Abdur Rahman(Ep-19543097)

M Wajaht Ali (Ep-19543115)

 Table of Contents

 Risk Assessment concept in Aviation Industry

 Airline Safety Risk Manager Role And Responsibility:
 Understanding The Types Of Risks In The Aviation Industry
 Risk Owner In Airline
 Qualitative Risk Analysis Methods in Aviation Projects
 Introduction to Project Risk Management
 Cause and effect in Qualitative Analysis
 Fishbone Diagram
 Fault Tree Analysis
 Cause and effect in Quantitative Analysis
 Risk Analysis
 Risk Management Strategy
 Appendix
Risk Assessment concept in Aviation Industry
Aviation regulators and industry experts have continually developed and
updated strategies and resources over the years for the evaluation of
ongoing developments in the aviation industry in order to ensure
appropriate standards of safety while enhancing flight operating
capabilities, increasing the utilization of airspace, and reducing operational
costs.

The concept of aviation safety and risk can have different perceptions: zero
deaths or serious incidents, free from hazards, aviation employee attitudes
toward unsafe acts and conditions, avoidance of error, and regulatory
conformity.
When new equipment is developed, or for instance a new flight operational
procedure is designed, the requirement for a safety assessment or risk
assessment is very common in the aviation industry before the new
technology or procedure is put into place. Very often, this is triggered by
the operator/manufacturer through recommendations made by aviation
associations/working groups or regulatory requirements.. An assessment
usually includes an overall evaluation of something called a framework that
may include a thorough review of particular subsystems. The assessment
aims to identify the level of safety associated with a certain action/operation
by identifying the expected risk(s) through guidance on the decision-making
roles to either accept or not accept the risk(s) to which the operation will be
exposed. This assessment, based on a predetermined acceptable level of
risk, can and should implement mitigation strategies and corrective actions
based on specific safety risks to reduce the potential effects of mitigation.
Safety and risk assessments are the terms most commonly used for this
assessment.

Airline Safety Risk Manager Role And Responsibility:

 Providing guidance
 Providing direction for the planning
 Providing implementation and operation of the organization's risk
management system embedded in the Integrated Safety
Management System, and will report direct to the safety manager and
will act as his deputy.

Understanding The Types Of Risks In The Aviation

Industry
As the supply chain struggles to keep up with demand due to the ramp-up
in production, volatility in the geopolitical and economic environment is
increasing, and a growing labor shortage is lurking in the background.
These types of risks will affect the very core of the aviation industry and
present new issues for the players within the aviation industry. Their
strategic initiatives will be tested, their financial position could be
threatened, their global operations will be pressured, and they will need to
adapt to new compliance requirements in the different markets in which
they operate.

Risk Owner In Airline:

Risk owner in airline faces 10 biggest challenges in the airline industry:

Risk 1: Volatility in the geopolitical and economic environment

Risk 2: Managing the supply chain

Risk 3: Competition in domestic and international markets

Risk 4: Managing and retaining talent in the aviation industry

Risk 5: Ability to perform in key contracts

Risk 6: Compliance with a wide range of regulations and restrictions

Risk 7: Incapacity to innovate

Risk 8: Failure to realize the benefits of M&A’s and partnerships

Risk 9: Exposure to cyber security events

Risk 10: Foreign currency and commodity price fluctuations

Qualitative Risk Analysis Methods in Aviation Projects

This paper provides information to project managers and project teams that
will help with their risk management efforts in the following ways: provide a
consistent methodology for performing project risk management activities,
provide techniques and tools for project risk management, identify data
requirements for risk analysis input and for output, and provide guidance on
how to proactively respond to risks. The research will outline a few of the
qualitative methods commonly used in project risk management and also
accomplishes the comparative evaluation of different methods using multi-
criteria analysis. Understanding of project risks will assessing project risk
and uncertainty to aide in making decisions regarding aviation project
development and delivery. These decisions contribute to public safety and
the projects we deliver add value on many levels and develop prioritized
lists of these risks for further analysis or direct mitigation.

Introduction to Project Risk Management

Project risk management attempts to anticipate and provide a solution
regarding the uncertainties that pose a threat to project objectives and
terms, to identify all the foreseeable risks, assessing the chance and
severity of those risks, and then deciding what might be done to reduce
their possible impact on the project or avoid them altogether.
 Cause and effect in Qualitative Analysis
The process of qualitative analysis means to evaluate the importance.
Priority lists of these risks for further weighing the importance of project
risk, anticipating an aggravating presumed situation, establishing projects
sensibility and also the probability of risk materialization. The concept of
qualitative risk analysis is of fundamental importance when it comes to the
need for the project management team and or the project management
team leader to take the action at the onset or prior to the onset of the
project to adequately and appropriately ascertain.
A qualitative risk analysis (designation of high, medium, or low probability
or impacts) is deemed sufficient for the selection of the most important
risks.

Regardless of the specific description, regulatory inclination is to break the

risks down in two components of the hazard, but discrepancies are again
noted on the designation of the two components: probability (or probability)
of occurrence if the risk is caused by a risk, intensity (or magnitude) of the
hazard-caused adverse effect. Likelihood is based on exposure to quantify
the possibilities in stages, periods, men, etc. Thus, exposure may or may
not be integrated depending on how the probability is calculated. Raised
risk of adverse effects is raised by exposure to unhealthy conditions.
Therefore, danger is described as follows:

Risk=Likelihood x Severity E1

Equation 1 – ICAO Risk equation.

The ARMS working presents risk as a breakdown of each one of the four
components:

Risk= (Likelihood x Frequency of Avoidance)x(Frequency of

Recoverability xSeverity) E2

Equation 2 - ARMS Risk Equation.

The stability of an action without taking into account risk exposures, the
effectiveness of barriers to the materialization of the risk, and the efficacy of
barriers to recovery and without enabling the accomplishment of a worse-
case situation, as seen in the ARMS bow-tie diagram, cannot be
adequately assessed. However, as such factors require a high degree of
subjectivity; they do not necessarily need to be included in the risk formula.

The protection of an action cannot be adequately measured without taking

into account hazard detection, the productivity of the barriers preventing the
danger of materializing, or the efficacy of the barriers to recovery and
inability to accomplish the worst case scenario (the worst scenario), as
seen in the diagram, Weapons bow-tie. But as these factors require a high
degree of subjectivity, they do not necessarily have to be included in the
dangerous formula.

Similar methodologies are described in a risk matrix for both elements,

each of which has different acceptance rates (Figure 7). Authorities
recommend that each operator develop its own matrix and criteria that best
reflect its operating environment.
  Fishbone Diagram :

This method is commonly used by reliability and safety engineers

to analyze or predict faults in design and construction. In project
risk is useful to examine risk cause diagrams can also be used to
analyze failures or poor performance in project organizations or
communications.

 Fault Tree Ananlysis

The fault-tree analysis diagram is an important tool when it comes

to quality management that has applications in reliability
engineering. This process examines the possibility of component
failures in all kinds of engineering systems, with a view to
improving safety and reliability. This enables all those who are
involved in the production of a product to be able to understand
why these failings and faults have occurred and they can then
ensure that the causes of the faults are eliminated. It can also be
used within the design process, using design to eradicate faults
that have occurred in a product and ensuring that future products
are fault free.

 Failure mode and effect Analysis:

This method is an established reliability engineering activity that also
supports fault tolerant design, testability, safety, logistic support, and
related functions. It is particularly helpful to aviation project managers
because it starts by considering possible risk events and then attempts to
predict all their possible effects.
 Cause and effect in Quantitative Analysis:
Quantitative criteria are determined by the historical architecture and
assessment of systems engineering. Aircraft regulators have long
established quantitatively acceptable levels of quality for all aircraft
construction equipment or systems in the certification specifications.
Failure to comply with these criteria does not authorize unique
certification of equipment.

Figure
Probability and severity relationship for failure condition effects.

Risk evaluation and risk control for each hazard or category are
standardized, comprehensive hazard detection and risk assessment.
The acceptability of risk is assessed by matching the measured risk
level with defined requirements or safety objectives.
Risk Analysis:

When a potential problem is detected, either as a result of an internal data

collection and analysis or from an external source study, it is difficult to
address all known situations.
It is important to quantify their likelihood and safety impact, determine
whether or not risks are acceptable, and measure the effort to prevent most
likely and dangerous threats.
For example, the qualitative possibility that an attack being successful
provided the Typical ED-202 model with five probability levels: “highly
improbable,” “extremely remote,” “very distant,” “probable,” and “frequent,”
and “risk analysis” involves developing comprehension that danger.
The work covers risks and factors, positive and detrimental outcomes, as
well as the possibility of consequences.
In aviation, regulatory requirements require certain degrees or procedures
to reduce risk, such as the registration of aircraft, but different levels of
regulation concern various parts of the industry. It offers a number of
methods for risk and safety assessment.
The initial use of a risk assessment helps to understand the extent of a
particular problem.
The risk assessment should however be reviewed later on to help
determine whether potential action plans are adequate.
Considerations of both impact and likelihood may be based on historical
data, but use of historic data should be reinforced by ensuring that they are
relevant to the mission in question.
Historical analysis will also involve consideration of existing NSW DPI
controls in conjunction with controls present or probably existed in historical
details. It is a call for judgment, but retrospective research is useful when
searching for a realistic picture of the probability of the case.
Ideally, consideration should be given without substantially reducing the
circumstances. NSW DPI Aviation has a standard category definition. The
Table below shows the categories of consequences.
 Severity of consequences Likelihood of occurrence

Severity Likelihood
Definition Value Definition Value
Level level

Likely to occur
Catastrophic Hardware annihilated; different passing 5 Frequent 5
many times

Enormous decrease in safety edges, physical trouble or a

remaining burden to such an extent that administrators
Likely to occur
Hazardous cannot be depended upon to play out their undertakings 4 Occasional 4
sometimes
precisely or totally. Genuine injury or demise to various
individuals. Significant gear harm

Huge decrease in safety edge, decrease in the capacity of

administrators to adapt to unfriendly working conditions Unlikely but
Major 3 Remote 3
hindering their effectiveness. Genuine occurrence. Injury to possible to occur
people

Nuisance. Operating limitations. Very unlikely to

Minor 2 Improbable 2
occur
Use of emergency procedures. Minor incident
Almost
Extremely
Negligible Little consequence 1 inconceivable that 1
improbable
the event will occur

Risk Management Strategy:

This is also part of the “risk analysis” which is understandable, defined and
evaluated for likely performance. No calculation is commonly considered to
be accurate. It is important to provide several safety therapies. If there is
only one therapy at a specific risk, without reduction of risk, the therapy
must be improperly handled. When assessing or implementing therapy to
reduce a specific risk, it must be guaranteed that treatments themselves do
not undermine or actually introduce a new risk to other therapies. For
example, if a suspected therapy was performed only in the winter to
minimize heat-related exhaustion, a new risk could be added for freezing or
icing exposure.
Understanding the idea of implementing an action plan is important,
because it helps explain the root cause of an issue. It can help identify
frequently occurring failures, and with time these problems have led to
more serious causes. When the resolution is recognized, it should be
developed in detail, tested to verify and validate the action. Records should
include the rationale and benefits of recommended actions.
  Disposition Action Plan and Further Treatment
Disposition Action Plan is divided into various aspects such as
prioritization and scheduling, implementation, actions at other levels,
document, and close.

 Prioritize, Schedule
Schedule is unique to every company that has its own way of managing the
schedule. The process determines qualified emergencies, for example, risk
reduction, cost, and implementation ease. This process involves setting up
tasks and resources to create and issue a service bulletin to organize the
system.

 Implementation
When identifying and evaluating the action plan to correctly address the
issue or concern, it can be extended to the fleet or organization. Problem
management should be tracked to ensure the efficacy of the action in
lowering or removing the issue.

 Actions to Other Levels

When service bulletins, ADs, or actions that may impact other
organizations have been created, they should be sent for execution
consideration. Some manufacturer’s contractual arrangements with
operators provide tracking for SB implementation, while others do not have
a closed-loop process.

 Document and Close

The problems are usually solved by issuing an official technical document
from the change-making organization.
If the current checks found do not reduce the risk to appropriate standards
or where there is consensus that further checks are needed in order to
accomplish the job safely, further checks should then be incorporated into
the evaluation. Additional checks cannot be applied without the mission
priorities being taken into account. This will also be a delicate balancing
act, so returning to the project can often help to keep risk management in
mind.

 Reevaluate the Risk

Once therapy is necessary, it is important to reassess the risk in order not
to add any additional risks. For example, if a decision were taken to fly a
different form of door aircraft, there will have been a new chance of items
falling out of the plane. This should be considered as a new vulnerability
and an appropriate diagnosis or solution if there is a potential door issue.
The above example shows the criticality of continuous risk analysis.

Further steps and evaluation are required where risk is already deemed
intolerable or whether the function will benefit from further risk
management.

Ultimately, the appraisal and analysis process continues until one of the
two consequences is reached, the task risk remains too high and then the
assignment is denied or input from senior departmental management is
required, the assignment risk is lowered to the acceptable level, and the
work profile and risk assessment is accepted.

 Submitting for Approval

The planner/worker individual shall send the final job profile and risk
assessment to the Director of Operations for approval. The document is
then forwarded to the Emergency Management Unit to be placed on the
Internet to be easily available to aircraft planning and operations personnel.

This describes step by step, or in detail, how risks assessment and safety
assessment is initiated and processed in aviation. The initial assessment
and major assessment are divided into two different aspects. It describes
how to detect and process an event. If an event is not too serious, use
basic process to eliminate the threat. But if the event is complicated, a
major risk and safety assessment is considered and implemented. In the
next chapter, we will discuss about the methods or tools required to carry
out these assessment.

 Methods/tools that are used in the safety and

risk assessment process
Any analysis is as valid as its conclusions, data, and analytical techniques.
Therefore, the underlying assumptions, data, and analytical techniques
should be identified and justified to ensure validity of analysis conclusions.
Variability can be inherent in elements such as failure modes, failure
results, failure levels, failure probability distribution functions, failure
exposure times, failure detection techniques, failure independence, human
interfaces (e.g., crew behavior and procedures), and limitation of analytical
approaches, processes, and assumptions. The rationale of the conclusions
on the above things should be an important part of the analysis.

Assumptions can be checked using experience with identical or similar

systems or components with due allowance for design, duty cycle, and
climate variations. Where the adequacy of the analysis cannot be entirely
explained and where evidence or conclusions are crucial to the
conclusion’s acceptability, extra conservatism should be incorporated into
either the research or intervention. Additionally, all data and conclusions
ambiguity should be analyzed to the degree required to show that the
research results are indifferent to this ambiguity. Any assumptions and
other uncertainties related to a safety analysis must be identified and
documented in order to judge their effect on the conclusions of such an
analysis and to conduct sensitivity analysis. Ongoing field experience
should be tracked to continue validating conclusions and reducing risks, or
to collect the data required to minimize the effects of the extra
conservatism built into the initial study. Finding any flaws in the
assumptions requires reviewing the safety analysis.
However, the need to calibrate the safety analysis with past experience
helps ensure that the future forecast is realistic, ensuring that operational
parameters (deadlines, etc.) remain constant. If the analysis does not
calibrate, further evaluation is required to determine which safety analysis
assumptions may be in error. The safety analysis will not predict accurately
unless it can calibrate to actual experience.

Appendix A