Chapter 48. Wing in Ground (WIG) Craft
Chapter 48. Wing in Ground (WIG) Craft
Chapter 48. Wing in Ground (WIG) Craft
48.1 INTRODUCTION km/h on the sea or Great Lakes. WIG craft can close the
gap between fast but expensive air transport, and cheap but
A Wing In Ground (WIG) Craft/Airfoilboat/Ekranoplan
slow water transport, as shown in Figure 48.2.
utilizes the so-called ground effect, in which lift increases
The power requirement of different transport systems
compared to a wing in free flight, if the distance to the
versus speed and in comparison with a Volkswagen car
ground H measured from the trailing edge is less than 30%
(Figure 48.3) impressively shows the economy of WIG
of the mean aerodynamic chord. Provided that the aerody-
craft. The degree of efficiency is indicated by the von Kar-
namic arrangement of a WIG craft is properly designed,
man Gabrielli diagram as per Figure 48.4. It is clearly seen
the drag also is reduced for a certain range of attack angles
that various systems with good L/D ratios are available
α when H tends to zero. In all cases the lift-to-drag ratio
below a speed of approximately 35 knots, while faster ve-
(L/D) is increased even if the drag increases. The L/D ratio
hicles are limited to L/D ratios from 5 to 15. WIG craft can
can be improved by a factor of approximately 2, or even
close the gap while still having potential for future im-
more, at the minimum possible height of flight. For com-
provements.
parison, the L/D ratio of WIG craft can approach the value
Some commercial applications of WIGs are presently
of 30 in close proximity to the ground whereas the maxi-
being considered in Germany, Russia, China, Japan,
mum L/D of a transonic airliner is only about 20.
France, Australia and the United States.
A few samples of utilization of the ground effect can be
found in the nature. For instance, it is used by heavy sea
birds and flying fish for efficient long-distance flights over
water. Ground effect is also known to pilots of seaplanes as
a way to increase the range of the aircraft. For instance, the
well-known German flying boat DO-X flew a long time
under ground effect during the first part of its transatlantic
flight in 1929.
One of the earliest WIGs was the Ekranoplan Orlyonok
shown in Figure 48.1. It was designed by Dr. R. Alexeyev
in 1974.
48.2 MISSION
Speeds of surface transportation on land (car and rail) are
in the range of 100 km/h, but decrease to approximately 25 Figure 48.2 Transport Expenses versus Speed
48-1
48-2 Ship Design & Construction, Volume 2
Figure 48.6 The 500 Ton WIG Craft KM Figure 48.8 The 8 Passenger WIG Craft Volga 2
48-4 Ship Design & Construction, Volume 2
pany AFD Airfoil Development GmbH developed the WIG and ACV. A two-seater test craft, the Hoverwin—2VT
8-seater WIG craft Airfish-8 according to a specification (Figure 48.10), scaled down by a factor of 3.35 from the
given by their Singapore customer. Under the designation projected 80-seat ferry for the Baltic Sea, has been built
Flightship 8, the craft has now been delivered to Australia, and all required and predicted performance and character-
where licensed production will take place. This craft was istics of the Hoverwing technology have been validated
the first WIG craft certified by Germansicher Lloyd. with the craft.
The next significant achievement was the development A most significant success is the development of the
of the Hoverwing concept, which is a hybrid between a Tandem configurations by German engineer, G. Jörg (Fig-
ure 48.11), who designed and tested a series of tandem
boats called TAF. A few of the TAF boats were sold in dif-
ferent countries.
Since the wing arrangements of other existing WIG
craft fall under the five types mentioned previously, they
are not listed here.
Figure 48.12 shows the general arrangement for the
WIG craft Airfish 8.
48.5 HYDRODYNAMICS
The waterborne regime of WIG craft includes the follow-
Figure 48.11 The Tandem WIG Craft TAF VIII-2 Jörg IV ing phases:
tu xt x1 tl1 tl2 x2 δ
Figure 48.23 Derivatives of the WIG Craft versus h for a Lippish Configura-
tion
冨
of small unsteady forces acting on the oscillatory wing. In dC ∂CL X∂ – Xh
L = <0 [1]
all other respects the technique of wind tunnel experiments dh Cm=0 ∂h X∂
for WIG craft is similar to that for conventional aircraft.
The aerodynamic centers of pitch Xϑ and height Xh, are
The tests with models and full-size trials are necessary
given by:
for:
∂Cm ∂CL
• checking the craft’s ability to achieve the cruising
regime for a given thrust,
X∂ =
∂ϑ /
∂ϑ
[2]
∂Cm ∂CL
• adjusting the position of the center of gravity,
• adjusting the zero settings for deflection of control sur-
faces,
Xh =
∂h / ∂h
Usually, for a common WIG, X∂<0 and ∂CL/∂h<0, so
[3]
• studying the response of WIG craft to actuation of con- the simplified criterion, Irodov criterion, XhX∂, can be
trol elements, wind gusts and wave perturbations, used for the stability analysis. Experience shows that pro-
• testing maneuverability characteristics, vided the Irodov criterion lies between 0.07 and 0.15 both
• testing and improvement the takeoff techniques. static and dynamic stability are ensured. The three most
The vortex wake of a WIG craft consists of a system of important factors influencing stability are: 1) the tail unit,
tip vortices shed from wing tips, tail unit, winglets and end 2) the form of wing sections, and 3) the main wing form.
plates. The strongest vortices are generated at the lower In contrast to conventional aircraft, the position of the
edge of the endplates whereas the other vortices decay center of gravity does not influence the static stability. Pro-
rather quickly behind the craft. The endplate vortices are a vided the variation of the wing form is restricted by differ-
potential hazard for closely following smaller craft. CFD ent construction and operational conditions, a large tail
simulations have shown that the trailing vortices behind a unit located rather far from the main wing can achieve the
WIG craft move in a corridor with a width not exceeding desirable stability. The tail unit also should be placed high
12 vortex generation heights plus the span of the WIG. enough above the main wing to avoid the negative influ-
ence of tip vortices shed from the main wing.
The presence of a large tail unit leads to an increase of
weight, and may make the WIG craft ineffective. The solu-
48.8 STABILITY OF THE FLIGHT tion to this problem was found by the invention of S-foils
The longitudinal stability of WIG craft is a very critical de- with a S-shaped camber line (Figures 48.20 and 48.25). The
sign factor. The scenario of most crashes in the last 30 stabilizing effect of the S-shaped profile is based on the in-
years with WIG craft is more or less the same: a sudden fluence of the venturi effect (Figure 48.19) which takes
loss of longitudinal stability, very often due to some un- place close to the trailing edge of a S-shaped profile. On the
known circumstances resulting in a sudden pitch-up mo- one hand the venturi effect reduces the lift, and on the other
tion of the craft causing the wings to stall. At increasing hand it has a positive effect on the static stability by shift-
speed, lift increases and results in increasing height over ing the aerodynamic center in height toward the bow.
the ground. The changing distribution of aerodynamic From the point of view of dynamics (mild response to
pressure can result in a so-called pitch-up tendency, as it is the disturbances) and serviceability (weak influence of the
known from high speed boats, which accidentally might speed of the motion and the height of flight on the pitch
flip over after reaching a certain speed and trim angle. angle), the most favorable position of the center of gravity
The theory of WIG stability was developed by Irodov is between the aerodynamic centers Xh and X∂, at the dis-
and Staufenbiel and it has been found that the following tance of about 0.1–0.3 (Xh X∂) from Xh.
criteria play a decisive role in terms of static stability (3): Dynamic properties of the WIG can be estimated using
the linear theory of stability of small perturbations of a
• Criterion of the static stability with respect to pitching WIG from the reference state of steady rectilinear flight.
48-12 Ship Design & Construction, Volume 2
Most of the research and practical design problems as- In displacement mode at low speed, maneuvering in
sociated with the WIG aerodynamics and hydrodynamics, harbor areas, tight river turns, etc., the power required is
including stability of the motion can be solved by simula- small. It is usually provided by water propellers driven by
tion with commercial software, such as Autowing (4). electric or hydraulic auxiliary motors capable of attaining
a minimum speed of approximately 8 knots. The resulting
noise emission, therefore, is similar to that of conventional
48.10 SEAWORTHINESS low-speed boats in this mode.
In taxiing mode, which is used only in unoccupied
The wave influence has a dramatic effect on the ability of
areas where noise emission is not harmful for the environ-
WIG craft to take off. Additional resistance caused by
ment, the propulsion is by the main propellers at approxi-
waves plays a significant role in the choice of an engine.
mately 70% power setting.
Thus, the seaworthiness of WIG craft is determined by the
For takeoff the maximum installed power is used for 60
takeoff regime. As mentioned, the main limitation of WIG
to 90 seconds, so that in this mode the highest noise level
craft by sea state is its size, similar to conventional ships.
is reached. In flare mode during cruise, the power setting is
The design of a WIG, therefore, should be adequate for the
reduced to 40 to 70%, depending on cruise height and
intended area of operation, wherein the size of the craft
speed, resulting in a corresponding lower noise emission.
should be selected such that for 80% of the operational
Measurements during the operation of Airfish and Hov-
time the sea state does not exceed 10% of the craft’s
erwing type WIGs recorded noise levels of 65dBA during
wingspan.
close fly-by.
The power to be installed is determined by the required
The power requirement of WIG craft is significantly
takeoff power at a wave height of 5 to 7% of the wingspan.
lower than that of comparable aircraft, especially since the
Thus, the installed power is also sufficient to overcome the
speed range of WIGs does not require the use of jet en-
drag in cruise heights of 20 to 30% of the wingspan. But
gines, again producing less noise.
this ability should be considered a technical feature only,
To reduce the engine noise, the engine can be encapsu-
and not a practical application, as the economic advantages
lated as in automotive designs, where solutions for the
of ground effect operation decrease with increasing cruise
avoidance of vibrations and acoustic decoupling of struc-
heights.
tural components are also available.
The water loads onto the structure give further limita-
The noise level can be further kept low by using pro-
tions, because the structures must withstand the sea states
peller blade tip speeds below 200 m/s. Shrouding of pro-
over which the craft is certified to cruise, in case of an
pellers would be an additional method to reduce noise.
emergency landing.
On future larger craft the use of gas turbines can be ex-
Finally, the limitation by aerodynamic design has to be
pected, as those offer a better power-to-weight ratio than
mentioned in regard to sea state. While the FF/AFD de-
reciprocating engines. Gas turbine engines would in most
signs Airfish and Hoverwing are inherently longitudinal
cases be mounted on pylons downstream of the passenger
and height stable in waves up to 30% of their wing span,
cabin area.
there are available designs such as tandem craft, which
In this case propulsion, as a source of noise, is located
offer the required stability only in close ground effect. In
downstream of the passenger cabin.
these designs, as an increase of operational height raises
In contrast to the Hovercraft, where a closed air cush-
the risk of a pitch up, the maximum safe cruise height is a
ion has to be maintained and every incoming wave in-
limitation caused by sea state.
creases the pressure with remarkably high frequency, WIG
Investigations (1) have shown that during cruise, wind
craft do not have this source of noise and vibration as the
gust limitation is more important than limitations due to
dynamic air cushion is not contained and pressure oscilla-
the influence of waves on the flight of WIG craft in rough
tions are hence not pronounced.
sea conditions in which the height of flight is great enough
to avoid water touchdown.
load tests should be performed to verify scantlings. Load loys, which are relatively soft, are well suited for more in-
assumptions can be taken from High Speed Craft Rules or tricate shapes produced by extrusion processes. By subse-
British Hovercraft Safety Requirements for hydrodynamic quent heat treatment it is also possible to improve the
loads or from FAR 25 for aerodynamic loads. Some clas- strength properties of AlMgSi alloys. When using high-
sification societies are developing guidelines for the clas- strength Al alloys in welded structures, the strength prop-
sification and construction of WIG. erties in the heat-affected zone are somewhat reduced.
Pressure measurements on the bottom structure of two Aluminum alloy AW-7075 has a good resistance to
different two-seater WIG craft have shown that slamming crack corrosion combined with very high strength proper-
loads during takeoff and landing are the design load cases ties and is, therefore, a popular choice for riveted con-
(5). Figure 48.35 illustrates a representative pattern for the struction of airfoil frames. It is not weldable and the cor-
bottom pressure at the step for a takeoff/flare/landing rosion resistance in marine environment is poor. Although
cycle. it is an interesting construction material for WIG craft, cor-
The lower sides of the wings have also to be designed rosion aspects would require particular attention.
to withstand slamming loads. Due to the presence of an air For smaller WIG craft and series production craft, fiber
cushion these loads are smaller than the loads of the wet- reinforced plastics (FRP) is an appropriate material. There
deck area of an HSC catamaran. The upper surfaces are is a wide variety of different FRP materials (see Chapter
subject to aerodynamic loads only. 21—Composites). The reinforcement material generally is
The wing’s trailing edge should be firm against aerody- glass, carbon or aramide fibers, which are available in the
namic loads while some flexibility against hydrodynamic form of rovings, mats, fabrics and non-woven fabrics and
impact loads helps reduce stress concentrations. This can combinations of these. Carbon and aramide fibers have
be achieved by suitably designed flaps with spring-damper very high tensile strength values; aramide fibers are used to
systems. increase impact resistance. The laminating resins used are
The choice of construction material is dictated by polyester, vinylester and epoxy resins. Core materials
weight considerations. Present designs adapt aviation available for sandwich laminates are generally PVC
practices with suitable modifications to allow for the cor- foams, polyurethane (PUR) foams, polymethacryl (PMI)
rosive operating environment. While this imposes addi- foams, balsa wood and honeycombs.
tional constraints, manufacturing processes and testing The advantage offered by these materials is the possi-
procedures do not necessarily have to meet the rigorous bility to design stiff, high strength light-weight structures
aviation standards. which, depending on the fiber orientation, display the de-
Several WIG craft, especial larger ones, were built sired strength properties ranging from a unidirectional to a
using aluminum (Al) alloys. In shipbuilding, aluminum al- quasi-isotropic behavior.
loys of the 5000 series (AlMg alloys) and the 6000 series Metallic fittings in FRP constructions require particular
(AlMgSi alloys) are common. Good weldability and ex- attention, as these are prone to corrode when in contact
cellent corrosion resistance in the marine environment with seawater. This is particularly true for the combination
characterize both alloys. Al-magnesium alloys are prima- of aluminum fittings and carbon fibers where the alu-
rily employed for plates whereas Al-magnesium-silicon al- minum parts can disintegrate rapidly with consequential
loss of structural integrity. A way around this problem is
proper isolation of metal fittings with resign or a glass
fiber/resign matrix.
Internationally, the International Maritime Organiza- The approach draws on techniques established outside
tion, IMO, started deliberations on requirements for WIG the marine industry, in particular the offshore industry’s
craft at DE 38 in 1995 (6) and has finalized a set of draft safety case regime and the aerospace industry’s safety as-
guidelines at DE 45 in 2002 (7). At a national level, vari- sessment procedures (8), and adapts the scope and the
ous administrations have issued guidance documents for process itself to the requirements of WIG craft.
designers and operators. Both share the same philosophy The following paragraphs describe the approach in
by seeking to ensure safety through a combination of de- more detail.
terministic rules and a forward-looking probabilistic ap- The safety assessment is conducted in parallel with the
proach. This is supplemented by safety management mea- design and construction of the craft. Accordingly, three
sures covering the operational life of a craft. phases may be distinguished:
Deterministic rules relate mainly to aspects such as Generation of requirements: Depending on the critical-
structural integrity, stability, life saving appliances, etc. ity of functional failures at craft and system level, safety
The probabilistic approach in the form of a systematic objectives are assigned to the various failure conditions
safety assessment focuses on system design and integrity. identified. These safety objectives are expressed as proba-
For safety provisions emanating from the deterministic bility levels and probability budgets that must be met by
approach the reader is referred to reference 7. The present the implemented system. Specific hardware and software
section focuses on the safety assessment process, as this requirements are derived that feed into the specification for
constitutes a new instrument in the marine industry afford- the procurement phase.
ing a high degree of flexibility to the designer while at the Design implementation: During procurement and im-
same time maintaining an acceptable level of risk (see plementation account must be taken of the failure rate
Chapter 8—Regulatory and Classification Requirements budgets assigned to hardware and software items.
and Chapter 16—Safety). Verification: In the verification phase it should be
demonstrated that the hardware and software actually im-
48.13.1 Safety Assessment Process plemented satisfy the relevant safety requirements.
Different processes are employed in the phases of the
The objective of the assessment process is to evaluate the
development cycle, as illustrated in Figure 48.36:
craft functions and the design of systems performing these
functions. It is important to note that the focus is on sys- • Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA),
tems and not on other safety-related issues such as struc- • Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), and
tural design, load assumptions, or stability in the different • System Safety Assessment (SSA).
operational modes. The safety assessment process should
ensure that all relevant system failure conditions are iden- There is likely to be some overlap between the phases
tified and that all significant combinations of failures, and the assessment process is iterative in nature. Individual
which could cause those failures conditions, are taken into activities will hence be revisited as the design evolves and
account. becomes more defined.
(PSSA)
Purpose of – Identify and classify – Establish system and – Verify that safety
Process: failure conditions item safety requirements requirements defined
– Establish safety – Develop specifications in FHA and PSSA
objectives for hardware are satisfied
procurement
The Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is con- 48.13.2 Safety Assessment Methods
ducted at the beginning of the development cycle. It should While the previous subsection outlined the overall process,
clearly identify and classify failure conditions associated the following paragraphs briefly describe the methods to
with the craft’s functions. These failure condition classifi- be employed in the different development phases.
cations establish the safety objectives. The output of the
FHA forms the starting point for the Preliminary System
48.13.2.1 Functional hazard assessment
Safety Assessment (PSSA).
The Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is essentially a
While the FHA is a purely functional type of analysis,
qualitative analysis. It relies on the analyst’s experience
the Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) is a
and understanding of the system under consideration and
systematic analysis of the proposed system architecture.
its operating environment. There are no simulation or
Its purpose is to show how failures at a lower hierarchical
modeling techniques, to ensure that all hazards are actually
level can lead to the functional hazards identified in the
identified. However, dedicated worksheets in tabular
FHA. The PSSA shall provide the designer with all neces-
form facilitate the process and aid the analyst in a system-
sary safety requirements of the system and demonstrate
atic approach. A sample worksheet is reproduced in Figure
that the proposed architecture can meet the safety objec-
48.37.
tives identified by the FHA.
Starting point for the assessment is a list of functions
The PSSA is an iterative process and conducted at dif-
(internal and external) associated with the various systems
ferent development stages. At the lowest level, the PSSA
envisaged for the craft. Using the FHA worksheet, failure
determines the safety-related design requirements of hard-
conditions are then applied to each of the functions and ex-
ware and software. The PSSA usually takes the form of a
amined with respect to their effect on both the system and
Fault Tree Analysis. It should also address safety issues
the craft itself, and on their severity. Depending on the out-
arising from Common Cause considerations.
come of the assessment, permissible probability budgets—
The System Safety Assessment is the final step in the as-
so-called objectives—are assigned to each failure condi-
sessment process. It integrates results of the previously
tion. These objectives should take the form of written
performed FHA and PSSA. While FHA and PSSA are
requirements in specifications (craft requirements, system
used during the design process to derive safety require-
requirements, and item requirements). Failure conditions
ments, an SSA is a verification tool to show that the im-
to be considered should include:
plemented design satisfies the requirements established by
the FHA and PSSA. • complete loss of function (detected/undetected),
The results of the SSA should be documented to ensure • malfunction (detected/undetected),
traceability of the verification steps. The documentation • incorrect function,
should include those activities (regular checks by the crew, • reduced performance,
maintenance tasks, inspections) necessary to satisfy the • interrupted function, and
safety requirements established by the PSSA. • inadvertent function.
System: Function:
Subsystems:
Item Failure Condition Mission Phase Failure Effects Classification Objectives Remarks
No:
Failure conditions identified in a qualitative manner as • published failure rate data, for example reference 9,
unacceptable need to be examined in more detail in the • published data on failure mode distributions, for exam-
Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA). The PSSA ple reference 10,
process employs a number of analysis techniques that are • industry sources, and
briefly described in the following paragraphs under the • computational methods.
headings:
48.13.2.4 Zonal hazard analysis (ZHA)
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),
Whereas FTA and FMECA examine the system architec-
• Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis
ture in a generic sense without looking at the actual instal-
(FMECA), and
lation of systems in the craft and in relation to each other,
• Zonal Hazard Analysis (ZHA).
the Zonal Hazard Analysis does precisely that, that is, ex-
amining the physical arrangement of systems and identify-
48.13.2.2 Fault tree analysis (FTA) ing potential hazards resulting from the way systems and
Fault Tree Analysis is employed in the PSSA process to de- components are installed in relation to other hazardous
termine the causes leading to undesirable top events iden- systems or elements.
tified in the FHA. It is a graphical representation of events, The starting point for a ZHA is the definition of specific
or more often combinations of events, that contribute to the zones within the craft that are, for example, separated by
top event. Principles and procedures for Fault Tree Analy- bulkheads or other parts of the structure. The analysis is
sis are not discussed in this section as they are well docu- performed initially based on design drawings and later on
mented in the literature, for example in ARP 4761 (8). mock-ups or the final craft. For each of the zones four as-
From the FHA the permissible failure rate for the top pects are addressed in the analysis:
event is known, for example, 10E-7 for a hazardous failure Compliance with installation rules: Compliance with
condition. This information allows the designer to allocate the relevant rules and requirements relating to equipment
failure rate budgets to intermediate level events and to installation must be demonstrated.
basic events. There is room for optimization, also from a Interaction between systems: The analysis should iden-
cost perspective, by concentrating resources on hardware tify intrinsically hazardous items (fuel lines) and show that
associated with events with the highest potential for reduc- failures (fuel leakage) do not cause cascade-type failures
ing the top event probability. For complex fault trees, com- in neighboring systems.
mercial software packages offer features, such as impor- Maintenance errors: Improper equipment installation
tance analysis, that help identify and rank these events. may increase the likelihood of maintenance errors. The
When the fault tree shows that the target probability for analysis should identify such areas and recommend alter-
the top event can be met, the failure rate data for the basic native designs.
events are included in the specifications developed in the Environmental effects: Consideration should be given
procurement phase (compare with Figure 48.36). to the effect of such as lightning strike, bird strike, water
ingress, and other environmental conditions.
48.13.2.3 Failure modes effects and criticality Results of the analysis are recorded in data sheets, as
analysis (FMECA) shown in the example in Figure 48.38
An FMECA should be performed for items that have been
identified as contributing to unacceptable hazards in the
previously developed fault tree. As with the FHA, the 48.13.3 Safety Management for Craft Operation
process is facilitated by worksheets in tabular form. Its Safe operation of WIG craft cannot be achieved by engi-
main purpose is to provide the quantitative failure rate data neering methods alone. It is equally important to have a
for each failure mode that appears as a basic event in the system in place that ensures continuous availability and
fault tree. performance of safety functions throughout the service life
An important and difficult aspect of an FMECA is con- of the craft. In the marine industry the appropriate mecha-
cerned with obtaining reliable data for failure mode rates nisms are provided by the ISM-Code as incorporated in
under similar environmental and operational conditions to SOLAS Chapter IX. The operator is thereby required to
those envisaged for the system being analyzed. The de- implement a certified Safety Management System (SMS)
signer may draw on various sources, such as: that addresses the following elements:
Chapter 48: Wing In Ground (WIG) Craft 48-21
• safety and environmental policy, taken that requirements resulting from the assessment can
• company responsibilities and authorities, feed into the evolving design.
• appointment of Designated Person(s),
• master’s responsibility and authority,
• resources, including personnel,
48.14 WIG CHARACTERISTICS
• development of plans for onboard operations,
• emergency preparedness, The characteristics of typical examples of WIGs are shown
• reporting and analysis of non-conformances, accidents, in Table 48.II.
hazardous occurrences and near misses,
• preventive maintenance for craft and equipment,
• documentation,
• company safety verification, review and evaluation, 48.15 REFERENCES
• third-party certification, verification and control. 1. Benedikt, K., Kornev, N. V., Meyer, M., Ebert, J., “Complex
Mathematical Model of the WIG Motion Including the
Most of these elements are directly linked to the safety Takeoff Mode,” Journal of Ocean Engineering, 29(3): 315–
assessment process. In particular, the output from the 357, 2001
PSSA and SSA provides valuable input for defining: 2. Maskalik, A. I., Rozhdestvensky, K. V., Synitsin, D. N., “A
View of the Present State of Research in Aero- and Hydro-
• onboard operations, dynamics of Ekranoplans,” RTO AVT Symposium on Fluid
• functional checks at specified intervals, Dynamics Problems of Vehicles Operating near or in the
Air-Sea Interface, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 5-8 Octo-
• maintenance procedures, including details about appro-
ber 1998: 25-1 to 25-9
priate inspection intervals and methods,
3. van Opstal, E. P. E., “The WIG Page,” http://www.
• emergency procedures and actions, se-technology.com/wig/
• procedures related to non-conformances, accidents and 4. Zhukov, V. I., Peculiarities of the WIG’s Aerodynamics, Dy-
hazardous situations, and namics and Stability, TSAGI Press, 1997
• document control procedures relating to the SMS and 5. Fach, K., Petersen, U., Reischauer, H. J., “Classification Ex-
the craft integrity. perience with an 8-Seater WIG Craft,” FAST ’99, Seattle,
1999
A system safety assessment as described in this section 6. International Maritime Organization, Sub-Committee on
constitutes a departure from traditional regulatory practice Ship Design and Equipment 38th session, Report to the
in the marine industry. The effort for the analysis is con- Maritime Safety Committee, DE38/29, 1995
siderable and involves experts with a range of backgrounds 7. International Maritime Organization, Draft MSC Circular
such as system design, operation, and assessment method- “Interim Guidelines for Wing-In-Ground (WIG) Craft,” DE
ology. Timing of the analysis is critical and care must be 45/27/Add. 1, 2002
48-22 Ship Design & Construction, Volume 2
8. Society of Automotive Engineers, Aerospace Recom- 9. Reliability Analysis Center, Non-electronic Parts Reliability
mended Practice 4761, Guidelines and Methods for Con- Data, 1997
ducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne 10. Reliability Analysis Center, Failure Mode/ Mechanism Dis-
Systems and Equipment, 1996 tributions, 1997