/***********************************************************************

* Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille *

* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
* file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
***********************************************************************/

#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H
#define SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H

#include "scalar.h"
#include "field.h"
#include "group.h"
#include "ecmult.h"
#include "ecmult_gen.h"
#include "ecdsa.h"

/** Group order for secp256k1 defined as 'n' in "Standards for Efficient
Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1
* sage: for t in xrange(1023, -1, -1):
* .. p = 2**256 - 2**32 - t
* .. if p.is_prime():
* .. print '%x'%p
* .. break
* 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffefffffc2f'
* sage: a = 0
* sage: b = 7
* sage: F = FiniteField (p)
* sage: '%x' % (EllipticCurve ([F (a), F (b)]).order())
* 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141'
*/
static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(
0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL,
0xBAAEDCE6UL, 0xAF48A03BUL, 0xBFD25E8CUL, 0xD0364141UL
);

/** Difference between field and order, values 'p' and 'n' values defined in
* "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1.
* sage: p = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F
* sage: a = 0
* sage: b = 7
* sage: F = FiniteField (p)
* sage: '%x' % (p - EllipticCurve ([F (a), F (b)]).order())
* '14551231950b75fc4402da1722fc9baee'
*/
static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(
0, 0, 0, 1, 0x45512319UL, 0x50B75FC4UL, 0x402DA172UL, 0x2FC9BAEEUL
);

static int secp256k1_der_read_len(size_t *len, const unsigned char **sigp, const

unsigned char *sigend) {
size_t lenleft;
unsigned char b1;
VERIFY_CHECK(len != NULL);
*len = 0;
if (*sigp >= sigend) {
return 0;
}
b1 = *((*sigp)++);
 if (b1 == 0xFF) {
/* X.690-0207 8.1.3.5.c the value 0xFF shall not be used. */
return 0;
}
if ((b1 & 0x80) == 0) {
/* X.690-0207 8.1.3.4 short form length octets */
*len = b1;
return 1;
}
if (b1 == 0x80) {
/* Indefinite length is not allowed in DER. */
return 0;
}
/* X.690-207 8.1.3.5 long form length octets */
lenleft = b1 & 0x7F; /* lenleft is at least 1 */
if (lenleft > (size_t)(sigend - *sigp)) {
return 0;
}
if (**sigp == 0) {
/* Not the shortest possible length encoding. */
return 0;
}
if (lenleft > sizeof(size_t)) {
/* The resulting length would exceed the range of a size_t, so
* certainly longer than the passed array size.
*/
return 0;
}
while (lenleft > 0) {
*len = (*len << 8) | **sigp;
(*sigp)++;
lenleft--;
}
if (*len > (size_t)(sigend - *sigp)) {
/* Result exceeds the length of the passed array. */
return 0;
}
if (*len < 128) {
/* Not the shortest possible length encoding. */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}

static int secp256k1_der_parse_integer(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char

**sig, const unsigned char *sigend) {
int overflow = 0;
unsigned char ra[32] = {0};
size_t rlen;

if (*sig == sigend || **sig != 0x02) {

/* Not a primitive integer (X.690-0207 8.3.1). */
return 0;
}
(*sig)++;
if (secp256k1_der_read_len(&rlen, sig, sigend) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (rlen == 0 || rlen > (size_t)(sigend - *sig)) {
 /* Exceeds bounds or not at least length 1 (X.690-0207 8.3.1). */
return 0;
}
if (**sig == 0x00 && rlen > 1 && (((*sig)[1]) & 0x80) == 0x00) {
/* Excessive 0x00 padding. */
return 0;
}
if (**sig == 0xFF && rlen > 1 && (((*sig)[1]) & 0x80) == 0x80) {
/* Excessive 0xFF padding. */
return 0;
}
if ((**sig & 0x80) == 0x80) {
/* Negative. */
overflow = 1;
}
/* There is at most one leading zero byte:
* if there were two leading zero bytes, we would have failed and returned 0
* because of excessive 0x00 padding already. */
if (rlen > 0 && **sig == 0) {
/* Skip leading zero byte */
rlen--;
(*sig)++;
}
if (rlen > 32) {
overflow = 1;
}
if (!overflow) {
if (rlen) memcpy(ra + 32 - rlen, *sig, rlen);
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, ra, &overflow);
}
if (overflow) {
secp256k1_scalar_set_int(r, 0);
}
(*sig) += rlen;
return 1;
}

static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(secp256k1_scalar *rr, secp256k1_scalar *rs,

const unsigned char *sig, size_t size) {
const unsigned char *sigend = sig + size;
size_t rlen;
if (sig == sigend || *(sig++) != 0x30) {
/* The encoding doesn't start with a constructed sequence (X.690-0207
8.9.1). */
return 0;
}
if (secp256k1_der_read_len(&rlen, &sig, sigend) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (rlen != (size_t)(sigend - sig)) {
/* Tuple exceeds bounds or garage after tuple. */
return 0;
}

if (!secp256k1_der_parse_integer(rr, &sig, sigend)) {

return 0;
}
if (!secp256k1_der_parse_integer(rs, &sig, sigend)) {
return 0;
 }

if (sig != sigend) {
/* Trailing garbage inside tuple. */
return 0;
}

return 1;
}

static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(unsigned char *sig, size_t *size, const

secp256k1_scalar* ar, const secp256k1_scalar* as) {
unsigned char r[33] = {0}, s[33] = {0};
unsigned char *rp = r, *sp = s;
size_t lenR = 33, lenS = 33;
secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&r[1], ar);
secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&s[1], as);
while (lenR > 1 && rp[0] == 0 && rp[1] < 0x80) { lenR--; rp++; }
while (lenS > 1 && sp[0] == 0 && sp[1] < 0x80) { lenS--; sp++; }
if (*size < 6+lenS+lenR) {
*size = 6 + lenS + lenR;
return 0;
}
*size = 6 + lenS + lenR;
sig[0] = 0x30;
sig[1] = 4 + lenS + lenR;
sig[2] = 0x02;
sig[3] = lenR;
memcpy(sig+4, rp, lenR);
sig[4+lenR] = 0x02;
sig[5+lenR] = lenS;
memcpy(sig+lenR+6, sp, lenS);
return 1;
}

static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_scalar *sigr, const

secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar
*message) {
unsigned char c[32];
secp256k1_scalar sn, u1, u2;
#if !defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
secp256k1_fe xr;
#endif
secp256k1_gej pubkeyj;
secp256k1_gej pr;

if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) {
return 0;
}

secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&sn, sigs);
secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u1, &sn, message);
secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u2, &sn, sigr);
secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeyj, pubkey);
secp256k1_ecmult(&pr, &pubkeyj, &u2, &u1);
if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pr)) {
return 0;
}
#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
{
secp256k1_scalar computed_r;
secp256k1_ge pr_ge;
secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pr_ge, &pr);
secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pr_ge.x);

secp256k1_fe_get_b32(c, &pr_ge.x);
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&computed_r, c, NULL);
return secp256k1_scalar_eq(sigr, &computed_r);
}
#else
secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, sigr);
secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&xr, c);

/** We now have the recomputed R point in pr, and its claimed x coordinate
(modulo n)
* in xr. Naively, we would extract the x coordinate from pr (requiring a
inversion modulo p),
* compute the remainder modulo n, and compare it to xr. However:
*
* xr == X(pr) mod n
* <=> exists h. (xr + h * n < p && xr + h * n == X(pr))
* [Since 2 * n > p, h can only be 0 or 1]
* <=> (xr == X(pr)) || (xr + n < p && xr + n == X(pr))
* [In Jacobian coordinates, X(pr) is pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p]
* <=> (xr == pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p) || (xr + n < p && xr + n == pr.x / pr.z^2
mod p)
* [Multiplying both sides of the equations by pr.z^2 mod p]
* <=> (xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) || (xr + n < p && (xr + n) * pr.z^2 mod p
== pr.x)
*
* Thus, we can avoid the inversion, but we have to check both cases
separately.
* secp256k1_gej_eq_x implements the (xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) test.
*/
if (secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(&xr, &pr)) {
/* xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x, so the signature is valid. */
return 1;
}
if (secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&xr, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order) >= 0) {
/* xr + n >= p, so we can skip testing the second case. */
return 0;
}
secp256k1_fe_add(&xr, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe);
if (secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(&xr, &pr)) {
/* (xr + n) * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x, so the signature is valid. */
return 1;
}
return 0;
#endif
}

static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx,

secp256k1_scalar *sigr, secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_scalar *seckey,
const secp256k1_scalar *message, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, int *recid) {
unsigned char b[32];
secp256k1_gej rp;
secp256k1_ge r;
 secp256k1_scalar n;
int overflow = 0;
int high;

secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &rp, nonce);

secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rp);
secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.x);
secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.y);
secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &r.x);
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(sigr, b, &overflow);
if (recid) {
/* The overflow condition is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it
requires finding the discrete log
* of some P where P.x >= order, and only 1 in about 2^127 points meet this
criteria.
*/
*recid = (overflow << 1) | secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y);
}
secp256k1_scalar_mul(&n, sigr, seckey);
secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, message);
secp256k1_scalar_inverse(sigs, nonce);
secp256k1_scalar_mul(sigs, sigs, &n);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n);
secp256k1_gej_clear(&rp);
secp256k1_ge_clear(&r);
high = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(sigs);
secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(sigs, high);
if (recid) {
*recid ^= high;
}
/* P.x = order is on the curve, so technically sig->r could end up being zero,
which would be an invalid signature.
* This is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the
discrete log of P.x = N.
*/
return (int)(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr)) & (int)(!
secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs));
}

#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H */