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ICMR Center for Management Research

The Kodak-Fuji Rivalry

This case was written by Sarvani, V, under the direction of Gupta, V, ICMR Center for
Management Research (ICMR). It was compiled from published sources, and is intended to be
used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective
handling of a management situation.

2002, ICMR Center for Management Research

ICMR, Plot # 49, Nagarjuna Hills, Hyderabad 500 082, India

Email: info@icmrindia.org.
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 302-159-1

The Kodak-Fuji Rivalry

“The fact that Fuji has made inroads in the US has surprised even Kodak, that is one reason why
they are fighting back in every other market.”
- Sugaya Aiko, analyst at Kleinwort Benson in Tokyo, Asia Week, July 1996.
“Fuji’s greatest strength is that they always make sure that consumers are ready to buy their new
products, and they actually get the products to the consumers.”
- Toby Williams, an analyst at SBC Warburg in Tokyo, Fortune Magazine, May 1998.
“The momentum is all in Fuji’s court. Fuji’s gains in the US will push it past Kodak in worldwide
marketshare.
- Alex Henderson, analyst at Prudential Securities, New York.

INTRODUCTION

In January 1998, the top management of the US-based Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) in
Rochester, New York, was extremely worried after reviewing the company‟s financial results for
the year ending December 1997. The company‟s revenues had come down from $15.97 billion in
1996 to $14.36 billion in 1997, a fall of more than 10%. Kodak‟s net earnings had taken a big hit
falling from $1.29 billion to just $5 million for the same period (Refer Exhibit I). However, the
most worrying factor for Kodak‟s management was the more than five percent points decline
(from 80.1% to 74.7%) in its US marketshare.
Kodak had been consistently losing its marketshare to its competitors since the early 1980s even
when it enjoyed almost a monopoly status in the photographic film and paper industry in the US
with more than 85% marketshare. However, the fall of 5-percentage points in just one year was
alarming. Market observers wondered what had happened to Kodak, which had built a strong
presence in the US markets and had established a household brand name synonymous for films.
Some analysts felt that Kodak had underestimated its competitors especially Fuji Photo Film
(Fuji). From being a lean player in the US during the initial years of its entry in the mid -1960s,
Fuji went on to become a major competitor of Kodak in the photographic film market. Though
Fuji was able to build just 10% marketshare till the early 1990s, the increase in the marketshare
was faster during 1993-1997 when Fuji‟s marketshare increased to 17%. Moreover, Fuji had
intensified its efforts to gain share in the US, the largest market for photographic film and paper.
The company established a production plant in the US, marketed aggressively and brought down
prices significantly.
In the late 1990s, the rivalry between Kodak and Fuji further intensified. Fuji had become the
world‟s second largest manufacturer of photographic film and paper after Kodak. Analysts felt that
for the first time in Kodak‟s century-long history had emerged a challenger who could dethrone
Kodak in the US and hence Kodak should not take its home market for granted. According to Ray
Pryor, Vice President, Gamma Labs, “Fuji is not just winning over cost conscious-consumers. Fuji
is steadily eroding Kodak‟s lead in the professional photography market.”

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BACKGROUND NOTE

George Eastman founded the Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) in Waterville, New York. Due to
the untimely demise of his father, Eastman discontinued his education at the age of 13. Being
interested in photography, he soon learned to make pictures. Eastman realized that the existing
photography methods were too cumbersome and complicated and did not appeal to the common
man. In the wet plate process, which existed in those days, the photographic images were made on
heavy, fragile glass plates that were inserted into the back of the camera. These plates had to be
coated with a wet emulsion just before each picture was taken and the development could be done
only in complete darkness. Overall, it took more than 20 minutes to take one photograph.
Eastman pioneered the development of the dry plate process and filed his first patent in 1879
related to a gadget that prepared dry gelatin plates. With the money raised from selling patents and
some financial support from his close associate, Henry Strong, Eastman formally entered the
photography business. By the end of 1882, the company had generated enough revenues to afford
a new factory in Tennessee to produce a steady supply of materials for making films.
By 1884, Eastman came up with a simple replacement for glass photographic plates, a roll of film.
At this point, Strong and Eastman established the Eastman Dry Plate and Film Company in
Rochester, New York. In 1887, Eastman turned his attention to manufacturing cameras. Eastman
also expanded the company‟s operations overseas by setting up the Eastman Photographic
Materials Company Limited in London in 1889. Through this outlet, products manufactured in the
US were distributed to Europe, the Far East, and Australia. The company settled on the name
Eastman Kodak Company in 1892. In the mid-1890s, Eastman decided to set up company-owned
distribution outlets, to be run and operated as separate companies. All the companies had the name
Kodak and they sold Kodak products, both to the general public as well as to other businesses and
professionals.
In the next couple of decades, Kodak introduced several innovative products and focused on
expanding its operations to other overseas countries. Kodak entered Japan in the early 1900 and
setup its first distribution outlet in 1905. In 1924, George Eastman retired from day-to-day
management of the company and became the chairman of the Board of Directors. He later
developed arteriosclerosis and arthritis of the spine and died in March 1932.
Kodak continued to prosper after even Eastman‟s death by launching several user-friendly
photographic products. By 1960, Kodak had 100,000 employees on its rolls and was generating
sales of more than $2 billion. However, the consumers‟ attitude changed in the early 1970s when
they were no longer loyal to just one brand. This was because many competitors had emerged with
new and better products. Kodak faced increased competition from several national and
international competitors such as Polaroid, Berkley Photo, 3M, Agfa, and Fuji. The growth rate of
Kodak‟s highly profitable photography business had slowed by 2%-4% per year. In the 1970s,
though Kodak lost its marketshare gradually to its competitors. However it still maintained an
enviable commanding share in the US market.
In 1981, Kodak was forced to respond when Sony Corporation announced plans for a filmless
electronic camera called Mavica, which would display pictures on a television screen. Pictures
could then be printed on paper. Kodak responded to the increased competition by reducing the
price of its films in order to protect its marketshare.
During the 1980s, Japanese companies such as Canon, Nikon, Minolta, and Olympus developed
35-mm autofocus cameras that were superior to Kodak‟s cameras. In response, Kodak launched a
unique new line of small disk cameras, which used film disks instead of film rolls. After a brief
initial success, the camera sales failed to pick up momentum. The advances by Japanese film and
camera-makers prompted Kodak to diversify into new businesses to supplement the lost income
from its core businesses.

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According to analysts, though several Japanese companies had entered the US market, Kodak
faced real threat only from Fuji. Over the years since its entry into the US markets, Fuji had been
constantly gaining Kodak‟s marketshare in the photographic film and paper market.

FUJI IN THE US

Founded in 1934, Fuji Photo Film had its headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. The company first entered
the US market in 1964 as a supplier of private label film and established its first subsidiary in
1965. Since the beginning, Fuji focused on providing quality and innovative products to its US
consumers. The company spent millions of dollars to design a new 8-mm home movie system. In
1967, when Fuji planned to introduce the movie system, Kodak introduced its Super 8 movie
camera, which had a larger film format that could not use Fuji film. Since Kodak had introduced
its new system ahead of Fuji, Fuji shelved the plan of introducing its system in the US.
After this, Fuji felt that it made more strategic sense to follow Kodak‟s lead, avoid attracting
Kodak‟s attention, and not take any steps that would provoke Kodak‟s retaliation. The company
focused on building its marketshare in the US by adopting strategies to get the share of weaker US
competitors rather than that of Kodak. However, in some cases, Fuji did outsmart Kodak
technologically. Slowly but steadily, Fuji entered the professional market and also made efforts to
build its credibility in the larger amateur market. In 1970, Fuji introduced a faster film with
brighter colors, which was what professional and serious amateur photographers were looking for.
In 1972, Fuji began to market its film under its own brand name in several camera stores. In an
attempt to gain more market recognition, Fuji provided buyers of Japanese cameras with free film
rolls.
In 1976, Fuji introduced the 400-speed color film that was faster than any of the films made by
Kodak during that time. Fuji became very popular among consumers because of its greater speed.
Following this launch, many photo finishers began to switch to Fuji‟s photographic paper and
other photo processing supplies. Moreover, Kodak‟s products were 20% more expensive than
those of Fuji during that time.
In 1977, Fuji reduced the prices of its print paper. The price was lower than that of Kodak. To this
move, Kodak responded by reducing its print paper price to match Fuji‟s and increased the
marketing efforts for its print paper. In 1978, Fuji expanded its distribution to drugstores,
supermarkets and discount chains.
In 1983, Fuji brought out a new high-resolution film in two speeds. Kodak responded by
introducing a similar film and offering it in four speeds. By now, Fuji realized that it would be
unable to outsmart Kodak. However, the company believed that by building its reputation for
quality products and offering products at prices lower than that of Kodak, it could gain significant
marketshare in the long run. The important element of Fuji‟s strategy was to ensure that its
products were 100% compatible with Kodak cameras and Kodak film, thereby allowing price-
conscious consumers to substitute Fuji film for Kodak. Whenever Kodak introduced
technologically improved products, Fuji quickly introduced imitative improvements of its own.
Over the years, Fuji became skilled in being a prompt follower of Kodak‟s lead in technology. For
example, Fuji was Kodak‟s first competitor to market a film compatible with Kodak‟s disk system.
Fuji‟s R&D department developed an imitative film and introduced it in the US just eight months
after Kodak introduced its product.
The Japanese threat began to mount when Fuji became the official film for the 1984 Summer
Olympics in Los Angeles, California. This sponsorship agreement helped Fuji gain international
recognition. Although Kodak did not get the deal it went on to sponsor ABC television‟s
broadcasts of the games and was the “official film” supplier to the US track team.

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Till the mid-1980s, Fuji was considered to be more of a bottomline driven rather than a marketshare
oriented company. After it lost the sponsorship agreement, Kodak realized that Fuji could be a
potential threat to it. Accepting Fuji‟s challenge, Kodak also engaged itself in constant price wars
with Fuji to gain valuable marketshare in the US. Kodak took the challenge a step further by
strengthening its presence in Japan, the world‟s second largest market for photographic products
after the US. This move came in spite of the fact that Fuji was already the market leader in Japan.
However, Fuji gained more from the price cuts in the US. Kodak could not sell its products at low
prices for long as it would have resulted in considerable profit erosion for the company. However,
as the competition intensified, Kodak eventually accused Fuji of dumping its photographic paper
in the US by charging as low as one-fourth of what it charged in Japan and the Netherlands, where
its paper production facilities were located. Suspecting that the US government might impose
punitive tariffs, Fuji planned to set up its own production facilities in the US. Fuji adopted the
strategy of producing locally in the US and competing globally.
This step helped Fuji in many ways. Fuji wanted to avoid any trade dispute with the US
government. Producing locally gave Fuji more scope to cope with the obligations of the US
accounting needs. Most importantly, it allowed Fuji to minimize its overall costs. Apart from the
US, Fuji planned to expand its presence into other countries including Germany, France and China
by establishing manufacturing plants at these places. The company followed the same strategy of
producing products locally and adapting its products and marketing to the host country conditions.
By 1991, Fuji had established 15 manufacturing plants (including joint ventures) in 12 countries
outside Japan.
Apart from providing photographic products at lower prices compared to Kodak, Fuji took
considerable interest in pursuing research and development to introduce new technology that
would enable it to produce innovative products to drive sales further. The company spent 7% of its
revenues on R&D annually. This helped Fuji to maintain its competitive advantage as it was able
to introduce new products that customers needed. In 1986, Fuji became the first company to
introduce one-time-use cameras. Following this launch, Fuji became the leader in one-time-use
cameras. Kodak did not offer a similar product thus giving Fuji the image of a company that
introduced more consumer-oriented and innovative products. However in 1988, Kodak grabbed
the opportunity to sponsor the Olympics and thus began the sponsorship battles and marketing
rivalry between Fuji and Kodak.
In the early 1990s, Fuji steadily gained marketshare as more consumers preferred to use Fuji‟s
film, as the color was brighter and the processing speed was faster. The company encouraged its
salesforce to spend more time with distributors thereby building good professional relationships
with them. These fruitful relationships helped Fuji in generating twice as much revenue per
employee than that of Kodak.
In 1996, Fuji once again reduced its film prices by 10-15% to sell the excess inventory of 2.5
million rolls of film. The company also distributed film rolls to retailers at a steep discount to
avoid losses due to film „expiration.‟ This move also came as a reaction to Kodak‟s decision to
appoint Costco Wholesalers, one of the leading distributors in photographic films in the US, to
exclusively market their photographic products.
In 1997, Fuji reduced prices by 50% on its multiple roll film packs and even sold four rolls of film
for just $4.99. Fuji‟s prices were three times lower than those of Kodak for the same product. This
reduction in prices resulted in 11% decrease in Kodak‟s film shipments and a 28% increase in the
case of Fuji. Due to the price-cutting, Kodak‟s marketshare in the US fell from 80.1% in 1996 to
74.7% in 1997.
In response to this move, Kodak also slashed its prices. However, the company once again could
not cut its prices steeply as this reduced its profit margins from its most profitable business of
films. During the late 1990s, Kodak‟s top management was in great dilemma whether to reduce
prices significantly to match Fuji‟s levels and thus risk the profitability of its most lucrative films
business or to keep quite and see its marketshare continue to erode.

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KODAK IN JAPAN

Though Kodak entered the Japanese market in 1905, the company never took the Japanese market
seriously. In the early 1980s, Japan emerged as the second largest market in photographic
products. Due to the rising competition from Fuji in the US, Kodak decided to strengthen its
competitive position in Japan.
In 1977, Kodak strengthened its control over the distribution and marketing efforts of its Japanese
arm Nagase & Co. In the following year, the company formed a joint venture company named
Kodak-Nagase. Later, Kodak converted the import division of Nagase into its own subsidiary and
was renamed as Kodak-Japan. After setting up a subsidiary, Kodak increased its workforce to 4500
from a mere 12. Tying up with the Japanese partner helped Kodak to have access to 60,000 camera
stores up from the initial 30,000 stores in Japan. It gave Kodak access to more shelf space to
display its products. However, Kodak could not get into the stores, which marketed Fuji products
exclusively.
In the late 1970s, Kodak formed several joint ventures and strategic alliances with many Japanese
partners. One such company was Bandai, a leading Japanese toy manufacturer, with which Kodak
established a co-branding arrangement to sell single-use cameras. Kodak set up its own R&D
center and opened a technical assistance center to help customers. The company conducted an
annual Kodak Symposiums in which the audience included university professors and researchers
and the major customers and companies with which Kodak had strategic alliances in Japan. These
meetings aimed to improve Kodak‟s image as a technology-intensive company recognized across
the globe and symbolized its commitment in building a technical presence in Japan.
In 1980, Kodak came out with the concept of “minilabs” at certain retail outlets in Japan. Kodak
entered into an agreement with the world‟s leading manufacturer of minilabs equipment, Noritsu
Koki. A film could be processed much faster in a “minilab” than in a conventional photo-
processing laboratory. Although the price was a little high for minilabs services, this strategic
move enabled Kodak to gain a competitive advantage over Fuji.
In the early 1980s, Kodak introduced many new products in the Japanese market and also reduced
the prices of some of its products as a challenge to Fuji‟s leadership. Kodak sold its new range of
photographic film name fcd Kodacolor VR at 38.3% less than the market price of other available
films. Kodak introduced the “panoramic disposable camera,” which was not present in Fuji‟s
product range. Kodak aggressively marketed the panoramic camera, as the Japanese were fond of
taking pictures in large groups. A group photograph outdoors was not possible with the help of
conventional cameras in those days.
In the mid-1980s, Kodak increased efforts to gain greater control over the distribution of its own
products. Fuji‟s products were sold through 216,000 retail outlets. Approximately, 15% (33,000)
retail outlets accounted for 75% of Fuji‟s sales. Fuji‟s salespeople and wholesalers regularly served
these retail channel members. Fuji owned a controlling interest in three of the five major
wholesalers in the photographic products industry. To compete with Fuji, Kodak bought Kusuda
Business Machines, which had been marketing Kodak‟s micrograph and business imaging systems
in Japan. By 1985, Kodak controlled around 150 labs1 for photographic paper in Japan whereas
Fuji controlled 250 labs.
In 1986, Kodak advertised heavily in the media to increase its popularity. The company
constructed a huge yellow sign symbolizing Kodak‟s name, which took many years to complete
and put it in downtown Tokyo. In August 1986, Kodak leased the only available blimp in Japan
and decorated it with bright yellow color with its trademark and name. It was placed front of the
Fuji headquarters in Tokyo.

1
Photo processing labs were the main customers for the photographic paper in the entire market for both
Kodak and Fuji.

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In the late 1980s, Kodak introduced waterproof disposable cameras. Initially, the consumers
complained about certain shortcomings in its design. Kodak employed a team of engineers, finance
and marketing people to rectify the problems. This team made phone calls to get feedback from the
consumers. The company re-launched the camera with a new design. The product became very
successful in the market especially with Japanese teenagers who enjoyed underwater swimming.
The disposable camera became the focal point for Kodak‟s youth-oriented advertising in Japan.
Kodak also introduced the first of its kind print film, Ektar, with brighter colors and contrasts and a
newly designed package. The film became quite popular and had high brand recognition and brand
recall among Japanese consumers.
During 1984-1990, Kodak spent approximately $500 million in an attempt to develop a strong base for
itself in the Japanese photographic industry. In spite of all its efforts, Kodak lost considerable
marketshare during 1986-1988. Overall, the company failed to get good retail acceptance and faced
problems like low trial rate and low brand recall among the Japanese consumers.
In 1994, Kodak came out with a new product, a single-use camera, called Falcon. The product was
so named because Kodak‟s development team wanted it to resemble a bird of prey attacking rival
products. Kodak advertised this product rather unconventionally in the Japanese market. The
advertisement featured a school where the principal is lecturing the students. The entry of a
popular actress with the new Kodak camera interrupts his speech. The principal takes the camera
and shoots a picture prompting all the students to run to the stage with their own cameras. This
product became one of the best photographic products in Japan for 1994.

THE DISPUTE
In 1995, Fuji had 18.8% marketshare in the US whereas Kodak had a mere 7-9% marketshare in
Japan. Defending its poor performance, Kodak alleged that the Japanese government had imposed
trade barriers, which had prevented it from competing effectively in Japan. The company claimed
that this had cost Kodak $5.6 billion in lost revenues during the period 1985-95.
In May 1995, the rivalry between Kodak and Fuji intensified when Kodak filed a petition2 under
section 301 stating that its poor performance in the Japanese market was a direct result of unfair
practices adopted by Fuji. Kodak alleged Fuji of price fixing in trade associations, bribing retailers
and wholesalers so that they do not sell film produced by other competitors.
However, some analysts felt that the reason for Kodak‟s failure in Japan was due to the significant
difference between the distribution networks in Japanese and the US markets. In the US, film
manufacturers sold directly to retailers and photofinishers whereas in Japan, distributors mediated
between the two parties (the manufacturers and the retailers/wholesalers). Of the many distributors
in Japan, Fuji had strong ties with four main distributors – Asanuma, Misuzu, Kashimura, and
Ohmiya. Fuji sold its films to these distributors, who in turn sold the films to large retailers and
wholesalers. The large retailers and wholesalers further sold films to small retail stores and camera
stores. On the other hand, Kodak had only one distributor, Nagase. All its film was sold through
Nagase to large wholesalers and retailers who in turn sold it to small retailers and camera stores.
Kodak claimed that Fuji‟s ties with the distributors prevented the distribution of any other brand in
Japan. Moreover, it claimed that Fuji had made hundreds of such deals with the photo finishing labs
and the Japanese government was backing the entire system preventing Kodak from being successful in
the Japanese market. Kodak also objected to Fuji‟s generous commissions to these distributors. In its
report, Kodak said: “Fuji‟s use of rebates is quite possibly the single most important control mechanism
in its distribution system.” The report also alleged that Fuji was generating majority of its profits in
Japan and using it to subsidize its sales in Europe and in the US.

2
Section 301 of the US Trade Act is a law that requires the US trade representative to determine whether
trade practices by a foreign country are unreasonable and discriminate against US exporters.

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Fuji denied these charges and brought out its own report said that Kodak‟s poor performance in
Japan was due to its own negligence, poor marketing and bad management. Fuji maintained that it
did not involve in any unfair practices. It stated that there was no distribution bottleneck in Japan
and that Kodak film was widely available at competitive prices.
The US government decided to support Kodak by taking the dispute to the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In a speech at the Academy of Management in Boston, Fisher made out a
strong case for taking punitive action against Japan: “This is not just Kodak‟s problem, but a
problem for all foreign businesses who wish to compete in Japan. If Japan can keep our film out,
there‟s nothing to prevent it from continuing to keep out foreign computers, chemicals, cars,
pharmaceuticals, telecommunication equipment and everything else. The ultimate losers are
Japanese consumers.”
In December 1997, the WTO passed a preliminary ruling against Kodak stating that the allegations
that Japan rigged its domestic market in favor of Fuji were not backed by any substantial proof.
Eventually, in January 1998, the WTO passed a judgement against Kodak because the company
could not establish clear evidence in support of its argument.
Notwithstanding allegations and counter-allegations, some Kodak managers accepted their fault.
Commenting on this issue, Albert Seig, former president of Kodak Japan said, “One of the biggest
problems that Kodak has in Japan is that for clearly ten years of good opportunity, we neglected
Japan. So you know, we did it to ourselves.” Others felt that Kodak was not successful due to its
lack of efforts rather than any other reasons.
In 1999, Kodak and Fuji had the same marketshare of 70% in their respective home countries and
had an almost equal marketshare in the rest of the world (each had 1/3 of the world marketshare).
In 1999, Fuji had 18.8% marketshare in the US while Kodak‟s share in Japan was hovering around
7%. It remains to be seen how well Kodak and Fuji would be able to sustain their respective
marketshares in the future.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION:

1. Examine the strategies adopted by Fuji to enter and build its presence in the US market.
Analyze the reasons for Fuji‟s success in the US.
2. Examine the strategies adopted by Kodak to counter Fuji in Japan. What were the reasons for
Kodak‟s poor performance in Japan?
3. Analyze the difference between the distribution network for photographic films in US markets
and Japanese markets. How did the distribution network in Japan help Fuji leverage its
dominant position in the photographic industry?

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Exhibit I
Kodak’s Consolidated Statements of Income
(In $ million, except per share data)

Year ended Dec 31 1998 1997 1996

Sales 13,406 14,358 15,968
Cost of Goods Sold 7,293 7,976 8,327
Gross Profit 6,113 6,562 7,641
Selling, Administrative expenses 3,303 3,912 4,410
Research and development costs 880 1044 1028
Purchased research and Development 42 186 Nil
Restructuring costs and assets impairments Nil 1290 358
EARNINGS FROM OPERATIONS
Interest Expense 110 98 83
Other Income (charges) 328 21 (206)
Earnings before income taxes 2,106 53 1,556
Provision for Income Taxes 716 48 545
Earnings from continuing operations 1,390 5 1,011
Gain on sale of discounted Operations Nil Nil 277
NET EARNINGS 1,390 5 1,288
Basic Earnings per share
From continuing Operations 4.30 0.01 3.00
From Discontinued Operations Nil Nil 0.82
BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE 4.30 0.01 3.82
Diluted Earnings per share
From continuing Operations 4.24 0.01 2.95
From Discontinued Operations Nil Nil 0.81
DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE 4.24 0.01 3.76
Earnings from continuous operations used in basic and diluted 1,390 5 1,011
earnings per share
Number of common shares used in basic earnings per share 323.3 327.4 337.4
Incremental shares from assumed conversion of options 4.5 4.5 5.3
Number of common shares used in diluted earnings per share 327.8 331.9 342.7
Source: Kodak Annual Report, 1998.

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Additional Readings & References:

1. Picture Imperfect, The Economist, May 28, 1994.

2. Maremont Mark, Kodak’s New Focus, BusinessWeek, January 30, 1995.
3. Donald J Robert, Eastman Kodak Company: Funtime Film, Harvard Business School,
9-594-111, Rev May 8, 1995.
4. Photowars Shuttered, The Economist, August 5, 1995.
5. Fujifilm Executives Testify on Capitol Hill That The Facts Show That Kodak's
Problems in Japan Are Of Its Own Making, Elmsford, NY, www.fujifilm.co.jp,
March 28, 1996.
6. Japan- Measures Affecting Photographic Film and Paper First Submission of the
United States of America, www.dbtrade.com, February 20 1997.
7. Smith Geoffery, Wolverton Brad, Palmer Therese Ann and Bureau reports, A Dark Kodak
Moment, BusinessWeek, August 4, 1997.
8. Desmond W Edward, While the US Giant Was Sleeping, the Japanese Film Company
Cut Prices, Marketed Aggressively, and Now Is Stealing Marketshare, Fortune,
October 27, 1997.
9. Greenwald John, Frank Gibney, Valerie Marchant, Aixa M. Pascual, Adam Zagorin,
Kodak's Bad Moment -Hit By Fierce Film Pricing and High Costs, The U.S. Photo
Giant Sees Layoffs Developing, www.time.com, September 29, 1997.
10. Jaffe Sam, Street Wise, BusinessWeek Online, July 22, 1998.
11. Jones Adrian, Kodak's Declining Marketshare, www.innogize.com, December 8, 1998.
12. Webber Chanoine, The Picture Just Keeps Getting Darker at Kodak, Fortune, June 21, 1999.
13. Dvorak C john, Razors with No Blades, Forbes Global, October 18, 1999.
14. Kunii M Irene, Smith Geoffrey, Gross Neil, Fuji: Beyond Film (int’l edition),
BusinessWeek Online, November 22 1999.
15. Kodak Allies with Tiffen Company, www.photoimagenews.com, November 30,1999.
16. Kodak Annual Report 2000, www.kodak.gr.
17. Martin Richard, Can Kodak Find Its Focus?, www.thestandard.com, July 16 2001.
18. Kodak Mistakes in Japan, www.home.fujifilm.com
19. Know the Facts–The Real Story, www.home.fujifilm.com
20. Will Kodak Minutes Replace Kodak Moments, www.hitechdirections.com
21. About Fujifilm, www.fujifilm.com
22. International Recognition For Advances In Technology, www.fujifilm.com
23. History, www.fujifilm.de.
24. The "Distribution Countermeasures" Do Not Nullify or Impair
Any Tariff Concessions, www.home.fujifilm.com
25. Analysis, www.home.fujifilm.com
26. Eastman Kodak Company, Transworld University.

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