Uneven and Combined Development

Ian D. Thatcher

I. INTRODUCTION

Polemics were an integral part of the lives of the Russian marxists.

Debates were often heated and passionate and covered a range of
topics. Such disputes could result in a break of personal relations, the
end of friendships. One of the most important arguments in the
political biography of Leon Trotskii was that which surrounded the
course and nature of the Russian revolution.
For Trotskii, Marxism was a method for the analysis of the interac-
tion of social forces within society: 'Marxism is above all a method of
analysis - not the analysis of texts, but the analysis of social relations.'1
The point of such an analysis was that it was linked directly to the aims
of people like Trotskii. His business was revolution, and 'a revolution
is a struggle for state power....As the party of revolution we have
before us the task to reveal to the masses the necessity of conquering
state power . . . . We considered the class dynamics of the Russian
revolution.'2 Therefore, in any situation, notions of class relations and
the relative strengths of the various component groups were the
crucial issues. With reference to pre-1917 Russian society Trotskii
presented a scenario in which the nature of the class relations within
Russia gave the possibility for the party of the proletariat to come to
power both before a regime of the bourgeoisie internally, and before
the establishment of proletarian governments in the advanced nations.
Moreover,, once in power the party of the Russian proletariat would
not be able to confine itself to a bourgeois-democratic programme but
would introduce socialist measures.
In so doing, Trotskii saw himself as opposing those Marxists whom
he saw as expressing a view of society, both internal and international,
as progressing through various stages of development. The version of
this idea which Trotskii criticised most vociferously was that which
claimed that a backward nation such as Russia had to go from tsarism
to parliamentary democracy politically, and under this political system
undergo a transition from a backward to an advanced economic base.
This developmental pattern would provide the pre-requisites for
Revolutionary Russia, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 1991, p p . 235-258
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
236 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

socialist revolution, and only when Russia had 'caught-up' with the
West in these senses could such a revolution take place there.
Trotskii accused all those whom he suspected of holding such an
idea of producing 'pseudo-Marxism',3 of basing themselves on state-
ments to be found within Marx but of turning such sentences into a
rigid maxim.4 Thus, in 'Our Differences' (1908) Trotskii attacked a
number of Mensheviks for limiting the immediate goal of proletarian
action to placing the bourgeoisie - who were seen as the social group to
implement the necessary catching-up measures - into government.
The Bolsheviks were praised for realizing the folly of positing hopes
for change of whatever nature on the Russian bourgeoisie and in
calling for a workers' and peasants' government; but were labelled
'hopelessly idealistic'5 in thinking that a government so composed
could limit itself to tasks with a bourgeois-democratic content.
These pre-1917 arguments composed part of Trotskii's theory of
permanent revolution, the prognosis of which Trotskii always main-
tained was fully confirmed by the October revolution. Of course,
Trotskii also wrote that while the nature of the class relations within
Russia gave the possibility for proletarian rule, world revolution
would be necessary for full socialism to be constructed. This formed
the final element of permanent revolution.
However, the nature of the power struggle in the CPSU from 1926
onwards meant that perceptions of the nature and possibilities of the
Russian revolution came to have renewed significance. Specifically,
Stalin claimed that socialism in one country was based upon Lenin's
usage of the law of uneven development in the period of monopoly
capitalism or imperialism.6 This, in turn, motivated Trotskii to turn to
uneven development and to give it concrete definition, most notably
in the work The Third International After Lenin (1928). The whole debate
involved questions of the nature of the Russian revolution, the
prospects for building socialism in the USSR, and which of the various
answers represented the Leninist heritage. Moreover, the way in
which Trotskii presented his case had consequences for any body of
text which one might want to highlight as being the theory of per-
manent revolution. For in the years 1927 onwards Trotskii reinter-
preted his previous writings with the law of uneven development
upmost in his mind. This had the result that theory shifted to the level
of the law of uneven development.
This article will present an exposition of Trotskii's writings on
uneven development and combined development and show how they
related to each other to form a hierarchical explanation of the October
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 237

1917 revolution. Moreover, it will be argued that the consequences of

this hierarchy lead us to abandon notions of the theory of permanent
revolution as being a theory at all. Uneven and combined development
became the theory of the Russian revolution, permanent revolution
acting as a political programme dependent for its proposed validity
upon this theory. The exposition will begin with the concept which
occupies the highest level of explanation in Trotskii, namely uneven
development.

II. UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

Talk of uneven development becomes dominant in Trotskii's writings

from 1927 onwards.7 From this date, whenever the law is mentioned,
the claim consistently made for it is that 'the entire history of mankind
is governed by the law of uneven development'.8 In itself unevenness,
Trotskii tells us, refers to differences in two states when making
comparisons between countries. First, in the speed of growth in the
fields of economics and culture. Second, in the absolute levels of achieve-
ment in those particular areas. The capitalist era is significant for
uneven development. It is important because it differs from previous
economic systems in being expansionist. This fact about capitalism led
it to have specific effects upon the existing state of unevenness in both
senses.
First, capitalism merged countries at different levels of advancement
into a connected whole. This, in turn, effected a levelling process
between nations, so that any gaps which existed between, for
example, India and Great Britain or Europe and America, diminished
over time. This process had implications for differences in the rates of
development between countries. Specifically,
The capitalist development in certain parts of India is much more
rapid than was the capitalist development in England in its
beginnings. The difference, the economic distance between
England and India - is this today greater or smaller than 50 years
ago? It is smaller ... . The development of Canada, South
America, South Africa has proceeded during the last period with
gigantic strides. The 'development' of England is a stagnation,
yes, even a decline. Therefore the tempo is uneven as never
before in history.9
Second, as a consequence of the situation in which the rate of develop-
ment of the backward nations increased while the tempo of the
238 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

advanced declined, the differences in the absolute levels of economics

and culture decreased:
Thereby it brings about their rapprochement and equalizes the
economic and cultural levels of the most progressive and the
most backward countries ... the level of development of these
countries has become more closely approximated than 30 or 50
years ago.10
It was a levelling out in the second sense that Trotskii was, in 1931, to
call the 'law of combined development'. And, accepting that this is
correct, it is here, in 1927-28, that Trotskii first showed how combined
development related to uneven development. The nature of uneven
development in the capitalist epoch, in regard to rates of development,
resulted in the backward nation importing the latest achievements of
capitalism into its society. It was from this interaction that combined
development was to emerge. As Trotskii claimed in History of the
Russian Revolution (1931), combined development is derived from un-
even development:

Historical laws have nothing to do with pedantic schematism.

Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process,
displays itself most sharply and complexly in the fate of back-
ward countries. Under the stimulus of external necessity their
backwardness is forced to accomplish leaps. From the universal
law of unevenness there is derived another law which, for the
want of a more suitable term, one may call the law of combined
development, in the sense that there is a rapprochement of differ-
ent stages of the journey, a combination of separate stages, an
amalgam of archaic with the most contemporary forms. Without
this law taken, of course, in its whole material content one cannot
understand the history of Russia or, in general, of any country of
the second, third or tenth level of civilization."

When Trotskii uses the phrase 'the stimulus of external necessity' he is

referring to the fact, expressed in 1927-28, that capitalism is expan-
sionist. Initially, Russia had no choice on whether it was to become a
part of the capitalist system. And as a member of the capitalist order it
had to submit to existing advanced forms:
The Russian state came into contact with the military organiza-
tion of Western nations, which stood on higher economic, politi-
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 239

cal and cultural foundations. Thus, Russian capital in its first

steps collided with the far more developed and powerful capital
of the West and fell under its leadership.12
However, this process, under capitalism, would never enable nations
to reach a position of equality in both tempo and levels of develop-
ment. Unevenness in both respects remained in force. Capitalism is a
definite economic order characterized, for Trotskii, by anarchic
methods which set country against country, and guarantees that
branches of industry will develop unevenly in relation to one another.
All of this was, in turn, made worse by imperialism:
Imperialism, thanks to the universality, penetrability, and
mobility and the break-neck speed of the formation of finance
capital as the driving force of imperialism, lends vigour to both
the tendencies. Imperialism links up incomparably more rapidly
and more deeply the individual national and continental units
into a single entity ... it attains this 'goal' by such antagonistic
methods, such tiger-leaps, and such raids upon backward
countries and areas that the unification, and levelling of the
world economy which it has effected, is upset by it even more
violently and convulsively than in the preceding epochs.13
We re-enter the language of 'tiger-leaps' and 'raids upon backward
countries'. This interaction amounted to combined development, and
Trotskii was to outline the specific effects of this on pre-revolutionary
Russian society.
However, before Trotskii wrote of a specific law of combined
development this law was subsumed under his earlier usage of the law
of uneven development. This explains why Trotskii made claims for
uneven development which were subsequently attributed to com-
bined development. For example, in 1930 Trotskii wrote that 'Stalin
does not understand to this day that the uneven development consists
precisely in jumping over stages (or staying too long in one stage)... the
prediction that historically backward Russia was able to arrive at the
proletarian revolution sooner than advanced Britain was entirely and
completely based on the law of uneven development';14 in 1933, 'We
have attributed the October revolution in the final analysis not to the
fact of Russia's backwardness, but to the law of combined develop-
ment';15 and in 1936, 'the law of combined development ... i.e., to a
jump of the backward country ahead in comparison with the advanced
countries'.16 Combined development will now be examined. The issue
240 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

of the relationship between uneven development and combined

development will be raised again in this section.

III. COMBINED DEVELOPMENT

For Trotskii it was combined development, the invasion of advanced

capitalism into backward Russia, which enabled the occurrence of
jumps over features which had been a part of progression within the
advanced nations:

Almost without highways, Russia was compelled to build rail-

roads. Without having gone through the European artisan and
manufacturing stages, Russia passed directly to mechanized
production. To jump over intermediate stages is the fate of
backward countries.17

More importantly, this had effects upon class relations within Russia:

[it] gives birth to an utterly new, 'combined' social formation, in

which the newest achievements of capitalist technique and
structure take root into relations of feudal and pre-feudal bar-
barism, transforming and subordinating them into the formation
of a peculiar alignment of classes.18

And, as Trotskii wrote, the October revolution triumphed because of

the 'peculiar correlation of forces among the different classes and the
state power'19 in pre-revolutionary Russia.
In particular the fact that capitalism entered Russia through the
influx of finance capital had several important consequences. First, it
enabled the Russian state to attain a high degree of independence. This
meant that the state was the executor of economic change in Russia,
becoming the largest capitalist entrepreneur. The state monopolized
and through this collected enough to fund a repressive force which
increased its capacity for survival. However, this meant that Russian
society was characterised by the separation of state from social classes
which led to a marked polarization of class forces. This, in turn, meant
that conflict in Russia would be noticeable for its extreme nature:

the revolution was guaranteed to have a radical character

beforehand, the more mighty absolutism deepened the gulf
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 241

between it and the masses who were involved in the new

economic development ... for revolution to become inevitable
class contradictions have to be strained to the breaking point.20
Second, finance capital prevented the development of a strong,
numerous indigenous bourgeoisie. Finance capital drew the Russian
bourgeoisie into the system of European capitalism at its imperialist
stage. However, the Russian bourgeoisie was the weakest member in
this system, so that when imperialism caused the First World War the
Russian bourgeoisie was the least well-equipped to survive it. The
weak position of this social class rendered it useless as a force for the
overthrow of tsarism and the introduction of bourgeois democracy. As
such it stood in stark contrast to the concentrated mass of Russian
workers collected in large-scale production units. These factories were
another result of finance capital.
In a society convulsed by the effects of rapid industrialisation it
would be the strength of the proletariat, derived from its homogeneity
and strategic importance within Russian industry, that would over-
throw tsarism. Combined development produced both the crisis in the
form of a reaction against the pre-revolutionary organisation of pro-
duction:
Russia advanced on the road to proletarian revolution not be-
cause its economy was the first to mature for a socialist revolu-
tion, but because it in general was not able to develop for long on
a capitalist basis. Social ownership of the means of production
became a necessary condition for leading the country from bar-
barism: such is the law of combined development for backward
countries,21
and the system of class relations in which the proletariat were the only
class powerful enough to cause change. Combined development did
not touch the Russian peasantry. It remained in a state of backward-
ness, experiencing no leaps, and was too isolated to be an effective
political force.22 The weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie simply made
the seizure of power by the proletariat easier.
Moreover, the Russian proletariat was special in that it did not
develop over a long period of time. It had skipped both medieval
apprentice schools and membership of guilds. This meant that it
lacked a conservative tradition and this fact constituted another nail in
the coffin of bourgeois democracy in Russia. For:
The Russian proletariat was formed not gradually through the
242 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

centuries, dragging with it the weight of the past, as in England,

but by leaps, by means of abrupt changes in conditions, connec-
tions, relations, and a sharp break with yesterday. It was prec-
isely this - in combination with the concentrated oppression of
tsarism - that made the Russian workers susceptible to the most
daring conclusions of revolutionary thought - just as backward
Russian industry was susceptible to the latest word in capitalist
organisation.23
Indeed, for Trotskii, the law of combined development included the
idea that in certain spheres the backward nation would even be ahead
of the advanced. So that the statement in the preface to the first edition
of Capital (1867)24 concerning the advanced nations showing the back-
ward just the mirror image of their own future development, which
Trotskii saw as being dogmatised by others, was turned on its head.
For instance, in ideology the Russian workers fell under the influence
of Marxism when the British proletariat was still going to church.25 In
organization the supreme means for coordinating revolutionary
struggle by proletarian democracy appeared first in Russia:
Let us note right away that the soviets ... are not simply the
outcome of the Russia's historical backwardness, but are a
product of her combined development, which is shown by the
fact that the proletariat of the most industrialised country,
Germany, at the time of its revolutionary upheaval, 1918-1919,
could not find any other form of organisation as the soviets . . . .
The law of combined development is revealed here before us in
its most extreme manifestation: beginning with the overthrow of
a decayed medieval institution, the revolution in the course of a
few months placed into power the proletariat led by the Com-
munist party.26

So combined development produced a situation in Russia in which the

proletariat armed with Marxism constituted the only real force for
change. This meant, first, that unlike the other advanced nations the
bourgeoisie would not be the focus for economic and political pro-
gress. Combined development caused a leap in this sense. And,
second, a Marxian inspired proletariat in power would be just that,
and introduce socialist measures. Combined development caused a
leap in another sense. There would be no protracted bourgeois-
democratic stage in Russia. Combined development thus explains the
first part of the 'theory' of permanent revolution. Trotskii repeatedly
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 243

stated that this consisted of two propositions: first that the Russian
proletariat would take power before the Russian bourgeoisie; and,
second, that once in power the Russian workers would introduce
socialist measures. Trotskii consistently stated that this resulted from
'the alignment of classes'.27 This alignment was a consequence of the
nature of Russian industrial development. For example, Trotskii
argued that: 'The social character of the Russian bourgeoisie and its
political make-up were determined by the conditions of the origin of
Russian industry and the structure which it acquired.'28 And, accord-
ing to Trotskii, the nature of Russian economic progress was explained
by the law of combined development: 'But it is precisely in the
economic field... that the law of combined development operates with
the greatest force.'29
Defining theory as something which seeks to explain phenomena,
the fact that combined development is the explanation of the first part
of permanent revolution means that, in this respect, permanent
revolution is a political programme, a political summary of a reality
which is explained by higher concepts. In 1928 Trotskii wrote that the
first element of permanent revolution was 'based upon a correct
understanding of the law of uneven development';30 which suggests
that the highest level of explanation is at uneven development. But we
have already seen that combined development is derived from uneven
development. So what emerges from this is a hierarchy of explanation
with uneven development at the top and permanent revolution at the
bottom. However, when the bottom - permanent revolution - is
reached there is not that much, if anything, which is left to be
explained. Given this, the claim that theory resides at the bottom level
is not tenable. So on this point the theory of permanent revolution is
not a theory at all. In diagrammatic form the hierarchy of explanation
would look as follows:

I. Uneven Development [unevenness+

capitalism]
II. Combined Development
1: Economic crisis demanding
socialisation of means of
production;
2: Independence of state
guaranteeing polarisation;
3: Weakness of Russian
bourgeoisie;
244 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

4: Weakness of Peasants;
5: Radical ideology among workers;
6: Advanced forms of proletarian
organization;
7: Strength of proletariat.
III. Permanent Revolution
1: Proletarian revolution;
2: Introduction of socialist
measures.

IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

There are two possible fundamental objections to the argument ex-
pounded thus far. The first could state that Trotskii's use of uneven
development from 1927 onwards was merely the naming of something
which was always contained within his analysis, that is, there is
straight continuity in Trotskii from 1904 to 1940. Indeed, in The Social
and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky (1978), Baruch Knei-Paz argues that
combined development was used by Trotskii in all his writings from
Results and Prospects onwards: 'the later use of the term does not
represent a new concept but simply the naming of an old one'.31
It is correct to claim that elements of the law of combined develop-
ment, as expounded by Trotskii in History of the Russian Revolution, are
to be found in Results and Prospects. For example, the importance of the
meeting of backward and advanced forms on the international arena
for the internal development of Russia; the role of the effects of finance
capital as the means of interaction; capitalism as a world wide system;
and the disappearance of the minimum into the maximum pro-
gramme, are expressed in the 1906 work.
But these elements are not incorporated into a coherent framework
(consisting of an explicit presentation of laws of uneven development,
combined development and how they relate to each other) which
illustrates how those elements result from the operation of laws of
development. It is the existence of this in History of the Russian
Revolution, missing from Results and Prospects, which differentiates
Trotskii's usage of the law of combined development from that which
can be highlighted in his earlier writings as being a precursor to the
law. There is both continuity and discontinuity in Trotskii. For
example, in 1906, Trotskii explains why the minimum programme of
Social-Democracy will collapse into the maximum with reference to the
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 245

'very logic' of the proletariat in power. A proletarian hegemony in

government equals socialist policies. But from where does the radical
ideology of the Russian proletariat originate? Thus far there are no a
priori reasons to substantiate Trotskii's conclusion. After all, Trotskii
himself informs us that others thought that a workers' executive could
limit itself to bourgeois policies. Explanation for the predominance of
Marxism in the working class is lacking in 1906, but is given - as an
effect of combined development - in 1931. Another notable example is
the change from a view of the Soviets as spontaneous organizations
consciously created by the proletariat, to the Soviets as a product of
combined development.32
Similarly, one can point to Trotskii's reference, in 1906, to the
bourgeois democratic stage of the revolution growing uninterrupted
into socialism as a combined development, of sorts. But, viewing
Trotskii's writings as a whole, this instance becomes an example of an
effect of the operation of the law of combined development and, as
such, occupies a lower level in the explanatory structure. It is only
possible to read of the Russian revolution passing straight from the
bourgeois democratic to the socialist stage as a consequence of the
operation of laws of development after History of the Russian Revolution
was written: 'It is at first sight paradoxical that the first sacrifice for sins
of the world-system was the bourgeoisie of a backward country but, in
fact, the phenomenon was quite to be expected [zakonomeren].'*
It is clear that in the context of the History that zakonomernost' refers to
the laws of uneven and combined development. And these laws were
not mentioned in 1906. In Results and Prospects one can discover a
description of a combined formation: in History of the Russian Revolution
one finds combined development acting at a higher level as the
explanation for that concrete example. Notions of continuity come
from the same point at issue, and the conclusions surrounding it,
being expressed in the early and the later texts, ideas about discon-
tinuity originate from the shift in explanation.
The second possible objection follows on from the first and relates to
the hierarchy of explanation. If uneven and combined development
was always present in Trotskii's analysis then no shift occurred and
explanation resided where it always did. However, the problem of
what to do with the terms 'permanent revolution', 'uneven develop-
ment' and 'combined development' remains. Knei-Paz solves this
particular conundrum by mixing terms, saying 'Perhaps ... Trotskii
should have named it [permanent revolution] from the outset the
theory of the "combined revolution".34 But the fact remains that
246 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

Trotskii did not do this. Even after 1927 he continued to use the phrase
'permanent revolution' as distinct from a law of uneven and combined
development. This is not a problem and one does not have to mix
terms. One is only forced to do this if one wants to retain notions of
permanent revolution as theory. However, to do this one would have
to show that permanent revolution explains something which uneven
and combined development does not and this is just not tenable. For
example, Trotskii's summary of permanent revolution in the 1930s
amounted to the statement of a political programme consisting of
several propositions which in themselves had no explanatory value:
the task of strategic prognosis is not to deduce the concrete stages
and episodes but to formulate the basic tendency of revolutionary
development. This basic tendency is indicated by the formula of
the permanent revolution, which is . . . . Under the dictatorship
of the proletariat, the bourgeois democratic revolution passes
over into the socialist revolution, which can triumph completely
only as a link in the world revolution.35
Indeed, in Knei-Paz's latest (1988) article on permanent revolution it is
implicit that explanation for the Russian revolution is at the level of
uneven and combined development. Knei-Paz writes that, 'The theory
of permanent revolution is rather a sociological analysis of the pecu-
liarities of Russian history which ... had evolved in accordance with
what Trotsky called "the law of uneven and combined develop-
ment".'36 If phenomena develop 'in accordance with' (that is, in har-
mony) something called a 'law', then explanation for the nature of
those phenomena must, in some sense, be located at the level of the
'law'. After all, if a 'law' is not defined within certain boundaries it en-
compasses every possibility and accounts for nothing. Given this, in
regard to explanation, the content of the law, in relation to the nature
of the phenomena in question, has higher explanatory value. Explana-
tion ultimately resides with the law.
This is implicit in what Knei-Paz writes. For example, according to
Knei-Paz, Russian development, for Trotskii, was 'uneven, because
economic and social change was intensive but narrow, disrupting yet
circumscribed; combined, because the consequent contradictions and
anomalies necessitated policies which drew together the backward
and the modern'.37 So, the contradictions of uneven development
made necessary conscious actions on the part of those in control of
Russian state policy which, in turn, created a coexistence of modern
and backward elements in Russian society. Thus far we have a
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 247

hierarchy of explanation with uneven development at the top and

combined development at the bottom. This is because combined
development is dependent upon the existence of the contradictions
emanating from uneven development. Knei-Paz then goes on to
outline the specific nature of the 'necessitated policies', that is,
combined development. These amounted to, 'a significant working
class, large urban centres, a revolutionary intelligentsia and radical
political demands and activities, even while leaving virtually un-
touched the predominantly agrarian and primitive character of Rus-
sian society'.38
It was the contradiction between these two elements - the modern
and the backward - which, Knei-Paz informs us, made Trotskii believe
that 'the only resolution ... was not a bourgeois revolution but a
"permanent", i.e., uninterrupted, revolution combining bourgeois-
democratic goals with the more advanced proletarian-socialist aspira-
tions'.39 If one extrapolates from what is implicit in Knei-Paz, there
clearly emerges a hierarchy of explanation in Trotskii. What needs to
be explained is Trotskii's political assertion that, in Russia, a successful
revolution would be both proletarian and socialist. The political prog-
nosis was substantiated by reference to the nature of pre-revolutionary
Russian society in which there existed a fundamental contradiction
between modern and backward elements. In terms of locating explana-
tion, the question to ask is 'what creates the fundamental contradic-
tion?' The answer-combined development. We have climbed a step in
the explanatory ladder. The next puzzle is 'from where does combined
development originate?' The solution - uneven development. In
Trotskü's presentation we have reached the top of the explanatory
ladder.
However, Knei-Paz's definition of the relationship between uneven
development and combined development is not in accord with that in
Trotskii's texts. Combined development did not result from the
unevenness internal to Russian society causing contradictions which
necessitated a conscious state programme which drew together ad-
vanced and anachronistic forms. On the contrary, combined develop-
ment, according to Trotskii, was derived from a law of uneven develop-
ment - from which separate countries had unequal rates and levels of
development - operating in the capitalist and imperialist epoch from
which individual nations were placed into a system of inter-relation-
ships. In this interaction the most modern elements were implanted
into the most backward environments. It was from this that combined
development emerged, a process over which the backward nation had
248 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

no control. We can see that a crucial point in this analysis is the fact
that, for Trotskii, countries were drawn into a system which inexorably
bound them together:
Capitalism ... prepares and, in a certain sense brings about the
universality and permanency of mankind's development. This
eliminates the possibility of a recurrence of forms of develop-
ment in different nations. Forced by the pressure of the advanced
countries, backward countries do not keep to that order: the
privilege of historical backwardness - and such a privilege exists -
allows, or rather compels the acquisition ahead of previous
allotted times, leaping over a number of intermediate stages.
Savages replace their bows for rifles at once, without following
the path which lay between these weapons in the p a s t . . . . The
development of a historically backward nation leads, of neces-
sity, to a peculiar combination of the different stages of the
historical process. Their orbit, as a whole, acquires a haphazard,
complex, combined character.40

These interconnections do not emerge from Knei-Paz's presentation

because he omits the law of uneven development in the capitalist era.
Without this one cannot begin to talk of how Trotskii derived com-
bined development from uneven development. How uneven develop-
ment relates to the second component of permanent revolution can
now be examined.

V. THE NECESSITY FOR WORLD REVOLUTION

For Trotskii uneven and combined development caused a relation of

class forces so as to enable a proletarian revolution and the introduc-
tion of socialism within Russia. However, this process did not leave the
Russian proletariat with a sufficient economic base from which com-
plete socialism could be built within the boundaries of Russia. For
several reasons Trotskii claimed that uneven development meant that
world revolution was necessary if socialism was to be fully achieved.
First, socialism meant the attainment of harmony in the fields of
economics and culture, and this could only be achieved through world
revolution. For Trotskii, the destruction of the restrictions of capitalist
national frontiers would enable the overcoming of the contradictions
flowing from uneven development through a process of co-operation
between the various economies and cultures:
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 249

From the world division of labour, from the uneven development

of the different countries, from their economic interdependence,
from the unevenness of different aspects of culture in the
different countries, from the dynamic of contemporary produc-
tive forces, it follows that the socialist order can be built according
to a system of economic spiral, by taking the inner disparities of
the separate country out into the whole group of countries,
through the mutual assistance to the different countries and the
mutual supplementation of different branches of their economy
and culture, i.e., in the last analysis on the world arena.41
Second, uneven development operated over capitalism in its im-
perialist stage which had brought about a world economy in which
national boundaries had to be transcended. This made a nonsense of
the idea of constructing anything within the nation-state. Just as the
capitalist powers were forced to trade with each other after the First
World War, so Russia would not be able to escape the reality of the
world economy post-revolution:
The problem of building socialism is not settled merely by the
industrial 'maturity' or 'immaturity' of a country. This im-
maturity is itself uneven. In the U.S.S.R., some branches of
industry are extremely inadequate to satisfy the most elementary
domestic requirements ... other branches on the contrary cannot
develop under present conditions without extensive and increas-
ing exports ... even the 'inadequate' branches cannot seriously
develop if the 'super-abundant' (relatively) are unable to export.
The impossibility of building an isolated socialist society ... in
the concrete geographical and historical conditions of our ter-
restrial economy, is determined by various countries in different
ways - by the insufficient development of some branches as well
as by the 'excessive' development of others. On the whole this
means that the modern productive forces are incompatible with
national boundaries.42
Third, even if Russia had an advanced economic base uneven develop-
ment would prevent the complete building of socialism in one country.
The contradiction between the limits of frontiers and the universal
nature of modern productive forces would vitiate any such idea,
irrespective of the level of technology:
the incompatibility between the present productive forces and
national boundaries, from which it follows that highly developed
250 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

productive forces are by no means a lesser obstacle to the

construction of socialism in one country than low productive
forces ... while the latter are insufficient to serve as the basis, it is
the basis which will prove inadequate for the former. The law of
uneven development is forgotten precisely at the point where it
is most needed and most important.43
Only if one assumed that countries develop both unevenly and in-
dependently of each other could the idea of building full-blown
socialism within national boundaries become tenable. For Trotskii, the
corollary of this would be an acceptance of the Menshevist version of
stages of development:
If the historical process were such that some countries developed
not only unevenly but even independently of each other....then
the law of uneven development would indubitably follow the
possibility of building socialism in one capitalist country and
then, as they mature, in the more backward ones.44
It was the acceptance of the independence of each unevenly developed
capitalist country that lay at the centre of Stalin's conception of the law
of uneven development. This fuelled his belief in socialism in one
country.45 For Stalin, monopoly capitalism or imperialism did not mean
that the economies of separate countries had become or were becom-
ing interconnected. Rather it signified a transition in capitalist develop-
ment itself from free competition to huge capitalist combines. These
combines were tied to individual capitalist countries and their colonial
empires in a world which was already divided. However, for Stalin,
this did not mean that a stable hierarchy of unevenly developed
nations had been established. Like Trotskii, Stalin thought that the
epoch of monopoly capitalism was notable for an increase in the tempo
of development of the backward nations compared to the advanced.
Like Trotskii, Stalin believed that this had the consequence of a
levelling process in which differences in absolute levels of develop-
ment between the various countries decreased.
Like Trotskii, Stalin argued that these processes contained the
possibility of the backward nation 'leaping over' the advanced. How-
ever, unlike Trotskii, Stalin did not make the levelling process depen-
dent upon a law of combined development deriving from a world
economy acting upon previous levels of unevenness.
According to Stalin, levelling was to be explained by the nature of
technology in the imperialist era. And, for Stalin, it was levelling that
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 251

gave the possibility to the proletariat of one country to have their own,
successful, socialist revolution:
It is precisely because the lagging countries accelerate their
development and tend to become level with the foremost
countries that the struggle between countries to outstrip one
another becomes more acute; it is precisely this that creates the
possibility for some countries to outstrip others and oust them
from the markets, thereby creating the pre-conditions for mili-
tary conflicts, for the weakening of the capitalist world front and
for the breaching of this front by the proletarians of various
capitalist countries. He who does not understand this simple
matter, understands nothing about the economic essence of
monopoly capitalism.46
Because this individual country was isolated, any internal contradic-
tions deriving from the workings of a capitalist economy could be
resolved through the establishment of socialism in that individual
country. For Stalin, the only remaining contradiction was external.
This consisted of the co-existence of a socialist state and capitalist
countries. Complete socialism meant the overcoming of this external
threat. According to Stalin world revolution was ultimately necessary
because this was the only condition in which each socialist state would
be safe and able to live in peace.47
However, for Trotskii, this was not the case. Uneven development
would vitiate any attempt to construct socialism in isolation. His
understanding of uneven development, in the era of the indivisibility
of the world economy, thus provides the explanation for the connec-
tion between the full victory of socialism and revolution on a world
scale which underpins Trotskii's second component of permanent
revolution:
The socialist revolution begins on the national arena, develops on
the international, and concludes on the world arena. Thus, the
socialist revolution becomes permanent in a newer, wider sense
of the word: it does not receive its completion until the definite
triumph of the new society on the whole of our planet.48
On this point permanent revolution does, however, point to the
sources which provide the impetus towards universal socialist up-
heaval. It does so, once again, by operating as a political programme in
the form of making predictions about the political form such a
movement will take.
252 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

First, capitalism would find it impossible peacefully to co-exist with a

workers' government. The two systems would inevitably enter into
conflict. Second, the Russian proletariat would only overcome the
contradictions between being a radical force in a backward country
through world revolution. This is why Trotskii claimed that the
Russian proletariat would have to construct tactics for the overthrow of
capitalism in the advanced nations. The emphasis would be on the
conscious export of revolution:
Before the revolutionary power would stand the objective tasks
of socialism, but at a certain stage their solutions would collide
with the country's economic backwardness. It would be impos-
sible to escape from these contradictions in the framework of a
national revolution. From the beginning the task of a workers'
government would be to unite its forces with the forces of the
socialist proletariat of Western Europe. Only on this path would
its temporary revolutionary supremacy become the prologue to
the socialist dictatorship. Permanent revolution thus becomes,
for the Russian proletariat, a demand for its class self-preserva-
tion.49
The Russian proletariat would be helped in this task by the revolution-
ary idealism of the proletariat in the advanced nations. This desire to
help Russian workers would come from the revolutionary fervour
caused by the Russian revolution:
The influence of the Russian revolution on the European prole-
tariat is huge. Apart from the fact that it destroys the St. Peters-
burg absolutism, the main force of European reaction, it creates
... the necessary revolutionary prerequisites in the conscious-
ness and mood of the European working class....The Russian
proletariat in power, although only the result of the temporary
juncture of our bourgeois revolution, will meet with the or-
ganised hostility from world reaction and will be ready with the
organised support from the world proletariat.50
Trotskii tried to avoid predicting a spread of socialist revolution
through certain nations in a certain order.51 Indeed, given that Trotskii
accused others who held to a theory of stages in relation to Russia's
internal development of schematism, one would expect such notions
to be absent from his writings. However, uneven development did
lead Trotskii to express his own version of stages in two senses.
First, Trotskii stated that there would be a Soviet United States of
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 253

Europe as a prologue to a World Socialist Republic.52 For Trotskii,

uneven development meant revolutions on a European scale before
revolutions in other areas. This committed him to a schema for the
progression of revolutions from one part of the world to another.
When Trotskii spoke of the need to create a United States of Europe
in his article 'Our Political Slogan' (1915) he related this to the 'only
political form by which the proletariat can resolve the irreconcilable
contradiction between modern forces of production and the national
exclusiveness of the State organization'.53 It was in response to Lenin's
critique54 of the notion of a United States of Europe that Trotskii argued
that the slogan was in harmony with the law of uneven development.
While Trotskii accepted Lenin's assertion that uneven development
could lead to the victory of a socialist revolution in one country, the
operation of the law still meant that Europe as a whole would most
likely experience close to simultaneous socialist revolutions. This was
because, taken on a world scale, there was 'unevenness within the
unevenness', and most notably this meant, for Trotskii, that one part
of the world - Europe - was more united in maturity for socialist
revolution than Africa or Asia:
That capitalist development of different countries is uneven is a
completely uncontroversial consideration. But in itself this un-
evenness is highly uneven. The capitalist levels of England,
Austria, Germany or France are unequal. But in comparison with
Africa or Asia, all of these countries are a capitalist 'Europe' ripe
for socialist revolution. That not one country should 'wait' for the
others in its struggle is an elementary thought, which is useful
and necessary to repeat ... we continue our struggle on a
national basis in the total assurance that our initiative will give a
push to the struggle in other countries ... the revolution [is] able
to start on a national basis [but] is unable to be completed on its
own under the present economic and military-political inter-
dependence of the European states which has never been
revealed so forcibly as precisely in the present war. This inter-
dependence, which directly and immediately conditions the
coordination of the activities of the European proletariat in the
revolution, also gives expression to the slogan the United States
of Europe.55
Trotskii was to repeat this argument in the The Third International after
Lenin (1928), claiming that he had defended the idea of a United States
of Europe from the perspective of a law of uneven development since
254 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

1915.56 However, he was in fact referring to part of the series of articles

which were originally written in 1916, revised in 1917, and published
in their revised form in volume three of his collected works.57
Aside from the confusion over dates, Trotskii was correct in his 1928
work to point to his earlier acceptance of the law of uneven develop-
ment when attacked by Stalin as being ignorant of this law. However,
one can highlight both continuity and discontinuity in Trotskii's
earlier and later usage of the law of uneven development. Continuity is
present in the fact that in both 1916 and 1928 the claim was that Europe
was ripe for socialist revolution. In 1916 this was substantiated by
comparing Europe with Africa and Asia; in 1928 Trotskii argued that
European nations were united at a lower level of development from
that obtaining in America, with the consequence that revolution
would occur in Europe before America.58 (The political repercussions of
this were outlined by Trotskii in a scenario of co-operation between the
Russian and European workers, in which Russian food would save the
European revolution from attacks by the American bourgeoisie.)59
Discontinuity derived from several differences. First, in 1916 Trotskii
simply took over Lenin's relation of unevenness in economic and
political development to an absolute law of capitalism. He was sub-
sequently to extend the law of uneven development to a law for the
whole history of mankind, and then to talk of its specific operation in
the capitalist epoch. Second, in the Nashe Slovo article 'The position of
the Social Democrat' (April 1916) Trotskii referred to 'unevenness
within the unevenness' without the fullness of definition which is
expressed in his later work. There is no mention of unevenness in
tempo and level of development in 1916. Third, in the 1916 text there is
no talk of how it is possible to derive a law of combined development
from the operation of uneven development since the emergence of
capitalism as a world system. Fourth, if in 1916 uneven development
allowed revolution initially in one country then, for Trotskii, that
country would be Germany, that is, the most developed of the Euro-
pean nations.
At that time Trotskii took the view that if revolution did not occur in
other European countries then it would be a 'hopeless thought - as
witnessed by historical and theoretical considerations - that socialist
Germany would be able to withstand bourgeois Russia and France'.60
However, in the revised version of this article published in 1917
Trotskii changed this text to take into account the fact that revolution
had broken out first in Russia, that is, the least developed of the nations
under consideration.61 This difference between the 1916 and 1917
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 255

versions was carried through to the 1927-28 writings when uneven

development had led to a break in the 'weakest link in the imperialist
chain'.62 The 1916 article clearly expected a break in the strongest link.
From the 1928 text, which took into account the shift in emphasis
from strong to weak links, one is able to derive a linear pattern of
successive revolutions - backward countries, Europe, the World -
which amounts to a view of revolution as progressing through
societies of decreasing backwardness. This was underpinned by the
law of uneven development.
Second is the notion that although backward nations will have
proletarian revolutions first, they will arrive at full socialism last.63
Thus, on the second component of permanent revolution, Trotskii
ended by expressing a rigid developmental pattern. This was based
upon the law of uneven development.
The second part of permanent revolution is like the first in two
respects. First, uneven development is the theory in that it provides
the explanation for the necessity of world revolution. Second, it is
Russo-centric in that it (eventually in relation to the texts surrounding
the 'United States of Europe') took Russia as the starting-point for
world revolution. The third part of permanent revolution is unique in
that it only received explicit recognition as an element of permanent
revolution in Permanent Revolution (1930); and in that it was divorced
from Russia.

VI. THE END OF PERMANENT REVOLUTION

Trotskii claimed that permanent revolution consisted of continuous
revolutions until all class distinctions had been abolished.64 At such a
time the need for new revolutions would be over:
every real revolution ... tends to transform itself into a per-
manent revolution, in other words, not to come to a halt at any of
the stages that it reaches, not to confine itself up to the complete
transformation of society, up to the final abolition of class
distinctions, consequently, up to the complete and final suppres-
sion of the very possibility of new revolutions.65
Trotskii does not relate this to uneven development, but one can see
how such a situation would also mean the end of unevenness. After
all, it is uneven development which explains the need for permanent
revolution; the elimination of one means the elimination of the other.
256 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

In conclusion, analysing Trotskii's writings in their entirety means that

one cannot talk of 'permanent revolution' as theory. Theory implies
explanation; and Trotskii's explanation for the Russian revolution, that
is, the proletariat taking power before the bourgeoisie, and for the
necessity of world revolution was the operation of laws of uneven and
combined development. The notion of 'permanent revolution' can be
retained, but as a political programme devoid of explanatory value.

NOTES
1. L. Trotskii, Nasha revoliutsiia (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 246.
2. L. Trotskii, 'Nashi raznoglasiia' (1908) in 1905, (Moscow, 1922), pp. 280 and 272.
3. L. Trotskii, 'Uroki oktiabria', 1917, Sochineniia, Vol. 3 (Moscow, nd), pp. xvi-xvii. See
also Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1 (Berlin, 1931), p. 506.
4. Ibid.
5. L. Trotskii, 'Nashi raznoglasiia', p. 315.
6. See, for example, I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 8, (Moscow, 1948), pp. 216-21; 251-7;
312-16; Sochineniia, Vol. 9 (Moscow, 1948), pp. 29-35.
7. Trotskii first used the law of uneven development in 1916 when defending the
slogan of a 'United States of Europe' from Lenin's critique. For this usage, and how it
was to differ when re-introduced into his later writings, see pp. 253-5 of this article
and note 58. For Lenin's critique see note 54.
8. L. Trotskii, The Third International after Lenin (1928) (New York, 1957) p. 19. See also
VII Meeting of the Enlarged ECCI, IPC (6 Jan. 1927); Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 3
(Berlin, 1933), p. 453; Chto takoe SSSR i kuda on idet ? (1936) (Paris, 1971), p. 240.
9. L. Trotskii, VII Meeting of the Enlarged ECCI.
10. L. Trotskii, The Third International after Lenin, p. 19 and VII Meeting of the Enlarged
ECCI.
11. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1, p. 22. Max Eastman inserted the word
'culture' into the sentence 'Under the whip of external necessity their backward
culture is compelled to make leaps' (History of the Russian Revolution London, 1967,
Vol. 1, p. 23) In 'Uneven Development and the role of American Imperialism' (4
March 1933), (Writings, 1932-33, New York, 1972, pp. 116-21) Trotskii stated that
combined development is an attempt to explain uneven development by way of
being a formula which highlights the consequences of uneven development.
12. Ibid., p. 513. Here Eastman mistranslated the first sentence of this passage. His
version reads: 'The Russian state encountered the military organisation of Western
nations standing on a higher political and cultural level' (Vol. 1, p. 432). This is
ambiguous in that it is not clear whether it is the 'Russian state' or the 'military
organisation of the Western nations' which stands on a higher political and cultural
level. If Eastman means the 'military organisation of the Western nations', then
Trotskii's logic is faulty: it does not automatically follow that just because a country is
politically and culturally backward it will be so in the economic field. If we read the
sentence and conclude that it was the Russian state which was politically and
economically advanced, then this would not be in harmony with Trotskii's earlier
assertion that Russia was politically and economically backward. It is possible that
Eastman omitted the word 'economic' from the first sentence -there in the original-
UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 257

because then Trotskii would have been presented as contradicting himself in this
sense. However, Trotskii did write that the West was politically, culturally, and
economically advanced when compared to the levels of Russian development, his
logic did not need saving. As Trotskii wrote: 'I carry no responsibility for the
interpretations of Max Eastman. I hope that my readers will understand my ideas
better than my translator' (Writings, 1936-37, New York, 1970, p. 212.)
13. L. Trotskii, The Third International after Lenin, p. 20.
14. L. Trotskii, Permanentnaia revoliutsiia (Berlin, 1930), p. 125.
15. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 3, p. 350.
16. L. Trotskii, Chto takoe SSSR i kuda on idet?, p. 300.
17. L. Trotskii, In Defence of the October Revolution (Nov. 1932) (London, 1971), p. 12.
18. L. Trotskii, Stalin, Vol. 2 (1941) (Vermont, 1985), p. 283. (emphasis added).
19. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1, p. 507.
20. L. Trotskii, 1905, p. 23 and The Chinese Revolution: Problems and Perspectives (1938)
(New York, 1969), p. 3.
21. L. Trotskii, Chto takoe SSSR i kuda on idet?, p. 9.
22. See, for example, L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1, p. 54.
23. Ibid., p. 28.
24. K. Marx, Das Kapital, (Hamburg, 1867), p. ix.
25. Trotskii claimed that the same mixture of advanced industry with backward con-
sciousness arose in America as an effect of the operation of combined development
there. See 'Uneven Development and the role of American Imperialism', p. 117.
26. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1, p. 31. From reading only the Max
Eastman translation of this passage one would miss Trotskii's view of the Commun-
ist Party as playing a vanguard role: ' . . . the revolution in the course of a few months
placed the proletariat and the Communist Party in power' (Vol. 1, p. 31).
27. L. Trotskii, 'Predislovie k pervomu izdaniiu', 1905, p. 7.
28. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1, p. 28.
29. Ibid., pp. 26-7.
30. L. Trotskii, The Third International after Lenin, p. 40.
31. B. Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky (Oxford, 1978), p. 89.
32. Cmp. Nasha revoliutsiia, pp. 242-243 and Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1, p. 31.
33. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 3, p. 416.
34. B. Knei-Paz, op. cit., p. 165.
35. L. Trotskii, Writings 1933-34 (New York, 1972), pp. 164-5.
36. B. Knei-Paz, 'Permanent revolution' in H. Shukman (ed.), The Basil Blackwell
Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution (Oxford, 1988), p. 199 (emphasis added).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 1, p. 21.
41. L. Trotskii, Istoriia russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 3, pp. 461-2. See also Permanentnaia
revoliutsiia, pp. 141-142.
42. L. Trotskii, The Third International after Lenin, pp. 58-9.
43. Ibid., p. 58.
44. Ibid., p. 21.
45. The following exposition of Stalin's conception of the law of uneven development is
based mainly upon I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 8, pp. 312-16; and Sochineniia, Vol. 9,
pp. 100-11.
46. Ibid., p. 105.
47. For the reasons for Stalin's belief that socialism had been created in the USSR see I.
V. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 8, pp. 298-307; for the internal/external contradiction
example see ibid., pp. 251-66.
48. L. Trotskii, Permanentnaia revoliutsiia, p. 167.
258 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

49. L. Trotskii, 'Nashi raznoglasiia', p. 286.

50. L. Trotskii, Nasha revoliutsiia, p. 285.
51. L. Trotskii, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (1928) (New York, 1932), p. 176.
52. L. Trotskii, The Bolsheviki and World Peace (1918) (New York, 1918), p. 28.
53. L. Trotskii, 'Nash politicheskii lozung', Nashe Slovo, No. 23, 24 Feb. 1915.
54. The relevant passage from Lenin is as follows: 'The unevenness of economic and
political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence it follows that it is
possible for socialism to triumph initially in several or even in one, taken separately,
distinct capitalist country' (V. I. Lenin, 'O lozunge soedinennykh shtatov Evropy',
Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 26, Moscow, 1961, p. 354).
55. L. Trotskii, 'Pozitsiia sotsialdemokrata', Nashe Slovo, No. 87 (474), 12 April 1916.
56. L. Trotskii, The Third International after Lenin, pp. 14-16.
57. There is no complete collection of Nashe Slovo on microfilm. The original 1916 articles
that I found were published on the following dates in that year: 29 Jan., No. 24 (411);
30 Jan., No. 25 (412); 3 Feb., No. 28 (415); 11 April, No. 86 (473); 12 April, No. 87 (474).
The revised 1917 versions of these articles are to be found on pp. 70-94 of Vol. 3,
(1917) Part 1 (Of fevralia do oktiabria) of Trotskii's Sochineniia, and on pp. 459-82 of Vol.
2 of the collection Voina i revoliutsiia (Moscow, 1924). An English translation of the
1917 version is available on pp. 2-21 of The Zimmerwald Manifesto (Ceylon, 1951). This
work also makes the mistake of attributing the original articles to 1915-16.
58. Trotskii was to return to the idea of a 'United States of Europe' between the years
1916 and 1917 and 1928 in the article 'O svoevremennosti lozunga 'soedinennye
shtaty Evropy" ' originally published in Pravda, No. 144, June 1923, and reprinted on
pp. 367-72 of 'Osnovnye voprosy proletarskoi revoliutsii', Sochineniia, Vol. 12
(Moscow, nd). This article is similar to the 1928 argument in that it stresses
revolution as progressing from a backward country (Russia), through Europe
(France and Germany), and then to America. However, while it is obvious that
Trotskii is taking into account the fact that countries stand at different, uneven levels
of development, the scenario for the progression of revolution is stated without
explicit use of a law of uneven development or the notion of 'unevenness within the
unevenness.' This distinguishes the 1923 article from both the 1916-17 and 1928
texts. The 1923 work differs from the 1916 article by focusing on weak links.
59. L. Trotskii, 'Radio, nauka, tekhika i obshchestvo', Kul'tura perekhodnogo perioda,
Sochineniia, Vol. 21, (Moscow, 1927), pp. 422-3. See also: Osnovnye voprosy prole-
tarskoi revoliutsii, pp. 368 and 370.
60. L. Trotskii, 'Pozitsiia sotsialdemokrata'.
61. The 1917 version of the previous citation reads that it would be a 'hopeless thought -
as witnessed and experienced by history and theoretical considerations - that, for
example, revolutionary Russia would be able to stand before the face of conservative
Europe'.
62. L. Trotskii, VII Meeting of the Enlarged ECCI.
63. L. Trotskii, Permanentnaia revoliutsiia, p . 168.
64. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
65. L. Trotskii, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, p . 163.