine was not producing power.
He then elected to conduct a forced landing in a shallow lagoon.
4/5/01 Cessna 150L NA Near Port Davey, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Tasmania, Australia
The aircraft departed for a flight around Tasmania. It was observed in deteriorating weather. Wreckage consistent with that of the missing
aircraft was subsequently washed ashore at Port Davey.
5/11/01 Beech 76 Wings of Gunnison, Colorado, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
Denver
The airplane struck power lines and descended into the Blue Mesa Reservoir.
5/11/01* Piper PA-30 Twin NA Morecambe Bay, Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
Comanche England
Both engines failed and were secured. Committed to a ditching, the pilot conducted the necessary checks, including preparation of survival
equipment and emergency exits. During the descent, he donned his life vest and placed a second vest on the seat beside him. ATC initiated
emergency action. Seconds before the airplane struck the sea, the pilot unlatched the cabin door/emergency exit and again confirmed
that both engines were secure and that the propellers were feathered. He reported that the impact with the sea was “remarkably light, with
the aircraft settling slightly nose-down in the water with the fuselage and wings intact and above the surface.” The pilot exited the aircraft,
inflated both life vests and walked along the wing. The aircraft remained afloat three minutes to four minutes, at which time the pilot
entered the water. The pilot was located by helicopter and was rescued 15 minutes after entering the water.
5/12/01 Avid Magnum NA Lake Shasta, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
The pilot encountered light to moderate turbulence on approach to the lake in his experimental seaplane. About 50 feet above the water,
he experienced a strong downdraft and applied engine power to decrease the 1,000-fpm descent rate. The airplane pitched down and
struck the water.
5/25/01 Cessna U206F NA Lowendal Island, Business 0 0 3 Substantial
Western Australia,
Australia
During a landing on calm water, the aircraft bounced as it touched down. The pilot realized that the landing gear probably was extended
and attempted to conduct a go-around. Airspeed, however, was insufficient, and the aircraft descended and bounced several more times.
On the third touchdown, the left wheel struck the water, and the aircraft flipped over, coming to rest inverted. The pilot and two passengers
evacuated and swam to the surface, where they were rescued by boaters.

586 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
5/31/01 De Havilland NA Whitehaven, Unscheduled 0 0 1 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver Queensland, Australia passenger
During approach for a water landing, the pilot was distracted by strong, gusty winds. He neglected the pre-landing checks and landed with
the landing gear extended. The aircraft overturned on touchdown.
6/3/01 Noorduyn Bear Lake Air Seward, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 6 Substantial
Aviation UC-64A passenger
After takeoff, the airplane was about 150 feet above the water when a very strong gust pushed the nose left. The pilot applied full right
rudder, but the nose continued moving left, and the airplane descended into the lake.
6/6/01 Beech 58 Baron NA Isle of Man, U.K. Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot reported a problem with the compass. Radar contact ended, and a search located only a small amount of floating debris.
6/26/01* Piper PA-32-300 NA Watch Hill, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
Rhode Island, U.S. passenger
The engine failed for an undetermined reason, and the airplane was ditched.
7/4/01 Piper PA-18 NA Clacton, England Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The aircraft overturned into the sea during a forced landing on a beach.
7/6/01* Cessna 208B Maxfly Aviation Near Fort Lauderdale, Positioning 0 0 2 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
Approximately 10 minutes after cruise flight was established at 6,500 feet, the engine “jolted” and began making a very loud noise. The
propeller stopped rotating and feathered itself, and engine oil temperature increased rapidly. The pilot shut down the engine, and the
noise stopped. After several unsuccessful attempts to restart the engine, the pilot declared an emergency and ditched the aircraft 20 miles
east of Fort Lauderdale.
7/7/01 Cessna 172P NA Cedar Key, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 4 Substantial
The airplane encountered a tail wind on final approach, causing the pilot to overshoot the runway. The pilot attempted a go-around, but
the airplane struck water 125 feet from the end of the runway.
7/8/01* Pilatus PC-12 Access Air Co. Makarov, Personal 0 0 4 Destroyed
Sakhalin Island, Russia
The aircraft was being used for an around-the-world trip and was en route between Hakodate, Japan, and Magadan, Russia. About 4.5
hours after takeoff, while in normal cruise flight at 26,000 feet, the pilot felt a vibration and noticed a rapid increase in the engine’s
turbine-temperature indication. A compressor stall then occurred. The pilot shut down the engine and feathered the propeller. The
aircraft descended through overcast cloud layers until breaking out of clouds at about 100 feet above the water. The pilot ditched the
aircraft on the crest of a swell and the aircraft came to rest floating upright. The pilot and passengers evacuated into a life raft and were
rescued some 15 hours later by the crew of a ship.
7/18/01* Cessna 172M NA Near Freeport, Ferry 0 0 2 Substantial
Bahamas
During descent from 5,500 feet to 4,500 feet, engine power decreased. The pilot conducted emergency procedures to regain full power,
but the engine did not respond. The pilot ditched the airplane in the ocean.
7/22/01 Max Air Drifter NA Collington, Personal 0 1 1 Substantial
ARV 582 North Carolina, U.S.
The experimental amphibious airplane struck water while being maneuvered to avoid a bridge after the engine failed.
7/23/01 Consolidated Buffalo Airways Inuvik, Northwest Fire suppression 0 0 2 Destroyed
PBY-5A Catalina Territories, Canada
During a water pickup from a lake, loss of control occurred and one of the aircraft’s wings dug into the water. The aircraft came to rest nose-
down on the lake and eventually sank in 100 feet of water.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 587
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/23/01* Piper PA-28 NA Guernsey, Channel Personal 0 0 3 Destroyed
Islands, U.K.
About 12 miles from the destination, Guernsey, the engine began to run very roughly and all efforts to restore power were ineffective.
A ditching became inevitable, and the passengers donned life vests. The pilot could not don a life vest because he was busy flying the
aircraft. During the wheels-up ditching in a calm sea, the pilot struck his head on the control column but remained conscious. Evacuation
and rescue were successful.
7/26/01* Rutan LongEze NA Shoreham, England Flight permit 0 0 1 Substantial
test
The engine failed, and the pilot told ATC that he intended to ditch the airplane near Shoreham Harbor. The aircraft struck the water at
about 60 knots in a nose-up attitude, but when the main landing gear touched the water, it was ripped off, causing the aircraft to pitch
nose-down. The fuselage remained intact, and the aircraft floated upright.
8/5/01 Cessna A185F NA Crane Lake, Personal 0 1 2 Substantial
Minnesota, U.S.
The floatplane sustained substantial damage on impact with water during takeoff.
8/9/01* Piper PA-32-260 Fly Key West Key West, Florida, U.S. Sightseeing 2 0 1 Substantial
During cruise flight, a passenger entered the cockpit, brandished a knife, turned off the radios and transponder, and demanded to be flown to
Cuba. In an attempt to thwart the hijacking, the pilot pitched the airplane nose-down and turned toward Key West. In the ensuing struggle, the
hijacker fell against and bent the retarded throttle lever. Attempts to straighten the throttle lever snapped it off, and an idle-power ditching
was conducted. During impact, forward motion was stopped violently, and the lap-belted passengers appeared to lose consciousness. The
pilot exited from the cockpit door, inflated his life vest and swam to the passenger door to extricate the passengers; however, the aircraft
began to sink before he could open the door. The passengers went down with the aircraft. The pilot was rescued by a U.S. Navy helicopter.
8/21/01 De Havilland Alaska Air Taxi Nondalton, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
DHC-2 Beaver passenger
The pilot reported that after a water takeoff, at about 100 feet, a very strong gust rolled the wings of the float-equipped airplane about 90
degrees left. The pilot attempted to regain control, but the airplane descended, and the left wing struck the water. The wing separated from
the fuselage and pivoted the airplane 90 degrees left, causing the right wing to strike the water. Both floats were torn from the fuselage,
and the airplane sank.
8/28/01 Denney Kitfox NA Beauly Firth, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Scotland
The pilot of the amphibious airplane neglected to retract the landing gear before a water landing. The front wheels struck the water,
and the airplane slowly overturned. The cabin began to fill with water. The pilot and observer evacuated without injury and stood on the
inverted floats until they were rescued eight minutes later.
9/12/01 DHC-3 Turbo Labrador Otter Creek, Unscheduled 0 0 4 Major partial
Otter Airways Newfoundland, Canada passenger
The pilot was conducting a takeoff from Otter Creek in the float-equipped aircraft. After liftoff, the control column “pitched violently
forward and then back before returning to the neutral position.” The aircraft pitched down and struck the water. The pilot and passengers
evacuated before the aircraft sank in 55 feet of water.
9/27/01 Cessna 208 NA Aurora, Minnesota, U.S. Corporate/ 0 0 7 Substantial
executive
The floatplane was substantially damaged on impact with water and a dock during a hard landing on a lake.
10/4/01 Tupolev Tu-154M Sibir Airlines Black Sea Unscheduled 78 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
Loss of control occurred; the aircraft struck the Black Sea and was destroyed. The pilot of another aircraft reportedly saw “an explosion on
the plane.” Unconfirmed reports said that the aircraft accidentally was struck by a surface-to-air missile that had been launched during
exercises being conducted by Ukrainian defense forces.

588 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
10/5/01 Cessna 185 NA Port Alsworth, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Alaska, U.S.
The pilot was landing the float-equipped airplane on a remote lake with a smooth, glassy surface. The pilot said that he touched down too
fast, and the airplane overturned. The pilot, who was wearing an inflatable jacket, exited the inverted airplane and climbed onto the floats.
The airplane sank in about two minutes. The pilot then swam for about 40 minutes to reach the shore.
10/10/01 Fairchild SA- Flightline Castellon, Spain Unscheduled 10 0 0 Destroyed
226AT Merlin passenger
The aircraft was believed to have struck the sea while en route between Barcelona, Spain, and Oran, Algeria. The last contact with the
aircraft crew was when the crew told ATC that the aircraft was being diverted from the planned route because of poor weather.
10/11/01* Cessna T206H Longleaf Lake Lanier Islands, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Georgia, U.S.
The engine failed, and the pilot ditched the airplane in Lake Lanier.
10/16/01 Antonov An-12 Air Bridge Honiara, Solomon Ferry 0 0 5 Major partial
Islands
Apparently, during the final stage of a nonprecision approach, the aircraft undershot the runway and struck the surface of the sea, tearing off
the right main landing gear. The pilot maintained control and the aircraft then was landed safely on the runway.
10/29/01* Cessna 177 NA Guernsey, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed
Cardinal Channel Islands, U.K.
During cruise flight at 2,000 feet, the engine began to backfire and run roughly. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilot declared mayday and
told ATC that he would have to ditch the aircraft. The aircraft struck the sea in a level attitude, stopped abruptly and pitched forward. The
left wing dipped into the sea, and the cabin rapidly filled with water. The pilot initially was unable to open either door, but when the cabin
was nearly filled with water, he was able to kick open his door and exit the aircraft under water. He was rescued by a fisherman.
11/23/01 Cessna 172M NA Barceloneta, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Puerto Rico, U.S.
The pilot failed to maintain control of the aircraft, which descended and struck the water.
11/27/01* Let 410UVP Aeroferinco Playa del Carmen, Ferry 0 0 4 Destroyed
Turbolet Mexico
During a short positioning flight from Cozumel, Mexico, to Playa del Carmen, both engines failed, and the crew ditched the airplane.
12/6/01* Convair 580 Trans-Air-Link Sunny Isles, Ferry 0 0 2 Destroyed
Florida, U.S.
After takeoff from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the crew heard a change in engine noise. The copilot observed that the right engine rpm
indication was fluctuating and no longer in the “green,” and that the fuel-quantity indication for the right tank also was fluctuating,
decreasing to zero before returning to the original reading.
The crew decided to shut down the right engine and to crossfeed fuel from the right tank to the left tank. The flight continued toward Opa
Locka, Florida, but the rpm indication for the left engine began to fluctuate. Power was lost on the left engine, and the crew decided to
turn back toward the sea and ditch the airplane. After crossing the coastline, the pilot ditched the airplane just off the beach at Sunny Isles,
a few miles east of Opa Locka. The crew evacuated without serious injury and were later rescued. The airplane was destroyed when it was
washed ashore.
12/8/01 Piper PA-32-260 NA Rottnest Island, Unscheduled 0 0 6 Substantial
Western Australia, passenger
Australia
The pilot was unable to maintain directional control during a takeoff in strong, gusty winds. The aircraft veered right, and the right main
landing gear struck a tree stump on the edge of a shallow saltwater lake adjacent to the airport. The aircraft briefly became airborne before
coming to rest in the lake.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 589
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
12/26/01 PBN PN-2B BAL Bremerhaven, Germany Scheduled 8 1 0 Destroyed
Islander Bremerhaven passenger
Airline
The aircraft struck the River Weser shortly after takeoff from Bremerhaven.
12/29/01 Cessna A185F NA Strahan, Tasmania, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
Australia passenger
The pilot evaluated sea conditions as marginal for takeoff. He was water-taxiing the floatplane back toward the wharf when a cruise
catamaran passed by, generating a powerful wake. After navigating through the wake, the pilot resumed course back to the wharf. He
then became concerned about the buoyancy of the right float. He increased power and applied left aileron and aft elevator to counter an
increasing list to the right, but the floatplane overturned.
1/5/02 Cessna U206F NA Shoal Bay, New South Unscheduled 0 0 4 Substantial
Wales, Australia passenger
During the takeoff run, the floatplane encountered wind shear, causing the aircraft to yaw and roll. The right wing struck the water, causing
the aircraft to cartwheel. The aircraft recovered to the upright position.
1/16/02* Boeing 737-300 Garuda Yogyakarta, Java, Scheduled 1 5 56 Destroyed
Indonesia Indonesia passenger
According to press reports, while in descent from FL 320 to FL 230 inbound to Yogyakarta, the aircraft penetrated an area of very heavy rain
and, shortly afterward, both engines flamed out. The aircraft continued toward Yogyakarta while the crew attempted to restart the engines,
but apparently without success. Eventually, the pilot elected to execute a forced landing in the Bengawan Solo River about 25 kilometers
northeast of the flight’s destination. During the ditching, the aircraft’s rear fuselage apparently struck the water first, and part of the
structure in that area was separated. The aircraft then pitched down and “pancaked” onto the water. It eventually came to rest in shallow
water close to the bank. Passengers and crew, other than a flight attendant who had been killed during the first water strike, evacuated and
were helped to the bank by villagers.
1/17/02* Let 410UVP Djibouti Airlines Djibouti City, Djibouti Positioning 4 0 0 Destroyed
Turbolet
The aircraft was ditched during a flight from Mogadishu, Somalia, to Djibouti.
1/27/02 Piper PA-18-150 Pilot/owner Eagle Point, Oregon, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot reported that after takeoff from a private airstrip, he forgot to retract the amphibious airplane’s landing gear. During a subsequent
landing in a river, the airplane overturned.
2/12/02 Piper PA-18 Pilot/owner Winter Haven, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
During a landing on glassy water, the pilot misjudged the float-equipped airplane’s height and flared prematurely. The left wing struck the
water, and the airplane cartwheeled.
3/17/02 Beech B100 Djibouti Airlines Djibouti City, Djibouti Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
King Air passenger
During the night approach, while in a left turn at a low altitude, the aircraft struck the sea.
3/28/02* Boeing S-307 National Air & Seattle, Washington, U.S. Test 0 0 4 Substantial
Stratoliner Space Museum/
The Boeing Co.
The crew flew the airplane from Seattle to Everett, Washington, to conduct practice takeoffs and landings. After the first takeoff at Everett,
the no. 3 engine briefly surged before returning to normal operation. The crew decided to return to Boeing Field in Seattle. During
approach, the left main landing gear did not extend fully. The approach was rejected, and the crew circled while an engineer manually
extended the landing gear. The crew resumed the approach and observed a low-fuel-pressure warning for the no. 3 engine, which then lost
power. The no. 3 propeller was feathered. Then, the crew observed low-fuel-pressure warnings for the other three engines, which also lost
power. The crew ditched the airplane in Elliot Bay, close to shore.

590 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

4/2/02 Piper PA-23-250 Aquarius Group Palm Bay, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed

IMC prevailed when the airplane struck a marsh during a VFR flight.

4/19/02 Aircam Pike Aviation Troy, Alabama, U.S. Personal 0 1 0 Destroyed

Witnesses said that the homebuilt airplane had been flown around the area for about 45 minutes at a low level before it struck power lines
about 70 feet above a lake and then descended into the water. A witness rescued the pilot from the submerged wreckage.

4/27/02 Buccaneer 2 NA Estero Bay, Florida, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed

Witnesses observed the experimental airplane flying overhead between 150 feet and 200 feet. The airplane began a steep right turn,
estimated at more than 45 degrees of bank, into a strong wind. The right wing dropped, the nose pitched down, and the airplane began
spinning and descended into the water.

5/7/02 McDonnell China Northern Dalian, China Scheduled 112 0 0 Destroyed

Douglas MD-82 Airlines passenger

The aircraft was destroyed when it struck the sea off Dalian. According to press reports, the pilot had reported a fire in the cabin during the
last communication with ATC.

5/21/02* Douglas DC-3A Aero JBR Laredo, Texas, U.S. Instructional 0 0 3 Destroyed

The crew was conducting a series of touch-and-go landings. Soon after becoming airborne, the aircraft had engine problems. The pilot
elected to ditch the aircraft in Lake Casa Blanca, close to the airfield. The DC-3 remained floating, partially submerged, and the crew was
able to escape without injury.

5/25/02 Boeing 747-200B China Airlines Pengu Islands, Scheduled 225 0 0 Destroyed
Taiwan, China passenger

About 20 minutes after takeoff from Taipei, Taiwan, China, just after reaching its en route altitude of FL 350, a structural breakup
occurred and the aircraft struck the sea. Metallurgical examination of the wreckage revealed a region of fatigue cracking.

6/15/02* Cessna 175 Pilot/owner Salt Lake City, Utah, U.S. Personal 0 0 3 Destroyed

During cruise flight at 5,600 feet, engine rpm decreased and oil temperature increased. The engine began to vibrate, and the upper cowling
separated, exposing a breach in the top of the casing aft of the no. 3 cylinder. White smoke filled the cockpit, the engine seized, and the
propeller stopped rotating. After declaring a mayday, the pilot ditched the airplane in Great Salt Lake. The crew of a Civil Air Patrol airplane
soon found the occupants swimming near the submerged airplane.

6/24/02 De Havilland Alaska West Nikilski, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 0 0 2 Substantial

DHC-2 Beaver Guides and
Outfitters

During landing, the left float dug into the water and was crushed against the fuselage. The airplane floated nose-down about 15 minutes,
then overturned.

7/12/02 De Havilland Wings Airways Juneau, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 0 0 1 Destroyed

DHC-2 Beaver

The pilot landed the airplane hard in a quartering tail wind. The airplane water-looped, and the right float separated. The airplane settled
into the water and overturned.

7/17/02 Luscombe 8A NA Cordova, Alaska, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial

The pilot reported that he rejected the takeoff when the airplane failed to become airborne in time to clear obstacles at the end of the
runway. During the next takeoff attempt, in a different direction, the airplane lifted off but failed to climb. As the airplane crossed the end of
the runway, it settled into a river and overturned.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 591
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

7/20/02 Piper PA-32RT- Lexanna Aircraft Freeport, Bahamas Personal 5 0 0 Destroyed

300 Turbo Lance

Loss of ATC contact with the airplane occurred 25 minutes after its departure from Freeport. Three bodies and a quantity of floating
wreckage were recovered.

8/13/02 Champion II NA Foxboro, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial

Massachusetts, U.S.

The pilot said that during a landing on Mirimichi Lake, a light gust of wind lifted the left wing when the floatplane was about one
foot above the water. The pilot did not correct for the wind, and the right float struck the water. The floatplane overturned and sank.

8/15/02 Pilatus PC6 B2-H2 SARL Europlane Forte dei Marmi, Italy Parachuting 1 0 0 Destroyed
Turbo Porter

The aircraft was returning to its base at Cinquale after releasing skydivers when it suddenly departed from controlled flight and struck the
sea near the beach.

8/23/02* Piper PA-14 Pilot/owner Eastsound, Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed

Washington, U.S.

The pilot said that he flew the airplane about 15 minutes to warm the oil for an oil change and was returning to the airport when the engine
failed. The pilot was unable to restart the engine and ditched the airplane, which sank in 60 feet of water.

8/28/02 De Havilland General Aleknagik, Alaska, U.S. Business 1 0 2 Substantial

DHC-2 MK3 Communications

During cruise flight, the pilot observed that the airplane would not attain its normal cruise airspeed and attitude. Believing that the
airplane was tail-heavy, the pilot asked the aft-cabin passenger to move forward. Upon touchdown on the lake at the destination, the
airplane pitched nose-down. Unsecured supplies in the aft cabin moved forward and pinned the pilot and front-seat passenger against
the instrument panel. The other passenger lifted as many supplies as he could off the pilot and front-seat passenger before he had to exit
the sinking airplane. Both the pilot and the front-seat passenger also exited the submerged airplane, but the pilot drowned. Postaccident
inspection of the airplane indicated that the wheels had not been retracted after takeoff and that the airplane had landed on the lake with
the wheels fully extended.

11/11/02 Fokker F.27-600 Laoag Manila, Philippines Scheduled 19 4 10 Destroyed

International passenger
Airways

The aircraft descended and struck Manila Bay about 12 kilometers from shore about three minutes after takeoff. Survivors reported that
the cabin immediately filled with water.

12/21/02 ATR 72-200F TransAsia Makung, Penghu Islands, Scheduled cargo 2 0 0 Destroyed
Airways Taiwan, China

The aircraft struck the sea while en route from Taipei, Taiwan, China,, to Macau.

12/24/02 Cessna 208B Telford Aviation Manteo, Ferry 1 0 1 Destroyed

Caravan I North Carolina, U.S.

The aircraft struck Croatan Sound during an NDB approach to Dare County Regional Airport, Manteo. The accident occurred about two
statute miles west of the airport.

12/27/02 Cessna 208B Tropic Air San Pedro, Belize Scheduled 0 0 15 Destroyed
Caravan I passenger

During an approach to San Pedro, the airplane was at about 400 feet and 2.5 statute miles from the runway, when the pilot reduced power
and extended the flaps. The aircraft’s rate of descent suddenly increased. The pilot increased power and attempted to climb, but the aircraft
continued to descend and struck Ambergris Cay.

592 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 1
Airplane Water-contact Accidents, 1976–July 8, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

1/9/03 DHC-3 Harbour Air Eden Lake, British Ferry 0 0 2 Destroyed

Turbo Otter Columbia, Canada

During the landing on Eden Lake, the aircraft’s left float broke away on touchdown. The aircraft decelerated rapidly and came to rest
upright but in a left-wing-low attitude. The water conditions at the time were described as “glassy.”

1/11/03 Cessna 150K NA Everglades City, Instructional 0 1 1 Substantial

Florida, U.S.

After a rejected landing, the instructor took control of the aircraft. The aircraft stalled because of inadequate airspeed, entered a spin
and struck water at the departure end of the runway. The student and instructor exited the airplane through the broken windshield.

2/16/03* Cessna 172N NA Bruny Island, Tasmania, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial

Australia

While the airplane was in cruise flight over water at 500 feet AGL, engine power decreased. The pilot attempted a forced landing on a
beach, but the airplane struck the water about 30 meters from the shore.

3/6/03 De Havilland NA Whitehaven, Positioning 0 0 1 Destroyed

DHC-2 Beaver Queensland, Australia

When the aircraft touched down, the pilot did not maintain directional control, and the aircraft overturned.

3/24/03 Mitsubishi Set Sul Taxi Santos, Brazil Unscheduled 0 0 3 Major partial
Mu-300 Aéreo passenger
Diamond IA

The aircraft overran the runway on landing and fell into the Canal da Bertioga. The runway was wet and reports suggested that the aircraft
may have aquaplaned.

4/8/03 Dassault Grand Aire St. Louis, Missouri, U.S. Unscheduled 0 2 0 Destroyed
Falcon 20 Express cargo

En route from Del Rio, Texas, the crew was conducting an ILS approach to Lambert–St. Louis International Airport. Because of deteriorating
weather conditions, ATC told the crew to go around. While being vectored for another ILS approach, the crew told ATC that they had a “fuel
limitation.” ATC issued a vector to the final approach course and cleared the crew to conduct the ILS approach. The crew then declared
mayday and told ATC that the left engine had flamed out. The right engine then flamed out, and the crew ditched the airplane in the
Mississippi River.

5/18/03* Piper PA-31 NA Caribbean Ocean Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed

The pilot declared mayday because of an engine failure and ditched the aircraft. Both occupants are presumed to have drowned.

6/5/03 DHC-6 Ontario Ministry Hornepayne, Ontario, Fire suppression 0 0 1 Destroyed

Twin Otter 300 of Natural Canada
Resources

The aircraft was equipped with amphibious “water bombing” floats. While picking up water at Wicksteed Lake, the aircraft nosed over and
cartwheeled, coming to rest inverted 100 meters from the lake shore in three meters of water.

7/8/03 Cessna 402C M and N Vieques, Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed

Aviation Puerto Rico, U.S. cargo

On a flight from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent for undetermined
reasons and struck the ocean. The depth of the ocean at the accident site was reported by the Coast Guard to be about 6,000 feet.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 593
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003
Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/14/80* Hughes 259B NA Lake Manapouri, Hunting 1 2 0 Destroyed
New Zealand
Shortly after crossing the shoreline, the “ENGINE OUT” light flashed and the pilot initiated an autorotative descent. The helicopter was
ditched before the pilot had time to check on engine-instrument indications. The pilot and two other occupants escaped from the
helicopter, but one of the passengers drowned while attempting to swim to shore.
7/31/80* Sikorsky S-61 BA Heli Aberdeen, Scotland Unscheduled 0 0 15 NA
passenger
The main-gearbox oil-cooler fan belts failed, resulting in loss of cooling air to the gearbox. The helicopter was ditched in the North Sea.
4/9/81 Bell 47G-3B1 NA Nourlangie, South NA 0 0 3 Substantial
Australia, Australia
During the power-on descent, the pilot made a steeper-than-normal approach for a hover position over a swamp. The engine failed to
respond when the pilot tried to increase the power setting. The rotor rpm decayed and the helicopter struck water.
7/15/81 Enstrom F28 NA Frimley, England Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Following an approach over a lake, the helicopter gently entered the water while transiting to a grass helipad following a turn to the right.
8/12/81 Bell 212 Bristow North Sea Unscheduled 1 2 11 Destroyed
passenger
While being flown over the North Sea, the helicopter encountered an area of reduced visibility and a decision was made to return to the
takeoff field. During the turn, control of the helicopter was lost after it pitched 20 degrees nose-up and climbed to 300 feet with zero
airspeed. The helicopter yawed rapidly to the right, descended and struck the sea in a level attitude.
8/13/81* Wessex Bristow North Sea Unscheduled 13 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
While flying at 1,500 feet, the pilot reported that he would be ditching the helicopter because of engine failure. An uncontrolled water
impact followed.
2/4/82* Bell 206-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 1 Substantial
passenger
The helicopter was landed on an oil drilling platform for refueling. The pilot said that after refueling, takeoff was conducted and after
clearing the platform, the helicopter yawed left and pitched nose-down. The pilot raised the collective to cushion the landing and
deployed the emergency floats. After touchdown in five-foot seas, the main rotor severed the tail boom and the helicopter rolled inverted.
The pilot was unable to exit through the right-front door, but after some difficulty, he exited through a rear door.
3/2/82 Bell 206B NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 2 0 0 Substantial
passenger
The helicopter was low on the approach and during the flare, the vertical fin and tail boom contacted the safety netting extending beyond
the boundaries of the platform landing area. The helicopter then settled back off the platform with one main-rotor blade striking flat on
the landing area prior to the helicopter coming to rest in the water.
Note: The water-accident data in this table were compiled from several sources, but completeness cannot be claimed. Information has been
transcribed faithfully from the sources, but some information may not be accurate. Military accidents have been excluded.
*Ditching accident.
AMSL = above mean sea level ATC = air traffic control EGT = exhaust-gas temperature ELT = emergency locator transmitter
FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration FARs = U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations IFR = instrument flight rules ILS = instrument landing system
IMC = instrument meteorological conditions MDA = minimum descent altitude MEL = minimum equipment list mph = miles per hour
NDB = nondirectional beacon PIC = pilot-in-command rpm = revolutions per minute SAR = search and rescue VFR = visual flight rules
VMC = visual meteorological conditions VOR-DME = very high frequency omnidirectional radio–distance-measuring equipment

Source: Airclaims World Aircraft Accident Summary; Australian Transport Safety Bureau; The Boeing Co.; Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand; New Zealand
Transport Accident Investigation Commission; Robert E. Breiling Associates; Transportation Safety Board of Canada; U.K. Civil Aviation Authority; U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center; U.S. National Transportation Safety Board.

594 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT Operations • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/22/82* Bell 212 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 2 1 9 Destroyed
passenger
The helicopter was in cruise flight when a sudden and severe right yaw occurred. Subsequently, it was autorotated to a ditching in rough
water. Touchdown was made on top of a wave, then the helicopter rolled over. The survivors did not deploy the life raft. Another helicopter
arrived but the pilot could not land in the rough sea. A life raft was dropped, but it was blown downwind by the time a survivor (the
copilot) swam to it and inflated it. The copilot was unable to paddle against the wind to the other survivors. The helicopter sank before a
rescue boat arrived; the helicopter later was recovered.
4/29/82* Bell 206L NA New York, New York, U.S. NA 6 0 0 Substantial
During a sightseeing flight, the pilot heard the low-rpm audio signal. He lowered the collective and rotor rpm returned to the green. While
turning to the East River the “GENERATOR-OUT” and “ENG-OUT” lights illuminated. The emergency floats were inflated and the helicopter
contacted the water in a level attitude. The nose then contacted the water and the chin bubble broke. Water entered the helicopter and it
rolled right to an inverted position.
5/29/82* Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
passenger
While approaching the landing platform, the pilot heard a loud bang and conducted an autorotation to the water. The helicopter rolled
inverted and was damaged by waves that pushed it against the platform.
8/21/82* Bell 206B NA Port Mansfield, Ferry 0 0 1 Substantial
Texas, U.S.
The helicopter was being ferried to shore from an oil platform when the tail-rotor gearbox failed and separated from the helicopter. The pilot
conducted an autorotation to the water. Upon water contact, the helicopter rolled over. The pilot had deployed the emergency floats upon
landing and waited for rescue after he exited the helicopter.
9/14/82 Bell 212 Bristow North Sea Search and 6 0 0 Destroyed
rescue
The helicopter had been sent to lift by winch an injured man from a ship, and was seen to pass close to an oil platform at a low altitude,
flying northeast. The helicopter entered an area of rain and poor visibility and struck the water. Wreckage was located on the sea bed at a
depth of about 1,120 feet.
10/21/82 Bell 47G-3B2 NA Lake Argyle, Western Aerial 0 1 0 Destroyed
Australia, Australia application
The helicopter struck water 25 minutes after departure for undetermined reasons.
11/19/82 Bell 206B NA Port O’Connor, Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
Texas, U.S. passenger
Crossing a bay, the pilot encountered severe turbulence and rain associated with a thunderstorm. The pilot made a 180-degree turn and
attempted to proceed to a beach to land. At about 100 feet AGL, during approach to landing, a severe downdraft was encountered. The pilot
applied full power, but the descent continued and the helicopter struck the water in a near-level attitude.
3/11/83* Sikorsky S-61 BA Heli North Sea Unscheduled 0 0 17 Destroyed
passenger
Shortly after the helicopter departed from an oil platform, an uncontained failure of the main rotor gearbox occurred. A mayday call was
transmitted and a ditching was conducted. The helicopter stabilized on its emergency floats. During deployment, both life rafts were
punctured and rendered unusable by sharp projections on the helicopter’s hull.
3/14/83 Aerospatiale Colt Humber Estuary, Aerial 2 0 1 Destroyed
SA350 Ecureuil England photography
The helicopter was being used for film work. To obtain the required shot, the pilot flew the helicopter backward and sideways. During this
maneuver, film magazines, maps and the technical log fell off the director’s knee, jammed the collective lever and pulled the pilot’s headset
askew. The helicopter accelerated backwards, striking the mast of a vessel, and fell into the sea.
7/13/83 Bell 206 PLM Heli Crieff, Scotland Construction 0 1 0 Destroyed
JetRanger work
The helicopter struck the River Almond while engaged in a lifting operation.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 595
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/16/83 Sikorsky S-61 BA Heli St. Mary’s, Scheduled 20 2 4 Destroyed
Isles of Scilly, U.K. passenger
During an approach in low-visibility conditions, the helicopter struck the sea in an approximately level attitude and a constant heading. After
three impacts with a calm sea, the helicopter rolled over and sank almost immediately.
7/17/83 Bell 206B NA Lake Burragorang, New Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
South Wales, Australia
Operating about 10 feet above the water, the pilot began a climbing turn. The helicopter struck the water surface and pitched forward into
the water. The passenger’s body was found 12 hours later. The pilot had misjudged the altitude over the glassy water.
9/20/83 Hughes 269C NA Adelaide River, Northern NA 0 0 1 Substantial
Territories, Australia
The pilot was mustering buffalo when some of the animals doubled back. The pilot descended to a lower altitude, the tail rotor inadvertently
entered the water and the helicopter sank.
9/24/83 Hughes 500C NA Pelican, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 3 Destroyed
The helicopter struck glassy water during an approach to land in marginal weather on a dark night. The helicopter was damaged and sank in
water 60 feet deep; the occupants escaped with no injuries.
11/22/83 Bell 206B Air Logistics Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 1 0 0 Substantial
passenger
The helicopter was found floating inverted about 1.5 miles from the point of departure. The tail boom had separated and there was evidence
that the main-rotor blades had struck the tail boom.
12/24/83 Bell 212 Bristow Brent, North Sea Commercial 0 1 1 Destroyed
training
During practice winching to the deck of a vessel, the winch hook was caught in the ship’s railing, causing loss of control and water impact.
1/4/84 Aerospatiale NA Morgan City, Positioning 2 0 0 Destroyed
AS355F Louisiana, U.S.
The pilots encountered fog and struck a lake about four miles from the departure point. A fisherman who witnessed the accident said that
the helicopter descended into the water in a nose-low attitude. The helicopter skipped and tumbled for about 100 yards before it sank.
2/5/84 Hughes 269A NA Lake Whangape, Ferry 0 0 NA Substantial
New Zealand
While in a turn near the shore of Lake Whangape to position for landing, the helicopter struck the surface of the lake and sank in shallow
water.
4/4/84 Aerospatiale NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
AS355F passenger
While the pilot was conducting the takeoff from an unmanned platform, the tail section of the helicopter contacted a rotating-beacon
support bracket on a crane. The helicopter then struck the water.
5/1/84* Sikorsky S-76A NA Gulf of Mexico NA 0 0 2 Substantial
During cruise flight at 500 feet, the left engine sustained a massive, uncontained failure. Shrapnel penetrated the AC and DC junction boxes,
causing complete electrical failure. Using the copilot’s side window to see the water surface, the pilot conducted an autorotation. The
helicopter rolled over and sank when the emergency floats, which were electrically operated, failed to deploy. After evacuation, the pilot
returned to the inverted helicopter and deployed life rafts.
5/2/84* Boeing CH-47 BA Heli North Sea Unscheduled 0 0 47 Substantial
Chinook passenger
Shortly after takeoff, the helicopter developed a hydraulic problem that caused serious handling difficulties. The pilot conducted a
precautionary landing on the sea with a gentle touchdown in spite of control difficulties. Ten minutes after landing, the helicopter began
taking on water. The pilot conducted an evacuation; the helicopter then capsized and floated inverted until recovery.

596 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

6/8/84* Bell 206B NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 4 Substantial

passenger

While cruising at 550 feet above the Gulf of Mexico, the helicopter experienced loss of N1 rpm and engine failure. An autorotation was
initiated, which terminated in a hard landing in five-foot waves. One emergency float separated during the landing and the helicopter rolled
over, but continued to float.

7/4/84* Bell 47G-2 NA Detroit, Michigan, U.S. NA 0 3 0 Destroyed

The pilot landed the helicopter in the Detroit River after the engine sputtered and abnormal vibration was felt. Passengers said that the pilot
did not mention the problem to them and the helicopter seemed under control before entering the water.

7/21/84* Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 4 Substantial

passenger

A helicopter skid contacted a net fence around the landing platform on an oil platform. The safety net broke and the helicopter rocked over
the side of the platform. The pilot attempted an autorotation into the water. The landing was hard and one float separated. The helicopter
rolled over and later sank in 200 feet of water.

7/24/84* Bolkow 105 Bond North Sea Unscheduled 0 0 3 Destroyed

Helicopters passenger

The helicopter was ditched in the sea following a tail-rotor driveshaft-coupling failure. After the helicopter contacted the water, it rolled
onto its side and the occupants escaped. Very shortly after that, the helicopter rolled upside down.

10/12/84 Robinson R22 NA Hueytown, Alabama, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Destroyed

The pilot reported that he allowed engine rpm to drop and at the same time increased collective pitch. The helicopter struck the water in a
steep descent.

10/19/84 Hughes 369D NA St. Thomas, Business 3 0 0 Destroyed

U.S. Virgin Islands

The helicopter was being flown at 50 feet above the water at 15 knots for the purpose of photographing a sailboat. Witnesses reported
hearing a loud pop and seeing a puff of black smoke from the engine exhaust. Engine noise ceased and the helicopter rolled about 90
degrees onto its left side and descended into the water.

11/12/84* Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 1 4 Substantial

passenger

Total loss of power occurred just after liftoff from a 130-foot-high drilling platform. The pilot entered autorotation but touchdown was hard
during the ditching, resulting in a rollover. Emergency floats did not inflate fully until the helicopter rolled over.

11/20/84 Bell 212 Bristow North Sea Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed

passenger

The helicopter was being flown to an oil platform to pick up workers. The helicopter was seen to fall into the sea.

1/5/85 Agusta Bell 206 Bristow Weddell Sea, Antarctica Construction 0 0 1 Substantial
work

The helicopter was moving fuel drums from a ship to a depot six miles away on an ice shelf. In deteriorating visibility and deteriorating
contrast over the ice, the pilot flew the helicopter into the frozen sea.

2/25/85 Robinson R22A NA Santa Barbara, Instructional 0 1 0 Destroyed

California, U.S.

The student pilot said that during the last leg of a solo cross-country flight, he was flying along the coast at 50 feet to 75 feet when
he diverted his attention to look at a man on the beach. When he looked back at the instruments he noticed that the helicopter was
descending. Before the descent could be stopped, the helicopter struck the Pacific Ocean.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 597
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/20/85* Sikorsky S-61 Okanagan Halifax, Nova Scotia, Unscheduled 0 0 14 Destroyed
Helicopters Canada passenger
While en route from an offshore oil platform to Halifax, the crew of the helicopter noticed that the main-rotor transmission oil pressure
was decreasing and that the torque indication was zero. The pilot conducted ditching about six miles from land. After the helicopter was
ditched, the 17 occupants boarded two life rafts. Although they were all rescued about one hour later by Canadian Forces helicopters, three
passengers suffered hypothermia and were hospitalized.
4/10/85 Bell 47G-2 NA Panama City Beach, Sightseeing 0 2 1 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The pilot was carrying two paying passengers on a sightseeing flight after takeoff two minutes earlier from a helicopter pad at the beach.
He said that he had felt the engine sputtering and the cyclic stick shaking, followed less than 10 seconds later by the helicopter striking the
water in a level attitude at a very high rate of descent. The pilot did not possess a pilot’s certificate.
4/20/85 Sikorsky S-58ET NA Gulf of Mexico Positioning 3 0 0 Destroyed
The helicopter struck the water during an overwater flight from Key West, Florida, U.S., to Ft. Pierce, Florida, U.S. One occupant and the
wreckage of the helicopter were subsequently recovered from the Gulf of Mexico. The pilot and the other occupant were not located and
were presumed dead. Prior to departure, one of the crewmembers was overheard to say, “That didn’t sound good,” referring to an unusual
sound at the time of shutdown. The pilot told a witness that a mechanical problem was to be corrected in Ft. Pierce.
4/26/85 Aerospatiale NA New York, New York, U.S. Scheduled 1 0 6 Substantial
SA360C Dauphin passenger
During climb over the east edge of the heliport, the pilot-in-command noted a popping sound, loss of engine power, loss of main-rotor
rpm and rise in EGT. The helicopter began settling and the pilot tried to deploy emergency floats, but did not have time. The helicopter
struck water, rolled over and sank. One passenger did not egress and drowned with his seat belt fastened.
6/15/85* Bell 206B-3 NA Lahaina, Hawaii, U.S. Sightseeing 0 0 4 Substantial
The pilot reported that the engine failed at an altitude of 800 feet during climb. The helicopter was landed in the surf of the Pacific Ocean
and the tail rotor was damaged.
6/16/85 Robinson R22 NA Manhattan Beach, Business 0 0 2 Substantial
California, U.S.
The helicopter was to fly in formation with a banner tow. Numerous witnesses along a 20-mile stretch of beach saw the helicopter “flying
erratically” and “buzzing the beach” just prior to the accident. Witnesses saw the helicopter enter a near-hover at 70 feet, turn 270 degrees
toward the beach and then descend into the water.
7/7/85 Robinson R22A NA Summit Lake, Business 0 0 2 Substantial
Alaska, U.S.
The helicopter struck the glassy water surface of a lake during a low-altitude turn.
7/16/85* Aerospatiale NA Hoonah, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
AS350D passenger
The pilot heard a loud noise from the rear of the helicopter with a corresponding left yaw. The engine was shut down in flight and an
autorotation was conducted to the water.
7/21/85* Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
passenger
The pilot was conducting a takeoff from a hover off an offshore oil platform. As he lowered the nose for takeoff, he heard a loud noise from
the tail-boom area and the helicopter began rotating to the right. The pilot continued to apply power and conducted an autorotation to
the water. On impact, the main rotor struck the tail boom and severed it.
8/1/85 Bell 47G-2 NA Ochopee, Florida, U.S. Business 1 0 0 Substantial
The pilot said that he dropped his passenger off at a water station in the Everglades, water-taxied away from the station and increased
power to 3,100 rpm. Just before he increased collective pitch the transmission assembly departed the helicopter. The helicopter rolled to
the right and came to rest inverted.

598 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/25/85 Hughes 269C NA Elizabethtown, Personal 0 0 3 Substantial
Kentucky, U.S.
After takeoff from an off-airport landing zone, the helicopter encountered heavy rain showers. The pilot attempted to return to the landing
zone. The pilot was unable to see the ground in low-visibility conditions, and the tail rotor contacted a lake adjacent to the landing zone.
The helicopter then sank in the lake.
9/24/85 Bell 206B NA Glendhu Bay, Aerial 0 5 NA Destroyed
New Zealand photography
While hovering at 60 feet, the main-rotor blades struck telephone wires that were suspended across a cove. The helicopter descended into
the water.
1/9/86 Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Executive/ 0 1 0 Substantial
Corporate
The helicopter descended into the Gulf of Mexico from a 100-foot hover after the pilot lost yaw control downwind of an offshore oil
platform in 35-knot winds. As the helicopter transitioned to a hover, it began a turn to the right, even though it was headed into the wind.
Full-left pedal did not stop the spin, according to the pilot, who tried to fly away rather than to initiate autorotation into 10-foot seas. The
helicopter continued to spin and then lost altitude and contacted the water, where it rolled and started to sink. The pilot escaped through
the broken windshield.
4/5/86 Sikorsky S-76 NA Safe Harbor, Search and 0 0 3 Substantial
Pennsylvania, U.S. rescue
The helicopter was maneuvering at low altitude and low airspeed while on a SAR mission at night, looking for a capsized boat, when it
struck the water.
5/6/86 Bell 47G-5A NA Gulf of Mexico Fishery support 1 0 1 Destroyed
The helicopter struck the ocean when the pilot attempted to lift off from a tuna-fishing boat. Three of the four tiedown ropes that had
secured the helicopter to the boat had been released before takeoff.
5/15/86* Bell 214 BCAL Heli North Sea Unscheduled 0 0 20 Substantial
passenger
The helicopter was ditched because of a collective-control malfunction. During the evacuation, numerous difficulties were experienced
with safety equipment (e.g., life rafts failed to deploy, doors were difficult to open and emergency-float bags were punctured).
6/25/86 Enstrom F-28A NA New York, New York, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
passenger
The pilot conducted a go-around because of excessive groundspeed during the first landing attempt. The pilot reported that as he
increased collective pitch to terminate the second landing approach over the helipad, the helicopter descended rapidly. The helicopter
contacted the water in a level attitude, then rolled onto its left side. Gusty winds prevailed at the time of the accident.
7/3/86 Bell 47G-3B1 NA Coleman River, NA 0 1 1 Destroyed
Queensland, Australia
After descending the helicopter to 20 feet to gain speed, the pilot intended to climb over mangroves. The helicopter did not respond to
control inputs and collective was raised. The rotor was overpitched and the helicopter flew into the water and sank.
7/6/86 Hughes 500A NA Fall River, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Massachusetts, U.S.
The pilot encountered fog and haze during a return flight to New Bedford, Massachusetts. The pilot failed to maintain directional control
and the helicopter struck water in the North Watuppa Pond.
7/17/86* Bell B-222A NA Staten Island, Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
New York, U.S. passenger
The helicopter was in cruise flight at 900 feet when the pilot heard a loud bang and the helicopter yawed. Both crewmembers said that
they reacted as instructed and, in the process, an engine failed. The pilots conducted a ditching.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 599
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/30/86 Bell 206L-1 NA Grand Isle, Unscheduled 0 1 0 Destroyed
Gulf of Mexico passenger
The helicopter crashed into the Gulf of Mexico following a suspected engine failure shortly after liftoff from an offshore oil platform.
The pilot said that after takeoff, while flying at 40 knots and 200 feet above the water, he heard a loud squeal followed by the low-rpm
aural warning and a loss of engine power. He attempted two times or three times to inflate the emergency floats but was not successful.
The helicopter landed hard, rolled over and sank. The pilot evacuated and swam back to the platform. The wreckage sank and was not
recovered.
11/1/86* Bell 206B NA Mustang Island, Unscheduled 0 1 1 Substantial
Gulf of Mexico passenger
The helicopter experienced a power loss immediately after takeoff from an offshore oil platform. The pilot maintained the collective pitch
to clear the platform and then inflated the floats and conducted an autorotation to the water. The helicopter was struck by a five-foot wave
and rolled over. Both occupants exited without difficulty and the passenger swam to the platform. The pilot inflated his life vest and was
swept away by the current. He swam ashore 14 hours later.
11/6/86 Boeing CH-47 Brintel North Sea Unscheduled 45 2 0 Destroyed
Chinook Helicopters passenger
The helicopter struck the sea 1.5 miles off Sumburgh, Shetland Islands, Scotland, and sank.
2/5/87 Bell 206L-1 Air Logistics Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 2 1 1 Substantial
passenger
The pilot conducted the takeoff from an offshore oil platform with three passengers on board. Shortly after departing, he transmitted
a mayday call, but did not say the nature of the emergency. A passenger reported that the engine sound changed and the pilot told
him to get the raft out. Subsequently, the helicopter struck rough water and sank. A shrimp boat arrived after about 30 minutes to 40
minutes and all occupants of the helicopter were retrieved; later, the pilot and one passenger died from injuries.
2/8/87 Hughes 369D Royal Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. NA 1 2 2 Destroyed
Helicopters
During takeoff climb, one of five main-rotor blades and the tail boom separated from the helicopter. The helicopter then struck the water
and a submerged reef about 200 feet from the heliport.
2/13/87 Hughes 269A NA Buford, Georgia, U.S. Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
The helicopter was seen to slow down, then continue out over a lake. A puff of smoke was observed around the rear of the engine area and
the helicopter “fishtailed” as it almost transitioned to a hover. It then descended into the water nose-first and sank almost immediately. The
pilot was a low-time helicopter pilot who could not swim.
3/22/87* Bell 47-D1 NA Homosassa, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot said that just after takeoff, at about 50 feet, the engine lost power and he conducted a forced landing in a canal.
3/29/87* Bell 206B Kona Kona, Hawaii, U.S. Unscheduled 1 3 1 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
At 200 feet and about 0.25 mile from the shoreline, the helicopter’s engine power began to decrease. The pilot conducted an autorotation
to the ocean. All of the occupants evacuated and the helicopter sank. The passengers were not wearing life vests and one passenger
drowned. The helicopter was not equipped with any of the required flotation devices.
4/15/87 Bell 206B NA Laupahoehoe, Unscheduled 0 1 2 Destroyed
Hawaii, U.S. passenger
The helicopter was carrying passengers to a beached barge. Two passengers exited the helicopter without incident. One of these
passengers observed a wave break against the barge and water spraying upward onto the helicopter. Both passengers saw the helicopter
roll left and strike the water. There was no evidence that flotation equipment was available to the crew or passengers.
7/4/87 Aerospatiale NA Venice, Louisiana, U.S. NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
AS355-F1
Witnesses observed the helicopter break up in flight and strike the water.

600 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/23/87 Bell 47G-2 NA Huntsville, Alabama, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
observation
The helicopter struck the water during a low-altitude turn over a river while showing an island to a police officer/traffic observer.
7/28/87* Aerospatiale NA Nantucket, Executive/ 0 0 1 Substantial
AS350D Massachusetts, U.S. Corporate
The pilot heard a loud bang followed by a severe vibration, loss of power to the main-rotor system and loss of hydraulic pressure. The pilot
conducted an autorotation to the water, ditching near a fishing boat. The pilot exited with minor injuries and the helicopter sank into the
Atlantic Ocean. The helicopter subsequently was recovered.
8/5/87* Robinson R22 NA Burrville, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Rhode Island, U.S.
Engine power failed shortly after takeoff at about 200 feet. The pilot attempted to conduct an autorotation back to the lake, but during a
turn to avoid collision with a boat, the helicopter struck the water.
8/12/87 Hughes 369D NA Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Geological 2 0 0 Destroyed
survey
The helicopter collided in flight with a Cessna 185 amphibian and struck water.
8/19/87 Aerospatiale NA Gulf of Mexico Executive/ 0 2 1 Substantial
AS355F-1 Corporate
The helicopter experienced a tail-rotor driveshaft failure during takeoff from an offshore oil platform. The helicopter spun left and completed
six revolutions to seven revolutions prior to water contact because centrifugal force prevented the single pilot from reaching the throttles to
reduce torque to idle. The helicopter landed hard and the right emergency float deployed on touchdown. The left emergency float did not
deploy and the helicopter rolled over. The occupants swam to the platform from which the takeoff had been conducted.
8/21/87* Bell 206B NA Washington, D.C., U.S. Unscheduled 3 1 0 Destroyed
passenger
While in a hover at about 200 feet above the Potomac River, the helicopter’s engine lost power. The pilot initiated an autorotation and deployed
the emergency floats. Subsequently, the helicopter struck the river and rolled over. The floats kept the inverted helicopter at the surface.
9/16/87* Bell 206B NA Gulf of Mexico Positioning 0 0 1 Destroyed
While departing from an offshore oil platform, the helicopter lost engine power. The pilot initiated an autorotation and declared mayday,
but did not inflate the emergency floats before touching down in the water. The helicopter sank and was not recovered.
10/24/87* Bell 47J-2 NA Key Colony Beach, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S. passenger
The helicopter departed on a sightseeing flight along the shoreline. While in cruise flight at about 500 feet, engine power failed. The pilot
conducted an autorotative landing in the water with no damage to the helicopter. The pilot then rolled the helicopter to the right to stop
the rotation of the main-rotor blades so the pilot and passenger could exit the helicopter. The helicopter was substantially damaged.
12/7/87* Bell 412 NA Galveston, Texas, U.S. NA 0 2 0 Destroyed
The helicopter landed hard during an autorotation that was entered following the separation of the 90-degree gearbox.
1/15/88* Kawasaki NA Balmoral Beach, New Aerial work 0 0 3 Destroyed
BK117-A4 South Wales, Australia
The left-engine cowl unlatched in flight and was struck by rotor blades. The damage to rotor blades caused severe vibration and temporary
loss of control. The pilot ditched the helicopter.
2/11/88 Bell 206L-1 NA Port Douglas, NA 0 0 2 Substantial
Queensland, Australia
The pilot lost visual references because of a fogged bubble and rain. The tail rotor struck the water surface and separated from the tail
boom. The pilot lost directional control and the helicopter landed in 1.5 meters of water.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 601
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/28/88* Bell 214ST NA Troughton Island, Unscheduled 0 0 15 Destroyed
Western Australia, passenger
Australia
The helicopter began to vibrate severely while in cruise flight at 4,000 feet. The pilot conducted an autorotative landing in three-meter seas.
During the landing, the main-rotor blades struck the sea and the fuselage. The helicopter rolled over on touchdown and floated inverted for
several minutes. The crew and passengers evacuated and released one life raft. They were rescued by personnel on other helicopters.
5/1/88* Bell 206B Island Long Island City, Unscheduled 1 0 4 Destroyed
Helicopter New York, U.S. passenger
The helicopter was on a sightseeing flight around Manhattan Island when it experienced low rotor rpm. The pilot conducted a ditching
in the East River. The pilot and three passengers exited the helicopter and held onto the emergency floats, which were inflated and had
separated from the helicopter. One passenger did not escape and drowned.
5/29/88 Bell 206B NA Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 5 Destroyed
passenger
During a sightseeing flight, just after takeoff, the helicopter began to spin to the right. The pilot recovered the helicopter from the spin, but
by that time the helicopter was low over the water. A wave struck a skid and the helicopter entered the water and rolled to the left.
6/25/88* Bell 47J-2 NA Newburyport, Business 0 1 2 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S.
The helicopter departed Runway 10 at Plum Island Airport, turned left over the Plum Island River and shortly thereafter engine power was
lost without warning. The helicopter was autorotated into water. The occupants were rescued by a private citizen.
7/13/88* Sikorsky S-61 Brintel North Sea Unscheduled 0 0 21 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
An engine-fire warning was followed by smoke. Ditching and evacuation were completed as the cabin filled with dense smoke. The
helicopter burned with an “intense white flame” in the area of the forward gearbox, eventually breaking up and sinking.
7/14/88 Aerospatiale Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 1 14 Destroyed
SA330J Helicopters Inc. passenger
During liftoff from an oil platform, the helicopter began a slow uncommanded left turn. The pilot lowered the nose and raised the
collective. After two turns, the helicopter settled and struck the water in a left-bank/nose-down attitude. The emergency floats were not
inflated.
8/5/88 Bell 47G-3B-1 NA Oakland, Maine, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
photography
The pilot was maneuvering at 30 feet and making a right turn over a lake when the nose of the helicopter swung to the right. The pilot
realized that he had lost tail-rotor effectiveness and attempted to accelerate forward with cyclic before the helicopter struck water.
9/1/88 Bell 206B NA Gulf of Mexico Positioning 0 0 1 Destroyed
Before takeoff, the pilot removed the rotor-blade tiedown and the forward tiedowns, but not the aft tiedowns. After liftoff, the helicopter
entered a nose-high attitude, settled back on the platform’s safety fence and slid backward into the water.
9/29/88* Bell 212 NA Deadhorse, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot encountered a whiteout condition and conducted the landing on a frozen lake. After touchdown, the helicopter broke the ice
and rolled over on its back. The helicopter was destroyed by ground fire.
10/17/88 Sikorsky S-61 Bristow Handa Island, Scotland Search and 0 0 2 Destroyed
rescue
While conducting a night SAR mission in fog, the helicopter began a significant rearward drift and a rate of descent that were undetected by
the pilot. The helicopter struck the sea and rolled over. One crewmember became trapped in the flooding rear cabin and was unable to reach
the emergency exit handle because of the buoyancy of his helicopter transport suit. He escaped when others opened the door from outside.
11/10/88* Sikorsky S-61 Brintel North Sea Unscheduled 0 0 13 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
A gearbox low-oil-pressure warning was accompanied by vibration. The pilot ditched the helicopter. After the ditching, the helicopter
rolled right and overturned in 45-mph winds. The passengers and crew evacuated safely and were rescued by the SAR service.

602 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/17/88* Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 3 0 Substantial
passenger
During an approach, the pilot heard a loud noise from the engine, which was followed by illumination of an “ENGINE OUT” warning light,
aural warning and instrument indications of engine failure. The pilot initiated an autorotation and deployed the emergency floats. The
helicopter landed hard in rough seas. During the hard landing, the three occupants were injured. The helicopter remained afloat until an
attempt was made to tow it, when it sank and was not recovered.
4/25/89* Bolkow 105 Bond North Sea Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
Helicopters photography
Both engines failed while the helicopter was being maneuvered to land after encountering sleet showers. Autorotation was initiated and
floats were inflated. The occupants were transferred to a life raft and were soon picked up by a car-ferry boat.
5/7/89 Eurocopter Air Logistics Gulf of Mexico NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
MBB BO-105S
The helicopter was in cruise flight when it pitched nose-down and began an uncontrolled descent, striking the water in an inverted
attitude.
6/22/89 Robinson R22 NA Terrigal, New South Personal 1 0 1 Destroyed
Wales, Australia
For undetermined reasons, the pilot lost control of the helicopter in a climbing turn. The helicopter was at a lower altitude than required
and the pilot could not recover control before striking water. The passenger drowned after exiting the helicopter.
6/24/89* Bell 206B NA Ingham, Queensland, Unscheduled 0 4 1 Destroyed
Australia passenger
The pilot reported engine failure during approach to an island. The helicopter was ditched in water and sank. The emergency floats failed
to inflate for undetermined reasons.
7/3/89* Bell 206B-3 NA Sydney, New South Aerial work 0 0 3 Substantial
Wales, Australia
The helicopter’s engine failed. The pilot ditched the helicopter in a harbor. Occupants were rescued by personnel of a barge.
7/30/89 Robinson R22 NA Brinnon, Washington, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
During a pleasure flight, the pilot felt a low-frequency vibration and initiated a precautionary landing. Because of unsuitable terrain, the
pilot maneuvered over glassy water to land on a beach area. The pilot misjudged the height above the water, resulting in the left skid
contacting the water. The pilot said that the engine failed and that the helicopter settled softly in the water and sank.
8/2/89 Schweizer 269C NA Philadelphia, Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial
Pennsylvania, U.S.
Shortly after departing the heliport, which was 20 feet above the water, the helicopter struck the water.
8/16/89* Enstrom 280-C NA Milbridge, Maine, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Shortly after departing the private heliport, partial engine failure occurred. The pilot conducted an autorotation to a river.
11/2/89 Sikorsky SK-70 NA Marathon, Florida, U.S. Law 1 0 5 Destroyed
enforcement
While being maneuvered at night for surveillance of a boat, the helicopter descended and struck the ocean. The cabin filled with water. All of
the occupants egressed from the helicopter, except for the copilot, who was presumed to have drowned.
12/27/89 Bell 206L-1 Air Logistics Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 3 3 Destroyed
passenger
The pilot initiated a go-around during approach to an oil platform. The helicopter spun to the right and the nose dropped. The pilot tried
to regain control, but could not. He deployed the emergency floats just before the helicopter struck the water, but one of the left floats
separated on water entry and the helicopter rolled over.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 603
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/23/90 Aerospatiale NA Gulf of Mexico Positioning 1 0 0 Destroyed
AS355F-1
The pilot was flying from an offshore location to a company onshore base. The weather was IMC along the entire coast, with fog reported
onshore and offshore. The pilot changed destinations several times. The last radio communication with the pilot indicated that the
helicopter was offshore about 20 miles from its destination. The pilot and the helicopter were not recovered.
1/30/90 Bell 206B NA Rotoroa Island, Passenger 0 1 NA Destroyed
New Zealand
Visual references were lost when window transparencies became covered by mist shortly after takeoff. The helicopter descended, struck
the sea and sank.
2/10/90 Bell 206L Island New York, New York, U.S. Business 0 0 4 Substantial
Helicopter Corp.
The helicopter was lifted off the helipad and made a left-pedal turn. The pilot believed that he was taking off in a crosswind, when a
tailwind actually was present. As the helicopter arrived at the end of the heliport platform and was moving slowly over the water, the
helicopter settled in a nose-low attitude. The pilot could not stop the descent and the helicopter struck the river.
3/8/90* Aerospatiale International Miami, Florida, U.S. Unscheduled 2 1 0 Destroyed
AS350D Helicopter Corp. passenger
The engine failed over the ocean, and the pilot initiated autorotation. He told the passengers to don their life vests. About 100 feet above the
water, he deployed the emergency floats, then ditched in the ocean about three miles from shore. A wave struck the helicopter and it rolled
over. The passengers and pilot climbed onto the fuselage, and the pilot dove under water to retrieve the ELT. After he activated the ELT, another
wave struck and the pilot dropped the ELT as he reached to help a passenger. The accident occurred about 1115 local time, the U.S. Coast
Guard was notified about the ditching at 1530, and the pilot was rescued at 0430 the following morning. One passenger died eight hours after
the accident, and the other died 15 hours after the accident; both deaths were caused by drowning.
4/1/90* Aerospatiale Micronesian Saipan, Pacific Ocean Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
AS350B Aviation Corp. passenger
The helicopter was in cruise flight when the pilot felt a strong vibration. The pilot made an emergency landing in the sea with seven-foot
waves. The helicopter subsequently overturned and sank.
4/17/90* Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled NA 1 4 None
passenger
During a flight over the Gulf of Mexico, the engine failed. Before touchdown, the pilot deployed the floats. One passenger received
serious injuries during the ditching. After the pilot and passengers were rescued, the helicopter rolled over in the glassy, smooth water
but did not sink.
5/13/90* Enstrom F-28A NA Marathon, Florida, U.S. Sightseeing 0 0 3 Substantial
Shortly after takeoff at about 50 feet, tail-rotor effectiveness was lost. The pilot conducted a power-on ditching in the ocean.
5/20/90 Robinson R22M NA Stevensville, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Maryland, U.S.
The pilot said that while he was water-taxiing the helicopter on a bay, he encountered a wave from a passing boat, causing the
helicopter to nose down. The pilot unsuccessfully tried to regain control with cyclic input. The helicopter nosed over and sank.
5/22/90 Hughes 269A NA Bremerton, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Washington, U.S.
During approach over a lake for landing at a private residence, the pilot experienced binding of the tail-rotor controls and loss of anti-
torque control. He reduced power to maintain the heading and the helicopter settled into the water.
6/23/90 Bell 47G-2A NA Dutch Harbor, Business 0 0 2 Destroyed
Alaska, U.S.
In heavy fog, the pilot saw a cliff appear in front of the helicopter and he turned to avoid it. Another cliff appeared, and as the pilot turned
again, the helicopter struck the water and sank.

604 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/19/90* Bell 206A NA Lake Ozark, Missouri, U.S. Business 0 0 4 Minor
Shortly after liftoff over water, the helicopter’s engine failed. A ditching was conducted and the emergency floats failed to deploy. The
helicopter sank; all four occupants escaped unharmed.
7/25/90 Sikorsky S-61N British 112 miles northeast of Unscheduled 6 4 3 Destroyed
International Sumburgh, Shetland passenger
Helicopters Islands, Scotland
The helicopter was maneuvering to land on a permanently moored offshore storage and tanker-loading unit. As the helicopter hovered
adjacent to the helideck, the tail-rotor blade tips struck a handrail surrounding a crane on the installation. The helicopter struck the
helideck and fell over the side of the deck and into the sea. Seven survivors were rescued from the sea after they escaped from the sinking
helicopter.
8/13/90 Bell 206B-2 NA San Francisco, Aerial 0 0 3 Destroyed
California, U.S. photography
The pilot was maneuvering the helicopter in a climbing right turn around a sailboat to provide an aerial platform for a movie film crew.
About 100 feet above the water and a few feet from the sailboat mast, the helicopter began to spin to the right. The pilot reduced
collective pitch and the spin stopped, but because of the collective-pitch reduction, the pilot was unable to regain control of the helicopter
before it struck the ocean surface and sank.
8/14/90 Hughes 269A NA Barramundi Lagoon, NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
Queensland, Australia
The helicopter experienced a tailwind gust during takeoff. The pilot overpitched the main rotor while attempting to counteract a descent,
which resulted in the right skid contacting the lagoon surface. The helicopter rolled over and sank.
9/8/90* Aerospatiale Canadian Ponita Lake, Animal control 0 0 3 Substantial
AS350B Ecureuil Helicopters Alberta, Canada
The helicopter was being flown at low level over a lake to assist in the capture of live trumpeter swans. The method of capture involved
hovering within four feet of the water to allow a biologist to scoop up a bird with a large fish net. While the helicopter was being
maneuvered into position to capture a bird, the tail rotor struck the surface of the water. Directional control was lost immediately and the
pilot ditched the helicopter to stop the uncontrolled rotation. The doors on the right side of the helicopter had been removed and water
entered the cabin immediately. The helicopter sank in shallow water. All three of the occupants egressed from the helicopter as it sank and
climbed up onto its left side. They were wearing life vests and swam to shore.
9/12/90 Bell 206-L1 NA Port O’Connor, Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
Texas, U.S. passenger
The helicopter departed at dawn for a VFR flight from a coastal base en route to an offshore oil platform during IMC. The helicopter
penetrated a heavy rain shower. The pilot descended and attempted to maintain visual contact with an oil-platform light. The helicopter’s
right skid dipped into the water and the helicopter tumbled forward and struck the water.
10/22/90 Bell 47G-5 NA NA Aerial 1 0 0 Destroyed
observation
The pilot was operating from a ship at sea for fish spotting and herding. The helicopter was herding fish into the deployed net when a rotor
struck a swell. The helicopter collided with the water, rolled inverted and sank.
11/16/90* Bell 212 Petroleum Air Egypt NA 0 0 1 Destroyed
Services
During takeoff from an offshore oil platform, the pilot found that a bridge that had been jacked up for painting obstructed his normal
departure path. The pilot then changed the departure route. While in a low hover and moving backwards, the helicopter’s tail rotor struck a
fence, which the pilot had not noticed. After impact, the helicopter began to vibrate and developed an uncontrollable yaw to the right. The
pilot subsequently ditched the helicopter.
11/24/90* Hughes 269C NA Lethbridge, Unscheduled 0 1 2 Substantial
Victoria, Australia passenger
Shortly after takeoff, at about 20 feet and 30 knots, power decreased briefly and main-rotor rpm decayed. Attempting to fly to the bank, the
pilot overpitched the main rotor and then ditched the helicopter.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 605
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/25/90 Aerospatiale Elitos SpA Mirana di Ravinna, Italy Unscheduled 13 0 0 Destroyed
SA330J Puma passenger
The helicopter was destroyed when the pilot lost control and the aircraft struck the sea about three minutes after takeoff. The accident was
caused by the fatigue failure of a main-rotor-hub spindle and subsequent departure of the main-rotor blades.
12/6/90* Aerospatiale Pelita Air Matak Island, Indonesia NA 10 2 0 Destroyed
AS332L Service
Super Puma
About two minutes after takeoff, the pilot reported that he was experiencing electrical problems and was returning. The crew declared
mayday and said that they were ditching. The helicopter was seen descending through about 200 feet, with flames and black smoke coming
from the vicinity of the main rotor head. It then rolled through 90 degrees and spun into the sea, striking the water in a nose-down attitude
about 600 feet short of the runway.
12/20/90 Bell 206B-3 NA St. Marks, Florida, U.S. Public use 0 0 1 Destroyed
While descending at night in VFR, the pilot lost outside visual reference and the helicopter struck the water. No mechanical failures or engine
failure were identified after the accident.
1/16/91* Bell 206B-3 NA Heron Island, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
Queensland, Australia passenger
During takeoff, at 200 feet, a loud bang was heard and the helicopter yawed to the right. The pilot activated emergency floats and ditched.
1/27/91 Bell 206L-1 NA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
passenger
The helicopter departed from an offshore oil platform en route to an onshore location. After takeoff, the pilot received a weather
briefing, which included adverse conditions in the area. The pilot did not make a required 15-minute flight-following call after
departure and was assumed to be missing. A search was initiated, but was hampered by bad weather. Neither the helicopter nor the
occupants were found during SAR efforts. When the wreckage was located later, investigators determined that a high-speed impact
with water had occurred.
1/31/91 Aerospatiale French Aircraft Watson Island Helipad, Aerial 0 3 0 Destroyed
SA341G Gazelle Agency Miami, Florida, U.S. observation
During takeoff from a helipad, the pilot climbed to about 200 feet at about 90 knots before engine failure occurred. The helicopter lost
height and struck the sea close to shore. The helicopter struck the water at a high rate of descent and came to rest upright.
2/10/91* Eurocopter Heli-Lift Valdez, Alaska, U.S. NA 0 0 4 Destroyed
MBB BO-105CBS
While en route, some 25 to 30 minutes after takeoff, the helicopter’s no. 1 engine failed. The helicopter was apparently unable to maintain
height and was ditched in the sea.
2/14/91 Mil Mi-2 Aeroflot Krasnopere-kopsk, NA 1 2 0 Destroyed
– Ukraine Ukraine, Soviet Union
Directorate (now Commonwealth of
Independent States)
During landing, the helicopter struck the water surface.
2/14/91* Hughes 369C Alpromar SA Manzanillo, Mexico NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
Control of the helicopter was lost while it was being flown at a low altitude over the sea. The helicopter was ditched and sank.
2/24/91* Bell 212 Bristow Eket, Nigeria Unscheduled 9 0 4 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
(Nigeria)
During the final stages of the approach to an offshore oil platform, as the helicopter descended through about 400 feet, a loud bang
was heard and the helicopter began to yaw violently. The pilot conducted an immediate ditching. On touchdown the helicopter was not
fully under control, pitched violently forward and rolled inverted. The helicopter came to rest floating inverted about half a mile from the
platform.

606 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/8/91* Bell 206B Kenai Air of Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
Hawaii passenger
About 15 nautical miles south of Honolulu, engine failure occurred because of fuel exhaustion. The pilot conducted an autorotation to the
water. After the touchdown, the right-forward emergency floats deflated, causing the helicopter to sink.
4/1/91 Hughes 369C NA Papua, New Guinea Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
observation
The pilot was flying between two tuna-fishing vessels. As the pilot began a climb from about 100 feet above the water, he found that
the cyclic control was binding longitudinally. The helicopter continued to climb until it reached a near-vertical attitude. The pilot applied
rudder pedal to move the nose down. The helicopter then descended rapidly to the surface of the ocean, where a float attached to a skid
contacted the water. The floats were torn off and the helicopter cartwheeled and sank.
4/5/91 Sikorsky S-61N Helivia Aero Taxi Tesse, Brazil Demonstration 0 0 2 Destroyed
During a demonstration of water landing on a river, the helicopter’s approach speed was too high and control was lost on touchdown.
The helicopter pitched up and its main rotors struck the tail and separated. The S-61 remained floating and was later towed toward the
shore by a local fishing boat. Before it was recovered to a beach, the helicopter rolled inverted and sank in about 10 meters of water.
4/14/91 Bell 206B-3 Polizia Bari, Italy NA 1 0 1 Destroyed
JetRanger
The helicopter was reported missing at sea. Details were not reported.
4/23/91 Bell 206B Offshore Gulf of Mexico NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
JetRanger Logistics
The pilot did not make the required 15-minute radio position report after departure from an offshore oil platform; a radio search and an air
search were initiated. About two hours later, debris was found floating about three miles from the departure point.
4/29/91 Bell UH-1B NA Lake Seminole, Aerial 0 0 1 Destroyed
Georgia, U.S. observation
The helicopter was being used to observe previously sprayed aquatic plants. The flight proceeded along the river at a low level. No
obstruction was seen but a bump was felt and the helicopter struck the river. The pilot and passenger exited the helicopter under water.
5/12/91* Aerospatiale NA Karratha, Western Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
SA330J Australia passenger
The helicopter entered a vortex-ring state after descent through 480 feet during a stabilized approach, at night, to a ship’s platform. The
rate of descent increased from 800 feet per minute to 4,000 feet per minute in 6.6 seconds from 480 feet to 100 feet. The rate of descent
was stopped just prior to ditching.
5/18/91 Hughes 269C NA Tarpon Springs, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The pilot climbed to a three-foot hover over a dock and, while he was transitioning to forward flight over a lake, the helicopter began to
descend. The pilot said that he raised the collective and applied power to stop the descent but the skids struck the water. He then rolled
the helicopter on its right side to stop the main rotor and both occupants exited the helicopter.
5/29/91 Bell UH-1B NA Lake Seminole, Aerial 0 2 1 Destroyed
Georgia, U.S. observation
The takeoff occurred at dawn on a flight for aerial observation of previously sprayed aquatic plants. The helicopter was flown at a low level
along a river. The pilot looked at the observer, then looked forward again. No obstruction was seen, but a bump was felt and the helicopter
struck the river surface. The pilot and his passenger exited the helicopter under water.
6/12/91 Enstrom F-28 NA Snowdonia, Wales Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
photography
While being hovered over a lake, the helicopter encountered a strong downdraft and settled into the water. Both occupants escaped
before the helicopter sank.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 607
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/17/91 Sikorsky S-76A Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 10 0 Destroyed
Helicopters Inc. passenger
During takeoff from an oil platform, the pilot increased collective pitch. The helicopter responded by turning right. The copilot interpreted
the right turn as a loss of directional control, so he took both engines offline. The action was taken without coordination or announcement
to the pilot-in-command. The main rotor blades struck the platform and the helicopter descended uncontrolled to the water.
6/25/91* Aerospatiale NA South East Point, Aerial work 0 1 0 Destroyed
AS350D Victoria, Australia
The helicopter was being used to sling-load a fuel bladder to a lighthouse. The helicopter’s engine-fire light illuminated and the engine
stopped as if from fuel exhaustion. The pilot ditched the helicopter.
7/3/91 Hughes 300C NA Whitehall, Michigan, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot said that he flew across Lake Michigan in dark night conditions. On arrival at the opposite shore, he entered a descending left
turn toward the destination. The pilot lost visual reference during this maneuver, and the helicopter descended into the lake.
7/12/91 Hughes 369 Guaradia di Baseleghe, Italy NA 1 1 0 Destroyed
Finanza
The helicopter was reported missing at sea. Details were not reported.
8/10/91* Bell 47G NA Lake Ozark, Missouri, U.S. Business 0 0 1 Substantial
Shortly after takeoff, the pilot heard a loud snap, which was followed by an uncommanded right yaw. An autorotation was conducted and
the helicopter forcefully struck the water during the ditching.
8/26/91* Bell 412 Petroleum Gulf of Mexico, south of Unscheduled 1 4 8 Destroyed
Helicopters Inc. Cameron, Louisiana, U.S. passenger
The helicopter was ditched during approach to a semi-submersible drilling platform. When about 500 yards from the platform and descending
through 250 feet, directional control was lost. On touchdown, the helicopter rolled inverted because only one of the emergency floats inflated.
9/15/91 Bell-K Copter NA Laurie, Missouri, U.S. Personal 3 0 0 Destroyed
47D1
The pilot was seen consuming beer with a group of people before the flight. He and two others of the group were seen boarding the
helicopter and the pilot was seen conducting the takeoff. A witness on a highway about 5.5 miles south of the departure point saw a
helicopter flying at treetop level, turning toward a lake and disappearing from sight. Two witnesses saw the helicopter strike power-line
cables, then strike the lake. Post-mortem tests showed that the pilot had a blood-alcohol level of 0.161 percent.
9/17/91 Robinson R22 NA Lewisville, Texas, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed
The pilot experienced binding of the flight controls and landed the helicopter on a lake. When the pilot moved the controls while floating
on the lake, the binding ceased. After conducting a takeoff, the pilot found that controls would not respond to inputs and were binding.
The helicopter descended out of control and struck the water.
9/23/91 Robinson R22 NA Point Judith, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Rhode Island, U.S.
The pilot departed Block Island, Rhode Island, on a dark night and was reported missing when he did not arrive at the destination. A search was
initiated, but the pilot and helicopter were not found. The tail section of the helicopter was recovered by the U.S. Coast Guard on Dec. 8, 1991.
9/24/91* Bell 206B Celtic Dunquin, Ireland Survey/Patrol 0 0 2 Substantial
JetRanger Helicopters
The helicopter was ditched during the filming of a motion picture.
10/14/91* Kaman HH-43B/F NA Mt. Vernon, Alabama, U.S. Positioning 0 0 2 Substantial
While in flight, the throttle rolled back uncommanded to flight idle. An autorotative landing was conducted to a shallow lake.
11/21/91* Bell 214ST NA Timor Sea Unscheduled 0 0 17 Substantial
passenger
Smoke was seen coming from the left engine after takeoff. The helicopter was landed 75 meters from an oil platform using the emergency
floats. One float bag burst and the helicopter rolled over.

608 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/22/91* Bell 214ST Lloyd Timor Sea, off Western Unscheduled 0 0 17 Destroyed
Helicopters Australia, Australia passenger
The pilot ditched the helicopter after partial power failure during departure. The pilot and passengers were rescued without injury and the
helicopter was recovered.
1/11/92 Bell 206B-3 NA Crockett, California, U.S. Aerial 5 0 0 Destroyed
observation
The helicopter collided with a power line, entered an uncontrolled descent and struck the water of a strait.
2/4/92 Bell 206B NA Swan Reach, Victoria, NA 0 1 3 Destroyed
Australia
While flying north, following a river about 250 feet above the water, the helicopter struck a power line. The helicopter descended into the
river, where it sank inverted.
2/12/92* Bell 206L-3 NA Fort Collins, Ferry 2 1 0 Substantial
Colorado, U.S.
While in cruise flight over a reservoir, the engine failed. The pilot conducted an autorotation through dense fog to the water surface, which
contained patches of ice. The helicopter sank. SAR personnel found the pilot about 45 minutes after the accident. The pilot was the only
person on the surface at the time.
2/15/92* Robinson R22M NA Chandler, Arizona, U.S. Business 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot was conducting an autorotation to the water in a float-equipped helicopter as a part of a sales demonstration flight. The
helicopter pitched forward during the touchdown phase of the water landing. The right float sank and the helicopter rolled over on its
right side.
3/2/92 Bell 206B-3 NA Glenbrook, Nevada, U.S. Aerial 0 0 5 Substantial
observation
The helicopter began an uncommanded right turn while being flown out of ground effect. The pilot attempted to stop the right turn
without success. The helicopter descended uncontrolled until it struck a lake.
3/14/92 Aerospatiale Bristow East Shetland Basin, Unscheduled 11 1 5 Destroyed
AS332L Helicopters Great Britain passenger
Super Puma
The helicopter was destroyed when it struck the sea during a 200-meter flight from an oil platform to a vessel that provided living quarters.
After liftoff, the pilot began a climbing right-hand turn toward the vessel. About 15 seconds later, while in the right turn, the helicopter
began to descend and struck the sea. The flight time was 47 seconds.
3/20/92* Bell 206B-3 Manchester Blackpool, Private 0 0 1 Destroyed
JetRanger Helicopter England
During cruise at 3,000 feet over the Irish Sea about two minutes after takeoff, the engine failed. The pilot transmitted a distress call and
conducted an autorotation to the sea. After touchdown the helicopter turned over and later sank.
4/9/92 Bell 206L-3 Petroleum Venice, Louisiana, U.S. Unscheduled 0 2 1 Destroyed
Helicopters Inc. passenger
The helicopter was en route to an offshore oil platform when the pilot became ill. While descending to conduct a precautionary landing on
the water, the pilot lost consciousness and lost control of the helicopter. Food poisoning was caused by ingestion of day-old fish that the
pilot had prepared the previous night for dinner.
4/22/92 Robinson R22 NA Rottnest Island, Western Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
Australia, Australia photography
The pilot, who was conducting aerial photography, lost control of the helicopter. The helicopter spun right and descended into the water.
6/4/92* Bell 212 Aeroleo Taxi Campos Basin, Brazil Unscheduled 3 3 1 Destroyed
Aereo passenger
According to press reports, a fire occurred the helicopter’s no. 2 engine during a flight to an oil platform and the helicopter subsequently
was ditched about 46 kilometers from the shore.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 609
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/10/92* Hughes 369D CRI Helicopters Ketchikan, Alaska, U.S. Personnel 0 0 4 Destroyed
positioning to
site
About three minutes after takeoff from a hilltop, the helicopter began to vibrate and tail rotor thrust was lost. The pilot could not control
the helicopter and elected to land immediately. The helicopter was ditched and sank in 30 feet of water.
6/16/92 Bell 47-G4A NA Shelburne Falls, Aerial 3 0 0 Destroyed
Massachusetts, U.S. observation
The helicopter struck power lines. Control was lost and the helicopter struck a river that was parallel to the flight path.
7/4/92* Robinson NA Cooktown, Queensland, Personal 0 0 2 Destroyed
R22 Beta Australia
The pilot was operating from a cleared area in a mangrove swamp. The helicopter lifted off and continued forward above the mangroves.
The pilot believed that he had overpitched the rotor and took corrective action, then conducted a ditching in the Normanby River.
7/26/92 Bell 206B-3 Industrial Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
The helicopter was approaching a platform to pick up two passengers. A nose-high flare was observed by the waiting passengers and the
tail-rotor blades struck the fence guard around the helideck. Control was lost as the tail-rotor assembly and gear box separated from the
tail boom. The helicopter spun off the helideck, falling to the ocean.
8/9/92 Eurocopter Rocky Mountain Madison, Business 0 0 3 Substantial
MBB BO-105 Helicopters South Dakota, U.S.
The pilot said that he entered a shallow right turn 200 feet to 300 feet above Lake Madison. He then realized that the helicopter had
descended considerably and was in a steep right bank. He said that he attempted to level the helicopter and climb but the helicopter
struck the water.
8/13/92* Rotorway Exec NA Kirkland, Personal 0 0 0 Substantial
Washington, U.S.
The pilot said that just after liftoff from a dock, about 50 feet above the water and 200 yards from the departure point, the cyclic control
became very stiff and almost impossible to move. The pilot attempted to return to the dock, but about 50 yards from the landing area, the
helicopter began to spin. Because of the restricted landing area and people along the shore, the pilot ditched the helicopter in the lake.
9/13/92 Robinson NA Colfax, California, U.S. Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
R22 Beta
The pilot and passenger were flying about 150 feet above the ground in a canyon. The pilot failed to see and avoid a steel cable crossing
the helicopter’s flight path. The helicopter struck the cable, descended and struck a river.
9/25/92 Hughes 369D Temsco George Inlet, Alaska, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 4 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
While the helicopter was being flown along a shoreline at about 300 feet, a passenger asked the pilot to fly in the opposite direction.
During the turn, the helicopter descended and struck the water.
9/25/92 Bell 47G-5 NA Cairns Harbour, Aerial 1 2 0 Substantial
Queensland, Australia photography
While the helicopter was being used in filming operations, about 150 meters from the shoreline of an inlet, it began rotating to the right and
losing altitude, narrowly missing the mast of a yacht. As the rotation continued, the helicopter veered closer to the shoreline and lost more
altitude while maintaining level flight. The helicopter struck the water right-skid-first about 70 meters from the shoreline and sank almost
immediately.
11/5/92* Mil Mi-8MT NA Yuanyang, Henan NA 0 0 5 Destroyed
Province, China
The helicopter was ditched after tail-rotor problems were experienced during a practice rescue mission.
12/7/92* Hughes 269B NA Kahului, Hawaii, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
observation
The helicopter was ditched in the ocean after an in-flight loss of control.

610 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/8/93 Robinson NA Coolangatta, Personal 0 2 0 Destroyed
R22 Beta Queensland, Australia
The pilot conducted a takeoff and flew the helicopter at a low level down a creek. The helicopter struck power lines and then struck the
water. The pilot and passenger swam to shore.
1/11/93 Hughes 269C NA Tonawanda, Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
New York, U.S. observation
The pilot requested and received a special VFR clearance to depart on a radio-traffic-watch flight into adverse weather. The helicopter struck
power-transmission lines 194 feet above a river and descended into the river.
1/12/93 Bell 206B Helinet Corp. Hayward, California, U.S. Cargo 2 0 0 Destroyed
The pilot flew the helicopter across a coastal bay in an area of low visibility near a bridge that spanned the bay. A witness observed the
helicopter descending below the level of the bridge where visibility was about 0.25 mile in rain. The helicopter struck the water about 0.5
mile from the shore and about 400 yards south of the bridge and was destroyed.
1/25/93* Fairchild-Hiller NA Volcano National Park, Sightseeing 4 0 1 Destroyed
FH-1100 Hawaii, U.S.
While the helicopter was hovering near a shoreline, a total failure of the left pedal occurred. The helicopter began to spin and the pilot lost
control. The pilot performed an autorotative descent and touched down in the Pacific Ocean. A wave swamped the helicopter and it sank.
The helicopter was not equipped with floats, and none of the passengers was wearing a life vest.
2/8/93 Bell 206L-1 Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
Helicopters Inc. passenger
Witnesses said that they saw the helicopter depart from the helideck in a steep left bank and nose-down attitude, which were maintained
until the helicopter struck the water.
3/24/93* Bell 47-G2A NA Pacific Ocean Aerial 1 0 1 NA
observation
On a fish-spotting mission with the ship’s master as passenger, the pilot heard a loud bang and felt a vibration in the rudder pedals. All yaw
control was lost. The pilot believed that the tail rotor had been struck by a large sea bird. He was able to maintain directional control with
the throttle and collective, and the ship from which the flight had departed maneuvered to create a smooth water surface for ditching. The
passenger unexpectedly jumped out of the helicopter and was killed; the pilot conducted a running landing on the water. The helicopter
was hoisted onto the deck of the ship.
3/25/93 Hiller UH12E NA Greeleyville, Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
South Carolina, U.S.
The pilot was flying over a lake while approaching to land at an empty field adjacent to his house. When the helicopter was flared for
landing over the lake, the tail rotor struck the lake surface. Directional control was lost and the helicopter struck the lake.
4/11/93* Fairchild-Hiller Pelican Air Caribbean Sea between Ferry 0 0 2 Destroyed
FH-1100 Helicopter Curacao and Santo
Domingo
Flying at 4,500 feet, about two hours and 20 minutes after departure, the pilot noticed that the engine turbine-outlet temperature
had begun to rise. The temperature continued to rise well past the maximum for continuous operation, and the pilot conducted a
precautionary ditching before the engine failed. The helicopter touched down on the sea but rolled over almost immediately in a swell and
began to sink, disappearing below the water after about 10 minutes. The crew was rescued three hours and 15 minutes later.
5/8/93* Bell 212 Lufttransport AS Tomso, Norway Test 0 0 3 Substantial
Shortly after takeoff for a routine test flight following maintenance, the helicopter apparently began to experience control difficulties and
the crew was conducted a ditching.
5/29/93 Robinson R22 NA Reading, England Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
photography
The helicopter struck water while a passenger was filming water sports. The helicopter came to rest inverted in the water.
7/26/93* Bell 206B-2 Motions Video Lake Powell, Utah, U.S. Aerial 0 0 3 Substantial
JetRanger Productions observation
The pilot was conducting a low-level pass over a jet ski for the purpose of filming when the helicopter entered a right-hand climbing turn.
During the turn, the engine failed and the pilot conducted an autorotation to the lake.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 611
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
7/28/93* Bell 206B-3 Lloyd Facing Island, Australia Unscheduled 3 1 0 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
While flying at 1,500 feet, the pilot reported that he had felt a sudden jolt and that he was returning. Shortly after this, he reported that he was
ditching the helicopter and transmitted a mayday call. This was the last radio communication with the flight, which struck the sea off Facing Island.
7/29/93 Bell 206A Osterman Musholmen, Sweden Aerial 0 0 3 Substantial
JetRanger Helicopter observation
The helicopter was being used to collect water samples. At one of the sampling points, the water surface was still and glassy and the pilot
used some water lilies for visual reference. He also expected that rotor downwash would ripple the water surface and provide additional
visual reference for the touchdown. The rate of descent was excessive; however, a normal landing flare could not be conducted to stop
the descent. The tail boom or the rear of the left float struck the water, and the main rotor struck and severed the tail boom. The helicopter
cartwheeled and came to rest inverted in the water.
8/10/93 Robinson Offshore Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
R22 Beta Helicopters
The helicopter’s main rotor diverged from its normal plane of rotation, which caused the rotor to contact the airframe. The helicopter
descended in uncontrolled flight and struck the Pacific Ocean.
9/10/93 Aerospatiale NA Ogden, Utah, U.S. Executive/ 1 2 3 Destroyed
SA365-N2 Corporate
The helicopter was flying over glassy water. The pilot had set the bug on the radio altimeter for 50 feet; while he was looking outside,
however, the helicopter descended below 50 feet. The pilot said that seconds before impact with the water, the radio altimeter had
indicated an altitude of 10 feet.
9/22/93 Bell 206B Supremas Bel Pacific Ocean Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
Golso observation
The helicopter pilot was conducting a fish-spotting mission, 15 miles to 20 miles from the ship from which it had been launched. The pilot
advised that he was returning to the vessel. Shortly thereafter, the pilot transmitted, ‘We are going down … the engine has stopped.” The
vessel immediately went to the last known position of the helicopter and began a search, which was suspended at dusk. At 0900 local time the
following morning, pieces of fiberglass and an unopened life raft were found, and a short time later, the body of the passenger was found.
10/23/93* Bell 47J-2A NA Whyalla, South Australia, Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
Australia
Five minutes after departing Whyalla and 10 kilometers from the coast, the helicopter began experiencing engine problems. The pilot
instructed the passenger to prepare for a ditching. After the helicopter forcefully struck the sea during the ditching, the passenger
egressed and removed the injured pilot from the helicopter. During the long swim to shore, the pilot was lost.
10/25/93 Bell 206B Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Nonscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
Helicopters Inc. passenger
The pilot reported that, during takeoff from an offshore oil platform, the helicopter pitched nose-down and began to spin uncontrollably.
The helicopter then struck the water. The operator reported that the left-front tiedown had not been removed prior to takeoff.
10/29/93* Bell 206L New York New York, New York, U.S. Sightseeing 0 0 6 None
Helicopter Corp.
The helicopter pilot was conducting a sightseeing flight over the East River in New York City when the engine failed. The pilot deployed the
emergency floats, initiated an autorotation and ditched in the river.
10/29/93 Bell 206B SeaHawk Gulf of Mexico Business 1 0 2 Destroyed
Services
The pilot set up an orbit to wait for thunderstorms and squalls to move out of the area. During one orbit, the helicopter was struck by a 15-
foot swell and rolled into the water. The three occupants were able to exit the helicopter and inflate their life vests.
According to passengers, the helicopter continued to float for five hours to six hours, during which one passenger attempted
unsuccessfully three times to retrieve the life raft from inside the helicopter. The passenger did retrieve another life vest, which he gave
to the pilot for additional flotation. The helicopter sank, and one of the passengers swam to the oil platform, which he estimated as
being about two miles away. Shortly thereafter, the second passenger began swimming toward the platform, but the pilot said that we
would await rescue. The first passenger reached the unmanned platform about three hours after he began swimming and was able to
telephone his office. The passenger on the platform was rescued by a Coast Guard cutter and the second passenger was recovered by
a work boat. The same boat found the unconscious pilot, who was face-down in the water, the following morning. During the recovery,
the pilot’s life vest came off and he sank below the surface.

612 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/7/93 Hughes 369D Big Eye Bismark Sea, Papua Aerial 2 0 0 Destroyed
Helicopters New Guinea observation
The helicopter was destroyed when it struck the Bismark Sea during a fish-spotting flight from a motor fishing vessel. The helicopter was
being tracked by radar from the ship, but about 1.5 hours into the flight, with the helicopter operating about 27.5 miles from the ship, the
radar return disappeared. There was no distress call.
11/17/93* Agusta-Bell 204B Meteor Chania/Souda, Greece NA 2 0 0 Destroyed
Constructionie
Aeronautiche
The helicopter was en route to retrieve a drone that was floating in the sea, and was being flown at 600 feet and 70 knots when
the pilot reported that he was ditching. Almost immediately, the helicopter entered a steep dive that continued until impact with the sea.
11/19/93* Bell 206L-1 Echo Portland, Maine, U.S. Emergency 3 1 0 Destroyed
medical services
During a flight to Portland, the pilot encountered IMC and a substantial headwind of 40 to 60 knots. The engine failed because of fuel
exhaustion and the helicopter was ditched in the ocean in rough seas seven miles east of the airport.
2/15/94 Bell 206B NA Dalywoi Bay, Unscheduled 0 0 6 Destroyed
Northern Territory, passenger
Australia
The pilot initiated a descending right turn to land into the wind. But as he raised the collective at 150 feet, the helicopter continued to turn
right. The tail-rotor pedals appeared to be ineffective, and the pilot was unable to regain control before the helicopter struck the sea. The
pilot and passengers evacuated the helicopter and were found safe on a beach later.
4/9/94 Bell 206L-3 NA Point Nepean, Personal 0 1 3 Destroyed
Victoria, Australia
The helicopter was being used to drop marker buoys from 100 feet, with the pilot maintaining altitude by reference to the radio altimeter.
The flight was being conducted at low speed over the sea at night for a SAR exercise with boats. As soon as the buoys were released, the
pilot directed his attention to the global positioning system receiver. As the pilot increased throttle to climb, the helicopter skids contacted
the water and the helicopter nosed over into the sea at about 15 knots. The four persons on board, none of whom was wearing a life vest,
were rescued within 20 minutes.
4/10/94 Bell 212 Hill Aviation (Hill Mayaguez, Aerial 0 1 2 Destroyed
Construction Puerto Rico, U.S. observation
Corp.)
The helicopter was destroyed when it struck the sea shortly after takeoff on a local observation flight.
4/23/94* Sikorsky S-76A Pelita Air Alpha One Platform, Unscheduled NA NA NA Destroyed
Spirit II Service Matak Island, passenger
Indonesia
During approach to the helideck on an oil platform, the pilot allowed the helicopter’s speed and rate of descent to increase excessively.
Near the platform he attempted to reduce the rate of descent by flaring the helicopter and increasing power. The helicopter touched down
hard on the helideck and bounced. The helicopter then pitched over the side of the platform, striking the edge of the deck with the rear
fuselage and tail. The pilot regained control and restored level flight. Because of the damage, the pilot conducted a ditching in the sea
beside the platform. He entered a hover just above the surface of the sea, inflated the emergency floats and settled onto the water. The
passengers and crew were not injured. They evacuated and were rescued quickly. The helicopter remained afloat and later was recovered.
6/22/94 Hughes 369HS C&C Endeavors Sarasota, Florida, U.S. Aerial 0 1 2 Substantial
observation
The helicopter struck water during an aerial photography flight.
6/27/94 Bell 47G-3B-KH4 NA Fraser Island, Unscheduled 0 0 4 Destroyed
Queensland, passenger
Australia
The pilot reported that when the helicopter was on final approach to the beach, about 30 feet above the water, he felt a “stiffness” in the
cyclic control as he attempted to move the control forward. Before he was able to assess the situation, the helicopter descended and struck
the water. The helicopter remained upright and all the occupants were uninjured. They evacuated and made their way through the surf to
the shore, 40 meters away. The helicopter subsequently rolled over because of wave action.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 613
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Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/30/94* Sikorsky S-76B United Newport, Private 0 0 3 Substantial
Spirit Technologies Rhode Island, U.S.
Corp.
About one minute after takeoff, while in level flight at 500 feet, the pilot heard an unusual hum or buzzing. Within a few seconds, this
noise grew considerably louder and the helicopter began to vibrate severely. There was then a loud bang and the main transmission-chip
caution light illuminated. The pilot flying called for the emergency floats to be deployed and conducted a ditching in the sea. The left
engine, which was at flight idle, was shut down.
The pilot began to water-taxi the helicopter toward safer waters but after about two minutes there was a loud rumble from the right
engine and the crew shut down the right engine. Shortly after this, emergency services arrived, recovered the occupants and towed the
helicopter. The helicopter was recovered.
7/7/94* Hughes 369HS Hornet Corp. Gilbert Islands Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
observation
The helicopter was orbiting a fishing vessel when it pitched forward and began an uncommanded spin to the right. The pilot lowered the
collective and initiated an autorotation to the water. He had difficulty maintaining control and the helicopter landed hard.
7/9/94 Robinson R22 Palm Beach Sanford, Florida, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
Helicopters observation
The helicopter was hovering at 15 feet when it began to spin to the right and descend. The pilot was unable to control the helicopter and it
struck the water.
7/13/94 Aerospatiale Sea Link Galveston, Texas, U.S. Unscheduled 4 1 0 Destroyed
AS350B1 passenger
The pilot reported that the helicopter was being flown through 2,000 feet in a climb when several bumps were felt, and then control
was lost. The helicopter struck the Gulf of Mexico about 11 miles offshore. The loss of control was caused by inadequate torquing by
maintenance personnel of the left lateral servo, which allowed the servo to become disconnected from the controls.
7/14/94* Aerospatiale Papillon Hanalei, Hawaii, U.S. Sightseeing 3 0 4 Substantial
AS350D Helicopters
The helicopter was being flown parallel to the shoreline when engine failure occurred. The pilot conducted an autorotation to the water
about 150 feet from a cliff shoreline. The helicopter was not equipped with emergency floats. All occupants were uninjured and exited
the helicopter as it was sinking. Life vests were aboard the helicopter, but were not worn by the occupants. Three occupants climbed onto
rocks and were rescued by helicopter. They said that they had not been briefed that life vests were aboard the helicopter. One of the other
passengers was rescued by personnel of a boat, but the pilot and the two other passengers drowned.
7/14/94* Aerospatiale Hawaii Kalaupapa, Hawaii, U.S. Sightseeing 0 1 6 Substantial
AS350B Helicopters
While in a hover about 150 feet from shore, rotor rpm deteriorated and the pilot of the emergency-float-equipped helicopter conducted
a ditching. The emergency floats were deployed. After the ditching, the seven occupants donned life vests and swam to the shore, where
they spent the night before being located by airborne searchers.
8/9/94 Bell 206B Pilot Chuit River, Alaska, U.S. Business 0 0 5 Substantial
The pilot landed the helicopter on a gravel bar in a river that had high banks. He conducted a hover to reposition the helicopter on the
gravel bar, and the helicopter began a right turn. The pilot applied left pedal and felt a response, but was unable to stop the turn. During
the turn, the helicopter descended and struck the water. After everyone exited the helicopter, it rolled over and sank in the river.
8/10/94 Eurocopter United Arab Arabian Gulf, off United NA NA NA NA Substantial
MBB BO-105C Emirates Police Arab Emirates
The helicopter was lost at sea. Details were not reported.
9/1/94 Sikorsky S-64F Erickson Air Libby, Montana, U.S. NA 0 0 3 Destroyed
Crane
The helicopter was destroyed when it settled into Hanging Flower Lake while in a hover. Investigation determined that the flight crew had
allowed the weight-and-balance limits to be exceeded.

614 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
9/17/94 Bell 47G-5 Helguam Pacific Ocean Aerial 2 0 0 Substantial
observation
The helicopter was on a fish-spotting mission when communications ceased with the ship base. Helicopters from other fishing vessels reported
that the helicopter had struck the ocean 17 miles from the ship. When the ship arrived at the scene, the helicopter was found inverted in the water.
9/23/94* Hughes 369D Caribbean Pacific Ocean Aerial 0 2 0 Destroyed
Fishing Co. observation
While the pilot was conducting a fish-spotting flight at an altitude of about 480 feet above the Pacific Ocean, the cyclic control began to
shake violently. The pilot regained control of the helicopter and conducted an autorotation. The helicopter was ditched on its emergency
floats but later sank.
10/11/94 Aerospatiale NA Whitianga, New Zealand Passenger 2 1 3 Destroyed
AS350B
The helicopter struck the sea near Needle Rock, 10 nautical miles northeast of Whitianga.
11/8/94 Sikorsky S-76A Mobil Business Cameron, Louisiana, U.S. Executive/ 1 0 2 Destroyed
Resources Corporate
The only visual references available were several lights on land, about four miles ahead. The local altimeter setting was 30.02. The captain’s
altimeter was set at 30.05 and the copilot’s altimeter was set at 30.12. These settings caused the captain’s altimeter to indicate an altitude
30 feet higher, and the copilot’s altimeter to indicate an altitude 100 feet higher, than the actual altitude. The copilot, the pilot flying, was
transitioning to outside visual references while the captain, changed radio frequencies. Neither pilot was aware of a descent until impact
with the water in a level attitude. The helicopter came to rest submerged and inverted, with all windows on the left side broken. The
copilot exited through his broken window. The captain was not able to open his door and became disoriented. He exhausted the air in his
emergency breathing system during the four minutes it took him to egress. The passenger drowned.
1/3/95 Bell 47G NA Bunnell, Florida, U.S. Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
The pilot failed to maintain altitude while descending over a lake and struck the water.
1/10/95* Aerospatiale Bristow North Sea, Unscheduled 0 0 18 Destroyed
AS332L Helicopters United Kingdom passenger
Super Puma
Shortly after commencing the descent from 3,000 feet towards an oil-production platform in the North Sea, lightning struck the helicopter.
The helicopter immediately began to vibrate severely and the first officer, who was the handling pilot, transmitted a distress call saying
that he had a lightning strike and that was going to ditch. Although the severe vibration continued, the helicopter was controllable, so he
leveled the helicopter at 1,300 feet.
The captain reported that they were going to proceed to the platform that was the nearest available landing site. Then the helicopter
yawed rapidly left, rolled and pitched down. The captain shut down both engines to control the yaw and the first officer conducted a
gentle touchdown on the sea. The crew deployed the helicopter’s emergency-float system and, despite a five-meter or six-meter swell
and a wind gusting to 40 knots, the helicopter remained upright with its left side into the wind. The passengers and crew evacuated the
helicopter into life rafts and were rescued.
1/18/95 Hughes 369E City of Tampa Tampa, Florida, U.S. Rescue 1 0 1 Destroyed
Police Dept.
While searching for a drowning victim in the vicinity of a bridge, the helicopter was seen to enter a left descending turn that continued
until impact with the water.

1/19/95* Aerospatiale Bristow North Sea Unscheduled 0 0 18 Substantial

AS332 Helicopters passenger
Super Puma
The helicopter was struck by lightning as the pilot began a descent toward an oil platform. A severe vibration developed, followed by the
separation of the tail-rotor gearbox from the helicopter. The pilot conducted a ditching in heavy seas. The helicopter remained upright,
enabling the passengers and crew to board a heliraft, from which they were rescued.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 615
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
2/14/95 Bell 206L-4 Offshore East Cameron, Unscheduled 5 0 0 Destroyed
Logistics Louisiana, U.S. passenger
The pilot transmitted a series of mayday calls indicating inadvertent flight into IMC. The helicopter, however, was not certificated for flight in
IMC. When the helicopter did not arrive at the destination, a search was initiated, but SAR efforts were hampered for several days by weather
conditions. Parts of the helicopter were found with indications that it had struck the water, and the bodies of four of the occupants were recovered.
2/14/95 Hughes 269C NA Moorabbin Airport, Personal 1 0 0 Destroyed
Victoria, Australia
The helicopter pilot reported at Carrum, inbound to Moorabbin. Shortly afterward, the helicopter struck the sea south of Moorabbin.
Investigators found that the main-rotor assembly and about half of the static mast had separated during flight.
3/6/95* Bell 206L Biscayne Biscayne Bay, Miami, Survey/Patrol 0 0 3 Destroyed
LongRanger Helicopters Florida, U.S.
About 45 minutes after takeoff, while maneuvering over Biscayne Bay, the pilot heard three loud thumps and felt a loss of engine power.
The pilot subsequently conducted a ditching.
3/20/95 Bell 206B Western Pacific Pacific Ocean Aerial 0 1 1 Destroyed
Fisheries observation
The pilot said that the helicopter had a tail-rotor problem during takeoff from a ship for a fish-spotting mission. The pilot reduced throttle and
lowered the collective to control the yaw. The helicopter’s main-rotor blade struck the ship. The helicopter landed hard on the water and sank.
4/7/95* Bell 214ST NA Ocean, 440 kilometers Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
west-northwest of passenger
Darwin, Northern
Territory, Australia
The crew returned to the oil platform from which they had departed because of airframe vibration that had stopped. When the vibration
began again, they lost tail-rotor control and were forced to ditch the helicopter short of their destination. The crew conducted an
autorotational descent and ditching. The helicopter overturned on entry to the water and floated upside down. When the pilot surfaced, he
observed that the tail boom was detached and was floating away from the main wreckage. The tail boom later sank.
5/2/95 Bell 206L-3 Offshore Venice, Louisiana, U.S. Unscheduled 1 2 0 Destroyed
Logistics passenger
During final approach to an offshore oil platform, the helicopter flew into exhaust gases from a flare boom. When the pilot attempted to
add power to stop the descent and transition the helicopter to a hover for landing, there was no engine response. The helicopter settled,
collided with the edge of the platform and descended in an inverted attitude into the water. The pilot and front-seat passenger exited the
helicopter unaided and were picked up by a boat. The rear-seat passenger did not exit the helicopter and drowned.
5/3/95 Eurocopter NA Sea Bright, Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
AS350D New Jersey, U.S. passenger
The helicopter struck the water because of fuel starvation and engine failure.
5/8/95 Robinson NA Toano, Virginia, U.S. Personal 1 0 1 Substantial
R22 Beta
The pilot misjudged altitude and distance, which resulted in an undershoot of the landing area and striking water.
5/15/95 Bell 206L Government of East Margaree, Survey/Patrol 1 3 0 Destroyed
LongRanger Canada Coast Nova Scotia, Canada
Guard
During a fisheries patrol, the helicopter collided with a power line that crossed a river. Control was lost and the helicopter struck the frozen
surface of the river.
6/18/95 Bell 206B NA Grafton (Township), Personal 2 0 0 Destroyed
New South Wales,
Australia
Witnesses reported that the helicopter was seen flying low near the accident site and shortly afterward, the sound of impact was heard.
The helicopter knocked down three power lines and struck a river.

616 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
6/28/95 Bell 205A-1 Northern Leaf Rapids, Public use 3 1 4 Destroyed
Mountain Manitoba, Canada
Helicopters
The helicopter was transporting a fire fighting crew. The pilot encountered significantly reduced visibility en route and turned the
helicopter to the right to return for landing. The helicopter descended while in the turn, the main-rotor blades struck the water and
the helicopter struck the river. The pilot and four of the passengers exited the helicopter and were rescued. Three passengers were
incapacitated by head injuries and drowned.
6/29/95* Agusta Bell 206 Castle ACH Alderney, NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
Channel Islands, U.K.
In cruise flight, a sudden severe disturbance in yaw control occurred, accompanied by abnormal noises from the engine and transmission
and an engine-chip warning. The pilot transmitted a mayday call, and following engine failure, initiated an autorotation to the sea. The
helicopter rolled left, filled with water and inverted. Although the engineer escaped quickly, the pilot initially had difficulty in evacuating
from the cockpit. He was wearing a life vest fitted with a short-term air-supply system (STASS), providing as much as three minutes of
breathable air, which was “extremely beneficial” in aiding his escape. A SAR helicopter arrived and both survivors were lifted aboard by
winch within 30 minutes of the accident.
7/9/95 Enstrom F-28A NA Philadelphia, NA 0 0 3 Minor
Pennsylvania, U.S.
The pilot maneuvered the helicopter for takeoff to the east over the Delaware River. As the helicopter entered effective translational lift,
it began to descend, and main-rotor rpm decreased. The pilot increased throttle, but the rotor rpm did not increase in time. The skids
contacted the water, resulting in the helicopter striking the water and sinking.
7/17/95* Bell 206B Air Logistics Gulf of Mexico NA 0 0 1 Substantial
The helicopter was in level flight at an altitude of 500 feet to 700 feet when the pilot felt a high-frequency vibration in the tail-rotor
antitorque pedals. Subsequently, a low pitch “hum” and a “shuddering vibration” were felt “followed by a loud bang from the rear of
the helicopter.” The helicopter began to rotate to the right, and the application of full left pedal had no effect in stopping the rotation.
After several 360-degree turns, the pilot attempted unsuccessfully to streamline the helicopter. An autorotation was initiated, and the
helicopter’s rotation was reduced to a “slow right-motion spiral or flat spin.” Near the end of the autorotation, the rate of rotation increased,
and when the left emergency float contacted the water, the helicopter rolled inverted.
8/17/95* McDonnell Starkist Foods Pacific Ocean Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
Douglas 500 Co. observation
The helicopter was in a hover 10 feet over a floating log that the observer was going to mark with a buoy using a spear gun. The observer
accidentally fired the spear gun into the main-rotor system. The pilot was able to maintain helicopter control and conducted a ditching in a
rough sea. The aft extensions to the utility fixed floats broke during the landing and the helicopter rolled over and sank.
9/10/95 Bell 206B U.S. Dept. of the Glennallen, Alaska, U.S. Public use 0 0 2 Destroyed
Interior
The helicopter pilot was attempting to rescue another pilot whose Cessna 180A had become inverted on a lake. The Cessna pilot had been
sitting on the inverted floats of the airplane for five hours and was showing signs of severe hypothermia and shock. As the helicopter was
hovered next to the airplane, the helicopter passenger partially stepped into an external-load basket and began to assist the stranded pilot
into the helicopter. The helicopter began to roll to the right, and the main-rotor blades struck the lake surface. The helicopter then struck
the lake and sank. The pilot of a third helicopter observed the accident and landed on the lake to rescue the others.
9/11/95 Agusta A109A II Hospital Air Winslow, Emergency 3 0 0 Destroyed
Transport Washington, U.S. medical service
The helicopter was flying at night to transport a woman on an island, who was in labor, to a hospital. Witnesses reported that the helicopter
was flying at low altitude over the ground and then over water toward the island. The helicopter struck the water and sank. Water condition
at the time of the accident was described as calm or glassy.
9/23/95 Eurocopter Manufacturer Crater Lake, Oregon, U.S. Business 2 0 0 Destroyed
AS350BA
A helicopter manufacturer employed the pilot as a demonstration pilot. The pilot and a passenger were flying to a business-aviation
conference. Along the route, numerous witnesses observed the pilot performing low-altitude maneuvers over a lake in a national park.
Witnesses observed the helicopter descend gradually in a shallow glide path at cruising speed until it struck the lake. The helicopter was
being flown toward the sun and over glassy water at the time of impact.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 617
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
11/2/95* B47G-4A Z Fishing Co. Pacific Ocean Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
observation
Following a hydraulic failure, the pilot planned to ditch the utility fixed-float-equipped helicopter in the water next to the ship from which it
had departed. He believed that the helicopter could not be landed safely on the pitching-and-rolling ship deck with no hydraulic assist on the
controls. While the helicopter was hovered just above the water, the passenger (a fish spotter) unexpectedly jumped out of the helicopter. This
resulted in a sudden imbalance, and the pilot lost control of the helicopter. The helicopter rolled over, struck the water and sank.
12/17/95 Mil Mi-8 Petrozavodsk Lake Ladoga, Miscellaneous 2 0 1 Destroyed
Flight Unit Helule, Russia
The helicopter pilot encountered poor weather with visibility down to 200 meters. The pilot turned back but while in the turn, at low level
and with a crosswind, control was lost. The helicopter struck the ice-covered surface of Lake Ladoga about 100 meters from the shore and
sank.
12/28/95* Bell 412 Forestry Korean Republic Fire suppression 0 2 2 Substantial
Aviation Office
(Korea)
The helicopter was ditched while returning to its base.
1/18/96* Aerospatiale Helikopter North Sea, off Norway Unscheduled 0 0 18 Destroyed
AS332L Service passenger
Super Puma
In normal cruise flight at 2,000 feet, about 26 minutes after takeoff, the helicopter suddenly developed severe vibration. The crew
immediately conducted a ditching on the sea and declared mayday. The helicopter was turned into the wind and, during the descent,
the emergency floats were armed. The helicopter touched down on the sea and initially floated upright in a three-meter swell to
four-meter swell. Despite attempts to evacuate into life rafts, the sea conditions made them unusable and the passengers and crew
remained aboard the helicopter. All were rescued by helicopters about one hour after the ditching.
After the rescue, the helicopter remained floating upright in gradually worsening conditions for some time. Fifteen hours after the ditching,
with the swell now increased to seven meters to eight meters, the helicopter rolled over and continued to float inverted. Seventeen hours
later, with the sea conditions even worse, the helicopter sank.
1/29/96 Bell 47G-2A1 NA Honiara, Aerial 1 0 0 Destroyed
Solomon Islands observation
The pilot lifted off the helicopter from a ship with the right-rear skid still attached with a tiedown rope. The helicopter rolled to the right
and struck the water inverted, sinking immediately. The floats on the skids separated during the impact. The pilot and the helicopter were
not recovered because of the depth of the water.
2/10/96 Aerospatiale ERA Aviation Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 2 0 0 Destroyed
MBB BO-105 passenger
The helicopter did not arrive at its planned destination and was reported missing. A six-day search failed to locate the helicopter or
its occupants. The aircraft was found 18 days after the accident when it became entangled in the net of a shrimp boat. Analysis of the
deformation signatures and the dynamic components of the helicopter suggested that the helicopter had struck the water at a high rate
of airspeed, near-level pitch attitude and slightly right-skid-down.
3/6/96* Robinson NA Georgina River, Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
R22 Beta Queensland, Australia observation
While inspecting flood fences, the pilot lost control and conducted a ditching in a river. The pilot later said that the main-rotor blades may have
struck tree branches immediately prior to loss of control. Both the pilot and the passenger exited the helicopter while under water without injury.
3/31/96 Robinson R44 NA Muriwai Beach, NA 1 0 0 Destroyed
New Zealand
The helicopter pilot called ATC and reported low cloud, poor visibility and gale-force winds. When the helicopter failed to arrive at its
destination, SAR efforts were initiated. The pilot’s body and some helicopter wreckage were found the next morning. The helicopter had
struck the sea, but no cause was established.

618 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
4/21/96* Enstrom F-28-A NA Lake Havasu City, Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial
Arizona, U.S. observation
During photography of boats, the helicopter began to descend from about 35 feet. Corrective action failed to increase main-rotor rpm or
stop the descent. The pilot ditched the helicopter and both occupants emerged uninjured after the main rotor contacted the water.
5/7/96* Bell 206L-1 NA Dauan Island, Unscheduled 2 0 3 Destroyed
Queensland, Australia passenger
During climbout, engine failure occurred. The pilot conducted an autorotation from about 300 feet. After forcefully striking the water,
the helicopter sank and rolled inverted. The pilot and three of the four passengers escaped. The remaining passenger remained in the
helicopter as it sank. One passenger did not remain afloat after exiting from the helicopter.
6/3/96 Robinson Bering Sea Mekoryuk, Alaska, U.S. Business 1 0 0 Destroyed
R22 Mariner Reindeer
Products
The pilot had departed to pick up a company worker about 35 miles south of the departure point on a remote island. The wreckage of the
helicopter was found the following day, partially submerged and floating in a small lake.
6/19/96* Hughes 269C NA Eldon, Washington, U.S. Personal 1 1 0 Destroyed
Fatigue failure of the connecting-rod cap resulted in engine failure and ditching of the helicopter at sea. The pilot and passenger exited the
helicopter and the passenger was able to swim to shore with serious injuries. The pilot, who was observed swimming toward the shoreline
by the passenger, was not recovered and was presumed to have drowned.
6/21/96 Eurocopter Air Logistics Sabine Pass, Texas, U.S. Unscheduled 4 0 0 Destroyed
MBB BO-105 passenger
The helicopter was destroyed after striking water in the Gulf of Mexico, while en route to an oil platform. The last known radio transmission
from the pilot came when the helicopter was 38 miles from the destination.
8/14/96* Robinson R22 NA Galway, Ireland Personal 0 0 2 Substantial
Abrupt left yaw movements occurred at 1,500 feet after takeoff and again at 1,000 feet after carburetor heat was applied. The pilot
conducted an autorotation and ditching in the sea.
8/15/96 Mil Mi-8P Hummingbird Male, Maldives Unscheduled 0 0 24 Destroyed
Helicopters passenger
During takeoff and climb to about 160 feet, hydraulic pressure failed. Control was lost and the helicopter descended into the shallow
waters of a lagoon next to the airport. The helicopter struck the water on its right side and was substantially damaged.
8/17/96* Aerospatiale Pelita Air Indonesia Unscheduled 0 0 15 Minor
SA330J Puma Service passenger
About 20 minutes after departure, the pilot reported technical problems and said that he was ditching. Three life rafts containing 15
passengers and crew were located about 17 nautical miles from land about an hour later. All occupants were rescued without injury. The
helicopter continued to float upright and was recovered with only minor damage.
9/13/96* Bell 206L-1/C-30P Mobil Business Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 6 Substantial
Resources passenger
En route to an oil platform shortly after takeoff, the helicopter began making continuous, chattering sounds and vibrated violently. As
the pilot was preparing for ditching in a canal, the vibration ceased but the helicopter began turning to the right. The pilot initiated an
autorotation and deployed the emergency floats. The helicopter touched down on the water in a level attitude and came to rest on its side.
9/20/96* Sikorsky S-61N Aeroleo Taxi Brazil Unscheduled 2 0 16 Destroyed
Aereo passenger
Near the end of a flight, as the helicopter descended through about 500 feet on approach to an offshore drilling ship, a loud bang was heard
and a puff of white smoke was seen from the top of the helicopter. A severe vibration began and the helicopter pitched nose-up, yawed and
rolled. The pilot attempted to ditch the helicopter but, without full control, the helicopter forcefully struck the water, rolled over and sank.
11/6/96* Bell 206B-3 Serbian Police Belgrade, Yugoslavia Survey/Patrol 3 0 1 Destroyed
JetRanger
While flying low over the River Danube with a film crew on board, the helicopter’s engine failed. The helicopter was ditched in the water
about 100 meters from the river bank and sank.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 619
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/11/97* Hughes 369HS Caribbean Pago Pago, Survey/Patrol 0 0 2 Destroyed
Fishing American Samoa
Company
The helicopter was being used for fish spotting from a ship. As the helicopter approached the ship, it lost engine power and was ditched.
4/8/97* Bell 206L-1 Air Logistics Louisiana, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
LongRanger passenger
During takeoff from an offshore oil platform, the helicopter began to spin. The pilot ditched the helicopter.
4/15/97 Eurocopter Colgate- New York, New York, U.S. Executive/ 1 2 1 Destroyed
MBB-BK117-B2 Palmolive Co. Corporate
After takeoff, at an altitude of 30 feet, the helicopter rotated to the right several times, descended, struck the heliport pier and struck the
East River, where it sank. The pilots exited the helicopter under water without assistance and were pulled from the water. Divers entered
the water to search for the passengers. The fuselage had rolled upside down, and the passengers were found unconscious and released
from their restraints inside the cabin, and were brought to the surface.
6/1/97 Bell 206B NA Intracoastal City, Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
Louisiana, U.S.
The Bell 206B collided with a Bell 206L-1 during flight. The Bell 206B pilot said that the helicopter descended and was “shaking violently.”
The helicopter touched down in the water, rolled over and sank. The pilot exited and swam to the surface, where he was rescued by a man
in a boat. (The pilot of the other helicopter was killed, and the helicopter struck terrain.)
6/20/97 Hughes 369HS Hansen Pacific Ocean Aerial 1 1 0 Destroyed
Helicopters observation
The pilot was spotting tuna and was about a 10-minute flight from the ship from which he was based. The cyclic moved to a full-left
position, and the pilot tried to re-engage the cyclic trim motor but could not. He was unable to return the cyclic to neutral position. The
pilot flew the helicopter back to the ship but lost control because he could not hold the cyclic with one hand. The helicopter struck an
antenna, rolled to the left and struck the water in an inverted attitude.
8/15/97 Bell UH-1H Nevada Division Tahoe City, Public use 0 0 7 Substantial
of Forestry California, U.S.
The helicopter was transporting firefighting personnel to the vicinity of a small lake. After arriving at the lake and lifting off again, the pilot had
insufficient blade pitch and power to climb above trees and was forced to reverse direction. In the middle of the turn, the helicopter began
descending toward the water, then settled into the lake with about 10 knots of forward speed. While the pilot was attempting to take off again,
the helicopter rolled to the right and sank inverted. The investigation determined that the helicopter had been overloaded for the density altitude.
9/17/97* Hughes 269A Pasco County Tarpon Springs, Public use 0 0 1 Substantial
Florida, U.S.
The engine failed and the helicopter, which was engaged in mosquito-control work, was ditched.
9/18/97* Bell 407 Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
Helicopters Inc. passenger
The helicopter was in 130-knot cruise flight over open ocean at about 800 feet when a tail-rotor-blade strike severed the aft part of the
tail boom. The pilot reduced throttle and began an autorotation. The helicopter struck the water in a level attitude with slight forward
speed. The helicopter stayed afloat on its emergency floats. After about one hour, a rescue boat arrived and the pilot and passengers were
transported to the nearest offshore oil platform. The helicopter was kept afloat by a recovery crew and transported by barge to Lafayette,
Louisiana, U.S.
12/20/97 Sikorsky S-76B KLM ERA North Sea Unscheduled 1 0 7 Substantial
Helicopters passenger
The helicopter was being used for shuttle flights among oil-drilling rigs and production platforms. One approach to a platform in dark-
night conditions ended in a go-around, and a second approach was begun. After a large power reduction, the helicopter’s forward speed
decreased almost to zero knots and the helicopter entered a steep descent toward the sea. The crew recognized too late the high rate
of descent and their corrective actions failed to stop the helicopter from striking the water. The crew and passengers evacuated the
helicopter and after about one hour in the water, they were taken aboard a supply vessel. One passenger died after rescue.

620 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/24/98 Hughes 369D Big Eye Pacific Ocean Aerial 1 0 1 Destroyed
Helicopters observation
The pilot and observer left the ship on an aerial observation flight to herd fish. During climb to about 400 feet to spot fish, the pilot turned
the helicopter downwind and descended into the prevailing 15-knot tailwind. Neither the descent nor the turn were stopped before the
helicopter struck the water.
4/10/98 Bell 206B-3 NA Dampier, Western Unscheduled 0 0 1 Destroyed
Australia, Australia passenger
After delivering a ship’s pilot to a vessel, the pilot was returning to Dampier when he was distracted by a mechanical problem
involving the pedals. He was unaware that the helicopter was descending until it struck the water. The helicopter sank and the pilot
was rescued.
7/10/98* Agusta A109A II Monacair Villefranche sur Mer, Unscheduled 0 0 6 Destroyed
France passenger
About four minutes after takeoff from Nice, France, while flying at 120 knots, the low-fuel warning light for the helicopter’s right fuel
tank illuminated. The pilot had begun to respond to this warning when the engine-failure warning light for the right engine illuminated.
Subsequent events were unclear but the pilot ditched the helicopter in the sea. The pilot and passengers escaped without injury, but the
helicopter was damaged by saltwater immersion.
10/5/98* Bell 407 and Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Positioning 1 0 1 Destroyed
Aerospatiale Helicopters
AS355-F1 Inc. and Tex-Air
Helicopters
The Bell 407 and the Aerospatiale AS355-F1 collided while both helicopters were in cruise flight at 1,000 feet over the Gulf of Mexico.
The pilot of the Bell 407 initiated an autorotation to the water and was rescued. The pilot of the Aerospatiale AS355 was killed during the
collision and water impact, and the helicopter sank.
10/26/98 Bell 47G-3B1 NA Swim Creek, Northern Aerial work 0 0 2 Substantial
Territory, Australia
The pilot reported that he maneuvered the helicopter to a high hover during a sling-load operation. As he initiated forward flight, the
helicopter pitched rapidly nose down. The pilot was unable to regain control and the helicopter struck water in a swamp. The investigation
revealed that the pilot had not lifted the sling load clear of the swamp before moving the helicopter forward.
12/3/98* Eurocopter Aerial Films Newark, New Jersey, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
EC-135-P1 observation
The pilot flew the helicopter below and behind the path of an airliner, and encountered wake turbulence. He inadvertently rolled the
throttles to manual mode and could not restabilize the engines or main-rotor rpm. The pilot declared an emergency, reported a double
power failure and ditched the helicopter in a river.
3/12/99* Bell 206L-3 NA Cairns, Queensland, Unscheduled 1 1 5 Substantial
Australia passenger
The helicopter entered an area of rain on an overwater flight. The pilot attempted to maintain visual contact with the water by
flying slowly at a lower altitude, but the weather deteriorated and he lost all outside visual references. The pilot activated the skid-
mounted floats, lowered the collective control and allowed the helicopter to contact the water. The helicopter capsized immediately.
Emergency services responded when ATC radio contact with the pilot ceased, and the helicopter was found with the survivors
clinging to the wreckage.

3/17/99 Eurocopter Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 2 2 0 Destroyed

AS 350-B2 Helicopters Inc. passenger
When the pilot conducted the lift off from the oil platform, he believed that “something wasn’t normal.” The helicopter nose pitched up
violently and the helicopter bounced from side to side on the platform. The pilot realized that he did not have enough space to land, and
raised the collective in an attempt to move the helicopter away from the platform. The helicopter rolled inverted and descended into the
water on the north side of the platform.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 621
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

4/5/99* Bell 206B P & I Data Lyme Bay, Dorset, Private 0 0 2 Destroyed
JetRanger Services England

Flying at 500 feet, the helicopter encountered deteriorating weather. After the pilot lost control and regained control several times, the
helicopter descended and struck the sea in a tail-low attitude. After impact, the helicopter pitched forward and rolled over. The pilot
and passenger, who were wearing light clothing and did not have life vests, escaped from the cabin and climbed on top of the inverted
helicopter. The helicopter continued to float, and a fishing boat rescued the pilot and passenger about one hour and 20 minutes after
the ditching.

5/28/99 Eurocopter Southern Huntington Beach, Executive/ 3 0 0 Destroyed

MBB BO-105LS California California, U.S. Corporate
A-3 Edison

The helicopter was to transport two company employees to Santa Catalina Island, 22 miles offshore. The pilot was not instrument
rated. Weather along the coast was overcast skies with cloud bases from 700 feet to 1,100 feet, tops between 1,900 feet and 2,200
feet, and visibilities generally in the four-statute-mile to five-statute-mile range. While flying over water en route to the island, the
pilot radioed another company pilot and said that he would be feet wet in two minutes. There were no further communications, and
the U.S. Coast Guard found debris identified as being from the helicopter about 3.5 miles from the mainland, along with a fuel slick.

6/7/99 Hughes 369HS Hoffman Pacific Ocean Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed

Helicopters observation

At 600 feet above the water, a violent vibration of the helicopter was felt. The pilot decreased throttle and airspeed to stabilize the
helicopter, but control became increasingly difficult. About 250 feet above the water, an extreme forward CG (center of gravity) shift
occurred and the pilot heard a whirring or spinning noise. The helicopter spiraled down toward the water, spinning to the right with an
estimated 55-degree to 60-degree nose-down attitude. After the helicopter struck the water, it rolled inverted. The pilot released his seat
belt and floated to the surface wearing his life vest. The passenger, also equipped with a life vest, also reached the surface. Both occupants
waited in the helicopter’s life raft until rescue about 40 minutes later.

6/9/99* Bell 412 Petroleum Gulf of Mexico Positioning 0 0 2 Destroyed

Helicopters Inc.

A tail-rotor blade separated from the helicopter in flight as a result of fatigue cracking, and then the tail-rotor system separated. The pilot
flying said that the helicopter “immediately and violently tucked down and left, then rolled over inverted and [was] spinning to the right.”
At about 1,000 feet, the pilot righted the helicopter. The pilot not flying inflated the emergency floats and the pilot flying conducted a
ditching. The helicopter came to rest upright in the water, and the two pilots exited through the right-side cargo window and entered a life
raft. Ocean waves caused the helicopter to roll to the left inverted and sink.

7/16/99* Hiller UH12-C Commercial Venice, Florida, U.S. Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial

pilot observation

The engine failed while the helicopter was being flown 100 feet above the ocean at 50 knots. The pilot conducted an autorotation to the
water, and the pilot and passenger immediately were rescued by a nearby boat. The passenger, who was wearing a seat belt loosely while
operating a video camera and carrying other equipment, inadvertently had shut off the fuel supply.

9/1/99 Hughes 369HS Hoffman Pohnpei, Federal States Aerial 1 0 0 Destroyed

Helicopters of Micronesia observation

About 90 minutes after takeoff from a fishing vessel to conduct tuna-spotting operations, the helicopter struck the ocean under unknown
circumstances. The ship’s crewmembers located the helicopter’s floats, pieces of the airframe and the engine. There were no distress calls
from the pilot.

10/15/99 Kawasaki KH-4 NA Joondalup Lake, Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed

Western Australia, application
Australia

The helicopter was being flown at a low altitude, spraying for mosquitoes in a lake. During a turn, before beginning a spray run, the
helicopter descended into the water.

622 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
12/5/99* Bell 206L-1 Evergreen Gulf of Mexico NA 0 1 0 Destroyed
Helicopters
International
The helicopter was about halfway to its intended destination in the Gulf of Mexico, about 150 feet above the water, when the engine failed.
The pilot initiated an autorotation and deployed the emergency floats. The helicopter was landed hard during the ditching, but remained
upright and afloat. The pilot retrieved the life raft from the cabin and inflated it. After the pilot got into the life raft, waves estimated at six
feet to eight feet overturned the helicopter, and it sank in 160 feet of water.
12/30/99 Hughes 369HS Hansen Pacific Ocean Aerial 0 0 1 Substantial
Helicopters observation
The pilot conducted a takeoff from a fishing vessel with a tail wind, and the helicopter settled into the water in a tail-low attitude. The
helicopter was equipped with utility fixed floats and remained upright.
2/14/00* Hughes 369HS O’Hara Pacific Ocean Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
Helicopters application
The pilot conducted a precautionary landing in the ocean about 500 miles north of Papua New Guinea, after he felt a metal-on-
metal grinding sensation from the cyclic control and heard a loud bang. Following the ditching, helicopter was struck by an ocean
swell, rolled over and sank. The pilot and observer exited the helicopter and were rescued by the fishing vessel from which the flight
had originated.
2/18/00 Hughes 500C Heli Guam Pohnpei, Federal Aerial 0 0 2 Destroyed
Republic of Micronesia observation
The pilot and the observer were planning to conduct tuna-spotting operations. After takeoff, at about 100 feet to 150 feet, the helicopter
began an uncommanded right turn, followed by an uncontrollable right spin. The helicopter spun several times, then struck the water. The
two right-landing-gear legs collapsed and the helicopter rolled onto its right side and sank. The pilot and observer both exited without
difficulty and were rescued by the ship’s crewmembers.
2/21/00 Hughes 369E NA Mackay, Queensland, Unscheduled 0 0 1 Substantial
Australia passenger
Because of high humidity, the helicopter’s windscreen became fogged, impairing the pilot’s forward vision. The pilot turned on the heater/
demister, which immediately increased the fogging and further reduced his vision. The pilot turned back to the flight’s point of origin,
reduced speed and descended clear of the low clouds in the area. During transition to a hover, the pilot leaned forward and began wiping
the windscreen with his hand. While he was wiping the windscreen, the helicopter struck the water. The pilot shut down the engine and
activated the helicopter’s emergency floats.
3/20/00 Bell 206B-3 Horizon Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 3 NA
Helicopters passenger
While maneuvering to land on an offshore oil platform, the pilot’s low-airspeed turn resulted in loss of tail-rotor effectiveness, a spin to
the right and loss of control. The helicopter descended and struck the water. The main rotor, transmission, tail rotor, tail-rotor gearbox and
vertical fin separated from the helicopter on impact, and the helicopter rolled inverted.
4/29/00* Bell 206L-3 Chevron USA Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial
passenger
Tail-rotor control effectiveness failed while the pilot was approaching an offshore oil platform. The pilot conducted an autorotative
landing on the water. According to witnesses, the helicopter began the autorotation and proceeded to rotate to the left and pitch nose-
down. The helicopter entered a steep descent, and the pilot could not control the helicopter. Prior to striking the water, the helicopter
entered level flight and the emergency floats were deployed. Upon impact with the water, the helicopter rolled right and came to rest
inverted in the water.
8/6/00* Bell 206B-2 NA Norman Reef, Unscheduled 0 0 5 Substantial
Queensland, Australia passenger
Following takeoff from a floating pontoon, at about 500 feet and with a forward airspeed of about 20 knots, the pilot lost directional
control of the helicopter. He immediately deployed the emergency floats and conducted a ditching. The helicopter rolled inverted in the
water.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 623
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

9/7/00* Bell 206L-1 Horizon Gulf of Mexico Positioning 0 1 0 Destroyed

Helicopters

After about two hours and 54 minutes of flight, the engines failed during approach to an offshore oil platform. The pilot initiated an
autorotation and subsequently landed hard on a rough and choppy ocean surface. Fuel-consumption calculations provided by the
operator showed that the helicopter could have been at or near fuel exhaustion at the time of the accident.

10/28/00 Aerospatiale Tex-Air Gulf of Mexico Positioning 1 0 0 Destroyed

AS350BA Helicopters

The helicopter departed from a helipad located on an offshore oil platform, and was three minutes from landing at a refueling helipad on
another platform, when the pilot transmitted two distress calls saying that the helicopter was “going down.” There were no witnesses to
the accident. Nine minutes after the distress calls were heard, the helicopter was found floating inverted in three-foot to four-foot seas. The
helicopter sank but was later recovered.

12/1/00* Bell 206B American Rockport, Texas, U.S. NA 0 0 1 NA

Helicopters

As the helicopter was returning to an airport from an offshore oil platform, engine failure occurred. The pilot initiated an autorotation,
inflated the floats and declared mayday. During the descent, the pilot had “full [aircraft] control to include tail-rotor authority.” During the
ditching, the tail-rotor blades entered the water and the tail-rotor drive shaft was twisted apart. The helicopter remained upright in the
water, and the pilot exited after the main-rotor blades stopped. After the pilot moved away from the helicopter, it rolled over. The pilot
crawled onto the helicopter and awaited rescue.

12/10/00 Robinson R22 Volar Marathon, Florida, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Destroyed

Helicopters

Without receiving a weather briefing, the flight instructor conducted the flight under VFR. IMC were encountered and the pilot landed on an
island. The instructor then called an FAA Automated Flight Service Station and received a standard weather briefing. The briefer told the pilot
that VFR flight was not recommended. The instructor began a second flight under VFR after he believed that weather had moved past his
location, but again encountered IMC. While reversing course the instructor became spatially disoriented, and the helicopter descended and
struck the Atlantic Ocean.

12/26/00 Bell 206B Tarlton Gulf of Mexico Cargo 1 0 0 Destroyed

Helicopters

The helicopter was reported missing and presumed destroyed. Search efforts were hampered by weather, including eight-foot to 10-
foot seas, wind from 25 knots to 44 knots, thunderstorms, rain, fog and limited visibility. The helicopter was equipped with utility fixed
floats; other than the pilot’s life vest, there was no overwater survival equipment aboard the helicopter. The pilot was presumed to be a
fatality.

1/5/01 Bell 206B Helixair Lake Windermere, Ferry 0 0 1 Destroyed

JetRanger Cumbria, England

The helicopter was being positioned to take its owner from his private residence by the shore of Lake Windermere. On arrival,
the pilot commenced a descending left turn to approach the landing site from the west. While in this turn, the pilot encountered
reduced visibility and lost all depth perception over the dark, still waters of the lake. As the pilot completed the turn at a point about
700 meters from the shore, the helicopter struck the surface of the lake. The helicopter began to sink but the pilot exited and swam
to shore.

1/7/01* Bell 206L-1 Island Virgin Gorda, British Unscheduled 0 0 7 Destroyed

LongRanger Helicopters Virgin Islands Passenger
International

The helicopter was being used for a sightseeing flight along the coast and was flying at about 300 feet offshore when the left fuel-boost
pump warning light illuminated. The engine failed, and the pilot ditched in the surf close to the beach. Emergency floats were deployed
and the helicopter touched down in a level attitude, then rolled over onto its right side.

624 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
1/8/01* Bell 206L-3 Rotorcraft Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
LongRanger Leasing Co. passenger

The pilot was conducting a short flight over the Gulf of Mexico. During departure, the pilot reported his fuel as 9/10th hours remaining.
Sometime later, he reported that he had missed a platform by a couple of miles and would be critical on fuel. The helicopter continued toward
the platform but, as it turned for the approach, the engine failed. The pilot transmitted a mayday call and deployed the helicopter’s emergency
floats. He subsequently conducted an autorotation to the water. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter into a life raft and were later
rescued without injury. About five minutes after touchdown, the helicopter rolled over and floated inverted. It was later recovered.

3/21/01* Bell 47G-2 Versatile Ardmore, Oklahoma, U.S. Instructional 0 0 2 Substantial

Helicopters

During a night flight, the helicopter was in level flight about 1,400 feet over a lake as the student pilot began a turn to the left with a forward
airspeed of about 45 knots to 50 knots. The flight instructor then assisted the student pilot on the controls with the coordinated turn,
and noticed that the turn indicator showed that the helicopter was slipping. The instructor applied left pedal to correct the slip, and the
airframe shuddered and began to yaw to the right. The airspeed began to decrease and the helicopter began to “spin to the right rapidly.”
The instructor then applied full left pedal and the helicopter continued to spin to the right. After lowering the collective and reducing the
throttle, the helicopter stopped spinning. The instructor then lowered the nose and maneuvered the helicopter toward shallow water near
the heavily vegetated shoreline for the landing. The helicopter came to rest on its left side in the shallow water.

3/30/01 Hughes 369HS NA Pohnpei, Micronesia Personal 0 0 1 Substantial

During a flight test after maintenance, cables being used by the engineer became jammed in the flight controls. The engineer removed
the shoulder part of his harness to enable him to release the cables. The pilot momentarily lost control and, as control was regained, the
helicopter struck the water. The pilot escaped uninjured and made several attempts to rescue the engineer, who had sustained head
injuries and was unconscious. The engineer was presumed to have drowned while the pilot was trying to release him.

4/21/01 Robinson R44 NA Airlie Beach, Personal 0 0 2 Substantial

Queensland, Australia

The pilot was conducting a local flight, intending to find friends aboard a yacht. The pilot reported that, after finding what he and his
passenger believed was the yacht, he descended to about 500 feet and reduced airspeed to between 45 knots and 50 knots to allow the
passenger to identify the crew of the yacht. While circling the yacht, the pilot noticed that airspeed had reduced to between 25 knots and
30 knots and the helicopter was descending. The pilot increased the throttle but there was no response and he believed that the engine
had failed. The low-rotor-speed warning sounded and the helicopter yawed right. Despite applying full-left pedal, the pilot was unable to
prevent the helicopter from rotating right, and the helicopter forcefully struck the water.

4/27/01 Bell 407 NA Swain Reefs, Search and 0 0 2 Substantial

Queensland, Australia rescue

The crew was assigned to drop a life raft to the occupants of a sinking yacht at the southern end of the Great Barrier Reef. On the drop run,
the pilot intended to overfly the yacht at about 20 knots and 50 feet, using the radio altimeter. As the helicopter approached the yacht at
40 knots, and shortly after a crewmember called 50 feet, the helicopter struck the water.

5/4/01* Bell 407 Air Logistics Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 2 Substantial

passenger

While in cruise flight, the pilot reported a slight vibration. After a few minutes, the vibration became more pronounced, and was
accompanied by a noise. During an attempted precautionary landing at an offshore oil platform, the vibration and noise level increased
again, and the engine failed. The pilot then initiated an autorotation to the water, deployed the emergency floats and landed safely. While
being towed in the water, the helicopter rolled inverted.

8/5/01 Bell 206L-1 Offshore Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 3 0 Substantial

Logistics passenger

The pilot had initiated an approach to an offshore oil platform into the wind when the helicopter made an “uncontrolled, uninduced yaw
to the right.” He turned to the right to stop the yaw and to maneuver away from the platform. As he increased throttle, the helicopter “went
into an uncontrollable and rapid spin to the right.” The pilot then closed the throttle, which “slowed but did not stop the spin.” As the pilot
raised the collective, the helicopter struck the water, rolled over and sank.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 625
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
8/24/01* Bell 206L-3 Offshore Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 2 0 Destroyed
Logistics passenger
The helicopter was in cruise flight over the Gulf of Mexico when it began to vibrate and shudder. The pilot lowered the collective to
initiate an autorotation and the engine failed. During the pilot’s autorotation, the helicopter’s emergency floats were deployed. The pilot
attempted to reduce the rate of descent but the controls became stiff and the helicopter forcefully struck the water.
9/5/01* Hughes 369HS NA Pacific Ocean, NA 0 0 2 Destroyed
741 kilometers
southeast of Tarawa
The pilot reported that, while the helicopter was in cruise flight, he suddenly became aware of an unusual vibration in the airframe.
He immediately began a descent and touched down on floats on the ocean surface. A swell overturned the helicopter before the two
occupants could evacuate from the cabin. They egressed under water and held on to the inverted helicopter until the floats began to fill
with water. The helicopter sank and the two occupants were rescued by personnel from their parent vessel soon afterward.
9/26/01* Bell 206L-1 Offshore Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 0 3 Substantial
Logistics passenger
The helicopter was on approach to an offshore oil platform, turning from base leg to final at 300 feet when the pilot heard the low-rotor-
rpm audio warning, and then noticed that the “LOW-ROTOR-RPM” warning light was illuminated. He initiated an autorotation and observed
that the main-rotor rpm needle had dropped to zero. The pilot said that as the helicopter was descending, he felt feedback in the flight
controls and decided that a precautionary landing was necessary. The pilot landed the helicopter in the water and shut down the engine.
9/27/01 Bell 206B-3 EAC Helicopters Potato Lake, Survey/Patrol 0 0 4 Destroyed
JetRanger Minnesota, U.S.
The helicopter was being used to take photographs in the vicinity of a lake. While the pilot was maneuvering, the helicopter struck the
surface of the water.
9/29/01* Bell 206B-3 Divesa Balfate, Honduras Private 5 0 0 Destroyed
JetRanger
The helicopter was reported missing during a flight to an offshore island and was assumed to have been ditched.
10/18/01 Bell 206L Era Aviation Anchorage, Alaska, Unscheduled 3 2 0 Substantial
U.S. passenger
Because of falling snow and low ceilings, the pilot, who did not hold an instrument rating, was intentionally flying very low over the surface
of an open area of flat and glassy water in whiteout/grayout conditions. As he continued toward his destination, he continued descending to
maintain visual reference with the water surface. The helicopter’s skids contacted the water, and almost immediately, the tail rotor and then
the fuselage struck the water.
10/18/01* Bell 206L-3 Air Logistics Gulf of Mexico Unscheduled 0 3 2 NA
passenger
The helicopter was in cruise flight at 500 feet when the pilot heard a “thud,” the helicopter yawed left. The engine failed, and the pilot
initiated an autorotation to the water. The emergency floats were not deployed.
1/8/02* Bell 206L-3 Air Logistics Houma, Louisiana, U.S. Ferry 0 0 1 Major partial
LongRanger
In cruise flight at 1,200 feet, the helicopter suddenly yawed to the left and the audio warning for engine power and main-rotor rpm
sounded. The pilot regained control and conducted an autorotation to the sea near an oil platform. The helicopter touched down hard,
causing the right-front emergency float to detach, and rolled over. The pilot later reported that there was only a light swell and that he had
had difficulty judging his height above the water.
3/8/02 Aerospatiale SK Logistics Savannah, Georgia, U.S. Unscheduled 1 0 0 Destroyed
AS355F1 TwinStar passenger
The helicopter was destroyed when it struck the water and sank during approach to an offshore oil platform.
3/21/02 Aerospatiale Mountain Life Susanville, Ferry 1 2 0 Destroyed
AS350B Ecureuil Flight California, U.S.
The helicopter was destroyed when it struck the surface of a lake while en route to its base. Just before the accident the pilot told the
passengers, “Boy, it’s disorienting when the lake is this smooth.”

626 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft
3/23/02 Bell 206L-4 Petroleum Lafayette, Louisiana, U.S. Ferry 1 0 0 Destroyed
LongRanger Helicopters Inc.
The pilot lost control of the helicopter during liftoff and struck the sea about 100 feet below the platform.
3/30/02* Rotorway NA May River, 210 Personal 0 0 1 Substantial
Exec 162F kilometers northeast
of Broome, Western
Australia, Australia
During a short flight over the May River, the pilot overpitched the helicopter, causing engine failure. The pilot ditched in the river.
The pilot exited the helicopter without injury and was rescued by the occupants of a nearby boat. The helicopter sank in about nine
feet of water.
4/14/02* Hughes City of Tampa, Florida, U.S. Private 0 1 0 Destroyed
OH-6 (369) Tampa Police
Department
During a routine police patrol, the tail-rotor effectiveness failed and the pilot conducted a ditching in Tampa Bay. The helicopter rolled over
on touchdown.
5/11/02 Aerospatiale Helicopter Kharq Island, Iran Unscheduled 4 1 0 Destroyed
SA316B Services passenger
Alouette III Organization
Shortly after takeoff from an oil platform, while flying at about 300 feet, the pilot transmitted a mayday call and reported technical
problems. According to press reports, he said that he was returning to the oil platform. Communication ceased and the helicopter was
found to have struck the sea about four miles from the platform.
5/24/02 Eurocopter Bond Air Orkney Islands, External load 1 0 0 Destroyed
MBB BO-105D Services Great Britain
The helicopter was being used to support construction at a lighthouse on a small tidal island and had made about seven trips to the
mainland with sling loads of surplus building material and rubbish. The eighth load comprised scaffolding sections and stainless-steel
cable. After the load was attached, the pilot climbed away. As the helicopter crossed the 45-meter cliffs at the edge of the island, the load
appeared to become unstable and started to swing. The helicopter was seen to yaw to the left while banking to the right. Control was not
regained and the helicopter struck the sea.
6/25/02 Bell 206B Wisk-Air Tilly Lake, Ontario, Personnel 0 0 3 Major partial
JetRanger Canada positioning
The helicopter had been landed on a lake and was being air-taxied slowly toward shallower water so that the passengers could collect
sediment samples. Waves began breaking over the left float. The pilot increased throttle to climb but as the helicopter lifted off, it began
to spin rapidly to the right. Control was not regained. The helicopter’s left float struck the water and it rolled inverted. The pilot and
passengers escaped from the submerged cabin and were rescued about three hours later.
6/26/02 Robinson R44 Quicksilver Air Shageluk, Alaska, U.S. Positioning 0 0 1 Substantial
The pilot was conducting a visual approach over water to a beach on the shore of a lake. About 200 feet above the water, the pilot shifted
his attention inside the helicopter to check the carburetor heat. When he looked up, the helicopter was descending nose-down toward the
water. During corrective actions, the tail rotor struck the water and then the fuselage struck the water. The helicopter sank in about nine
feet of water.
7/10/02 Sikorsky S-58ET Midwest Brookville Lake, Ferry 1 2 0 Destroyed
Truxton Indiana, U.S.
International
While apparently maneuvering at a low altitude during a ferry flight from Indianapolis to a location in Ohio, the helicopter struck power
lines and then struck a lake.
7/16/02 Sikorsky Bristow Cromer, Norfolk, Unscheduled 11 0 0 Destroyed
S-76A Spirit Helicopters England passenger
As the helicopter was approaching a drilling rig in level flight at 320 feet and 100 knots, workers on the rig heard a loud bang and then
saw the helicopter dive steeply into the sea. One witness saw what appeared to be the main rotor head with blades attached falling
separately into the sea.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004 627
 Stat i s t i c s

Table 2
Helicopter Water-contact Accidents, 1980–Feb. 23, 2003 (continued)

Injury to Occupants
Date:
Month/Day/ Minor/ Damage to
Year Aircraft Operator Location Nature of Flight Fatal Serious None Aircraft

7/25/02* Bell 206L-3 Air Logistics In the Gulf of Mexico, off Unscheduled 0 0 2 Destroyed
LongRanger Franklin, Louisiana, U.S. passenger

While in normal cruise flight, about 10 minutes after takeoff, the pilot heard a bang and the helicopter yawed. The pilot was unable
to control the yaw and conducted a ditching. During the final stage of the autorotation, the pilot deployed the emergency floats. The
helicopter rolled over and floated inverted.

8/1/02* Bell 206L-1 Go Helitrans Harlingen, Texas, U.S. Unscheduled 0 0 4 Major partial
LongRanger (Go Helicopters) passenger

While in cruise flight, the helicopter’s engine failed. The pilot conducted an autorotation to the water but, on touchdown, the main rotor
struck the tail boom. The crew of a boat rescued the pilot and passengers. The helicopter was recovered onto a barge and transported to
shore.

9/7/02 Robinson R22B Quicksilver Air Jamestown, Aerial 0 0 2 Substantial

Kentucky, U.S. observation

The helicopter was being used by a photographer to take pictures of boats during a race conducted on a lake. The helicopter was about
200 feet above the lake when the pilot spotted a boat that had not been photographed. The pilot entered a left turn and began a descent
to keep pace with the boat. The pilot later said, “I noticed an abnormal sink rate and put in aft cyclic. The rate did not arrest, so I brought in
more aft cyclic along with collective power. As I came into about 50 [feet] to 100 feet AGL, I heard a low-rpm warning horn. I continued to
slow the [helicopter], while rolling on throttle. The descent rate brought the [helicopter] in contact with the water.” The helicopter sank and
came to rest at a depth of about 115 feet. It was not recovered.

9/15/02* Hughes Killian Cable Rocky Gorge Reservoir, Private 0 0 2 Destroyed

OH-6A (369A) Contracting Co. Maryland, U.S.

The pilot experienced a sudden shuddering of the helicopter followed by a loss of directional control. The helicopter began an
uncommanded left turn and would not respond to the anti-torque pedals. The pilot was able to regain control by using collective but,
as the helicopter neared its destination, warning indicators illuminated in the cockpit and the engine began to spool down. The pilot
turned the helicopter through 180 degrees and began an autorotation toward the surface of a reservoir. As the helicopter descended to
the water, the engine power was restored and the helicopter began to rotate to the left. The pilot was completed the ditching and the
helicopter immediately rolled to the left. The pilot and passenger were able to escape before it sank.

10/31/02 Agusta A109C Lionel Poilane Cancale, France Private 1 0 0 Destroyed

The helicopter disappeared while en route to an island off the Brittany coast, and is believed to have crashed in the sea near Cancale.

10/31/02 Hughes Lancaster Susquehanna River, Crew training 0 2 1 Destroyed

OH-6A (369A) Helicopters Pennsylvania, U.S.

During a crew training flight, practicing maneuvers in a confined area over a river, the flight instructor, who was handling the
controls, misjudged its height above the water. One of the helicopter’s skids struck the water and then the fuselage struck the water.

11/8/02 Aerospatiale William Smitters East Hampton, Private 1 0 0 Destroyed

SA341G Gazelle New York, U.S.

The helicopter was destroyed when it struck the sea off East Hampton while en route from Long Island MacArthur Airport, Islip, to
East Hampton.

1/27/03* Robinson R44 NA Antarctica Private 0 0 2 Destroyed

The helicopter was ditched in the sea off Antarctica following an engine failure. Both crewmembers evacuated into a life raft and were rescued.

2/23/03 Aerospatiale PLM Dollar Auchtertyre, Scotland Fire fighting 0 0 1 Substantial

SA350 Ecureuil Group

The helicopter was being used in fighting a forest fire. The tail rotor struck the surface of a loch (lake) while collecting water.

628 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WATERPROOF FLIGHT OPerationS • September 2003–February 2004
References
  References

631 They’re Slippery When Wet,

Better Read Them Now
659 Photo Credits
 PUBLICATIONS
RECEIVED AT FSF JERRY LEDERER
AVIATION SAFETY LIBRARY

They’re Slippery When Wet,

Better Read Them Now
Here are many of the books, manuals, handbooks, reports, videotapes and standards
we encountered in preparing this issue. Go ahead, immerse yourself in reading.

— FSF Library Staff

A Further In-water Performance considered important to achieving ef- which was developed by FAA and the
Assessment of Lifejacket and fective protection for survivors and il- U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Immersion Suit Combinations. Light, lustrated the need to define acceptable Administration, uses coded data to
I.M.; Slater, P. Health and Safety sea conditions for which equipment provide airframe response to dynamic
Executive (HSE), Offshore Technology should be designed. accident impact. To determine possible
Information (OTI). OTI report 91 code modifications for structure/terrain
550. 1991. 65 pp. Figures, tables, A Literature Survey of Airborne interaction and head/structure interac-
appendixes, references. Available on the Vehicles Impacting With Water tion, 28 water-impact-related reports
Internet at <www.hse.gov.uk/research/ and Soil; Head Injury Criteria and and 40 soil-impact-related reports were
offshore.htm> or from HSE.6 Severity Index Development of identified and reviewed. Their abstracts
Computer Program KRASH. Wittlin, and summaries are included in the re-

T his report describes a series of tests to

study self-righting ability and airway
protection when immersion suits and life
G.; Gamon, M.A. U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Technical
Center. Report DOT/FAA/CT-90/24.
port. Head injury criteria and severity of
injury also are addressed.

vests are used in combination, the goal July 1992. 72 pp. Figures, tables, A Practical Guide to Lifeboat
being to evaluate performance of im- appendixes. Available from NTIS.11 Survival. The Center for the Study and
mersion suit and life vest combinations Practice of Survival. Jeffs, David S.;
available to crewmembers. A mannikin
was used to simulate a relaxed or uncon-
scious person in the sea.
W hen this study was conducted,
analyses of airplane accident im-
pacts were based on the assumption that
Keating, David, translators. Annapolis,
Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press,
1997. 160 pp. Figures, drawings, charts,
impact surfaces were rigid and unyield- plotting tool, index. Available in French
Comparative data, representing com- ing. The report said, “The difficulty in and English.
binations tested in calm waters and modeling water and soil impacts relates
disturbed waters in a wave tank, showed
a decrease in airway protection as rough
water was introduced into the tests.
to the ability to accurately depict the force
distribution on the fuselage as the vehicle
penetrates the terrain.” Crashworthiness
T his is an English translation of
Manuel Pratique de Survie en Mer
by Centre d’Etude et de Pratique de la
The project identified design features simulation software, such as KRASH, Survie (CEPS), first published in 1990 by

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WaterProof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 631
 Re f e r e n c e s

Editions Charles-Lavauzelle in Panazol, France. • Twenty percent of deaths occurred outside

The original guide was developed by survival the cabin, most from drowning; and,
instructors and other professionals, endorsed by
the French Maritime Administration and required • When shoulder harnesses were available, two-
to be aboard all French lifeboats. thirds of the accident pilots did not use them,
and one-half of accident passengers did not
Widely divergent needs and contingencies are ad- use them.
dressed, from 20 people in a lifeboat in the North
Sea to a lone survivor in a life raft in tropical seas. One recommendation from the study was that
Guidelines cover issues that survivors may face all seaplane occupants wear personal flotation
— leadership; morale; organization of activities; devices during standing, taxiing, takeoff and the
protection from environmental elements; first approach-and-landing phase of flight.
aid and hygiene; navigation; weather forecast-
ing; fatigue, rest, relaxation and sleep; food and A Study Into Onshore and Offshore Based
drink; marine life; equipment use, maintenance Rescue and Recovery (OBRR) Helicopters.
and repair; and prayer. Bomel. Health and Safety Executive (HSE),
Offshore Division. OTO report 2001/039. 2001.
The book’s format is especially useful. Each chap- 136 pp. Appendixes, references, index. Available
ter begins by highlighting quick-reference infor- on the Internet at <www.hse.gov.uk/research/
mation and continues with detailed explanations offshore.htm> or from HSE.6
and illustrations. For example, the chapter about
rescues emphasizes the point that the rescue itself
can be the most dangerous part of abandonment
at sea and lists favorable and unfavorable condi-
T he study was commissioned by the HSE to
provide a detailed review of OBRR helicop-
ters supporting oil and gas field operations on the
tions for rescue before explaining the numerous U.K. Continental Shelf. The following government
aspects of rescue. bodies were consulted on their roles in regulating
and setting standards for offshore helicopter and
A Safety Study of Survivability in Seaplane search-and-rescue operations: HSE, Civil Aviation
Accidents. Transportation Safety Board of Authority, Maritime and Coastguard Agency,
Canada (TSB). Report SA9401. 1994. 12 pp. Royal Air Force Search and Rescue Training Unit,
Tables, appendixes, references. Available on and British Helicopter Advisory Board.
the Internet at <www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/
studies/index.asp> or from TSB.17 The study reviewed routine factors and key factors
that may arise in planning for helicopter use in

T he TSB analyzed data from seaplane accidents

that occurred in Canada from 1976 through
1990 to identify safety deficiencies in seaplane op-
OBRR operations. Principal areas reviewed relate
to regulations and codes of practice; OBRR heli-
copter operations management; offshore facilities
erations. Results showed there were 1,432 seaplane and equipment; OBRR helicopters, equipment and
accidents and 452 deaths. A 1993 report used the operations; and historical data on helicopter opera-
data to identify deficiencies in pilot skills, abilities tions incidents.
and knowledge. Based on the same data, this 1994
report identified factors affecting occupant surviv- A Wind-tunnel Assessment of the Contribution
ability in seaplane accidents terminating in water. of the Wind Loads on a Liferaft to the Problem
of Overturning. Ponsford, P.J. National
The study examined use of personal restraint Maritime Institute. Report NMI TM 26.
systems, use of flotation devices, causes of deaths November 1978. 32 pp. Figures, tables,
and locations where deaths occurred. Findings illustrations, photographs. Availability.4
showed that:

• Most pilot and passenger drownings occurred

inside the aircraft;
A t the time of this study, little was known about
the role of wind in overturning life rafts. The
report describes a study of wind loads on a 25-per-
son life raft with open and closed hatches (windows)
• Those able to egress did so with difficulty; in the raft’s canopy. The life raft was tested in several

632 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

positions, from full contact with water to overhang- water collection systems; life raft repairs and first
ing waves. The tests showed that maximum lift and aid. He also shares his experiences, thoughts, beliefs
overturning (pitching) moment occurred with the and lessons learned.
canopy hatches closed and increased progressively
as the leading edge of the life raft underside ex- Airmen Against the Sea: An Analysis of Sea
tended beyond the edge of a wave. Survival Experiences. Llano, George Albert.
Research Studies Institute, Arctic, Desert, Tropic
Adlard Coles’s Heavy Weather Sailing. Bruce, Information Center (ADTIC). Maxwell Air Force
Peter. Camden, Maine, U.S.: The McGraw-Hill Base, Alabama, U.S. ADTIC publication G‑104.
Companies, International Marine Publishing 1955. 119 pp. Figures, tables. Availability.1
Co., 30th anniversary edition, 1999. 308 pp.
Figures, photographs, illustrations, bibliography,
index. T his retrospective study was fourth in a series of
ADTIC studies undertaken to determine how
military personnel survived under emergency con-

T his edition follows Adlard Cole’s style of

presenting actual accounts of heavy weather
sailing as learning experiences for readers. It is a
ditions in different parts of the world (Southwest
Pacific tropics, African deserts and the Arctic).
Most of the incidents occurred in the 1940–1946
collection of articles about storm experiences and period. The oldest account is from 1913, and the
expert advice, with information about crew fitness, most recent is from 1955.
use of drag devices, meteorology, wave action, life
raft use, and survival equipment for non-sailors The report contains factual accounts of men who
wanting an understanding of storm winds and sea survived aboard rubber life rafts, following air-
conditions as preparation for life raft use. craft ditchings or parachute bail-outs over water.
Personal accounts describe successes and failures of
Adrift: Seventy-six Days Lost at Sea. Callahan, survival equipment, rescue efforts, survival manuals
Steven. Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.: Houghton and training used during respective time periods.
Mifflin Co., 1986. 260 pp. Map, illustrations, Two opposing groups emerged from narrative ac-
photographs. counts — those who lacked planning, foresight and
imagination and experienced despair; and those

C allahan built a 21-foot (6.4 meter) sloop and

outfitted it for single-handed ocean sailing.
Callahan and his boat performed very well dur-
who planned for eventualities by making personal
survival kits, checking their equipment repeatedly
and practicing survival drills.
ing successive voyages from the eastern coast of
the United States, to Bermuda and across the The report includes a chapter on development of
Atlantic Ocean to England, then down the coasts water survival concepts from 1913 to 1954.
of Portugal and Spain to the Canary Islands. A few
days into the trip from the Canary Islands to the American Practical Navigator: An Epitome
Caribbean Sea (an anticipated 14-day trip), a storm of Navigation. Bowditch, Nathaniel.
caused the sailboat to sink in approximately one Washington, D.C., U.S.: Defense Mapping
minute. It would take 76 days and approximately Agency, Hydrographic/Topographic Center
1,800 nautical miles (3,334 kilometers) for the (DMAHTC). 1984 edition with updates,
sailor and his life raft to drift into the Caribbean volume I, pub. no. 9. 1430 pp. Figures, tables,
Sea. Callahan had drifted within 60 nautical miles illustrations, appendixes, references, index.
(111 kilometers) of his original destination when
he was rescued by local fishermen.

Callahan was better prepared for living aboard his

T his technical book begins with the history
of navigation and basic definitions. Timeless
navigation topics are discussed thoroughly: instru-
life raft than most, having read survival manuals ments, such as compasses and sextants; celestial
and having included additional equipment in navigation; oceanography; and weather. Final
his life raft and emergency travel bag. The book chapters cover modern electronics for navigation.
details his use of a spear gun and other makeshift
tools; his life raft and safety equipment; fishing The point is made that when emergencies arise,
techniques and food preparation; improvised knowledge of basic principles leads to ingenuity

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 633
 Re f e r e n c e s

and improvisation of equipment from available The report said that opportunities for emergency
materials. “For the navigator prepared with such water landing events are significant and that air-
knowledge, and a determination to succeed, the crew training, survival equipment and survival
situation is never hopeless. Some method of navi- procedures are “likely to become more important
gation is always available.” than ever before.” Aircrew training programs relat-
ed to ditching, water survival equipment and water
[Nathaniel Bowditch (1773–1838) contributed to survival procedures at nine major airlines and six
the first American edition (1798) of John Hamilton major airframe manufacturers were reviewed.
Moore’s book, The Practical Navigator. This British Deficiencies were identified, and recommenda-
book was the leading navigational textbook at tions for improvement were discussed.
the time. Subsequent revisions to the American
edition were made by Bowditch. The U.S. Navy Aviation Distress Signal. Society of Automotive
purchased the copyright in 1868, and DMAHTC Engineers (SAE), S-9a Safety Equipment
continues to make corrections and modifications and Survival Systems Committee. Aerospace
to the text and to publish the book.] Standard (AS): AS5134, revision A. December
2001. 11 pp. Figures, references. Availability.14
An Investigation Into the Performance of Sea
Anchors for Inflatable Liferafts. Foreman, E.J.
National Maritime Institute (NMI). Report
NMI R 127. January 1982. 40 pp. Figures,
A n aviation distress signal is defined by SAE
as “a handheld, high-intensity, stroboscopic
light source designed to facilitate location and
table, photographs, references. Availability.4 rescue of aviation accident/ditching survivors
by ground, sea or airborne search-and-rescue re-

A sea anchor, towed behind a drifting life raft,

provides drag to reduce the raft’s drift rate
and to orient the raft so that its canopy entrance
sources.” This document defines a signaling device
that can be used in lieu of pyrotechnic devices in
aviation survival kits to aid in search and rescue
faces away from the weather. In this study, British and eliminate hazards of pyrotechnics if used by
researchers at NMI examined the physical proper- untrained personnel in inflatable life rafts.
ties and design theories of sea anchors, drogues
and parachutes, and they conducted in-water Business Turbine Aircraft Accidents Involving
tests (some of which were conducted in Iceland) Intentional In-water Ditching, 1964–2003.
to identify problems that need to be addressed in Robert E. Breiling Associates. Proprietary report
future designs and with materials of the future. for Flight Safety Foundation (FSF). February
2003. 17 pp. Available at the FSF office in
Analysis of Ditching and Water Survival Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
Training Programs of Major Airframe
Manufacturers and Airlines. Cosper, Donna
K.; McLean, Garnet A. U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Office of Aviation
A review and analysis of 787 business jet and
917 turboprop aircraft accident reports
worldwide identified ditchings involving four
Medicine. Report DOT/FAA/AM-98/19. jet-powered aircraft and five turboprop aircraft.
July 1998. 33 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes, Accidents involving inadvertent flight into water
references. Available on the Internet at or impacting water during approach and departure
<www.cami.jccbi.gov> or from NTIS.11 were not included. The report includes summaries
and data for each of the ditching accidents.

T he report was produced in response to con-

cerns expressed by the aviation industry and
regulators regarding short-term and long-term
Capsized. Nalepka, James; Callahan, Steven.
New York, New York, U.S.: HarperCollins
increases in aircraft operations near or over water. Publishers, 1992. 244 pp. Map, illustrations,
Tables in the report show the number of surviv- photographs.
able worldwide water landings and the number of
FAA-controlled airports and their proximities to
large bodies of water. In 1996, 44 of the 50 busiest
U.S. airports were located within five statute miles
I n August 1989, four men left New Zealand on a
leisurely sail aboard a trimaran (a three-hulled
sailboat). Three days out of port, Antarctic gale-
(eight kilometers) of a significant body of water. force winds and rough seas capsized the trimaran.

634 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

All of the men survived, but most of their gear, research studies conducted in static, calm water
food and water were lost overboard. They lived using safe, repeatable methods. However, calm
inside a small compartment of one hull and out- water testing practices cannot measure the effects
side, atop the capsized hulls. of wave action on life vests to determine optimum
angle of repose, optimum head angle relative to a
Initially the men functioned independently. As wave, the number of mouth immersions or buoy-
they learned to trust each other, their collective ancy requirements in waves.
will to live forged them into a cooperative team,
performing survival tasks such as collecting water This report provides an overview of the Coast
and finding food. Adrift in the wintry South Pacific Guard’s research program on the performance
for 119 days, the craft was finally carried by ocean of PFDs in rough water and describes an in-
currents toward shore, where it was crushed by strumented mannikin under construction that
nature’s forces at the Great Barrier Island, and the would serve as a full-scale validation tool for
team’s will to live was tested again. Coast Guard survival system studies. [This re-
port was published in the 1992 SAFE Symposium
Chapman Piloting: Seamanship & Small Boat Proceedings.]
Handling. Chapman, Charles F. Revisions by
Elbert S. Maloney, et al. New York, New York, Commuter/Air Taxi Ditchings and Water-
U.S.: Hearst Marine Books, 62nd edition, related Impacts That Occurred From 1979 to
1996. 1430 pp. Figures, tables, photographs, 1989. Chen, Charles C.T.; Muller, Mark.
illustrations, charts, appendixes, index. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration,
Technical Center. Report DOT/FAA/CT-92/04.

C harles F. Chapman produced the first edition

of his book in 1917 as a handbook for instruct-
ing boatmen who had volunteered to assist the U.S.
July 1994. Figures, tables, appendixes,
references, glossary. 105 pp. Available from
NTIS.11
Navy in World War I. The original handbook was
a combination of educational articles previously
published in Motor Boating Magazine and new
material appropriate for military boatmen.
T he study’s purpose was identification of
trends in occupant survivability in com-
muter and air taxi aircraft ditchings and water-
contact accidents from 1979–1989. Of the acci-
The 62nd edition contains chapters on various dents examined, 40 met the criteria for inclusion
aspects of sail and power boating. Chapters of in the study. The study reviewed impact condi-
particular interest to aviators deal with water- tions, post-impact conditions, aircraft behavior,
related emergencies; first aid and medical emer- impact velocities and attitudes, injury causes
gencies; navigation and navigational aids; wind, and severity, flotation availability and flotation
waves and weather; tides and currents; com- performance.
munication; abandoning ship; survival floating;
helicopter rescue and life rafts. There were numerous findings on impact condi-
tions, occupant survivability hazards, effect of re-
Chapman Piloting: Seamanship & Small Boat straint use on occupant injury and aircraft impact
Handling is updated periodically by contributing damage, most notably:
writers and contributing consultants.
• The most prevalent impact hazard was injury
Coast Guard Approach to Develop Improved attributed to flailing;
Personal Flotation Devices: Final Report for the
• Frequency and severity of injuries increased
Period May 1992–November 1992. Macesker,
as weight and size of the aircraft decreased;
Bert; White, Richard P., Jr. U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) Research and Development Center. • The most significant post-impact hazard was
Report AL/CF-TP-1994-0019. November 1992. drowning; and,
15 pp. Figures, references. Available from NTIS.11
• There was a direct correlation between the

S ince the early 1970s, the USCG has spon-

sored personal flotation device (PFD) related
lack of personal flotation equipment and the
number of drowning fatalities.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 635
 Re f e r e n c e s

Compatibility Test Protocol for Lifejackets and Laboratory. NACA Technical Note 1347. 1956.
Immersion Suits on Offshore Installations. 28 pp. Tables, references. Availability.9
Mensafe. Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
OTO report 2002/021. April 2002. 22 pp. Tables,
appendixes, glossary, references. Available on
the Internet at <www.hse.gov.uk/research/
D ata from actual, full-scale aircraft ditchings
and data from dynamic, scale-model inves-
tigations were collected and analyzed to gain an
offshore.htm> or from HSE.6 understanding of the effects of design parameters
on the ditching characteristics of airplanes. The

T he International Maritime Organization,

U.K. Civil Aviation Authority and the Comité
Européen De Normalisation specify performance
goal was to determine design parameters that
could improve ditching safety without sacrificing
aerodynamic properties. Performance data from
standards for life vests and performance standards scale models of bomber, fighter and transport
for immersion suits used by helicopter and marine aircraft are summarized.
crewmembers while working in offshore environ-
ments, and the offshore industry has accepted Drift of Common Search and Rescue Objects
these standards for type testing. Nevertheless, the — Phase II. Fitzgerald, R.B.; Finlayson,
report says a significant shortfall in performance D.F.; Cross, J.F.; Allen, A. Transport Canada,
standards for compatibility and suitability exists Transportation Development Centre; Canadian
when life vests and immersion suits are used in Coast Guard. Report TP 11673E. March 1993.
combination. 200 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes. Available
from NTIS.11
Previous HSE and industry reports on tests of life
vest-immersion suit combinations found that sev-
eral combinations are unsuitable for use offshore.
This report provides protocol for compatibility
A ccording to the report, “leeway is defined as
the movement of a craft through the water
caused by the wind acting on the exposed surface
testing in situations common to all installations of the craft.” This report, the second in a series
(e.g., immersion suit and life vest compatibility of multi-year projects, describes in-water experi-
with helicopter seats and restraint systems). ments conducted in 20-knot and 50-knot winds
to determine leeway rates and angles for several
Coping With Survival. Aircraft Disasters and objects commonly found in search-and-rescue
Emergencies: Guidelines for Psycho-Emotional operations — an asymmetrical life raft, a sym-
Recovery. Kilpatrick, Margaret Ann. Glendale, metrical life raft, and an 18-foot (six meter) plank
California, U.S.: Self-published, 1981. 36 pp. boat used in the Atlantic coastal waters of Canada.
Addenda, photographs. The rafts and boat were tested with various con-
figurations of people aboard and with and without

T his monograph was published in booklet

format by its author, Margaret Kilpatrick.
It is about people helping people recover from
drogues. The leeway rates were determined to be
less than those shown in the National Search and
Rescue Manual (National Defence and Canadian
traumatic events, such as aircraft accidents. The Coast Guard, 1985).
author, a licensed clinical social worker, provides
information to increase awareness of what to Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT)
expect and ways to assist. The text identifies Installation and Performance. RTCA,
factors influencing the nature and severity of an Special Committee 136. Report DO-182.
event’s impact upon survivors; characteristics of Nov. 17, 1982. Figures, tables, appendixes.
typical mental and physical reactions; strategies Availability.13
to assist and support survivors with their psycho-
emotional recovery; and guidelines for self-care.

Ditching Investigations of Dynamic Models

T his document provides consensus-based
guidelines for ELT placement and installa-
tion; reports on false alarms, activations in crash
and Effects of Design Parameters on Ditching environments and analyses of ELT systems per-
Characteristics. Fisher, Lloyd J.; Hoffman, formance in various aircraft installations; and
Edward L. National Advisory Committee for makes specific recommendations on each of
Aeronautics (NACA), Langley Aeronautical the topics.

636 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

Essentials of Sea Survival. Golden, Frank; life for 60 days, yet small enough to fit into a life
Tipton, Michael. Champaign, Illinois, U.S.: raft compartment.
Human Kinetics, 2002. 320 pp. Figures, tables,
photographs, appendix, glossary, bibliography, After extensive research of survivor accounts,
index. survival kits and life rafts, Sigler prepared to test
his theory. With no open-ocean experience in a

A ccording to the book, analyses of maritime

tragedies suggest two underlying causes: a
general lack of understanding about the nature of
floating vessel, he and another former U.S. Navy
pilot modified a small rubber inflatable (Zodiac)
raft to carry a sail and two solar stills for water
various threats and the human body’s reactions or collection. They started the voyage with Sigler’s
physiological responses to those threats; and “in a self-designed survival kit, six pounds (three
survival situation, costly safety equipment is often kilograms) of food and no fresh water. The men
not readily at hand, is difficult to operate in adverse sailed from San Francisco, California, U.S., across
conditions, or is impossible to use correctly without the Pacific Ocean to Hawaii, U.S., in 56 days and
specific training.” Referencing historical anecdotes successfully provided adequate food and water
and published scientific research, the authors ex- en route.
amine threats to survivors at sea and methods to
prevent or minimize these dangers. “Fastnet, Force 10.” Rousmaniere, John. New
York, New York, U.S.: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980.
The first half of the book discusses physiological 288 pp. Charts, maps, drawings, appendixes,
and behavioral responses to cold temperatures, references, photographs, index.
immersion and drowning. The second half covers
techniques for survival and rescue in a lifeboat or
in water. The intent of the book is to provide a
comprehensive and practical guide to open-water
A vicious “Force 10” summer gale, lasting about
20 hours, battered 303 yachts sailing in the
1979 Fastnet yacht race off the English coast. Force
survival. 10 velocity on the Beaufort scale of wind and sea
conditions equals a wind speed of 48 knots to 55
Estimating Extreme Wave Heights in the NE knots, very high waves with long overhanging
Atlantic From GeoSat Data. Carter, D.J.T. crests and a tumbling sea.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Offshore
Safety Division. Offshore Technology Report Many yachts were overturned, capsized or badly
OTH 93 396. 1993. 35 pp. Figures, tables, damaged. Some crewmembers were seriously
appendix, references. Available on the Internet injured, lost overboard, swept away, drowned,
at <www.hse.gov.uk/research/offshore.htm> or or died of hypothermia. Of the 2,700 male and
from HSE.6 female crewmembers, nine died and 136 were
rescued from sinking sailboats, from life rafts

A n Earth-orbiting satellite, using downward-

looking radar, measures altitude to estimate
significant ocean wave heights. Significant wave
and from the rough waters.

Yacht and crew accounts and descriptions of

height is a measure of the general sea state. This search-and-rescue efforts are described with
technical report explains how radar altimeters enough detail to encourage experienced seamen
measure wave height and describes some of their and novices to think carefully about the suitability
limitations. of their own life rafts and life vests in rough seas
and stormy weather.
Experiment in Survival. Sigler, George. Vero
Beach, Florida, U.S.: Vero Technical Support, Fatal Storm: The Inside Story of the Tragic
2001. 208 pp. Photographs. Sydney-Hobart Race. Mundle, Rob. New York,
New York, U.S.: The McGraw-Hill Companies,

S igler said that his “entire philosophy about

ocean survival revolved around the castaway
saving himself, totally independent of outside
International Marine, 1999. 275 pp. Map,
photographs.

help.” He believed that he could make a survival

kit with appropriate supplies to sustain a person’s E ach Dec. 26, sailboats of all sizes begin the
Sydney-to-Hobart Yacht Race (from Sydney

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 637
 Re f e r e n c e s

to Hobart, Australia), a distance of 630 nauti- and adaptation are emphasized. Full text of the
cal miles (1,167 kilometers). In 1998, a freak- Army’s June 1992 updated version can be found
ish, unseasonal storm with hurricane-strength on the Internet.
winds and rough seas with waves 60 feet (18
meters) high or higher struck the 115-boat rac- Full-scale Trials of Inflatable Liferafts
ing fleet. During the storm, some boats were so in the Waters Off Iceland. Foreman, E.J.
badly damaged that racing crews were forced to National Maritime Institute (NMI). Technical
abandon them. Memoranda NMI TM 53. September 1980.
22 pp. Figures, references. Availability.4
The book recounts the experiences of those re-
quiring assistance and search-and-rescue efforts.
Readers unfamiliar with “riding out a storm” in a
life raft with repeated capsizings or with jumping
T est trials of six 10-person inflatable life rafts
(from four manufacturers) were conducted
during February 1980 in the open waters off the
into rough seas and swimming to meet a rescue northwest coast of Iceland. Production-model
helicopter sling will have a new appreciation for life rafts, with and without ballast modifications,
the term, “safety and survival at sea.” were tested for life raft stability, effectiveness of sea
anchor systems, canopy strength and door closing
Fatal Traps for Helicopter Pilots. Whyte, Greg. methods. Photographs and schematic drawings of
Auckland, New Zealand: Reed Publishing, 2003. trial equipment are included in the report.
396 pp. Figures, bibliography, index.
Results showed that a life raft must have maximum

T he book’s main purpose “is to promote safety

in rotary-wing aviation by identifying and ad-
dressing the main causes of helicopter accidents.”
stability immediately upon launch to prevent
tipping or capsizing before passenger boarding
and that an intact sea anchor can substantially
A broad range of situations and conditions that improve inflatable life raft stability and drift rate.
may lead to an accident are discussed. Each situ- Effectiveness of modified ballast arrangements
ation is described in general terms and followed was not clearly demonstrated. Manufacturers
by examples or an actual accident report with were already aware of door closing problems and
findings and recommendations. were making improvements.

In the chapter on ditching, a personal account by Full-scale Trials of Inflatable Liferafts in the
a pilot who ditched a Hughes 500D helicopter in Waters Off Iceland — Second Series. Foreman,
Cook Strait, New Zealand, is used as an example. E.J. National Maritime Institute (NMI).
The pilot said that he “went from flying straight Technical Memoranda NMI TM 63. June 1981.
and level to swimming in two to 2½ minutes!” 22 pp. Figures, references. Availability.4
The account describes ditching, inversion and
difficulties of evacuation.

The book suggests ways to prepare, in advance

D uring March 1981, trials were conducted
in open waters off the southeast coast of
Iceland to determine the effectiveness of modi-
of flight, for ditching, cold water survival and fications made to life rafts as a result of sea trials
life vests. conducted in February 1980. Four modified, in-
flatable life rafts with 10-person capacity, two new
Field Manual: Survival. U.S. Department of the sea anchor designs and a newly designed canopy
Army. Washington, D.C., U.S.: Headquarters, entrance were tested.
Department of the Army. Series FM 21-76.
October 1970. 288 pp. Figures, appendix, Results showed the new sea anchor designs were
references, map, index. effective in maintaining life raft stability, and the
NMI design was recommended for adoption

T his 1970 version follows the Oct. 25, 1957,

field manual and was written to prepare
soldiers, alone and in groups, for survival in a
on future British-manufactured International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
life rafts. It was recommended that research con-
variety of environmental and hostile settings. tinue until optimum size and shape of ballast
The “will to survive,” valuing life, basic skills pockets on life rafts are determined.

638 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

General Aviation Safety Sense Series: Ditching.

U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), SRG Safety
Promotion Section. Leaflet 21A. 2000. 16 pp.
T he handbook, first produced in 1947, was
intended to serve primarily as a textbook for
courses in survival that were administered to first
Tables, illustrations, photographs, supplements. lieutenants and other naval officers. It contains
Available on the Internet at <www.caa.co.uk> background material and training suggestions
or from Documedia.5 for first lieutenants to use in conducting similar
programs for all shipboard personnel operating

T his leaflet addresses the main points of

ditching — knowledge of your own aircraft
(distance your aircraft can glide); criteria for
on naval surface ships.

Important topics addressed in the handbook are:

selecting and maintaining life vests, life rafts types of survival equipment available; correct use
and other safety equipment; crew and passenger of equipment; accepted medical and physiological
preparation; ditching instructions, such as “above procedures to prolong survival; contributions of
all, throughout, fly the aircraft”; and rescue in- psychology and neuropsychiatry; best methods for
structions, “let the rescuer take control of the retrieving survivors from water; and best training
actual rescue.” methods for maximum results.

The leaflet includes lists of companies offering Heavy Weather Life Raft Test: June 22
survival training and lists of CAA-approved life raft and July 4, 1991. West Marine Products.
and life vest manufacturers and service companies. 16 pp. Index. Available on the Internet at
<www.ussailing.org> or from USSA.18
Global Survival Skills. U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Office of Aerospace
Medicine. Videotape. Availability.12 F our marine life rafts, one portable rescue
platform and related safety equipment were
tested in open waters off the California, U.S., coast

T he videotape covers eight topics about surviv-

ing in adverse conditions: the will to survive;
survival signaling; survival medicine; surviving on
to evaluate specific aspects of each item.

In repeated abandon-ship enactments on open

open water; life rafts, survival kits and accessories; waters, participants evaluated various aspects of
hotland survival; coldland survival; and tropical each of the following: raft deployment, launch
survival. and canopy unfurling; boarding techniques and
limitations; drogue deployment and resulting ef-
Guidelines for Management of Offshore fects; canopy design, visibility and ventilation; life
Helicopter Operations. Australian Petroleum raft floor design, floor space and personal volume;
Production & Exploration Association air-holding ability and repairability; equipment
(APPEA). February 2000. 82 pp. Available on ease of use, instructions or lack of information;
the Internet at <www.appea.com.au> or from leaking water, pumping and bailing; survival kits
APPEA.3 and water makers; life vests; seasickness; very-
high-frequency (VHF) radios, and emergency

T he guidelines are intended as a reference of

good industry practices for the safe conduct
of operations within the offshore petroleum in-
position-indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs); and
flares and smoke canisters.

dustry. Information regarding flotation devices, Heavy Weather Sailing. Coles, K. Adlard.
life rafts, life vests, immersion suits, emergency Tuckahoe, New York, U.S.: John de Graff,
locators, emergency exit illumination systems, 1968. 310 pp. Tables, photographs, appendixes,
survival packs and first aid kits is included. bibliography, maps, diagrams, index.

Handbook of Survival in the Water. U.S.

Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval
Personnel. Navy Training Courses, NavPers
H eavy weather sailing as referenced in this
book means sailing in fresh winds of
17–21 knots (Force 5), strong winds of 22–23
16046. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government knots (Force 6 and Force 7) and gales of 34–40
Printing Office, 1951. 224 pp. Figures, tables, knots (Force 8). Winds at these speeds permit the
appendix, index. captain and crew to retain control of the boat.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 639
 Re f e r e n c e s

In survival storms and hurricane-strength

storms (Force 10), wind and sea become masters
of the vessel, and captain and crew must battle
A ccording to the report, “Helicopter travel to
and from offshore installations generates one
of the main sources of risk for offshore workers.
to steer the boat to its best angle of defense Particularly on more modern installations where
against high waves and to keep the boat from other risks are low, helicopter transport may be the
sinking. dominant risk.” The study focused on accidents oc-
curring in Western Europe and especially the U.K.
Most day-sailors and leisure-cruisers avoid heavy Analysis of accident data and relevant literature
weather sailing, while sailors aboard racing boats led to conclusions and recommendations about
generally commit to operating under any condi- causes of accidents; risk factors; aviation culture;
tions. This book provides accounts and brief re- current regulations; helicopter operating limita-
ports of boats that experienced heavy wind and tions; responsibilities of installation operators and
sea conditions, followed by recommendations, owners; helicopter and helideck designs and related
observations and conclusions. The intent is to risk assessments; effects of platform physical en-
share learned experiences without readers hav- vironment; communication; and adverse weather
ing to endure such events. policy.

Heavy Weather Tactics Using Sea Anchors & The report is based on a dissertation submitted
Drogues. Hinz, Earl R. Arcata, California, U.S.: as partial fulfillment of the author’s master of
Paradise Cay Publications, 2000. 182 pp. Figures, science degree program and was later revised and
tables, appendixes, bibliography, glossary, index, updated to include more recent information for
photographs. this OTO report.

A ccording to the book, over the past 30 years,

there has been a growth in the number of
people traveling over open water in small vessels
How to Fly Floats. Frey, J.J. Kenmore,
Washington, U.S.: Kenmore Air Edo Floats, 20th
edition, 2003. 65 pp. Photographs, diagrams.
and in airplanes who subsequently experience
unanticipated storms and extreme weather con-
ditions. There has been a corresponding growth
in the need for drag devices as standard safety
F irst published in the early 1970s, this book
discusses the basics of seaplane flight for new
pilots and pilots transitioning from landplanes,
equipment on boats and life rafts. telling readers that float flying is “the easiest type
of flying to learn for the beginner” and that it
There are two types of drag devices — a drogue “comes quickly and naturally for the seasoned
attached to the stern of a vessel to slow it and a sea landplane pilot.”
anchor attached to the bow of a vessel to “anchor”
it to the surface of the water. Both types help to The book includes chapters on preflight opera-
prevent vessels lacking power or control from be- tions, taxiing, takeoffs, landings, sailing (control-
ing knocked about, rolled or capsized by high wind ling the aircraft by positioning it into the wind and
and large waves. The book is written for neophytes using the force of the wind to move the aircraft to
and experienced seamen who need an understand- the desired position on the water), operating regu-
ing of drag devices, their potential benefits, how lations, docking, and service and maintenance. An
they work and when to deploy and retrieve them. appendix describes methods of estimating wind
Design specifications and technical data illustrate speeds and provides advice for different types of
optimum design and use of drag devices for sail- wind conditions and water conditions.
boats, powered yachts and life rafts.
How to Survive on Land and Sea. Craighead,
Helicopter Safety Offshore. Morrison, Graham. Frank C., Jr.; Craighead, John J. Annapolis,
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Offshore Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press,
Division. OTO report 2000/089. 2001. 114 pp. fourth edition, 1984. 444 pp. Figures, map,
Figures, tables, appendixes, bibliography, bibliography, index.
references. Available on the Internet at
<www.hse.gov.uk/research/offshore.htm> or
from HSE.6 T he first edition of this book was published
in 1943 and contained materials developed

640 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

by the U.S. Navy “to provide the best possible In Harm’s Way: The Sinking of the USS
standardized instruction in survival techniques Indianapolis and the Extraordinary Story of
for combat naval pilots, both on land and at sea.” Its Survivors. Stanton, Doug. New York, New
After World War II, the book became widely used York, U.S.: Henry Holt and Co., 2001. 345 pp.
in the civilian sector. Through periodic updates, Photographs, bibliography, notes.
it continues to be a timely survival resource. Part
1 covers land survival, and Part 2 covers water
survival. There are extensive lists of items for
consideration in assembling well-stocked life raft
O n July 30, 1945, while the battle cruiser USS
Indianapolis was returning from a top secret
mission — delivering components for the atomic
survival kits and first aid kits for land or water. bomb that would later be dropped over Hiroshima,
Japan — it was struck by torpedoes launched from
“Survival is a state of mind, and your life may very a Japanese submarine in the Pacific Ocean. Before
well depend on it. The state of mind most likely sinking, the cruiser cast approximately 900 of its
to sustain you is achieved through a combination sailors (many others died aboard ship) into the
of will and behavior,” says the book. ocean, where they struggled to survive for nearly
five days.
The book emphasizes “preparedness and priori-
ties.” Preparedness covers a broad range of tasks, When the ship did not arrive as scheduled for
from mental and physical readiness to practice practice maneuvers in the Philippines, there was
with survival equipment. Survival priorities for no immediate concern by the U.S. Navy. Survivors
an episode at sea are very specific and should adrift in the ocean were spotted accidentally by
follow in this order — flotation, first aid, water a U.S. Navy pilot on anti-submarine patrol and
procurement, shelter construction, food procure- were subsequently rescued by Navy aircraft and
ment and travel. Navy vessels. Several of the 317 survivors describe
their own incredible experiences and those of their
Human Factors Relating to Escape and companions as they fought sharks, dehydration,
Survival From Helicopters Ditching in Water. sunburn, injuries, physical and mental exhaustion,
Brooks, C.J. Advisory Group for Aerospace fear, despair, and hallucinatory dementia before
Research and Development (France); U.S. being rescued.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Report AGARD-AG-305. February 1991. 125 pp. Individual Inflatable Life Preservers. Society
Figures, tables, annex, references, photographs. of Automotive Engineers (SAE), S-9a Safety
Available in French and English. Available from Equipment and Survival Systems Committee.
NTIS.11 Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP):
ARP1354, revision A. Oct. 28, 1991. 7 pp. Tables.

T he report, Evacuation et Survie en cas

d’Amérrissage Forcé d’un Hélicoptère Le
Availability.14

Facteur Humain, was prepared by C. J. Brooks,

Defence & Civil Institute of Environmental
Medicine in Ontario, Canada, for the sponsoring
S AE standards documents are technical infor-
mation resources that provide guidance for
the design, testing, construction, maintenance,
organizations. The author reports on worldwide and operation of self-propelled vehicles for use
accidents and incidents involving military and ci- on land, at sea, in the air and in space. This ARP
vilian overwater helicopter operations. Accident provides criteria for operational characteristics in
scenarios review pilots’ actions from the moment designing individual inflatable life vests for four
they step aboard and begin the pre-flight brief- classifications of users — adults, combination
ings, continuing through impact, underwater adult/child, children and combination infants/
escape and search and rescue. Training, advance small child.
preparation, safety equipment, immersion suits,
life vests and problems affecting survival are de- Inflatable Liferaft Research 1978–82: Summary
scribed. Recommendations for improvements in Report. Morrall, A.; Foreman, E.J. National
helicopter crashworthiness, life support equip- Maritime Institute. Report NMI TM 96.
ment and a syllabus for underwater-escape train- January 1983. 41 pp. Figures, tables,
ing are included. photographs, references. Availability.4

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 641
 Re f e r e n c e s

I nflatable life rafts were introduced for use

aboard ships in 1959. While generally effective,
some life rafts failed to save the occupants for rea-
interest to those involved in aircraft overwater
operations are examination of patients; care
of the injured; medical care of castaways and
sons that were not understood. Incidents where rescued persons; external assistance by radio or
life rafts were launched from ships in emergency helicopter; and death at sea.
situations were reviewed, and casualty informa-
tion of eight launchings, occurring from 1964 to Changes in the second edition reflect marine,
1976, was examined. These life rafts had capacities scientific and technological advances.
for two to 12 occupants. It was concluded that
inflatable life rafts were effective in saving lives, International Sailing Federation Special
and the majority of capsize events occurred upon Regulations Governing Offshore and Oceanic
inflation or immediately after launching, when life Racing 2002–2003, Including US Sailing
rafts were lightly loaded. Prescriptions. International Sailing Federation
(ISAF), Offshore Racing Council. March 2002.
International Aeronautical and Maritime 52 pp. Tables, appendixes, index, notes.
Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual). Available from ISAF8 or USSA.18
International Maritime Organization (IMO);
International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Montreal, Canada: ICAO, first edition,
1998–99. ICAO Doc 9731-AN/958. Figures,
T he booklet outlines regulations for maintain-
ing optimum safety at sea (inshore, offshore,
and transoceanic) based upon the degree of
glossary, appendixes. Available in Arabic, exposure a sailing vessel likely will encounter
English, French, Russian and Spanish. while racing or cruising. These regulations can
serve as benchmarks for anyone wanting to im-

T he IAMSAR Manual provides search and

rescue (SAR) guidelines to nation-states for
organizing aviation and maritime resources to
prove the safety of a vessel, its equipment and its
crew. The regulations address structural features,
stability, fixed and portable equipment, supplies,
provide SAR services. Volume I, Organization personal equipment and training. Benchmarks
and Management, gives an overview of the SAR for life rafts, life vests, training, survival kits
concept at global, regional and national levels. and signaling devices can be applied to aviation
Volume II, Mission Co-ordination, focuses on key survival equipment. [This particular booklet was
components of the SAR system, like communi- reprinted by US Sailing Association (USAA) and
cations, planning, techniques and operations. includes prescriptive information to meet USAA
Volume III, Mobile Facilities, is an on-board requirements.]
handbook to assist aircraft, rescue unit and
vessel personnel with their own specific emer- Lake Michigan Crew Over Board Study, 1998.
gencies. Each volume is written as a stand-alone Lake Michigan Sail Racing Federation. 1998.
document and as a companion to the other 43 pp. Appendix. Available on the Internet at
volumes. <www.ussailing.org> or from USSA.18

International Medical Guide for Ships,

Including the Ship’s Medicine Chest. World
Health Organization (WHO). Geneva,
T he study is a collection of stories about sail-
ing yachts and their crew who participated
in offshore racing events, in all kinds of weather
Switzerland: WHO, second edition, 1988. conditions on Lake Michigan, U.S. Stories, re-
376 pp. Figures, tables, illustrations, index. ferred to as cases, were recounted by sailors who
experienced crew-overboard events or boat sink-

T he guide was developed for people with little

or no medical training who are responsible
for health care aboard ships and diagnose and
ings and those who participated in rescue efforts.
Each case gives essential facts, describing actions
surrounding crew-overboard or boat-abandon-
treat injured and sick seafarers. It also serves ing events, use of survival equipment (including
as a textbook resource for those studying for life rafts and personal flotation devices), immer-
certification in medical training and gives ships’ sion time, effects of immersion at various tem-
crewmembers basic training on first aid and dis- peratures, reactions of crew remaining aboard,
ease prevention. Topics that may be of particular and reactions of crew aboard rescue boats.

642 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

Life Raft Test. West Marine Products; personal lifesaving appliances (life vests, immer-
Sea Star Yachting Products. June 25, sion suits, anti-exposure suits and thermal pro-
1994. 14 pp. Available on the Internet at tective aids); visual signals (hand flares, rocket
<www.ussailing.org> or from USSA.18 parachute flares and buoyant smoke signals);
survival craft (inflatable and rigid life rafts and

T his report documents tests of two different

types of craft used in survival and rescue after
vessel abandonment in rough seas — a conventional
various types of life boats); rescue boats and other
marine appliances and systems.

six-person life raft by Switlik that is stored in a pack- In addition to standards, there are revised recom-
aged state and inflated on demand; and a combina- mendations for prototype, production and instal-
tion (dual-purpose) inflatable dinghy and survival lation testing of lifesaving appliances and the code
craft from Tinker that can be inflated on demand or of practice for evaluation, testing and acceptance
carried on a boat’s deck in its inflated state. of prototype novel lifesaving appliances and
arrangements.
Comparisons were made for technical specifica-
tions, deployment, inflation, air-holding ability, Marine Offshore Rescue Advisory Group:
survivor boarding and crew recovery from water, Good Practice in Offshore Rescue. MaTSU.
canopy design, drogue deployment, floor design, Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Offshore
personal volume and floor space, survival kit Safety Division. OTO report 2001/040. 2001.
inventory, ease of repair, intuitive assembly and 78 pp. Tables, glossary, bibliography. Available
operations, instructions, capsize resistance and on the Internet at <www.hse.gov.uk/research/
righting after capsize, water intrusion and bailing, offshore.htm> or from HSE.6
rate of drift, maneuverability, and special features.
Summaries of advantages and disadvantages of
both types of survival craft are included. T he report acknowledges that in recent years
many research studies, codes of practice and
company-based operations manuals have been
Life Rafts. Society of Automotive Engineers created and dispersed. The concern is that best
(SAE), S-9a Safety Equipment and Survival practices and relevant information may not be
Systems Committee. Aerospace Recommended reaching all who are involved in offshore rescue.
Practice (ARP): ARP1356, revision A. This report is an attempt to disseminate infor-
December 1989. 8 pp. Availability.14 mation about marine rescue to and from rescue
craft so that rescue crews may benefit from the

S AE standards documents are technical infor-

mation resources that provide guidance in
product design, testing, construction, mainte-
experiences of others. Good practices in ship and
boat operations; location, care and transfer of the
casualty; and human factors aspects of rescuers
nance, and operation of self-propelled vehicles for are provided.
use on land, at sea, in the air and in space. This
ARP provides criteria for design and performance Mariner’s Weather Handbook: A Guide to
of aircraft life raft devices to ensure rapid and ef- Forecasting & Tactics. Dashew, Steve; Dashew,
fective use as a flotation device in a water landing. Linda. Tucson, Arizona, U.S.: Beowulf, 1998.
The document does not specify design methods or 604 pp. Photographs, illustrations, charts,
equipment to be used in meeting the criteria. bibliography, index.

Life-saving Appliances. International Maritime

Organization (IMO), 2003 edition. 194 pp.
Appendixes. Availability.7
T he handbook is written with two goals — to
present “the basics of what makes weather
work the way it does” and to show mariners how
to tactically take advantage of weather conditions

T his 2003 edition contains the text of the

International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA)
code regarding international standards for life-
(and resulting sea conditions). The book can
serve as a textbook for beginners and as a refer-
ence handbook for those with experience. Some
saving appliances required by chapter III of the of the topics discussed are principles that cause
International Convention for the Safety of Life weather to be created; types of weather systems;
at Sea (SOLAS). Included are requirements for cloud recognition and interpretation; forecasting

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 643
 Re f e r e n c e s

based on current conditions; tropical meteorology; should have manual override capability that does
ways to obtain weather data; and weather forecast- not compromise the visual indicator.
ing tools.
Minimum Operational Performance Standards
Medicine for the Outdoors: the Essential for Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs).
Guide to Emergency Medical Procedures RTCA, Special Committee 136. Report RTCA/
and First Aid. Auerbach, Paul S. Guilford, DO-183. May 13, 1983. 82 pp. Figures, tables.
Connecticut, U.S.: The Lyons Press, fourth Availability.13
edition, 2003. 544 pp. Figures, appendixes,
glossary, index.
T his document contains minimum op-
erational performance standards for ELTs

T he book, written by a physician who special-

izes in wilderness and emergency medicine,
provides brief explanations of a wide range of
installed primarily in fixed-wing aircraft. Four
types of emergency locator transmitters operat-
ing on 121.5 megahertz (MHz) and 243.0 MHz
medical problems that could be encountered are discussed — automatic fixed-ELTs, automatic
outdoors (land or water) and offers practical so- portable-ELTs, automatic deployable-ELTs and
lutions and treatments for laypersons to apply. Part survival-type ELTs.
1 outlines general first aid principles, and parts 2
and 3 describe major and minor medical events, Minimum Operational Performance
such as fractures and dislocations. Part 4 covers Standards for Emergency Locator
problems related to specific environments, such Transmitters (ELTs), Change 1 to
as underwater diving accidents, near-drownings, RTCA/DO-183. RTCA, Special Committee
hazardous aquatic life, and injuries and illnesses 136. Paper RTCA/DO-183. Jan. 17, 1986.
due to cold. Instructions on compiling first aid 1 pp. Availability.13
kits, avoiding motion sickness and other practical
information appear in part 5.

Minimum Operational Performance

C hange 1 to report RTCA/DO-183 changes
values in modulation characteristics from
those previously stated.
Standards for 406 MHz Emergency Locator
Transmitters (ELTs). RTCA, Special Nigel Calder’s Cruising Handbook: A
Committee 160. Report RTCA/DO-204. Compendium for Coastal and Offshore Sailors.
Sept. 29, 1989. 92 pp. Figures, tables, Calder, Nigel. Camden, Maine, U.S.: The
appendixes. Availability.13 McGraw-Hill Companies, International Marine,
2001. 582 pp. Tables, photographs, illustrations,

T his document recommends consensus-based

standards and test procedures for ELTs that
bibliographies, index.

utilize the 406.0 megahertz (MHz) to 406.1

MHz band and operate in the Cospas-Sarsat
International Satellite system. It includes test
C alder said that he designed this book to pro-
vide experienced and aspiring sailors with
an understanding of sailboats and boat systems
conditions and procedures for installed equip- suitable for cruising under sail. Part of the book
ment performance. concentrates on practical and technical matters,
and other sections focus on necessary skills.
Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for 406 MHz Emergency Portions of the book may interest those involved
Locator Transmitters (ELTs), Change 1 to in overwater operations. The chapter on health
RTCA/ DO-204. RTCA, Special Committee 160. and safety issues provides a checklist of medical
Paper 299-94/TMC‑139. July 13, 1994. 6 pp. supplies to have aboard and a health-related bib-
Availability.13 liography of international resources. The chapter
on weather discusses basic theory, predictions

C hange 1 to RTCA document, DO-204, deals

with two requirements. ELTs are required to
radiate a visual signal indicating the unit is oper-
and weather systems. There are explanations of
ways to deal with extreme wind, weather and sea
conditions; how and when to use sea anchors and
ating. If an optional aural monitor is installed, it drogues; when and how to launch a life raft; and

644 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

how to compile a ditch bag. Desirable features of

life rafts, communication devices and signaling
equipment, life vests and other safety features
T he committee conducted in-water tests on
strobe lights used as floating man-overboard
lights and strobe lights and incandescent lights
are enumerated. Explanations of basic compass used on personal life vests. Battery endurance tests
use and rope/knot tying are accompanied by for the same lights were conducted onshore. Some
illustrations. of the data collected on each light in the three-
year study included: manufacturer, model, type,
Notes of a Seaplane Instructor: An visibility range, ease of use, battery replacement,
Instructional Guide to Seaplane Flying. battery endurance, battery cell type, and product
Mees, Burke. Newcastle, Washington, U.S.: construction.
Aviation Supplies and Academics, 2002. 160 pp.
Diagrams, glossary. Among other findings, the report said:

• “Strobe lights are the best type of light for

M ees, a commercial seaplane pilot in the
Aleutian Islands, Alaska, U.S., and a flight
instructor, wrote this book as an instruction
attention-getting and extremely poor for
distance-ranging”;
manual for pilots seeking a seaplane rating and
• “Rescue helicopter pilots have indicated that
as a reference book for pilots who already have
strobes get them to the scene but spoil depth
the rating.
perception”; and,
The book, which discusses single-engine float- • “They [rescue helicopter pilots] would like
planes, is intended to ease the transition to sea- to have a steady light on the victim for exact
planes for pilots with landplane experience. location and height judgment for actual
pickup.”
The book describes the unique aspects of seaplane
takeoffs and landings, as well as seaplane flight Radar Reflector Test. Corenman, Jim; Hawley,
characteristics, water handling, preflight inspec- Chuck; Honey, Dick; Honey, Stan. West
tions, postflight procedures and cold-weather Marine, 1995. 14 pp. Figures, tables. Available
operations. A separate chapter is devoted to am- on the Internet at <www.ussailing.org> or
phibious floatplanes. from USSA.18

Our Last Chance: Sixty-six Deadly Days

Adrift. Butler, William; Butler, Simonne. Miami,
Florida, U.S.: Exmart Press, first edition, 1991.
T he report describes marine radar reflectors,
in general and by specific reflector configura-
tions (octahedral, quadrahedral, trihedral, spheri-
328 pp. Maps. cal and variations of each). Test data for minimum
reflectance were collected on 23 reflectors of vari-

W hile crossing the Pacific Ocean, en route

to circumnavigate the world, the authors
found themselves traveling in the same ocean
ous configurations. Data characteristics included
strength of the reflected signal, range of visibility,
probability of being seen by a ship at an unknown
current and at the same speed as a pod of horizontal angle, angular width of blind spots and
whales. After circling the boat for several hours, product durability.
the whales began to push the 38-foot (12-
meter) sailboat about, damaging it and causing it Tests yielded sufficient data to influence product
to sink. From this point, the book describes the preference. For example, the larger the sailboat’s
experiences of life aboard a six-foot (two-meter) reflector, the better.
plastic life raft — a raft designed for 7–10 days
of coastal use, not ocean use, and certainly not The report makes the point that “a ship’s radar
as a home for 66 days. may only see a sailboat three or four nautical miles
[six kilometers or seven kilometers] away, but that
Overboard Light Study. The Sailing same sailboat can typically see the ship 12 nautical
Foundation, Safety at Sea Committee. 1996. miles [22 kilometers] away by radar and visually
4 pp. Tables. Available on the Internet at at least eight nautical miles [15 kilometers] away
<www.ussailing.org> or from USSA. 18 in clear weather.”

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 645
 Re f e r e n c e s

Report of the NSW State Coroner Into February 1995. 85 pp. Annexes, appendixes,
the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race. glossary. Available on the Internet at
New South Wales (NSW) State Coroner’s <www.caa.co.uk> or from Documedia.5
Court. 331 pp. Available on the Internet at
<www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lc.nsf/> or from
NSW.15 T his report addresses elements of offshore
helicopter safety and survival within the con-
text of an integrated system, but it does not address

I n December 1998, during Australia’s Sydney-

to-Hobart Yacht Race (from Sydney, New South
Wales, to Hobart, Tasmania), a storm with hur-
causes or prevention of helicopter accidents. The
review is presented as an event tree, representing
all phases of offshore helicopter flight and illus-
ricane-strength winds and rough seas with waves trating significant points where something could
60 feet (18 meters) or higher caused such havoc on go wrong. Scenarios include safe flight, ditching,
the racing fleet that five sailboats sank, six sailors impact (with or without warning), subsequent
died at sea, 55 sailors were rescued, and 66 of 115 aircraft flotation or sinking, availability of life
sailboats were forced to retire from the race. rafts, functionality of personal safety equipment,
and the rescue process.
Of particular interest to overwater operators are
testimonies that describe performance of life The report said, in its overall assessment of the
rafts, life vests, locator beacons and flares, and safety and survival system in use at the time, that
testimonies that describe difficulties encountered the success record of survival after ditchings was
during search-and-rescue efforts in rough seas. 100 percent successful, but the record of accident
survival was less favorable, suggesting a need for
[An executive summary of the coroner’s report greater emphasis on safety measures related to
and the actual report are available on the Internet heavy impacts as opposed to ditchings.
as noted above. The entire record of the coroner’s
investigations, containing thousands of pages of Rotary Wing Aircraft Water Impact Test
testimonies and evidence, is available on the and Analyses Correlation. Wittlin, Gil;
Internet at <www.equipped.org> or from NSW.] Schultz, Mike; Smith, Michael. Naval Air
Warfare Center, Aircraft Division (NAWCAD).
Rescue Pilot. McKinnon, Dan. New York, 2000. 14 pp. Figures, tables. Available from
New York, U.S.: McGraw-Hill, 2002. 302 pp. NTIS.11
Photographs.

T he author, a former U.S. Navy aviator, writes

about his experiences from the mid-1950s to
N AWCAD and the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration jointly sponsored a pro-
gram to investigate water impact dynamics and
late-1950s when U.S. naval aviation was undergo- to develop analytical tools that could be used in
ing continuous changes in aircraft and air carrier demonstrating compliance with current civil and
designs. He said, “It was a unique time to observe military ditching requirements. This technical
this transition in naval aviation as a helicopter paper reports initial findings from Phase II of
rescue pilot.” He said that his primary job and the project, regarding the use of crash modeling
that of his squadron mates was to “pluck from and simulations, in lieu of scale model ditch-
danger” pilots and other individuals in trouble. ing tests. [This monograph was presented at
To accomplish such tasks, rescue pilots faced the the American Helicopter Society 56th Annual
same difficulties as those in peril. Forum in May 2000.]

The book discusses the changing, maturing Rotorcraft Ditchings and Water-related
aviation environment and the pilot’s accounts of Impacts That Occurred From 1982 to 1989
dramatic at-sea rescues, vertical-lift rescues and — Phase I. Chen, Charles C.T.; Muller,
evacuations from the pilot’s seat. M.; Fogarty, K.M. U. S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Report DOT/FAA/CT-
Report of the Review of Helicopter Offshore 92/13. October 1993. 116 pp. Figures, tables,
Safety and Survival. U.K. Civil Aviation appendixes, glossary, references. Available from
Authority, Safety Regulation Group. CAP 641. NTIS.11

646 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

P revious rotorcraft studies by the U.S. Army and

FAA focused on impact terrains of all types.
This document reports on phase I of a two-phase
upright and afloat. To avoid entrapment, occu-
pants rushed to evacuate without retrieving life
rafts when aircraft overturned rapidly. Occupants
program that focused specifically on water as an also hurried to evacuate when water rushing into
impact environment to determine factors affecting the aircraft caused life rafts to drift away from
occupant survivability during water impact and occupant reach.
post-impact. The Army and FAA examined 89 ro-
torcraft accidents occurring in 1982–1989 and iden- To protect occupants from injury, the study iden-
tified 77 accidents (67 from the private sector and tified areas needing improvements — occupant
10 military) that met the study criteria. Three surviv- restraints and seats; cockpit and cabin hazards;
able water impact scenarios (vertical impact, longitu- life raft locations; personal flotation equipment;
dinal impact and flight path angle) were defined. and rotorcraft flotation.

Researchers found four significant issues that con- Rough Weather Rescue. W.S. Atkins
tributed to survivability. Occupant survivability Consultants. Health and Safety Executive (HSE),
hazards were identified as: Offshore Division. OTO report 2001/089. 2002.
78 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes, references.
• Flailing;
Available on the Internet at <www.hse.gov.uk/
• Excessive decelerative loads; research/offshore.htm> or from HSE.6
• Drowning; and,
• Exposure. T he report was generated from a study of
types of equipment used in offshore res-
cues, limitations of equipment in extreme en-
Performance of aircraft flotation equipment vironmental conditions and effects of adverse
generally was found to be inadequate, and perfor- weather conditions on equipment. The report
mance of personal flotation equipment generally reviews regulations and literature; training
was found to be adequate. programs and practice activities; performance
standards for crew and equipment; incidents of
Rotorcraft Ditchings and Water-related water rescues; types of equipment in use; meth-
Impacts That Occurred From 1982 to 1989 ods and procedures for using rescue equipment
— Phase II. Muller, Mark; Bark, Lindley W. and systems; and results from a survey of various
U. S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), industry sectors.
Technical Center. Report DOT/FAA/CT-92/14.
October 1993. 39 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes, Recommendations address design and suitabil-
glossary, references. Available from NTIS.11 ity of emergency response and rescue vessels;
suitability and effectiveness of equipment; speed

D ata on rotorcraft structure and occupant

hazards from 77 water-related accidents were
collected in phase I of a two-phase program and
and safety of helicopter rescue; and the quantity
and quality of training programs and practice
sessions.
analyzed in phase II. Phase I focused specifically
on water as an impact environment to identify Rough-water Ditching Investigation of a Model
factors affecting occupant survivability during of a Jet Transport With the Landing Gear
water impact and post-impact. Phase II analyzed Extended and With Various Ditching Aids.
specific aspects of the data against three impact Thompson, William C. National Aeronautics
scenarios — vertical impact, longitudinal impact and Space Administration (NASA), Langley
and flight path angle. Research Center. NASA Technical Note TN
D-101. October 1959. 34 pp. Figures, tables,
Analyses showed that occupant injuries resulted references. Availability.9
primarily from flailing and excessive deceleration
at impact with water, not from structural failures.
Occupants used life rafts on a limited basis because
rotorcraft flotation equipment was inadequate
R esearchers tested a dynamic, jet transport
model (portions of the aircraft were con-
structed approximately to scale) in rough-water
in keeping the occupied portion of the aircraft tanks to determine probable ditching behavior and

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 647
 Re f e r e n c e s

resulting damage. Tests were conducted with and Safety From Capsizing: Final Report of the
without the use of landing aids and with landing Directors. The United States Yacht Racing
gear extended and retracted. Union (USYRU); The Society of Naval
Architects & Marine Engineers (SNAME);
Data showed that ditching with landing gear Joint Committee on Safety From Capsizing.
retracted would likely tear away most of the June 1985. 68 pp. Figures, appendixes,
fuselage bottom, and ditching with the landing references. Available from USSA.18
gear extended would likely result in a dive or a
“deep run,” depending upon performance of the
main gear. Either action would likely damage the
fuselage bottom. Using landing aids, hydro-skis
U SYRU/SNAME issued interim progress
reports in 1983 and 1984 on the work of
the Joint Project on Safety From Capsizing. The
or hydro-foils may improve ditching performance focus of the project was to attain an adequate
and protect the fuselage bottom. understanding of the violent processes of wind
and waves that cause sailing yachts to be rolled
Safety and Survival at Sea. Lee, E.C.B.; Lee, 360 degrees, to be inverted 180 degrees or to be
Kenneth; editors. London, England: Greenhill knocked down 90 degrees. One benefit resulting
Books, new edition, 1989. 358 pp. Appendixes, from the project was a better understanding of
photographs. capsize behavior and a formula that boat design-
ers can employ.

H istory has shown that those who have expe-

rienced trouble at sea could have improved
their chances for survival significantly if they
Safety Recommendations for Offshore Sailing,
Including ORC Special Regulations Governing
had been better prepared, better trained, better Offshore Racing for Monohulls and Multihulls
equipped and psychologically stronger. A review 2000–2001. International Sailing Federation
of numerous personal accounts that were collected (ISAF), Offshore Racing Council (ORC). 52 pp.
following rescues reveals personal characteristics Figures, tables, appendixes, index, Available
and actions that enabled individuals to survive at from ISAF8 or USSA.18
sea following collisions, fires, aircraft accidents,
boat sinkings, acts of war and acts of nature. A
section on human fallibility also is included. T he ORC regulations and recommendations
establish uniform minimum standards for
yacht equipment (accommodations, structural
Safety and Survival at Sea. Lee, E.C.B.; Lee, features and safety gear), personal equipment and
Kenneth. New York, New York, U.S.: W.W. training. The regulations and recommendations
Norton & Company, revised and expanded apply to offshore sailing and racing environments
edition, 1980. 332 pp. Appendixes, illustrations, and can serve as additional guidance for pilots and
index. overwater operators regarding life raft and life vest
specifications; radar reflectors, pyrotechnics and

O ne of the authors states, “The sea is capri-

cious and the action to be taken in an
emergency must depend on the prevailing cir-
navigational position-fixing devices; emergency
food and water; grab (ditch) bags; first aid manuals
and kits; and training.
cumstances, which can only be assessed on the
spot. Nevertheless, there is much to be learnt from Existing regulations and submissions for changes
the past. We have attempted to draw conclusions from national authorities are reviewed annually.
from reports of disaster at sea and offer them for This particular booklet was reprinted by the US
guidance when danger threatens.” Sailing Association and includes prescriptive in-
formation to meet USSA requirements.
Material in this edition revises, augments and
updates the first edition published in 1971. Text Safety Study — Air Carrier Overwater
has been amended to reflect pronouncements Emergency Equipment and Procedures.
by various national and international entities U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
concerned with maritime matters. Information (NTSB), Bureau of Safety Programs. Report
about medical emergencies, safety aspects, ocean NTSB/SS‑85/02. Jun. 12, 1985. 25 pp. Available
engineering and hovercraft has been added. from NTIS.11

648 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

T he NTSB examined U.S. Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) standards and regu-
lations for passenger-transport overwater op-
Based on the findings, the NTSB made 20 re-
commendations and reiterated three safety
recommendations to the U.S. Federal Aviation
erations in effect at that time. NTSB determined Administration.
that standards and regulations reflected an FAA
assumption that ditching accidents were planned [The complete safety study was reprinted by
events, occurring in favorable water and wind con- Flight Safety Foundation in Flight Safety Digest,
ditions. According to the study, accident history December 2000.]
showed that inadvertent water-impact accidents
were more typical than planned ditchings, and Sea Survival: A Manual. Robertson, Dougal.
FAA requirements should be revised. New York, New York, U.S.: Praeger Publishers,
1975. 164 pp. Tables, maps, appendixes,
The study showed that chances of survival could be photographs, drawings.
increased if improvements were made in the follow-
ing areas: FAA overwater emergency regulations;
basic water survival equipment; additional equip-
ment for extended overwater flights; emergency
T he purpose of this manual “is to provide survi-
vors with enough information to enable them
to cope with the life-and-death circumstances in
equipment, including slides and life vests; training which they find themselves immediately after their
of flight crew and cabin crew to manage planned parent craft has sunk, and during the subsequent
ditchings and inadvertent water impacts; and water period of time which has to elapse before they
rescue planning at airports located near water. reach safety either by rescue or by their own ef-
forts, or, as is more usual, by a combination of
Safety Study — Emergency Evacuation both,” said the author.
of Commercial Airplanes. U.S. National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Safety Information for the manual was gathered pri-
study NTSB/SS-00/01. Jun. 27, 2000. Figures, marily from three sources: nautical knowledge
tables, appendixes. 166 pp. Available from NTIS.11 and wisdom of seamen and scientists; research at
practical survival institutes; and personal experi-

T he NTSB investigated 46 emergency evacua-

tions of commercial airplanes involving 2,651
passengers that occurred between September 1997
ences. One example of personal survival given in
the book is that of the author and five other cast-
aways who survived a 37-day ordeal in the Pacific
and June 1999. Eighteen different aircraft types Ocean after their schooner was attacked and sunk
were represented. Summaries of evacuations in the by killer whales.
study are included in the report, as are diagrams
of aircraft configurations. Seaplane Operations: Basic and Advanced
Techniques for Floatplanes, Amphibians and
Information was collected by the NTSB from pas- Flying Boats From Around the World. De
sengers, cabin crews, flight crews, air carriers and Remer, Dale; Baj, Cesare. Como, Italy: Edizioni
aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) units. The Newpress, 1998. 450 pp. Figures, photographs,
study focused on the following safety issues: tables, diagrams, bibliography.
• Certification issues related to airplane
evacuation;
• Effectiveness of evacuation equipment;
O riginally written in Italian by Baj, this book
subsequently was translated into English
and expanded by De Remer, with the intention of
transmitting knowledge of water flying to “water-
• Adequacy of air carrier and ARFF guidance
flying enthusiasts, as well as people who have never
and procedures related to evacuations; and,
seen or flown a seaplane or have never been to a
• Communication issues related to evacuation. seaplane base.”

The study also compiled general statistics on The book’s chapters are organized according to
evacuation, such as events leading to evacuations the order of a typical flight, from takeoff to land-
and numbers and types of passenger injuries in- ing, with other chapters devoted to the effects of
curred during evacuations. wind and water on the aircraft, water aerodromes,

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 649
 Re f e r e n c e s

amphibious aircraft, multi-engine seaplanes, flight This is an account of his experiences as a lone
planning, aircraft choices and “seaplane art and survivor, intermingled with memories of his
collectibles.” The authors also discuss aspects of family and customs on Hainan Island, China. He
water flying that are unique to Europe, North applied many of the life skills he learned in Hainan
America and Australia — where most of the to help him adapt to his immediate circumstances,
world’s water flight operations are conducted. capture fresh water, catch birds and fish, maximize
his resources and ultimately persevere.
The book includes a cutout seaplane pilot’s com-
puter, developed by Baj, along with instructions for Staying Alive! 117 Days Adrift — the
its use. The computer can be used in determining Incredible Saga of a Courageous Couple Who
the length of a water-landing area, the headwind Outwitted Death at Sea for a Longer Period
component speed at the height of overflight, the Than Any Humans Before. Bailey, Maurice;
aircraft’s groundspeed and the length, speed and Bailey, Maralyn. New York, New York, U.S.
period of a wave. David McKay Co., 1974. 196 pp. Photographs,
illustrations, appendixes, maps.
SOLAS, Consolidated Edition, 2001
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
London, England: IMO, third edition, 2001.
528 pp. Tables, appendixes. Availability.7
I n the vicinity of the Galápagos Islands of
Ecuador, during a trans-Pacific crossing, the
Baileys experienced a sudden jolt and shaking
of their sailboat. Moments later they observed a

T he IMO convened the International Convention

for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which
produced SOLAS requirements to improve the
whale threshing its tail wildly, leaving the ocean
surface reddened by blood and their sailboat with
a large gash in its hull.
safety of shipping, ship construction and ship
equipment. This consolidated edition contains Fifty minutes later, the Baileys abandoned their
the text of the International Convention for the vessel. One boarded a life raft and the other
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974; its Protocol of 1988 and climbed into a small inflatable rubber dinghy.
subsequent articles, appendixes and certificates; and They drifted about 1,500 nautical miles (2,778
amendments in effect from Jan. 1, 2001. kilometers). Fortunately, most of the distance
was across an area of the Pacific Ocean known as
Of particular note to overwater operators are the tropical convergence, where the ocean current
SOLAS requirements for personal lifesaving appli- produces frequent (potable) rain and a variety of
ances — life rafts, immersion suits, distress flares, edible marine life. The Baileys were keen observ-
life vests, emergency training and practice drills, ers of details. They kept a journal of local marine
inspection and servicing of inflatable appliances, species, their own adaptation to a very different
and communication signaling devices to aid in lifestyle and their close association with and de-
search and rescue. pendence upon an open ocean.

Sole Survivor. McCunn, Ruthanne Lum. Boston, Stowage of Cabin Emergency Flotation
Massachusetts, U.S.: Beacon Press, 1999. 239 pp. Equipment. Society of Automotive Engineers,
Photographs, maps. (SAE), S-9b Cabin Interiors and Furnishings
Subcommittee. Aerospace Recommended

I n 1942, during World War II, German submarine

torpedoes struck and sank the British merchant
vessel Benlomond approximately 750 miles (1,389
Practice (ARP) ARP496C, revision C. March
2000. 4 pp. References. Availability.14

kilometers) east of the mouth of Brazil’s Amazon

River while the merchant ship was en route
from Cape Town, South Africa, to Dutch Guiana
S AE standards are technical information
resources that provide guidance in product
design, testing, construction, maintenance, and
[Suriname]. The lone survivor, a Chinese steward operation of self-propelled vehicles for use on
named Poon Lim, floated for 133 days in one of the land, at sea, in the air and in space. This ARP
ship’s wooden rafts to within 10 nautical miles (19 establishes criteria for aircraft installations to en-
kilometers) of the Amazon, where he was rescued sure rapid and effective use of emergency flotation
by a local fishing family. equipment in the event of ditching.

650 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

Study on Transport Airplane Unplanned Water and other findings on flotation system performance
Contact. Johnson, Richard A. U.S. Federal resulted in recommendations for regulatory and
Aviation Administration, Technical Center. design improvements to increase survivability.
Report DOT/FAA/CT-84/3. January 1984. 36 pp.
Figures, tables, references. Available from NTIS.11 Survival at Sea: A Practical Manual of
Survival and Advice to the Shipwrecked,

W orldwide accident data from transport

category aircraft that made inadvertent or
unplanned contact with water were examined for
Assembled from an Analysis of Thirty-one
Survival Stories. Robin, Bernard. Simpkin,
Richard; editor and translator. Camden, Maine,
occupant risks and survival equipment needs. Some U.S.: International Marine Publishing Co., 1981.
of the findings regarding occupant risks were: 258 pp. Illustrations, appendix, index.

• “Unplanned water contact occurs less fre-

quently than unplanned ground contact but
more frequently than planned water landing
B ernard Robin, a French physician, said that
he wanted to “give sailors the experience of
all those who have actually known shipwreck and
(ditching); survived.” He said that he was most interested in
“accurate comments on how their [life] raft[s]
• “[Such landings] lead to higher impact loads
behaved or the resources they drew from the sea.”
and greater fuselage damage than correspond-
He studied shipwrecks, dating back to the year
ing ground contact;
1431, extracting relevant information.
• “Flooding conditions adversely affect the abil-
ity of occupants to retrieve and make use of In part 1 of the book, he summarizes 31 stories,
on-board flotation equipment; [and,] showing “how the survivors managed and how
this knowledge can be utilized.” Part 2 contains
• “Emergency flotation equipment that is in- information to help those who may face similar
tended for use during a planned ditching may perils, battling against thirst, hunger, fatigue, cli-
not be useable during an unplanned water mate, panic, drowning, illness, despair of not be-
contact occurrence.” ing spotted, and dangers of going ashore. He also
provides practical advice for advanced preparation
Survey and Analysis of Rotorcraft Flotation while still on shore.
Systems. Muller, Mark; Greenwood, Richard;
Richards, Marvin; Bark, Lindley; Simula. U.S. Survival at Sea: The Development, Operation
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office and Design of Inflatable Marine Lifesaving
of Aviation Research. Report DOT/FAA/AR-95/ Equipment. Nicholl, G.W.R. London,
53. May 1996. 76 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes, England: Adlard Coles, 1960. 180 pp. Figures,
references. Available from NTIS.11 appendixes, bibliography, photographs.

R otorcraft flotation system performance in

water-contact accidents and ditchings was
evaluated to identify areas for potential improve-
A s a result of naval experiences — specifically,
loss of life caused by exposure and drowning
— during World War II, the British Admiralty cre-
ment. System performance data were gathered ated a committee to study lifesaving equipment
from the FAA, U.S. National Transportation Safety and survival at sea. The committee’s research led
Board (NTSB) and the U.S. Navy. to the creation of inflatable life rafts and life vests.
The book recounts the evolution of the life raft
The report said, “NTSB data showed that occupants and life vest; operational, technical and design
generally survived impact conditions more severe developments of life rafts, life vests and accom-
than those defined in the FAA ditching regulations. panying survival equipment; and regulatory and
Drowning was found to be the leading cause of production controls.
death, even in rotorcraft equipped with floats.”
Survival for Aircrew. Prew, Sarah-Jane.
Data also showed that rotorcraft (with and without Aldershot, Hants, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing,
deployed floats) in ditching and water-impact sce- 1999. 160 pp. Illustrations, photographs,
narios overturned immediately upon impact. These bibliography, index.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 651
 Re f e r e n c e s

T he book is an instructional resource that

focuses specifically on the role of aircrew in
aviation survival situations occurring in water
The following topics are addressed:

• How and why drowning in cold water oc-

and wilderness regions, the major role being curs; the four stages at which death may occur
leadership. The book groups people into three — initial immersion or cold shock, short-term
categories: leaders (most being natural leaders), immersion or swimming failure, long-term im-
followers and obstructionists with negative atti- mersion or hypothermia, and post-rescue col-
tudes. Leaders generally form about 25 percent of lapse — and protection from the four stages;
a given group, followers 50 percent and obstruc-
tionists 25 percent. • Protection requirements based on need — con-
stant-wear suits (i.e., workers aboard fishing
Leadership and management roles, required skills boats); quick donning, ship-abandonment
and training, and development of relationships be- suits (for workers and passengers aboard cruise
tween crew and passengers are discussed. There are ships, ferries and tour boats who are currently
brief chapters on the various aspects of advanced unprotected);
preparations, initial actions, equipment and res-
• Key physical issues in the design and testing of
cue. Also included is a list of sources for survival
cold-water immersion suits — water ingress
equipment and training programs.
(leakage), dryness, warmth, insulation and
buoyancy;
Survival Kit — Life Rafts and Slide/Rafts.
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE),
• Key construction issues of cold-water immer-
S-9a Safety Equipment and Survival Systems
sion suits — water-integrity, fabrics, quality
Committee. Aerospace Recommended Practice
and technology;
(ARP), ARP1282, revision A. August 2000. 5 pp.
References. Available from SAE.14 • Inter-relationships between cold-water immer-
sion suits and life vests; progress in the last 40

S AE standards are technical information

resources that provide guidance in product
design, testing, construction, maintenance and
years regarding standards and regulations; and,

• Historical (1939–2002) reporting of cold-

operation of self-propelled vehicles used on land, water immersion-suit studies and trials; ac-
at sea, in the air and in space. This document es- counts of cold-water accidents and incidents.
tablishes criteria for minimum survival equipment
in survival kits carried with life rafts or slide/rafts The report incorporates new information into the
on transport category airplanes — when approved first edition, which was published in August 2001.
radio frequency signaling devices are available for Each chapter may be read as a stand-alone docu-
deployment. ment. At the close of each chapter, there is a brief
summary emphasizing salient points.
Survival in Cold Waters: Staying Alive. Brooks,
C.J.; Survival Systems. Transport Canada (TC), Survival Psychology. Leach, John. Washington
Marine Safety Directorate. Report TP13822E. Square, New York, New York, U.S.: New
January 2003. Figures, photographs, references, York University Press, 1994. 232 pp. Tables,
index. 92 pp. Available on the Internet <http: bibliography, index.
//www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/tp/Tp13822/
TP13822E.pdf> or from TC.16
S urvival is a very personal and lonely event
whether experienced alone or with others.

T he report provides information on personal

survival protection in cold water environ-
ments associated with work and leisure activities.
“How [one] copes psychologically with this situa-
tion will determine whether [one] becomes a sur-
vivor or remains a victim,” says the author. At the
The report is directed toward a broad audience time this book was written, psychological concerns
— coroners, pathologists and physiologists; safety were primarily directed toward understanding and
inspectors and investigators; manufacturers and medically treating the aftermath of survival. One
operators; and fishing, cruise ship and petroleum example of this was recognition of the medical
industries. condition called post-traumatic stress disorder.

652 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

Conversely, there was comparatively little effort others. Human factors issues and preparing and
being made to understand the psychological using life rafts in heavy weather are included.
functioning of would-be survivors during actual
periods of threat. This is the focus of the book Survivor. Greenwald, Michael. San Diego,
— psychological functioning during survival. The California, U.S.: Blue Horizons Press, 1989.
book was written for seamen and aircrew, offshore 628 pp. Bibliography, index, illustrations,
and field workers, rescue workers, military person- photographs.
nel and all who may be called upon to plan for or
deal with survival situations.

Survive the Savage Sea. Robertson, Dougal.

“T he most difficult aspect of survival
preparation is the unique character of
each situation and the limit of that for which one
New York, New York, U.S.: Praeger Publishers, can prepare,” said the author. This book was writ-
1973. 276 pp. Maps, photographs, drawings, ten as an instructive manual to improve chances
glossary. for surviving a boating disaster. Examples of
actual boating disasters are followed by accounts

T he Robertson family decided to leave the family

farm in England and circumnavigate the world
aboard a 43-foot (13-meter) schooner to enrich the
of lengthy survivals at sea. Detailed explanations,
such as the physiology of water loss, and descrip-
tions of events, such as “good reasons to abandon
children’s education. By the time they reached the ship,” could help anyone in a water-operations
Canary Islands, they were seasoned seafarers. environment prepare for contingencies, whether
from aircraft ditchings or sailboat sinkings.
While sailing from the Galápagos Islands, Chile, to
New Zealand, the schooner was suddenly struck by Test of Etafoam Buoyancy Material for Life
killer whales, and it sank in 60 seconds. Six cast- Jackets Regarding Water Absorption. Påsche,
aways, in an inflatable rubber raft and a dinghy (a Arvid. Sintef-Unimed, Section for Extreme
small boat), changed course and headed for Costa Work Environment. Report STF23 A94030.
Rica, an estimated 50 days away. Their 37-day Sept. 12, 1994. 6 pp. Table. Available from
ordeal and subsequent rescue are recounted, day NTIS.11
by day. Their fears and hopes, their determination
to live, the techniques that enabled them to survive
and lessons they learned are included. I n 1987, the buoyancy material, Etafoam, used
in life vest construction, was evaluated for
water absorption, using International Maritime
Surviving the Storm: Coastal & Offshore Organization (IMO) test protocol. The water ab-
Tactics. Dashew, Steve; Dashew, Linda. Tucson, sorption test was repeated in 1994, against revised
Arizona, U.S.: Beowulf, 1999. 684 pp. Charts, IMO requirements. After seven days of immersion
photographs, index. in fresh water, the buoyancy material showed no
sign of damage or change in mechanical proper-

S torms at sea (heavy weather) fall into three cat-

egories based upon wind and sea conditions.
The least serious are normal gales that make the
ties and met the revised IMO acceptance require-
ments. Both tests were conducted in Trondheim,
Norway, by Sintef-Unimed.
crew uncomfortable and tax the vessel. The second
category requires caution, good decision making The Captain’s Guide to Liferaft Survival.
and good seamanship to handle more challenging Cargal, Michael. Dobbs Ferry, New York, U.S.:
(not necessarily dangerous) conditions. “Survival Sheridan House, 1990. 198 pp. Appendixes,
storms,” the most serious of all, are rare and can charts, illustrations, index.
result in catastrophe for crew or vessel or both.

According to the authors, “mariners strive to avoid

direct experience with heavy weather,” and conse-
T he author, a U.S.-licensed master mariner with
20 years of experience as captain of merchant
vessels around the world, says, “Life rafts certi-
quently limit their skills and limit advance prepa- fied for ocean service typically carry enough water
ration. The book is filled with descriptive accounts and food for three to seven days. The raft itself
of people and vessels in survival storm conditions might be guaranteed only for 30 days.” His book
so that readers may learn from experiences of discusses elements needed for short-term and

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 653
 Re f e r e n c e s

long-term survival in a life raft or lifeboat — lead- acquiring potable water and food; dangerous sea
ership, teamwork, navigation aides, signaling, life; navigation, weather and ocean currents; and
medical care and obtaining food and water. The signaling and rescue. More detailed information
book is concise and written in an easy-to-read is provided in the second half of the book.
style.
The Evaluation of Surface Evacuation
The Development of an Easily Recovered Procedures for a Ditched Helicopter. The
Liferaft. Paterson, R.B.; Sullivan, C.A. Transport CORD Group; National Energy Board, Program
Canada, Transportation Development Centre of Energy Research and Development. PERD
(TDC). Publication TP 13041E. March 1997. report 200-9. July 1995. 99 pp. Tables, annexes,
130 pp. Figures, tables, illustrations, appendixes, references. Available from NTIS.11
glossary, references. Available from NTIS.11

T he search-and-rescue (SAR) community

was concerned that life rafts and associated
P receding this Canadian study, there had been
disagreement among offshore helicopter op-
erators and training organizations, in Canada and
recovery procedures in use at that time were in- internationally, regarding the best procedures to
adequate for rescues in Canada’s east coast waters follow for evacuation from a ditched helicopter
where sea conditions can be too severe to permit into life rafts. In the traditional or “dry shod”
rescue operations using standard procedures. method, life rafts are inflated alongside the float-
The Canadian Coast Guard and TDC’s Safety ing helicopter and held against the aircraft as pas-
and Security project initiated a research program sengers and crew step aboard. The other accepted
to investigate methods that could improve surviv- method, called “wet” or “swim away” procedure,
ability during occupied life raft recovery by large requires passengers and crew (wearing immersion
vessels such as passenger ferries and smaller vessels suits) to swim clear of the helicopter before inflat-
such as fishing boats. ing and boarding life rafts.

The study focused on two areas for improve- As there had been no practical, scientific data dif-
ment: seakeeping performance of life rafts to ferentiating between the two methods, the study
reduce capsize and performance of recovery sys- team reviewed helicopter water-related accident
tems. The report describes recovery systems, raft reports and conducted a series of simulated
modifications and results of sea trials, concluding helicopter evacuation trials in calm water, us-
that test results proved promising and that further ing both methods. The report recommends that
evaluation, development and discussions with the further studies should include field trials of both
SAR community were warranted. methods for windward and leeward evacuations
and that passengers and crew should be taught
The Encyclopedia of Survival Techniques. both methods and understand the advantages and
Stilwell, Alexander. Guilford, Connecticut, disadvantages of each method.
U.S.: The Lyons Press, 2000. 192 pp. Appendix,
illustrations, index. The Evaluation of Surface Evacuation
Procedures for a Ditched Helicopter —

“T he mental and physical quality that is

most required of you as a survivor is
endurance,” said the author. He informs readers
Phase II. Cord Group; National Energy Board,
Program of Energy Research and Development.
PERD report 200-17. December 1996.
that they already possess the innate qualities nec- 105 pp. Tables, annexes, references.
essary to survive — determination, perseverance, Available from NTIS.11
ingenuity and humor. All that is needed is to adapt
these qualities, as quickly as possible, to the new
circumstances. P hase II of this Canadian study was conducted
as recommended in PERD report 200-9, the
phase I study that compared simulated helicopter
The first part of the book gives an overview of evacuation trials in calm waters, using wet and
survival techniques within the context of global dry evacuations. [The dry method for evac-
regions. For example, one chapter is devoted to uating an upright, ditched helicopter is to inflate
survival at sea: life rafts; survival and first aid kits; a life raft alongside the floating helicopter and

654 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

subsequently hold the raft against the aircraft as

passengers and crew step aboard. The wet evacua-
tion requires passengers and crew, wearing immer-
T his is the revised edition of a previously pub-
lished book, The Waterlover’s Guide to Marine
Medicine. The author’s observation of boating en-
sion suits, to swim clear of the helicopter before thusiasts, as a group, is that they want to know how
inflating and boarding life rafts.] things work and that they enjoy using their ana-
lytical skills to solve problems. He took this into
Phase II describes experiments conducted in wet account while writing this book, going beyond the
and dry evacuations in severe sea state condi- usual “signs, symptoms and treatments” to explain
tions. Using a helicopter simulator, Norwegian how various illnesses and injuries disrupt normal
Underwater Technology Centre (NUTEC) con- anatomy and physiology.
ducted wet and dry evacuations from the windward
and leeward sides of the helicopter into aviation life The book is organized in a general-to-specific
rafts with canopies and aviation life rafts without format, beginning with cardiac arrest, shock and
canopies. “The results indicate that the preferred airway emergencies. The next five chapters ad-
method of evacuation is the dry method, on the dress injuries to organ systems. Thirteen chapters
windward side, using a non-canopy life raft,” said cover specific marine medical problems, such as
the report. Included with the report is the text of survival-at-sea. Chapters 20–26 are new to this
the “Instructor’s Guidance Course in Helicopter edition and describe treatments for a variety of
Surface Evacuation for Persons Taking Part in common medical problems affecting cruisers,
Evacuation Tests at NUTEC.” including children. The book recommends an
extensive inventory for the boat’s medical kit and
The Leeway of Persons-In-Water and contains quick-reference sheets with step-by-step
Three Small Craft. Allen, A.A.; Robe, R.Q.; instructions for rapid handling of the nine most
Morton, E.T. U.S. Coast Guard Research and critical medical emergencies.
Development Center. Report CG-D-09-00. July
1999. 151 pp. Available from NTIS.11 The Outward Bound Wilderness First-aid
Handbook. Isaac, Jeffrey. New York, New York,

I n preparation for a search operation, planners

determine the area over which the search will
be conducted, defining the smallest, most rea-
U.S.: The Lyons Press, revised and updated
edition, 1998. 272 pp. Appendix, illustrations,
glossary, index.
sonable area where survivors or their craft may
be located. The size of the search area is directly
related to the last known position (LKP) of a
search object, time of LKP, wind, ocean currents
T he modern medical system permits the general
population to maintain an acceptable level of
comfort with the risks of daily living while know-
and type of search object. “While current-induced ing very little about emergency care. As a matter of
search object motion generally follows the surface routine, most people delegate responsibilities for
water movement, the action of wind on a survivor medical emergencies and subsequent treatments
or survivor craft leads to a drift direction that is to trained medical professionals. Responsibilities
usually different from the downwind direction,” shift, however, when emergencies occur in loca-
the report said. tions where medical professionals are not imme-
diately available.
Movement of survivors or objects through the
water, caused by wind acting on their exposed To help in such situations, this handbook explains
surfaces is termed “leeway.” This report describes the principles of body functions, in health and
experiments to determine leeway values for vari- in injury, and teaches readers how to apply basic
ous persons and objects in open water to provide knowledge and common sense to a wide variety
verifiable leeway planning guidance. of medical problems. Several sections in the book
can be applied in aviation environments — major
The Onboard Medical Handbook: First Aid body systems and their functions; organized think-
and Emergency Medicine Afloat. Gill, Paul G., ing; patient or situation assessment; problems with
Jr. Camden, Maine, U.S.: International Marine/ body core temperature; cold injuries; near drown-
Ragged Mountain Press, 1997. 240 pp. Figures, ings; first aid kits and medical kits; and symptoms
tables, appendix, glossary, index. and treatments of common medical problems.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 655
 Re f e r e n c e s

The Proving Ground: The Inside Story of the derness rescue. It contains guidelines for patient
1998 Sydney to Hobart Race. Knecht, G. Bruce. assessment to identify urgent problems, assign-
New York, New York, U.S.: Little, Brown and ment of treatment priorities, patient management
Co., 2001. 308 pp. Photographs, illustrations, and patient transport. It also addresses common
map. medical problems, rescue kits, survival kits and
rescue operations.

T he book reconstructs events which occurred

in the 1998 Sidney-to-Hobart Yacht Race.
Sailboats of many sizes raced from Sidney, to
Transport Water Impact and Ditching
Performance. Patel, Amit A.; Greenwood,
Hobart, Australia, a distance of 630 nautical Richard P., Jr. U.S. Federal Aviation
miles (1,167 kilometers). According to the book, Administration (FAA), Office of Aviation
“many yachtsmen believe that every seventh Research. Report DOT/FAA/AR-95/54.
Hobart [race] is subject to a special curse,” with March 1996. 68 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes,
particularly severe storms causing serious harm references. Available from NTIS.11
to sailors and yachts. This 1998 race was one of
those years.

The book focuses on three yachts, profiling crew-

T he study identified water-contact accidents
occurring from 1959 to 1991 and examined
structural features, fuselage breakup patterns,
members and describing moment-to-moment subsystem failures, cabin interiors as they related
events — while aboard their yachts, in their life to injuries and fatalities, and interactions between
rafts and during search-and-rescue operations. passengers and their surroundings. These elements
were examined within the context of relevant U.S.
The Sea Anchor and Drogue Handbook. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) and aircraft
Shewmon, Daniel C. Safety Harbor, Florida, ditching certification requirements.
U.S.: Self-published, 1998. 176 pp. Figures,
tables, photographs, illustrations.
Two findings of particular note are that the
majority of water-related mishaps occur during
T he handbook explains the differences between
sea anchors and drogues and describes appro-
priate use of each. A sea anchor is deployed over
flight phases with close proximity to an airport;
and approximately three-fourths of all worldwide
transport airports having international flights
the bow (front) of a boat where the water is too
require approaches over significant bodies of wa-
deep for ground anchoring. A drogue is launched
ter. Other findings address airport runways, seat
over the stern (back) of a boat and exhibits a brak-
cushion flotation, life vests, training, emergency
ing effect to slow the vessel. In discussions about
procedures and emergency equipment.
sea anchors and drogues, the following topics are
covered: historical background; how they func-
tion; sea and wind conditions; deployment and Analysis of a survey of transport category airports
recovery; care and maintenance; construction and located near significant bodies of water is included
materials; design considerations and design types; in the report.
and accessories.
Transport Water Impact, Part II. Tahliani,
The Wilderness Medical Associates Field Guide. Jagdeep M.; Muller, Mark. U.S. Federal Aviation
Morrissey, Jim. Bryant Pond, Maine, U.S.: Administration, Office of Aviation Research.
Wilderness Medical Associates (WMA), third Report DOT/FAA/AR-95/112.
edition, 2000. 99 pp. Figures, tables, glossary, May 1996. 114 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes,
illustrations, index. references. Available from NTIS.11

T he field guide was written for wilderness

travelers, outdoor professionals and rescue
specialists who have completed the WMA train-
T his report covers the second part of a program
to study overwater operating environments
of jet transport aircraft. In the first section of this
ing course or its equivalent. Its intended use is as report, a mathematical model was used to predict
a quick-reference tool for persons who are trained the outcome of actual land accidents had they oc-
or experienced in emergency medicine and wil- curred in water. Findings showed that post-impact

656 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

fatalities were almost 2-1/2 times higher in water

accidents than in land accidents. D e Remer, a professor at the Center for
Aerospace Sciences at the University of
North Dakota in Grand Forks, North Dakota,
The second section focuses on airport water U.S., teaches advanced wilderness seaplane pilot
rescue. Key findings are related to water rescue courses and has written this book for pilots who
capabilities, proximity to water, new techniques, already understand the basics of water flying.
new equipment and regulations. For example, 38
percent of airports located immediately adjacent The book discusses seaplane takeoff performance
to water have no water-rescue capability. and takeoff techniques, center-of-gravity effects
on seaplanes, external loads, reducing water drag,
Emergency flotation devices (life vests, seat cush- stability on the water, and flight planning and deci-
ions and life rafts) are reviewed in the third section sion making in wilderness flying.
and recommendations for their improvement are
made. A separate chapter — written by Paul Johnson,
a pilot and search-and-rescue volunteer — dis-
United States National Search and Rescue cusses survival issues for seaplane pilots who find
Supplement to the International Aeronautical themselves “down in the bush, perhaps hundreds
and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual. of miles from civilization.” Johnson’s discussion
National Search and Rescue Committee of land-survival techniques includes how to cope
(NSARC). Washington, D.C., U.S., May 2000. with thirst, pain, cold temperatures, fatigue and
234 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes, charts, boredom. He emphasizes the importance of im-
glossary, index. Available on the Internet at mediately assessing the situation and establishing
<www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opr/sar.htm> or from priorities for being rescued.
the NSARC.10
When Seconds Count: Care and Use of

T he NSARC is a U.S. government committee

that coordinates search-and-rescue (SAR)
matters of interagency interest within the U.S.
Immersion Suits. University of Alaska Marine
Advisory Program; Alaska Marine Safety
Education Association (AMSEA). 1998.
and provides guidance to these agencies regard- Videotape, 15 minutes. Available from AMSEA.2
ing National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP)
implementation. The NSP is based upon the
principle that “no single U.S. organization has
sufficient SAR resources to provide adequate
T he videotape is a comprehensive and practi-
cal guide, explaining how to keep cold-water
immersion suits in top condition and how to don
SAR services,” and “SAR authorities should use them quickly and correctly. Additional topics cov-
‘all available’ resources, including federal, state, ered are: sizing to one’s body, personal product
local, private and volunteer resources, to respond selection, features common among branded
to persons and property in distress.” products, stowage and maintenance.

This supplementary manual provides specific Wilderness Medicine: Beyond First Aid. Forgey,
national standards and guidelines to all federal William. Old Saybrook, Connecticut, U.S.: The
forces (military and civilian) that support civil Globe Pequot Press, fourth edition, 1994. 252
SAR operations. It is based upon provisions, stan- pp. Figures, tables, appendixes, illustrations,
dards, and recommendations of the International glossary, index.
Civil Aviation Organization, the International
Maritime Organization and other international
organizations, and serves as a training tool and an
operational tool.
L eadership and behavior issues, not medical
problems, are the most significant challenges
to safety. Breakdowns in either area can “lead to the
United States
National Search and Rescue Supplement

Search and Rescue Manual

to the
International Aeronautical and Maritime

most significant of wilderness accidents — acci- I

DOC
O

Water Flying Concepts: An Advanced Text dents which can easily magnify into serious medi-
D
NA
DOD

SA

on Wilderness Water Flying. De Remer, Dale. cal disasters,” the book says. Pre-trip preparation,
F

C
T C
DO

Newcastle, Washington, U.S.: Aviation Supplies (i.e., physical and mental conditioning), medical
National Search and Rescue Committee
Washington DC

and Academics, second edition, 2002. 263 pp. assessment and management of injuries and ill- May 2000

Photographs, figures, glossary, bibliography. nesses, and first aid/medical kits are emphasized.

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • waterproof flight operations • September 2003–February 2004 657
 Re f e r e n c e s

An ideal medical kit is modular and   6. HSE Books 14. SAE World Headquarters
contains multi-functional components. P. O. Box 1999 400 Commonwealth Drive
Instructions for compiling modules Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 2WA U.K. Warrendale, PA 15096 U.S.
Internet: <www.hsebooks.co.uk>
and lists of medical resources are 15. The Clerk of the Court
included.    7. International Maritime Organization NSW State Coroner’s Court
4 Albert Embankment 44-46 Parramatta Road
London, England SE1 7SR U.K. Glebe, New South Wales 2037Australia
Sources Internet: <www.imo.org>
16. Transport Canada
  1. Air University Library/   8 International Sailing Federation Marine (AMSRE)
LDRRX Interlibrary Loans Ariadne House Place de Ville, Tower C
600 Chennault Circle Town Quay, Southampton SO14 2AQ U. K. 330 Sparks Street
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36112 U.S. Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0N8 Canada
  9. NASA Center for Aerospace Information
  2 Alaska Marine Safety Education Association 7121 Standards Drive 17. Transportation Safety Board of Canada
P.O. Box 2592 Hanover, MD 21076 U.S. Head Office
2924 Halibut Point Road 200 Promenade du Portage
10. National Search and Rescue Committee Place du Centre, 4th Floor
Sitka, AK 99835 U.S.
2100 Second St. SW, Suite 3106 Hull, Quebec K1A 1K8 Canada
  3. Australian Petroleum Production & Washington, DC 20593 U.S.
Exploration Association 18. US Sailing Association
11. National Technical Information Service
GPO Box 2201 P.O. Box 1260
5285 Port Royal Road
Canberra ACT 2601 Australia 15 Maritime Drive
Springfield, VA 22161 U.S.
Portsmouth, RI 02871 U.S.
  4. British Maritime Technology Internet: <www.ntis.gov>
Internet: <www.ussailing.org>
Orlando House, 1 Waldegrave Road 12. Opportunity Productions
Teddington, Middlesex TW11 8LZ U.K. 2506 North Jefferson
Enid, OK 73701 U.S.
  5. Documedia Solutions
37 Windsor St. 13. RTCA
Cheltenham, Gloucestershire GL52 2DG U.K. 1828 L St. NW, Suite 805
Internet: <www.documedia.co.uk> Washington, DC 20036 U.S.

658 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WaterProof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
 Re f e r e n c e s

Photo Credits Page 71–U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Page 121–Gloria Heath
Administration
Front cover–© copyright 2004 Corbis A Signal for Help Is Heard,
Page 72–U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Help Arrives Too Late
Inside front cover, page iv, 2, 110, 148, 232, Administration
386, 468, 630–© copyright 2004 Corbis Stay Tuned: A Guide to
Page 75–U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Emergency Radio Beacons
Administration
Ditching Page 139–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 76–U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Page 1–U.S. Coast Guard Administration
The Unthinkable Happens Survival
Accident Experience Influences Helicopter
Page 3–U.K. Air Accidents Overwater Operations Page 147–A life raft at sea near Bermuda,
Investigation Branch before the crew of the hospital ship USNS
Page 78–U.S. Coast Guard
Comfort rescued a survivor of a capsized
Page 5–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc. Page 82–© copyright 2004 Corbis fishing vessel. U.S. Navy photo by Journalist
2nd class J. Maurer.
Page 6–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc.
Imagine the Worst Helicopter Ditching
Page 8–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc. — Now Get Ready for It Keeping Your Head Above Water
When Your Aircraft Isn’t
Page 9–U.S. National Aeronautics and Page 85–Civil Aviation Safety Authority–
Space Administration (NASA) Australia Page 149–Flight Safety Foundation
Langley Research Center
Page 150–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 10–Library of Congress, Prints &
Page 151(upper right)–Flight Safety
Photographs Division FSA/OWI Collection,
Foundation
Reproduction No. LC-USW3-033064-C
Page 151(lower right)–Flight Safety
Page 11–Library of Congress, Prints &
Foundation
Photographs Division FSA/OWI Collection,
Reproduction No. LC-USW3-032635-C Page 152–Flight Safety Foundation

Page 15–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc. Page 155–Flight Safety Foundation

Prepare to Ditch Page 156–Flight Safety Foundation

Page 20–U.S. National Oceanic and Page 157–Flight Safety Foundation

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Page 160–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 22–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc.
Offshore Helicopter Operators’ Emergency Page 162–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 32–© copyright 2000 PhotoDisc Inc. Systems Incorporate Rescue Planning
Page 165–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 33–ARINC Page 95–© copyright 2004 Corbis
Page 166–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 35–U.S. Coast Guard Helicopter Hull-flotation Systems
Page 167–Flight Safety Foundation
Reduce the Risk of Rapid Sinking
Page 36–© copyright 2003 Corbis
Page 168–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 103–Apical Industries
Page 42–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 171–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 105–Atlantic Airways
Page 44–Cessna Aircraft Co.
Page 172–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 47–U.S. Coast Guard Search and Rescue Page 173–Rescue Technologies Corp.
Page 48–U.S. Coast Guard Page 109–U.S. Coast Guard Page 174–U.S. Navy
Page 62–Flight Safety Foundation The Search-and-rescue System
‘Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor
Will Find You — If You Help
Ditching Certification: Any Drop to Drink … ’
What Does It Mean? Page 111–U.S. Coast Guard
Page 177–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc.
Page 66–Dassault Falcon Page 113–U.S. Coast Guard
Page 178–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 68–Embraer Page 117–U.S. Coast Guard
Page 179 (photos 1 and 2)–Flight Safety
Page 69–Bombardier Aerospace Page 118–U.S. Coast Guard Foundation

Page 70–Raytheon Aircraft Co. Page 120–Gloria Heath Page 180–Katadyn North America

Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WaterProof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004 659
 Re f e r e n c e s

Page 182 (photos 1–4)– Flight Safety Page 236 (lower right)–Winslow LifeRaft Co. Your Life Vest Can Save Your Life …
Foundation If It Doesn’t Kill You First
Page 238 (top)–Air Cruisers Co.
Is There a Doctor Aboard the Life Raft? (bottom) Eastern Aero Marine Page 346–Flight Safety Foundation

Page 187–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc. Page 239 (top)–Goodrich Corp. Page 347–Switlik Parachute Co.
(bottom) Hoover Industries
Page 198–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc. Page 350–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 240 (top)–RFD/Revere
Page 200–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc. (bottom) Survival Products Page 352–Switlik Parachute Co.

What’s Eating You? It’s Probably Page 241–Winslow LifeRaft Co. Cold Outside, Warm Inside
Not a Shark
Page 242–Flight Safety Foundation Page 357–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 211–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc.
Page 243–Flight Safety Foundation Page 358–Mustang Survival Corp.
Page 212–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc.
Page 244–Flight Safety Foundation Page 360–Mustang Survival Corp.
Page 218–© copyright 2004 Corbis
Page 245–Flight Safety Foundation HEED This
Page 220–Florida Keys National Marine
Sanctuary Page 249–Flight Safety Foundation Page 365–Flight Safety Foundation

Page 221–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc. Page 250–Flight Safety Foundation Page 366–MSI-Defence Systems (Weymouth)

Page 222–U.S. National Oceanic and Page 251–Flight Safety Foundation Page 369–MSI-Defence Systems (Weymouth)
Atmospheric Administration Oceanic and Train to Survive the Unthinkable
Page 252–Flight Safety Foundation
Atmospheric Research/National Undersea
Research Program Page 254–Flight Safety Foundation Page 372–Flight Safety Foundation

Aviators and Sailors in the Water Page 255–Flight Safety Foundation Page 374–Flight Safety Foundation
Depend on the Same Rescue Resources Page 375–Aviation Egress Systems
Life Raft Evaluation:
Page 225–U.S. Navy Pooling the Resources Page 376–Flight Safety Foundation
Page 227–U.S. Navy Pages 258–335–Flight Safety Foundation
Regulations
Page 228–U.S. Navy Primary photography for “Life Raft
Evaluation: Pooling the Resources” by: Page 385–Flight Safety Foundation
Equipment and Training Michael J. Bailey (underwater video) Regulations, Judgment Affect
Nyle Leatham Overwater Equipment Decisions
Page 231–Aviation Egress Systems
Rick Lindstrom (video) Page 387— Duncan Aviation
A Life Raft Primer:
Guidelines for Evaluation Chris Nelson (underwater still
photography) Stats
Page 233–Flight Safety Foundation Douglas S. Ritter Page 467–© copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc.
Page 234–Flight Safety Foundation Kim Rosenlof
Steve White References
Page 235 (upper right)–Flight Safety
Foundation Page 629–Flight Safety Foundation
Physical Fitness for
Page 235 (lower left)–Flight Safety Foundation Life Rafts and Life Vests Photo Credits
Page 236 (upper left)–Flight Safety Foundation Page 337–Flight Safety Foundation Page 659–Flight Safety Foundation

660 Flight Safety Foundation • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • WaterProof Flight Operations • September 2003–February 2004
Now you have
the safety tools
to make a difference.

The Flight Safety Foundation is a comprehensive and practical resource on

compact disc to help you prevent the leading causes of fatalities in commercial aviation:
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