Ramirez vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
 The petitioner in this case is Socorro Ramirez. She filed a civil case for damages in RTC of Quezon City.
 According to her during a confrontation in the office of Garcia, Garcia insulted and humiliated her, which
offended her dignity and personality.
 To support her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the confrontation via a recording she made
during the incident. She now seeks for damages and other expenses.
 However, because of the recording event, Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez (before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City) for violation of RA 4200 (The Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes) alleging that the said act of recording
secretly the confrontation was illegal.
 When she was arraigned. Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the Information in lieu of a plea on the ground that
the facts do not constitute a violation of RA 4200.
 The trial court granted the motion to quash, agreeing with the petitioner that:
o The facts charged do not constitute a violation of RA 4200
o The violation punished by the said law refers to taping by a person not a participant in the
communication
 Because of the decision of the trial court, Garcia filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court,
and referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
 The Court of appeals declared the order of the Trial Court null and void holding that:
o The judge of the trial court acted in grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information
 The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
 Hence her petition.

Issues:
 Whether or not RA 4200 applies to a recording of private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation
 Whether or not the substance must be alleged in the information and RA 4200 applies to a private conversation

Ruling:
 Legislative intent is determined from the language of the statute. If the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms. Interpretation occurs only if literal
interpretation is absurd or will lead to an injustice.
 Section 1 of the RA 4200 clearly makes it illegal for any person not authorized by the parties to any private
communication, to secretly record such communication via recorder.
 The law makes no distinction whether the party to be penalized should be different from those involved in the
private communication.
 The unambiguity of the provision penalizes even that party to the private communication.
 Where the law makes no distinction, one should not distinguish.
 The court held that the nature of the conversation is immaterial to the violation of the statute. What RA 4200
penalizes is the act itself, of secretly recording (overhearing, intercepting) private communications.
 According to the court, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting as, in a conversation, or the
process which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols.
These definitions are broad enough to include the exchanges of both parties that occurred during the incident.
Court of Appeals Justices Veloso, Gacutan Salazar

Facts:
 The petitioners in this case are Justices of the Court of Appeals.
 Justices Veloso and Fernando claim longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of
their compensation package.
 Justice Gacutan who recently retired, claims deficiency payment of her longevity pay for the services she rendered
before she joined the judiciary, as well as the re-computation of her retirement pay to include to longevity pay.
 The basis of the claim for their longevity pay is in Batas Pambansa 129, Section 42. (Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980)
JUSTICE GACUTAN AND VELOSO (NLRC COMMISSIONER) JUSTICE FERNANDO (COMELEC COMMISSIONER)

Issues:
 Whether or not Section 42 of the BP 129 should be given liberal interpretation

Held:
 The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to examine
the law itself to see what it plainly says. This is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.

Section 42. Longevity Pay. A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly
basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each
5 years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary;
provided That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned,
after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank

 The language of the provision is clear and unequivocal: longevity pay is granted to a judge or justice of the courts
who has rendered 5 years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary.
 The longevity pay is 5% of the monthly basic pay.
 The plain meaning of Section 42 provides that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial officer who is not a
judge or justice.
 It cannot be available to a judge or justice for past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as
services rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by the law.
GLOBE MACKAY VS IMELDA SALAZAR
FACTS:
 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation employed Imelda Salazar and Delfin Saldivar
 An investigation was initiated against Saldivar’s activities, when reports showed that company equipment and spare
parts were missing
 Prepared by the internal auditor, the report showed that Saldivar entered into a partnership with Richard Yambao
the owner of a supplier of Globe Mackay
 Imelda Salazar was likewise involved in these transactions
 Evidence show that she was a signatory to the partnership of Yambao and Saldivar
 She was also aware of the loss of the air conditioner but did not inform her employer
 Imelda was then placed under preventive suspension for 1 month, giving her 30 days to explain her side
 However she filed a complaint for illegal suspension amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave
benefits and damages after she was considered dismissed.
 After hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered her reinstatement and pay her full backwages and other benefits she would
have received if no for the illegal dismissal.
 On appeal, the NLRC affirmed its decision
 Hence the petition, assailing that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that suspension
and dismissal of Salazar were illegal and ordering for her reinstatement

ISSUE:
 Whether or not private respondent is entitled to reinstatement and backwages

HELD:
 Yes, the law sides with the private respondent. The words provided in the Article 279 of the Labor Code are clear
and unambiguous.
 Section 3 provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and to backwages.
 If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempt
of interpretation.
 Verbal egis non est recedendum which means that from the words of the statute, there shall be no departure.
 NLRC Resolution affirmed.
FELICITO BASBACIO v. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DOJ

FACTS:
 Felicito Basbacio was acquitted and filed a claim under Rep. Act 7309 Sec 3a which provides compensation to “any
person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by judgment of acquittal.
 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the DOJ, but was denied
 On the ground that even if his presence in the scene of killing was not sufficient to find him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, considering there’s a bad blood between him and the deceased because of a land
dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there is basis in finding him probably guilty.
 Through counsel he contends the language of Sec3a is clear and does not need interpretation.
 He argues that there is only one requirement for conviction and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
 If prosecution fails to present the proof, the presumption of innocence stands.
 There is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for
his imprisonment

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the phrase “unjustly accused convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal” refer to all kinds of accusation and conviction
HELD:
 Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
 It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal, he must be given compensation on the theory
that he was “unjustly convicted” by the trial court.
 His professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear, it should be given its natural
meaning, leaves out the qualifying word “Unjustly”.
 Section 3a requires that the claimant be “unjustly accused convicted and imprisoned”. The fact that his conviction is
reversed and the accused is acquitted does not mean that the previous conviction was “unjust”. An accused may be
acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons be set aside.
 Section3a does not refer solely to an unjust conviction, as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, to an
unjust accusation.
 The accused must have been “unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted then imprisoned”.
JMM PROMOTIONS AND MNGMT v NLRC
FACTS:
 In a decision rendered by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, petitioner JMM Promotions and
management, Inc. appealed to NLRC which dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the ground of failure to post the
required appeal bond.
 Respondent cited the 2nd paragraph of Article 223 of Labor Code and Rule VI Section 6 of the new Rules and
Procedure of the NLRC
 Petitioner contends that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by
the POEA.
 It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because it
is required under POEA rules not only to pay a license fee of 30,000 but also a cash bond of 100,000 and a surety
bond of 50,000.
 The petitioner claims that it has placed in escrow the sum of 200,000 with the PNB in compliance with the rules, to
primarily answer for a valid and legal claim of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money
claims.
 The solicitor general sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggests that the rules cited by the NLRC are
applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA.
 Appeals from the decisions of POEA are governed by the provisions of Rule V Book VII of the POEA Rules.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioner was still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the
POEA to the NLRC after posting a total bond of 150, 000 and placed in escrow the amount of 200,000
HELD:
 Yes, the POEA Rules are clear. A reading of Section 6 Rule V Book VII of the POEA Rules shows that in addition to the
cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required
to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
 The appeal bond is intended to insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
 In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof should be given effect, on the theory that it
was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.
 Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute –
every word.
 PETITION DISMISSED.
DUNCANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
 Danilo Duncano is the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with Salary Grade 26
 The office of special prosecutor, office of the ombudsman filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8
in relation to 11 of RA 6713 (ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES), allegedly failing to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Networth for the year 2002, his business interests and a motor vehicle registered to his son
 Prior to arraignment he filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
respondent Sandiganbayan
 He admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26 and the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and
hear the case.
 OSP argued that Section 4 A(1) of RA no 8249 (ACT DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN) would clearly
show the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies to officials of the executive branch other than
Regional director and those specifically enumerated.
 The term Regional Director and higher are separated by the conjunction and, signifying the two positions are
different.
 The fact that Regional Director was mentioned without indication of salary grade, signifies the lawmaker’s intention
that such officials regardless of their salary grade fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and issued a warrant for his arrest.
 He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, hence the petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not according to Section 4(A) (1) of RA 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade 27 or higher as
classified under RA 6758 fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of sandiganbayan
HELD:
 There is merit in the petition. The relevant provision is Section 4 of RA 8249
 Those that fall within the jurisdiction of sandiganbayan are officials of the executive branch with salary grade 27 or
higher and officials which are specifically enumerated regardless of their salary grades.
 Except for those officials included in the Section 4(1) a to g regardless of their salary grades over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper
trial courts (where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher
 By this construction the entire Section 4 is given effect.
 The cardinal rule in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts.
 Courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of the statute if at all possible.
 Ut magis valeat quam pereat – construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute- its every
word.
MENDOZA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
 Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan,
besting Roberto M. Pagdanganan.
 Pagdanganan filed the Election Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by
Mendoza.
 Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties, the COMELEC Second
Division rendered its Resolution on Dec 1, 2009, which annulled and set aside Mendoza’s proclamation as
governor and proclaimed Pagdanganan duly elected to the said position.
 Coupled with a directive to the DILG to implement the same, the resolution ordered petitioner to immediately
vacate the office, desist from discharging its functions and to cause a peaceful turn-over to Pagdanganan.
 Dissatisfied, Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc but it issued a resolution
denying the motion.
 He filed the Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010
 He filed the instant Petition on Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction directed on the February 8 Resolution
 In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General argue that, in
addition to its premature filing, the petition at bench violated the rule against forum shopping.
 The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the implementation of Dec 1
2009 Resolution
 Aggrieved, Mendoza filed several motions and a Supplement to the Petition with a Most Urgent Reiterating
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Status Quo Order
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the assailed COMELEC Resolution valid

RULING:
 No. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-
hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent’s Election Protest.
 Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter.
 Section 6, Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules and Procedure is categorical.
“Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the
action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall
be denied.”
 The propriety of applying Section 6 Rule 18 of COMELEC according to its literal tenor cannot be gainsaid.
 If what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the
protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a
motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is
an original action, shall be dismissed.
 The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact that despite the existence in its books of the
clearly worded Section 6 of Rule 18, it completely ignored and disregarded its very own decree and proceeded with
the questioned Resolution annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza as the duly elected governor
of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner
Joselito R. Mendoza to cease and desist from performing the functions of the Governor of Bulacan and to vacate
said office in favor of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan
 The petition is GRANTED.
Cynthia Bolos v. Danilo Bolos (MARRIED ON FEB 14, 1980)

Facts:
 Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Danilo Bolos, under Article 36 of the
Family Code. After the trial on the merits, the RTC of Pasig City granted the petition for annulment.
 Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal after receiving the copy of the decision.
 However the RTC denied due course to the appeal for his failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
 The RTC issued the order declaring its decision final and executory granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed
by Cynthia.
 Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the orders of the RTC and prayed that he be
declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be
declared guilty of abandoning him, the family and their children.
 The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and explained that a motion
for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages) did not apply in this case as the marriage between the
parties was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.
 Cynthia sought reconsideration by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10,
2008].
 The CA, however, denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period is
non-extendible, and the motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied. (pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40,
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure)
 Hence Cynthia interposes the present petition.

Issues:
 Whether or not Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is
applicable to Marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code

Held:
 The rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages promulgated
on March 15, 2003 is explicit in its scope.
 Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
 The categorical language of the rule leaves no room for doubt.
 The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988.
 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code.
 A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. It must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is the plain-meaning rule.

LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE, Respondents.

FACTS:
 Luis Villafuerte and Miguel Villafuerte were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the province of
Camarines Sur in the May 2013 local elections.
 Luis filed with the COMELEC a verified Petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Miguel alleging that
o he intentionally misrepresented a false and deceptive name that would mislead the voters when he
declared under oath in his COC that LRAY JR.MIGZ was his nickname and that the name he intended to
appear on the ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.MIGZ NP;
o he deliberately omitted his first name MIGUEL and inserted, instead a nickname similar to his father’s,
who is the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, LRay Villafuerte, Jr
 Miguel denied the commission of any material misrepresentation in his Answer with Special and Affirmative
Defenses and asserted that the presumption that the voters will be confused on the simple fact that his name
would be placed first in the ballot was misplaced.
 COMELECs First Division denied the petition for lack of merit.
o Stating that laws and jurisprudence on the matter are clear that material misrepresentation in COC
pertains only to qualifications, such as citizenship, residence, etc., and nothing is mentioned regarding
the candidate’s name/nickname as a ground to deny COC. When the language of the law is clear,
there is no room for interpretation, only application.
 He filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc but was also denied
o Ruling that misrepresentation on certificate of candidacy as to the qualifications for elective office is
material, whilst misrepresentation as to non-material fact is not a ground to cancel COC
 Dissatisfied, Luis filed the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not respondent committed a material misrepresentation to justify the cancellation of his COC

HELD:
 No.
 Material misrepresentation contemplated by Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refer to “qualifications” for
elective office
 In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false
representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would
affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy.
 Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office.
 The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to one’s identity is not within the scope
of the provision. Respondent’s nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence
showing that respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity.
 Also, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then incumbent
Governor of the province, popularly known as LRay. Their relationship is shown by the posters, streamers and
billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son on them. Thus, the voters of the
Province of Camarines Sur know who respondent is.
 Decision of COMELEC en banc affirmed and the petition DENIED.
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

SPOUSES PASCUAL v. SPOUSES BALLESTEROS

Facts:
 The case involves a parcel of land situated in Laoag City which is co-owned by the spouses Albino and Margarita
Mariano, the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor and Angela Melchor
 Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share was inherited by their daughter Lorenza.
 Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros acquired the share of Angela.
 In 2000, Margarita, already widowed, sold their share to Spouses Pascual and Francisco.
 The old Transfer Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new one was issued in their names together with Angela and
Spouses Melchor.
 Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for legal redemption, claiming that they did not receive any written
notice of the said sale and argued that they are entitled to redeem the portion sold as co-owners of the same.
 RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that they failed to seasonably exercise the right of redemption within the 30-
day period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the lack of a written notice since they had
actual notice of the said sale.
 The respondents appealed the decision of the RTC. The CA granted the appeal.
 The petitioners sought for reconsideration but it was denied.
 The petitioners then instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari

Issues:
 Whether or not the respondents could no longer exercise their right of redemption having failed to exercise the
same within 30 days from actual knowledge of the said sale

Held:
 Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption.
 The 30-day period given to the respondents within which to exercise the right of redemption has not commenced
in view of the absence of a written notice.
 Despite the respondent’s actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory and
indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the right of
redemption.
 Article 1623 of the Civil Code:
 Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
 The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
 The written notice of sale is mandatory. The court has established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge
of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
 Where the law speaks in categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. If the language of the statue is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation should only be resorted to where literal interpretation would be absurd or lead to an
injustice.

CORPUZ VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at a casino in Olongapo
 Tangcoy was engaged in business of lending money to casino players
 Upon hearing that he also has jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him and offered to sell the pieces of jewelry on
commission basis
 The jewelries, amounting to 98,000 were turned over to Corpuz after agreement
 The agreement involved the remittance of the proceeds of the sale, or the returning of the jewelry if not sold
within 60 days
 The period expired, without remittance of sale, or return of the jewelries.
 But Corpuz promised to pay the value of the items entrusted to him, but to no avail, thus an information for the
crime of estafa was filed against Corpuz.
 The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to an imprisonment under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law of (4 years and 2 months of prision coreccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as MAXIMUM).
 The CA upon review, denied his appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC, with modification. (Indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision coreccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum plus 1
year for each additional 10,000 or a total of 7 years).
 The case was elevated to the Supreme Court and on deliberation of the case; the question of the continued validity
of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up.
 The legislature pegged the penalties on value of money and property in 1930.
 The members of the division reached no unanimity regarding the question.
 A court en banc session was held and amici curiae were invited to give their opinion.
 It was raised that the incremental penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel and
unreasonable punishment and violative of equal protection.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Court can adjust the penalties provided under the law to prevent injustice
HELD:
 There seems to be injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes
against property committed today based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money in 1932.
 However the court cannot modify the said range of penalties, because that would be judicial legislation. The failure
of legislature in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied in the court’s decision,
as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government.
 The primordial duty of the court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by
judicial legislation. The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED

ATTY VIDAL VS COMELEC

FACTS:
  In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly
stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
 In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
 In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
 Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada
is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
 The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public
office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
 Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying
that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime
of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office

RULING:
 The petition lacks merit.
 Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
 The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
 It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
 ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. – A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
 ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal — their accessory penalties.—The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
 It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est
recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.
 It is the Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President
Estrada “is hereby restored to his civil and political rights” substantially complies with the requirement of express
restoration.
.
 The 1987 Constitution, specifically provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency(except in impeachment cases, cases that have not yet resulted
in final conviction and cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations)
AT&T V. COMMISSIONER
FACTS:
 The factual antecedents of this case reveal AT&T Communications Services Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), being a
domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of rendering information, promotional, supportive and
liaison service, entered into a Service Agreement with AT&T Communications Services International, Inc. (AT&T-CSI),
a nonresident foreign corporation, on 1 January 1999, whereby compensation for such services is paid in US Dollars.
 Petitioner has an Assignment Agreement with AT&T Solutions, Inc. (AT&T-SI) where the latter assigned to petitioner
the performance of services AT&T-SI was supposed to provide Mastercard International, Inc. (a nonresident foreign
corporation) under a Virtual Private Network Service Agreement.
 Likewise, the compensation for such services is paid in US Dollars to be inwardly remitted to the Philippines byAT&T-
SI, which acts as the collecting agent of petitioner.
 Thereafter, a second Assignment Agreement was executed and entered into by petitioner with AT&T-SI for the
purpose of performing the latter’s obligation to Lexmark International, Inc. (also a nonresident foreign corporation)
by providing services to its affiliates in the Philippines, namely: Lexmark Research and Development Corporation and
Lexmark International (Philippines), Inc.(both Philippine Economic Zone Authority [PEZA]-registered enterprises).
Payment of petitioner’s aforesaid services is as well paid in US Dollars through telegraphic transfer.
 Consequently, petitioner filed its Quarterly VAT Returns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for the taxable
year period covering 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003, detailed hereunder as follows:
 On 5 February 2004, petitioner filed its first Amended Quarterly VAT Return for the Fourth Quarter of taxable year
2003; while on 26 April 2004, petitioner filed its Amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the First to Fourth Quarters of
the taxable year 2003.
 Petitioner filed on 13 April 2005 with the BIR an application for refund and/or tax credit of its unutilizedVAT input
taxes for the aforesaid taxable periodamounting to P3,003,265.14. However, there being noaction on said
administrative claim, petitioner filed aPetition for Review before the CTA in Division on 20 April2005 (or exactly
seven [7] days from the time it filed itsadministrative claim) in order to suspend the running ofthe prescriptive
period provided under Section 229 of theNational Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, asamended.
 dismissing petitioner’sclaim for the refund or issuance of a TCC
 CTA in Division deniedpetitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
 Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a Petition for Review beforethe CTA En Banc
 Finding no merit in petitioner’s contentions, the CTA
 EnBanc
 rendered the assailed 24 September 2008 Decisionwhich affirmed both the Decision and Resolution renderedby the
CTA in Division in C.T.A.
TEAM ENERGY VS CIR
FACTS:
